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Transforming Cities: Urbanization and International Development in Africa and Latin America since 1945

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Transforming Cities: Urbanization and International Development in Africa and Latin America since 1945

Ed. by Marc Frey, Sönke Kunkel,
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Editorial

Global history has achieved its impressive progress not least by suggesting intellectual entanglements between previously little connected fields of research. The present issue is a further example of this successful strategy. The editors have succeeded in bringing together specialists in the history of development with the young field of global urban history and putting them into a fruitful dialogue. The history of development has a long tradition, but it has often been concerned with the involvement of international organizations, national frameworks, or the imperial constellations of metropolis and (former) colony.

It is by no means a new insight that urbanization is not only a sign of "development" but also poses enormous challenges to exactly this development. With an accuracy that is impressive at first glance, statisticians announced some years ago that the time had come when more people would live in cities than in the countryside. This statement was visualized with two intersecting trend lines, so that everyone can see that this tendency will linearly expand into the future – reversal is out of the question. But what does it mean to live in a city? Do seemingly unambiguous conventions calculate that every community of more than 2000 inhabitants should be called a city (as the French administration assumes) or that one should orientate oneself by historically grown city law (as in the German case)? Obviously not, because the cities of the Global South, be they of megalomaniacal proportions or just average greetings, obviously do not follow such criteria from European historical tradition. They do not grow restricted by planning law and cadastre, but rather proliferate into a surrounding area that is difficult to delimit; people change, whatever the above-mentioned statistics suggest about their stationary way of life, back and forth between city and countryside, sometimes daily, sometimes seasonally. Urban infrastructures can hardly keep up with such fluidity, quite apart from the fact that they often have colonial origins and were designed to make life easier for

colonial elites and their successors after independence rather than to satisfy the needs of the indigenous poor and subaltern.

This issue draws attention to the fact that these processes have long been the subject of a community interested and active in development policy, and that a look in the historical rear-view mirror can help to raise awareness again of the diversity of attempts to understand, work on and solve the problem of urban development in the Global South before embarking on the next initiative. Historians are not among the main actors on the development policy scene, which is dominated by practitioners trained in the social sciences, but they can contribute important insights on historical agency and the contextualization of the emergence and transformations of mega-cities, as the historiographical overview that the editors of this issue precede the contributions shows. Two aspects in particular are brought to the fore: the first concerns a series of problems related to the accommodation of such large numbers of people in extremely limited space, ranging from colonial segregation to social housing and the persistence of huge slums as the hallmark of modern cities in the Global South. Connected to the housing issue is the attention to the explosive social situation and the potential of political upheavals that lie in this concentration of people. Accordingly, a long tradition of planning fantasies can be traced, which were not only aimed at alleviating problems of the ever-growing cities in Asia, Latin America and Africa and avoiding their destabilizing effect for individual societies and the two opposite camps during the Cold War, but also at identifying lessons for urban planning in Europe and North America.

This "transnational turn" in the history of urban planning is about to replace an all too flat Eurocentrism, the failure of which can be observed by every visitor who approaches the former colonial cities from the outside towards the centre. As a result, we now have at our disposal a larger number of studies that address the cities in the Global South and no longer take it for granted that solutions from the North will be realized in the South with a certain time lag, but that the cities between Sao Paulo and Maputo are independent socio-political equations and laboratories of original social and political movements. This provides a noteworthy analysis and a rich source of illustrative material, which challenges those development policies that formulate their "offers of help" without taking social realities sufficiently into account.

If we can currently observe a growing attention to strategies of resilience, which process the experiences of the Covid-19 pandemic as well as the rapidly growing importance of the climate crisis for any societal strategy and the intensification of the attempts to decouple the USA and China, then it is appropriate to look at the mega-cities of the Global South, which, due to their long-lasting resource weakness, have for many decades had to pay much more attention to their vulnerability (and especially that of their socially weakest). The present issue is an invitation to familiarize oneself with the state of the art of research in an area whose significance is growing not only for Mexico City and Shanghai, but also for Paris with its banlieues in France or Saint Louis in the USA.

<div align="right">Matthias Middell / Katja Castryck-Naumann</div>

Introduction: Transforming Cities: Urbanization and International Development in Africa and Latin America since 1945

Marc Frey / Sönke Kunkel / Nancy Kwak

ABSTRACTS

Forschungen zur Stadtgeschichte und zur Geschichte der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit sind bisher selten miteinander in Verbindung gebracht worden. Welche analytischen Perspektiven aber eröffnen sich an der Schnittstelle dieser beiden Forschungsfelder? Ausgehend von einer Zusammenschau neuerer Forschungen benennt die Einleitung Anliegen und Forschungsfragen dieses special issue und führt in die einzelnen Beiträge ein. Der Blick auf die Geschichte urbaner Entwicklungspolitik, so wird argumentiert, ermöglicht nicht allein ein besseres Verständnis der Kategorie „Raum" als Zielobjekt und Handlungskontext von Entwicklungspolitik. Sie eröffnet auch neue Einblicke in die Rolle transnationaler Akteure wie Architekten und Stadtplaner. Nicht zuletzt zeigt die Geschichte urbaner Entwicklungspolitik, wie Entwicklung zum big business wurde.

This introduction makes a case for a more forceful dialogue between historians of development and global urban historians. Global processes of urbanization, it argues, have long been an important concern for development actors, but historians have only recently begun to explore the meaning and role of urban spaces within international development. The article suggests that a look at the history of urban development policies provides a better understanding of space as an object and context of development. It also claims that a new research focus fosters new insight into the transnational agency of architects and city planners. Last, it sheds new light on the ways in which development became big business in the post-1945 world.

This special issue brings together two highly dynamic fields of historical research: the history of development and global urban history. Global urban history examines the global connections of cities as well as the intersections between globalization and the transnational circulation of ideas and actors, and as such increasingly overlaps with the history of global development. However, global urban historians have only very recently begun to connect their stories to the history of international development. Historians of global development, on the other hand, typically address the historical ideas, motivations, aims, and interests of political actors and institutions, but they only rarely focus on the actual spaces of development policies and their local ramifications.[1]

Urban spaces have for a long time been an important focus for international development institutions, not least because of the centrality of urbanization in many regions of the world. In Asia, Africa, and Latin America, many cities underwent dramatic transformations in the decades between the 1920s and 1990s. Rural poverty, the modernization of agriculture, land grabbing, civil wars and violent conflicts in the countryside, but also urban industrialization and the hope for work and better living standards in the 'modern city' set millions of people on the move from hinterlands to urban areas, making rapid population growth a shared experience of many places across the colonial and postcolonial world. Historical census data and estimates often reveal spectacular growth numbers. In Mexico City, an area with roughly one million residents in 1920, surveys registered a population of 3 million some thirty years later and counted already 5 million by 1960. By 1980, it was one of the world's largest cities, with a population of more than ten million city dwellers.[2] African cities, too, more than doubled their urban population between the 1920s and 1950s, a process that carried on and accelerated after decolonization and independence.[3] By 2018, all of the world's ten biggest megacities were located in Latin America, Africa, and Asia, including Mumbai, Mexico City, São Paulo, Cairo, and Dhaka.[4]

A historical perspective shows that colonial governments began to address the immense social, economic, and infrastructural challenges involved with urbanization already in the 1930s, if on a limited scale.[5] By the 1950s, international organizations, under the

1   See most recently on the history of development: C. Unger, International Development: A Postwar History, London 2018; S. Macekura and E. Manela (eds.), The Development Century: A Global History, Cambridge 2018. See also the review articles by J. Hodge, Writing the History of Development. Part 1: The First Wave, and Part 2: Longer, Deeper, Wider, along with the roundtable discussion in: Humanity (2016), http://humanityjournal.org/joseph-hodge-roundtable/ (accessed April 20, 2020).
2   See Sabrina Kirschner's contribution to this issue.
3   See United Nations, World Urbanization Prospects 2018, under https://population.un.org/wup/Publications/Files/WUP2018-Highlights.pdf (accessed April 28, 2020). See also the contribution by Tobias Wolffhardt in this issue and A. Eckert, Lagos im 20. Jahrhundert: Informalität als urbanes Prinzip, in: W. Schwentker (ed.), Megastädte im 20. Jahrhundert, Göttingen 2006, pp. 238–256.
4   Schwentker, Die Megastadt als Problem der Geschichte, in: Schwentker (ed.) Megastädte, pp. 7–26, list on pg. 9.
5   See R. Harris and S. Parnell, The Turning Point in Urban Policy for British Colonial Africa, 1939–1945, in: F. Demissie (ed.), Colonial Architecture and Urbanism in Africa: Intertwined and Contested Histories, Farnham 2012, pp. 127–151; F. Colombijn and Joost Ctoé, Modernization of the Indonesian City, 1920–1960, in: F. Colombijn and J. Coté (eds.), Cars, Conduits, and Kampongs: The Modernization of the Indonesian City, 1920–1960, Leiden 2015, pp. 6f.

leadership of the United Nations' Department of Housing, Building and Planning, too, began to enter the field, mainly through sponsoring studies, international conferences, and expert missions. Funding for ambitious new housing schemes, for instance in Islamabad, Rio de Janeiro, Buenos Aires, Dakar, or Singapore, however, also increasingly came from aid donors such as the United States, and, since the late 1960s, the World Bank. Both were joined by a multitude of housing experts, architects, and international planning consultants like Alexandros Doxiadis, Otto Koenigsberger, Charles Abrams, Le Corbusier, or John Turner, who charted urban master plans for postcolonial governments, formulated blueprints for new policies, and thus contributed to making cities a new playing field of international development initiatives.

Histories of development have paid little attention to the multiple historical trajectories and experiences with urban development so far. This special issue therefore seeks to centre attention on the overlaps between urbanization and international development in the twentieth-century world. Contributions assembled in this special issue ask how exactly and why global processes of urbanization became a concern of the development community, what ideas about urbanization they formulated, and which concepts and solutions they promoted in response to the social, political, and environmental challenges of urbanization in Africa and Latin America. The issue also seeks to understand how urban development policies in Africa and Latin America linked up with transnational urban movements such as the "Urban International"[6] (Pierre-Yves Saunier) and how international urban interventions contributed to maintaining political orders or building new nations. In addition, it is one of the goals of this issue to bring in new transnational actors to the international history of the later twentieth century: scientists and engineers, city planners and architects, mayors and private businesses. Collectively and individually, the articles assembled here therewith seek to sketch out first insights into the intertwined growth of cities and international development.

Research on such legacies has long taken place outside and beyond the discipline of history. Practitioners in fields such as social science, geography, city planning, architecture or urban anthropology often foregrounded the process of urbanization as such, compiling data on city growth, modelling the features of the emerging 'third world Mega-City' and inquiring into its functional primacy.[7] Others inquired into the patterns and reasons behind rural-urban migrations or they addressed issues like the housing crisis and the emergence of the informal sector.[8] Many of those works included short history sections,

6   P. Saunier, Sketches from the Urban Internationale, 1910–50: Voluntary Associations, International Institutions and US Philanthropic Foundations, in: International Journal of Urban & Regional Research 25 (2001), pp. 380–403.

7   See for example R. Potter, Urbanisation in the Third World, Oxford 1992; P. Feldbauer et. al. (eds.), Mega-Cities: Die Metropolen des Südens zwischen Globalisierung und Fragmentierung, Frankfurt 1997; D. Bronger, Metropolen, Megastädte, Global Cities: Die Metropolisierung der Erde, Darmstadt 2004.

8   Examples are R. Potter (ed.), Cities and Development in the Third World, London 1990; A. Gilbert (ed.), The Mega-City in Latin America, Tokyo 1996; A. Gilbert / J. Gugler (eds.), Cities, Poverty, and Development: Urbanization in the Third World, Oxford 1997; C. Rakodi (ed.), The Urban Challenge in Africa: Growth and Management of its Large Cities, Tokyo 1997.

but those were often sketchy at best and typically privileged process and structure over historical agency and context.

Urban historians and historians of development, in contrast, were slow to link their work to the history of international development. One of the first historians to do so, Mike Davis, in his *Planet of Slums* described the historical making of mass poverty in the megacities of the 'global South' and addressed urban interventions by the World Bank and the United Nations as well as the role of influential experts like John Turner.[9] Early works by Leandro Benmergui and Mark Kehren, meanwhile, addressed the urban policy dimensions of the 1960s *Alliance for Progress* by exploring its programmes on housing and urban renewal.[10] More recently, pioneering works also came from historians like Markus Daechsel whose study of the planning and making of postcolonial Islamabad stands out as one of the finest examples of current history-writing on urban development.[11] Much in a similar vein, Nancy Kwak's *A World of Homeowners*, charted new terrain by exploring homeownership campaigns in the United States, Puerto Rico, Dakar, and Singapore, arguing that "Americans pursued homeownership for all first as a Cold War strategy to control radical elements in geopolitically critical regions of the world, and then as a way to install capitalist institutions like savings and loans and as a stimulant for American overseas investments."[12]

Colonial urban historians also continue to provide insights that intersect in new ways with this growing literature. By virtue of their research interests in colonial experiences, transfers, and models of social organization, colonial historians have long focused on city planning, colonial architecture, residential segregation, race relations, and differing spheres of power and privilege.[13] Newer works by Richard Harris, Tim Livsey, or Michael Sugarman build on such traditions, but extend the focus to aspects like mass poverty, social housing, and 'modern' building.[14] Histories of urban planning and renewal, too, have shifted their interest since the publication of Peter Hall's groundbreaking study

9   M. Davis, Planet of Slums, London 2006.

10   L. Benmergui, The Alliance for Progress and Housing Policy in Rio de Janeiro and Buenos Aires in the 1960s, in: Urban History 36 (2009), pp. 303–326; M. Kehren, Tunnel Vision: Urban Renewal in Rio de Janeiro, 1960–1975, Diss. University of Maryland 2006.

11   M. Daechsel, Islamabad and the Politics of International Development in Pakistan, Cambridge 2015.

12   N. Kwak, A World of Homeowners: American Power and the Politics of Housing Aid, Chicago 2015, 234 f.

13   Some of the classic studies on colonial urban history are: A. King, Colonial Urban Development: Culture, Social Power, and Environment, London 1976; R. Betts / R. Ross / G. Telkamp (eds.), Colonial Cities: Essays on Urbanism in a Colonial Context, Dordrecht 1985; G. Wright, The Politics of Design in French Colonial Urbanism, Chicago 1991; B. Yeoh, Contesting Space in Colonial Singapore: Power Relations and the Urban Environment, Singapore 2003; R. Home, Of Planting and Planning: The Making of British Colonial Cities, London 1997; H. Gründer / P. Johanek (eds.), Kolonialstädte – europäische Enklaven oder Schmelztiegel der Kulturen? Münster 2001. See also L. Bigon, A History of Urban Planning in Two West African Colonial Capitals: Residential Segregation in British Lagos and French Dakar (1850–1930), Lewiston 2009; M. Fuller, Moderns Abroad: Architecture, Cities, and Italian Imperialism, London 2010.

14   See R. Harris / S. Parnell, Turning Point in Urban Policy; R. Harris, Housing Policy for the Colonial City: The British and Dutch Experience Compared, in: Urban Geography 30 (2009), pp. 1–23; R. Harris / A. Hay, New Plans for Housing in Urban Kenya, 1939–1963, in: Planning Perspectives 22 (2007), pp. 195–223; M. Sugarman, Reclaiming Rangoon: (Post-)Imperial Urbanism and Poverty, 1920–1962, in: Modern Asian Studies, 52 (2018), pp. 1–32; T. Livsey, Suitable Lodgings for Students': Modern Space, Colonial Development and Decolonization in Nigeria, in:

on the *Cities of Tomorrow*.[15] A new handbook of planning history, edited by Carola Hein, now devotes more space to global histories of planning.[16] Sue Parnell and Sophie Oldfield's edited handbook on cities of the global south continues to offer fresh insights for scholars of both the north and south.[17] Research by Andreas Hofer on Karl Brunner's influence in Latin America, or, more recently, by Helen Gyger on John Turner, too, has done much to illuminate the transnational agency and influence of experts and city planners since the 1920s.[18] Marcio Siwi, David Lee, Tobias Wolffhardt, Tracy Neumann or Tamar Elshayal follow similar lines in their research on São Paulo, Manaus, and the urban development policies of international organizations, INGOs, and corporate actors.[19] Much of the emerging scholarship on urban development policies falls in line with a general reorientation of urban history. Connecting their work to the broader currents of transnational and global history, urban historians in Europe and North America no longer take the European or American city as their natural point of reference, but inquire into connections, flows, and interlinkages between cities across continents and regions. Research on transnational networks of architects and planners, long a matter of transatlantic history, now increasingly targets the ways in which networks such as the Congrès Internationaux d'Architecture Moderne (CIAM) extended into regions like Latin America.[20] Other networks and regions, too, are moving more and more into focus.[21] As a recent volume on "The Transnational Turn in Urban History" argues, the writing

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Urban History 41 (2014), pp. 664–685. See also T. Livsey, Nigeria's University Age: Reframing Decolonisation and Development, London 2017.

15 P. Hall, Cities of Tomorrow: An Intellectual History of Urban Planning and Design in the Twentieth Century, Malden 2003.

16 C. Hein (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Planning History, London 2017. See also C. Hein, Crossing Boundaries: The Global Exchange of Planning Ideas, in: A. K. Sandoval-Strausz / N. Kwak (eds.), Making Cities Global: The Transnational Turn in Urban History, Pittsburgh 2018, pp. 114–132. See also the issues in Routledge's series on Planning, History and Environment.

17 S. Parnell / S. Oldfield (eds.), The Routledge Handbook on Cities of the Global South, London 2014.

18 A. Hofer, Karl Brunner und der europäische Städtebau in Lateinamerika, Wien 2010; H. Gyger, The Informal as a Project: Self-Help Housing in Peru, 1954–1986, Diss. Columbia University 2013.

19 M. Siwi, Making the Modern and Cultured City: Art, Architecture, and Urbanism in Postwar São Paulo, 1945–1968, Diss. New York University 2017; D. Lee, De-Centring Manaus: Post-Earthquake Reconstruction and Revolution in Nicaragua, in: Urban History 42 (2015), pp. 663–685; T. Wolffhardt, Vom Wiederaufbau zur urbanen Entwicklungspolitik. Die Vereinten Nationen, transnationale Netzwerke und das Problem der Urbanisierung, ca. 1945–1966, in: Historische Zeitschrift 309 (2019), pp. 337–376. Tracy Neumann's current project addresses „The Urban International: Design and Development from the Marshall Plan to Microfinance" (see more under: http://tracyneumann.org/the-urban-international/); Tamar Elshayal, a PhD student at Harvard University explores the broader history of UN-HABITAT (see http://urbantheorylab.net/people/tamer-elshayal/). See on the World Bank for example E. Ramsamy, The World Bank and Urban Development: From Projects to Policy, London 2006.

20 See for example the contribution by Amanda Waterhouse in this special issue as well as A. Almandoz, Urbanization and Urbanism in Latin America: From Haussmann to CIAM, in: A. Almandoz (ed.), Planning Latin America's Capital Cities, 1850–1950, London 2009, pp. 13–44. See also A. Novick, La Ciudad, El Urbanismo Y Los Intercambios Internacionales: Notas Para La Discusión, in: Revista Iberoamericana De Urbanismo 01 (2009), https://www.raco.cat/index.php/RIURB/article/view/267879 (accessed April 29, 2020).

21 See for example Philipp Wagner's study of the International Federation for Housing and Town Planning: P. Wagner, Stadtplanung für die Welt? Internationales Expertenwissen 1900–1960, Göttingen 2016. See on intermunicipal connections in Asia for example P. Saunier / S. Ewen (eds.), Another Global City: Historical Explorations into the Transnational Municipal Moment, 1850–2000, New York 2008.

of urban history not only involves "provincializing the United States by contextualizing its metropolitan areas within (…) global processes of urbanization and suburbanization" – it also "necessarily means looking at different geographies and chronologies" of urbanization "in East Asia, South Asia, and the Americas."[22] Similar views are being voiced under the newer rubric of global urban history.[23] Following the lead of Carl Nightingale, Michael Goebel, and others involved in the Global Urban History Project, global urban historians examine how practices and models of social urban organization and control travelled around the world, they compare experiences and urban processes between cities inside and outside of Europe, they address the importance of cities for the formation of global political movements, and they inquire into the transformations of port cities into the hubs and nodal points of global trade lines.[24] More important, they shift attention away from places like Berlin or New York to bring in the stories of individual cities in Latin America, Africa or Asia.[25] Newer works like David Morton's "Age of Concrete" offer much needed insight here by addressing the ways in which 'modern' building technologies like concrete transformed social life-worlds and aspirations in a city like Maputo, Mozambique.[26]

The essays assembled in this special issue build on those conversations by adding new nuance and insight to a number of pertinent issues, including the role of transnational experts, knowledge, and networks, the travels of planning concepts, and the importance of colonial legacies. They also open a number of new lines of inquiry, particularly for historians of development. For example, they show that physical space and the built environment mattered in the history of development. Changing the built environment of cities contributed in very practical ways to improving local living conditions; all the while, reorganizing urban space was also central to maintaining social order and political control. Bringing in space as an analytical category points our attention to new dimensions such as housing, infrastructure, resources, and urban management. It sheds new light on the concrete social and spatial contexts in which ideas and strategies of development played out. And it demonstrates the importance of a research perspective that shifts focus away

22 A. K. Sandoval-Strausz / N. Kwak, Introduction: Why Transnationalize Urban History? in: Sandoval-Strausz / Kwak (eds.), Making Cities Global, pp. 1–16, quotes on pg. 8 and 7.

23 See the Global Urban History Blog for reviews and discussions of new works: https://globalurbanhistory.com/.

24 See C. Nightingale, Segregation: A Global History of Divided Cities, Chicago 2012; M. Goebel, Anti-Imperial Metropolis: Interwar Paris and the Seeds of Third World Nationalism, Cambridge 2015; J. B. Prestel, Emotional Cities: Debates on Urban Change in Berlin and Cairo, 1860–1910, Oxford 2017. See on the newer literature on port cities the review by L. Heerten, Ankerpunkte der Verflechtung: Hafenstädte in der neueren Globalgeschichtsschreibung, in: Geschichte und Gesellschaft 43 (2017), pp. 146–175.

25 See for a useful overview F. Miraftab / N. Kudva (eds.), Cities of the Global South Reader, London 2015. Other good examples for this shift are: S. R. Sanchez, Ruralizing Urbanization: Credit, Housing and Modernization in Colombia, 1920–1948, Diss. Cornell University 2015; J. Brennan / A. Burton / Y. Lawi (eds.), Dar es Salaam: Histories from an Emerging African Metropolis, Dar es Salaam 2007; B. Freund, The African City: A History, Cambridge 2007; S. Salm and T. Falola, African Urban Spaces in Historical Perspective, Woodbridge 2005.

26 D. Morton, Age of Concrete: Housing and the Shape of Aspiration in the Capital of Mozambique, Athens, OH, 2019.

from armchair strategists in Washington, New York, London, Paris or Bonn to those individuals and institutions that made development happen on the ground.

Another theme that comes through in the essays is that urban development, just like development in general, was also big business: In Africa, construction firms like West German Julius Berger drew large profits from constructing urban expressways, roads, waterworks, and bridges. In Latin America, meanwhile, European and U.S. companies often found new business opportunities in developing urban metro systems. Development historians have done little work on the commercial aspects of development so far, but, as some of the essays suggest, may find urban development a productive object of inquiry here. Historians of capitalism also have much to discover in this collection, for it was precisely these networks of investment and profit that fueled an expansive form of twentieth-century economic interdependence and hierarchy.

Third, the special issue suggests that histories of urban development offer a fruitful perspective for international historians. Cities across Asia, Africa, and Latin America were drawn into global frameworks not only by way of trade or new mobilities. Given their chronic lack of resources, they also increasingly integrated into the evolving global governance structures of development institutions since the 1940s. For a metropole like Mexico City, funding by the Pan-American Health Organization or the United Nations Development Programme was key to being able to address the environmental problems of urbanization. In other places, urban administrations turned to international institutions like UNESCO, the World Bank, regional development banks, or organizations like the Rockefeller and Ford Foundations to promote urban disaster protection and resilience, or more recently, to mitigate the impacts of climate change.[27] Addressing the urban histories of international development offers international historians alternative opportunities to generate similar and other new themes, questions, and research perspectives.

Comparing experiences of urbanization and development in Africa and Latin America, the essays contributing to this theme issue are structured along geographical lines. Leading off the special issue, Tobias Wolffhardt introduces us to UN urban development initiatives in Sub-Saharan Africa between 1955 and 1965. UN experts, he shows, provided much sought-after urban expertise to newly independent nations, but could hardly ignore the colonial heritage of African cities, spanning from a lack of public housing through an inadequate building materials industry to growing shanty towns to a shortage of data, statistics, and qualified personnel. While, given those circumstances, UN housing programmes had little impact on the ground, they sparked much debate about the trajectories of Africa's urban futures and about the tools of how to get there: some UN experts favored industrialized building, others preferred self-help approaches or "community development", many saw urbanization as an engine of modernization and staked their hopes on housing policies as a way to introduce Africans to "modern" living. Either

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27   See S. Kunkel, No Easy Solutions: Global Cities, Natural Disasters, Development, and the Origins of Resilience Thinking, 1960s to 1990s, in: D. Brantz / A. Sharma (eds.), Urban Resilience: Actors, Scales, Goals, to be published 2020 with Transcript.

way, what we see in those debates are not only first efforts to make sense of the meanings of African urbanization. Through them, we also see how the urban gradually moved into the orbit of development institutions like the United Nations.

Newer international histories of postcolonial African development often distinguish between Western or Socialist ideas and practices of aid, typically treating either one of them as a separate strand.[28] The study of urban development policies, in contrast, suggests that postcolonial environments often also provided fertile ground for surprising overlaps and collaborations, as Anne Fenk's, Rachel Lee's, and Monika Motylinska's analysis of the planning of Abuja shows. Following East German architect Heinz Schwarzbach's involvement in the planning of Nigeria's new capital, their article opens a fascinating window on an international project that integrated architects and experts from the UK, the United States, East Germany, and Japan, engineers from Poland, workers from Vietnam, the Philippines, and India as well as a West German construction company along with local staff and officials. The international character of the project made Abuja the site for the negotiation of national planning approaches and principles, but it also offered new business opportunities that the East German state and West German companies were keen to cash in on.

Bernardo Pinto da Cruz's contribution addresses urban planning ideas in the Portuguese empire. Situating those in the context of colonial warfare and counterinsurgency, his study points particularly to the importance of the concept of the "neighborhood unit". Appropriated since the 1940s by Portuguese architects and planners, the concept underwrote colonial ideas of spatial concentration and resettlement of scattered native populations into controllable units within and along the suburban periphery of Luanda. As such, it corresponded and overlapped with the military's villagization policy, but also informed new urban interventions in the low-income areas at the outskirts of Luanda. The essay shows that those urban reform projects, staged since the early 1960s, linked social engineering with socio-ethnic zoning and new techniques of police surveillance to fend off subversion and get control of population mobility. This way, it raises important questions about the darker legacies of urban planning in the twentieth century, namely its links to colonial violence, repression, and practices of social control.

Moving the focus to Latin America, Amanda Waterhouse's contribution, too, explores connections between urban planning and the state's quest for social control. Her subject is the set of new master plans which international star architects Josep Lluis Sert, Paul Lester Wiener, and Le Corbusier worked out for Bogotá in response to the 1948 *Bogotazo*. Theirs, too, is a tale of close alignments between planners and the interests of the state in which governments offered contracts and architects offered new concepts of order. Plans envisioned a web of new roads, walkways, parks, buildings, and shopping

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28   See for example, most recently, the chapters in S. Lorenzini, Global Development: A Cold War History, Princeton 2019 or the works by A. K. Mc Vety, Enlightened Aid: U.S. Development as Foreign Policy in Ethiopia, New York 2012 and J. Monson, Africa's Freedom Railway: How a Chinese Development Project Changed Lives and Livelihoods in Tanzania, Bloomington, IN, 2009.

promenades that intended to create content citizens, but, as a side effect, also served to forestall the dangers of public revolt. Those plans, however, were never realized, as they ran into the opposition of the mayor, real estate businesses, land developers, and the president. By shedding light on those local frictions and struggles, Amanda Waterhouse's essay underlines a central point about urban development: In practice, it was seldom a set programmes of transformative ideas that was transferred from West to South, but a negotiated project that involved a multitude of local stakeholders and interest groups. The ensuing compromises not only integrated hybrids of alternative urban visions – they also created a relative openness of urban development that allowed local actors considerable rooms of manoeuvre.

The agency and importance of local urban actors and experiences is also an important theme in Emilio de Antuñano's contribution that uses the example of Mexico City's *colonias proletarias* to explore shifting understandings of urban poverty and Mexico City's long transition towards new housing policies. Like many other large cities in Latin America and Africa, Mexico City saw the formation of slums and low-income housing areas at the urban fringes since the turn of the century. While early surveys and theories typically described those in terms of an urban pathology of overcrowding, crisis, and decay, views on *colonias proletarias* over time started to take on a more positive and progressivist meaning. By the 1940s, local urban development actors increasingly saw those *colonias* not as the problem, but increasingly promoted them as the solution to Mexico City's rapid population growth by offering settlers new urban services, building manuals for cheap and efficient building, counseling services, subsidies for building materials and new lines of credit assistance. In dialogue with Tobias Wolffhardt's contribution on Africa, Emilio de Antuñano shows here how Mexico City became part of a shared transnational moment in which international experts and organizations began to rethink the meanings of squatter settlements.

Andra Chastain's essay explores another important aspect of Latin American urbanization: the remaking of urban infrastructures. Covering Latin America's metro boom of the 1960s to 1980s, the article points to the importance of local political interests, new infrastructure ideas, and the particular symbolism of metros as a model of a new modern urbanism. At the same time it shows that metro building was also a transnational business. In doing so, Andra Chastain draws our attention particularly to French company SOFRETU (*Société française d'études et de réalisations de transports urbains)*, the French Company for the Design and Construction of Urban Transport, an affiliate of the Paris transit authority. The company provided consulting, equipment, French metro technology, and engineering expertise to Latin American cities. More important, its activities were backed up by massive French loans that enabled ambitious building projects in the first place. Following Clément Orillard, Andra Chastain sees French funding as a form of "geopolitical urbanism" that used urban development projects to build new influence and reputation in Latin America.

The rapid growth of Latin American cities not only fueled new forms of urban poverty and infrastructure between the 1940s and 1980s, however. It also came with environ-

mental costs and problems that ranged from urban industrial river pollution to the question of water infrastructures to issues like air pollution. Environmental historians like John McNeill have therefore long pointed to the need of studies that address those environmental dimensions of global urbanization.[29] In her contribution, Sabrina Kirschner does just that. Tracking the story of Mexico City's involvement in the REDPANAIRE, one of the first transnational air quality monitoring networks for Latin American cities, she shows how local industrial disasters, press reports, and international policy initiatives by the WHO and the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) coalesced into first environmental surveillance measures already by the mid-1960s, and thus long before the much-hailed 1972 UN Conference on the Human Environment, often taken as the turning point of international environmentalism. The REDPANAIRE linked local researchers with national authorities and international organizations, generated the first basic data and new environmental knowledge about health threats and environmental relationships, framed the introduction of new national environmental legislation in the early 1970s, and overall helped to build awareness for the problem of urban air pollution, as the article underlines. Therewith it also marked one of the first transnational efforts to understand the scale and magnitude of urban air pollution in the emerging metropoles of Latin America, even though there was little actual improvement on the ground.

Global processes of urbanization, the essays assembled in this special issue underline, fundamentally changed the living conditions and social life-worlds of millions of people, turned cities into new showcases of global inequalities, and mobilized a wide network of international organizations, architects, scientists, city administrations, and companies to address the immense social, economic, environmental, and infrastructural challenges coming with those processes. The historical research presented here invites for a critical reflection of the ideas and policies those networks promoted, but, we hope, may also provide a starting point for histories of development that take urban space serious as a category and context of analysis.

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29   See J. McNeill, Future Research Needs in Environmental History, Regions, Eras, and Themes, in: K. Coulter and C. Mauch (eds.), The Future of Environmental History: Needs and Opportunities, Rachel Carson Center Perspectives 2 (2011), pp. 13–15, quote on pg. 14.

Transforming African Cities: United Nations Technical Assistance, Urban Development, and Modernization in a Decade of Decolonization, c. 1955–1965

Tobias Wolffhardt

ABSTRACTS

Experten der Vereinten Nationen spielten in den späten 1950er und frühen 1960er Jahren eine bedeutende Rolle bei der Formulierung urbaner Entwicklungspolitiken für das subsaharische Afrika. Obwohl der Prozess der rasanten Urbanisierung hier bereits in den 1920er Jahren begonnen hatte, waren die damit verbundenen Probleme von den kolonialen Regimes lange Zeit vernachlässigt worden, so dass die Regierungen der neuen unabhängigen Nationen mit einer Reihe von strukturellen Problemen konfrontiert waren, zu denen beispielsweise das Fehlen einer effizienten Bauindustrie, Mangel an ausgebildetem Fachpersonal oder die weitgehende Nichtexistenz von Daten und Statistiken zählte. Vor diesem Hintergrund entspann sich ein Diskurs über Strategien zur Lösung der Herausforderungen, die weit über pragmatische Ansätze hinaus auch grundsätzlichere Fragen über die Zusammenhänge zwischen Urbanisierung, Modernisierung und Entwicklung im subsaharischen Afrika beinhaltete.

United Nations experts played an important role in formulating policies of urban development in Sub-Saharan Africa during the late 1950s and early 1960s. Even though the process of rapid urbanization in the region had begun in the 1920s, colonial regimes had been slow to react to this challenge. Thus, governments of the newly independent countries were confronted with a number of structural problems, among them the lack of an efficient building materials industry and qualified personnel or the virtual non-existence of data and statistics. In this context, a discourse on strategies to cope with the challenge developed that went far beyond pragmatic approaches and involved more general questions about the interrelationship of urbanization, modernization and development in Sub-Saharan Africa.

The two decades after the end of the Second World War saw the emergence of a newly globalized "Urban International".[1] Undoubtedly, questions of housing and urban planning had been discussed in a transnational setting for much of the twentieth century, and architects and urbanists exchanged expertise both through private networks and the structures provided by influential organizations such as the International Federation for Town and Country Planning.[2] But, despite some interest in the colonies and apart from a few exceptional conferences where colonial urban problems were discussed,[3] the inter-war Urban International had been mainly transatlantic in scope, focusing on urban policies in Europe and America.[4] It was only in the post-war decades, when the dimension of rapid urbanization in the Global South became visible and the processes of decolonization led to new challenges, that its perspectives became truly global.

As I have argued elsewhere,[5] the United Nations played a leading role in this process. Given the new organizations' commitment to international social and economic cooperation in its charter,[6] it became involved in questions of housing and planning in the immediate post-war years when reconstruction in Europe and Asia seemed one of the most pressing problems. From the early 1950s however, under the influence of new members from the rapidly decolonizing Global South and the emerging discourse of "development", the focus changed to the specific problems posed by rapid urbanization in what were regarded the "less developed" parts of the world. Debates on these problems in the United Nations Economic and Social Council made them highly visible for an international audience, and it was indeed under the aegis of UN and UNESCO that the first international conferences on social and economic questions connected to urbanization in Africa, Asia, and Latin America were held during the late 1950s and early 1960s.[7]

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1   I borrow this term from P.-Y. Saunier, Sketches from the Urban Internationale, 1910–50: Voluntary Associations, International Institutions and US Philanthropic Foundations, in: International Journal of Urban & Regional Research 25 (2001) 2, pp. 380–403. This article builds on sources from the following archives: Architectural Association, London/Otto Koenigsberger Papers (AA/OK); Cornell University Library, Ithaca, NY/Charles Abrams Papers (CUL/CA); United Nations Archives, New York City (UNA).

2   For discussions see e.g. ibid.; P. Hall, Cities of Tomorrow. An Intellectual History of Urban Planning and Design in the Twentieth Century, Oxford 2014; A. Sutcliffe, Towards the Planned City. Germany, Britain, the United States, and France, 1780–1914 (Comparative Studies in Social and Economic History 3), Oxford 1981; D. T. Rodgers, Atlantic Crossings. Social Politics in a Progressive Age, Cambridge, MA 1998; P. Wagner, Stadtplanung für die Welt? Internationales Expertenwissen 1900–1960 (Kritische Studien zur Geschichtswissenschaft 220), Göttingen 2016; S. V. Ward, A Pioneer 'Global Intelligence Corps'? The Internationalisation of Planning Practice, 1890–1939, in: Town Planning Review 76 (2005) 2, pp. 119–141.

3   See e.g. P. Schäfer (ed.), Wohnungswesen in Tropischen und Subtropischen Ländern. XIV. Internationaler Wohnungs- und Städtebau-Kongress, Brussels 1938; J. Royer (ed.), L'urbanisme aux colonies et dans les pays tropicaux. Communications & rapports du congrès international d l'urbanisme aux colonies et dans les pays de latitude intertropicale. 2 vols, La Charité-sur-Loire and Paris 1932–1935.

4   Wagner, Stadtplanung für die Welt, pp. 140–142.

5   T. Wolffhardt, Vom Wiederaufbau zur urbanen Entwicklungspolitik. Die Vereinten Nationen, transnationale Netzwerke und das Problem der Urbanisierung, ca. 1945–1966, in: Historische Zeitschrift 309 (2019) 2, pp. 337–376.

6   UN Charta, Chapter IX, esp. articles 55 and 56. B Simma (ed.), The Charter of the United Nations. A Commentary (Oxford Commentaries on International Law). 2 vols, 3rd edn, Oxford 2012, vol. 2, pp. 1535–1610; for a programmatic assessment of the global role of the United Nations in the social field see S. Amrith and G. Sluga New Histories of the United Nations, in: Journal of World History 19 (2008) 3, pp. 251–274.

7   See P. M. Hauser (ed.), Urbanization in Asia and the Far East. Proceedings of the Joint UN/UNESCO Seminar

At the heart of UN activities stood the small Department of Housing, Building and Planning within the Secretariat in New York. From 1951 to 1966 it was headed by Ernest Weissmann, a Yugoslav former CIAM architect with a broad network of connections in architectural and urbanist circles.[8] Under his leadership, the department developed into what I want to call one of the "nodding points" of the globalizing Urban International. Its influence was not only guaranteed by working for UN bodies and publishing an international magazine on housing and planning, but above all through its activities within the United Nations' Program of Technical Assistance.[9] Through the 1950s and early 1960s, the department not only organized a series of transnational conferences, many of them on specific urban problems of the Global South, but also engaged in about 130 expert missions to the Global South, involving more than 280 experts from at least 43 countries.[10]

In this article, I will focus on the department's activities in Sub-Saharan Africa during the decade from around 1955 to 1965, the period in which most Sub-Saharan countries gained their independence. In doing so, I want firstly to provide insight into the role of the United Nations Technical Assistance Programme during the crucial years of constitutional decolonization. International Organizations tried to fill spaces left void by departing colonial administrations through international expertise. Secondly, I want to show that in the specific circumstances of decolonization the formulation of policies of urban development presented itself as a choice between different alternatives that were as much dependent on actual conditions as on general questions about the meaning of the urbanization process in Sub-Saharan Africa. I begin this paper with a short overview of the urban situation at the time of decolonization. The second section is devoted to the emergence of the UN Programme of Technical Assistance in the years of independences, while the third discusses alternative approaches to the housing problem proposed in the early 1960s. The final part of the article will be concerned with the question of how policies of urban development were tied to larger ideas about Sub-Saharan societies and the relationship between urbanization and modernization.

(in Co-operation with the International Labour Office) on Urbanization in the ECAFE Region, Bangkok, 8.–18. August, 1956, Calcutta 1957; id. (ed.), Urbanization in Latin America. Proceedings of a Seminar jointly sponsored by the Bureau of Social Affairs of the United Nations, the Economic Commission for Latin America and UNESCO (in Co-operation with the International Labour Organization and the Organization of American States) on Urbanization Problems in Latin America. Santiago (Chile), 6 to 18 July 1959, New York 1961; UNESCO (ed.), Social Implications of Industrialization and Urbanization in Africa South of the Sahara, Paris 1956; Report on the Workshop on Urbanization in Africa, 26.4.–11.5.1962, UN/ST/TAO/Ser.C/57.

8   For Weissmann's pre-war activities see T. Bjazic Klarin / Ernest Weissmann. Socially Engaged Architecture, 1926–1939, Zagreb 2015; for more detail on the war and immediate after war years my "Vom Wiederaufbau zur urbanen Entwicklungspolitik", pp. 346–348.

9   For recent accounts see C. N. Murphy, The United Nations Development Programme, Cambridge 2006, pp. 51–81; O. Stokke, The UN and Development. From Aid to Cooperation (United Nations Intellectual History Project), Bloomington 2009, pp. 43–82.

10 For an overview for the years 1950–1967 see: The United Nations Development Programme in Housing, Building and Planning. Cumulative List of United Nations Development Programme Projects, 18.7.1966, UN/E/C.6/54/Add. 1.

1. The Colonial Heritage

The period of Sub-Saharan independences was in many ways a period of optimism. Independent governments aspired to overcome the humiliating colonial experience and to define a new role for Africa in the world. Central to this vision was, as Frederick Cooper has argued, the idea of "development", understood as a general rise of living standards, access to social services, healthcare and education, water and food security or even the increase of agricultural productivity and the introduction of modern farming methods.[11] For the more radical African leaders it also encompassed the vision of an industrialized and urbanized future.[12] Iconic figures such as Kwame Nkrumah in Ghana or Sékou Touré in Guinea envisioned a future for their capitals as modern cities comparable to the metropolises of Europe and North America, symbolizing at the same time the will of overcoming colonial restraints and the claim of African countries for participation in international modernity.[13]

However, these aspirations met with a difficult colonial heritage. Since the 1920s, Sub-Saharan urban agglomerations had entered a phase of intensive growth. Many Africans migrated to administrative and economic centres in the hope of higher standards of living, better job opportunities, and more generally, of escaping rural poverty. Urban populations doubled between 1920 and 1940, and again during the two following decades.[14] The inhabitants of colonial capitals such as Dakar and Léopoldville (Kinshasa) multiplied up to more than tenfold during these forty years, meaning that towns with a population from about 25,000 to 30,000 inhabitants grew to cities of 300,000 and 400,000 inhabitants.[15] Urban growth was maybe not as spectacular in the lesser colonial towns, but clearly it pointed in the same direction: Conakry in Guinea, for example, still a comparatively small town in the late 1950s, grew from 15,000 in 1939 to 70,000 inhabitants at the time of independence.[16]

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11 F. Cooper, Africa since 1940. The Past of the Present (New Approaches to African History), Cambridge 2002, p. 91.
12 However, there were also dissenting voices among Sub-Saharan Intellectuals. For differing views in French West Africa cf. J. E. Genova, Africanité and Urbanité: The Place of the Urban in Imaginings of African Identity during the Late Colonial Period in French West Africa, in: S. J. Salm / T. Falola (eds.), African Urban Spaces in Historical Perspective, Rochester 2005, pp. 266–286.
13 See N. Plageman, 'Accra Is Changing, Isn't It?'. Urban Infrastructure, Independence, and Nation in the Gold Coast's Daily Graphic, 1954–57, in: International Journal of African Historical Studies 43 (2010) 1, pp. 137–159; M. Smokvina / M. Smode Cvitanovic / B. Kincl, Influence of Croatian Urban Planners. Urban Development Plan of Conakry, Guinea, 1963, in: C. Nunes Silva (ed.), Urban Planning in Sub-Saharan Africa: Colonial and Post-Colonial Planning Cultures, New York 2015, pp. 225–244; Ł. Stanek, Architects of Socialist Countries in Ghana (1957–67). Modern Architecture and Mondialisation, in: Journal of the Society of Architectural Historians 74 (2015) 4, pp. 416–442, at 426–428.
14 United Nations, Growth of the World's Urban and Rural Population, 1920–2000 (Department of Economic and Social Affairs Population Studies 44), New York 1969, UN/ST/SOA/Ser. A/44, p. 27.
15 L. Beeckmans, Making the African City: Dakar, Dar es Salaam, Kinshasa, 1920–1980, PhD thesis Rijksuniversiteit Groningen 2013, p. 22.
16 J. Suret-Canale, Conakry, Capitale de la Guinée, in: C. Coquéry-Vidrovitch (ed.), Processus d'urbanisation en Afrique, 2 vols, Paris 1988, vol. 2, pp. 93–103, at 93.

Colonial urban policies never proved to be adequate to that challenge. For much of the twentieth century colonial urbanism had been based on the principle of segregation which found its expression in the duality of colonial cities:[17] Investment and building concentrated on city centres with their administrative and public buildings and European residential areas, where services such as water-pipes and sewerage, electricity and paved roads were generally available. The needs of growing African populations, however, were largely neglected: "Traditional" quarters that often predated colonial power became increasingly overcrowded and insanitary, while the large number of newcomers had to be content to live in self-built shacks and huts in the peripheries, regularly without any services or even paved roads available.[18]

Only in the years of development colonialism after the Second World War, colonial urban policies gradually began to change. Colonial administrations, be they French, Belgian or British, developed a greater interest in Sub-Saharan cities. Master plans for many of them were drawn during that period, while investment in housing for Africans was made for the first time on a large scale. In the French colonies semi-public Sociétés Immobilières began to play a major role,[19] while in the Congo the Office des Cités Africaines began huge construction activities.[20] British approaches were hardly centralized, but also in the Colonial Office structures for urban policies were created and building programmes set up in many colonies.[21]

17   See e.g. C. Coquéry-Vidrovitch, From Residential Segregation to African Urban Centres. City Planning and the Modalities of Change in Africa South of the Sahara, in: Journal of Contemporary African Studies 32 (2014) 1, pp. 1–12; id., Racial and Social Zoning in African Cities from Colonization to Postindependence, in: E. Bogaerts / R. Raben (eds.), Beyond Empire and Nation. Decolonizing Societies in Africa and Asia, 1930s–1970s, Leiden 2012, pp. 267–286; R.K. Home, Of Planting and Planning. The Making of British Colonial Cities (Planning, History and Environment Series). 2nd edn, London 2013, pp. 135–147.

18   See e.g. L. Bigon, A History of Urban Planning in two West African Colonial Capitals. Residential Segregation in British Lagos and French Dakar (1850–1930), Lewiston 2009, p. 209; p. 294f.

19   S. Dulucq, La France et les villes d'Afrique noire francophone. Quarante ans d'intervention (1945–1985). Approche générale et études de cas: Niamey, Ouagadougou et Bamako (Collection villes et entreprises), Paris 1997, pp. 144–146; J. Poinsot / A. Sinou / J. Sternadel, Les villes d'Afrique noire. Politiques et opérations d'urbanisme et d'habitat entre 1650 et 1960, Paris 1989, pp. 173–176; J.-L. Vénard, 25 ans de Intervention française dans le secteur urbain en Afrique noire francophone, Paris 1986, pp. 26–27.

20   B. de Meulder, OCA (Office des cités africaines) and the Urban Question in Central Africa, in: Conference Proceedings: Modern Architecture in East Africa around Independence (Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, July 27–29, 2005), Utrecht 2005, pp. 141–148; id., Het Office des Cités Africaines. Wonen als instrument van instant welvaartskolonialisme in Belgisch Congo (1952–1960), in: K. van Herck / T. Avermaete (eds.), Wonen in welvaart. Woningbouw en woncultur en Vlaanderen, 1948–1973, Rotterdam 2006, pp. 94–109.

21   R. Harris, The Turning Point in Urban Policy for British Colonial Africa, 1939–1945, in F. Demissie (ed.), Colonial Architecture and Urbanism in Africa Intertwined and Contested Histories, Farnham 2012, pp. 127–152; A. D. King, Exporting Planning: The Colonial and Neo-colonial Experience, in: G. E. Cherry (ed.), Shaping an Urban World. Planning in the Twentieth Century (Studies in History, Planning and the Environment), New York 1980, pp. 203–226, at 215–216.

Figure 1: "Guinea-Conakry: A Study in Contrast" (Background Photography), 1962.
Source: UN Photo Library, New York.

However, the results of these efforts may be summed up as "too little too late". A number of modern housing developments resulted (fig. 1), which on the supply side of the housing problem may indeed have made a difference. But this was certainly not enough to balance decades of neglect. And while colonial low cost housing programmes were designed for African wage earners, this group presented only a small fraction of African urban populations. Even given the lack of data characteristic of colonial Africa, it seems certain to assume that the rent for low standard modern housing was out of reach for the majority of African urbanites.[22] At the same time, ongoing rapid urbanization aggravated the urban problems still further, and peripheral settlements that came to be known as shanty towns and bidonvilles grew ever larger.[23]

Tackling these problems was even made harder for independent governments by a number of structural problems. The first of these lay in the fact that the African building materials industry could safely be described as "underdeveloped". Colonial administra-

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22   Coquéry-Vidrovitch, Racial and Social Zoning, p. 277.
23   C. Coquéry-Vidrovitch, Villes coloniales et histoire des Africains, in: Vingtième Siècle. Revue d'histoire 20 (1988), pp. 49–73, at 67–69.

tions had been happy to import building materials and had never made much effort in developing a domestic industry. In the early 1960s for example, in the whole of West Africa no factories producing necessary building materials such as iron or steel parts for construction, electrical or sanitary equipment, window glass and paint could be found. In addition, the three cement plants which existed produced only a third of the amount consumed in the region.[24] The fact that all these materials had to be imported increased building cost enormously.

At the same time, the departure of colonial administrations and their subsequent Africanization often meant a profound loss of expertise. Colonial education systems did not provide for a large number of qualified Africans to fill these gaps – while there was a small number of persons that could study abroad, in general the secondary education provided for in the colonies was far from sufficient to satisfy postcolonial needs. This was particularly true for the fields of housing, building and planning. Not everywhere was the situation as dramatic as in Malawi, where the only town planning expert left the country with independence.[25] But the fact that apart from South Africa no Sub-Saharan territory possessed an architectural faculty or a town planning school before independence, guaranteed that, apart from a few privileged graduates from North American or European universities, almost no qualified personnel was available.[26] And even if the colonial powers had hesitantly begun to build administrative structures to cope with the problems of housing and urban development in most of their territories after the Second World War, the upper echelons of institutions such as Public Work Departments in the British and Directions de l'urbanisme in the French colonies were almost exclusively staffed with Europeans. Where, as in Ghana, the transfer of power was taking on the form of a more or less organized process spanning a period of years the worst consequences could be avoided through targeted qualification and gradual replacement.[27] However, where political decolonization came as a rupture, independent governments would be confronted with an untenable situation. In what might be the most extreme case, Guinea, left by the French colonial administration in a rush after its negative vote on de Gaulle's "Communauté Française" in September 1958, found itself not only de-

24 United Nations/Economic Commission for Africa, Housing in Africa [Addis Ababa?] 1965, UN/E/CN.14/HOU/Rev, p. 4f.

25 The United Nations Development Programme in Housing, Building and Planning. Cumulative List of United Nations Development Programme Projects, 18.6.1966, UN/E/C.6/54/Add.1, p. 40.

26 N. Odentaal / J. Duminy / D. K.B. Inkoom, The Developmentalist Origins and Evolution of Planning Education in Sub-Saharan Africa, c. 1940 to 2010, in: C. Nunes Silva (ed.), Urban Planning in Lusophone African Countries, Farnham 2015, pp. 285–299, at 289 and 291; African Modernism. The Architecture of Independence: Ghana, Senegal, Côte d'Ivoire, Kenya, Zambia eds. M. Herz, I. Schröder, H. Focketyn, J. Jamrozik, I. Baan, A. Webster, Zurich 2015, p. 11.

27 However, even in Ghana the change-over from Colonial Office to Gold Coast Civil Service and the departure of colonial administrators caused a huge lack of qualified staff, even if, in retrospective, the loss of expertise seems less dramatic than in many other African countries. Otto Koenigsberger, United Nations Technical Assistance Administration Second Housing Mission to the Gold Coast 1955/56. Progress Report No. 1, 16.1.1956, UNA/S-0441/1084, p. 2.

prived of all expert staff in questions of urbanism but also without documentation of previous and ongoing projects.[28]

2. United Nations Technical Assistance (UNTA) and Decolonization in Africa

In this situation, international expertise was much sought for by the newly independent Sub-Saharan states, and the UN Programme of Technical Assistance proved particularly attractive. Compared to other parts of the world, UN Technical Assistance to Sub-Saharan Africa was slow to develop. In 1952, of the 1,767 experts engaged in the programme, only 55 or little more than three per cent were assigned to Sub-Saharan territories.[29] Four years later, on the eve of Ghanaian independence, total numbers had risen to 220 experts, but that still represented only about seven per cent of the total of 3,122.[30] The reason for this was, of course, not a willful neglect of the region by the United Nations, but an obvious aversion of the colonial powers to international interference of what they regarded as their respective empires' internal affairs. Indeed, the mistrust against International Organization in the early 1950s went so far that they founded their own organization for technical assistance – the Commission for Technical Cooperation in Africa South of the Sahara (CCTA) – that was supposed to channel and control international activity in the field.[31] Given these constraints during the colonial period, it is hardly surprising that UN Technical Assistance activity almost exploded during the years of constitutional decolonization: In 1964 expert assignments to Sub-Saharan Africa reached a number of 1,700, meaning more than 30 per cent of the total programme (fig. 2).[32]

Many of the UNTA projects during the decade of independences mirrored the "classical" fields of UN Specialized Agencies such as the FAO, the WHO or UNESCO in that they focused on issues such as the improvement of agricultural production, health services and education. However, already in 1954 a first mission was also organized by the UN Department of Housing, Building and Planning.

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28   F. Pfister, M comme métis. Des idéalistes en Guinée-Conakry, Paris 1995, p. 37; p. 135.

29   Fifth Report of the Technical Assistance Board to the Technical Assistance Committee, UN/E/2433, p. 151f.

30   Annual Report of the Technical Assistance Board for 1956, UN/E/TAC/REP/97, p. 112.

31   V. Bonnecase, La pauvreté au Sahel. Du savoir colonial à la mesure international, Paris 2011, pp. 114–118; J. Kent, The Internationalization of Colonialism. Britain, France, and Black Africa, 1939–1956, Oxford 1992, pp. 263–267.

32   Fifth Report of the Technical Assistance Board to the Technical Assistance Committee, UN/E/2433, 151f; Sixth Report of the Technical Assistance Board, UN/E/TAC/REP/3, p. 257; Seventh Report of the Technical Assistance Board, UN/E/TAC/REP/25, p. 260; Eighth Report of the Technical Assistance Board, UN/E/TAC/REP/66, p. 97; Annual Report of the Technical Assistance Board for 1956, UN/E/TAC/REP/97, p. 112; Annual Report of the Technical Assistance Board for 1957, UN/E/TAC/REP/120, p. 107; Annual Report of the Technical Assistance Board for 1958, UN/E/TAC/REP/143, p. 120; Annual Report of the Technical Assistance Board for 1959, UN/E/TAC/REP/166, p. 108; Annual Report of the Technical Assistance Board for 1960, UN/E/TAC/REP/189, p. 124; Annual Report of the Technical Assistance Board for 1961, UN/E/TAC/REP/213/Rev.1, p. 29f; Annual Report of the Technical Assistance Board for 1962, UN/E/TAC/REP/235/Rev.1, p. 134f; Annual Report of the Technical Assistance Board for 1963, UN/E/TAC/REP/265, p. 106f; Annual Report of the Technical Assistance Board for 1964, UN/E/TAC/REP/276, pp. 120–122.

Figure 2: Number of UNTA-Experts in Sub-Saharan Africa 1952-65 (exclusive of regional experts). Regional numbers including former colonies. Sources: Annual Reports of the Technical Assistance Board, 1953–1965. Details given in note 32.

In what must be seen as a unique case that predated political independence, a team of three high-level experts – Otto Koenigsberger, Charles Abrams and Wladimir Bodiansky – visited Ghana, then still the Gold Coast.[33] Most missions, however, took place immediately after independences. In the late 1950s and early 1960s experts were sent to fourteen newly independent countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, and in addition, a team of three regional advisers was formed in 1963, who travelled the continent on short-term missions.[34]

3. Approaching the Housing Problem

UN experts became involved in tackling the problems of urbanization on many different levels. They advised governments on the establishment of new administrative structures such as Housing and Planning Boards, on the reform of building and planning regulations, legislation concerning land titles, and also on savings and loans institutions. They organized courses for engineers and foremen, and, in some cases, they were instrumental in the founding of institutions of higher education and building research.[35] Sometimes,

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33   See Report on Housing in the Gold Coast. Prepared for the Government of the Gold Coast by Charles Abrams, Vladimir Bodiansky and Otto H. G. Koenigsberger. Appointed by the United Nations Technical Assistance Administration, 26.4.1956, UN/TAA/GOC/1.

34   The United Nations Development Programme in Housing, Building and Planning. Cumulative List of United Nations Development Programme Projects, 18.7.1966, UN/E/C.6/54/Add.1, pp. 21–56.

35   A good example for this is the establishment of an architectural and planning school at the Kumasi College of

as in Lagos, they even became involved in metropolitan planning.[36] Suggestions and results necessarily differed, depending on local conditions and government priorities, but in sum these advisory missions must be seen as part of a medium-term strategy which aimed at providing independent Sub-Saharan countries with the necessary instruments to cope with the challenges posed by ongoing rapid urbanization.

All experts agreed, however, that the deteriorating situation in African cities also urgently needed immediate action, particularly with regard to the ever worsening housing situation. UN experts spent much of their energies in conceptualizing national housing programmes that could replace colonial projects which had only improved supply for selected groups. Among housing experts from both the Western and Eastern hemispheres it was a long-held belief that the mechanisms of the free market could not, in the foreseeable future, offer a solution to the problem of adequate housing for the urban poor. This was the more so in Sub-Saharan countries, where even in a country with an above average medium income such as Ghana only four per cent of the urban population were expected to dispose of the necessary financial means to provide for adequate housing without any form of external support.[37] In other words, the housing problem was not seen as a question of supply and demand but as a question of needs and economic capacities to meet these needs.[38]

Such a perspective caused a full set of consecutive problems because it required a knowledge of both needs and capacities that was virtually non-existent in Sub-Saharan Africa. A lack of data on actual urban populations and housing conditions was virtually ubiquitous, which made the exact analysis of present inadequacies and the projection of future needs almost impossible. The same was true for reliable statistics on household incomes, essential for the definition of target groups in any comprehensive housing programme.[39] However, even without exact data, any possible solution to housing problems could be defined as depending on three variables: income and saving levels (extremely low), housing costs (extremely high) and governments' financial possibilities to bridge the gap between the two (severely limited). As any of these variables could determine the success or failure of a housing programme, much thought was spent on how slender government

Technology in Ghana. First suggested by Abrams and Koenigsberger, a school for 'community planning' was established in 1958, which formed a basis for the faculty of architecture that in the late 1960s cooperated with the Architectural Association in London. See Report to the Council of Kumasi College of Technology, Gold Coast, on Professional Education in Subjects Allied to Building. By Prof. R. Gardner-Medwin and Prof. J. A. L. Matheson, 5.11.1956, UN/TAA/GOC/1Add.1 App; H. P. Oberlander, Planning Education for Newly Independent Countries, in: Journal of the American Institute of Planners 28 (1962) 2, pp. 116–123, at 121–122; Arena: The Architectural Association Journal 82 (1966) 904: Kumasi Special Issue.

36   See Charles Abrams, Susumu Kobe, Otto Koenigsberger, Maurice Shapiro and Michael Wheeler, Metropolitan Lagos. Report Prepared for the Ministry of Lagos Affairs of the Federal Government of Nigeria, April 1963, UNA/S-0175/1554/0003.

37   Report on Housing in the Gold Coast, UN/TAA/GOC/1, pp. 10–12 and App. A: Housing Needs and Targets, pp. 44–61.

38   United Nations/ECA, Housing in Africa, pp. 107–122.

39   United Nations/Bureau of Social Affairs, Report on the World Social Situation including Studies of Urbanization in Under-developed Areas. Prepared in Cooperation with the International Labour Office, the Food and Agriculture Organization, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization and the World Health Organization, New York 1957, UN/ST/SOA/33, p. 148.

means could be put to most effect and of how savings for housing could be encouraged. The approach that seemed to promise the most immediate success, however, was the lowering of building costs which formed the most substantial part of housing cost. When the United Nations initiated a series of pilot and demonstrations projects in Sub-Saharan Africa in the early 1960s,[40] emphasis was thus laid on testing different methods of construction that were deemed to allow substantial reductions of expense. The ultimate aim was not only giving examples of how a reduction in building cost could be realized but also comparing the value of differing approaches.[41]

Basically, this meant a choice between three different ways of building, even if approaches could be combined, and choosing one never meant completely excluding the others. The first of these was what could be called a "high modernist" approach to building as it tended to replace traditional building methods by decidedly modern technologies based on the industrialization of building. In its centre stood the method of heavy prefabrication, meaning that standardized building elements such as walls or ceilings were produced in factories and transported to building sites where they would be compounded. This technology was not only deemed to be the basis of the success of housing programmes in the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries, but also proved to be increasingly attractive to the Western hemisphere.[42] While UN experts on the spot generally took a critical stance on such programmes,[43] they proved to be popular with West African governments, probably because they promised modern accommodation for modern African urbanites as well as industrialization at the same time. Even if this would initially cause huge investments, it was thought that these could be amortized by high output over a number of years.

A second, much less radical, approach built on the improvement of conventional construction methods. Experts believed that much cost could be saved through more efficient planning and improved housing design, reorganization and rationalization of building processes, standardizing building elements such as doors and windows and, wherever possible, the replacement of imported materials with domestic production. This approach was, for example, tested in Guinea, where the United Nations in cooperation with the government of Israel initiated a pilot project consisting of the building of 47 housing units in Conakry.[44]

Finally, building in the form of aided self-help projects was a question much discussed

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40 These were based on a resolution of the UN General Assembly in 1960. UN/A/RES/1508(XV) 12.12.1960. For the general scope of these projects see e.g. Planning and Implementation of Pilot Projects in Housing, Building and Planning. Report by the Secretary-General, 30.12.1963, UN/E/C.6/15.

41 See Ernest Weissmann, Guinea – Pilot Project, 7.7.1962, UNA/S-0175/0535/0001. The project was only realized in part.

42 See e.g. United Nations/Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Report of the Ad hoc Group of Experts on Housing and Urban Development, New York 1962, UN/ST/SOA/50, pp. 32–34.

43 See Report on Housing in the Gold Coast, UN/TAA/GOC/1, App. M: The Schokbeton Building Method, pp. 134–142.; Branko Tuckoric to Ernest Weissmann, 1.4.1965, UNA/S-0175/0534/0008.

44 Accord tripartite Guinée-ONU-Israel pour la construction d'un habitat expérimental a rez-de-chaussée à Conakry, 9.4.1963, UNA/S-0175/0535/0001. For a short overview see Henrik Ramic, Report of Mission to Republic of Guinea (21 September–17 November 1966), UNA/S-0137/0002/0012.

in the early 1960s. Basic to this approach was the idea that cost could be considerably reduced by future house owners' contribution in form of their own labour. Such projects could take on different forms, but in general they consisted of the provision of serviced lots, the purchase of materials in bulk, the selection of appropriate participants, their training and organization in working groups and finally the supervision of works and technical support.[45] Savings were thought to be considerable: When the UN expert Donald Hanson prepared a UN pilot project in Mogadishu in the early 1960s, for example, he expected a reduction of costs of 20 to 50 per cent.[46]

Each of these approaches had its flaws. Despite early warnings from UN experts against such an approach, prefabrication plants were set up by governments in both Ghana and Guinea during the 1960s. Both never reached the stage of mass production as given transport problems and the dependence on imported materials their produce was too expensive. Thus, the plant in Guinea simply found no market for its produce,[47] while the plant in Ghana, erected with Soviet financial support, was found uneconomic shortly after completion as well.[48] Improvement of conventional technologies was in many experts' eyes the right way to move forward – but it was clear that the reduction of costs that could be reached would never be high enough to make these houses affordable for the largest parts of urbanites in the medium-term. And governments were financially simply not in a position to bear a large part of the expense.[49]

Aided self-help projects seemed to be more promising for reaching low income groups – however, experience soon showed that in a low-wage country such as Somalia where imported building materials made up for the greatest part of building cost, expectations of high savings through self-building were misleading. Only one year after the initiation of the Mogadishu project, the responsible UN-expert came to the conclusion that self-help could reduce costs at best by five per cent.[50] More generally, urban self-help projects

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45   For details see United Nations/Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Manual on Self-Help Housing, New York 1964, UN/ST/SOA/53.

46   Donald R. Hanson, Preliminary Survey of Housing, Building and Planning Needs and Resources in Somalia, 21.9.1960, UNA/S-0175/1814/0003, chap. 4.

47   Branko Tuckoric to Ernest Weissmann, 1.4.1965, UNA/S-0175/0534/0008; International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/International Development Association, Economic Trends and Prospects in the Republic of Guinea Volume II: Sectoral and Statistical Appendix (Africa series no. AF 63), Washington, DC 1967, http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/974291468037150131/Sectoral-and-statistical-appendix [accessed 26 March 2020]), Tab 33.

48   C. Stevens, In Search of the Economic Kingdom. The Development of Economic Relations between Ghana and the U.S.S.R, in: Journal of Developing Areas 9 (1974) 1, pp. 3–26, at 22.

49   In his proposition for a housing programme for Guinea, for example, UN-expert Branko Tuckoric suggested that only minimum standard accommodation should be built for 90 per cent of the population. But nevertheless, even if half of the cost would be borne by private investment, the programme would still engulf 75 per cent of the country's budget. Further reduction seemed possible but a comprehensive programme would always cost a multiple of the percentage of government spending on housing thought to be reasonable. See Branko Tuckoric, Rapport final de mission, 10.9.1965, UNA/S-0175/0535/0001, esp. p. 30; p. 56; pp. 59–62. See also François Pfister, Rapport de Fin du Mission, 18.1.1966, UNA/S-0175/0534/0008.

50   Axel V. Axelsson to Y. J. Joury, 20.4.1964; id., Memo: Aided Self-help Housing within the Low Cost Housing Project in Mogadiscio, November 1963, both UNA/S-0175/1832/0003. See also Noel McGovern to Ernest Weissmann, 28.6.1963, ibid.

could only be conceived as temporary solutions by many experts, as in their eyes they were necessarily based on low-tech and threatened to ossify traditional ways of building and living.[51]

4. Modernization, Housing, and African Urban Futures

The final argument leads to a number of questions surrounding the formulation of national housing policies that pointed far beyond questions of pure practicability. These were questions concerning what role housing could play in the process of development and modernization, and ultimately, what urbanism could mean in Sub-Saharan Africa. The formulation of national housing programmes was not only complicated by a lack of quantitative data but maybe even more so by a more general lack of understanding of the sociological processes tied to urbanization. As the social and cultural changes tied to urbanization in Sub-Saharan Africa were – despite some pioneering work by both UNESCO and United Nations[52] – hardly understood, it was by no means clear what sort of housing would be needed for the future. Did governments have to build for "traditional" African extended families, or was it to be expected that supposedly more modern structures based on the nuclear family would emerge? How would housing have to be designed to meet particular cultural needs? In what ways could and should housing contribute to modernization, not only from a technological perspective, but also in changing cultural and social patterns?

To understand the urgency that was attributed to such questions it is well worth to consider the changes in perception of African urbanism in the period of decolonization. The long neglect of African urban populations by colonial regimes can be seen partly as a result of colonial sociologies. For the best part of colonial rule, African societies had been seen as tribal, integrated rural communities with little potential for change or development. Apart from a small "detribalized" and Europeanized elite, there was little space for permanently urbanized Africans in this traditionalizing perspective. It was only the emergence of urban unrest and strikes in all parts of Sub-Saharan Africa through the 1930s and 1940s that made seem a rethinking necessary. But even if this led to the new policies described above, the colonial developmentalism of the 1950s never fully replaced older skepticism. From the perspective of many colonial administrators, urbanization was, in Richard Harris' words, "a necessity that had to be accepted", but never "a strategy to be embraced."[53]

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51 Pierre-André Emery, Observation sur le rapport de la mission chargée d'examiner et d'évaluer le „self-help housing" en Afrique, 11.5.1963, UNA/S-0445/0038/0006.

52 UNESCO, Social Implications; Report on the Workshop on Urbanization in Africa, 26.4.–11.5.1962, UN/ST/TAO/Ser.C/57.

53 Harris, Turning Point, p. 150. See also: F. Cooper, Development, Modernization, and the Social Sciences in the Era of Decolonization: The Examples of British and French Africa, in: M. Bandeira Jerónimo and A. Costa Pinto (eds.), The Ends of European Colonial Empires. Cases and Comparisons (Cambridge Imperial and Post-colonial Studies Series), New York 2015, pp. 15–50, at 17–30.

However, during the 1950s, with modernization theory a more optimistic vision of urbanization in Sub-Saharan Africa emerged in which it was seen as central element within the larger process of social and economic transformation. From this perspective, the city was seen as the place where humans could liberate themselves from traditional ties, get to know new modes of production and consumption and build new social institutions. Some theorists went even so far that they tried to index degrees of development according to a country's degree of urbanization.[54] Modernization theory, of course, largely equated modernization with Westernization. As Frederick Cooper has argued, it can be seen an "arrogant, teleological and ethnocentric" approach as it replaced "dynamic analyses of actually on-going societies" with a "stereotype of the West". However, as he points out, instead of building on racist colonial sociologies it propagated the idea that development was open for all and welcomed formerly colonial people to the modern world.[55] More than that, it could give support to the vision of an urbanized African future put forward by nationalist leaders such as Sékou Touré or Kwame Nkrumah.

During the 1950s and 1960s, such a perspective was also very common among UN housing advisors. The first UN mission to the Gold Coast in 1954 that set in many ways the tone for later missions, described a period of transition, not only politically, but also in regard to cultural and socioeconomic development. While signs of a new modernity could be seen everywhere, tradition still had a great role to play, as could be seen in the "extreme contrast" between "[…] tribal and […] urban ways of life, between social customs of the West and of the Old World, […], between the old ethic and the new […]."[56] While this situation implied a number of choices for the moment, its ultimate outcome was beyond doubt, as Charles Abrams, head of the mission, pointed out in a private letter to Kwame Nkrumah:

> […] *it is incontrovertible that the influences and impacts of the West are already here and can no longer be held down. The city is emerging from the plains, the markets are bulging with the goods from the West, the house builder has begun to emulate Western styles, the environment is changing and bringing with it the inevitable duality of city and country, the migrations to seek better opportunity, and with it the first symptoms of overcrowding, squatting, absentee landlordism, slums, the break-up of simple land tenures. No nation has been able to resist the relentless advance of these forces and every country has had to evolve a program to cope with them.*[57]

How deep convictions of the equivalence of urbanization and modernization ran, is shown by a graph included in the Report on Housing in the Gold Coast. While rural populations are represented here by human figures dressed in what seems to be some

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54   See Wolffhardt, Vom Wiederaufbau zur urbanen Entwicklungspolitik, pp. 364–365.
55   Cooper, Development, Modernization and Social Sciences, pp. 34–35. For a valuable critique of modernization theory see N. Gilman, Mandarins of the Future. Modernization Theory in Cold War America (New Studies in American Intellectual and Cultural History), Baltimore 2007.
56   Report on Housing in the Gold Coast, UN/TAA/GOC/1, p. 5; p. 3; p. 12.
57   Charles Abrams to Kwame Nkrumah (personal and confidential), 16.12.1954, CUL/CA/Reel 21.

form of traditional clothing, urban populations are symbolized by figures that remind of modern workers wearing overalls (fig. 3).

But while in general supporting the optimistic visions of Sub-Saharan political leaders such as Kwame Nkrumah of Africa's urban future, UN experts from early on also played a role in lowering the expectations of a rapid solution of urban problems. They regularly warned against too much trust in supposedly modern solutions caused by the euphoria surrounding independences, and they emphasized the need to adapt urban policies to existent practices and financial possibilities.[58] The high costs of prestigious building projects were sometimes criticized as standing in the way of broader building programmes that could help solving the housing crisis.[59] Even if sometimes differing positions between the experts could be found, they generally agreed on the principle that building and especially housing policies depended "both on the prevailing situation and on the level of development of the national economy."[60]

Nevertheless, during the early 1960s a school of thought emerged among UN advisors that emphasized the necessity of seeing any approach to the housing problem in light of its potential to contribute to modernization and development. It was centred around the group of regional housing advisors working for the UN Economic Commission for Africa, where persons such as the eminent architects Alfredo "Duccio" Turin, Pierre-André Emery or Marc Nerfin played a leading role. For them, any investment in housing would, given the slender means available, always have to be measured against its

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58   See e.g. Report on Housing in the Gold Coast, UN/TAA/GOC/1, p. 7.
59   Otto Koenigsberger, Building Cost in Nigeria. Prepared for the Ministry of Economic Development of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 15.6.1962, AA/OK/Box 38, p. 4; p. 6.
60   United Nations/ECA, Housing in Africa, p. 174.

contribution to modernization, not only in technological terms but also in terms of how much specific housing designs could contribute to accustom the inhabitants to living in modern economies and societies: "It would be a matter of granting priority according to the accelerating effect of housing on modernization […]."[61] And while these experts were prepared to accept self-help housing as a temporary answer to the pressing needs, they would always insist that modern housing, including multi-story buildings and high densities, could be seen as essential for creating African urban futures.[62]

Such views certainly did not remain uncontested. In particular, housing experts involved in "community development" could offer an alternative vision. The concept of "community development" had a long history, the roots of the idea reaching back at least to the United States of the interwar years. In the 1950s it had become an important concept in international development policies,[63] being adopted not only by a number of Asian countries but also by colonial administrations in Sub-Saharan territories[64] and the United Nations.[65] The concept involved a number of differing strategies, dependent on who embraced it, but in its most general sense it was based on the idea that development was not only a question of top-down initiatives but also of group agency in a defined community:

> *Community development can be tentatively defined as a process designed to create conditions of economic and social progress for the whole community with its active participation and the fullest possible reliance upon the community's initiative.*[66]

Of course, this was not necessarily a strategy of empowerment, as it implied "objective needs" defined by experts, as opposed to the needs felt by the community in question. Wherever the two were not identical, the communities' wishes were to be manipulated: "Either the people feel no need, because they are too backward. In this case the need must be inculcated in them. Or else the needs felt by the people do not coincide with objective real needs in which case the people must be induced to modify their ideas."[67]

In what regards the housing questions, programmes of community development were initially seen as a promising approach to the problems of rural settlements. However, in

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61   United Nations/ECA, Housing in Africa, 126. See also M. Nerfin, Pour une politique de l'habitat en Afrique, in: Revue Tiers-Monde 6 (1965) 24, pp. 959–988.

62   Notes for a Proposed Study on the Changing Nature of the African Household in the Process of Rapid Urbanization (Note by the Secretariat), 27.6.1963, UNA/S-0445/0016/0001.

63   See D. Immerwahr, Thinking Small. The United States and the Lure of Community Development, Cambridge 2015.

64   Probably in reaction to US development policies, the Colonial Office in London in 1949 had decided to rename its programme of "mass education" to "community development". See R. Hyam (ed.), The Labour Government and the End of Empire 1945–1951 (British Documents on the End of Empire Series A 2), London 1992, part 1, p. lxi, and part 4, p. 60, doc. 365: [Mass Education]: Circular Despatch from Mr Creech Jones to African Governors and Others, 10.11.1948.

65   See United Nations/Bureau of Social Affairs, Social Progress through Community Development, New York 1955, UN/ST/SOA/26.

66   Ibid., p. 10.

67   Draft Final Report of the Workshop on Urbanization in Africa D: Community Development and Organization, 4.5.1962, UN/Sem/Urb/Af/30/Rev.1(d), 67a.

the late 1950s and early 1960s, much thought was spent on the question if such an approach could be transferred to urban groups.[68] This, of course, meant that communities had to be identified in urban conditions, where, given the expectations of urban sociology, traditional group identities based on kin and local solidarities would lose much of their meaning. In particular, in Sub-Saharan Africa urbanization was often equated with "detribalization". Communitarians, however, advanced a contrary view. In their eyes, African urban agglomerations were marked by compartmentalization based on ethnic and tribal solidarities.[69]

Thus, communitarian approaches to urban housing problems implied a very different vision of African urbanism. For them, aided-self-help was not only a question of necessity but could, in building on "traditional" forms of African solidarity, help preclude the worst consequences of social disorientation caused by rural-urban migration. Consequently, urban housing would not need to have a modernizing effect – quite the contrary, it should be designed similar to rural housing, as most urbanites had only recently arrived in the cities and thus brought rural ways of living with them. One-story-single-family houses were preferable to multi-story, multi-family houses as there was "[…] a preference for being close to the ground and for being able to grow food crops."[70] Urbanization, from this perspective, was less a radical step towards modernization than a process of spatial concentration of rural populations.

5. Resumé

In 1964, on the occasion of the first session of the UN Economic Commissions for Africa's new Committee on Housing, Building and Planning, a high official put the challenges posed to governments by the fully inadequate housing situation as follows:

> […] *the housing situation in our continent* […] *is characterized, quantitatively and qualitatively, by absolute inadequacy.* […] *this situation gives us at least one reason for optimism. It is true that our responsibilities are immense, but since the entire task lies before us, we are freer.* […] *we have to build the new Africa, we have to design the new city and it is the sign of our liberty that this new Africa, this new city will be what we can make it. We have all the task before us and that is what gives us this rare opportunity, this historic opportunity of being able to decide on almost everything, if not everything.*[71]

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68 See United Nations, Approaches to Community Development in Urban Areas. Notes on Recent Experience in Twenty-Four Countries and Territories (United Nations Series on Community Development), New York 1959, ST/SOA/Ser.D/3; The Applicability of Community Development to Urban Areas. Report by the Secretary General, 27.3.1961, UN/E/CN.5/356.

69 Community Development and Urbanization. Prepared by the Secretariat of the Economic Commission for Africa (Workshop on Urbanization in Africa), 9.4.1962, UN/E/CN.14/Sem/Urb/Af/11.

70 Donald R. Hanson, Report of the Mission to Survey and Evaluate Self-Help Housing in Africa, 18.3.1963, UNA/S-0175/0079/0003, i-iii, quote iii.

71 Text of the Opening Address by Mr F.A. U'Liba N'Guimbous, Deputy Executive Secretary of the Economic Commission for Africa, 23.11.1964, UN/E/CN.14/329/Ann. 1, S. 1f.

This must be seen as a programmatic statement, of course, as already by the mid-1960s the high hopes tied to independence had begun to fade, and it had become ever clearer how limited Sub-Saharan governments' capabilities were. If Africans had found their political kingdoms, everything else was not added automatically. Urbanization went on with annual rates probably even higher than before independences, the housing situation kept on deteriorating while scarce public means meant that investment could only be made very selectively. This situation was aggravated by the structural constraints left by colonialism, the most serious among them being the virtual non-existence of an effective building industry. Nevertheless, as I have argued, the need to formulate policies of urban development allowed for a number of choices to be made, choices not only regarding technicalities of building, but also of what the very meaning of Sub-Saharan urbanism should be.

In the years surrounding independences, UN experts had an important role to play in the formulation of national policies of urban development. Given the lack of expertise in postcolonial administrations their advice was much sought for in many fields, from administrative issues to questions of building technology. Given the nature of advisory missions, visible results of UN activities are hard to be found, but it seems clear that while governments followed their suggestions in many instances, in others different agendas than those proposed by the experts were followed. The least successful part of UN activities in Sub-Saharan Africa in the early 1960s is almost certainly represented by their programme of pilot- and demonstration projects. While the testing of different approaches to a solution of the housing crisis may have been an important experience with the challenges posed by the specific African conditions, many of these projects never reached the self-set targets.[72]

More importantly, however, the experiences gained by UN experts in Sub-Saharan Africa can be seen as valuable contributions to the formulation of different approaches to the challenges posed by rapid urbanization. The alternative visions of policies of urban development they discussed were in many ways focused on the specific conditions of Sub-Saharan Africa. But they also touched on a fundamental question of urban development: Should policies of urban development in the Global South focus mainly on easing the worst problems of ever growing populations and concentrate on the urban poor? Or should they be seen themselves as a contribution to development and modernization, not only in technological terms, but also by promoting change of social and cultural patterns? This, however, was a question that was to engage the Globalized Urban International for a long time to come.

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72   A pilot project in Guinea had to be discontinued after many years of work and the spending of considerable financial means, another in Somalia brought, even though around 60 houses were finished, rather disappointing results. See Yuri Sokolov to A Sager, Inter-Office Memorandum: Pilot Housing Project – Conakry, Guinea, 11.1.1968, UNA/S-0535/0001; Report on Pilot Project of Low-cost Housing, Appendix to C.A. Qawi to N. Gleboff, 24.4.1967, UNA/S-0175/1832/0003.

Unlikely Collaborations? Planning Experts from both Sides of the Iron Curtain and the Making of Abuja

Anne-Katrin Fenk / Rachel Lee / Monika Motylińska

ABSTRACTS

Als so genannte „Spielwiese des Kalten Krieges" war das postkoloniale Subsahara-Afrika ein um-kämpftes Territorium im ideologischen Machtspiel, das die zweite Hälfte des 20. Jahrhunderts beherrschte. Doch trotz der Spannungen zwischen Ost- und Westblock boten die blockfreien Nationen des „Südens" auch Möglichkeiten für unwahrscheinliche Kollaborationen. Im Bereich der Stadtplanung ist dies bei der Entwicklung neuer Hauptstädte zu beobachten. Abuja, die neue Hauptstadt Nigerias, dient als ein anschauliches Beispiel. Unter Einbeziehung verschiede-ner Stimmen (vor allem aus den USA und dem Vereinigten Königreich) konzentrieren wir uns in diesem Artikel auf das Engagement der DDR und insbesondere auf den Beitrag von Heinz Schwarzbach. Durch die Analysen auf Makro- und Mikroebene hoffen wir, die bestehenden Planungsgeschichten des Kalten Krieges zu differenzieren. Und auch wenn die DDR als zweit- oder drittrangiger Spieler erscheint, stellt die Tatsache, dass überhaupt Personen aus der DDR am Abuja-Projekt beteiligt waren, die allgemeine Erzählung des Kalten Krieges in Afrika grund-sätzlich in Frage.

As a so-called "playground of the Cold War", post-colonial sub-Saharan Africa was contested ter-ritory in the ideological power game that dominated the second half of the twentieth century. However, despite the tension between eastern and western blocs, the non-aligned nations of the "South" also provided opportunities for unlikely collaborations. In the realm of urban plan-ning, this can be observed in the development of new capital cities. Abuja, the new capital of Nigeria, serves as a potent example. While including a variety of voices (notably from the USA and UK), in this article we focus on the involvement of the GDR and particularly on the contribu-tion of Heinz Schwarzbach. By providing analyses at both macro and micro scales, we hope to

complicate existing Cold War planning histories. And even though the GDR appears as a minimal player, the fact that figures from the GDR took part in the Abuja project at all fundamentally questions the general narrative of the Cold War in Africa.

1. Introduction

Writing to colleagues in September 1978, the architect and urban planner Heinz Schwarzbach gave his impressions of his first three weeks in Nigeria, where he had been engaged by the national government to work on the development of the new capital city, Abuja. Schwarzbach, whose professional base was at that time the Institute for Advanced Training [*Weiterbildungsinstitut*] in Weimar, German Democratic Republic (GDR), began his letter with a description of Lagos:

> *Lagos is a distressingly ugly city, just a city for cars* […]. *The cityscape is determined by a flyover, built by Julius Berger. There are no pedestrians; there are drivers and there are vendors who scurry between the cars, carrying the most incredible things on their heads.*[1]

In addition to illustrating his disdain for the city's lack of pedestrian accessibility, this short excerpt also shows the East German planner's interest in a major infrastructure project built by the West German construction company Julius Berger Nigeria Plc. Although he was not aware of it when he wrote the letter, during the Cold War, both Schwarzbach and Julius Berger, as well as a diverse range of international actors from both sides of the Iron Curtain and local figures, would contribute to the making of the new Nigerian capital. By documenting and exploring these cooperations, this article seeks to complicate binary narratives of the Cold War, arguing for a more nuanced understanding of the period. It further suggests that in former colonial environments that were undergoing nation-building processes, strict distinctions between East and West, or socialist and capitalist, were less disruptive than in other parts of the world. Indeed, despite the tension between the eastern and western blocs, the non-aligned nations of the "South" provided opportunities for unlikely collaborations.[2] Thereby, the agency of the non-aligned nations in creating such opportunities was crucial, as the following citation evidences:

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1   Letter from Heinz Schwarzbach to colleagues in Weimar, 19 September 1978, University Archive Weimar (UAW), I 10 900 – Reisen in- und aus nichtsoz. Ausland.

2   Lukasz Stanek's research on the work of architects and planners from former communist nations around the world has shown that in the Middle East and Africa such collaborations were not as unusual as might be presumed. See Ł. Stanek, Introduction: The 'Second World's' Architecture and Planning in the 'Third World', in: The Journal of Architecture 17 (2012) 3, pp. 299–307; idem, Miastoprojekt Goes Abroad: The Transfer of Architectural Labour from Socialist Poland to Iraq (1958–1989), in: The Journal of Architecture 17 (2012) 3, pp. 361–386; Ł. Stanek (ed.), ABE Journal: Socialist Networks, in: ABE Journal. Architecture beyond Europe no. 6, http://dev.abe-journal.eu/index.php?id=773 (accessed 5 March 2015); Ł. Stanek, Architects from Socialist Countries in Ghana (1957–67)" in: Journal of the Society of Architectural Historians 74 (2015) 4, pp. 416–442, https://doi.org/10.1525/jsah.2015.74.4.416 (accessed 20 October 2019); idem, Architecture in Global Socialism: Eastern Europe, West Africa, and the Middle East in the Cold War, Princeton, NJ 2020.

Most of the twenty-eight independent states of Africa have tended to align themselves with one of two blocs – African blocs, to be sure, but oriented in many important ways either to East or West. […] The new governments have signed trade and credit agreements with Russia, Poland, Czechoslovakia, China, Hungary, and East Germany on the one hand; with Scandinavia, Japan, West Germany, Britain, and America on the other.[3]

It seems that the Cold War was significantly warmer in the South. In the realm of urban planning, Abuja serves as a potent example.

After its discovery in 1958, oil became a determining factor in Nigeria's economy, rendering it one of the most sought-after states for Western and Eastern business interests in post-colonial Africa. At the same time, after gaining independence and following a devastating civil war (1967–1970), the government of Nigeria committed to bolstering its national narrative.[4] The need to create unity was the driving force behind relocating and rebuilding the capital from scratch within a so-called ethnically neutral landscape."[5] To accomplish this goal, the planning of Abuja in the late 1970s and 1980s witnessed the collaboration of architects and planners of diverse nationalities, traversing East-West and North-South divides. Nigeria's political decision to seek out international urban planning services by commissioning foreign parties enabled these transnational and trans-ideological collaborations to take place. Planning principles and policies from historically competing systems were integrated within the project: North American based liberalized market policies of the Garden City met the modernist town planning principles of the Congrès Internationaux d'Architecture Moderne (CIAM), Great Britain's post-World War II new town practices were combined with Japanese urban design as well as planning and engineering expertise from European socialist countries, India, Vietnam, and Tanzania, among others. This took place within a relative void of national urban policies in Nigeria.[6] Abuja could thus be designated as a site of negotiated twentieth century planning policies. By examining the making and early implementation of the Abuja master plan produced by this unexpected constellation of 'experts', this article sheds light on the mechanisms and structures of international urban planning projects in the second half of the twentieth century through the voices of three protagonists.

The transnational narrative of the development of the Abuja master plan is complex and ambiguous. Involving a diverse array of figures in shifting constellations – the majority of whom are not named in planning documents – it spans at least six continents and 40 years. Reflecting this spread, archival and other sources pertaining to the project are located around the globe. Despite our commitment to consulting as wide a range of

3   W. Schwarz, The Cold War and the African States, in: Commentary (June 1962), https://www.commentarymagazine.com/articles/the-cold-war-the-african-states/ (accessed 10 October 2019).

4   S. Samaila, Politics of heritage: Ethnic minorities and the politics of heritage in northern Nigeria, in: R. Lee / D. Barbé / A.-K. Fenk / Ph. Misselwitz (eds.), Things don't really exist until you give them a name. Unpacking urban heritage, Dar es Salaam 2017, pp. 124–129.

5   Interview with Stephen Lockwood by Rachel Lee, Transcript, 19 September 2018.

6   A. Mobugunje, Abuja: The Promise, the Performance and the Prospects, in: M.S.U. Kalgo, Olatubosum Ayileka (ed.), Abuja: Review of the Masterplan, Ibadan 2001, pp. 1–10.

material as possible, the picture remains imbalanced and incomplete, raising questions about how to write accurate histories of such projects. Research funding that contributed to the preparation of this article came from two research projects, both focused on the international role of the GDR.[7] Thus, while including a variety of voices (notably from the USA and UK), in this article we focus on the involvement of the GDR and particularly on the contribution of Heinz Schwarzbach. The article is framed by an analysis of the GDR's geopolitical and economic policies in relation to Africa and an exploration of architecture and planning projects on the continent. It then zooms in to the case study of Abuja, focusing on the work of Heinz Schwarzbach and the planners 'from the West' with whom he cooperated – particularly Stephen Lockwood (USA) and John Napleton (UK) – thus traversing the stereotypical boundaries associated with the Cold War.

This section is complemented by observations on the role of the construction company Julius Berger – which proved to be a key player in the development of Abuja. By providing analyses at both macro and micro scales, we hope to complicate existing Cold War planning histories. And even though the GDR appears as a minimal player, the fact that figures from the GDR took part in the Abuja project at all fundamentally questions the general narrative of the Cold War in Africa.

2. The GDR and Relations with Nigeria

Histories of post-World War II western European, Israeli and US American architecture, planning and development policies vis-à-vis decolonizing societies and new nation states have recently begun to be researched and written. These often point out the continuation of colonial policies or the development of neo-colonial methods – tropical architecture, Point 4, Rockefeller Foundation, UN Habitat etc.[8] However the role of socialist /

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8   See, for example, K. Arts / A. K. Dickson (eds.), EU development cooperation. From model to symbol, Manchester / New York 2004; C. Lancaster, Foreign Aid: Diplomacy, development, domestic politics, Chicago / London 2007; P. Hansen, Eurafrica: The Untold History of European Integration and Colonialism, London 2015; H. le Roux, The Networks of Tropical Architecture, in: The Journal of Architecture 8 (2003) 3, pp. 337–354; J.-H. Chang, A Genealogy of Tropical Architecture: Colonial Networks, Nature and Technoscience, London 2016; K. De Raedt, Between "True Believers" and Operational Experts: UNESCO Architects and School Building in Post-Colonial Africa, in: The Journal of Architecture 19 (2014) 1, pp. 19–42; A. Levin, Exporting Architectural National Expertise: Arieh Sharon's Ife University Campus in West–Nigeria (1962–1976), in: R. Quek / D. Deane / S. Butler (eds.), Nationalism and Architecture, Farnham 2012, pp. 53–66; O. Uduku, Modernist Architecture and "the Tropical" in West Africa: The Tropical Architecture Movement in West Africa, 1948–1970, in: Habitat International 30 (2006) 3, pp. 396–411; I. Jackson / J. Holland, The Architecture of Edwin Maxwell Fry and Jane Drew: Twentieth Century Architecture, Pioneer Modernism and the Tropics, Farnham 2014; A. Iyer Siddiqi, Architecture Culture, Humanitarian Expertise: From the Tropics to Shelter, 1953–93, in: Journal of the Society of Architectural Historians 76 (2017) 3, pp. 367–384; R. Lee, Constructing a Shared Vision: Otto Koenigsberger and Tata & Sons, in: ABE Journal.

communist actors is less well understood. The GDR's position in particular remains under-researched. GDR foreign policy was conceived of and mediated as a tool for the class struggle on a global scale. Current research shows a much more fragmented picture – presenting a chimera of strategies that were packed in the propaganda of solidarity, but driven by a need for economic survival and a striving for international recognition.[9] Especially at an early stage, projects were small-scale manoeuvres, often initiated and dependent on highly personalized relationships, following a trial and error approach, rarely with sufficient budgets to follow up.[10]

From 1956, the GDR attempted to enter the African market through various economic, political, cultural and technical operations and contracts.[11] After failing in Asia,[12] a rapprochement with Africa offered a great opportunity in the face of the Hallstein doctrine, which denied the GDR recognition as an independent state. The political leadership of the GDR began seeking trade relations with African nations that were moving towards independence, especially Ghana and Nigeria. However, it soon became clear that the GDR was taking the wrong approach to the African market, a circumstance that would not improve in the following years, and that this rather damning internal report confirms:

> *The increase in the volume of trade with Africa in 1958 is obviously completely inadequate and proves that the GDR's foreign trade did not understand how to make even the slightest use of the opportunities that presented themselves.*[13]

The first trade relations between the GDR and Nigeria were developed on the basis of free currency transactions, through intermediaries mainly operated by British companies. The entry into trade relations with Nigeria was justified politically by employing the ideological argument of supporting the independence struggle. This was all the more necessary, as from the beginning the Nigerian market was judged to be capitalist.

It was not unusual for the newly independent states of Africa to approach the countries of the "North" independently – often without positioning themselves between the increasingly polarized political blocs. Numerous memos document that above all the independent African countries demanded financial support through loans as well as edu-

Architecture beyond Europe 2 (2012), http://abe.revues.org/356 (accessed 17 December 2018); Idem, Otto Koenigsberger, Transcultural Practice and the Tropical Third Space, in: OASE 95 (2015).

9   C. Bernhardt / A. Butter / M. Motylińska (eds.), Between Solidarity and Business. Global Entanglements in Architecture and Planning in the Cold War Period (Rethinking the Cold War series), Berlin / Boston, forthcoming. See also: H. Büschel, Hilfe zur Selbsthilfe: Deutsche Entwicklungsarbeit in Afrika 1960–1975, Frankfurt am Main 2014.

10   Bundesarchiv DN1/11432, Abkommensunterlagen (Sonstige Abkommen wie z.B. Kulturabkommen, Rundfunkabkommen, WTZ etc.) betreffend, Dahomey 1962, Ghana (1959–65, Guinea 1958–67), e.g. DIM, Länderberichte, Deutsches Institute für Marktforschung, Föderation Rhodesien und Nyasaland, Juni 1961.

11   Bundesarchive Berlin DN 1/10145, Vermerk vom 30.1.1959 über die Handelsbeziehungen der DDR zu den Afrikanischen Staaten.

12   Bundesarchiv DN1/10170 – Indonesien, Abkommen aus den Jahren 1956–1963.

13   Bundesarchiv, DN 1/10145, Ministry of Finance, Department of Foreign Exchange, International Financial Relations Sector, Trade Agreement Preparation, includes Sudan, Tanganyika, Nigeria, VAR, Note on GDR/Nigeria trade relations, 1959.

cation and professional training opportunities in the GDR. However, the GDR could rarely meet such demands – a first consequence of the escalating Cold War of Development Loans[14]. This often presented the GDR with enormous political challenges, as it was economically fragile and subjugated to a problematic special position within the political structure of the Eastern bloc.

3. GDR Architecture and Planning Projects in Africa and Attempts to enter the Nigerian Market

The majority of the GDR's construction projects in Africa were realized after the 1960s. However, a few were carried out during the early postcolonial phase. These included the construction of state printing presses in Conakry, Guinea (1959–1962) and in Tema, Ghana (1961–1964) as well as the cement plant in Alexandria (1960s). Yet it was not until the initially successful cooperation with Zanzibar, later united with Tanganyika, that the GDR succeeded in achieving a stronger foothold in the African market.[15]

By the end of the 1970s the international construction market had become highly differentiated. In comparison to West German construction companies and those from other members of the eastern bloc, the GDR played a minimal role in this respect,[16] apart from the specialized construction of cement plants. This was due to the fact that the restructuring of the construction industry, the rationalisation of the construction process and the standardisation of "typifications" in the GDR took their toll on overseas interests. In addition, projects such as the modernization of cities and very specific cybernetic discourses in the building and administrative disciplines promoted an introverted GDR perspective – out of step with international urban discourse.[17]

A focus on the industrial prefabrication of building elements was part of this shift. The GDR's inability to win international contracts even in this specialized context became clear in negotiations with Nigeria, circa 1978: The fact that the construction of a prefab housing plant would take three years, led to an immediate cancellation of the contract, which was subsequently awarded to an Irish company.[18] In some ways, the GDR "missed the boat" on the African construction market: On the one hand GDR companies failed

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14   E.g. C. Lawson, Soviet Economic Aid to Africa, in: African Affairs 87 (1988) 349, pp. 501–518.

15   L. Wimmelbücker, Architecture and city planning projects of the German Democratic Republic in Zanzibar, in: Ł. Stanek/T. Avermaete (eds.), Cold War Transfer: Architecture and Planning from Socialist Countries in the 'Third World', special issue of The Journal of Architecture 17 (2012) 3, http://www.tandfonline.com/toc/rjar20/17/3?nav=tocList (accessed 21 June 2019), pp. 407–432.

16   Bundesarchiv, DH 2/2302, Bauakademie der DDR, building information, document abolishment and provision, study about the building market of the BR Nigeria, 15.10.1983.

17   Deutsche Bauakademie, Die Aufgaben von Städtebau und Architektur beim umfassenden Aufbau des Sozialismus, 6. Industrielles Bauen, Standardisierung und Typenprojektierung, Arbeitsmaterial zum Hauptreferat für die 9. Plenartagung der Deutschen Bauakademie, 1964: "The transition from handicraft to industrial building production is tantamount to a revolution in the building industry. (…) It was not until socialism that it became possible to follow the path of industrialization in the building industry with all its consequences."

18   Interview with Heinz Schwarzbach by Anne-Katrin Fenk, 30 November 2018.

to prepare themselves for the international market, and, on the other, in comparison to western countries, the GDR could not muster sufficient construction capacity. There was a shortage of skilled workers and resources.

The 1980s represented a turning point: the need for hard currency led to an international and capital market policy adjustment. In 1983, after the deployment of a handful of GDR construction experts to Nigeria, the GDR's Academy of Architecture (Bauakademie der DDR) commissioned a study for possible construction contracts in Nigeria. These studies clearly show that the largest contractors in Nigeria at the time were West-German, building mostly large-scale infrastructure projects, healthcare facilities as well as industrial projects such as automobile factories, steel or pharmaceutical plants. In the area of social (public) buildings, only Hungary, Romania and the USSR from the eastern bloc were able to hold their own. New housing projects were largely planned by major British or French firms. For the GDR, entry into the Nigerian market presented a real challenge:

> *As described* […] *some European, capitalist countries dominate the Nigerian construction market. Especially West-Germany, Great Britain, France and Italy have been present for many years* […]. *Since an entry into the Nigerian market* […] *is only possible through mixed companies* […] *such a company would have to be founded or the purchase would have to be made into already existing ones (USSR, Hungary).* […] *In addition, a long-standing presence in the Nigerian market, personal relationships and "market maintenance funds" [German:* Marktpflegegelder, *euphemism for bribery] play a role that should not be underestimated in penetrating the Nigerian market.*[19]

Despite the earlier failure, the GDR was still speculating that it could export housing factories that would be used in the construction of Abuja, which may have been a reason for allowing Schwarzbach's involvement. This can be seen most clearly in the example of a study on the adaptation of the WBS 70[20] prefabricated building system for the "development market".[21] The documents also evidence the reduction in ideology in the GDR's export policy. This becomes comprehensible in particular by the adoption of a more business-like language. The technical references used for the study were also all of international importance – beyond the Cold War's borders. The most frequently quoted book *Tropenbau. Building in the Tropics* by Georg Lippsmeier,[22] a West-German architect, was diametrically opposed to the official political orientation of the GDR. None-

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19   Bundesarchiv, DH 2/2302, Bauakademie der DDR, building information, document abolishment and provision, study about the building market of the BR Nigeria, 15 October 1983.

20   WBS 70 is a GDR-specific form of a highly industrialized, building system with prefabricated panels. From the mid-1970s it developed into a building system which found the greatest possible application in new construction. The standardisation, and only a small range of types, generated the typical appearance of the new housing estates in the GDR.

21   Bundesarchiv, DH 2/23668, Bauakademie der DDR, Institut für Wohnungs- und Gesellschaftsbau, Department Elementezentrum, Study "Product Offer for Housing and Social Construction in African Nation States" (Initiative Research Export) – Offer Solutions for Reinforced Concrete Construction Elements.

22   G. Lippsmeier et al., Tropenbau, Building in the Tropics, Munich 1980.

theless, changing the rigid specifications of the prefabricated construction technique to accommodate Nigerian climatic (and social?) conditions proved difficult:

> *At the same time, however, it must be noted that the concrete solutions, especially their details, are not directly transferable to construction in the desired customer field (tropical and subtropical countries).*[23]

With the building of Abuja, the GDR was hoping to have a new opportunity to export its prefabricated housing technology. This was one of the reasons they were keen to get involved.[24]

4. International Collaboration in Abuja

While the creation of a new capital city in Nigeria was certainly catalysed by the Nigerian Civil War (1967–1970), Nnamdi Elleh traces its history to the country's late nineteenth century colonial origins and early twentieth century attempts to administratively "amalgamate" the disparate regions of the vast West African territory under British control.[25] In the early 1970s, in an effort to counteract the tension and violence between the many Nigerian ethnic groups that had culminated in the Biafran War, the Nigerian government took the decision to establish a new capital city at the geographical centre of the country, in an area where no single group dominated. Abuja is located within the Federal Capital Territory which was established in 1976 on land characterized by small settlements: about 125,000 people lived in 840 villages at a low density of 16 persons/km².[26] As neither Muslims, Christians nor Ancestor Worshippers dominated among the inhabitants, the territory was regarded as culturally and religiously "neutral" and therefore suitable as the site for the new capital city that would help to unify the fractured country.[27] Funding the project through wealth derived from petroleum export, the Nigerian government sought proposals for a master plan for the capital city.[28] Although this stage of the planning process has been described as a competition,[29] specifics about who participated and how it was organized have not yet surfaced.[30] According to Stephen Lockwood, Abraam Kruschkhov of Archisystems (Los Angeles) and director of the consortium International Planning Associates (IPA), that was awarded the commission in June 1977, was

23   Bundesarchiv, DH 2/23668, Bauakademie der DDR, Institut für Wohnungs- und Gesellschaftsbau, Department Elementezentrum, Study "Product Offer for Housing and Social Construction in African Nation States" (Initiative Research Export) – Offer Solutions for Reinforced Concrete Construction Elements.

24   Interview with Heinz Schwarzbach by Rachel Lee, 9 July 2014.

25   N. Elleh, Architecture and Politics in Nigeria: The Study of a Late Twentieth-Century Enlightenment-Inspired Modernism at Abuja, 1900–2016, Milton Park et al. 2017, p. 69.

26   Ibid., p. 74.

27   Ibid., p. 74.

28   Ibid., p. 95.

29   Ibid., p. 79 and S. C. Lockwood, Abuja: Planning the New Capital of Nigeria – Unique Symbol or Urban Prototype, in: T. L. V. Blair, Urban Innovation Abroad. Problem Cities in Search of Solutions, New York 1984, p. 266.

30   And Elleh does not include the competition in his timeline (Elleh, Architecture and Politics, p. 290).

informed about the Nigerian government's plans by an art dealer acquaintance in New York who strongly encouraged him to submit an entry.[31] Kruschkhov then put together a team consisting of the urban planning practice Wallace, McHarg, Roberts and Todd (WMRT) of Philadelphia, and Planning Research Cooperative (PRC) of Washington DC.[32] While Kruschkhov played a crucial role in securing the commission, the majority of IPA's planning work was conducted by WMRT and PRC.

At around the same time, the Nigerian government began assembling a team to manage the project in Nigeria. Alongside the Federal Capital Development Authority (FCDA) Board was the Technical Assessment Panel, an International Review Panel, and a contingent of unnamed FCDA Staff Members. While the International Review Panel consisted of experts who had been involved in the planning of other large new towns around the world – M.N. Sharma, Chief Architect of Chandigarh, India; G. Kahama of Dodoma, Tanzania; Charles Conrad of the National Planning Commission in Washington DC; and Fred Roche of the Milton Keynes Development Corporation (MKDC) in the UK – the Technical Assessment Panel was made up of mainly Nigerian architects, planners and engineers, as well as a few foreign experts. These included Heinz Schwarzbach, an architect-planner based in Weimar with experience in practice, research and teaching, who had been eager to work internationally for some time.

5. Heinz Schwarzbach: International Mobility, Transnational Cooperation, and Local Challenges

When Schwarzbach had inquired about joining the team of technical experts who would undertake the rebuilding of the devastated city of Vinh in Vietnam in 1974, he had been told that they needed engineers rather than architects. Four years later, however, when Nigerian government officials approached the GDR government about hiring a team of experts to work on the new capital city plan, Schwarzbach was suggested as a potential candidate. Two weeks after an interview at the Hotel Metropol in Berlin, Schwarzbach received his contract as Chief Architect and Planner of the Federal Capital Development Authority (FCDA). Schwarzbach recalls the process as follows:

> *I wanted to emphasize once again that the initiative came from the Nigerians, they wrote to the Americans, the English, the Poles and the GDR … my predecessor was an Englishman who had spent an awful lot of money, they dismissed him and probably they then thought let's try the people from the East. Interviews were conducted in both Lagos and Geneva. Luckily, the Nigerian minister at the time had a soft spot for the Eastern countries.*[33]

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31   Interview with Stephen Lockwood (note 5).

32   Kruschkhov knew the senior partner David Wallace from the 1940s when they had worked together for the Chicago Housing Authority.

33   Telephone interview with Heinz Schwarzbach, interview by Anne-Katrin Fenk, Rachel Lee, and Monika Motylińska, Erkner, 17 September 2018.

Following a two-week (!) training course on the geography, politics, and culture of Nigeria, Schwarzbach and seven others – a team of doctors and engineers – travelled to Lagos with their partners to begin their work on the capital city project. In terms of hierarchy, Schwarzbach was the most senior member of the FCDA's architecture and planning team within the Nigerian government, and also the highest paid member of the GDR team, as he recalls.[34] First in Lagos and later at the site of the new capital itself, together with his team of largely Nigerian staff he was responsible for coordinating the work on the master plan, and managing the incoming tender applications. In letters to his colleagues in Weimar he remembers developing designs for housing and neighbourhoods, formulating building regulations and dealing with the "endless bureaucracy and double work."[35]

Fig. 1. Heinz Schwarzbach with Mobolaji Ajose-Adeogun and Alhaji Abubakar Koko in Nigeria, 1978 (photo with water damage). Courtesy of Heinz Schwarzbach.

Apart from a few discreet hints, in his letters Schwarzbach, did not write about supposed or actual divisions of the Cold War. Instead he keenly observed the circumstances in Lagos and on the planning site, with a preference for anecdotes highlighting supposedly exotic experiences, a vibrant local market in Suleja or the long waiting periods and challenges of communication and logistics. His commentaries are marked with both sympathy for the mistreated, as in the remark "Often my heart bleeds [when I witness] how the petty local workers are hustled and neglected", and superficial framing of racial differences and gendered othering, as in the description of Lagos:

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34   Telephone interview with Heinz Schwarzbach (note 33).
35   UAW, I 10 900 – Reisen in- und aus nichtsoz. Ausland. Original: unendliche Bürokratie und Doppelarbeit.

> *There are so many exotic pictures and proud figures – women carrying children on their backs with large loads on their heads, women with many small braids or huge shawls, with straightened hair they frequently look like rats.*[36]

Such statements meant only for a small group of colleagues offer insights into personal narratives not written for a broader audience or in any official context. These are especially valuable as 'snapshots' of particular positionalities (of a male planner from the GDR) at the time when he was present in Nigeria, as contrasted with his retrospective statements in the interviews, which were more filtered through the later experiences, awareness of the academic conventions and socially acceptable language. Nevertheless, it can only be speculated if the remark that,

> *in our group, we often think how much easier it would be to bear with restrictions, mishaps and strains, and how much more we would have preferred to offer our workforce and our knowledge to a socialist-oriented developing country, and not this greedy, corruption inclined, rich Nigerian upper class*[37]

had a hint of irony which could be understood by close colleagues or was a sincere expression of frustration with local circumstances. Another possibility here is that the author was playing a game with the East German censorship, knowing that even private correspondence could be subjected to checking.

The change of tone between Schwarzbach's private letters as quoted above and his official reports is apparent. In the latter, the focus lies – in accordance with the interests of the addressee, the Institute for Advanced Training – on the possibilities of implementation of knowledge gained in Nigeria for the courses and seminars in Weimar. However, a recurring source of Schwarzbach's discontent, underlined both in the official documents and in our interviews, was the disappearance of a cache of materials and publications he had shipped from Nigeria to the GDR, with the intention of including it in the collection of the Institute for Advanced Training. This anecdote points to the fact that our perception of planning activities in Abuja in the late 1970s and 1980s is based on a limited number of sources – and to the element of chance involved in dictating which documents became available in archives and which were lost.

Far from feeling intimidated by a project that was directed by planners from the capitalist West, Schwarzbach, who was well versed in international planning ideas, found the experience very enriching, and, despite having a different ideological background, took advantage of the opportunities the project gave him to contribute his considerable expertise and skills. He manoeuvered and negotiated between socialist, capitalist, and local expectations

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[36]   "Es gibt so viele exotische Bilder und stolze Gestalten – Frauen die Kinder auf dem Rücken gebunden mit großen Lasten auf dem Kopf, Frauen mit vielen kleinen Zöpfchen, oder riesigen Tüchern, mit entkrausten Haaren sehen sie leider aus wie Ratten." Letter from 19 September 1978 to friends and colleagues from the Institute for Advanced Training, UAW, I 10 900I 10 900 – Reisen in- und aus nichtsoz. Ausland.

[37]   Letter from 9 April 1979 to friends and colleagues from the Institute for Advanced Training, UAW, I 10 900 – Reisen in- und aus nichtsoz. Ausland.

that often collided, as the planners were confronted not with one Nigerian way of life, but with dozens of regional traditions to be taken into consideration, e.g. living outdoors, polygamy, and living in large families.[38] Schwarzbach enjoyed substantial mobility during his tenure. As well as travelling between Lagos and the Suleja Base Camp near the capital city site, which he compared to "living on the moon" in "barracks made of polyurethane foam where you sit like you're in a tin can",[39] he also travelled to Washington DC and Philadelphia to take part in meetings with IPA, to Wales to inspect prefabricated building elements, and to Milton Keynes to work on the detailed plans for the first residential district. According to Schwarzbach, despite the very challenging working conditions, particularly on site at Abuja where he and his FCDA team were stationed for the majority of the project (living and working in temporary buildings constructed of locally made cement bricks after termites had destroyed previous buildings made of sandwich board panels), the design process was one of constructive exchange in which all those involved were able to express their opinions on aspects of the plan, both in Nigeria and on his trips to the USA and UK.

6. Situating Schwarzbach's Work Alongside that of his International Colleagues: Stephen Lockwood and John Napleton

IPA directed their operations from the USA, and the project partners only travelled to Nigeria for important occasions, such as the final presentation of the master plan in February 1979. However, a Resident Manager – the architect, urban designer, and infrastructure planner Stephen Lockwood of PRC – was their representative, or "man on the ground" in Nigeria.[40] For three years Lockwood spent two weeks of every month in Nigeria, "handling anything that required direct cooperation with the client or 'being there'."[41] He also carried technical material between Philadelphia and Lagos where PRC maintained a liaison office with support staff. His contributions to the project were significant, particularly in the selection of the site for the new capital city and development of the Logistics Plan which addressed infrastructure development, construction schedule and related requirements.

While the political decision had been taken to locate Abuja in the central part of Nigeria, and maps had enabled the FDCA to identify a rough area for the site, extensive aerial reconnaissance and multi-factor site suitability analyses had to be carried out to determine its precise location, scale, and configuration. Among other considerations, flat land to accommodate an international airport with a 15,000 ft runway had to be available. Natural water features and interesting topographical elements befitting a capital city site

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38   Letter from 18 December 1978 to friends and colleagues from the Institute for Advanced Training, UAW, I 10 900I 10 900 – Reisen in- und aus nichtsoz. Ausland.

39   Ibid. Original: "wir leben hier wie auf dem Mond", "Baracken aus Polyurethanschaum, in denen man sitzt wie in einer Konservendose".

40   Interview with Stephen Lockwood (note 5).

41   Interview with Stephen Lockwood (note 5).

were also sought. One of the IPA team's first tasks was to find such a site. To do this, Lockwood and IPA environmental experts were flown around an 8000 sq.km. area in a helicopter. Because the region was largely 'undeveloped' in terms of infrastructure, the Nigerian army placed canisters of aviation fuel in a few strategic locations, allowing the helicopter crew to land, refuel, and continue their survey.

Fig 2. Stephen Lockwood (centre) and colleagues on a break from a "ground truth" flight. During these helicopter expeditions favoured locations for the site of the new capital were analysed regarding geology, topography, landscape, water bodies, and views. Courtesy of Stephen Lockwood.

IPA's master plan for Abuja included both the Capital City Master Plan and a development plan for the region, with resettlement villages for those forced to leave their homes by the development of the capital, and satellite cities, later designed by Schwarzbach's colleague, G. Wagner of the Bauakademie in East Berlin. Taking advantage of the topography and natural beauty of the area, Abuja is dominated by Aso Hill, a rocky outcrop on which the central axis, which comprises governmental, commercial and cultural facilities, is focused. Similarly to Brasilia, an acknowledged source for the project[42] and a city that Lockwood visited as part of the preparation of the master plan,[43] two wings of residential districts branch out on either side, responding to the topography of the site. The residential areas were conceived at the scale of "mini-cities" of 100–200,000 inhabitants, and subdivided into neighbourhood units of 40–60,000, linked by public transit

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42   The Federal Capital Development Authority, The Master Plan for Abuja the New Federal Capital of Nigeria, Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1979, p. 99.
43   Interview with Stephen Lockwood (note 5).

spines in "development corridors". An additional network of parkways and freeways was to serve private cars and other vehicles.

Fig 3. View of the parliament building from the central area of Abuja. Aso Hill dominates the backdrop. Federal Capital Development Authority, 1979, p. iv.

Stephen Lockwood's activities intersected with Schwarzbach's as both took part in Technical Assessment Panel meetings during the development of the master plan. Lockwood also remembers enjoying professional discussions with Schwarzbach over lunches and dinners. Trained in the US as an architect and planner, Lockwood was aware of the strong architectural and planning culture in pre-World War II (eastern) Germany. Initially, however, he was not sure how to interact with his colleague from the other side of the Iron Curtain, wondering to himself, "should I really be talking to him?"[44] It is worth noting that Schwarzbach encountered similar feelings when meeting West-German colleagues for the first time. As they initially spoke to each other in English, their national identities were downplayed. This broke the ice and led one of them to later say, "Oh, it is possible to talk to you!"[45] Although on a macro level the Abuja project seemingly smoothly combined actors from the eastern and western blocs, such everyday encounters show the extent to which Cold War propaganda had affected people's lives and inhibited their interactions.

The Milton Keynes Development Corporation (MKDC) made up another significant contingent of the foreign architects and planners working on Abuja. Similar to IPA, most of the work by the British group was conducted from their domestic base in the UK. John Napleton, a traffic and infrastructure planner, directed MKDC's activities in Abuja between 1978 and 1982. According to Napleton, the connection between the

44   Interview with Stephen Lockwood (note 5).
45   Interview with Heinz Schwarzbach (note 33).

Nigerian government and the Milton Keynes group came through Fred Roche, General Manager at MKDC, who met a senior FCDA official at a conference on new towns held in Iran. Napleton's work began with a month-long consultancy, during which he selected architecture and planning consultants to take part in the project. Because the FCDA was satisfied with his work, MKDC was awarded subsequent contracts that included developing an engineering and infrastructure system for the whole city, conducting the detailed planning of a housing district – the so-called "accelerated district" – and culminating in the short-lived award of the contract for the prestigious central area. According to Napleton, MKDC lost the central area commission to Kenzo Tange due to bribery:

> One time Fred Roche and I were in Lagos and we had just been awarded the full design consultancy contract for the central area of Abuja, which was an area the size of central Milton Keynes. The whole lot, everything, all the buildings, hotels, infrastructure, the lot. It was a vast appointment. And about two days later we found we had lost it because it had been given to a Japanese architect called Kenzo Tange[46] in a sudden change of mind by the Nigerian cabinet. So probably, in my view, backed by substantial payments to somebody or other – but this was usual in Nigeria.[47]

Corruption was also alluded to by both Lockwood and Schwarzbach in our interviews with them. Indeed, Lockwood's firm (PRC) eventually pulled out of Nigeria because US corporate tax and audit laws, notably the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (1977) was a major handicap to US businesses working in Nigeria. Together with the difficulty of obtaining payment in hard currency, this Act put PRC (Nigeria) Ltd. out of business as they were unable to pay the bribes and employ the third party agents necessary to win commissions.[48] Towards the end of his tenure, Schwarzbach spent six weeks in Milton Keynes working with the MKDC on the plans for the accelerated district – the first residential area of the master plan to be realized. The detailed drawings were submitted to the FCDA in 1980, and the contract for the realization of the work was awarded to the West-German construction company Julius Berger.[49] MKDC remained actively involved in the Abuja project until late 1982, when the situation in Nigeria was getting "politically hairy"[50] and the government seemed likely to fall.

Besides Lockwood and Napleton, on a day-to-day basis, Schwarzbach worked closely with Ikema, a young architect who, originally from Nigeria, had studied in Stuttgart and

46   It is interesting to note that despite his limited contribution of the design for the central area, which built substantially on the work of IPA, Kenzo Tange has wrongly been canonized as the designer of Abuja (for more on this see Elleh, Architecture and Politics, p. 79 and pp. 134–143).

47   Interview with John Napleton (b.1944) by Sheila Lindsay. Digital recording. Living Archive Milton Keynes, http://www.livingarchive.org.uk/content/catalogue_item/the-peoples-history-of-milton-keynes/oral-history-audio-recordings-of-residents-who-moved-into-milton-keynes-to-work-for-milton-keynes-development-corporation/interview-with-john-napleton-b-1944 (accessed 10 May 2020).

48   Interview with Stephen Lockwood (note 5).

49   Ibid.

50   Interview with John Napleton by Sheila Lindsay (note 47).

had been working in the USA before the Abuja commission. He also cooperated with planners and architects of other nationalities.

Fig. 4. Schwarzbach and international colleagues. From left to right: Ngungen from Vietnam, Johanssen from Sweden, Schwarzbach, and a group of unnamed Polish engineers. Courtesy of Heinz Schwarzbach.

Like the East German team, a group of Polish engineers, including some with previous experience abroad in Afghanistan, were based full-time in Nigeria, as was a Swedish surveyor, and engineers and other workers from India, Vietnam, and the Philippines.[51] None of these people are acknowledged by name in the master plan document, presumably being categorized as "staff members of the Federal Capital Development Authority." The Abuja project thus raises questions regarding authorship in international planning projects. Considering the thousands of named and unnamed people involved in the planning of Abuja, untangling who designed what is practically impossible, as Schwarzbach's own case demonstrates. While Schwarzbach maintains the significance of his responsibilities, and Napleton confirms that Schwarzbach was "deeply embedded in the whole process,"[52] Lockwood stated that "his [Schwarzbach's] roles in the project were not very clear."[53] While Lockwood was aware the Schwarzbach had an office with the FCDA and was an active member of the Technical Assessment Panel, their discussions regarding the Master Plan were informal. In an interview, Schwarzbach recollected that one of his contributions to the master plan had been the inclusion of a narrow park that flanks the

51   E.g. A letter from 19 September 1978 to friends and colleagues from the Institute for Advanced Training, UAW, I 10 900I 10 900 – Reisen in- und aus nichtsoz. Ausland.
52   Interview with John Napleton by Rachel Lee, 27 August 2018.
53   Interview with Stephen Lockwood (note 5).

north-western edge of the central area, extending to Aso Hill, joined by the parkways and containing cultural and recreational infrastructure as well as a meandering stream.[54]

Fig. 5. Landscape plan of Abuja showing the water feature. Federal Caital Development Authority, 1979, p. 9.

Comparing it to the late eighteenth century Park an der Ilm in Weimar – Schwarzbach's hometown – with its river, Goethe House and museums, similarities emerge. Within the new federal capital of Nigeria Schwarzbach had included a piece of Romantic German planning culture. While for Schwarzbach this green space was intended to improve the quality of life for the inhabitants of Abuja, for Stephen Lockwood it represented one of the failings of the project, namely the lack of international, and particularly local Nigerian planning experience of the team:

> [The] *water feature expresses the limitations of doing the master plan in the way it was done. Water borne diseases were not really thought of. The idealisation throughout the plan reflects that the work was done by a non-Nigerian team based on international principles. If everyone had lived and worked in Nigeria for a long time before working on the plan, the plan would have probably been very different.*[55]

Apart from a number of the Polish engineers, none of the team, including IPA and the MKDC contingent, had previous experience of working in the Global South, and no development planners – urban planners with specialist training that focused on planning issues in the Global South – were involved.[56] John Napleton also expressed his disapproval of the water feature, for health and economic reasons:

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54   Interview with Heinz Schwarzbach (note 24).
55   Interview with Stephen Lockwood (note 5).
56   Ibid.

> *Keeping the river open was not a good idea because of water borne diseases. The water would have to have been carried through site on culverts, which would have been massively expensive. There was no way it could be turned into Weimar.*[57]

Neither the water feature, nor the long, narrow park were ever realized. Lockwood, whose inputs to the project included reviewing alternative sites, maintains that his contribution – as member of a planning team – was "modest",[58] while Napleton sees his personal role as much more significant. In an interview, he recalled meeting a minister from Nigeria in England in the early 1990s. In an attempt to get Napleton back on board, the minister reportedly said:

> *Mr Napleton, you did a wonderful job on Abuja, but since you left we have made a mess of it, and we want you to come back.* […] *Mr Napleton you are the founding father of our capital city.*[59]

Far fewer open questions regarding authorship remain, however, in the realization of Abuja and the construction work that followed the approval of the master plan.

7. The Elephant in the Room: West-Germany and the Implementation of the Master Plan

As underlined by one of the Nigerian planners involved in the review of the Abuja master plan conducted in the 1990s, Johnson Falade,[60] the role of another major actor should be scrutinized in order to understand power structures behind the development of Abuja. The silent protagonist of the development process was the construction company Julius Berger Nigeria Plc., a subsidiary of Bilfinger Berger corporation (since 2012: Bilfinger SE) – mentioned already in the introductory quote by Heinz Schwarzbach, in which he commented on the cityscape of Lagos as dominated "by a flyover, built by Julius Berger". This was a reference to Eko Bridge – the first investment of the company from West Germany in Nigeria that was completed in 1969. It paved the way for further investments in transport infrastructure (e.g. the harbour on the Tin Can Island, several highways, further wide-span bridges in Lagos) and, in the following decades, in almost every other area of construction industry.[61]

57   Interview with John Napleton (note 52).
58   Interview with Stephen Lockwood (note 5).
59   Interview with John Napleton (note 52).
60   Interview with Johnson Bade Falade by Monika Motylińska, Lagos, 2 September 2018. Falade was a lecturer at the Obafemi Awolowo University in Ile-Ife, Nigeria, besides he worked in several positions with the United Nations Systems including the UNDP and the UN-Habitat.
61   B. Stier / M. Krauß, Drei Wurzeln – ein Unternehmen. 125 Jahre Bilfinger Berger AG, Verlag Regionalkultur, Ubstadt-Weiher, 2005 pp. 469–475.

Fig. 6. Fragment of the image from a Julius Berger Nigeria official publication with a caption in propagandistic tone: "with optimism in the future: workers of Julius Berger Nigeria Ltd. are called upon. In the heart of the country their new capital is being built – Abuja." Source: D. Blum, Bauen in Nigeria – Eine Dokumentation der Julius Berger Nigeria Ltd., Tochtergesellschaft der Bilfinger+Berger Bauaktiengesellschaft, Wiesbaden 1981, p. 206.

The company was registered in the 1960s with 100 % German capital, however, the shares of local stakeholders (esp. governments of Lagos state and the plateau states) have subsequently risen as a consequence of legal requirements, so that since 1979 the company has had a 60 % involvement of Nigerian capital.[62]

From Lagos as the largest Nigerian city and business hub, Julius Berger expanded its zones of influence across the whole country and became involved in the realization of the majority of construction projects in Abuja. Strikingly enough, this dominance of a single company – perhaps due to its ubiquitousness in the Nigerian context of the 1970s and 1980s – has not been reflected upon by Schwarzbach, whereas both Napleton and Lockwood mentioned the significant role of the construction firm in our interviews with them. However, the history of the construction of infrastructure and large-scale architecture in Abuja has become an important chapter in the self-depiction of the company. In this narrative of success and overcoming logistical challenges in this vast sub-Saharan country, the "swift and efficient" work that began in 1981 with the preparation of the terrain between the rainy seasons. This haste was crucial as originally the Nigerian federal government had intended to move to Abuja as early as 1983.[63] In doing so the company followed a long-term strategy of securing as many commissions as possible within the Federal Capital Territory. In one of Berger's lavish coffee table books, it was stated that:

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62   D. Blum, Bauen in Nigeria – Eine Dokumentation der Julius Berger Nigeria Ltd., Tochtergesellschaft der Bilfinger+ Berger Bauaktiengesellschaft, Wiesbaden 1981, p. 57.
63   Ibid., p. 44.

> […] *shovel excavators, roller compactors, crawlers, low-loading trucks and trailers are rolling almost without a pause to their sites of operation. And that is why 40 of our men had moved from the swampy bush and mangrove regions of Lagos to the favourable altitude of 400 metres.*[64]

Yet this was just the beginning of the labour and capital intense involvement of the Julius Berger company in Abuja. Since the 1980s it has developed a profile as a general contractor, able to provide for the whole construction chain – starting with the supply of construction materials such as cement or steel, up to turn-key projects and production of interior design, as described in the following enumeration:

> *Thus, Julius Berger now has its own company quarrying and processing granite into wall or floor cladding, granite flooring, stairs, tiles and special products for household applications* [that] *were previously non-existent in Nigeria. And it also now produces a large range of general building materials such as terrazzo and tiles, as well as the famed red concrete roof tiles now sported by many buildings in Abuja. (These are so popular, meanwhile, and have so proven their worth, that some houses have even opted for plastic imitations!) The Julius Berger product line also includes a full spectrum of pre-cast concrete parts, as well as aluminium window frames, doors, and sun breakers.*
> *Then there is also the Julius Berger furniture manufacturing facility in Abuja, the Abuja Furniture Production company. Furniture designed jointly by Nigerians and Europeans is produced here ready for a life in a building Julius Berger has been commissioned to erect, or elsewhere: made from top-quality local wood in keeping with European designs, the range includes superior functional furniture, fitted kitchens, and fitted offices, dining and coffee tables, wardrobes, cabinets, and chairs.*[65]

To paraphrase, even if such marketing propaganda should be treated with caution, Julius Berger International has played a seminal role in the creation of the built environment in Abuja.

In this regard, the erection of the federal capital has become a crucial phase in the expansion of the firm in the country, as it enabled the contractor to gain even wider access to political and economic stakeholders. In geographic terms, Abuja was considered an outpost base for focusing new activities in central and northern parts of Nigeria. Moreover, the ongoing development of the new capital city and the ever-growing maintenance needs have led to follow-up commissions, thus cementing the presence of the company from Wiesbaden in the most populous African country.

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64   Ibid.
65   D. Blum / J. Gaines, Julius Berger in Nigeria 1970–1995; A Documentation on Julius Berger Nigeria PLC An affiliated Company of Bilfinger, Wiesbaden 1995, p. 101.

Fig. 7. An illustration from the publication celebrating 25 years of Julius Berger Nigeria Ltd. Depicted are diverse construction activities of the company in Abuja in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Source: Blum / Gaines, Julius Berger in Nigeria, pp. 117–118.

Nowadays functioning under the name Julius Berger International, it continues to be the main contractor for the construction of the Nigerian capital. Yet what may look like a simple success story of market conquest by a construction company with its origins in Germany calls for a much broader scholarly investigation including not only transnational entanglements behind the planning of Abuja but also underlying environmental issues or resettlements of the population living in the area – only then can the history of the Nigerian capital can be depicted in a much more nuanced way.[66]

8. Conclusion: Making a Capital City

Abuja offered a diversity of professional groups opportunities to exhibit know-how in the field of urban development and planning, and establish themselves internationally, while coincidentally providing vast possibilities for investment. As the "biggest urban planning project in the world"[67] at the time, it is of no surprise that the planning documents refer to large iconographic projects such as Chandigarh, India or Islamabad, Pakistan, to name just two, in whose 'successful' histories the IPA and FCDA hoped to align themselves. Whether the case of Abuja is a Cold War anomaly, a collaborative bright spot in a period defined by fear, or indicative of a movement that was taking place across the First, Second and Third Worlds requires more research. As demonstrated above, it was the agency of actors from the Global South that facilitated the transnational and trans-ideological exchange, enabling boundaries to be broken and productive co-operations to take place.

66   Interview with Johnson Bade Falade (note 60).
67   Interview with John Napleton (note 52).

Furthermore, myriads of individual or collective, expressed or implied motivations and agendas have intersected in the development of the capital city.

Abuja cannot be considered as a concluded project, as more recent developments demonstrate. In 2006 Albert Speer and Partners (AS+P) were commissioned to provide a revised master plan for Abuja. A globally active architecture and planning firm headquartered in Frankfurt am Main, AS+P have since received follow up work in Abuja. The domination of globally operating German firms such as Julius Berger and AS+P over international alliances or indeed a shift towards commissioning Nigerian planning and construction firms deserves a more detailed examination.

The Neighbourhood Unit in Late Colonial Angola: Concentration Repertoires and Urban Policies (1950–1974)

Bernardo Pinto da Cruz

ABSTRACTS

Während der späten Kolonialzeit Angolas bemühten sich portugiesischen Eliten um zwei gegensätzliche Mittel sozialer Kontrolle: Repression und Wohlstand. Dorfentwicklungsprogramme waren vorherrschend in ländlichen Räumen. Zugleich wurden neue Formen urbanen Gestaltens in den suburbanen Regionen Luandas erprobt, den *musseques*. Der Beitrag befasst sich mit den Verbindungen zwischen strafrechtlichen Zielsetzungen, ländlicher Umsiedlung und Slum-Management. Er untersucht die politischen und professionellen Auseinandersetzungen um die „Nachbarschaftseinheit" in Angola und ihre koloniale Rezeption. Die koloniale Wiederbelebung eines Konzepts, das in der „entwickelten Welt" in Misskredit geriet, legitimierte die urbane Attraktivität einer ausbeuterischen ländlichen Institution – dörfliche Konzentration – und seine Anwendung im urbanen Milieu. In Angola wurde staatlicher Zwang für neues Wohnen und das damit verbundene soziale Wissen von wesentlicher Bedeutung.

During Angola's late colonial period, Portuguese elites tried to put forward and bring together two antagonist means of social control: repression and welfare. While villagization schemes were being deployed across the hinterland, a new form of urban management was taking place at the suburban areas of Luanda, the *musseques*. This article unearths the links between penal concentration, rural resettlement and slum management, by examining the colonial reception of and the political and professional struggles around the urban design notion of "neighbourhood unit" in Angola. The colonial revival of a concept that was falling into discredit in the "developed world" was critical to legitimize the urban appeal of a rural extractive institution – village concentration – and its deployment in the urban milieu. In Angola, state coercion became integral both to the development of permanent housing and the social knowledge the former entailed.

1. Introduction

The final fourteen years of Portuguese colonial rule in Angola can be described as a wartime (1961–1974) attempt to put forward and bring together two antagonist means of social control: repression and welfare. While villagization schemes were being deployed across the rural hinterland of the colony, through the often-forced removal of populations and their concentration in special "welfare villages", a new form of urban management was taking place in the suburban areas of Luanda. In this article, I am concerned with the links between penal concentration, rural resettlement and slum management by Portuguese imperial elites, both at the higher ranks of ministerial policy-making and at the colonial planning levels. Recent evidence suggests that community development plans – drawn from a myriad of international discourses and epistemic communities postulating bottom-up initiatives, collective responsibility and local participation and information –, were designed in parallel with the creation of concentration camps and village-building in the countryside.[1] However, and despite their decisive role in counter-subversion strategies, urban slums have been given less careful historical attention. Apart from some notable exceptions, current studies dealing with Angola's capital economy, socioeconomic structure and change and, above all, its shantytowns – the *musseque*s – seldom take the war period serious enough.[2] When they do, though, the war is considered a fertile context wherein new agents experimented with innovative design and urban planning techniques.

One of those urbanistic novelties can be found in the import and local reworking of the inter-war urbanistic concept of the "neighbourhood unit". While there is still no consensus about its exact authorship and its institutional and ideological backgrounds, Clarence Perry is usually cited as the original promotor of the "neighbourhood unit" as a well-defined and programmatic planning concept.[3] Coined during the interwar years in

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1 On the subject of "repressive developmentalism" and its application to the Portuguese imperial case see M. Bandeira Jerónimo / A. Costa Pinto, A Modernizing Empire? Politics, Culture, and Economy in Portuguese Late Colonialism, in: M. Bandeira Jerónimo / A. Costa Pinto (eds.), The Ends of European Colonial Empires London 2015, pp. 51–80; M. Bandeira Jerónimo, Repressive Developmentalisms: Idioms, Repertoires, Trajectories in Late Colonialism, in: A. Thompson / M. Thomas (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of the Ends of Empire, Oxford 2018, pp. 537–554. For an overview of the late colonial entanglements of repression and development professionals in Angola, see M. Bandeira Jerónimo, "A Battle in the Field of Human Relations": The Official Minds of Repressive Development in Portuguese Angola, in: M. Thomas / C. Gareth (eds.), Decolonization and Conflict: Colonial Comparisons and Legacies, London 2017, pp. 115–136. On the matter of concentration camps and warfare resettlements in Angola, B. Pinto da Cruz, The Penal Origins of Colonial Model Villages: From Aborted Concentration Camps to Forced Resettlement in Angola (1930–1969), in: Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 47 (2019) 2, pp. 343–371 and B. Pinto da Cruz / D. Ramada Curto, The Good and the Bad Concentration: Regedorias in Angola, in: Portuguese Studies Review 25 (2017) 1, pp. 205–231.

2 Unsurprisingly, their *state of the art* pays only lip service to simplified versions of *musseque* history, drawing on one of the leading colonial human geographers of the late 1960s and early 1970s, Ilídio do Amaral, who ultimately depended on – and contributed to – the making of the city's informal quarters as a target of psychosocial action. One of the exceptions is the late Juliana Bosslet's Lazer Em Luanda: O Controlo Do Tempo Livre Dos Trabalhadores e a Manutenção Da Ordem Colonial (1961–1975), in: Análise Social 52 (2017) 225, pp. 830–847.

3 C. A. Perry, The Neighborhood Unit, a Scheme of Arrangement for the Family-Life Community, in: Regional Survey of New York and Its Environs, Vol. 7, New York 1929, pp. 2–140. See also L. Mumford, The Neighborhood and

the United States, this conceptual tool provided a set of specific guidelines for the physical arrangement of ideal residential blocks within a city. It became a template of small-scale urban development and redevelopment and a framework for the (re)constitution of residential zones into physically bounded and socially cohesive parcels, with a population optimum ranging from five to nine thousand inhabitants (with enough children to maintain at least one primary school), its main commercial and economic amenities located within walking distance and an internal street system allowing for safe pedestrian circulation. As a normative diagram based on the functional distribution of spaces (including open spaces and gardens), routes and people, the neighbourhood unit prescribed the principle of internal unity, with communitarian institutions at its centre, automobile traffic pushed out of its inner circulation system to the perimeter and arterial streets serving as the unit's boundaries. A post-World War II French version of the concept, rewritten by Gaston Bardet and Robert Auzelle, travelled south with Portuguese architecture and urbanistic thinking into African colonies, including Angola, to the point of being taken today as a hallmark of twentieth-century Portuguese innovation in the tropics.

The latter has been labelled *tropical modernism* or *Luso-Africanism*, to convey a sense of novelty and local sensitivity brought by an internationally trained generation who applied the solutions divulged by London's Architectural Association (under the tutelage of Maxwell Fry or Otto Koenigsberger) to Portuguese Africa.[4] While so doing, so goes the main argument of current studies, they took more progressive stances away from the traditionalizing architecture of Lisbon's fascist New State regime (1933–1974), displaying architecture adaptability to African climates, geographies and peoples. According to some, it is possible to discern three distinctive moments or phases of Portuguese urban strategies in Africa in the post-war period: the first one (1945–1955), highly aesthetical with a manifest preference for the City Beautiful and City Garden models, but defined by clear segregationist *rationales*; the second, grossly corresponding to the 1960s, during which the City Garden premises were coupled with "more in-depth knowledge of indigenous settlements", applied in the plans of new popular neighbourhoods, and a third phase (1970–1974), characterized by an interrupted attempt to adopt quantitative methods, such as sociodemographic and economic enquiries.[5] It is thus widely held that, during the second and third phases, the so-called estrangement of that generation from

the Neighborhood Unit, in: The Town Planning Review 24 (1954) 4, pp. 256–70, and L. Lloyd Lawhon, The Neighborhood Unit: Physical Design or Physical Determinism?, Journal of Planning History 8 (2009) 2, pp. 111–132. Perry's single authorship, however, remains a contested topic in urban planning history. For example, Donald L. Johnson traces the concept's origins back to William E. Dummond in his article Origin of the Neighbourhood Unit, Planning Perspectives, 17 (2002) 3, pp. 227–245.

4   Research advocating this argument includes A. Vaz Milheiro, Nos Trópicos Sem Le Corbusier: Arquitectura Luso-Africana No Estado Novo, Lisboa 2012; S. Leiria Viegas, Urbanization in Luanda: Geopolitical Framework. A Socio-Territorial Analysis, in: 15th International Planning History Society Conference, 2012, pp. 1–20, and J. Venâncio, O Bairro Prenda Em Luanda: Entre o Formal e o Informal Universidade do Porto, 2013. But see also, F. Fiúza / A. Vaz Milheiro, The Prenda District in Luanda: Building on Top of the Colonial City, in: C. Nunes (ed.), Urban Planning in Lusophone African Countries, Silva, London 2016, pp. 93–100.

5   A. Vaz Milheiro, Construir Em África 1944-1974: A Arquitectura Do Gabinete de Urbanização Colonial Em Cabo Verde, Guiné-Bissau, São Tomé e Príncipe, Angola e Moçambique, Lisboa 2013.

metropolitan conservative views paved the way for an exceptional Portuguese synthesis, indebted, for instance, to Le Corbusier's guiding principles but against Le Corbusier in search for more nuanced, almost sociological approaches.

This article questions the validity of this evolutionist and racially progressive thesis. It does so by presenting a modernist project laid out for the outskirt informal neighbourhoods of Luanda. Despite its overt assimilationist pretentions, the plan's provision for class and status stratification into and around the notion of neighbourhood unit degenerated into tropical segregation. This project was unique for two reasons. On one hand, it reunited, in the same Commission, two of the leading experts in lusotropical architecture, both representing the second stage of a supposedly emergent Portuguese adaptability of the International Style to the African landscape and social customs: Vasco Vieira da Costa and Fernão Simões de Carvalho. Both were influenced by Le Corbusier's modernist programme, the former having trained at his studio in Paris, the latter with one of the Swiss-French master's closest, André Wogenscky. Because the project was inscribed in the colonial state's attempt to counteract subversive actions in the suburban areas of Luanda, it represents a clear-cut opportunity to describe the immediate and indirect links of the urban planning field to the military and political domains. Moreover, it allows us to reconsider the larger context of production of scaled-down plans which are today presented as strong evidence of the social sensitivity of these authors. I am referring to Simões de Carvalho's Neighbourhood Unit Nr 1 at the Prenda *Musseque*. This project is currently offered as the material testimony of Carvalho's reinterpretation of Le Corbusier in the tropics through his appropriation of Robert Auzelle's analytical method, more proximate to a social sciences approach. It is worth quoting a recent analysis of the Prenda scheme:

> *The beginning of the colonial war in the country (1961) and the will to minorate the existent segregation at the capital forced the architect* [Carvalho] *to take a very pragmatic approach, by applying the knowledge acquired at the Sorbonne, refusing the most diagrammatic aspects of the Athens Charter* […] *In this vein, Simões de Carvalho's proposal was innovative… an ideal habitat for the reordering and expansion of Luanda […] in a perspective that was humane rather than mechanic, anthropological rather than functionalist.*[6]

While studying the singular biography of Simões de Carvalho, the authors tend to reduce the Prenda project to the individual planning intentionality of a single agent, when it really was integral to the larger political agenda of countersubversion and social con-

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6   A. Vaz Milheiro / S. Leiria Viegas, Uma Experiência Brutalista Nos Trópicos: O Bairro Prenda, in: X Seminário Docomo Brasil – Arquitectura Moderna e Internacional: Conexões Brutalistas 1955–1975, 2013, pp. 7–13. On Auzelle's plans and his close reliance on the urban sociologist Paul Henri Chombart de Lawe's research, see, for all, K. Cupers, The Social Project: Housing Postwar France, Minneapolis 2014; K. Cupers, Mapping and Making Community in the Postwar European City, in: Journal of Urban History 42 (2016) 6, pp. 9–28, at 10. But see also H. Jannière, Planifier le quotidien. Voisinage et unité de voisinage dans la conception des quartiers d'habitation en France (1945–1965), in: Strates 14 (2008), pp. 3821–3838.

trol. Here I draw on the bourdieusard plea for reinserting these biographical accounts back into the field of colonial power and their connections to the dominant colonial urban system as a means to overcome unreflected celebrations of lusotropicalism and colonial exceptionality[7]. Moreover, by itself, the neighbourhood unit technique was far from innovative, once we look at the villagization programmes that antedated or were coeval to Carvalho's and Vieira da Costa's layouts. One may argue that the influence of international urban and housing experiences and the participation of designers within the counter-subversive apparatus suggest a chronology far more complex than the one presented by the *tropical modernism* thesis. What is particularly interesting, however, is to acknowledge that, despite all the complexity and the dubious moral stance of these modernist architects and planners, the said shift towards a more statistical and sociological urban management did, in fact, occur during the very last years of Portuguese rule. Nonetheless, what were the costs of such a shift?

2. The *Musseque* Plan

While military and civil operations of countersubversion were taking place elsewhere in the country, Luanda itself was targeted as one of the pivotal warfare scenarios of Angola. After Luanda's prison riots of February 1961, following the first major revolt of the liberation movements earlier that year in the cotton-growing areas of Malange, it was only normal that top political officials turned their attention to the peripheric areas of the capital. Luanda's riots finally managed to put the 'problem of the *musseque*s' high on the political and technical agendas of the colonial government. The main intent was simple and its achievement urgent: to eliminate the informal settlements of Luanda. To do so, the Governor-General nominated a Commission charged with studying the low-income segments of the city's population.[8] The big question was then how to accomplish slum clearance on the short run without jeopardizing the Portuguese propaganda effort. This was the first institutional response to a couple of long-term structural shifts: the overpopulation of the capital city, with steadfast inward migratory movements from the countryside and the metropole, and the overcrowding of its prison facilities, already felt in the early 1930s, but aggravated after the outbreak of the colonial war.[9] In fact, from a structural viewpoint, the intersection of both these big demographic processes accounted for the massacres that took place after the February riots, precisely in the peri-urban areas of the city.

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7   N. Domingos, Colonial Architectures, Urban Planning and the Representation of Portuguese Imperial History, Portuguese Journal of Social Science 14, (2015) 3, pp. 235–55. Without Domingos' straightforward critique, this enquiry about neighbourhood units and concentration schemes would have taken a very different direction.

8   Governor-General Order of 6-2-1962, in: Estudo Preliminar do Problema da Habitação em Luanda, Luanda: Laboratório de Engenharia de Angola, 1962.

9   From 1940 to 1960 the urban population in Angola rose an impressive 151.6 per cent. Just in Luanda, urban dwellers experienced an increase of 267.9 per cent during those two decades. Ilídio do Amaral, Contribuição Para o Conhecimento Do Fenómeno de Urbanização Em Angola, in: Finisterra XIII (1978) 25, pp. 43–83.

However, and contrary to what the social and political upheavals may lead us to think, late 1961 marked the beginning of a vibrant urban period in the city's history. After a short phase of economic decay, starting in 1957, with the collapse of world coffee and cotton prices, and of political insecurity with the first anti-colonial revolts, Luanda witnessed a quick upsurge in industrial investments and civil construction.[10] Such was the economic side of an urban revival that was also felt in the cultural domain, especially in the musical realm with the production of Angola's famous *semba*. As Marissa Moorman recalled, this was but a sign of Luandans taking advantage of Portuguese renewed tolerance towards African recreational activities.[11] This tolerance was representative of the new colonial policy of the 1960s, with political reformist and economic industrialist agendas. It was also the period during which the central government's capacity augmented, its infrastructural power reaching deeper into the territory and through the country's social fabric.[12]

It was thus within this ambivalent context of repression and economic dynamism that the Commission, reuniting engineers and architects from the local urbanization office, the geographical and cadastral services and Luanda's engineering laboratory, advanced one of the most radical proposals for tackling the suburban "problem". From the urbanistic standpoint, it quickly developed a scheme aiming at compartmentalizing the whole suburban population into three types of distinctly self-containing "modern neighbourhood units". Clearly, these urban planners devised a modern *sensitive* approach with regards to the matter of "elimination". As short-term eradication could only be achieved through demolition, relocation and preventive actions on informal housing construction around the city's centre, against this background all proposed measures gained an aura of *sensitiveness*. This is important because the former was the first urban plan to target the *musseque*s area as an autonomous object of study and policy intervention. By putting aside the option of immediate demolition and deportation, the Commission was forced to design an inner solution to the city's unstable and politically dangerous belt.

It became evident to the planners that the future neighbourhood units of Luanda were best suited to those segments of the African population already "prepared to urban life". This idea complicated the execution of the projects' main urbanistic highlights: carefully composed neighbourhood units, with a population volume ranging from five to six thousand inhabitants; multiracial social class heterogeneity, with at least 50 per cent economically vulnerable European and African families; and common public facilities prompting the social evolution of "detribalized individuals" through collective civic life. Since the majority of the families inhabiting the *musseques* were still maladjusted to proper city life, social services ought to lead "progressive preparation" campaigns while selec-

10   J. Paige, Agrarian Revolution: Social Movements and Export Agriculture in the Underdeveloped World, New York 1975, pp. 226–228. Amaral, Contribuição Para o Conhecimento Do Fenómeno de Urbanização Em Angola, p. 64.
11   M. Moorman, Dueling Bands and Good Girls: Gender, Music, and Nation in Luanda's Musseques, 1961–1974, in: The International Journal of African Historical Studies 37 (2004) 2, pp. 255–288.
12   R. Soares de Oliveira / Susan Taponier, „O Governo Está Aqui?" : Post-War State-Making in the Angolan Periphery, in: Politique Africaine 130 (2013) 2, pp. 165–187.

tion procedures determined rigorously which families to integrate immediately. From the Commission's perspective, the efficacy of new international guidelines in Luanda, in the form of overtly anti-segregationist neighbourhood units, implied a second-degree separation, based on a sound sociological classification of individuals and on the societal fabrication of new men and women at "social preparation schools". Indeed, sociological enquiries were called upon to study the structural conditions of the detribalized Africans dwelling in Luanda, to classify and place them on a scale of "gradual acculturation". Moreover, a community development framework was to guide sociologists in the terrain helped by the "direct collaboration of the interested population".

What were the results, one may ask, of such enquiries? In the absence of fine-grained sociological studies about Luanda, the Commission conducted a survey-sampling complemented by interviews with local officials and assimilated Africans, in order to collect data on the various household types, differing positions of ethnic groups in relation to each other, on the cohesion of informal settlements, degrees of sociability and stability. The aim was to quantitatively divide the ill-housed native population into distinct evolutionary groups and to rearrange them in a three-tiered scheme of socioeconomic strata. "Big numbers demand conceptions of the same scale", so went the thinking of the proponents, advocating the use of high-rise buildings in future neighbourhoods. Then again, such a solution was only appropriate for the first tier of the total population under study – 10,000 whites, 6,800 *mestiços* and 8.000 assimilated blacks. In fact, another significant aspect of the proposal was the diversification of housing types within the scheme. Depending on the target population's socioeconomic position, each unit comprised high-building blocks (1st tier) and single-family housing (2nd and 3rd tiers). The rigidness of the plan, despite the purported "maximum dissemination of all somatic types" across units, did not fit well the urban reality, for there was the obvious huge disproportion between the number of white Europeans living in informal settlements and the overwhelming majority of Africans in the same conditions. Out of a total of 30 projected neighbourhood units, only ten would house "multi-racial communities", that is, the first population echelon. It goes without saying that the bulk of the African population would fill the remaining 20 units, 17 of which with lower-class detribalized "blacks" – an unpleasant but inevitable unintended consequence of assimilationist efforts.

Highly rational urbanization along socioeconomic stratification lines crudely exposed to urban planners the race relations problem at the heart of Portuguese colonialism. A recent study suggests that the project eventually failed to be completely executed because it was deemed too multiracial. But the evidence tells us a different story. As some notable observers of the time had noticed, Western planning frameworks were the real problem. For instance, by the time Prenda was being devised, Peter Gutkind's research on Kampala, in Uganda, had led him to conclude that

> *ideas of neighbourhood planning as a device for controlled urban development cannot, in all likelihood, be implemented* […] *the pitfalls of such an approach – the transference of patterns of layout and design even after so-called adaptation to achieve harmony with*

> local *traditions – can be far reaching and result in the coercion to a way of life which brings in its wake, often unconsciously, all that is undesirable and has been found wanting. There is some evidence that this is taking place.*[13]

And it was certainly so in Luanda. Due to the conclusion of somatic imbalance within their own anti-segregationist plan, urban planners were straightforwardly advised to temper their modernist ambitions. One of the ways to solve the detribalization conundrum was to ponder the transplantation of the Mozambican experience of "native quarters". In Lourenço Marques (Maputo), "handicapped" African families were given previously demarcated terrains on the periphery, on the condition that self-built rudimentary houses would later be replaced by definitive, durable ones. The example was thought as a complementary technique to in-town "neighbourhood units", also on the grounds of empowering administrative authorities on the matter of police order and security. [14] This case of intra-imperial institutional circulation shows how a group of urban experts in western Africa could modify their initial modernizing plans by drawing on previous eastern experiences of slum management and still present them as ground-breaking experiments. They achieved this by placing their efforts under the principles of "racial and urban dissemination" and industrialization. Dissemination, which should be followed not only in Luanda across the 30 proposed units but also in the hinterland, professedly avoided segregation and induced industrial and urban decentralization. The creation of small to medium-sized settlements, also called "urban dissemination", should follow the installation of industrial facilities, thus enabling the dispersion of the suburban population across the countryside. [15] But this strategy, too, was far from unique.

3. The Neighbourhood Unit

A closer look at the rural uses of Clarence Perry's analytical notion of "neighbourhood unit" will allow us to grasp the real weight of innovation in the 1962 Plan for the *musseques* area and to understand the impact of rural sociology as the basis of urbanization plans. Even if both strategies were thought of as complementing each other – the creation of satellite camps and villages serving as crucial instruments in the fight against rural migration to Luanda – rural concentration also contributed to the urbanization of the countryside. Since the late 1940s, the acknowledgement of this paradox led to the appropriation of the "neighbourhood unit" concept as a tool of detribalization containment, usually as a milder instrument of controlling social disintegration. Ten years before the outset of the Prenda scheme, the engineer Eurico Machado, Head of the Repartition

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13   Gutkind was thinking, first and foremost, on the notion of "neighbourhood unit". P. C. W. Gutkind, Urban Conditions in Africa, in: The Town Planning Review 32 (1961) 1, pp. 20–32.
14   Manuel Pereira dos Santos, Secretário Provincial do Governo-Geral de Angola, Order no. 25/L.E.A./962, 1-3-1962.
15   Estudo Preliminar do Problema da Habitação, pp. 9, 12.

of National Buildings and Monuments, conceived of medical services along with schools as permanent formations to be installed within "neighbourhood units":

> *In urban centres, as soon as the indigenous residential zones are chosen… it is imperative to organize those same zones. The structuration* [estruturação] *in residential units (neighbourhood units) is no less necessary or justifiable here than it is in civilized zones. Actually, it may be even more so.* [16]

According to Machado, the distribution patterns of the African masses, grouping around agricultural farms or industries forming "camps", imposed a new kind of rural space arrangement in the form of settlements or agricultural colonies that were to recreate the feelings of unity of the social group, through a strict regulation of the minimum and maximum limits of the number of inhabitants. The same principles should organize neighbourhood units in towns: small enough to "make life easier", while large enough to support social and recreational social security schemes. Each unit ought to be divided into clusters based on the regional origins and the professional occupations of the detribalized. However, these areas would have to be planned with an eye to their eventual assimilation, so as to enable a controlled civilization process without "structural changes". Eventually, the neighbourhood units would give rise to "civilized residential units".

One important aspect of Machado's suggestion lies on the double use he makes of the concept, applying it for administrating both rural and urban milieus. As later projects ended up replicating, it was a tool for managing peri-urban rural belts, indistinct zones where future African slums were imagined and feared by architects, designers, social workers and military and political officials. In this sense, the neighbourhood unit became a preventive measure inscribed within the renewed policy of *regedorias*. This happened, for instance, with the first civil regedoria plan, launched in 1962, contemporary to the Prenda scheme and, more importantly, tackling directly the village closest to the capital: Viana. Altogether similar to Eurico Machado's ideas around the notion of "neighbourhood unit", it aimed at concentrating African families scattered across a native reserve in a single satellite agglomerate. It is clear, now, that the rationale of neighbourhood units accompanied by native quarters, which was dear to the Prenda project, was precisely the same behind Luanda's regedoria schemes[17]: to provide provisory settlement at the outskirts of the urban centre or diffusion poles while projecting their long-term engulfment into the expanding city.

It was no coincidence that explicit references to the "neighbourhood unit" concept as applied to Angola made their first appearances during the 1950s. After all, this was the concept's golden age in the United States and in Europe, framing institutions and

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16   E. Gonçalves Machado (Head of the National Buildings and Monuments Office), A habitação indígena em Angola: subsídios para o estudo do problema, Luanda 1952, pp. 15–16. Machado feels the need to refer directly to the original English term to convey the concept he has in mind.

17   Until now, the evidence about regedoria plans for Angola is scarce. Viana stands out as an exception to this. Other redevelopment projects for the outskirts of Luanda, such as the one for Mazozo, are still completely absent from historical (and sociological) literature, even though they are alluded to in official documents.

public/private policy following the post-war's large-scale homebuilding demand and the upsurge in the suburban housing industry.[18] However, colonial and postcolonial settings added a distinctive quality to this process of technical diffusion. What the factors were that made the neighbourhood unit so appealing, were all of them the result of an elective affinity between the concept's sociogenetic influences and colonial institutions and ideologies. In other words, the resemblance between the neighbourhood unit device and the policy of village-building did not go unnoticed by colonial agents. Three such factors deserve our scrutiny: the idea of urban village, the technique of subdivision and the moral stance behind the advocacy of the neighbourhood unit.

It was perhaps chiefly through its main western critics that the concept of "neighbourhood unit" and the practice of neighbourhood planning became so closely associated with the ideal village. For some, it amounted to a conservative, if not corporatist, and outdated attempt at recreating not only the physical layout, but also the social structure of rural villages within modern, increasingly heterogenous cities, while at the same time overlooking "the less attractive features of the village – its narrowness, gossip and intolerance".[19] A ferocious critic of the British post-war embracement of the concept, Peter Mann, could not "get away from the idea that the neighbourhood unit does hark back to an ideal of village life in the past, which may or more likely may not have ever existed".[20] In fact, by the late 1940s, the village-like nature of new urban units was considered a determinant of social stability, individual development and communitarian strength, features that Clarence Perry – the neighbourhood unit's father – had drawn from the then extremely influential Chicago school of sociology.

The dubious assumption that "primary groups" shaped individual personality and collective mores, exposed by Charles Cooley, along with Robert E. Park's explicit endorsement of the neighbourhood as the fundamental social unit or "moral region" that could prevent deviant behaviours, went deeply into the neighbourhood unit's original conception as a physical place that ought to produce or enable sound community interaction.[21] Criticized by some as an instrument of social homogeneity that induced "segregation by race, caste or income", other social engineering aspects of the neighbourhood units as urban villages were championed. Functionalist thinking went on advocating them as buttresses against disorganization and social disintegration, by decreasing heterogeneity and by stimulating face-to-face interaction, neighbourliness and civic life. The European experi-

18 See, for the British case, A. Homer, Creating New Communities: The Role of the Neighbourhood Unit in Post-war British Planning, in: Contemporary British History 14 (2000) 1, pp. 63–80.

19 P. Collison, Town Planning and the Neighbourhood Unit Concept, in: Public Administration 32 (1954) 4, pp. 463–469, at 464.

20 P. H. Mann, The Socially Balanced Neighbourhood Unit, in: Town Planning Review 29 (1958) 2, pp. 91–98, at 93; J. Brody, The Neighbourhood Unit Concept and the Shaping of Land Planning in the United States 1912–1968, in: Journal of Urban Design 18 (2013) 3, pp. 340–362, at 352.

21 On Cooley's and other communitarian movements influence, see Mumford, The Neighborhood and the Neighborhood Unit, pp 259–262. On Park's definition of the basic social unit and the religious origins of the social control function neighbourhoods could perform, see Johnson, Origin of the Neighbourhood Unit, pp. 239–240 and E. Talen, Social Science and the Planned Neighbourhood, in: Town Planning Review 88 (2017) 3, pp. 349–372, at 365.

ence of civil defence during the II World War was also brought into the debate about the beneficial outcomes of the new urban villages. Many hoped that the unit would propel a new form of political action within the city, enabling the selection of community leaders, reaching deliberative cross-class consensus and forging a strong sense of identity.

It is against this background that I think one should interpret the proliferation of model villages in colonial Angola (as in other colonial and ex-colonial cases) from the inter-war period on. We may recall that Perry had placed communitarian institutions, especially the school, at the centre of the idealized urban blocks, a premise welcomed by Machado's residential units proposal. But purely rural model villages, conceived earlier in the 1920s, had already followed the same rationale. For example, responding to larger shifts in International Health, from vertical disease eradication campaigns and individual curative medicine to horizontal and collective healthcare delivery based on prevention, plans were advanced that tentatively reordered African local densities through resettlement schemes along with hygienist and sanitary principles. But seldom were such medical models actually applied.[22] A different, but telling story happened in the penal domain. Prison reform impulses, from the 1930s up until the colonial war, all conceded a greater weight to penal village experiments that were legalized and made into official doctrine in 1954. As open camps, with residential, industrial and collective amenities, but no individual cells, prison villages designed for native criminals crossed inmate decongestion from the urban centres with the principle of re-education or, to put it bluntly, forced community development, that is, the compulsory modernization of detribalized individuals through the re-enacting of civic interaction and professional training.[23] By the time urban planners started using the neighbourhood unit as a malleable *rurbanization* tool (an urban socialization outside the urban space), within the *regedorias* policy, the symbolic village, as a utopian self-contained organism producer of sanitary behaviour, political solidarity and societal equilibrium, was firmly established in Portuguese colonial thinking.

Closely associated with the perks and the symbolism of the (urban) village scale is the technique of Euclidean zoning, the strict functional separation of zones within a city. If town planning in Africa, and the key-concept of Master Plan, integral to the disciplining of space and land distribution, appeared in the early twentieth century, urban zoning was an instrument that followed later unregulated experiences of segregation. Only after World War II were there significant movements towards the normalization of the "dual city", previously determined by the "sanitation syndrome".[24] This experience was linked

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22   This was due to structural shortcomings such as the lack of financial investment, excessive dependency on underequipped local administrators and popular resistance, according to S. Coghe, Reordering Colonial Society: Model Villages and Social Planning in Rural Angola, 1920–45, in: Journal of Contemporary History 52 (2016) 1, pp. 16–44. Although I do not agree with the centrality of sanitary thinking in Coghe's analysis – neither do I follow his softer developmentalist thesis throughout – I do believe his is the best collection of villagization efforts in twentieth-century Angola up to date.

23   Pinto da Cruz, The Penal Origins of Colonial Model Villages.

24   A. D. King, Colonialism and Urban Development, in: F. Miraftab / N. Kudva (eds.), Cities of the Global South Reader, New York 2015, pp. 29–39; C. Coquery-Vidrovitch, The Process of Urbanization in Africa (From the Origins to the Beginning of Independence), in: African Studies Review 34 (1991) 1, pp. 1–98, at 67-70.

to the shift in colonial policy (and mentalities) from urban regulation as the control of migratory movements (with in-town passports) to permanent (even if self-aided) housing – a shift that testifies to the declining image of the African city dweller as a temporary rural individual in town. Only then did social and racial zoning become a functional social management tool. Supposedly multiracial cities engendered the kinds of anxieties that justified the technique. In the general plan of Nairobi (1945/46), for instance, a South African commission thus stated that "the more there are divergent and complex interests, the more will the municipal area be broken in separate specialized zones".[25]

But Angola may be one notable exception to this larger trend, racial and ethnic zoning being present in government-led villagization schemes since 1921. A Portuguese counterpart of the French policy of "association" was tested across Angola's hinterland during the High-Comissariat of Norton de Matos.[26] It was then that village regrouping, under the ostensible tenet of indigenous habits and customs' preservation, became mandatory. Zoning was central to the laws that enacted it, for they predicted the systematic division of larger ethnic groups into smaller ones.[27] Commenting on how this 1920s policy antedated the counterinsurgency resettlements of the 1960s, Basil Davidson underlined the fundamental issue at stake. From the colonialist standpoint, it really was a matter of combining micro-ethnicity with apartheid, since the law explicitly prohibited native construction outside said "indigenous concentrations" or villages and ordered the violent destruction of all huts found outside the new planned locations.[28]

Village *déguerpissement* went hand in hand with ethnical zoning within entirely racially segregated dwellings. As soon as it became available, it was all but normal that the neighbourhood unit would be applied, first and foremost, to these native settlements. And well into the 1960s, a period during which the neighbourhood unit was being dismissed in Europe, it still served to assuage strict zoning regulations, at least in theory. Tribal settlements posed lesser difficulties to the local chief or the local administrator when compared to the mixed tribal communities of the congested peri-urban belts. This was due to the simplification of codes that governed the conduct of the better-defined conglomerates and to the inner election of leaders or community elites that eased the politics of administration. Neighbourhood units applied in housing estates were thus seen as important instruments in the regimentation of congested mixed settlements, that is, in imposing spatial arrangements akin to tribal villages or at least to the settlement's social structure.[29] Whether this actually worked is an entirely different matter (and we

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25 L. W. T White / L. Silberman / P. R. Anderson Williams, Nairobi: Master plan for a colonial capital, London 1948, quoted in: C. Coquéry-Vidrovitch, Racial and Social Zoning in African Cities from Colonization to Postindependence, in: E. Bogaerts / R. Raben (eds.), Beyond Empire and Nation: The Decolonization of African and Asian Societies, 1930s–1970s, Brill, 2012, pp. 267–286, at 276.

26 On the French colonial policies of assimilation and association in the field of urban planning, see, for all, G. Wright, Tradition in the Service of ModernityArchitecture and Urbanism in French Colonial Policy, 1900–1930, in: The Journal of Modern History 59 (1987) 2, pp. 291–316.

27 Portaria n.º 137, Boletim Oficial n.º 51/1921.

28 B. Davidson, In the Eye of the Storm: Angola's People, New York 1973, pp. 119–120.

29 Gutkind, Urban Conditions in Africa.

have seen that it usually failed). What is worth stating, nevertheless, is that the centrality of zoning coupled with the neighbourhood unit principle was further reaffirmed by detribalization sociology.

The latter shared many assumptions with the Chicago school, many of them providing the foundations of later community development frameworks: the village or the unit as incubator of communitarian spirit, the preservation or altogether invention of collective ways of life, the densification of grassroots associations and cooperatives, and, above all, the physical control of migratory movements. When villagization policy started being implemented by the military, first, and by welfare agencies afterwards, during the 1960s, detribalization discourses went into plans that not only aimed at surveying and tracing rural-urban migrants, but also at circumscribing them, in a mix of disciplinarian mechanisms and security *dispositifs*. Here, pre-war Belgian colonial thought exerted a decisive influence at Lisbon's Escola Superior Colonial (Colonial High School), mainly through the action of the Jesuit priest Pierre Charles. For the missionary, "in order to attain the progress of human society", it was not sufficient to ensure an exterior appearance of public order, by police regulations and sanitary prescriptions. There was an administrative obligation: the juridical framing of African settlements, which, left without a precise statute, would become "spots of anarchy and discontent".[30] This idea was mobilized to justify the Belgian policy of *centres extra-coutumiers* at the Brussels Colonial International Institute – also known as the Moral and Political Science Academy of the Colonies. Those centres, or suburban villages, designed to avoid population fluxes through the issuing of *passports de mutation*, were transposed as exemplary institutions to the Portuguese colonial thought only during the 1950s, when it was retaken by sociologists and political scientists newly graduated from the colonial school.

Among them, Amadeu Castilho Soares elaborated the most complete and lasting approach to the phenomenon of detribalization in Portugal, strongly influencing colonial civil servants due to its programmatic nature. Soares advocated a new state-led programme conducted by agents "with a solid Christian education and elementary sociological preparation". His proposal reflected the direct contact he had maintained with native Angolan populations during his internship at the Mission for the Big Cities and Rural Well-Being. The fabrication of a sociological gaze within the colonial state's bureaucracy is well felt in his project for the inauguration of an Identification and Statistical Service, in charge of classifying urban natives on a civilizational scale, by measuring sociological indicators, such as the duration of residency outside the rural zones and the degree of professional and family stabilities. In accordance, his approach aimed at knowing the *real* dimension of detribalization and at launching satellite centres of containment based, again, on "neighbourhood units":

> *The large concentration of houses and people in a true indigenous city is not a happy solution. On the contrary, it is rather preferable the small concentration in smaller areas,*

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30   P. Charles, Le problème des centres extra-coutumiers et quelques-uns de ses aspects, Brussels 1936.

> *which not only brings sound advantages in the sanitary, administrative and police fields, but also makes the development of an authentic group spirit easier, allowing in turn a more efficient educational action and a smoother permeability to cultural contacts and acquisitions.*[31]

However, and unlike Prenda, but very much like Clarence Perry's preference for curvilinear pedestrian streets, these coeval projects placed a stronger emphasis on the need to avoid strict geometric patterns. Official statements, reproducing detribalization themes, warned against standardized gridded layouts, deemed artificial, stiff and inhuman when imposed on non-acculturated Africans. They devised, instead, more organic diagrams, seemingly inspired on native housing traditions.[32] Because this foreshadowed future critiques to the Prenda design, as we shall see, it sheds some light on the contested terrain on which these urban and village planners stood. The proponents of controlled assimilation, even after the abolition of the native's statute, with their *rurbanization* stages and *regedorias*, were also voicing against high-modernist designers such as Prenda's Simões de Carvalho, who did not consider himself to be – nor is he nowadays considered – an urban planner of a high-modernist quality. But his direct collaboration with military strategists, the enormous complexity of his Commission's project and the biased pre-sociological enquiries that he sponsored tell us otherwise.

While the Prenda Commission was set up, the policy of *aldeamentos* or strategic villages was initiated after the Portuguese razzia operations in the northern part of the country. Those northern villages would become the blueprint of later strategic hamlets within the counter-subversion effort. Civil authorities, then, had good reasons to advance milder forms of African settlements' layouts, the regedoria Viana and the Prenda scheme both standing at the forefront of the latter. After 1962, military planners started circulating civil rural settlement norms that prescribed the use of the neighbourhood unit's principles, such as wavy streets and more flexible designs. Central to this institutional learning were the commissions bringing together technical planners of all kinds, the military and the police, of which the one presiding over the Prenda *musseque* scheme was just one example. Usually, international discourses helped framing such knowledge circulation within civil-military working groups. Dialogues promoted by FAO around the comparability of the experiences of rural well-being implemented at a global scale gave economists, for instance, the possibility to locate colonial cooperative experiments on an ideological scale.[33] To them, military village experiments were the Angolan execution of the "colonies cooperatives divisées", extracted from the Israeli experience of the *moshav*, which consisted in the colonization of border areas based on the regime of land leasing

31   Amadeu Castilho Soares, Política de Bem-estar rural em Angola, Lisboa,1961, quoted in: PT/IPAD/MU/DGE/RPAD/1415/01931Junta Provincial de Povoamento, Reordenamento Rural, 4.

32   For a description of that first study, see Cruz / Curto, The Good and the Bad Concentration: Regedorias in Angola. See also Junta Provincial de Povoamento, Reordenamento Rural, 6-9.

33   Margaret Digby's paper "Co-operatives and land use", Rome 1957, prepared as a FAO report proved to be extremely influential on this matter among Portuguese economists.

to each family for an extended period of time and on free agricultural labour. Matter of fact, the Israeli case was the main source of inspiration for these northern Angolan *aldeamentos*, since it was the "most blatant case of the use of the cooperative system for dual ends" with economic and military objectives, that is. In the words of one leading economist, what was intended for northern Angola was comparable to the creation of a state "in a territory limited by hostile neighbours".[34] Moreover, community development themes were invoked to draw a rhetorical contrast between top-down, totalitarian economic and social planning and gradual modernization schemes. In a similar vein, the depiction of voluntary labour as a pragmatic and beneficial expedient for village-building and the opportunities local "community developments" opened up for recently trained social technicians also concurred to differentiate repressive military measures from welfarist rural reordering.[35] Since old and new villages, forming *regedorias*, were subject to varied exceptional military measures, and social workers were usually dependent on and played an active role in the social knowledge produced by the army, that is, in the policy of "mentalization", it is virtually impossible to distinguish civil from military regrouping experiences.

All the experiences described above were linked and contributed to the reorganization of Luanda's peripheries. They offered a strategic model on how to deal with the matter of population mobility within and out of the city. At the same time, they paved the way for the emergence of a new urban planning approach.

4. Auzelle Behind the Barbed Wire

The further one goes into the last years of Portuguese rule in Angola, the more one finds a more perfected integration of urban planners within the colonial structure of counter-subversion. Deliberative technical institutions on urban design and management became increasingly dependent on centralized appointments bringing together military officers, the political and public police, civil administrators and technical expertise. And this happened at all governmental levels. This does not mean that civil bureaucrats, some of them with coordinating and policy-making powers in Lisbon, were disinterested about the social and economic dimensions of urban planning in times of war. But when they turned their gaze to those dimensions, while carving out an autonomous field of urban management away from military rationales and security mentalities, they either reinforced older views on detribalization or focused on the precarious conditions of poor lower white classes living in Luanda.

Exactly how, then, had the subject of colonial urbanism evolved during this short period?

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34   W. Marques, Povoamento em esquemas comunitários de soldados-colonos, Actividade económica de Angola: revista de estudos económicos, propaganda e informação, Luanda 1964, pp. 33–65.

35   For the historical appropriations of UN's community development techniques at this time, see, among others D. Curto / B. Pinto da Cruz / T. Furtado, Políticas Coloniais Em Tempo de Revoltas – Angola circa 1961, Porto 2016, pp. 17–57.

Firstly, the access to and the visibility of comparable international slum management experiences showed that the lack of housing, not insufficient family income, was the main determinant of coeval social upheavals, familiar disaggregation, juvenile delinquency and of a general "impossibility of the social recuperation of one's self".[36] Housing levels were much more than mere indicators of an overall development pattern: they actively shaped economic and social progress and should thus be considered before trying to raise the African standards of living through higher income generation. Residencies, however, ought to be modest: realism served better the extant populations, ameliorating everyday life and inducing adaptive, not radical, social change. Even the unfinished, minimal and provisory traditional huts should be accepted if correctly seconded by the efficient delivery of public goods. Secondly, urban planning stopped being understood as a subsidiary principle of housing programmes. The tradition of considering shelter above anything else, without proper sewage, water and electricity systems' groundwork was shattered. Housing and infrastructural planning had to go hand in hand. This was crucial to the representation of law and order as tangible public goods liable to rational distribution within space constraints. Policing and surveillance finally entered the calculus of Luanda's urban planners. Thirdly, the latter had to concede a greater weight to the social, economic and political variables while designing concatenating urban projects. Pleas for more accurate and reliable data were frequent. Accuracy was key to the general aim of urban design under budgetary discipline: adjusted funding required social needs be meticulously measured. Lastly, zoning techniques were especially suited to the reordering of high-density areas: in order to open up sufficiently large spaces for circulation, to discipline the constant mutation of informal settlement quarters and to ease authority surveillance.[37]

The notion of "positive urbanization", conveyed by the Secretariat des Missions d'Urbanisme et d'habitat, the French agency for technical assistance on housing in developing countries, was key to this dynamic. Translated into Portuguese colonial urban policies opposing so-called "negative planning", that is, urban management based solely on temporary prohibitions and sanctions, it prescribed pre-emptive calculus, consisting on prediction, anticipation and public-private partnerships, a strategy particularly suited to Luanda's clandestine housing situation. Clandestine or informal white settlements illicitly built on public lands had increased at exceptional rates, from 4 per cent in 1956 to 20 per cent in 1963. By the end of the decade, the case of white poverty in Luanda triggered as many anxieties as the ever-growing native quarters. To public officials at the ministerial level, covert operations of public land acquisition by Europeans, of house and building construction financed by major constructor companies and of real estate speculation with unbearable upsurges in rents – affecting both white and African urbanites – were encouraged by the shortage of state financial resources as well as by the

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36   PT/IPAD/MU/DGOPC/DSUH/1973/09786, M. S. Teixeira de Sampayo, H. Novais-Ferreira, J. de Almeida Santos Jr., Habitação Social em Angola: Esboço de um programa de acção, Luanda 1968.

37   Ibid., pp. 208–212.

absence of updated master plans. Underfunding of state services stalled the execution of public goods infrastructures (water, sewage, electricity) and prevented the constitution of municipal land reserves, critical both to the regulation of the real estate market and to the provision of adequate space for urban expansion on strict guidelines. In addition, planning activities were fragmented and uncoordinated due to the lack of a recent master plan. The 1962 Commission's neighbourhood unit plan for Luanda fiercely supported the idea that future directive urbanization plans of Luanda should accommodate local arrangements tackling the problem of the *musseque*s, and not the reverse. Almost a decade later, top civil servants working at the Overseas Ministry would consider such an idea untenable and nefarious: neighbourhood units were important inasmuch as they complied with holistic city projects. In fact, it was acknowledged that the municipal Urbanization Office under the tutelage of Simões de Carvalho had done absolutely nothing to tackle the problem: local studies were mainly focused on the historical centre of the capital or addressed limited areas of the suburbs; and because there was no structural conception of the city on a larger scale, those plans were responsible for heterogeneity, lack of cohesion and urbanistic disorder. Central technical authorities also charged local architects and engineers for the successive phases of clandestine housing legalization, claiming that the absence of properly scaled habitational programmes spurred further rent increases. Demolition or the slow suffocation of extant informal quarters through public facilities' deprivation, such as schools, thus appeared as the only alternatives for imposing a certain degree of urban order.

Manifestations of field autonomy included an increasing polarization opposing high-modernist experts, such as Simões de Carvalho, and technocosmopolitan housing technicians of the late 60s around the subject of "social sensitiveness". "Who gets to monopolize Robert Auzelle's urbanism programme?" was the structuring issue of these years. Interestingly, Auzelle was used to criticize in explicit terms the subordination of holistic urbanization to dispersed, sometimes unsynchronized rehearsals of grandiose schemes like Prenda. In 1968, a new Commission on social housing programmes in Angola pointed out that for Auzelle:

> *l'urbanisme ne connaît guère, en effet, que des cas particuliers... [Il] apelle une intervention organisatrice. Cette intervention ne peut être arbitrairement laissée à l'inspiration éventuellement capricieuse d'un spécialiste. Elle doit être guidées par les Pouvoirs publics [...] La carence de l'Etat en ce domaine aurait pu prendre les proportions d'une démission nationale.*[38]

This position was further legitimized by the participation of colonial officials in international meetings where one could clearly feel an unspoken clash between two schools of thought: the French *tecnicista* – which the Portuguese would call *dogmatic* – premised on abstract rationalism, idealized outlines and on a will to "mould a people" to fit their

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38   Auzelle quoted in ibid., pp. 11–13.

schemes; another Anglo-Saxon *empiricist*, using the "people, the house, the city, just as they are". Accordingly, Angola had suffered enough from devotees of the first even when tempered with claims of local adaptability.

One of such meetings took place in Brazil, under the theme of Regional Planning and Housing, in 1967. It soon became a foundational event in the history of urban planning in Angola, for it allowed Portuguese representatives to import the conservative model of a "National Housing Bank" (NHB).[39] The appeal of the Brazilian experience rested on three interrelated reasons. First, the NHB was the central piece of Brazil's first National Housing Plan (1964), a landmark of the military dictatorship of Castello Branco, known for the implementation of orthodox macroeconomic policies aimed at drastically reducing inflation and public expenditure. The goal of the programmes was to stir self-sustained financial resources to the habitational sector of the lower classes, without increasing government spending. The NHB was the federal agency in charge of coordinating state-level CoHabs, housing companies that garnered financial resources and made real estate investments based on the active contribution of lower-class workers.[40] This suited the new colonial housing planners' dreams of a public coordinating branch that alleviated the state's budgetary burden on native housing. Second, as a means-tested approach using compulsory contributions, its application in Angola could instil domestic rigour and saving habits on the traditional economically weak populations. At the same time, the acquisition of houses would propel "social emulation" by creating superfluous consumerist needs of a western kind – an indirect technique for attaining controlled social progress in Africa. Third, the model had already been tested in Chile and Mexico (countries with a similar socio-economic structure to that of Angola's), that had imported it, with local variations, from the United States' housing system, thus attesting to its cross-country validity.

If Brazil offered a solution to the trade-off between centralized coordinated planning and low-cost housing construction to the poor, South Africa presented exemplary answers on the matter of urban design. Stripped of the inconvenient allusions to the role of urban planning under the apartheid regime, Southern African technical literature reached Angola indirectly, through the influence it exerted on Mozambique. The reference here was D. M. Calderwood's *Native Housing in South Africa* (1953), an influential graduate thesis concluded under the auspices of the South Africa National Building Research Institute. Because in Mozambique engineers were trying to articulate rural lifestyles at suburban areas within larger urbanization efforts, Calderwood's proposal of small private farmable lots surrounding Black residences was tempting. Moreover, Angolan and Mozambican technicians found the South African approach as encapsulating a synthesis between *tech-*

39   Cf. PT/IPAD/MU/DGOPC/DSUH/1973/09786, 2ªs Jornadas Luso-Brasileiras de Engenharia Civil, 6–19 August 1967.

40   M. Beckert Zappellini / J. Gomes Lima / M. Correia Guedes, Evolução Da Política Habitacional No Brasil (1967–2014): Uma Análise de Equilíbrio Pontuado, in: Revista Interdisciplinar de Gestão Social 6 (2017) 3, pp. 153–172; PT/IPAD/MU/DGOPC/DSUH/1973/01474 Relatório da Missão Oficial ao Brasil – Presidente do fundo dos Bairros Populares de Angola, 26 September 1967.

nicism and humanism, perhaps due to Calderwood's predilection for a social sensitive, survey-based approach drawn from Patrick Abercrombie and Lewis Mumford.[41]

Despite a growing awareness of shared transnational experiences of *bidonvillisation*, concerns about the definition of what was local precluded the import of radical experiences of urbanization and housing from "more advanced western countries". The latter represented the kind of machinist de-humanized urban conceptions inadequate to individuals undergoing a process of detribalization. But international knowledge also helped rationalise such a position. For instance, experts drew on the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa's recommendations to justify why Luanda's suburban population could hardly be sheltered in several floor-buildings – a veiled critique to the Prenda initiative: "one should notice", concluded the Survey of the Economics of Grouped Housing in Africa, "that the less educated the population, the less capable it is of adapting to certain aspects of urban life and the larger the space it needs for domestic activities".[42] Likewise, the same idea underpinned the noticeable absence of metropolitan urban solutions as exemplary: recently erected conglomerates for the housing of lower-class residents in Lisbon, at the neighbourhoods of Olivais Sul or Chelas, were only fitted to populations accustomed to century-long urban lifestyles, and, for that matter, "to high-rise buildings".[43] Psycho-social enquiries were similarly employed to underscore the irreconcilability between traditional and modern uses of the domestic space, by rendering some threshold values useful. Regarding the most appropriately covered areas per person in Africa, the French sociologist Chombart de Lauwe's binomial "dangerous limit" and "satisfactory limit" had to be reconsidered: if the interval of 8–10 square meters made up an unhealthy environment for the upbringing of French children, then in Angola the dangerous threshold had to be higher – not just due to geographical determinants, but social as well. Anxieties about infant pathological cases and maternal extreme fatigue gave the tone to this renewed discourse on detribalization.[44]

That these late-imperial reports served to collect and summarize a bulky set of state-of-the-art material on global urban and housing systems is a clear indication of how contentious the issue of urban planning was still in Angola on the eve of independence. We are far from the well-defined lusotropical synthesis put forward by such stellar figures as Simões de Carvalho in the early 60s and underscored by some recent scholarship on

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41   On D.M. Calderwood's approach, see E. Haarhoff, Appropriating Modernism: Apartheid and the South African Township, in: 14th IPHS Conference, 2010, pp. 5–7; A.S. Marques, Primeiras Jornadas de Engenharia de Moçambique, 1965.

42   ECA, Survey of the Economics of Grouped Housing in Africa, in: Ekistics, 19 (1965) 112, pp. 172–181, quoted in: Teixeira de Sampayo, Novais-Ferreira and Santos Jr., Habitação Social em Angola, at 183.

43   Ibid., p. 180.

44   It is difficult to grasp the extent of psychological and socio-genetic knowledge acquired by Portuguese central and colonial urban/house technicians, and the exact influence of other international sources other than the French one. At least, reports took the latter seriously enough to parametrize low-cost house dimensions. Cf. M.-J. Chombart de Lauwe, Psychopathologie sociale de l'enfant inadapté. Essai de sélection des variables du milieu et de l'hérédité dans l'étude des troubles du comportement. Travaux du Groupe d'ethnologie sociale, Paris 1959.

the topic.[45] Moreover, from 1966 on, architect and engineer-only state commissions represented much more a collective effort of bibliographical collection, sorting out and appropriating vast arrays of international data, than actual decision-making players. The importance of an unequal access to universal knowledge, usually caused by the inexistence of official translations into Portuguese, can't be overlooked. To be sure, international meetings played a relevant role in model circulation, but printed sources contributed deeply to the period's urban planning framework. A strong dependence on Brazilian and French sources, with indirect and very limited contacts with the Anglo-Saxon world, may have curtailed the array of urbanistic choices.

Nevertheless, the fact that the major campaign for gathering informational capital on the topic began in 1967 testifies to the thesis that very little had been done in the matter of suburban infrastructural reordering and housing. The same year also witnessed the most impressive consequence of making colonial rural sociology the basis of urban policy: the import of emergency procedures from the hinterland warzone to Luanda. The northern experiences of concentration with barbed wire surrounding centric and peripheric residency zones of strategic hamlets were then explicitly projected to the *musseques*.[46] This fact alone indicates that, regardless of the relative importance of international learning, the decisive factor for the emergence and consolidation of a new planning approach was state violence. Pre-emptive and repressive actions laid the ground for the said shift towards a permanent housing policy. What made such a terrible complementarity possible? We may recall that proposals of neighbourhood units and villagization schemes in the late 1950s and early 1960s stated that detribalization containment could only be achieved through an adequate state knowledge of the population. The enquiries inspired by Auzelle's methodology that antedated the construction of Prenda multi-floor buildings were a small piece of this larger trend towards a socio-spatial cartography of Luanda. Simões de Carvalho survey was followed by a handful of studies that faced the same set of shortcomings.[47] All of them wanted to characterize the "interstitial areas" of the city, the transitional or deteriorating belt, as some observers had called the *musseques*. To do so, they had to rely on the reification of administrative neighbourhoods, a phenomenon that followed closely the ever-increasing volume of rural migrants living in the city, which in turn guaranteed geographers, sociologists and social workers their indispensable research framework and empirical evidence.

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45   Milheiro, Nos Trópicos Sem Le Corbusier; Viegas, Urbanization in Luanda, and Venâncio, O Bairro Prenda Em Luanda.

46   PIDE/DGS, Del A, 14.14/B, NT 2042, Normas respeitantes ao serviço de controle e segurança na Vila do Ambrizete, elaborado pelo Comando Militar do Sector A, em colaboração com as autoridades policiais e administrativas locais, 12 March 1967.

47   These were conducted by the municipal sanitary services, the ITPAS, the labour and social assistance institute of the colony created after the war, and the Missões de Inquéritos Agrícolas, the Angolan agricultural agency. The latter provided the majority of the personnel to one of the most relevant studies of the musseques, the one conducted by Ramiro Monteiro, a chief of cabinet at the Angolan Services for Intelligence Centralization and Coordination (the SCCIA). See below.

Since 1956, Luanda was systematically split into a growing number of smaller administrative units in order to ease the herculean tasks of local administrators and their staffs.[48] But it was only in 1964, when the policy of population transference, regrouping and control was applied in the countryside, that the urban authorities undertook the first population census for police registration. This operation entailed, in turn, the division of each *musseque* into several *zonas de esquadra* (police station zones), covering a determined set of households. The need to register families and chiefs of families also implied the taming of the plastic, resilient-like nature of the slums. Police registration, therefore, depended on the inscription of two numbers and two letters on each door, representing the house, the zone and the initials of the *musseque's* designation.[49] If such procedures were new to the suburban populations, some of their long-distant relatives living in the countryside had felt them immediately after the beginning of the war. There, psycho-social actions of capture, recuperation and rehabilitation followed a very similar pattern: the separation of pseudo-homogenous communities into distinct neighbourhoods after local statistical rituals that were directed by the military. Covering everyone, the family, the group and the village, these files were often aggregated to convey psychological charts.[50] There is, of course, more than mere similarity and chronological accident to both these surveillance strategies. They were profoundly entwined by the very nature of population mobility across the country. The endeavour, as it became clear a few years later, was to achieve government monitoring through synoptic data, made up of evidence collected at distinct points of Angola. In the matter of "abnormal population movements" this allowed both biographic tracing and the finding of biopolitical patterns.[51] Since after the urban riots of February 1961, there was, in the words of the District Governor, an "absolute urgency in having duly controlled all the individuals… not only for security measures but even to avoid the fleeing of those who lack any identification card".[52] With the abolition of the Native Statute and with the enactment of the new labour code, the *cadernetas indígenas* (native identity cards) and their labour records were no longer usable, a situation that posed grave difficulties to the government of African masses. Legislative diplomas enacted in the mid-1960s tried to overcome the void left by those reforms. To achieve a reasonable degree of control over the freedom of movement, police

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48 Portaria n.º 9585, de 19 de Dezembro de 1956; Decreto n.º 4257, de 23 de Dezembro de 1959; Diploma Legislativo n.º 3042, de 11 de Maio de 1960; Portaria n.º 13489, de 14 de Novembro de 1964 e Portaria n.º 14165 de 29 de Janeiro de 1966. See also AHU-ISAU, A2.49.004/53.00.397, D. Pires Velloso, Relatório de Inspecção ao 1.º Bairro Administrativo do Concelho de Luanda, 1969; AHU-ISAU, A2.49.004/53.00389, V. Telles da Gama, Relatório de Inspecção ao Concelho de Luanda, 2.º Bairro Administrativo, 1961.

49 For instance, 3 MO 155 meaning house 155, zone 3 of Musseque Mota. Ramiro Ladeiro Monteiro, A Família Nos Musseques de Luanda: Subsídios Para o Seu Estudo, Luanda 1973, p. 30.

50 3/C/II standing, in a village, for house 3, of Group C, from Conglomerate II. For a thicker description of the process, see Cruz and Curto, The Good and the Bad Concentration: Regedorias in Angola, pp. 14–19.

51 PIDE/DGS, Del A, 14.14/B, NT 2042, PIDE Malange, RSPI n.º 10/66, of 8 November 1966 and answer by the PIDE in Luanda.

52 PIDE/DGS, Del A, P Inf, 15.11.A, NT, 2084, GDLuanda, C. Oliveira Santos, Perintrel anual 1962, 17 July 963. For the Angolan cities or concelhos, see Governo-Geral de Angola, Diploma Legislativo n.º 3447 de 22 de Fevereiro de 1964; for the rural zones, Governo-Geral de Angola, Diploma Legislativo n.º 3819 de 4 de Abril de 1968.

officers had to keep track not only of travels, but most importantly of residence changes. This was mainly done through the disclosure of varied personal data before the issuing of a permit, enabling future comparisons of central categories: gender, provenience, new residency (quarters, streets and houses).[53] Police sources acknowledged that the system was "complex, expensive and insecure", but it remained useful, nonetheless, especially if accompanied by data collected from taxpayers and sanitary census, such as the campaigns against sleeping-sickness.[54]

Another issue at stake was the discipline of in-town populations. Here, the most pressing concern was connected to getting access to and prevent "terrorist" plans. The mass imprisonments of 1961, with at least three thousand African rebels arrested and detained in a matter of months, was hardly seen as a successful measure, for it left intact a vast majority of individuals that the secret police presumedly knew to be somewhat related to the liberation movements. The parallels to rural political conditions predating repression were striking. There, too, entire villages were depicted to be seditious, the suspects of terrorism mingling freely among the masses. This situation led the army to resort to open concentration repertoires, ranging from penal camps to *regedorias*. In the capital city, the probability of native escapes, when confronted with public authorities, had been exacerbated by military patrols within and around the periphery. Intelligence services noted that said "incidents" were usually physical assaults provoked by the army and that the fear of an eventual coercive dispersion was constantly felt. For example, in Prenda, Africans were "unmercifully punished" when found drunk on weekend evenings or holding "seldom recommendable meetings" in the annexes – annexes that had been reconstructed with bricks, a practice considered transgressional construction. Private justice, with physical reprimands and in-house imprisonment, was becoming normal, while signs of sedition, especially alleged communist propaganda, were found everywhere within the *musseques.*[55] Among the signs, one could find white hands painted on the settlements or the circulation of rumours about "how the city is for the European and the suburbs for the African".

Due to the difficulty of identifying certain individuals and of creating a reliable chain of informants, the rural policy of *enquadramento* (framing) had to be reinvented. From the state's perspective, one of the advantages of village reordering was the reduction of traditional collaborative elites and the duplication of a concatenated scheme of intelligence gathering that added a totalitarian quality to the bounded-neighbourhood system within each new village. In Luanda, the disorganization of settlements, the inexistence of "traditional authorities" and the lower densities of *enquadramento* (framing) agents mitigated such direct systems of forced collaboration.[56] However, in 1967, urban population *enquadramento* would be imposed on the exact same lines: public servants and household

53   A small sample of such files can be found in ANTT/ PIDE/DGS, Del A, 14.14.A, NT 2041.
54   PIDE/DGS, Del A, 14.14/B, NT 2042, SCCIA, Apontamento, 17 August 1966.
55   PIDE/DGS, Del A, P Inf, 15.11.A, NT, 2084, Inf. 7/2/1963; Inf. 393-180/964, de 4/6/64; Relatório 197/64 de 17/2/64.
56   Inspection reports of the city date the last traditional authority, Domingos António de Menezes, and his respective regedoria in the Cabo Island to 1961. V. Telles da Gama, Relatório; Duarte Pires Velloso, Relatório, p. 6.

chiefs were obliged to provide intelligence on the events of their residency area, to track the arrival of fluctuant individuals, to signal the presence of suspects or strangers and to report all the required identification data and household changes. "Mutatis mutandis", an intelligence secret report acknowledged, "the exact same competencies thought to be performed by traditional authorities" in rural villages.[57]

The idea that the *musseques* were fertile ground for subversive actions and terrorist plans was continuously evoked until the 1970s. Political police agents constantly conveyed an image of African thorough resistance, to which the informality of suburban settlements was essential: native Africans tried to build seeming traditional huts, "making paddocks and palisades" thus obstructing the native quarters and isolating themselves from the authorities. Cruel military beatings and police murders due to barrier building were notified[58]. Closely related to the image of a denser racial atmosphere in the slums was the situation of public police officials vis-à-vis the military. Police agents, in increasing numbers year after year until 1974, were seen as "soft" when compared to the "hard" armed forces patrols. White Europeans were particularly keen on commenting against "psychological actions", the majority of which carried out by the police:

> *It is rumoured that police elements fear the natives and try to avoid them* [...] *since they do not feel supported by their superiors, who are still fanaticized by the* psico [...] *invented as a balsam for the protection of the irresponsible and as acid for those who try to educate.*[59]

In fact, corporate measures had been taken to control punitive actions and violent impulses on the part of the police and civil administrators since 1961. But private commercial interests and Afro-European public opinion divulged the idea that policemen were falling in discredit. Moreover, this phenomenon, combined with the increasing influx of rural labour migrants to Luanda, who could not be absorbed by labour demand in the city, had two major consequences. For one, the frequency of surveillance rounds increased; those rounds began to be done at different times with inconstant patterns and surveillance and repression were exerted simultaneously across the *musseques*,

> *in order not only to instil a climate of insecurity in the respective zones, but also to better control the populations who, running from one* musseque *to another, would end up caught in the latter, or the other way around.*[60]

Second, urban planners were finally called upon to apply zoning techniques to the *musseques* in order to plan the demolition of some segments. In 1966, high political

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57 PIDE/DGS, Del A, 14.14.A, NT 2041: SCCIA, Projecto de Diploma Legislativo sobre Controle de Populações, 16 August 1967.
58 PIDE/DGS, Del A, P Inf, 15.11.A, NT, 2084: Relato de notícia 1441-215/65, 26 August 1965.
59 PIDE/DGS, Del A, P Inf, 15.11.A, NT, 2084: Inf. 116/65 from José Manuel da Costa Marques to the public and military police, 15 January 65; Relato de notícia 1290-215/65, 25 July 1965.
60 PIDE/DGS, Del A, P Inf, 15.11.A, NT, 2084: Informação 40/66: Panorama político-subversivo nos musseques, 31 March 1966.

and military officials established multilateral countersubversion teams to deal directly with the problem of the peri-urban masses, thus resuming the programme of the 1961 Commission of Simões de Carvalho and Vieira da Costa.[61] The goal was to discipline the space, applying village reordering schemes through the division of informal conglomerates into parishes with local mayors and to buttress the pass system by enforcing campaigns of suburban census, police and social security enquiries. This urban subversive panorama, then, made colonial authorities increasingly more reliant on actual neighbourhood planning and permanent housing. As it happened in rural Angola, identification, fixation and surveillance depended very much on the real reordering of the human and natural environment. Police patrols, periodical hearings and crime management had engendered a vested interest in urban development.

Urban development, here understood as an outcome of civil and military strategies regarding detribalization management during the 1960s, was a contributing factor in the emergence of social science studies about the population of Luanda. The centrality of new habitational files in the development of behavioural science cannot be emphasized enough. They not only provided the largest amount of information on families (nuclear and extended) and isolated individuals that had ever since been collected in Luanda (one might rightly say in Angola). Resulting from the spatial rearrangement of the slum areas, they also delimited the universe of the sociodemographic research for the collection of empirical material. While doing so, the police mentality shaped the sources, the methods and the findings of those enquiries. Perhaps more importantly, it influenced the questions that researchers posed. That the two most influential sociohistorical monographs about Luanda were published in 1968 and 1971 is but a sign of this interplay: both studies were consciously dependent on the new administrative quarters, on police techniques and on networks of informers. Reversely, academic research helped the police and urban planners in defining more cautiously the collective identities and individual behaviours of future well-defined units.[62]

6. Conclusion

Histories of Portuguese architecture and urban planning in former African colonies have overlooked the role played by modernist designers in shaping colonial policies of social control, as well as the more immediate political and military contexts of production of new styles and techniques. Despite their welcoming attention to international epistemic

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61 PIDE/DGS, Del. A, 14.13.A/3, NT 2040: SCCIA, Informação 1540/5, 31 July 1967.
62 Ilídio do Amaral, Luanda: Estudo de Geografia Urbana, Lisboa 1968, and Ramiro Monteiro, A Família Nos Musseques. Amaral's and Monteiro's research materials followed the same destiny: they informed and actually gave sociological life to the birds' eye-view of aerial surveys. Substantial portions of the raw data collected by Monteiro were used by the Omnium Téchnique d'Amenagement, the French agency contracted to produce the last colonial Master Plan of Luanda. Cf. PT/IPAD/MU/DGOPC/DSUH/1974/04961: Dossier sobre os bairros populares de Luanda, 1972. Monteiro. A Família, p. 31.

communities and their rediscovery of a luso-african contribution to the modernization of the Global South, those studies have stripped historical agents off their close involvement with dominant colonial institutions. While effacing this side of warfare collaboration and authoritarian partnership, biographical accounts also tend to emphasize the humanist dimensions of their projects. By questioning the novelty of the 1962 appliance of the neighbourhood unit technique to the Prenda *Musseque* at the outskirts of Luanda, I was able to bring the rural domain back into the urban picture, to qualify the more radical enthusiasm behind said forms of modernist sensitiveness and local empathy and to determine the relative autonomy of the urban planning field in late colonial Angola. In itself, such an approach – that the postcolonial history of Angola is still very much in need of – was not new, at least since Gwendolin Wright's enquiry on the political complementarity between the cultural-relativist strand of French twentieth-century colonial urbanism and military might.[63]

One of the most interesting questions about the Angolan case relates to how larger, international and global tensions were eventually mirrored at the imperial level, during the formative period of the postcolonial world. My guess is that struggles around the proper use of the neighbourhood unit, the humanity and the sensitivity of urban plans in Angola were local episodes of the global tension that opposed, during the exact same years, modernist agents and community development technicians at the UN assistance agencies. As Tobias Wolffhardt points out in this volume, in the matter of post-war housing in the Global South, modernization agents' expectations and mindsets were at odds with communitarian advocates, the latter proposing *softer* techniques based on aided self-help, active participation and state-society synergies. Both were anchored on two, very different, sociologies about African urban and rural ecologies: the first revolving around the strict dichotomy between the traditional rural African peasantry, immobile and static, and the city, the modern locus par excellence, displaying western-like heterogeneity and social mobility; the second, closer to the first adaptive theorists of the late 1950s and early 1960s, finding hybridity in urban configurations and looking at acculturative elements and institutions that mediated the transition – if any – from the tribal world to modernity. Amongst social scientists, there was, of course, an evolution in this thinking, with modernization theorists' rigid dichotomy and pattern-variables coming first, but being slowly replaced, during the 1960s, by more nuanced, empirically grounded analyses. "Detribalization", then, was not the equivalent of modernization, for urban growth could and did coexist with "traditional" values and behaviour. From this assumption, community development techniques specifically designed for the rural sphere started being tested at urban milieus.

Read in this light, the transference of the neighbourhood principle from the hinterland into the capital city of Angola cannot be disentangled from the more coercive goals it was purportedly applied to attain. Villagization efforts, clearly entrenched in a detribalization framework, shared an elective affinity with immigration anxieties that underpinned

some conservative Chicago school of sociology premises, the scientific foundations on which Clarence Perry's notion stood. By the early 1960s, its widespread use can be accounted for by the reinvigorated policy of village-building and population resettlement, civil and military, a tendency that culminated with the full-fledged conception of Luanda as an interdict, quarantine city. However, without the international debate on the extension of rural community development techniques to urban groups, the legitimacy of such authoritarian – not to say totalitarian – measures were unlikely to be secured among the Portuguese elite itself.

Regarding the matter of modernizing ambitions, Nils Gilman called attention to the ways multiple stances could coexist within a single author, the paradigmatic arch being that of Walt Rostow's ruthless high-modernist foreign policies turned into late developmental communitarianism.[64] The partial genealogy of the neighbourhood unit principle in Angola wards us against the simple reproduction of one's own position taking in the historical past: by unearthing conflictual moments, even if delayed in time, a greater degree of distance may be achieved. This cautionary perspective brought the international urban and housing experiences to the fore of the debate and allowed to broaden the canvas that currently depicts the Prenda project and its main author. But too far a look at international circulation and inter-imperial learning can cause scholarly farsightedness concerning the much more local subnational transferences of extractive institutions. In other words, the colonial urban planning field was not as autonomous as the transnational approach might suggest: urban developmental ideas and frameworks emerged out of a colonial warfare context. Counter-subversion commissions were the most important triggering moments of urban reform, while the police, the army and social scientists were critical actors in the making of *musseques*' history and physical evolution. Therefore, I tried to understand how urban planning across Angola became dependent on and actively contributed to the rationalization of colonial repression.

Even if the urban and house planning commissions of the late 60s reanimated the field around the definition of sensitivity, the uses of sociology and the limits of industrialization, such struggles did not prevent their ideas from being deployed to more prosaic ends. They were all too dependent on the military and police efforts of counter-subversion to achieve such "sensitiveness". In other words, demands for a more thorough socio-demographic knowledge about targeted urban populations were voiced much more *because* of military thinking rather than *against* it. Police and military manoeuvres of surveillance and mobility control, across the country and at the capital city, provided urban technicians and sociologists with the necessary infrastructural reach for attaining subjective and objective data about African urbanites. Quite paradoxically, the submission of the field of urban planning to the coercive branch of the state's apparatus was integral to the development of a new form of urban management based on permanent housing. Those coming from the recent labour and welfare agencies created after the war – with only

64   N. Gilman, Mandarins of the Future: Modernization Theory in Cold War America, Baltimore 2003.

an indirect interest in urban management and security – frequently expressed a truly reformist agenda, demystifying old notions of "detribalization" and "vagrancy" and unveiling the powerful economic interests on which they stood. But theirs was a lost cause: urban planners offered security agents more appealing and cost-effective images of social engineering, reinstating the principles of centralized planning and control.

Bogotá Utopic: Urban Planning and Public Order in the Building of Colombia, 1948–1953

Amanda C. Waterhouse

ABSTRACTS

Der Artikel untersucht ein urbanes Planungsprojekt für Bogotá, Kolumbien, das ausländische Planer nach den großen Unruhen vom April 1948 entwickelten. Die Bogotazo führte bei den Eliten zu großer Sorge vor öffentlichen Aufständen und zu einer Kongruenz anti-kommunistischer Zielsetzungen der USA und dem Interesse an der Aufrechterhaltung der öffentlichen Ordnung seitens der kolumbianischen Regierung. Stadtplanung erschien als ein Mittel, Ordnung zu fördern. Der Aufsatz untersucht Pläne für Bogotá von Le Corbusier, Josep Lluis Sert und Paul Lester Wiener im Kontext der Congrès Internationaux d'Architecture Moderne (CIAM). Im Anschluss wendet er sich der Planungsphase zu, die im Kontext gewalthafter Konflikte, Repression und urbaner Migration in den späten 1940er und frühen 1950er Jahren verkompliziert wurde. Letztlich scheiterten die Pläne an praktischen Gründen und an der Opposition kolumbianischer Politiker und Unternehmer. Damit untersucht der Aufsatz Utopismus im politischen Kontext und plädiert für die Bedeutung von Plänen, die nicht realisiert wurden.

This article examines an urban planning project for Bogotá, Colombia, that foreign planners formulated after large-scale riots of April 1948. The Bogotazo propelled elite fears of popular revolt, aligning United States anticommunist interests with the public order concerns of the Colom-

bian government. These state actors looked to urban planning as one way to foment order. The article explores plans for Bogotá developed by Le Corbusier, Josep Lluis Sert, and Paul Lester Wiener first by analyzing ideas related to their professional organization, the Congrès Internationaux d'Architecture Moderne (CIAM). It then turns to the planning process, which became increasingly complicated in the late 1940s and early 1950s, amidst ongoing violent conflict, repression, and urban migration. The plans ultimately foundered on practical issues and opposition by Colombian actors, including officials and business interests. The article considers utopianism in political context and posits the historical importance of plans that are never enacted.

This is an essay about a future that never happened. On the afternoon of Friday, 9 April 1948, Colombian lawyer and politician Jorge Eliécer Gaitán was fatally shot in front of his office in Bogotá's city centre.[1] Gaitán fell only blocks from where United States and Latin American officials had been meeting at the IX Pan-American Conference.[2] He died soon after. Supporters of the leader, who had galvanized a broad popular base that assumed the Colombian government was responsible for his death, responded in the same place that he was assassinated: the streets of Bogotá. During the *Bogotazo* (riots in Bogotá), people tore apart much of the city's downtown buildings and transportation infrastructure, looted, and brutally murdered Gaitán's alleged assassin. Anything that "symbolized social order or political power", historian Jorge Osterling writes, "was destroyed."[3] Afterwards, officials grappled with what kind of future they wanted for the city and the nation. A certain vision for including the *pueblo* (people) in formal politics was contested and died with Gaitán; and so too did urban plans to reconstruct Bogotá articulate a prospect of utopian city life that was soon foreclosed and would never come to pass.

The vision inherent in these urban plans was a transnational product of its particular moment. The Colombian government contracted United States and European actors to rebuild and modernize Bogotá from the late 1940s through the early 1950s. The plans thus responded to the profound destruction wrought by politically enraged people who had demolished numerous buildings in Bogotá's downtown area. Given that the charter meeting of the Organization of American States was taking place in some of the very buildings affected by the riots, international attention for reconstruction was easy to capture. The Colombian government solicited loans from the United States, and it also hired planners to come to Colombia to rebuild and modernize the city. Architects Josep Lluis Sert and Paul Lester Wiener, both European expatriates who together owned a

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1   H. Braun, The Assassination of Gaitán: Public Life and Urban Violence in Colombia, Madison, WI 1985, pp. 134–135.

2   Bogotá berserk, in: Newsweek 31, 19 April 1948, pp. 48–49; Upheaval, in: Time 51, 19 April 1948, pp. 38–39; La Noche Quedó Atrás, in: Semana IV (24 April 1948) 78, p. 5, Folder 1, Box 47, Alfonso Araújo Gaviria collection (hereafter AAG), Archivo General de la Nación (hereafter AGN), Bogotá, Colombia. Unless otherwise noted, sources from the AGN are originally in Spanish.

3   J. Osterling, Democracy in Colombia: Clientelist Politics and Guerrilla Warfare, New Brunswick 1989, p. 88.

New York firm called Town Planning Associates, partnered with the famed Swiss-French architect Le Corbusier on the project, working across three continents. Yet despite years of effort, the detailed and completed plans never led to construction.

Two categories guide this story: planning and order. Planning had wide meaning and diverse valences in this particular moment. National economic planning was fundamental to World War II and post-war policymaking, and urban planning shifted in the wake of wartime destruction, displacement, and reconstruction efforts.[4] In the post-war period, urban planning and architecture were closely intertwined. It was common for Europeans and Americans trained in these skills to travel the world proposing new private homes, government and corporate buildings, and neighbourhood and city plans.[5] Though such projects in newly decolonizing areas of the world, such as Nigeria and Pakistan, would become an arena in which to negotiate the formal transfer of power and constitute independent states, in Latin America, which had decolonized over a century earlier, they shored up the state's elite interests. These included industrial development and the modernization of capital cities and universities.[6] The region saw an opening moment in the wake of World War II, in which economic growth and political openness fuelled a leftist democratization process and labour militancy in many countries.[7] Yet the tide soon turned back to conservatism in a counterrevolutionary wave propelled by local elites' fear of popular politics, which fed into the Truman Administration's growing anxiety about communism across the globe.[8]

Bogotá in 1948 was a place and time in which the counterrevolution began in both loud and quiet ways; state repression as well as planning aligned with the political interests of the Colombian and US governments, in response to a disruption of public order. Order, for planners, meant both a well-functioning city – good transportation, functional infrastructure – and calm, compliant citizens, who would enjoy the benefits of housing, parks, and other amenities and thus remain aligned with the state. Planners, as Timothy

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4   D. Engerman, The Rise and Fall of Central Planning, in: J. Ferris et al. (eds.), The Cambridge History of the Second World War, vol. 3: The Moral Economy of War and Peace, Cambridge, UK 2015; E. Mumford, The CIAM Discourse on Urbanism, 1928–1960, Cambridge, MA 2000; E. Mumford, Designing the Modern City: Urbanism Since 1850, New Haven 2018, especially pp. 202–252.

5   Mumford, Designing the Modern City, pp. 207–219. See also N. Kwak, A World of Homeowners: American Power and the Politics of Housing Aid, Chicago 2015, p. 111; A. Offner, Sorting Out the Mixed Economy: The Rise and Fall of Welfare and Developmental States in the Americas, Princeton 2019, p. 84. Not all building policies came from international circulation. For an account of domestic influences on Colombian housing policies, see S. Romero Sánchez, Ruralizing Urbanization: Credit, Housing and Modernization in Colombia, 1920–1948, PhD thesis, Cornell University 2015, ProQuest (3730458).

6   Mumford, Designing the Modern City, pp. 237–244. See also L. Carranza and F. Lara, Modern Architecture in Latin America: Art, Technology, and Utopia, Austin 2014.

7   L. Bethell / I. Roxborough, Introduction: The postwar conjuncture in Latin America: democracy, labor, and the left, in: L. Bethell / I. Roxborough (eds.), Latin America Between the Second World War and the Cold War, 1944–1948, Cambridge, UK 1992, pp. 1–32, at p. 2.

8   Ibid.; G. Grandin, Living in revolutionary time: coming to terms with the violence of Latin America's long cold war, in: G. Grandin / G. Joseph (eds.), A Century of Revolution: Insurgent and Counterinsurgent Violence during Latin America's Long Cold War, Durham 2010, pp. 1–42, at pp. 11–18, 29.

Hyde writes, sought "civic order" through "formal order."[9] This goal reflected the fact that the very categories of planning and order were in flux, and in Bogotá they co-produced each other in specific ways – planners saw themselves as apolitical technocrats working from the top down, but their work gained heightened political stakes through the actions of rioters in the street. A protest-planning dynamic thus undergirded a broad definition of order in urban space at a foundational moment in the emergent Cold War in Latin America.

My essay locates urban planners in this context alongside Colombian and US government actors in order to demonstrate the way that states explored the projection of power through built environment. It first details the April 1948 riots as destruction of physical infrastructure by examining US and Colombian press and governmental documents. Violent political upheaval changed US-Colombian relations during the late 1940s, when the notion of communist threat became both a danger and an opportunity to state actors from both countries. The plans for reconstruction responded to this context. Urban planners operated with a vision of the future that functioned to prop up state control through the built environment of the city, even as they claimed to be apolitical. Analysis of the plans themselves and the way that the architects wrote about them in architectural trade press and private letters shows how their pre-war ideas both carried forward and shifted in the Cold War context. It reveals the political stakes of their work due to its context in the post-riot capital of a country sliding into violent rural conflict. The second section discusses the project's failure and legacies, as planners and local officials and others came into conflict, and the possibility of the plans was foreclosed. The essay utilizes primary sources from Colombia, the United States, and France to interpret both utopian intent and the projection of state power by the United States and Colombia through transnational work. It shows how urban plans – influential and immaterial; tangible and ephemeral – hold deep historical importance in both the legacy of what remained unrealized and the material significance of that which did come to pass.

1. Reconstruction Plans

Just before Gaitán's assassination, the IX Pan American Conference was underway in April 1948, with Bogotá as its backdrop. The city was located, one promotional article noted, at a high altitude (about 8600 feet or 2600 meters), on a plateau called the *sabana* (savannah) of Bogotá, with a "salubrious climate" and numerous Spanish "colonial masterpieces."[10] Its population in 1947 was only about 600,000 people, but it was growing and urbanizing rapidly (in 1951 the population topped 700,00 and by 1964 it exceeded 1.6 million and 51% of Colombians lived in cities).[11] Bogotá had been

9   T. Hyde, Planos, Planes y Planificación: Josep Lluís Sert and the Idea of Planning, in: E. Mumford/H. Sarkis/N. Turan (eds.), Josep Lluís Sert: The Architect of Urban Design, 1953–1969, New Haven 2008, p. 56.
10   L. Judson, Behold Bogotá, in: Bulletin of the Pan American Union 82 (1 April 1948), pp. 185–197.
11   Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadisitica, XIII Censo Nacional de Población (Julio 15 de 1964),

an administrative centre of the Spanish empire. But it was mountainous and relatively isolated, at least until the advent of commercial air travel there in 1919, which would soon connect the capital to other parts of Colombia and beyond.[12] By 1948, it was only a two-hour flight from the coast, and travellers could ride from the Techo airport through "[m]iles of flat savanna ringed with bare mountains" on the new four-lane Avenida de las Américas.[13] Bogotá had recently seen "phenomenal growth and modernization," with the "ancient, narrow streets", one article stated, "giving way to wide modern avenues and boulevards."[14] An extensive building programme was already underway in the late 1940s. It included construction of public and private buildings, factories, schools, and dwellings, as well as roads.

State officials convened the conference in a context of fraught international and domestic politics. While the United States sought to solidify a post-war hemispheric bloc under its leadership, the Colombian government's goals were more economic. Officials wanted a Marshall Plan for Latin America.[15] The international conference also occurred amidst domestic political tensions. Jorge Eliécer Gaitán had articulated a popular form of politics that challenged the elite nature of Colombia's two-party political system. The Liberal and Conservative parties, who had openly fought in the past, were attempting to get along in a practice called *convivencia* (coexistence). Gaitán criticized this political establishment. Neither party engaged with the masses, he argued, as he sought to draw the *pueblo* into a politics of the common man against the oligarchy. Some saw him as a socialist or even a fascist in the making, while others charged him with class resentment or career ambition; to his followers, Herbert Braun writes, Gaitán was "the savior who would redeem them from all earthly ills."[16] With a complicated relationship to the Liberal party, whom he alternately worked with and against (and to institutional politics, having served as a congressmen and briefly been mayor of Bogotá and held government minister postings), Gaitán was widely believed to have been on track to win the Liberal nomination and presidential election planned for 1950. The day that he died, Gaitán's followers assumed his assassination to have been a Conservative government plot – perhaps aided by the Liberal establishment – to stop both the man and his political movement (although his

Bogotá 1969, p. 24; M. O'Byrne, Le Corbusier en Bogotá, 1947–1951, in: M. O'Byrne Orozco (ed.), Tomo 1: LC BOG: Le Corbusier en Bogotá, 1947–1951, Bogotá 2010, p. viii; Romero Sánchez, Ruralizing Urbanization, p. 1.

12 L. Judson, Behold Bogotá, pp. 185–197.

13 V. Hazen / V. Wheeler, Sky-Bound Bogota is Getting Dressed Up, in: New York Times, 1 February 1948, p. X17.

14 Judson, Behold Bogotá, pp. 185–197.

15 US Department of State Policy Information Committee, Proposals By Other American Republics Emphasize Needs, Current Economic Developments 127 (1 December 1947), p. 9, in: Foreign Relations of the United States (hereafter FRUS), Current Economic Developments 1945–1954 (Issues 68–156), Microfiche Supplement, Washington, DC 1986; EE. UU. Necesitan de la Ayuda Económica de Latino-América, in: El Tiempo, 2 April 1948, p. 1, Luis Ángel Arango Library (hereafter LAA), Bogotá, Colombia. Unless otherwise noted, sources from LAA are originally in Spanish; Dollar diplomacy at Bogota, in: Bloomberg Businessweek, 13 March 1948, p. 113; Communication from Washington to Bogotá, 9 April 1948, Box 358, Folder 316, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Archivos Oficiales (hereafter MRE), AGN.

16 Braun, Assassination, p. 37.

alleged assassin, Juan Roa Sierra, more likely had a personal vendetta).[17] *Gaitanistas* saw in his assassination the death knell for the radical popular politics that he championed, and they took their anger and despair into the streets.[18]

The *Bogotazo* was a chaotic, explosive, and unplanned event of widespread destruction whose place in the historical record is refracted through positionality and the politics of memory.[19] After murdering Gaitán's alleged assassin and dragging his corpse to the steps of the presidential palace, the crowd was dispersed by government troops. Gaitán died at a nearby clinic, and, as word of his death spread, people began to stream into downtown Bogotá. They smashed, burned, and looted buildings. The protests quickly switched from a partisan focus on the presidential palace and Conservative newspapers to a more general attack on the "hierarchical social order", in which people turned their anger on "symbols of public power", including public buildings, police stations, businesses, churches, and the homes of politicians.[20] All told, 157 private buildings in downtown Bogotá were damaged, in addition to numerous public buildings and churches. Yet the crowd was not indiscriminate. Select potential targets survived, such as Gaitán's well known car – a dark-green Buick – which was left untouched.[21] Some accounts assert that Bogotá was saved due to the late afternoon drunkenness of the crowds as well as rain that helped extinguish fires.[22] The dead were un-counted and the full extent of mortality will never be known, though casualties were likely in the thousands.[23] Braun sees the riots as an attack on the very social order, which focused on the physical locations in which people could "easily see decisions being made about their lives."[24] The crowd, he shows, remains anonymous, though he deduces that it was "urban but lacked a strong working-class base" and included lower- and middle-class men and women.[25] Journalists and officials from both Colombia and the United States saw in the rioters an unruly mass instigated by sinister forces.[26]

17   Ibid., p. 186.
18   Ibid., pp. 36–38, 51, 56–62, 71, 74.
19   For oral history accounts, including with Fidel Castro, who was in Bogotá as a young student delegate, see Arturo Alape, Memorias del olvido, 2nd ed., La Habana, Cuba 1983.
20   Braun, Assassination, pp. 155–163.
21   Ibid., p. 164. The exact figures are for private buildings whose owners filed claims, and so do not include the numerous public buildings and many churches that were also destroyed.
22   Osterling, Democracy in Colombia, pp. 88–89.
23   Braun, Assassination, p. 169. Estimates range from about 500 to 2500 dead.
24   Ibid., p. 168. For an interpretation more based in the urban history of Bogotá, see Romero Sánchez, Ruralizing Urbanization, p. xvii.
25   Braun, Assassination, pp. 157, 171–172.
26   For US accounts, see press already cited; Telegram from Ambassador Beaulac to Acting Secretary of State, Bogotá, 9 April 1948, in: FRUS, 1948, Vol. IX, The Western Hemisphere, Washington, DC 1972, Doc. 22. For Colombian accounts, see: Asi se Desarrollaron los Acontecimientos, in: El Tiempo, 16 April 1948, p. 7, Folder 1, Box 47, AAG, AGN; Mensaje de Ospina, Anoche, in: El Liberal, 12 April 1948, p. 8, Gilberto Alzate Avendaño Foundation Library (hereafter GAA), Bogotá, Colombia. Unless otherwise noted, sources from the GAA are originally in Spanish. See also Catalina Muñoz Rojas, Más allá del problema racial: el determinismo geográfico y las 'dolencias sociales,' in Los Problemas de la raza en Colombia, Bogotá, 2011, pp. 11–60.

Elite and press accounts from both countries fixated on the physical destruction of the city as well as the vulnerability of the statesmen within it. US press said that the city looked "burned", "wrecked and looted", "desolate", "gutted", "battered", "bullet-chipped", and "ruined."[27] One newspaper even reported that the "uprising" had turned the city into "an inferno of loot-lust and blood-lust."[28] US Secretary of State Marshall wrote the following night that the capital building in which the conference had been held was "completely gutted" and that the "Center of city shambles and fires still burning."[29] *Time* and *Newsweek* emphasized how the city became divided between safe space (the US embassy; the foreign press hotel with a "grandstand view of the fighting"; the suburban residence where Marshall was "safe but marooned") and targeted loci – especially the presidential palace.[30] US Ambassador Willard Beaulac telegrammed the State Department hours after the riots began to report that "Mob invaded Capitolio, seat of Pan American Conference, ransacking building and attempting set fire at least one wing" and that "Bomb was thrown into ground floor Edificio Americano where offices US delegation housed on seventh floor."[31] Colombian press likewise deemed Bogotá "Semi-Destroyed" and in a state of "Anarchy."[32] Alfonso Araújo Gaviria, a Liberal statesmen, wrote in a private letter that the Government Ministry "burned like a torch" and that Carrera 7 [7th avenue] was a "volcano", with all the buildings like "pyres, with flames up to the sky."[33] In a radio address the following day, President Ospina called on the Colombian pueblo, "all the citizens of order and work", to "form a compact squadron beside the government to bring to bear a definitive crusade against subversion, killing, and pillage."[34] His was a call to citizenship and order meant to re-establish the rule of the state.

After being temporarily suspended, a "skeleton conference" of only 21 leaders reconvened in a high school library in what was then the suburban neighbourhood of Chapinero.[35] They signed the Organization of American States (OAS) into existence by the end of April 1948.[36] The valedictory act such an accomplishment was meant to be, however, had been greatly diminished. Only a month had passed since President Truman declared

27   Aftermath, in: Time 51, 26 April 1948, p. 35; Upheaval, in: Time 51, 19 April 1948, pp. 38–39; Warning pigeonholed, in: Newsweek 31, 26 April 1948, pp. 22–23.
28   Bogota Riots Laid to Reds by Marshall, in: Los Angeles Times, 13 April 1948, p. 1.
29   Telegram from Secretary of State George Marshall to Acting Secretary of State, Bogotá, 10 April 1948, 10 pm, in: FRUS, 1948, Vol. IX, The Western Hemisphere, Washington, DC 1972, Doc. 23.
30   Bogotá berserk, in: Newsweek 31, 19 April 1948, pp. 48–49; Upheaval, in: Time 51, 19 April 1948, pp. 38–39.
31   Telegram from Ambassador Beaulac to Acting Secretary of State, Bogotá, 9 April 1948, in: FRUS, 1948, Vol. IX, Doc. 22.
32   Bogotá Está Semidestruida, in: El Tiempo, 12 April 1948, p. 1, LAA; La Noche Quedó Atrás, in: Semana IV, no. 78 (24 April 1948), p. 5, Folder 1, Box 47, AAG, AGN.
33   Letter from Alfonso Araújo Gaviria to his wife and children, 15 April 1948, Folder 1, Box 47, AAG, AGN. See also Braun, Assassination, pp. 178–179.
34   Mensaje de Ospina, Anoche, in: El Liberal, 12 April 1948, p. 8, GAA.
35   Telegram from Ambassador Beaulac to Acting Secretary of State, Bogotá, 14 April 1948, in: FRUS, 1948, Vol. IX, Doc. 28.
36   Aftermath, in: Time 51, 26 April 1948, p. 35; Warning pigeonholed, in: Newsweek 31, 26 April 1948, pp. 22–23.

Pan American Day and Pan American Week.[37] Now the Cold War in Latin America began with Colombia at centre stage.

The Colombian government suddenly had to contend with the global stakes of its domestic political tension. An Associated Press dispatch reportedly stated that "Communists appear to be spurring the revolution."[38] Secretary Marshall denounced communist involvement from Bogotá.[39] One U.S. congressman deemed the riots a "South American Pearl Harbor."[40] His remarks charged US intelligence failure as much as they framed the moment as drawing the US into a significant global conflict. In private, the Colombian ambassador to the United States, Gonzalo Restrepo Jaramillo, objected to the press classification of Colombia as an "unstable government" and to the charge of communism.[41] Yet publicly, the Colombian ambassador played into US rhetoric by deferring to Marshall's assessment and stating that the "uprising in Bogotá was not a local or domestic event; it has to be included in the general pattern of strike, unrest and violence at present spreading throughout the world."[42] Colombia soon severed diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. As the post-war democratic spring across the region turned back the other way, Colombian officials quelled the many uprisings in its cities, where rioting had spread from Bogotá in a broader set of events known as the *9 de abril* (9th of April). The events escalated previous rural unrest, spurring *La Violencia* (the Violence) – a protracted period of partisan battles and governmental repression, fought mostly in the countryside, in which an estimated 200,000 Colombians died and two million migrated or were displaced between 1946 and 1966.[43] The assessment of communism by US and Colombian state actors traded in anxieties about popular uprising in this moment, helping to fuel the search for different mechanisms for central state control and public order.

One week after the riots, Bogotá had somewhat returned to normal, and the Colombian government worked to restore order through both domestic and foreign policies. It issued public order decrees[44]; levied new taxes to fund reconstruction (while giving those

37   Harry S. Truman, Proclamation 2771: Army Day and Proclamation 2772: Pan American Week, Proclamations Harry S. Truman, 1945–1953, Harry S. Truman Library (hereafter HTL), http://www.trumanlibrary.org/proclamations/index.php?pid=346; http://www.trumanlibrary.org/proclamations/index.php?pid=347.

38   M. Johnson, Revolt Grips Bogota: Marshall Safe, Bloody Riots End Parlay, in: Daily Boston Globe, 10 April 1948, p. 1.

39   W. Sanders, Reminiscence of William Sanders, August 1975, HTL, http://www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/sandersw.htm. Bogota Riots Laid to Reds by Marshall: Secretary of State Blames International Group for Uprising, in: Los Angeles Times, 13 April 1948, p. 1.

40   W. White, A "Pearl Harbor" in Bogota Charged: End of Any State Department Curb on Intelligence Agency Urged in House Action, in: New York Times, 17 April 1948, p. 7. The article attributes the quote to Representative Clarence J. Brown of Ohio.

41   Letter from G. Restrepo Jaramillo to the Minister of Foreign Relations, 14 April 1948, Folder 316, Box 358, MRE, AGN; Letter from US Embassy in Colombia to the Minister of Foreign Relations, 26 April 1948, Folder 316, Box 358, MRE, AGN.

42   Statement by G. Restrepo Jaramillo, 13 April 1948, Washington, DC, Folder 27, Box 188, MRE, AGN.

43   For more on La Violencia, including debates on causality and periodization, see C. Bergquist, ed., Violence in Colombia: The Contemporary Crisis in Historical Perspective, Wilmington, DE 1992; M. Roldán, Blood and Fire: La Violencia in Antioquia, Colombia, 1946–1953, Durham, NC 2002, especially at p. 5; and R. Karl, Forgotten Peace: Reform, Violence, and the Making of Contemporary Colombia, Oakland, CA 2017.

44   These decrees include 1148, 1239, and 1259 of May 1948. Folder 1, Box 47, AAG, AGN.

who had suffered losses a tax break)[45]; and employed hundreds of workers to demolish and clean up burned and ruined buildings.[46] By mid-April, officials had created a National Office of Reconstruction and Urbanism, which was a joint effort between the Municipality of Bogotá, the Ministry of Public Works, and the Pan-American Conference Planning Office. The new office was charged with studying and planning to reconstruct the capital city as well as other cities that had suffered destruction during the events of the *9 de abril*.[47]

Reconstruction was also front and centre in Colombian foreign relations with the United States as policymakers negotiated early foreign aid. Whereas Colombian policymakers had trouble advocating a Marshall Plan for Latin America before, in the wake of the violence the US government authorized a USD 10,000,000 "emergency reconstruction loan" from the Export-Import Bank.[48] Characterization, in Colombian and US press, of Bogotá as "bombed" or "blitzed" helped create an equivalence with Western Europe's wartime experience, which merited high levels of reconstruction aid.[49] By August, the Colombian government signed an agreement for a line of credit to acquire in the United States "supplies, materials, equipment, and services required for replacement, reconstruction or repair and development of properties destroyed or damaged during the recent disturbances in Colombia."[50] In the year before President Truman announced Point IV – the fourth point of his inaugural speech in 1949, which is widely considered to be the first articulation of foreign aid as part of US presidential foreign policy doctrine to fight communism abroad – funding for Colombia was being worked out in an ad hoc way, at the behest of a local government with particular needs. Though approval issues hampered the disbursement of the Bogotá Reconstruction credit, the Export Import Bank did allocate USD 3,000,000 in 1950 for the purchase of houses for the city of Bogotá and maintenance equipment for the National Highway Department.[51] Economic advisers also began to travel from the United States to perform studies in Colombia. These included Lauchlin Currie, a New Deal economist who led the first World Bank mission to the country beginning in 1949.[52] Simultaneously, Colombian officials solicited US policymakers for military aid, expressing a need to triple their standing army (Colombia

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45   G. Marshall, Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, 12 July 1948, in: FRUS, 1948, Vol. IX, Doc. 93; Riots Cut Taxes in Bogota, in: New York Times, 9 June 1948, p. 7.

46   Un Gran Plan de Reconstrucción de Bogotá, Estudia Ahora la Alacaldía, in: El Liberal, 17 April 1948, p. 6, GAA.

47   G. Córdoba, Bogotá Recobró la Normalidad con la Ayuda de Todos sus Habitantes, in: El Liberal, 17 April 1948, p. 3, GAA; P. Forero, Inician la Reconstrucción, in: El Liberal, 15 April 1948, p. 6, GAA.

48   Treasury Secretary J. Snyder to the Acting Secretary of State, 14 April 1948, in: FRUS, 1948, Vol. IX, Doc. 29.

49   W. Alig, Bogotá's Plight: US Funds Urged to Rebuild City Wrecked by Mob, in: New York Herald Tribune, 14 April 1948, p. 22; Americans Taken to Safety: 300 Reported Dead in Bogota, in: Washington Post, 11 April 1948, p. M1; Coalition Cabinet Formed to Seek Peace; La Noche Quedó Atrás, in: Semana IV, no. 78 (24 April 1948), p. 5, Folder 1, Box 47, AAG, AGN.

50   The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Colombia, 24 August 1948, in: FRUS, 1948, Vol. IX, Doc. 93.

51   Memorandum of informal conversation, Colombian Embassy in Washington DC, 5 May 1948, Folder 316, Box 358, MRE, AGN; US Department of State Policy Information Committee, Current Economic Developments 264 (24 July 1950), p. 11, in: FRUS, Current Economic Developments 1945–1954, Microfiche Supplement.

52   See Offner, Sorting Out the Mixed Economy, pp. 6, 100–111.

would soon gain more leverage for military aid by becoming the only Latin American country to contribute troops to the Korean War effort).[53] Thus did public order become cemented into the foundation of US and Colombian policymaker notions about Latin America's dawning Cold War.

As the Colombian government pursued reconstruction with some urgency, including by seeking US government funds, it also solicited ambitious urban planning help from international experts. Their work would build on a series of earlier studies. These included those by Austrian urban planner Karl Brunner, which were, as historian Susana Romero Sánchez puts it, "fundamental to Bogotá's expansion in the late 1930s and early 1940s."[54] Attempts at largescale urban plans for Bogotá were also made by local authorities, such as in the Plan Soto-Bateman of 1944, and by local architects, chief among them the Colombian Society of Architects (Sociedad Colombiana de Arquitectos, SCA).[55] The SCA advocated for core principles of urban design in Bogotá: respecting the orthogonal design of the city, including by avoiding diagonals and transversals; accepting the preponderance of north-south transit and promoting wide and continuous streets; and establishing new arteries within a grid of rectangular superblocks. The mid-1940s SCA *plan vial* (road plan) was completed in part. This included construction of Avenida de las Américas, which connected the airport to the city centre, as well as widening a number of main avenues. As the first functional master street plan, the SCA project remained influential.

When they were hired in the late 1940s to create new urban plans for Bogotá, Le Corbusier, Josep Lluis Sert, and Paul Lester Wiener were famed architects who had each worked all over the world. They had formed part of a common pre-war intellectual milieu through their European working group, created in the late 1920s, called the International Congresses of Modern Architecture (Congrès Internationaux d'Architecture Moderne, CIAM). All saw fascism affect countries in which they had lived, in France, Spain, and Germany, respectively. And all immigrated to a new country – Le Corbusier (whose given name was Charles-Édouard Jeanneret) to France from his native Switzerland, and Sert and Wiener to the United States. Each was also politically ambiguous to an extent. Accusations of communism have been levied against Le Corbusier, as well as, less commonly, fascism.[56] The architect's ideas were statist in ways that lent them to

53   B. Coleman, Colombia and the United States: The Making of an Inter-American Alliance, 1939–1960, Kent, OH 2008; G. Marshall, Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, 12 July 1948, in: FRUS, 1948, Vol. IX, Doc. 93; US Department of State Policy Information Committee, Colombian Economic Mission Visits US, Current Economic Developments 157 (28 June 1948), p. 10, in: FRUS, Current Economic Developments 1945–1954, Microfiche Supplement.

54   Romero Sánchez, Ruralizing Urbanization, p. 287; see also J. Montoya, Planificación, urbanismo y la construcción de la Bogotá moderna: De Brunner a Le Corbusier, in: I. Duque Franco (ed.), Historiografía y planificación urbana en América Latina, Bogotá 2013, pp. 73–168.

55   Plan Vial Piloto – 1960, pp. 3–11, Estudios de la Vialidad Bogotana, Departamento Administrativo de Planificación Distrital, Bogotá, D.E., 1960, Cámara de Representantes, Información Jurídico, Archivo Legislativo, Informes Misceláneos, Nro. 4, Material Descatalogado, AGN.

56   M. Antliff, Avant-Garde Fascism: The Mobilization of Myth, Art, and Culture in France, 1909–1939, Durham, NC 2007, especially pp. 144–145, 152–153. Le Corbusier worked on plans for both the USSR and Vichy France,

authoritarian usage, from across the political spectrum, and he worked for governments of various political orientations around the world. He believed in the power of the state to shape modern life for citizens in the public sphere.[57] Sert emigrated to New York City after the fall of the Spanish Republic in 1939, and though he thus demonstrated greater aversion to fascism, he shared a belief in the power of the state to help create favourable planning outcomes.[58] In New York, Sert started working with Wiener, who had settled in the United States by the early 1930s and forged both personal and professional ties to government.[59] Sert and Wiener established the firm of Town Planning Associates (TPA) in New York City in 1942. TPA provided architecture and urban planning services across the world for two decades, especially in Latin America.

Each of the three architects had worked to align the modern city to the human body in physical space. Sert published *Can Our Cities Survive?* and Le Corbusier published *The Athens Charter*, both during World War II, to crystallize CIAM thinking as it had developed since the group's founding in 1928. They closely connected the urban planning reforms that they advocated to the human subject in the physical space of the city. Both advanced the concept of "human scale" as a planning referent. Sert, for example, called man the "axis of new cities."[60] Each evoked the city as a "living organism." In their "urban biology", public health for the individual and the collective relied on CIAM's four functions: "inhabiting, working, recreation (in leisure time), and circulation."[61] Yet health was also metaphysical. The "ignorance of vital necessities, as much physical as moral", Le Corbusier wrote, "bears its poisoned fruits: illness, decay, revolt."[62] The planners understood health as encompassing political stability – as against revolt – and they

though he later tried to distance himself from both, and his French CIAM group, ASCORAL, had ties to the French-Algerian resistance against the Vichy regime. See also P. Hall, Cities of Tomorrow: An Intellectual History of Urban Planning and Design in the Twentieth Century, Oxford, UK 1996, pp. 210–212; E. Mumford, Designing the Modern City: Urbanism Since 1850, New Haven 2018, p. 203; N. Weber, Le Corbusier: A Life, New York 2008, pp. 342–345 413, 465.

57   For one important theorization of this feature of Le Corbusier's work, see J. Scott, The High-Modernist City: An Experiment and a Critique, in: Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed, New Haven 1999, pp. 103–146.

58   Biography, The Josep Lluis Sert Collection, Frances Loeb Library, Harvard University, https://hollisarchives.lib.harvard.edu/repositories/7/resources/726; Josep Luis Sert, Spanish architect and artist, in: Chicago Tribune, 17 March 1983, p. A16; J. Rovira, José Luis Sert, 1901–1983, Milan 2003, pp. 82, 50, 94. Sert had designed the Spanish Pavilion at the 1937 International Exposition in Paris, where Pablo Picasso's Guernica was displayed at the request of the Republican government. Sert became a US citizen in 1951 and dean of the Harvard Graduate School of Design in 1953.

59   Wiener left Germany in 1913 and became a US citizen in 1919, but he studied and worked in Germany during the Weimer period before returning to the United States, where he worked for the Office of Production Research and Development. In 1934, he married Alma Morgenthau Wertheim, daughter of diplomat Henry Morgenthau and sister of Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau, Jr. See Paul Lester Wiener, Architect and City Planner, Is Dead at 72, in: New York Times, 18 November 1967, p. 37; Historical Note, Paul Lester Wiener papers, 1913–1968, University of Oregon Libraries, http://archiveswest.orbiscascade.org/ark:/80444/xv66707; Mrs. A.M. Wertheim Architect's Bride, in: New York Times, 25 January 1934, p. 16.

60   J. Sert, Can Our Cities Survive? An ABC of Urban Problems, Their Analysis, Their Solutions, Cambridge, MA 1942, p. 228.

61   Ibid., pp. 4, 232. Le Corbusier, The Athens Charter, transl. Anthony Eardley, New York 1973 (c 1943), p. 101.

62   Le Corbusier, Athens, p. 101.

integrated public order into their notion of the modern. Though they denigrated the pernicious effects of industry – the "civilization of black smoke, of noise, of noxious gases, of crowded slums" – Le Corbusier and Sert promoted the underlying structure of industrial capitalism.[63] They focused on transportation efficiency, for example, for ease of work. Both had a "profound respect for individuality" that could, on its face, seem democratizing.[64] Yet the paradox of individual liberty predicated on state planning points to the limitations of individualism as a truly democratic ideal. In the space of the city, from the civic to the domestic, urban planning should, they argued, act on people in a way that sought to be totalizing: their bodies made healthy and efficient by its structures. Individuals were an "enlightened population" that "will understand, desire, and demand what the specialists have envisaged for them."[65] Democracy meant individual allotment in their rendering, but it did not mean self-determination. Individual choice was not part of the frame.

The architects' ideology dovetailed with burgeoning ideas within the Truman Administration of just how subtle the geostrategic threat that it faced could be. At this early moment in the Cold War, its real fear was of changing forms of "indirect aggression", which could include nuanced shifts in public attitudes and ways of life. The preoccupation sometimes went under the name of Psychological Strategy. Its ambit included information control and psychological operations, including radio stations and propaganda. The Marshall Plan was an important piece in the US psychological campaign because it promoted a non-communist, public-relations friendly form of economic advancement.[66] Such conceptions of subtle influence expanded the purview of the ideological conflict. Beyond territorial control, the human mind was a site to win influence. What urban planners like Sert, Wiener, and Le Corbusier offered was a model for how such a contest might be fought in actual, everyday terrain: in spaces of leisure, transportation, and even the human body itself. Preoccupation with these new spaces, especially in cities, gained political traction in much the same way, and for similar reasons, as Psychological Strategy and thus were connected to the Cold War conflict at its outset.

In Colombia, the planners already enjoyed both a cultural reputation and specific histories.[67] Wiener had travelled to Colombia, among other Latin American countries, in 1945 on a US State Department-sponsored lecture trip designed to garner political support through cultural and educational initiatives. Sert also became involved in lecturing

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63 Ibid., pp. 49, 76-78, 97; and Sert, Can Our Cities, pp. 58, 229, 128.

64 The Founding of the CIAM, 1928 and The Declaration of La Sarraz, in: Le Corbusier, Athens, pp. 5, 7.

65 Sert, Can Our Cities, p. 239. Le Corbusier, Athens, pp. 94, 95, 103, 105.

66 S. Lucas, Campaigns of Truth: The Psychological Strategy Board and American Ideology, 1951–1953, in: The International History Review 18, no. 2 (May 1996), pp. 279–302, at p. 28.

67 Le Corbusier had lectured in Latin America in 1929, worked in Chile in 1930, and designed a project in Argentina beginning in 1948. See N. Weber, Le Corbusier: A Life, New York 2008. Montoya argues that South America held particular interest for Le Corbusier. See Montoya, Planificación, urbanismo y la construcción de la Bogotá moderna, p. 108. TPA drew up plans for Cidade dos Motores, Brazil (1943–1947) and Chimbote, Peru (1947–1948), and would also later take on work in Venezuela and Cuba. See Carranza and Lara, Modern Architecture in Latin America, 1943-B.

in Latin America.[68] Le Corbusier, meanwhile, had lectured in South America in 1929, and he later met Colombian official Eduardo Zuleta Ángel during work on the United Nations building in New York City. Zuleta Ángel invited Le Corbusier to a pair of conferences in Bogotá in June 1947, on modern architecture and town planning. Upon arriving in the city for the first time, Le Corbusier was greeted at the airport by hundreds of students, along with almost all other architects living in the city, who yelled, in French, "Down with the Academy! Long live Le Corbusier!"[69] Local interest in CIAM ideas coalesced in a Colombian chapter of the organization established shortly thereafter. A subsequent city mayor later wrote that, in their "youthful fervor", the group of young Colombian architects were "disquieted […] by the apparent inability of the city to conform" to a new order. Negotiations for Le Corbusier's work in Bogotá began at this time; the authorities hired him to "insure success", as he had "led the world in architectural expression of modern sociological concepts."[70] Sert and Wiener had already contracted TPA to create plans for Tumaco, followed by Medellin and Cali.[71] Yet it was in Bogotá, Colombia's capital city, that the clearest links between civil unrest and state planning played out.

Though the Bogotá project had been discussed before the *Bogotazo*, commentators in Colombia began to relate the urban planning efforts to the destructive events in their wake. A 1952 study through the Inter-American Housing and Planning Centre (Centro Interamericano de Vivienda y Planeamiento, CINVA, an agency of the OAS headquartered in Bogotá) articulated the project as responsive to the *9 de abril*. Like newspapers, it compared the events to war. England, it stated, "influenced by war, is considered today as the cradle of modern urbanism. France, Sweden and the United States have also done a lot in this sense."[72] Thus was Bogotá's situation still hopeful, despite the "disaster of the 9 of April of 1948," which helped motivate officials to "put things in order."[73] Later accounts agreed. A 1960 Pilot Plan that reviewed previous such efforts noted that officials acted amidst the "urban ravages occasioned by the events of the 9 of April of 1948."[74] The planners were charged, it stated, to study "without delay the necessary measures for a prompt reconstruction of the central area, affected by the fires of the month of April and

68   See F. Hernández, Architectural Latin American Modernism: Twentieth-Century Politics, Historiography, and the Academic Debate, in: A. Lindgren / S. Ross (eds.), The Modernist World, London 2017, pp. 383–391, at pp. 385–386; Carranza / Lara, Modern Architecture in Latin America, 1943-A and 1943-B.

69   Notas Editoriales, PROA, August 1947, LAA; F. Pérez Oyarzún, Le Corbusier: Latin American traces, in: J. Lejeune (ed.), Cruelty & Utopia: Cities and Landscapes of Latin America, New York 2005, pp. 99–100.

70   S. Trujillo Gómez, Birth of a city, in: United Nations World 5 (1 May 1951), pp. 57–58.

71   Part of Medellín's downtown centre was developed from these plans. See Aids City Plans in South America: Wiener-Sert Group Here at Work on 6 Projects in Peru and Colombia, in: New York Times, 18 February 1951, p. 198; Carranza and Lara, Modern Architecture in Latin America, 1943-B; Mumford, CIAM Discourse, p. 327.

72   R. Vargas Mera, El Plan Regulador de Bogotá y Sus Relaciones con la Vivienda, Bogotá 1952, p. 4., Box 144, Fondo CINVA, Universidad Nacional de Colombia (hereafter UNal). This study was performed by Vargas in order to earn a postgraduate degree at CINVA.

73   Vargas Mera, El Plan Regulador de Bogotá, p. 24. CINVA, UNal.

74   Plan Vial Piloto – 1960, p. 11, AGN.

the adoption of plans to permit the harmonious development of the city."[75] The project was motivated by a reconstruction ethic. It necessarily responded to concerns about order and intertwined them, in lasting official narratives, with goals of future growth and development.

The riots thus raised the political stakes of the work, as did ongoing violence. After spending the first six months of 1948 traveling in Latin America, including meetings in Colombia with Zuleta Ángel, Sert wrote to Le Corbusier: "I have the impression, that this 'reconstruction' of the city is becoming a political affair, and that the fight between 'liberals' and 'conservatives' dominates everything."[76] Yet project participants denied politics, perhaps too vehemently. Bogotá mayor Fernando Mazuera, who wanted to be known as the "public works mayor", told the popular magazine *Cromos* that he had "rejected politics from the beginning. He has wanted to be a simple administrator of the city."[77] The denial of politics continued throughout 1948 and 1949, as the Oficina del Plano Regulador de Bogotá (OPRB) was created to oversee the urban planning project and the city council passed Acuerdo (Agreement) 88 to commission the plan in two phases (the Plan Director [Master Plan], otherwise known as the Plan Piloto [Pilot Plan], headed by Le Corbusier, and the Plan Regulador [Regulatory Plan], by Sert and Wiener). "When politics gets involved, the simplest things become complicated", Sert wrote to Le Corbusier in February of 1949, as the contracts were negotiated (both architects would sign them by the end of March 1949).[78] Wiener reminded him that "we must bear in mind that bureaucrats will hold us – if not always themselves – to the letter of the contract."[79] Like Mazuera, they wanted to be technocrats: they attempted to act as "international experts to formulate 'apolitical' urbanistic doctrines for common good" and "avoided local political involvements."[80] Wiener wrote to Le Corbusier in November 1949, after work on the pilot plan had started. He said that he had advised Herbert Ritter, a Colombian architect partnering on the project who decried the "extreme political unrest" in which Colombia found itself as "the most serious of the century",[81] to remain quiet on politics – to "stand on the completely neutral grounds of a technician, so as not to draw the City Plan into the political battle where it would only be used unscrupulously as [a] political 'football'" – even though Wiener acknowledged that "civil war

75   Ibid.
76   Sert letter to Le Corbusier, 30 June 1947, in: M. Tieleman (ed.), Correspondance, 1928–1965, Paris 2009, p. 117. All correspondence between Le Corbusier and Sert or Wiener originally in French, unless otherwise noted.
77   J. Ordoñez, Cómo se está engrandeciendo Bogotá, in: Cromos LXVI, no. 1643, 26 August 1948, p. 40, GAA. See also Romero Sánchez, Ruralizing Urbanization, pp. 339–340.
78   Sert to Le Corbusier, 26 February 1949, in: Tieleman (ed.), Correspondance, p. 120; Plan Vial Piloto – 1960, pp. 11, 15, AGN.
79   Wiener letter to Le Corbusier, 14 June 1949, E029, Josep Lluis Sert Collection (hereafter JLS), Frances Loeb Library, Harvard University.
80   Mumford, CIAM Discourse, p. 327.
81   Letter from H. Ritter to Le Corbusier, 26 October 1949, H3-4-175, Le Corbusier Archive (hereafter LCA), Paris, France. Unless otherwise noted, sources from the LCA are originally in French.

is expected momentarily."[82] Their discourse around avoiding politics, as well as worries about its possible outcomes, pointed to the fraught situation that they wished so greatly to remain above.

But, unsurprisingly, politics intervened, in two major ways that challenged the architect's claim to apoliticism. First, national politics structured and increasingly constrained possibilities. As the Liberal Party boycotted Colombia's presidential election in late 1949, violence in the countryside escalated, and the subsequent victory of Conservative Laureano Gómez coincided with a shift in the urban planning project. Carlos Arbeláez Camacho replaced Herbert Ritter as director of the local planning office in early 1950, and he requested that Le Corbusier submit his pilot plan by August, to coincide with the new president's inauguration. Sert and Wiener cautioned Le Corbusier to comply. They wrote that "we will have to come to good terms with the new regime since they are to carry on the work", and that "we may have to face a less friendly and perhaps more bureaucratic regime which may want to take advantage of any omission on grounds of pure technicality, and delay or frustrate approval of the plans and the payments for same."[83] But the new timeline caused the project, whose contract had initially made Le Corbusier feel "impatient" because it was delayed, to now become rushed.[84] Though Le Corbusier worked closely with Colombian collaborators Germán Samper, Rogelio Salmona, and Reinaldo Valencia, he lost the partnership with Ritter, who had come to southern France to work for a time and kept up a lively correspondence with Le Corbusier.[85]

In this context, the container of national politics gave way to a second kind of mitigating dynamic: the obstacle of interpersonal politics. Le Corbusier tried to tighten his grip on the work, writing Arbeláez – who he at first was hopeful about because, like Ritter, the new director was a member of CIAM[86] – that "we consider it indispensable to remain, we planners (Le Corbusier, Wiener and Sert) attached as Council to the execution of such buildings that it would be dangerous to leave to the initiative completely free to Bogotá."[87] Sert and Wiener continued to negotiate the increasingly tense relationship between Le Corbusier and Colombian officials. Bogotá's new mayor Santiago Trujillo saw the TPA planners possessing "experience and realism" to balance Le Corbusier's ""powerful, creative imagination" which arguably "soared beyond the limits of practicality."[88] Indeed, they pushed the French architect to be aware of financial issues and potential

82   Wiener to Le Corbusier, 8 November 1949, in: Mumford, CIAM Discourse, p. 327. Last part of quote directly from letter from P. Wiener to Le Corbusier, 8 November 1949, H3-4-173, LCA. Original in English.
83   Letter from Sert and Wiener to Le Corbusier, 21 June 1950, H3-4-97, LCA. Original in English.
84   Letter from Martinez to Le Corbusier, 2 June 1949, H3-4-214, LCA; Letter from Martinez to Le Corbusier, 31 December 1949, H3-4-516, LCA.
85   R. Cortés / F. Arias, La intervención de Le Corbusier en la Planeación Física de Bogotá 1945–1958, in: H. Vargas (ed.), Le Corbusier en Colombia, Bogotá 1987, p. 106; and D. Tarchópulos, Las Huellas del Plan para Bogotá de Le Corbusier, Sert y Wiener, in: Scripta Nova X, no. 218 (86) (1 August 2006), http://www.ub.edu/geocrit/sn/sn-218-86.htm.
86   Letter from Herbert Ritter to Le Corbusier, 28 November 1949, H3-4-165, LCA; and letter from Le Corbusier to Ritter, 7 December 1949, H3-4-159, LCA.
87   Letter from Le Corbusier to Arbeláez, 21 April 1950, H3-4-117, LCA.
88   Trujillo, Birth of a city, pp. 57–58.

opposition, and to work – in a literal way – with an awareness of the Colombian context. "The important existing buildings which must remain in the heart of the city", Sert and Wiener wrote to him in June 1950, "should appear on your plans […] so that they can see how they can evolve from the present to the realization of your plans, without having to demolish important buildings in the city."[89] Le Corbusier returned to Bogotá and stayed for most of September and October 1950 to deliver the pilot plan.[90] His work was thus the product of a charged political context that stretched from the governmental to the interpersonal.

The political context in which the planners worked resulted in a Plan Piloto whose technical attempts at ordering bodies in the physical space of the city must be understood, also, in political terms. The final versions of Le Corbusier's plan created order first through an intricate road system that separated people by speed and type of mobility. While many roads were different types of local streets or highways for cars, the prized V7s were green paths and park strips for exclusive pedestrian use. They connected school and play areas, including parks, which encouraged exercise as transportation and directed the flow of pedestrian traffic.[91] About one third of the 49 plates of plans printed in an *informe técnico* (technical report), at every scale – from the regional to the metropolitan, urban, and civic centre – explicitly evoked the human body by rephrasing the third CIAM function of recreation as "cultivating the body and spirit."[92] Le Corbusier coded the reference with "C.C." to indicate zones devoted to "corporeal culture", which he also coloured green.[93] The urban scale situated areas of trees and grass together with sites of culture, such as universities, museums, and libraries. Le Corbusier proposed "cultural parks", which combined "physical and intellectual diversions."[94] He deployed the human scale by asserting that people should only have to travel "maximum 15 minutes on foot" to services such as markets, business, or cinemas.[95] Overall, the pedestrian plans at different levels tied an organized city to the pleasure of the natural world. They normalized the environmental ordering that they dictated and rendered bodily experience of nature in line with political order, human health, economic exchange, and industrial transportation.

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89   Letter from Sert and Wiener to Le Corbusier, 29 June 1950, H3-4-93, LCA. Original in English.
90   R. Cortés / F. Arias, La intervención de Le Corbusier en la Planeación Física de Bogotá, p. 106; and Tarchópulos, Las Huellas.
91   P. Wiener / J. Sert, The Work of Town Planning Associates in Latin America 1945–1956, in: Architectural Design 27 (Mar–June 1957) 6, pp. 190–213, at pp. 192–193; and J. Rovira (ed.), Half a Century of Architecture, 1928–1979 Complete Work, Barcelona 2005, pp. 148–149.
92   Le Corbusier, Elaboración del Plan Regulador de Bogotá: Establecimiento del Plan Director por Le Corbusier en París, 1949–1950 (edición facsimilar), in: M. O'Byrne Orozco (ed.), Tomo 1: LC BOG: Le Corbusier en Bogotá, 1947–1951, Bogotá 2010, p. 4. Original in French. The introduction discusses different copies of the informe técnico del Plan Director para Bogotá (technical report of the Master Plan for Bogotá) and plans in existence, pp. x–xi (one can be found in B081oo, JLS). See also K. Manco Rozo, El Plan Director de Le Corbusier y su influencia en el proceso de planeación en Bogotá (1949–1969), Bogotá 2010, especially p. 31.
93   Le Corbusier, Elaboración del Plan, p. 8. Original in French.
94   Ibid., pp. 24–25.
95   Ibid., Grid 112-1. Original in Spanish.

Le Corbusier's civic centre was to be re-formed in the old Plaza Bolívar, to great physical effect. The main square was so decrepit that an initial study (maybe apocryphally) discovered "one underground drainage pipe that actually dated from colonial times."[96] Le Corbusier's plans extended the plaza along Carrera 7 (7th Avenue) – a major site of destruction during the riots – to become a shopping promenade, the business and commercial heart of the city, and an amusement centre. The square itself was also to have several levels connected by ramps, for pedestrian use only. Visiting and sketching the space and studying aerial photographs, Le Corbusier framed the civic centre as "following the old Latin-American tradition of colonial days", including in making Carrera 7 "exclusively reserved for pedestrians following the old colonial tradition of the 'walking street.'"[97] Emphasizing the core as historical past signalled an openness to local history and a preoccupation with monumentality, but only of a certain kind. It deployed the *damero* (checkerboard) style of grid design, which the Spanish crown had used toward the martial aim of public order, to replicate the effect while also evoking a storied past of high culture.[98] The tall rectangular buildings that Le Corbusier envisioned dwarfed the colonial cathedral, reorganizing the state's power as modern through aesthetic and spatial elements. The pilot plan for the civic centre thus worked to legitimize the architectural and statist project of bodily control in the physical space of the city by giving it timeless value.

Le Corbusier's plans also evoked a visual human form in relation to planning elements, which reflected both CIAM principles and a preoccupation with human bodies in the Bogotá context. One plate showed the Avenida Jiménez, a major thoroughfare, in tandem with drawn human figures, while another, entitled "a house, a tree", represented the passage to dwellings through the three-dimensional space of pedestrian paths, parks, and collective garages. Plates on "Rochelle" houses depicted human figures for scale in perspectival height drawings, along with calculations of square footage per person.[99] The plans posited, in sanitized statistical form, that which each individual physically deserves. The evocation of the human form was made possible by CIAM's new graphic methodology – first implemented in the Bogotá plans – which was supposed to facilitate the groups' work by creating a common format for architects across the world to manifest an ideal city.[100] The grid format was not just about buildings. It was also about graphic representation of a standardized way of acting on people in urban space. In the post-riot Colombian context, it was inseparable from reconstruction, which found cause in the way that the "bodies and spirits" that Le Corbusier wanted to act upon had been used toward urban destruction and revolutionary intent.

96   Trujillo, Birth of a city, pp. 57–58.
97   Ascoral, Centre, Grille Ascoral, Bogotá Plan Pilote draft, R2-15-5, LCA.
98   C. Hernández Rodríguez, Las ideas modernas del Plan para Bogotá en 1950: El trabajo de Le Corbusier, Wiener y Sert, Bogotá 2004, p. 87.
99   Le Corbusier, Elaboración del Plan, Grid 131-1; 131-1-3; 134-1-1.
100 Manco Rozo, El Plan Director, 51.

2. On-the-Ground Realities

Despite the public order function of Le Corbusier's plans, politics continued to cause tension in the working relationship with the architects even as the pilot plan was approved. The mayor of Bogotá had alluded to limiting the action to circulation roads in 1950. He wanted to focus on building public works.[101] Real estate developers voiced strong objections to the pilot plan,[102] as they planned large-scale developments to the north and south, even as "monstrous" and "clandestine land developments" sprung up spontaneously outside of the city's perimeter.[103] The president delayed in making decisions about the pilot plan.[104] It was approved in mid-1951, many months after submission, but Le Corbusier had already become disillusioned and disinterested. He accepted his now-famous job in Chandigarh, India, despite Sert's protests and the tension it caused with Colombian authorities, whom he openly blamed for their "complete silence."[105] The country's government institutions were often uncommunicative and guarded during this time, to Le Corbusier's frustration.[106] Privately, he pointed to the political situation and civic centre construction stalling. He travelled to Colombia with Sert and Wiener in May 1951 to meet with Colombian authorities. According to a biographer, he was "expecting triumph", but was "disappointed." President Laureano Gómez, increasingly conservative and authoritarian in the face of continued unrest and economic crisis, oscillated on the pilot plan.[107] The architect was faced with a public opinion nightmare. "The newspapers accuse me of being an aristocrat and a conservative!" he wrote to his mother.[108] He was "attacked by the people in power for failing to accommodate the rich," a biographer writes, while, "at the same time, the press, like the general population, laced into him for being an aristocrat too focused on the rich."[109]

The problem reflected the logic of statist progressivism, wherein the provision of services was in tension with the need for central control. That which biographer Nicolas Weber deems the "double-barreled fusillade" was what CIAM's paradox looked like in practice. Earlier in the year, Arbeláez Camacho of the OPRB had reassured Le Corbusier that the national government decree authorizing the mayor to adopt the pilot plan would ensconce it in its current form for future city officials, making it "outside of political discussions of the lowest order."[110] "As you can see", he wrote shortly after, "we have sought to make the Pilot Plan have a very firm base and not just be a series of well drawn

101   Letter from Wiener and Sert to Le Corbusier, 17 November 1950, in Hernández, Las ideas modernas, p. 101.
102   Ibid. At the LCA, this letter is H3-4-378.
103   Letter from Wiener to Le Corbusier, 28 October 1950, H3-4-85, LCA. Original in English.
104   Ibid.
105   Letter from Le Corbusier to S. Trujillo, 20 December 1950, G2-11-116, LCA; Hernández, Las ideas modernas, p. 105. Le Corbusier informed Colombian officials of the India job in December 1950.
106   Tieleman (ed.), Correspondance, p. 147; and Hernández, Las ideas modernas, p. 104.
107   Hernández, Las ideas modernas, p. 102.
108   Le Corbusier letter, 20 May 1951, R2-2-44, LCA.
109   Weber, Le Corbusier, p. 551.
110   Letter from Arbeláez to Le Corbusier, 12 March 1951, H3-4-403, LCA. Original in Spanish.

papers."[111] Yet by late 1951, Arbeláez Camacho admitted that the civic centre plan was in "bad shape", as the "government does not want to accept a different idea of the location of the Palace than the current site", and, furthermore, the president "has been sick and at the moment does not exercise power."[112]

Despite continuing tension, TPA nevertheless began the next phase of the project: the Plan Director was developed into a complete Plan Regulador from mid-1951 to 1953. Wiener and Sert worked closely with the local planning office. They created designs in New York but prepared and checked them in Bogotá, making constant trips to the city for several months. Though Le Corbusier still served in a consulting capacity, his role was limited. Sert and Wiener had a more practical engagement with the reality in which they worked – still counselling Le Corbusier on how to act diplomatically, for example, by cautioning him to "take an attitude of complete compliance at all times" and "not to pressure the Mayor of Bogota."[113] The New York firm also bowed to Colombian governmental pressure to reduce the green areas due to cost, and they proposed a four-lane rapid highway that borrowed from the "proven efficiency in American highways and conforms to US standards."[114] Sert and Wiener thus built US modelling into the plans. Like their diplomatic cautioning with Le Corbusier, they framed US-style public works as a practical solution to the obstacles presented by the Colombian political, economic, and natural environment.

Yet they nonetheless encountered continued difficulties. "El Plan Regulador, a Failure?" one newspaper headline in Colombia read around this time, as tensions with the new director mounted, and he told the press that Colombian architects could finish the project.[115] Another made a play on words, calling it "El 'Plan Congelador,'" or "freezer plan" due to one businessman's charge that its urban regulations, especially the fixed perimeter, discouraged buying and selling of properties.[116] It became increasingly clear that part or all of the plan would never be built, especially the civic centre, which would be delayed or impossible due to "political and financial reasons over which [the Oficina del Plan Regulador] have no control."[117] Nonetheless, Sert and Wiener kept working, even amidst another personnel change that saw Carlos Arbeláez Camacho resign and be replaced by the chief engineer from the Public Health department, Ernesto González Concha.[118] Wiener reported continued problems during a trip in 1952, but he remained

111 Letter from Arbeláez to Le Corbusier, 19 April 1951, H3-4-398, LCA. Original in Spanish.
112 Letter from Arbeláez Camacho to Le Corbusier, 21 November 1951, H3-4-26, LCA. Original in Spanish.
113 Letter from Wiener and Sert to Le Corbusier, 3 January 1951, H3-4-60, LCA; Letter from Sert and Wiener to Le Corbusier, 30 January 1951, H3-4-53, LCA. Originals in English.
114 Letter from Wiener and Sert to Le Corbusier, 29 March 1951, H3-4-405, LCA. Original in English.
115 El Plan Regulador, Un Fracaso? El Contrato con Wiener y Sert no lo Prorrogará el Municipio, in: El Tiempo, 27 September 1952, p. 1.
116 El "Plan Congelador," in: El Espectador, 9 October 1952, Folder Bogota Clippings, 1952–53, Box 3, Paul Lester Wiener Papers (hereafter PLW), University of Oregon Libraries.
117 Letter from Wiener and Sert to Le Corbusier, 2 May 1952, H3-4-38, LCA. Original in English.
118 Renunció el Director y Dos Altos Funcionarios del Plan Regulador, and González Concha Sería Director de la Oficina del Plan Regulador, El Tiempo, 17 September 1952, p. 1, Folder Bogota Clippings, 1952–1953, Box 3, PLW.

resolute. TPA made modifications to the plan, including leaving the presidential palace at its present site.[119] Believing that they had "finally solved" the "difficulties with the Municipality", they agreed to prolonging the contract by six months, until it was completed in 1953.[120]

The Plan Regulador extended Le Corbusier's focus on roads, and especially pedestrian walkways, as the foundation of an ordered city. Sert and Wiener worked to divide the area covered by the amended city and planned extension into 35 sectors of 25,000 to 75,000 inhabitants. Each contained integrated green areas and local cores, with road networks determining the contours of the sectors. TPA employed an American road engineering firm to develop the concept, which continued the extension of their plan into the realm of public works. Seelye, Stevenson, Value and Knecht of New York City used the V7 system. Sert and Wiener engaged with the CIAM principal of circulation by planning for cars. One observer even noted that their metropolitan plans transformed the railroad system inside the urban space of the city to complement roads, including through displacing and eliminating certain stations and lines whose function was to be absorbed by highways.[121] Yet they also continued to emphasize the principal of "cultivating the body and the spirit." Sert and Wiener described the physical experience of the pedestrian paths in an article in *Architectural Design*: they would be "independent of cars and protected from noises, lined with trees, and opening into parks, play-fields and quiet squares." The separate "complete pedestrian network" would make controlling passage easy on the V7s.[122] Though cars could cause the physical elements that the planners sought to avoid – pollution, noise, etc. – and built class inequality into the plans, as not everyone could afford a car, the public pathways sought to open public space for all. The tension between class difference and the notion of equal allotment permeated the road plans.

Their efforts to more pragmatically plan the civic centre and dwellings show Sert and Wiener continuing to grapple with order. One way that the planners articulated their own vision for the city was through the vistas that they allowed and precluded for its inhabitants. In the middle of the Plaza Bolívar, the historical and monumental site that served as the city's main square, "you would get frequent views of the beautiful hills" behind. There was a height restriction on new buildings to ensure visibility of the mountain silhouette that formed the "backdrop of the city."[123] Yet in the new shopping centre, a series of squares linked by bridge overpasses, commercialistic efficiency ruled the day. "The squares are laid out in different shapes and staggered", they wrote, "so that you can-

119   Letter from Wiener and Sert to Le Corbusier, 2 May 1952, H3-4-38, LCA. Original in English.

120   Letter from Wiener and Sert to Le Corbusier, 26 November 1952, H3-4-31, LCA; and in: Tieleman (ed.), Correspondance, p. 213. Original in English.

121   Vargas Mera, El Plan Regulador de Bogotá, p. 35. CINVA, UNal.

122   Wiener and Sert, The Work of Town Planning, pp. 192, 197; Rovira (ed.), Half Century, p. 148; K. Bastlund, José Luis Sert: Architecture, City Planning, Urban Design, New York 1967, p. 67.

123   Hernández, Las ideas modernas, p. 87. Attributes the height restriction to Le Corbusier's original design. Quotes Wiener / Sert, The Work of Town Planning, p. 197.

not get a straight-line view which would discourage walking." In half an hour's time, the pedestrian could pass from the political centre, through the commercial squares to the cultural and tourist heart of the city – a large, open park.[124] They focused on functionality and efficiency in urban space, partially for capitalistic concerns, which they echoed in planning local markets elsewhere. The planners proffered an ordered city in which the experience of space would be uniform.

The plans also reflected a paradoxical sensibility of the role of the state. The planners differentiated between low-cost housing and middle-class apartments – an unequal allotment predicated on continued socioeconomic stratification.[125] The open availability of public space in the commercial centre was also in tension with the reality of unequal buying power. Was the state, in these cases, providing equitable services, or did its projects literally build inequality into the urban landscape? In the civic centre, Sert pushed the concept of the urban core, believing that it promoted democracy by facilitating contact and discussion.[126] Without it, he argued, people were "more easily governable by the rule of the few."[127] Yet Sert advocated governmental financing and oversight of the project. Thus, like other aspects of the architects' plans, the democratizing function of the civic centre was not a protection so much as a happy – and contingent – result. It depended on and reflected a strong government. It was not inherently democratic outside of a circular, self-affirming logic, which belied the power differentials inherent in enforcing political equality.

Though politics had created the impetus for the Colombian government to hire the planners, its vicissitudes resulted in their eventual dismissal. In August 1953, the architects delivered the complete Plan Regulador for Bogotá. The government accepted it, and they declared the contract completed in November. Construction, however, never began. A military coup on June 13 had installed General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla as president. He would rule the country until 1957. Though Trujillo, the mayor who had worked with the architects, became the Minister of Public Works, and Le Corbusier offered to continue the project – "Let's all do this Civic Centre together", he wrote in the fall of 1953, continuing: "I would do it and I am at your disposal" – the military regime did not adopt TPA's plans for the Colombian capital city.[128] The government ignored a suggestion by the SCA to create an independent commission to carry out the plan.[129] It stumbled on internal coordination issues, with one study noting that housing, for example, entailed

124 Ibid., p. 201.
125 Ibid., pp. 195–196.
126 Some scholars have seen Sert's advocacy of the urban core as showing both US and Latin American influence. See M. Bacon, Josep Lluís Sert's Evolving Concept of the Urban Core: Between Corbusian Form and Mumfordian Social Practice, in: Mumford, Sarkis, and Turan (eds.), Josep Lluís Sert: The Architect of Urban Design, pp. 77–114; Mumford, CIAM and Latin America, in: Sert: Arquitecto en Nueva York, Barcelona 1997, p. 48.
127 Mumford, CIAM and Latin America, p. 60. Sert quote is from J. Sert, Centres of Community Life, in: J. Tyrwhitt, J. Sert, and R. Ernesto, CIAM 8: The Heart of the City, New York 1952, p. 11.
128 Letter from Le Corbusier to S. Trujillo, 23 September 1953, H3-4-28, LCA.
129 La S.C.A. Rinde Informe sobre el Actual Plan Regulador de Bogotá, in: El Tiempo, 18 December 1953, p. 11, Folder Bogota Clippings, 1952–1953, Box 3, PLW.

at least three entities that functioned amongst themselves with a "marked individualist criteria creating obstacles and interferences and distorting the principles of a work of such transcendence."[130] Lack of official capacity and support combined with ongoing practical issues of cost, especially related to land acquisition for green areas.[131] The planners' failure to specify costs and construction details and the tension over governmental versus design control had finally come to a breaking point.[132] Sert and Wiener had begun to incorporate the practical suggestions for which the government pushed and some observers castigated the "myopia" of those who did not understand the opportunity of a proposal originating from Le Corbusier.[133] Yet though Rojas Pinilla would pursue an aggressive programme of public works and infrastructure development, these particular plans were too utopian for the fraught and shifting political context.

Many Colombian architects soon remembered the project in terms of more specific failings and often cast blame on Sert and Wiener. Editorials in the architectural magazine PROA – largely read by architects as well as industry and business elites[134] – charged that the Plan Regulador was a failure because it did not properly utilize geographic, topographic, or demographic information, nor did it incorporate studies related to circulation and economics. A particularly scathing passage said that Sert and Wiener received over USD 200,000 for "some vacuous drawings", along with a report and verbal exposition. The architects presented their sketches privately, they said, and did not accept questions.[135] Even the more generous interpretations found fault in the foreign planners. The history section of the Plan Vial of 1960, for example, which saw the planners as operating with scant statistical information and fiscal resources in a time of chaotic urban growth, charged that their plans suffered from "insufficiencies and lack of foresight."[136]

A major sticking point was the regional plan. "The project of Sert and Wiener was a paltry plan without regional ambitions," PROA stated in 1955, and the planners had a "disdain for the topics of regional planning", the publication said in 1956.[137] It charged that the planners "imagined that the city was an isolated nucleus in a plain", rather than part of a "network of intermunicipal communications."[138] Another observer noted that the distribution of industry that they planned was only proportionate to the necessities of local consumption, rather than broader industrial exploitation.[139] Colombian commentators especially objected to the restriction of the urban perimeter, which was actu-

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130   Vargas Mera, El Plan Regulador de Bogotá, p. 52. CINVA, UNal.

131   Letter from Wiener and Sert to Le Corbusier, 2 May 1952, H3-4-38, LCA. Original in English.

132   See Mumford, CIAM and Latin America, p. 72.

133   Montoya, Planificación, urbanismo y la construcción de la Bogotá moderna, pp. 73–168, at p. 131.

134   Ibid., 119.

135   El Fracaso del Plan Regulador de Bogotá, PROA (Sep. 1955); Otro Fracaso del Arquitecto P. L. Wienner [sic], PROA (Feb. 1956), LAA.

136   Plan Vial Piloto – 1960, p. 22, AGN.

137   El Fracaso del Plan Regulador de Bogotá, PROA (Sep. 1955); Otro Fracaso del Arquitecto P. L. Wienner [sic], PROA (Feb. 1956), LAA.

138   Otro Fracaso del Arquitecto P. L. Wienner [sic], PROA (Feb. 1956), LAA.

139   Vargas Mera, El Plan Regulador de Bogotá, p. 31. CINVA, UNal.

ally temporarily enacted by Decreto (Decree) 185 in 1951.[140] They saw it as a hindrance to future city growth that inevitably underwrote clandestine or informal housing being built outside the city.[141] Along with the road plan, the fixed perimeter generated intense controversy, including tensions between the OPRB and the new municipal authorities under the Rojas Pinilla administration. In December 1954, Decreto 3640 created the Distrito Especial (Special District) of Bogotá, which dissolved the urban perimeter and incorporated nearby municipalities.[142] But informal settlements had already caused "grave social conflicts, serious economic interferences, and delicate administrative problems," according to one report, and incorporating them caused "serious disruptions to the road system."[143]

Through many of these more specific critiques, a geopolitical implication is clear. The architects who came from other countries did not care enough about what Bogotá actually *was.* They did not study its potential or its problems closely enough in their full context. They did not see what Bogotá could become, in terms of industrial or population potential, even as the city grew rapidly in a "migratory wave" that was partially due to ongoing rural violence.[144] They also did not fully grasp the city's history or the impact of plans that would have eliminated much of its urban patrimony.[145] When Wiener visited the city in February of 1956, a number of architects snubbed him as what they called the "natural sanction" for the "nonsense of the failed regulatory plan of Bogotá." The implication that the country had been misunderstood – looked down upon, or even tricked or "duped" – can account for the scathing tone of some of the critiques.[146]

The foreign planners likewise did not understand the limited resources with which local architects and officials worked. A government report from 1960 blamed Sert and Wiener for this reason. Even though Le Corbusier's plans were grandiose, it concluded that he stayed attuned to the "economic possibilities of Bogotá"; his plans, it said, were "less utopian than those of the Plan Regulador of Wiener & Sert, whose proposals require such onerous urban restructuring, that it is not possible to attend them with the tight fiscal resources of the District."[147] The charge was especially striking given that, during the working process, it was the New York planners who had tried to keep Le Corbusier's plans grounded, in sometimes literal ways. One form of utopianism that the Colombian government could not accept was, paradoxically, a plan in which the practical steps necessary to achieve a new kind of city were laid out in full. The many costs prohibited making the visions articulated in the plans into a reality.

The Corbusier-Sert-Wiener plans for Bogotá did not materialize, but their legacy is significant. Though Colombian architects criticized the limiting urban perimeter, they ac-

140 Montoya, Planificación, urbanismo y la construcción de la Bogotá moderna, pp. 133–134.
141 Otro Fracaso del Arquitecto P. L. Wienner [sic], PROA (Feb. 1956), LAA. See also Plan Vial Piloto – 1960, p. 23, AGN.
142 Montoya, Planificación, urbanismo y la construcción de la Bogotá moderna, p. 137.
143 Plan Vial Piloto – 1960, p. 23, AGN.
144 Tarchópulos, Las Huellas.
145 Montoya, Planificación, urbanismo y la construcción de la Bogotá moderna, pp. 93, 112, 121, 131.
146 Otro Fracaso del Arquitecto P. L. Wienner [sic], PROA (Feb. 1956), LAA.
147 Plan Vial Piloto – 1960, p. 21, AGN.

knowledged that the plans were some of the first to work on a regional scale. As such, they became the "fundamental base for later studies."[148] A 1957 plan even used Le Corbusier's V-7 system to propose new roads. The project also helped to strengthen the "institutionalization of planning," especially by creating the OPRB, which would later become the Departamento Administrativo de Planeación Distrital (Administrative Department of District Planning). Scholars have seen Le Corbusier's influence in Bogotá's housing and modern buildings in the city centre, as well as in ideas such as hygiene, urban density, and renovation.[149] In a broader sense, an important legacy of the work was the entrenchment of the post-*Bogotazo* moment in Colombia's urban planning history. Its core tenets continued to manifest in both US and Colombian government policies, in which national development and public order were inextricably linked in spatial and aesthetic terms.

Likewise, the project matters *for* the very fact that it was cast off. The choice overran a set of ideas and alternatives that are nonetheless recoverable through written and visual source text. The alternatives took the form of both what historian Jay Winter has termed "minor utopias" – those belonging to "a very disparate group of people [who] tried in their separate ways to imagine a radically better world" – and "major utopias" – those attempted by state actors through coercion and violence.[150] The Bogotá story is driven not only by the minor utopias envisioned by Gaitán and his followers, or the leftist tide in Latin America turned back in this period by counterrevolution, but it also shows how major utopias, too, can be foreclosed by the shifting tactics of state management and repression. That alternatives – of both the minor and major variety – never came to pass does not reduce their historical importance. It should, rather, shake our sense of linear narrative. It should displace the notion that material history need be solely rooted in the concrete. We can trace differing visions and thus better understand national and international development as a process of implementation with multiple origin points, whose aesthetic and spatial properties were contingent and, in some cases, deeply imbricated with urban processes and fears. Development was negotiated and contested; it overran other options; it was also obviated by different ways of living in the minds of many. That which came to pass was not unscathed by alternative visions, by frustrated hopes, or by people who were killed. Just as it was not unchanged by cities never built.

148 Plan Vial Piloto – 1960, p. 23, AGN.
149 Montoya, Planificación, urbanismo y la construcción de la Bogotá moderna, pp. 154–159.
150 J. Winter, Dreams of Peace and Freedom: Utopian Moments in the Twentieth Century, New Haven 2006, pp. 1–2.

From the "Horseshoe of Slums" to *Colonias Proletarias*: The Transformation of Mexico City's "Housing Problem", 1930–1960

Emilio de Antuñano

ABSTRACTS

Der Aufsatz untersucht Mexico City's „Wohnungsproblem" zwischen 1930 und 1960 aus der Sicht von Wohnungsexperten. In den 1930er Jahren begriffen Architekten und Planer Mexico City im Sinne der nordatlantischen Kategorien eines Ernest Burgess als ein Modell konzentrischer Zonen. Entsprechend interpretierten sie zentrale Slum-Bezirke als drängendstes Wohnungsproblem. Diese Sicht verschleierte jedoch den Blick auf eine wichtige urbane Veränderung, die Entstehung „informeller" Wohnbezirke in den Peripherien, und auf die Tatsache, dass sich diese entgegen der damaligen Erwartung positiv entwickelten. Untersucht werden Netzwerke von Architekten, Planern und Ökonomen in Mexiko und im pan-amerikanischen Kontext. Innerhalb von zwei Jahrzehnten mutierten periphere Siedlungen von unsichtbaren Räumen und temporären Quartieren zu praktikablen Lösungen des „Wohnungsproblems".

This article charts how housing experts dealt with Mexico City's "housing problem" between 1930 and 1960. In the 1930s, architects and planners understood Mexico City through such North-Atlantic categories as Ernest Burgess' concentric zone model, an approach that led them to target central "slums" as the city's most pressing "housing problem." But these models distorted and rendered invisible one of the city's most original transformations: the construction of "informal" neighbourhoods in its peripheries and the fact that these neighbourhoods were, against widespread expectations, improving over time. By following a network of architects, planners, and economists working in Mexico while engaging in a broader Panamerican dialogue, I describe how Mexico City's housing policies and ideas shifted. In the course of two mere decades, the city's peripheral neighbourhoods went from invisible spaces to problematic and provisional settlements to a viable solution to the housing problem.

In the mind of mid-century architects, planners, sociologists, and economists, Mexico City's "housing problem" (*problema de la vivienda*) was, by definition, the problem of the slum – *tugurio* in Spanish. Half a million dwellers lived in overcrowded and unhygienic slums north and east of Mexico City's central square. Urgent measures were needed, policy reports and muckraking articles alerted, to prevent *tugurios* from choking the city centre and spreading their influence to the modern and sanitary city. In the 1930s, the area became known as a "horseshoe of slums" (*herradura de tugurios*). The moniker stuck, as the northeast of the city was long stigmatized as an unhygienic, uncultured (indigenous), and immoral space. But the term would also become popular, among both Mexican and foreign observers, because labelling the area as a slum made it legible as a local iteration of global processes of industrialization, rural-urban migration, and urban growth and decay.

The legibility and hypervisibility of the slum, however, rendered invisible – at least in the eyes of housing experts – Mexico City's fastest growing form of low-income housing: *colonias proletarias* (proletarian neighbourhoods). *Colonias proletarias* were a political *and* a policy solution to the housing needs of a city that had just undergone a revolution and was in the midst of a population "explosion." While the Mexican Revolution (1910–1920) was primarily an agrarian affair, it also transformed the political discourse, the balance of power between elites and popular groups, and the legal framework of Mexican cities. Built in the peripheries of Mexico City starting in the 1920s and 1930s, *colonias proletarias* were intimately entangled with government officials and independent brokers that deftly managed and secured their place in the city at the interstices between legality and illegality. While most *colonias proletarias* broke urban codes and ordinances, they also enjoyed ample political legitimacy during the 1930s and 1940s. Government support for *colonias proletarias* ranged from allowing their construction in defiance of city codes to more proactive actions such as expropriating land and selling it in installments to workers. Regardless of government actions, the impetus for the construction of *colonias proletarias* came from thousands of families who organized to make claims for land, housing, and urban services in the city's peripheral districts.

Up until the 1950s, however, *colonias proletarias* were outside of the field of vision of the housing experts dealing with Mexico City's "housing problem." Therefore, this article asks when and why housing experts realized that the ground under their feet was shifting, and how they dealt with this new scenario. It describes how, in the course of a couple of decades, *colonias proletarias* went from invisible spaces, to a Mexican version of a Latin American "explosion" of "squatter settlements," to a viable (if far from perfect) solution to the "housing problem," a sequence that illuminates similar changes in other Latin American cities. The first section describes the housing problem during the 1930s and 1940s, focusing on *tugurios* and the wealth of surveys, policies, and theories of housing, urbanism, and poverty that they generated. I then centre on the emergence of *colonias proletarias* as a policy category, analyzing how they challenged entrenched notions of urban poverty and the housing problem. Finally, the third section reframes the counter-

point between *tugurios* and *colonias proletarias* within a larger hemispheric debate about urbanization, social change, and the Latin American city.

The gap between transnational urban models and the singular history of Mexico City is a recurring thread throughout my narrative. That Mexico City was not merely a site where "foreign" models were implemented is a point that (I hope) no longer needs repeating.[1] Mexico City was one among several cities – at times more central, at others more peripheral – where theories, policies, and representations of urban growth, housing, and poverty were generated, debated, and disseminated in the years between 1930 and 1960. In the 1950s and 1960s, for instance, portrayals of poverty in Mexico City by filmmaker Luis Buñuel and anthropologist Oscar Lewis reverberated across the world (both the "Global North" and the "Global South") among scholarly, policymaking, and intellectual circles.[2] "Los Olvidados" (screened in the United States as "The Young and the Damned") and *The Children of Sánchez* scandalized audiences worldwide, much to the dismay of political elites eager to project to the world a "Mexican Miracle" of stability and development. To the extent that it was set in Mexico City's "horseshoe of slums," the work of Buñuel and Lewis conjured a well-known plot of poverty, violence, and social disorder. Therefore, notwithstanding the centrality of Mexico City within an international circuit of representations, theories, and policies, *colonias proletarias* remained largely invisible, at least when seen from the vantage point of the transnational dialogue about cities and urbanism taking place between 1930 and 1960. This invisibility was extremely consequential for it refracted and distorted – for both Mexican and foreign experts – the politics and policies of housing in Mexico City.

1. The War Against *Tugurios*

In 1880, Mexico City counted approximately a quarter million souls and roughly the same area as it had at the time of Mexican Independence (1821). After decades of stagnation, the city remained anchored to its colonial grid, although seismic change was about to take place. Mexico's post-independence civil wars came to an end in the 1860s, and the following decade the modernizing dictatorship of Porfirio Díaz launched an era of political stability and economic growth that transformed the country and its capital city. Driven by public works and a churning real-estate market, Mexico City began a process of growth, reaching a population of 470,000 in 1910, the year of the Mexican Revolution. A decade of war slowed population growth, but the city continued its expansion

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1 There is a rich and growing corpus of authors who have deprovincialized urban studies. In thinking about Latin American cities and their relationship with the world (and their relationship to a universal idea of what a city is), I have been inspired by B. Sarlo, Una Modernidad Periférica: Buenos Aires, 1920 y 1930, Buenos Aires 1988; A. Gorelik, Miradas Sobre Buenos Aires: Historia Cultural y Crítica Urbana, Buenos Aires 2004; M. Tenorio, I Speak of the City: Mexico City at the Turn of the Twentieth Century, Chicago 2012 and J. Robinson, Ordinary Cities: Between Modernity and Development, New York 2006.

2 K. Rosenblatt, Other Americas: Transnationalism, Scholarship, and the Culture of Poverty in Mexico and the United States, in: Hispanic American Historical Review 89 (2009) 4, pp. 603–641.

in the 1920s and 1930s, when a frenzy of subdivisions – rich and poor – further pushed its limits outwards. Capitalizing on its position as the main engine of an industrial-izing economy, Mexico City continued to grow, reaching a population of 2,250,000 (3,240,000 if the entire Federal District is included) in 1950. Hundreds of thousands migrated to the city, finding a dwelling in the self-built neighbourhoods in the peripher-ies of the city. Against all odds, Mexico City would become one of the largest cities of the world by the end of the twentieth century.[3]

While Mexico City changed dramatically between 1880 and 1950, the *idea* of urban poverty barely did, as evidenced by the endurance of the *tugurio* as its most widespread representation. Since the turn of the twentieth century, the "horseshoe of slums" was one of the most studied areas in the city if not the world. Starting in the 1890s, sanitary in-spectors surveyed the area, describing its "filthy, dirty, and abandoned houses […] where a combination of men and animals lived."[4] In the following decades, criminologists, journalists, sociologists, and anthropologists would also study the area, from sociologist Gonzalo de Murga, who lamented in 1913 that industrial cities triggered "the physical and moral degeneration of people," to Oscar Lewis, whose research in Colonia Morelos in the 1950s gave origin to the influential – and infamous – theory of the "culture of poverty."[5]

Beginning in the 1930s, economists, architects, and planners began surveying the "horse-shoe of slums." These professionals understood the area primarily in terms of its housing deficit rather than its criminality. It was in this decade when the area became primarily known as the epicentre of the so-called "housing problem". The Banco Nacional Hipote-cario y de Obras Públicas (National Bank of Mortgages and Public Works, BNHOP) led the effort, surveying housing conditions in order to decide where to finance and build housing social housing. The activities of the BNHOP boosted in the late-1940s, build-ing 12,000 units between 1947 and 1952. This number represented a six-fold increase from the earlier period, when "no serious efforts to fix the problem of popular housing" was undertaken.[6] As important as the number was the spectacular nature of some of these constructions. The Juárez and Miguel Alemán housing projects, designed by mod-ernist architect Mario Pani – a follower of Le Corbusier well connected with Mexico's political and economic elites – were instantly hailed as landmarks and remain symbols of the mid-century Mexican Miracle.[7]

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3   For population numbers, see A. R. Kuri, La Experiencia Olvidada. El Ayuntamiento de México: política y gobierno, 1876–1912, Mexico City: 1996, p. 92; and D. Davis, Urban Leviathan, Philadelphia 1994, p. 329.

4   C.S. de Salubridad, Informes Rendidos por los Inspectores Sanitarios de Cuartel y los de Distrito al Consejo Supe-rior de Salubridad, Mexico City 1895, p. 11.

5   G. de Murga, Atisbos Sociológicos. El Fraccionamiento de Tierras. Las Habitaciones Baratas, in: Boletín de la So-ciedad Mexicana de Geografía y Estadística, Quinta época, Tomo VI (1913), p. 485. Lewis conducted his research in the 1950s, leading to the publication of *Five Families* (1959) and *The Children of Sánchez* (1961).

6   F. Sánchez, La Realidad Mexicana y las Nuevas Concepciones Arquitectónicas Urbanísticas en Material de Habi-tación Popular, in: Estudios 1 (1952), p. 48.

7   E.A. de Anda, Vivienda Colectiva de la Modernidad en México: Los Multifamiliares Durante el Periodo Presiden-cial de Miguel Alemán (1946–1952), Mexico City 2011.

It was amidst such optimism that President Miguel Alemán Valdés (1946–1952) ordered that the BNHOP organize a conference on popular housing. Adolfo Zamora, director of the BNHOP, confidently claimed at the conference inauguration in 1950 that the "war against the *tugurio*" had begun.[8] While the war began in 1950, preparations commenced much earlier, as evidenced by Zamora's long-term engagement with the housing question as an organizer of housing surveys that sought to quantify housing conditions in Mexico City. Trained as a lawyer at the National University, Zamora joined the BNHOP in 1933 – after a brief stint in Paris – becoming its director in 1947. Zamora considered himself an adoptive son of Mexico's capital city (he was born in Nicaragua) and something of a flâneur as well, someone who for thirty years wondered around the streets of Mexico City, discovering "its perspectives one by one, and read[ing] full of emotion the Braille of its palaces and tugurios."[9]

Zamora organized or participated in three housing surveys – in 1935, 1946, and 1952 – all of which centred on the problem of the *tugurio*. The 1935 "Study of Mexico City" focused on low-income housing from an "urban, architectural, and social" perspective. The survey identified 100,000 overcrowded and insalubrious houses where half a million people lived. Zamora proposed replacing these dwellings with hygienic units in order to protect residents from "tuberculosis, rickets, typhus, and all the vileness, depravity, and disease that are incubated in [these] pigsties."[10] This solution, razing down slums and replacing them with modern housing (urban renewal, in short), became an unquestioned – if not always easily implemented – policy recipe, developed by emulators of Baron Haussmann and Le Corbusier and tested in cities throughout the world.[11]

The second survey, the 1947 "Investigation about the housing problem in Mexico City," reproduced this approach. Directed by architect Félix Sánchez, the survey understood the housing problem, essentially, as the problem of *tugurios* or *vecindades*. The latter word is probably better known, and it still commonly used. A *vecindad* consisted of several one or two-room dwellings distributed around a central patio or corridor. The "horseshoe of slums" consisted mostly of *vecindades*, but while this word designated a specific group of homes around a courtyard, *tugurio* was usually used to name a larger area of the city. (Accordingly, *vecindad: tugurio* are roughly equivalent to tenement: slum in the American context). The survey added two transitional categories: "*jacales*" (shacks) and "*zonas decadentes*" (decaying areas). Located in the outskirts of the city and lacking public services, shacks were provisional homes built with improvised materials. "*Zonas decadentes*"

8   BNHOP, Memoria de las Conferencias Sobre Habitación Popular Organizadas por el BNHOP, Mexico City 1950, p. 19.

9   Estudios 6 (1952), III. Biographic Information from Roderic Ai Camp, Mexican Political Biographies, 1935–1993 (3d ed.), Austin 1995, p. 746.

10   Ibid., p. 4.

11   A. Zamora, "Memo" [1937], Carlos Lazo Archive, Archivo General de la Nación [Mexico], Box 89, File 8. For transnational histories of urban renewal policies, see C. Klemek, The Transatlantic Collapse of Urban Renewal: Postwar Urbanism from New York to Berlin, Chicago 2012; A. Mayne, Slums: The History of a Global Injustice, London, 2017.

were better-off areas in a process of deterioration, usually adjacent to slums. The unstated assumption was that, with time, they would become slums as well.[12]

A note on my translations might be necessary at this point, lest the reader become overwhelmed by a flurry of Spanish terms. In translating *tugurios* as slums I am following American and Mexican social scientists who resorted to this translation to make sense of urban processes that they considered universal. Oscar Lewis, for instance, described the Casa Grande *vecindad* where he conducted his research as a "slum tenement, in the heart of Mexico City."[13] Lewis interrogated his informants about the history of Colonia Morelos as he tried to figure out where exactly the neighbourhood fit in Ernest W. Burgess' ecological model.[14] Sociologist Norman S. Hayner – as Lewis, a follower of anthropologist Robert Redfield – conducted fieldwork in Oaxaca and Mexico City in order to study social change in traditional societies. In 1945, Hayner used the word *vecindades* to describe Mexico's slums, which he located north, east, and south of the city centre, following Adolfo Zamora's mapping of poverty.[15] In a longer, revised version of his findings published in his 1966, Hayner adopted the formulation of the *herradura de tugurios*, translated as "horseshoe of slums."[16]

If American sociologists recognized *tugurios* as a version of the slum, Mexican housing experts read them as familiar forms in the universal script of urbanization and industrialization. Following Lewis Mumford, economist Ramón Ramírez – another participant in the 1947 survey – argued that overcrowded *tugurios* were the result of housing shortages produced by the industrial city. Full of nostalgia for a Golden Age, Ramírez deplored the "divorce between city and countryside" as well as the overcrowding and promiscuity of the modern city.[17] This vision of industrialization and urban growth, written by a Mexican economist in 1952, was slightly off the mark. Industrialization, rural-urban migration, and overcrowding existed in Mexico City, but not to the same degree as in North Atlantic industrial cities or as the result of the same causal relationships. Nightmarish visions of overcrowded slums notwithstanding, Mexico City was a flat and low-density city. Or at least much of it was. According to Hannes Meyer – the Bauhaus urban planner who came to Mexico in 1939 to direct the Planning Institute of the Instituto Politécnico Nacional (National Polytechnic Institute (INV) – Mexico City had one of the lowest densities in the world: its 1,464,556 residents were spread across 134 square kilometers, amounting to an average of 109 residents per hectare. The "horseshoe of slums," however, was a different story, peopled by an average 691 residents per hectare.[18]

12   BNHOP, Memoria de las conferencias sobre habitación popular organizadas por el BNHOP, p. 139.

13   O. Lewis, The Children of Sánchez: Autobiography of a Mexican Family, New York 1961, xxv.

14   E. de Antuñano, Mexico City as an Urban Laboratory: Oscar Lewis, the 'Culture of Poverty', and the Transnational History of the Slum, in: Journal of Urban History 45 (2019) 4, p. 820.

15   Mexico City: Its Growth and Configuration, in: The American Journal of Sociology 50 (1945) 4, pp. 295–304.

16   New Patterns in Old Mexico, New Haven 1966, p. 61.

17   R. Ramírez, El Problema de la Habitación y Sus Aspectos Generales y en la Ciudad de México, in: Estudios 1 (1952), p. 62.

18   La Ciudad de México. Fragmentos de un Estudio Urbanístico, in: Arquitectura/México 12 (1943), pp. 96–109.

Remarkably, *colonias proletarias* were not included in the housing surveys of 1935 and 1947, even though hundreds of thousands of people had moved to these peripheral neighbourhoods during that period. What are the reasons for this omission? In the first place, most *colonias proletarias* were located in the peripheral districts (*delegaciones*) of the Federal District, outside the city limits. The cadastral plan did not include these areas that popular imagination still considered rural and bucolic spaces. As already mentioned, *colonias proletarias* were intimately entangled with myriad city offices, mostly in the political sections of the city government.[19] They were a key component of the city governance but they were, so to speak, off the map. It would seem natural to posit a relationship between this invisibility and political powerlessness. But invisibility did not amount to political irrelevance, far from it. At the margins of housing surveys, cadastral maps, and the purview of architects and urban planners, *colonias proletarias* flexed strong political muscles and were far from marginal: they were steadily growing and successfully acquiring public services. The 1940s were, in fact, the period when they had the most political leverage – precisely when they were not included in architectural surveys.

In the second place, the hypervisibility of the slum diverted the gaze of experts from the city margins to the centre. This refraction took place in many other cities in the Global South, where turn-of-century city centre tenements continued to be considered the epicentre of the housing problem decades after their population, relative to the city total, had plummeted.[20] Oscar Lewis' *Five Families* (1959) included a chapter on a *colonia proletaria*, but the rest of the book, and the entirety of *The Children of Sánchez* (1961), took place in the "horseshoe of slums," whose stigmatization as an urban problem had been cemented by decades of studies by social scientists and policymakers. According to its resident chroniclers, the barrio of Tepito – the most emblematic neighbourhood of this area – is "more than 400 years old […] and thus for us the social sciences are the sciences of human stupidity [*pendejez humana*], for they have undoubtedly fucked us over [*nos ha ido como en feria*]."[21] Such was the inertia of the decades of studies, so powerful the fears and fascination elicited by the slum, that little attention was left to direct elsewhere.

2. The "Discovery" of *Colonias Proletarias*

Zamora and his colleagues at the BNHOP did not acknowledge the existence of *colonias proletarias* until 1952, when they were finally included as a housing category in its landmark survey: "The Housing Problem in Mexico City."[22] The seven-month research project, by far the most complete to date, was based on the work of an army of surveyors

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19   Colonias Proletarias were under the Authority of the Oficina de Colonias, within the Gobernación Section of the City Government.

20   For a similar observation, regarding Buenos Aires, see J. Moya, Settling in the City, in: Cousins and Strangers: Spanish Immigrants in Buenos Aires, 1850–1930, Berkeley 1998.

21   A. Hernández et. al., Tepito Para los Tepiteños, in: J. Alonso, coord., Los Movimientos Sociales en el Valle de México, Mexico City 1984, p. 334.

22   The survey was published as a special number of Estudios, the journal of the BNHOP.

who distributed questionnaires, conducted interviews, and analyzed blueprints, cadastral maps, and aerial photographs.[23] The goal of "The Housing Problem in Mexico City" was twofold: providing a diagnosis of housing conditions and coming up with a plan to fix them. While the survey, unsurprisingly, did not fix the housing problem, it did reframe it, and its categories became a fixture for decades to come. *Colonias proletarias* were described as a recent phenomenon, the product of a migratory crisis, and an urban form akin to squatter or "parachutist" settlements (*colonias paracaidistas*).[24] Based on this assessment, scholars often consider, equivocally, the 1940s as the decade of explosion of Mexico City's informal city.[25]

It is worth remarking on three key difficulties faced by Zamora and his team. First, their survey attempted to capture in time a dynamic landscape marked by regional and intra-urban movements of people. Therefore, the categories they used failed to acknowledge how different housing forms were changing. Second, surveyors mapped housing conditions throughout large sectors of the city, but did not capture inequalities within neighbourhoods or city blocks. This method offered the picture of a city where the social class and economic function of neighbourhoods were clearly demarcated and matched into one another. Finally, and most importantly, the survey categorized *colonias proletarias* essentially as an urban form – by analyzing their density, location, and physical conditions – but it did not consider them as a legal, administrative, or political unit. Each of these issues – change, scale, and political invisibility – merits further revision.

Starting in the 1860s, the social geography of Mexico City underwent key transformations, driven by successive waves of growth. The first wave was led by wealthier classes who abandoned the colonial centre and moved southwest, to "modern" neighbourhoods furnished with urban services and unrestrained by the Spanish orthogonal grid. At the same time, working-class neighbourhoods were established north and east of the city centre, in more insalubrious lands, between 1880 and 1930. Whereas the first neighbourhoods were subdivided by powerful developers who provided urban services, developers of low-income neighbourhoods often disregarded municipal codes and sold lots without urban services in the area that would later be known as the horseshoe of slums. The establishment of *colonias proletarias* (after 1920) followed these patterns, reinforcing the class division between east and west. Their multiplication over the following decades, however, would dislocate this axis. Most *colonias proletarias* were located north and east, but others were settled in the west and south, beyond middle-class neighbourhoods.

According to the 1952 survey, the difference between *tugurios* and *colonias proletarias* were historical and geographical. The former were described as overcrowded, decaying, and unhygienic remnants of the old city geographically circumscribed to its centre while

23 Proyecto de Estudio de la Ciudad de México, in: Estudios 6 (1952), pp. 101–104; El Problema de la Habitación en la Ciudad de México, Estudios 6 (1952), pp. 15–26; Proyecto de Estudio de la Ciudad de México, Estudios 2 (1952), pp. 101–104.

24 El Problema de la Habitación en la Ciudad de México, p. 17.

25 See, for instance, P. Conolly, Uncontrolled Settlements and Self-build: What Kind of Solution? The Mexico City Case, in: P. Ward (ed.), Self-help Housing: A Critique, London 1982, pp. 141–174.

the latter were a more recent creation: a product of industrialization that went back ten or twelve years.[26] But this opposition blurred the more complex processes of decay and improvement that different generations of *tugurios* and *colonias proletarias* were undergoing. *Colonias proletarias* were described as unplanned neighbourhoods created from scratch and lacking urban services. With time, however, many of them densified, received urban services, and became integrated into the city, a progression that the survey did not anticipate. (Many others deteriorated, became with time *tugurios*). In other words, Zamora and his team shot a photograph rather than a film, leading them to underestimate the progressive nature of *colonias proletarias* and their possible similarities with *tugurios*.

The survey also mapped Mexico City according to rigid understandings of how cities worked and developed. Roughly following the tenets of the CIAM, it divided the city into four functions: housing, work, social services, and circulation. In regards to housing, the survey set an implicit benchmark according to which social classes, housing forms, and clearly delimited neighbourhoods matched into one another. The fact that porous boundaries between social classes and housing forms abounded was unequivocally seen as a problem; the survey disapprovingly noted that "small peddlers, bums, prostitutes, beggars, and [other] *lumpen* sectors were intermingled with industrial workers and the lower petit bourgeoisie."[27] The "human ecology" model was also used to assess Mexico City's housing conditions. Many geographers suggested that Latin American cities followed a different logic of growth from that observed by Ernest W. Burgess in Chicago.[28] Anchored to a central plaza where the commercial, political, and religious powers met, their lower-income sectors were pushed to poor suburbs while the elites stayed in the streets around the central plaza. While this is not the place to assess these debates, it is important to point out the common assumption that Burgess and his challengers shared: that territorial units had a single function and were occupied primarily by a social class. Housing officials were eager to format complex urban configurations under such headings as "industrial zones" and "low-income housing."[29]

Clearly this was not the case for Mexico City, where multiple uses and housing forms coexisted in a single block. According to the BNHOP, this coexistence had been produced by the recent transformations of the city, which had not reached the "rigid forms" of more advanced cities.[30] Since "different residential areas did not have a single housing form," surveyors decided to categorize city block as "homogenous," based on the housing form that predominated.[31] This decision was partly the outcome of the research tools

26 El Problema de la Habitación en la Ciudad de México, p. 187.
27 Ibid., p. 49.
28 N.S. Hayner, Mexico City: Its Growth and Configuration, in: The American Journal of Sociology 50 (1945) 4, pp. 295–304; F. Dotson and L.O. Dotson, La Estructura Ecológica de las Ciudades Mexicanas, in: Revista Mexicana de Sociología 19 (1957) 1, pp. 39–66.
29 G. Ortiz and C. Vilaseñor, Desarrollo de las Colonias Proletarias de la Ciudad de México, in: Boletín de la Sociedad Mexicana de Urbanismo 2 (1962), pp. 23–27.
30 El Problema de la Habitación en la Ciudad de México, p. 49.
31 Ibid., p. 40.

at the disposal of surveyors – sample surveys and questionnaires distributed by a small team – as well as the shortcomings that they faced; for instance, there was not a complete cadastral plan of the city, and numerous neighbourhoods lacked official blueprints. But the decision to map the city as a mosaic of discrete and homogenous city zones also reveals the power of models diffused by the CIAM and the Chicago School of Sociology. Finally, "The Housing Problem in Mexico City" did not analyze *colonias proletarias* as a political and administrative unit but as an architectural and urban form. The survey made only a fleeting reference to the government participation in the establishment of *colonias proletarias* (it referenced the "improper" grants of public land that gave origin to them), but it did not mention the sui generis urban code regulating them, the patronage networks buttressing them, and the key official recognition that the city government awarded them.[32] Rather than addressing these linkages with political power, the survey examined the neighbourhoods' infrastructure, the material conditions of their houses, and their position in relation to the larger city. Were *colonias proletarias* communicated with the city centre? Did they have access to schools and markets? What was their population density? In asking such questions, the survey construed *colonias proletarias* as an urban pathology and not as constitutive of Mexico City's political structures, a complex web of politicking that entangled the city government, official and independent brokers, and organizations of "urban poor."[33]

3. Government Policy Towards *Colonias Proletarias*

The fact that *colonias proletarias* were initially understood as the sign of an unforeseen crisis was extremely consequential, for it justified a battery of municipal policies passed in the 1950s prohibiting new subdivisions and severely restricting the provision of urban services. The dilemma for the city government was, in the words of conservative architect Mauricio Gómez Mayorga, that "providing urban services to the nightmarish swarm of colonias proletarias established an urban cancer and fueled its flourishing".[34]

Although the city government adopted a strict anti-growth policy in the 1950s, once housing officials identified *colonias proletarias* as the most important low-income housing form in the city, they faced the task of devising policies towards them (towards those that already existed). It was a tall order, since *colonias proletarias* challenged most assumptions about the city's perennial housing problem, which up until then materialized in *tugurios*. In the 1950s, the recently created Instituto Nacional de la Vivienda (National Housing Institute, INV) continued the studies conducted in previous years by the BN-

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32   Ibid., p. 15.

33   Such political entanglements would be studied by political scientists who in the 1970s studied the relationship between the "state" and the "urban poor". Classical examples include W. A. Cornelius, Politics and the Migrant Poor in Mexico City, Stanford 1975); and S. Eckstein, The Poverty of Revolution: The State and the Urban Poor in Mexico, Princeton 1977.

34   ¿Qué Hacer por la Ciudad de México?, Mexico City 1957, p. 48.

HOP.[35] Architect Félix Sánchez, the main author of the 1952 BNHOP survey, led the INV studies, evidencing the continuities between both institutions. The INV divided its efforts between *tugurios* and *colonias proletarias*, to each of which it consecrated a research team. This binary crystallized a vast, confusing, and shifting landscape. While *tugurios* were old, *colonias proletarias* were new. While *tugurios* were in, or close to, the city centre, *proletarias* were located in the peripheries of the city. While residents of *tugurios* paid rent, inhabitants of *proletarias* owned their own lots (or were buying them through monthly payments). *Tugurios* were overcrowded and close to markets, schools, and other urban facilities. *Colonias proletarias* were sparsely populated and lacked urban services. While overcrowded *tugurios* bred incest, crime, and corruption, residents of *proletarias* suffered from social anomie because they lacked spaces of sociability.

The 1952 survey offered a bleak image of *colonias proletarias*, describing them as spaces of despair and hopelessness, where an overburdened government was incapable of distributing urban services. Over the 1950s, however, housing officials adopted a more positive stance towards them. This optimism was borne from a key insight about the differences between *colonias proletarias* and *tugurios*. Whereas the latter were decaying, many *colonias proletarias* were progressive environments, amenable to improvement through the provision of urban services and targeted interventions.

Two young architects from IPN, David Cymet and Guillermo Ortiz, spearheaded the study of *colonias proletarias* in the 1950s. Established by a cohort of radical architects in 1937, the IPN's School of Architecture and Engineering welded the practices of architecture and engineering together to produce a pragmatic and politically progressive approach to the housing question. When architect Ricardo Pérez Rayón, a graduate of the school, became the head of Mexico City's Master Plan Office in the 1950s, he invited Cymet and Ortiz to join him in devising a policy towards *colonias proletarias*.[36] In a 1955 study, they calculated 279 *colonias proletarias*, adding to around a quarter of the population of the city (736,035).[37] Most of these neighbourhoods were lacking in myriad ways: 85% lacked paved streets; 57% lacked schools; 72% did not have a market; 80% did not have parks and gardens; 45% lacked sewage; and 35% lacked water. Rather than tearing them down – alas, there was little to bring down – the way to fix *colonias proletarias* was providing them with urban services and helping residents improve their homes. Cymet and Ortiz considered that *colonias proletarias* not only lacked urban services but the "organs integrating an urban community: workplaces, markets, churches, gardens, sports facilities, recreation centres, etc."[38] Whereas the 1952 survey saw *colonias proletarias* as a

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35   Representative INV studies include Colonias Proletarias: Problemas y Soluciones, Mexico City 1958; Herradura de Tugurios: Problemas y Soluciones, Mexico City, 1958; Una Ciudad Perdida, Mexico City, 1968.

36   On P. Rayón's work at the Master Plan Office, see "Entrevista Realizada a Reinaldo Pérez Rayón, Realizada por Graciela de Garay, el día 2 de Octubre de 1991 en la Ciudad de México". Archivo de la Palabra del Instituto de Investigaciones Dr. José María Luis Mora.

37   El Problema de las Colonias Proletarias en la Ciudad de México, Mexico City 1955, p. 66.

38   Colonias Proletarias: Problemas y Soluciones, p. 9.

discrete housing problem, plans for them became increasingly embedded within broader urbanistic and sociological frameworks.

In 1958, the INV proposed a 4-point programme for *colonias proletarias*: demolishing houses beyond repair; improving conditions of houses that could still be saved; increasing population density by building houses in *colonias proletarias*; and providing households with technical and credit assistance for improving and building their homes.[39] The first point – urban renewal – was reminiscent of earlier projects to replace *tugurios*. But the novelties of the programme outweighed past inertias and represented a transition to a new housing policy. In the first place, the plan to increase population density in *colonias proletarias* constituted a radical and counterintuitive idea since the housing problem had always been inextricably linked with overcrowding. Secondly, the INV *began* to recognize the impossibility of demolishing deficient houses and the futility of pushing them outside of the law. Instead, it recognized the existence of *colonias proletarias* as well as the work that residents had already invested in them, which the INV viewed as a foundation for further improvements. The INV sought to establish a partnership with neighbourhood residents in order to build structurally sound, inexpensive houses.[40] It prepared and distributed building manuals to help untrained residents build their own houses in a cheap and efficient manner. Manuals included information on materials and construction techniques and were also designed to foster collaborations between residents, architects, engineers, and social workers.[41] The "integral improvement" programme for Colonia Agrícola Oriental, for instance, developed as a "possible model" for other neighbourhoods, included the building of a thousand houses as well as the provision of counseling and subsidized materials so that residents could improve their homes.[42] Underlying all of these actions was a more ambitious drive to develop communities in environments often described as lifeless, "devoid of water and trees, resembling a desert."[43] But these were limited efforts that did not amount to a forceful city policy. The INV did not have the monopoly over urban and housing policies, so *colonias proletarias* were entangled in myriad government offices, including the Ministry of Health, the city government, and public banks who provided mortgages. The most consequential policy was the building of around 1,600 houses in colonias Gabriel Ramos Millán, Agrícola Oriental, and San Juan de Aragón.[44]

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39   Ibid., p. 13.

40   Ibid., p. 11.

41   B. Frieden, The Search for Housing Policy in Mexico City, in: The Town Planning Review 36 (July 1965) 2, p. 91; A.G. Cortéz, Cartilla de la Vivienda, in: El Universal (16 May 1957).

42   "Plan de Mejoramiento Integral de la Colonia Agrícola Oriental," Archivo General de la Nación (hereafter AGN), Fondo Instituto Nacional de la Vivienda (hereafter INV), Box 1.

43   Guillermo Ortiz Flores, "La Vivienda Popular," AGN, INV, Box 12.

44   Most houses (around 1,000) were built in San Juan de Aragón, a number that would be increased by ten when the city government later built a unit there. See A. Escudero, Conjunto Urbano San Juan de Aragón, in: E.A. Alonso/G.Á. Montes (eds.), El Espacio Habitacional en la Arquitectura Moderna: Colonias, Fraccionamientos, Unidades Habitacionales, Equipamiento Urbano y Protagonistas, Mexico City 2013, pp. 187–202.

The limited power of the INV is further evidenced by the policy of growth restriction that the city government implemented during the 1950s, beginning with the tenure of regent Ernesto P. Uruchurtu (1953–1966). More than any other regent before or since, Uruchurtu sought to restrict urban growth, a goal pursued through the enforcement of urban codes and the tight control over the distribution of urban services (water most importantly).[45] His law and order approach to government won him the support of the city's middle-classes, allowing him to remain in office for an unprecedented thirteen years. The 1950s thus witnessed a paradoxical dual process: on the one hand, the city government restricted growth while local and federal housing offices sought to improve conditions in *colonias proletarias* and integrate them into the city.

This progressive shift in the policy towards *colonias proletarias* dovetailed with – and was part of – a larger Pan-American dialogue about the housing question. As shown by a growing historiography, the 1950s were animated by hemispheric discussions about housing, urbanization, and modernization more broadly. Seminars and congresses were convened; think tanks and institutions created. This expert dialogue – which counted with the participation of officials from national governments and international institutions, as well as academics from different disciplines – gave a theoretical, institutional, and ideological existence to the idea of the "Latin American city."[46] Two key interrelated principles emerging from this dialogue pinpoint the new approach towards *colonias proletarias*: the policy of aided self-help (and the benefits of self-construction more broadly) and the notion of "slums of hope," the realization that "squatter settlements" could be progressive environments that improved with time.

Before 1950, most social scientists and political observers referred indistinctly to central slums and squatter settlements, both of which they understood as spaces of economic deprivation, cultural backwardness, and moral vice.[47] However, such sweeping analyses of urban poverty would be replaced by more granular and dynamic studies that recognized the progressive nature of squatter settlements. John F.C. Turner's work in Peruvian *barriadas* praised the advantages of self-construction and the power of communities to collaborate in order to build their homes and neighbourhoods. Turner arrived in Peru at a

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45 There are significant gaps in our understanding of the government of Uruchurtu. Evidence for the denial of urban services to "clandestine neighbourhoods" can be found in Archivo Histórico de la Ciudad de México, Fondo Obras Públicas, box 86, bundle 1.

46 This proposition is advanced by Adrián Gorelik in several writings. Recent works on these exchanges that have informed my thinking include A. Gorelik, Miradas sobre Buenos Aires; L. Benmergui, The Alliance for Progress and Housing Policy in Rio de Janeiro and Buenos Aires, in: Urban History 36 (2009) 2, pp. 303–326; H. Gyger, Improvised Cities: Architecture, Urbanization, and Innovation in Peru, Pittsburgh 2019; A. Offner, Homeownership and Social Welfare in the Americas: Ciudad Kennedy as a Midcentury Crossroads, in: Sandoval-Strausz / Kwak (eds.), Making Cities Global, pp. 47–70; P. Connolly, La Ciudad y el Hábitat Popular: Paradigma Latinoamericano, in: B.R. Ramírez Velázquez / E.P. Cobos (eds.), Teorías sobre la Ciudad en América Latina, Mexico City 2013, pp. 505–562; B. Fischer, A Century in Present Tense: Crisis, Politics, and Intellectual History of Brazil's Informal Cities, in: B. Fischer / J. Auyero / B. McCann (eds.), Cities from Scratch: Poverty and Informality in Latin America, Durham 2014), pp. 9–67.

47 This point was made by W. Mangin, Latin American Squatter Settlements: A Problem and a Solution, in: Latin American Research Review 2 (1967) 3, pp. 65–98. Of course, broad generalizations on Latin American or global slums continue to be made.

time when the country became a key laboratory for the study of self-construction, squatter settlements, and rural-urban migration. Turner was well positioned to amplify these ideas in venues like the widely-read *Architectural Design*.[48] In 1967, anthropologist William Mangin – who worked with Turner in Peru – identified a number of myths about squatter settlements in an influential article. Firstly, squatter settlements were formed by rural (or indigenous) people who "reconstituted" their social organization in the city. Secondly, settlements were chaotic and disorganized, breeding ground for crime, family breakdown, and political radicalism. Finally, settlements did not participate in city life; they were, in fact, an "economic drain on the nation:" unproductive, unemployed, and diverting work from the agricultural sector.[49] Mangin understood squatter settlements differently. He viewed their residents as "less alienated from the national state and more involved with each other than residents of central city slums," largely because they could look around and see "a major accomplishment of their own, i.e., the seizure of land and the creation of a community."[50]

Mexican *colonias proletarias* began to be seen in this light in the 1950s, as evolving INV studies make clear. Seen through a Pan-American lens, they were part of a larger family of Latin American squatter settlements that included, in Mangin's listing, "*barriadas bruja* in Panama, *ranchos* in Venezuela, *barriadas* in Peru, *callampas* in Chile, *cantegriles* in Uruguay, *favelas* in Brazil and, in other places, marginal areas, clandestine urbanizations, *barrios* of invasion, parachutists, phantom towns, etc."[51] It did not really matter that *colonias proletarias* rarely were originated from squatter invasions and that most of them were sanctioned or actively supported by the government. By the 1960s, they had become the Mexican version of Latin America's "slums of hope," leading Turner to compare them with Lima's *barriadas*.[52] Reviewing Mexico's housing policy, Turner's colleague at M.I.T, Bernard Freiden, summarized the new consensus when he described *colonias proletarias* as "the most significant step in solving the housing problem of Mexico City."[53] By the time Wayne Cornelius published his influential *Politics and the Migrant Poor* in 1975, the vindication of *colonias proletarias* was definitive. Their residents were pragmatic, risk-averse, and working along with the municipal government in order to improve their homes and their neighbourhoods. "Central-city slums," on the other hand, were "the worst-low income dwelling environments in the city."[54] Cornelius' originality lay in his

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48   On Turner's work in Peru, see H. Gyger, Improvised Cities. Before Turner's diffusion of these ideas, experiments in aided self-help had been tried out in other contexts (often colonial), such as Puerto Rico. On this earlier history, see R. Harris, The Silence of Experts: 'Aided self-help' housing, 1939–1954, in: Habitat International 22 (1998) 2, pp. 165–189.

49   W. Mangin, Latin American Squatter Settlements, p. 66.

50   Ibid., p. 74.

51   W. Mangin, Latin American Squatter Settlements, p. 65.

52   Barriers and Channels for Housing Development in Modernizing Countries, in: Journal of the American Institute of Planners, 33 (1967) 3, pp, 167–181.

53   The Search for Housing Policy in Mexico City, p. 81.

54   Ibid., p. 28. By the early 1980s, the optimism had waned, and the dominant view of the squatter settlements as progressive spaces received a backlash. See P. Ward (ed.), Self-Help Housing: A Critique, London 1982; and S.

analysis of the relationship between *colonias proletarias* and the Mexican political system. But in his assessment of *colonias proletarias* as progressive neighbourhoods, he was riding the scholarly wave.

For scholars from the period between 1950 and 1970, peripheral squatter settlements represented an urban version of the frontier in U.S. history: an empty space to be colonized through the hard toil of settlers. But just as the myth of the frontier in American history erased Native American histories, the idea of the urban periphery as an empty space transformed by industrious settlers (small capitalist entrepreneurs in Hernando de Soto's influential interpretation) was blind to the political and juridical entanglements that shaped these neighbourhoods.[55] In the case of Mexico City's *colonias proletarias*, this blindness is all the more remarkable because, as I have argued, they were sponsored by several government offices and the object of a policy that reached a remarkable degree of institutionalization during the 1940s. *Colonias proletarias* were listed in an official register and were part of a (de facto) bureaucratic regime in the 1940s. Hundreds of *colonias proletarias* were established in this decade, oftentimes following government expropriations justified by the legal principle of the social function of property (*función social de la propiedad*). The payment and installation of urban services in *colonias proletarias* was negotiated between the city government and residents who flexed strong political muscle in the 1940s.[56] This de facto policy was less the product of an expert understanding of the housing problem than the outcome of a political crucible in a post-revolutionary city. It was less a policy than a politics – borne not at the desktops of architects and planners but in negotiations between government officials, political brokers, and residents, at a time when the winds of Mexico's revolution were still blowing.

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Colonias proletarias were rediscovered by housing experts in the 1950s and 1960s, first as an urgent problem and then as a possible solution to the housing problem, a stance that was partially framed by the language of aided self-help and community organizing of the period. Nonetheless, this expert rediscovery of *colonias proletarias* – a progressive expertise, opposed to authoritarian modernist planning – was quite myopic towards the politics that first allowed their flourishing in the decades of the 1930s and 1940s. The change by which squatter settlements went from "problem" to "solution" was not an ex-

Eckstein, Urbanization Revisited: Inner-City Slum of Hope and Squatter Settlement of Despair, in: World Development 18 (1990) 2, pp. 165–181.

55   A. Roy, Transnational Trespassings: The Geopolitics of Urban Informality, in: A. Roy and N. AlSayad (ed.), Urban Informality: Transnational Perspectives from the Middle East, Latin America, and South Asia, Lanham 2004), p. 308. My deployment of the myth of the urban frontier to the urban margins is also informed by K. Brown, Gridded Lives: Why Kazakhstan and Montana are Nearly the Same Place, in: Dispatches from Dystopia: Histories of Places Not Yet Forgotten, Chicago 2015.

56   On these policies, see M.P. Cohen, Política y Vvienda en México, 1910–1952, in: Revista Mexicana de Sociología 41 (1981) 3, pp. 769–835; A. Azuela / M.S. Cruz, La Institucionalización de las Colonias Populares y la Política Urbana en la Ciudad de México (1940–1946), in: Sociológica 4 (1989) 9, pp. 111–133; C.S. Mejorada, Rezagos de la Modernidad: Memorias de una Ciudad Presente, Mexico City 2005.

ceptional Mexican story. Everywhere the tide changed. But the Mexican case differs from that of other Latin American countries because *colonias proletarias* had been hailed as a solution, *by government officials*, much earlier, since the 1930s and 1940s. Therefore, in the span of twenty years they went from 1) a political solution to the housing problem, to 2) an invisible urban form, to 3) the manifestation of an urban crisis, to 4) a solution, imperfect but plausible, to the challenge of popular urban expansion.

This transformation is ridden with ironies. The 1940s, the period when *colonias proletarias* were invisible for housing officials, was also the decade when they were most powerful politically. *Colonias proletarias* thrived during this decade, when their residents pushed the expansion of the city through negotiations with political brokers and city officials. The failure of architects to recognize this process did not undermine its success. It simply underscores the importance that international models had for reading or misreading what was happening in Mexico City. The growth of *colonias proletarias* was under the radar because these neighborhoods challenged a global narrative of urban modernity, growth, and decay modelled on North-Atlantic cities. But their magnitude and importance as the preferred housing option for the city's working classes is undeniable. *Colonias proletarias* improved over time. They were, in the words of sociologist Emilio Duhau, "progressive" housing forms.[57] They were also, as numerous authors starting in the 1970s pointed out, a bedrock of Mexico's authoritarian political system.[58] And yet, this centrality was hard to see before the 1950s.

In further irony, the reappraisal of *colonias proletarias* by housing experts as progressive neighborhoods, pregnant with possibilities for self-construction and grassroots community-building, coincided with the tenure of Ernesto P. Uruchurtu, whose government sought to halt the establishment of new low-income neighborhoods. While targeted interventions to improve *colonias proletarias* were conducted by government offices, the organizations of residents that successfully pushed for the creation of more neighborhoods in the 1930s and 1940s lost legitimacy, power, and autonomy over the following two decades. This loss was concomitant with the public stance towards *colonias proletarias*, which deteriorated after 1950. References to *colonias proletarias* as squatter settlements, illegal neighborhoods, and drains on the municipal finances became more common, precisely when experts began to see them in a more positive light.

The category *colonia proletaria* holds an exceptional polysemy and carried vastly different meanings across different fields: as an administrative category within the city bureaucracy, as a political organization claiming a place in a city, as an object of expert knowledge, and as a figment of the imagination and fears of Mexico City's middle classes. The difficulty – for the historian if not necessarily for the historical actor – is that these perspectives and their chronologies do not neatly align with each other. The power of Mexican housing experts to design progressive and consequential policies to-

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57   The Informal City: An Enduring Slum or a Progressive Habitat, in: B. Fischer / B. McCann / J. Auyero (eds.), Cities from Scratch: Poverty and Informality in Urban Latin America, Durham 2014, pp. 150–169.

58   W. Cornelius and S. Eckstein, referenced in footnote 33, are classic examples.

wards *colonias proletarias* paled in the face of the city government, eager to please the middle-classes, curtail urban growth, and move away from the radicalism of the Mexican Revolution. Extremely successful as a politics of land and services distribution in post-revolutionary Mexico City, *colonias proletarias* were much less consequential as a policy of aided self-help and community development in the 1950s and 1960s. Transnational housing policies and national and city politics were not in sync with each other and, in the end, the latter proved more important in defining Mexico City's housing problem for the remainder of the century.

Rethinking Basic Infrastructure: French Aid and Metro Development in Postwar Latin America

Andra B. Chastain

ABSTRACTS

In der zweiten Hälfte des 20. Jahrhunderts entstanden in lateinamerikanischen Metropolen acht neue U-Bahn-Systeme, darunter in Mexiko, Brasilien, Chile und Venezuela. Welche Faktoren können diese dramatischen Veränderungen in urbanen Räumen erklären? Der Aufsatz argumentiert, dass dafür französische Akteure verantwortlich waren. Während internationale Entwicklungsagenturen grundlegende Infrastrukturprojekte wie Häfen oder Dämme förderten, bot sich Frankreich urbanen Modernisierern an. Die Beziehungen zwischen lateinamerikanischen Planern und französischen Investoren kamen französischen Herstellern und lateinamerikanischen Befürwortern von U-Bahn-Systemen gleichermaßen zugute. Der Aufsatz basiert auf spanischen, portugiesischen und französischen Quellen, darunter Archivmaterial der Société française d'études et de réalisations de transports urbains (SOFRETU), lokalen Zeitungsberichten und offiziellen Stellungnahmen. Er hebt die Bedeutung bilateraler Entwicklungskooperation zwischen Frankreich und lateinamerikanischen Ländern hervor.

Postwar Latin America witnessed a remarkable wave of metro construction as eight new urban rail transit systems opened in Mexico, Brazil, Chile, and Venezuela in a span of less than twenty years. What explains this dramatic transformation in the built environment of Latin American cities? This article argues that French metro boosters played a crucial role in the Latin American transit boom between the 1960s and the 1980s. While international development agencies favoured what they considered more basic infrastructure projects such as ports or dams, France constituted a key source of aid for modernizing urban planners in Latin America. Relationships between Latin American planners and French funders benefitted French manufacturing interests, in addition to Latin American metro proponents. This article draws on sources in Spanish,

Portuguese, and French, including archival sources from the French Company for the Design and Construction of Urban Transport (Société française d'études et de realizations de transports urbains, SOFRETU), local news articles, and official reports by Latin American metro agencies. It highlights the role of bilateral aid between France and Latin America, thus complementing work on multilateral organizations and US influence in the region.

Since the late 1960s, the city of Santiago de Chile has built one of the largest metro systems in Latin America, second in size only to that of Mexico City.[1] Its six lines cover more than 100 kilometres, and millions of riders rely on it each day to get to work, school, or home. For a metropolis of seven million people that sprawls across a valley ringed by mountains, the metro is crucial to keeping cars off the streets. Santiago's air pollution – which is particularly intense in the winter months and causes serious damage to public health – would be much worse without the essential human and material infrastructure of the Santiago metro.[2]

Yet the system's status has been in question throughout much of the project's history. The high quality of materials and construction methods "frequently surprised and even confused the visiting foreign experts [...] some of whom could not associate such achievements with an underdeveloped country."[3] Such comments offended the planners behind the project not only because they had poured their lives into the metro, but because they had battled for years to convince domestic audiences that this massive investment would benefit national development. Within Chile, experts had debated the question of whether the metro constituted essential infrastructure and whether it was a higher priority than projects such as highways, ports, or dams. These debates were especially heated during the military dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet, when free-market ideology reigned within the government and economists revised the criteria for funding public works.[4]

Chilean urban planners, engineers, and economists were not alone in their struggles to define what constituted basic infrastructure and the role that a metro system could play in urban and national development schemes. In fact, postwar Latin America witnessed a remarkable wave of metro building as new urban rail transit systems opened in Mexico City (1969), São Paulo (1974), Santiago (1975), Rio de Janeiro (1979), Caracas (1983), Porto Alegre (1985), Recife (1985), and Belo Horizonte (1986). Moreover, many cities

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1   The Santiago metro is the longest in South America by track length, while São Paulo's metro has higher ridership. In 2017, Mexico City had 226 kilometres and 5.3 million passengers daily, on average; Santiago had 103 kilometres and 1.8 million passengers daily; and São Paulo had 92 kilometres and 2.5 million passengers daily (M. P. Salas, Radiografía de las redes del Metro en América Latina, in: La Tercera, 17 June 2017, http://www2. latercera.com/noticia/radiografia-las-redes-del-metro-america-latina/ (accessed 1 October 2018)).

2   P. Pino et al., Chile Confronts Its Environmental Health Future after 25 Years of Accelerated Growth, in: Annals of Global Health 81 (2015) 3, pp. 354–367.

3   M. Muñoz, Vocación y creatividad en el servicio público, in: M. I. Pavez Reyes (ed.), En la ruta de Juan Parrochia Beguin: Premio Nacional de Urbanismo, Chile 1996, Santiago 2003, p. 44.

4   See, for example, the metro debates in the press in late 1975, 1980–81, and 1983–85, in A. B. Chastain, Vehicle of Progress: The Santiago Metro, Technopolitics, and State Formation in Chile, 1965–1989, Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University, 2018.

– such as Lima, Bogotá, and Montevideo – hosted long-running debates about the need for a subway to serve their rapidly growing populations.[5] Until the 1960s, the Buenos Aires *subterráneo* (underground), which dated from 1913, was the only subway in the region.[6] Yet in a span of less than 20 years (1969–1986), Latin America suddenly boasted eight new systems, with others proposed and discussed. What explains this dramatic transformation in the built environment of Latin American cities?

This article argues that French metro boosters played a crucial role in the Latin American transit boom between the 1960s and the 1980s. While debates about the role of a metro system in broader urbanization and modernization schemes played out at the local and national levels, the construction of these massive infrastructure systems required international financing. At a time when international development agencies such as the World Bank favoured what they considered more "basic" infrastructure projects, such as ports and dams rather than urban transit systems, France constituted a key source of aid for modernizing urban planners in Latin America. Relationships between Latin American planners and French funders benefitted not just metro boosters in Latin America, but French manufacturing interests. More broadly, this article shows that Latin American urbanization was shaped by trans-Atlantic networks of expertise and financing.

The story of Latin America's metro boom demonstrates how urban history and the history of international development are closely linked. The influence of European urban planning traditions on Latin American cities is well known, particularly for the period of rapid urban growth in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.[7] With the rise of US hegemony in the hemisphere since the War of 1898, the impact of US planners and technocrats in Latin America also increased, particularly in the context of the 1930s and 1940s with the New Deal and Good Neighbour Policy.[8] After World War II, the growth

5   Plans for a metro in Lima date back at least to the 1960s: see Lima tendrá transporte subterráneo, in: La Tarde, 13 April 1966. Line 1 was inaugurated in 2011; see L. Santolalla Huerto, El tren eléctrico: Lima tuvo que esperar 25 años para inaugurar este sistema de transporte, in: La República, 11 July 2011, https://larepublica.pe/sociedad/555393-el-tren-electrico-lima-tuvo-que-esperar-25-anos-para-inaugurar-este-sistema-de-transporte/ (accessed 3 April 2020). In Bogotá, metro proposals date back to the 1940s, and the project continues to be debated and planned; see A. M. García, La interminable historia del metro imaginario de Bogotá, in: Vice, 28 September 2017, https://www.vice.com/es_co/article/43a7yn/interminable-historia-metro-imaginario-bogota (accessed 3 April 2020). Despite proposals for a Montevideo metro dating back to the 1940s and the more recent creation of a fictional metro by graphic designer Marco Caltieri, Montevideo does not have an actual subway; see La verdadera historia del Metro de Montevideo, in: El Observador, 16 December 2011, https://www.elobservador.com.uy/nota/la-verdadera-historia-del-metro-de-montevideo-2011121620170 (accessed 3 April 2020); and Subterráneo en Montevideo: La alternativa que nunca llegó, Montevideo Subterráneo, http://proyecto2018.um.edu.uy/subte/ (accessed 3 April 2020).

6   For an in-depth history of this system, see D. Zunino Singh, The History of the Buenos Aires Underground: A Cultural Analysis of the Modernization Process in a Peripheral Metropolis (1886–1944), Ph.D. dissertation, University of London, 2012, https://www.academia.edu/5620996/The_history_of_the_Buenos_Aires_Underground_A_cultural_analysis_of_the_modernization_process_in_a_peripheral_metropolis_1886-1944_ (accessed 3 April 2020).

7   A. Almandoz (ed.), Planning Latin America's Capital Cities, 1850–1950, New York 2002; J. E. Hardoy, Theory and Practice of Urban Planning in Europe, 1850–1930: Its Transfer to Latin America, in: R. M. Morse / J. E. Hardoy (eds.), Rethinking the Latin American City, Washington, DC 1992, pp. 20–49.

8   A. B. Chastain / T. W. Lorek (eds.), Itineraries of Expertise: Science, Technology, and the Environment in Latin America's Long Cold War, Pittsburgh 2020; G. M. Joseph, Close Encounters: Toward a New Cultural History of U.S.-Latin

of international development agencies focused more attention on the problems of what was then called "underdevelopment" in Latin America, including the region's rapidly growing cities and informal urban settlements.[9] While there has been growing research on the history of international development and urbanization in Latin America, the story in this chapter differs from existing studies in two ways: it focuses on transportation as an important facet of urban policy, and it highlights the role of bilateral aid between France and Latin America, in contrast to the predominant emphasis on US influence in the region.

1. A Global Wave of Metro-Building

In the wake of World War II, global economic growth paved the way for the construction of urban rail systems around world. Broadly speaking, the first era of metro construction, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, had witnessed the opening of subways in Europe, the United States, and Japan.[10] After a halt during World War II, the construction of metros around the world took off. The rate of new metro openings in the 1950s and 1960s averaged eight per decade, double what it had been at the turn of the century. Then, in the 1970s and 1980s, the rate picked up to 23 and 27 new systems each decade, respectively – more than five times the rate from the turn of the century. Growth has been even more feverish since the start of the new millennium, led overwhelmingly by cities in Asia (see figure 1). While the recent expansion is remarkable and worthy of attention, this article instead examines why metro development took off in the decades after World War II. In particular, it focuses on the five largest postwar metro systems in Latin America: in Mexico City, São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Santiago, and Caracas.

American Relations, in: G. M. Joseph / C. C. LeGrand / R. D. Salvatore (eds.), Close Encounters of Empire: Writing the Cultural History of U.S.-Latin American Relations, Durham, NC, 1998, pp. 3–46.

9   For a critical history of international development, see G. Rist, A History of Development: From Western Origins to Global Faith, 4th edn, London 2014. On US housing aid around the world, see N. H. Kwak, A World of Home-owners: American Power and the Politics of Housing Aid, Chicago 2015. For recent work on urban informality and international housing programmes in Latin America, see L. Benmergui, Building the Alliance for Progress: Local and Transnational Encounters in a Low-Income Housing Program in Rio de Janeiro, 1962–67, in: A. K. Sandoval-Strausz / N. H. Kwak (eds.), Making Cities Global: The Transnational Turn in Urban History, Philadelphia 2018, pp. 71–97; B. Fischer / B. McCann / J. Auyero (eds.), Cities from Scratch: Poverty and Informality in Urban Latin America, Durham, NC, 2014; M. Healey, Planning, Politics, and Praxis at Colombia's Inter-American Housing Lab, 1951–1966, in: Chastain / Lorek (eds.), Itineraries of Expertise, pp. 199–216; and A. C. Offner, Homeownership and Social Welfare in the Americas: Ciudad Kennedy as a Midcentury Crossroads, in: Sandoval-Strausz / Kwak (eds.), Making Cities Global, pp. 47–70.

10   The literature on the subways of Paris, London, and New York is wide-ranging. A classic cultural history is B. Bobrick, Labyrinths of Iron: Subways in History, Myth, Art, Technology, and War, New York 1986. On the Moscow metro, see A. Jenks, A Metro on the Mount: The Underground as a Church of Soviet Civilization, in: Technology and Culture 41 (2000) 4, pp. 697–724; and T. Vujosevic, Soviet Modernity and the Aesthetics of Gleam: The Moscow Metro in Collective Histories of Construction, in: Journal of Design History 26 (2013) 3, pp. 270–284.

Decade	# New Metro Openings	Decade	# New Metro Openings
1860–69	1	1940–49	0
1870–79	0	1950–59	7
1880–89	0	1960–69	9
1890–99	4	1970–79	23
1900–09	4	1980–89	27
1910–19	3	1990–99	25
1920–29	2	2000–09	30
1930–39	2	2010–19	45

Figure 1. New Metro Systems Worldwide by Decade[11]

The postwar wave of metro-building touched nearly every continent. Before 1990, Western Europe and Asia were by far the most impacted by this metro boom, with 20 systems opening in the former and 17 in the latter. The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe also made a significant mark, with 11 metros opening here between the start of the Cold War and the fall of the Berlin Wall.[12] Many debuted in capital cities of the Soviet Socialist Republics – such as Tbilisi (Georgia), Baku (Azerbaijan), and Tashkent (Uzbekistan) – which suggests that the projection of political power was not always far removed from more pragmatic concerns.[13] The potential to project power and prestige was present in the capitalist west, as well: in Canada, the Montreal metro opened in time for the 1967 World's Fair, whereas in the United States, the Washington D.C. metro embodied the ethos of Lyndon B. Johnson's Great Society.[14]

But what was arguably the most striking feature of this worldwide wave of metro-building was that it included the Global South and non-aligned countries: not only the eight new Latin American metros that opened prior to 1990, but also the metro systems in Cairo and Istanbul, Beijing and Tianjin, Seoul and Kolkata. In some ways, the boom in urban infrastructure makes sense in light of the rapid urbanization occurring in Latin

11   Source: International Association of Public Transport, Statistics Brief: World Metro Figures 2018, Brussels 2018, p. 4, https://www.uitp.org/world-metro-figures-2018 (accessed 8 April 2020).

12   I am using the geographic distinctions made by the International Association of Public Transport (UITP). See International Association of Public Transport, Statistics Brief: World Metro Figures 2018, Brussels 2018, p. 4. The notable exception was sub-Saharan Africa, where the first metros opened in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia (2015) and Abuja, Nigeria (2018). See International Association of Public Transport, Statistics Brief: New Urban Rail Infrastructure 2018, Brussels 2019, p. 1; International Association of Public Transport, New Light Rail System in Addis Ababa, 7 October 2014, https://www.uitp.org/new-light-rail-system-addis-ababa (accessed 4 April 2020).

13   On Soviet metros, see O. Hatherley, Metro, in: Landscapes of Communism: A History Through Buildings, New York 2015, pp. 250–309.

14   On the Montreal metro, see D. Gilbert / C. Poitras, "Subways Are Not Outdated": Debating the Montreal Metro, 1940–1960, in: Journal of Transport History 36 (2015) 2, pp. 209–227; for a comprehensive history of the Washington, DC, metro, see Z. M. Schrag, The Great Society Subway: A History of the Washington Metro, Baltimore 2006.

America, Asia, and Africa in the second half of the twentieth century.[15] Certainly, metro-boosters sought to depict a natural correlation: by this view, as cities grew – particularly after they surpassed one million people – they reached a point where a metro became a necessity.[16] But the line of causation was not so simple. In fact, metros were extremely expensive in terms of up-front costs, although planners argued that these costs would be made up over the long run. Many cities lacked the resources to undertake such ambitious urban infrastructure projects, even if they were experiencing rapid growth.

The dilemma of how to fund a potential metro pointed to a thornier issue: whether such projects should even be considered basic infrastructure by the state, the public, or potential investors. Scholars of infrastructure have shown that the category is not static or self-evident. Historian William Rankin argues, for example, that the concept of infrastructure emerged in tandem with debates about international development aid in the 1950s, and that it quickly expanded to mean not only physical structures such as railroads or hydroelectric plants, but also social services such as education and health.[17] For our purposes, it is important to note that multilateral lenders such as the World Bank did not typically fund metro projects, likely because the expected rate of return was too low.[18]

Just as importantly, the concept of a metro in the capital of a developing nation contravened theories of modernization in the 1950s and 1960s. According to economist Walt Rostow, societies progressed through five "stages of economic growth", from traditional to modern, in a sequence modelled on the historical trajectory of England and the United States.[19] For many observers both domestic and foreign, metros in places like Mexico City and Santiago scrambled linear modernization narratives because Latin American countries were perceived to be in the middle "take-off" stage, where investments should be targeted in strategic industries; only later, during the "drive to maturity" and "age of

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15 Urbanization since 1950 has been rapid in Latin America and the Caribbean, Western Asia, Eastern Asia, and sub-Saharan Africa, and somewhat slower in Northern Africa and South-Central Asia; see United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, The Speed of Urbanization Around the World, in: Population Facts 2018 (2018) 1, p. 2.

16 This was the argument made by Austrian urbanist Karl Brunner when visiting Chile in the 1930s: see K. Brunner, Santiago de Chile: Su estado actual y futura formación, Santiago 1932. Similarly, the Soviet Union deemed cities eligible for a metro once they reached the one-million mark (Hatherley, Metro, p. 304).

17 W. J. Rankin, Infrastructure and the International Governance of Economic Development, 1950–1965, in: J.-F. Auger / J. J. Bouma / R. Künneke (eds.), Internationalization of Infrastructures: Proceedings of the 12th Annual International Conference on the Economics of Infrastructures, Delft 2009, pp. 61–75. See also A. Carse, Beyond the Big Ditch: Politics, Ecology, and Infrastructure at the Panama Canal, Cambridge, MA 2014.

18 A 1997 World Bank report noted that up to that point, the Bank had "financed only a handful of projects involving metros or similar public transport options", and that most of these "involved rehabilitation and/or extension", not new metro lines. See S. Mitric, Approaching Metros as Potential Development Projects, Transportation, Water and Urban Development Department discussion paper, no. TWU 28 (1997), p. 1, http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/476621468335948071/Approaching-metros-as-potential-development-projects (accessed 4 April 2020). Rankin observes that, in the mid-1950s, there was no multilateral lender that could offer below-market-rate loans – precisely the kind of economic assistance that would be needed for long-range infrastructure projects (Rankin, Infrastructure, pp. 68–69).

19 W. W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifest, Cambridge, UK 1990 [1960].

mass consumption", would urban services develop.[20] Echoing this logic, a Chilean government planner argued in 1964 against a subway, drawing an analogy to family budgeting. Just as the "head of the household" should not "buy a car over the necessities of food, shelter, and housing", a country should "obtain, first, the fundamental necessities and means of production that will allow it to achieve its basic income, until it has enough to acquire a metropolitan railway."[21] By this logic, a metro was not basic infrastructure, but an expense that only a more developed country could afford.

2. Latin America's Metro Boom

Yet even without economic assistance from groups like the World Bank, cities with limited resources in Latin America nonetheless managed to build significant urban rail networks between the 1960s and 1980s. Mexico City led this boom when, in 1967, construction began on the first three lines of what would become the metro, formally known as the Collective Transport System (Sistema de Transporte Colectivo, STC). By this point, the capital city, located in a drained lakebed encircled by mountains, had already grown rapidly, reaching nearly seven million inhabitants. Like many Latin American capital cities in the mid-twentieth century, it concentrated the political power of the national government, the economic clout of elites and growing industries, and the expanding population that migrated from the countryside in search of better life prospects. The vast majority of Mexico City's residents relied on public transportation, mainly buses and trolleybuses, but the system was slow and inefficient due to street congestion, increasing numbers of vehicles on the streets, and a lack of coordination among routes. Added to the material realities of congestion and population growth, there was political will: President Díaz Ordaz wanted to build a metro in time for the 1968 Olympics, to be held in Mexico City. The path was clear after he pushed aside the mayor, who opposed the project. There was also longstanding desire for a metro from the Mexican engineering conglomerate, Associated Civil Engineers (Ingenieros Civiles Asociados, ICA), which stood to benefit from the construction contracts.[22]

Despite initial concerns about Mexico City's watery subsoil and earthquake-prone geography, metro construction proceeded rapidly. The subway opened to the public in 1969,

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20   In 1960, Rostow classified Chile, Mexico, Brazil, and Colombia in the "take-off" stage and noted that Venezuela might have recently moved into this category (Rostow, Stages of Economic Growth, p. 44).

21   The quotes come from Rosendo Caro, deputy director of the Ministry of Public Works at the end of Jorge Alessandri's presidency (Construir ferrocarril subterráneo para Santiago equivale al presupuesto anual de Obras Públicas, in: La Nación, 18 July 1964).

22   L. Castañeda, Choreographing the Metropolis: Networks of Circulation and Power in Olympic Mexico, in: Journal of Design History 25 (2012) 3, pp. 293–294; D. E. Davis, Urban Leviathan: Mexico City in the Twentieth Century, Philadelphia 1994; O. González, El Metro de Ciudad de México, in: Revista EURE 14 (1988) 42, pp. 64–65; J.-C. Parpillon / G. Larraufie, SOFRETU et le métro de Mexico: 25 ans d'un collaboration exemplaire, in: Revue générale des chemins de fer 10 (1992), p. 50; W. Veeder, El Metro: The History of a Monument in Motion, Ph.D. dissertation, University of New Mexico, 2015.

and by 1970 a total of 41 kilometres had been built, which amounted to the stunning rate of one kilometre per month.[23] After a halt in construction during the Echeverría administration in the 1970s, construction picked up again after 1977. By 1988, the network totalled 141 kilometres and eight lines. It was very heavily used, as well: in the early 1990s, it ranked third in the world for passenger traffic, after the metros in Moscow and Tokyo.[24] It also emerged unscathed after the powerful 1985 earthquake that struck near Mexico City and killed at least 10,000 people.[25]

Other metro systems grew more slowly, despite similarly rapid rates of urbanization. In Brazil, two metros opened in the 1970s: São Paulo's in 1974, and Rio de Janeiro's in 1979. The São Paulo urban area had grown dramatically since the late nineteenth century, driven by the region's booming coffee economy, the network of railroads that converged on the city, and waves of migration from within Brazil and from abroad. By the late 1930s, São Paulo was Brazil's industrial powerhouse, and by 1954, when the city celebrated its quadricentennial, its population reached three million.[26] Although there had been several proposals for a subway and much discussion about the need for a metro since the 1920s, the project did not take shape until the mayoralty of José Vicente Faria Lima in the late 1960s. Construction began in 1968, and, after some delays, the first line of the Companhia do Metropolitano de São Paulo opened to the public in 1974.[27]

It remained a modest, limited system despite the city's continued growth. In 1978, when the city's population already exceeded seven million, there was only a single line, 14 kilometres long.[28] A second, east-west, line opened in 1979, and a third short line opened in 1991.[29] By 1999, when the network celebrated twenty-five years of operation and São Paulo had topped ten million people, the system was only 49 kilometres in length.[30] The trains were packed with passengers, and ridership was reportedly among the highest in the world in terms of passengers per kilometre.[31] One of the main challenges that the metro faced was São Paulo's pattern of sprawling development, spurred by an early emphasis on road-building, the auto industry in the region, and high rates of car use.[32]

23   Parpillon / Larraufie, SOFRETU, p. 51.
24   Ibid., p. 52, p. 58.
25   Ibid., p. 52.
26   J. R. Langenbuch, A estruturação da grande São Paulo: Estudo de geografia urbana, Rio de Janeiro 1971, p. 131; A. de Azevedo, A cidade de São Paulo: Estudos de geografia urbana, 4 vols, São Paulo 1958, vol. 1, p. 8, and vol. 2, p. 102, p. 243.
27   Portal Metrô Mémoria – Linha do Tempo, originally available on the website of the Companhia do Metropolitano de São Paulo, http://www.metro.sp.gov.br/index.aspx (accessed July 2013).
28   L. Guieysse / D. Sutton, Les transports de Saint-Paul (Bresil), April 1978, Paris: Régie autonome des transports parisiens, RATP Archive, Box-Brésil.
29   Portal Metrô Mémoria – Linha do Tempo, pp. 8–12.
30   R. Miotto, Trens do Metrô começaram a circular no mesmo dia, in: Metrô News (São Paulo), 15 September 1999.
31   M. Uchôa, Metrô faz 17 anos com superlotação, in: O Estado de São Paulo, 14 September 1991.
32   The engineer and political scientist Eduardo Alcantara de Vasconcellos notes that the number of vehicles in the São Paulo metropolitan area increased sixfold between 1970 and 1999; see E. A. de Vasconcellos, Urban Change, Mobility, and Transport in São Paulo: Three Decades, Three Cities, in: Transport Policy 12 (2005), pp. 91–104; see also B. J. Godfrey, Revisiting Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo, in: The Geographical Review 89 (1999) 1, pp. 94–121.

The metro in Rio de Janeiro has also remained modest in size compared to the Mexico City system. The city had long been the political and cultural centre of Brazil and retained its importance after the capital was moved to Brasília in 1960. The city's unusual geography, situated along the coastline with vertical granite hills studding the urban fabric, made transportation more difficult, and trams and railways structured urban growth in the early twentieth century.[33] By the 1950s and early 1960s, there had been a number of proposals and studies for a metro system, but these did not materialize.[34] In the 1970s, however, Brazil's booming economy made conditions ripe for the project, and the first line opened in 1979. This expanded gradually, and in 1984 a second line opened.[35] However, as recently as 2009, the network was still small – only 37 kilometres in length.[36]

The metro in Santiago, Chile, by comparison, has left a much stronger mark on the city. Since the 1920s, Chilean engineers and city planners had argued that a subway was necessary to alleviate congestion in the growing city, but early proposals foundered. As in Mexico and Brazil, debates about an urban rail system became more intense in the 1950s and 1960s, and by the time the proposal was being seriously considered by the Christian Democratic government of Eduardo Frei Montalva in the mid-1960s, many observers were sceptical that this time would be any different. Nonetheless, Frei was committed to the project, and he lent his support to metro architect Juan Parrochia, a Haussmann-like figure with a far-reaching vision for transforming Santiago's transportation system. The government approved a five-line metro plan in 1968, and construction began the following year. Amid the social and economic upheavals of Salvador Allende's socialist government, construction proceeded apace. After the 1973 military coup, the new regime accelerated construction, and the first line opened in 1975.[37]

During the military regime of Augusto Pinochet (1973–1990), the metro at first remained relatively protected from the radical free-market reforms of the Chicago Boys, the government's neoliberal economic advisors. Nonetheless, by 1980 intense criticism of the project led to the curtailment of new construction and a lengthy campaign to transform the metro into a state corporation, which occurred in 1989 and paved the way for the privatization of certain functions. As of 1990, when Pinochet was forced to step down and cede power to the newly elected democratic government, the Santiago metro was relatively small, covering only two lines and 27 kilometres. Under the centre-left

33   B. Fischer, A Poverty of Rights: Citizenship and Inequality in Twentieth-Century Rio de Janeiro, Stanford 2008, pp. 27–29.

34   See, for example, Tudo pronto para as obras do Metrô, in: Tribuna da Imprensa, 27 March 1954; O futuro Metrô carioca, in: Manchete, 25 February 1956; Metropolitano do Rio de Janeiro, in: Correio da Manhã, 20 February 1964. Abundant news clippings demonstrate the long-running debates about a Rio de Janeiro metro in Boxes 3D 11, 3D 12, and 3D 13, Archive of the Régie autonome des transports parisiens (RATP), Paris.

35   História: Como tudo começou, Metrô Rio, https://www.metrorio.com.br/Empresa/Historia (accessed 6 April 2020).

36   B. L. de Carvalho da Costa / F. C. de Carvalho da Costa, The Evolution of the Rio de Janeiro Subway System, paper presented at the 12th World Conference on Transport Research, Lisbon, July 2010, p. 8.

37   Chastain, Vehicle of Progress.

Concertación coalition, metro construction again became a priority, and the network expanded rapidly, tripling in size by 2006. It became further entrenched in the city's infrastructure after the 2007 transportation reforms known as Transantiago, which solidified the metro's role as the backbone of the entire transit system.[38]

Lastly, the Caracas metro, like the systems in Brazil, emerged out of the economic boom of the 1970s, when Venezuela enjoyed surging oil profits. More than many Latin American cities, Caracas had embraced US-style road-building and car-oriented urban development.[39] Yet the desire for a subway was longstanding, and plans had existed for decades before the project began to take shape in the 1970s, during the governments of Carlos Andrés Pérez (1974–1979) and Luis Herrera Campíns (1979–1984). Construction began in 1978, and the first line opened in 1983. In addition to expansions on this first line, a second line opened in 1989, and two more lines were built in the 1990s and 2000s.[40] The system maintained a positive image as a public service that was clean, orderly, and well-functioning, at least until the most recent economic turmoil in Venezuela.[41]

3. French Aid and Technology

As the individual cases described above illustrate, Latin America witnessed a remarkable wave of metro construction between the late 1960s and the early 1980s. Although each system developed differently based on a host of factors, with some metros remaining poorly integrated with the rest of the city while others, such as Mexico City's, becoming the essential circulation system for the metropolis, they also shared certain elements. One notable feature was that in most cases, metro proposals, studies, and public debate on the issue had existed for decades prior to the project's realization. Why, then, did these projects happen when they did?

One possible answer is that rapid urbanization in Latin America was transforming the region's capital cities at an unprecedented pace, and such growth demanded forceful state intervention to "rationalize" urban populations. This dynamic certainly seems to be true for the arena of housing in Latin American cities at this time. As city populations

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38 Ibid., chapter 6 and epilogue.

39 F. Violich / R. Daughters, Urban Planning for Latin America: The Challenge of Metropolitan Growth, Boston 1987, pp. 164–165; L. Blackmore, Spectacular Modernity: Dictatorship, Space, and Visuality in Venezuela, 1948–1958, Pittsburgh 2017, pp. 89–93. Caracas also embraced modernist high-rise apartment blocks, most dramatically with the construction of a massive housing project during the dictatorship of Marcos Pérez Jiménez in the 1950s, renamed the 23 de Enero project after his overthrow in 1958. See A. Velasco, Barrio Rising: Urban Popular Politics and the Making of Modern Venezuela, Oakland, CA, 2015.

40 D. V. Kingsbury, Infrastructure and Insurrection: The Caracas Metro and the Right to the City in Venezuela, in: Latin American Research Review 52 (2017) 5, pp. 775–791; Caracas Metro, Railway Technology, https://www.railway-technology.com/projects/caracas-metro/ (accessed 6 April 2020).

41 The Caracas metro's orderly public image in the early 1980s is discussed in Kingsbury, Infrastructure and Insurrection, pp. 776–780. This is echoed more recently in N. Casey, The Caracas Metro: Rat-Free and Only a Half-Cent to Ride, in: The New York Times, 20 January 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/projects/cp/reporters-notebook/moving-to-venezuela/metro-caracas (accessed 6 April 2020).

swelled from rural-to-urban migration, the housing deficit sharpened, and thousands of poor families were pushed into overcrowded, unsanitary shantytowns. As Leandro Benmergui has shown for Buenos Aires and Rio de Janeiro, Cold War reformers from both the United States and Latin America targeted housing as a site for modernization; by turning slum-dwellers into homeowners, they believed they could promote a more modern mindset among the poor. By transforming individuals' living conditions, residents might be made into cleaner, more orderly subjects who would be open to reformist (not radical or populist) political change.[42] Moreover, as Nancy Kwak demonstrates, US policymakers were concerned with promoting homeownership in the developing world as a tool for foreign policy.[43]

Yet as politicians and planners well realized, vertiginous urban growth, even when combined with intense public debate and interest, did not a metro make. The long-running discussion about a metro for Bogotá, or the recent construction of Lima's first line, illustrates this point. What set Mexico City, São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Santiago, and Caracas apart? In all but one of these cases, French aid and technology played a crucial role.[44] Each project demanded massive funding, and by partnering with national governments, France assured a dominant role for itself in these projects while also enabling national dreams of progress.

The main organization behind this wave of Latin American metro-building was the French Company for the Design and Construction of Urban Transport (Société française d'études et de réalisations de transports urbains, SOFRETU), an affiliate of the Paris transit authority (Régie autonome des transports parisiens, RATP). SOFRETU's first major project in the Americas was the Montreal metro, which opened in 1966, followed by the metros in Mexico City and Santiago. All three systems used rubber-tyre rolling stock, an innovation developed for the Paris metro that allowed French experts to promote their technology as cutting-edge in their negotiations with overseas officials; rubber-tyre metros were billed as providing an especially smooth, quiet ride, and for allowing tighter turns, sharper inclines, and faster starting and stopping times. SOFRETU also provided consulting and equipment for the Rio de Janeiro and Caracas metros, although these systems used traditional metal rolling stock. SOFRETU's footprint, in fact, extended far beyond Latin America. It was also active in promoting metros in the

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42   L. Benmergui, The Alliance for Progress and Housing Policy in Rio de Janeiro and Buenos Aires in the 1960s, in: Urban History 36 (2009) 2, pp. 303–326.

43   Kwak, A World of Homeowners.

44   São Paulo was the exception. French engineers sought out this market, but São Paulo's project was awarded instead to a German-Brazilian consortium. On SOFRETU's "many years of effort" to establish itself in São Paulo, see the memo from R. Arasse to the President and General Director of SOFRETU, 28 April 1976, Box 3D 13, Archive of the Régie autonome des transports parisiens, Paris. The German-Brazilian consortium published its feasibility study for the São Paulo metro in 1968: Hochtief-Montreal-Deconsult, Mêtro de São Paulo: Sistema Integrado de Transporte Rápido Coletivo da Cidade de São Paulo, 2 vols, São Paulo 1968. On West Germany's development aid policies in the Third World, see H.-I. Schmidt, Pushed to the Front: The Foreign Assistance Policy of the Federal Republic of Germany, in: Contemporary European History 12 (2003) 4, pp. 473–507.

Middle East, and by 1983 it had a truly global reach, with activity in over 40 cities around the world.[45]

The French metro agency was quite candid about its desire to export a certain kind of urban mass transit system around the world. In 1971, it published a six-page advertisement in *Life* magazine. "METRO: The Paris subway adds a stylish line," it read, a reference to the new Regional Express Network (Réseau express regional, RER) being built in Paris. The emphasis on style was undeniable, with gleaming escalators, light glinting off the geometric design overhead, and a spacious expanse filled with light but few people. This was not merely a utilitarian mode of mass transit, but a space of style. The accompanying text read: "Métros for Export. With the success of the Paris Métro system, the French have become the most sought-after subway engineers in the world."[46] For their part, French metro engineers were acutely aware of their role in promoting global metro construction. As the president of SOFRETU noted in 1982, "Paris leads the world in generating exports" of subways; the same year, the agency's sales director boasted that it had, until recently, enjoyed a "world monopoly of subway exports."[47]

Crucial to French dominance in this industry was the French government's willingness to provide and guarantee loans to help cover the massive price tag of these projects. In the case of Mexico City and Santiago, the French government worked directly with the Mexican and Chilean governments to provide hefty sums in exchange for the agreement to purchase French-made equipment. By 1973, French loans for the Mexico City metro had totalled 999 million francs (about $225 million), from both the French government and private French banks.[48] In Santiago, loans had reached $110 million by 1974, with more loans granted later that decade.[49] Journalists also noted that the French government's "cut-rate loans and credits" to partnering governments gave it an edge in the competition for the metro market.[50]

The export of metros to Latin America simultaneously served economic and political aims. It generated a market for French rail manufacturers while reinforcing French influence and prestige abroad. In fact, SOFRETU's work, which began in the 1960s, can be seen as an outgrowth of Charles de Gaulle's efforts to restore French "splendour." Following the humiliations of World War II, the Algerian War, and decolonization, de Gaulle sought to rebuild French grandeur through major initiatives in science and technology.[51] Most well-known was France's development of nuclear weapons and nuclear

45   A. Jeux, L'expérience de SOFRETU et de la R.A.T.P. dans le domaine du transfert de savoir-faire, in: Revue générale des chemins de fer 102 (1983), pp. 401–412; M. Whitaker, The Metro Rules the World, in: Newsweek, 15 November 1982; P. Lewis, French Lead Way in Subway Exports, in: The New York Times, 18 October 1982.

46   Metro: The Paris Subway Adds a Stylish Line, in: Life, 7 May 1971, pp. 84–89, https://books.google.com/books?id=LUAEAAAAMBAJ&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q&f=false (accessed 8 April 2020).

47   Whitaker, The Metro Rules the World; Lewis, French Lead Way in Subway Exports.

48   J. E. Ulloa, La Construcción del Metro, in: Sistema de Transporte Colectivo – Metro, El Metro de México: Primera Memoria, México, DF, 1973, p. 19.

49   Chastain, Vehicle of Progress, p. 228, p. 254.

50   Whitaker, The Metro Rules the World.

51   T. Stovall, Transnational France: The Modern History of a Universal Nation, Boulder, CO, 2015, pp. 404–413. For

power, which went hand in hand with its diplomatic independence from the United States.[52] Another key initiative was the modernization of the Paris metro system and the construction of the RER. The innovation of rubber rolling stock, developed through these Paris-based projects, could then be exported through the efforts of SOFRETU.[53] Moreover, France's presence in the sphere of metro construction was not unique. As Clément Orillard has shown, the late 1960s witnessed a flurry of French technical aid missions in urban planning in Argentina, Brazil, and Bolivia, a phenomenon that he terms "geopolitical urbanism." The coming together of France and Latin America in this decade – symbolized most memorably by de Gaulle's tour of Latin America in 1964 – was shaped by strong developmentalist governments in Latin America and by France's search for new markets and cultural influence in the wake of decolonization.[54]

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How should we interpret this transnational process that brought together Latin American urban planners and French metro developers in cities as far-flung as Santiago and Mexico City, Rio de Janeiro and Caracas? Was this a case of French economic neocolonialism, another instance of Latin American dependence on foreign technology and capital? There is truth to this view. The metro partnerships opened up new markets and benefited French manufacturers. They also entailed major foreign loans that tied Latin American governments to France, requiring that much of the money be spent on French services and equipment.[55]

Yet this is not the whole story. The construction of metro systems, as critics alleged, was not about indulging in a luxury that these cities struggled to afford. In fact, many of these systems became essential infrastructure, relied upon by millions of residents of all social classes and critical to the survival of Latin America's most dynamic metropolises. They have reduced these cities' reliance on fossil fuels and helped to curb dangerous levels of air pollution.[56] Moreover, the Latin American-French technical partnerships have re-

more on French foreign policy in this period, including a chapter on de Gaulle in Latin America by Joaquín Fermandois, see C. Nuenlist, A. Locher, and G. Martin (eds.), Globalizing de Gaulle: International Perspectives on French Foreign Policies, 1958–1969, Lanham, MD, 2010. On French development aid in Africa, see G. Bossuat, French Development Aid and Co-operation under de Gaulle, in: Contemporary European History 12 (2003) 4, pp. 431–456.

52 G. Hecht, The Radiance of France: Nuclear Power and National Identity after World War II, Cambridge, MA, 1998.
53 Lewis, French Lead Way in Subway Exports.
54 C. Orillard, Nueva generación de consultorías francesas y políticas desarrollistas en América Latina en los años sesenta y setenta, article submitted to *Revista Iberoamericana*, 2020. I thank Orillard for kindly sharing his work in progress with me as I drafted this chapter.
55 This is true for the Mexico City and Santiago cases. While there is less documentation for Rio de Janeiro and Caracas, there is no reason to think that SOFRETU would have operated differently in these cases.
56 In 1992, Mexico City was deemed the most polluted city in the world. It has made major strides since then in combatting air pollution, including through improvements to public transportation systems (buses and metro) and restrictions on car use. See Mexico City-Harvard Alliance for Air Quality and Public Health, Air Quality Surveillance, 2014, https://www.hsph.harvard.edu/cdmx/about-us/air-quality-surveillance/ (accessed 6 April 2020). While Santiago continues to struggle with air pollution and rising car use, changes to its public transportation system – including tighter vehicle emission standards and the integration of metro and buses – have helped mitigate the impact of vehicular pollution. See L. Gallardo et al., Evolution of Air Quality in Santiago: The Role of

sulted in the transfer of technology and expertise. While the benefits to local or national industries were uneven, these partnerships in some instances supported the development of domestic metro manufacturing industries, as in Mexico and Brazil.[57] And, not least, the maturation of metro systems in Latin America since the 1960s has generated new transnational collaborations – not just between France and Latin America, but within Latin America. Mexican machines and engineers were sent to Santiago, for example, and Brazilian experts observed the Santiago system as Rio readied its own line for operation. More recently, Santiago has provided consulting expertise in Buenos Aires and Caracas.[58] At a time when organizations like the World Bank did not fund metros in the developing world because they were not considered basic infrastructure, French funders had no such qualms. French metro boosters, organized and channelled by SOFRETU, constituted crucial protagonists in the broader story of Latin American urbanization in the mid-twentieth century. Nevertheless, they would not have been able to achieve such success without the existence of longstanding material realities and political demand for modernized forms of transportation in the region's rapidly growing cities. It was at the local and national level where metro proponents had to make the case that these systems were essential infrastructure, not a frivolous luxury. Once these arguments were won, and national funding secured, French metro experts were waiting.

Mobility and Lessons from the Science-Policy Interface, in: Elementa: Science of the Anthropocene 6 (2018) 38, p. 15.

57   On the increase in Mexican-made metro components, see Parpillon and Larraufie, SOFRETU, pp. 58–59. Concarril, the Mexican state railway manufacturer, supplied metro cars to Mexico City in the 1970s and 1980s; in the early 1990s it was sold to the Canadian firm Bombardier; see A. Escamilla Trejo, Privatización y reestructuración de la industria de equipos ferroviarios en México (1993–2012): El caso de Concarril-Bombardier, in: Economía Informa 395 (2015), pp. 70–106. In Brazil, Mafersa manufactured the first cars for the São Paulo metro in the 1970s; see D. Priscila, Relembre a história da antiga frota A do Mêtro de São Paulo, in: Rede Noticiando, 20 June 2019, https://noticiando.net/frota-a-historia/ (accessed 6 April 2020).

58   On Mexican engineers and machines in Santiago, see Abren paso al metro, in: El Mercurio, 28 July 1970. On Brazilian experts in Santiago, see Metro de Santiago: Uno de los más completos del mundo, in: El Mercurio, 5 March 1978. On Santiago consulting elsewhere in Latin America, see A. Mardones, interview with the author, 12 March 2015, Santiago, Chile.

Fighting against Urban Air Pollution: Mexico City and its Participation in the Pan American Air Pollution Sampling Network (1967–1980)

Sabrina Kirschner

ABSTRACTS

Der Beitrag befasst sich mit der mexikanischen Hauptstadt, die seit den 1930er Jahren gegen massive urbane Luftverschmutzung zu kämpfen hatte. Dabei möchte er eine weitere Perspektive auf das umwelthistorische Feld der Luftverschmutzung ermöglichen, indem er sich lokalen und nicht-westlichen Perspektiven öffnet, die viele bis dato veröffentlichte Verschmutzungsgeschichten vernachlässigten. Den Rahmen der Untersuchung bildet das panamerikanische Luftverschmutzungsüberwachungsnetzwerk REDPANAIRE, das in den 1960er Jahren im Umfeld der panamerikanischen Gesundheitsorganisation als entwicklungspolitische Antwort auf die mit der urbanen Luftverschmutzung verbundenen Herausforderungen entstand. Der Aufsatz beleuchtet dabei auch die lokale Wissensproduktion sowie Perspektiven, die sich im entwickelnden Global Governance-Prozess zur urbanen Luftverschmutzungsthematik eine wichtige Rolle spielten, bislang allerdings in der Forschung eine marginale Rolle spielten.
Der Beitrag argumentiert, dass die Teilnahme am REDPANAIRE für Mexiko-Stadt durchaus lohnenswert war, da sie den lokalen Verantwortlichen nicht nur umfassendere Einsichten in die urbane Luftverschmutzungsthematik erlaubten, sondern auch wertvolle entwicklungspolitische Kooperationen ermöglichten, die der Stadt im Kampf gegen die Luftverschmutzung halfen.

The article deals with the Mexican Capital, a city that has been struggling with massive urban air pollution since the 1930s. Within the framework of an environmental history, it considers air

pollution from local and pan-American perspectives. The Pan American Air Pollution Sampling Network REDPANAIRE serves as a framework for the study. The REDPANAIRE was set up in the 1960s by the Pan American Health Organization as a development policy response to the challenges posed by urban air pollution. The article also examines local knowledge production and perspectives that played an important role in the emerging global governance discourse on urban air pollution that have been marginalized in previous research. The article argues that Mexico City's participation in the REDPANAIRE was useful as it not only allowed local decision-makers to gain insight into urban air pollution issues, but also enabled valuable development cooperation that helped the city in its fight against air pollution.

Within the environmental history of the twentieth century, the environmental challenges and problems faced by the growing megacities of the 'Global South' typically receive little attention. Existing accounts focusing on problems of urban air pollution delineate key episodes in the Belgian Meuse Valley (1930), the Pennsylvanian City of Donora (1948), and the story of the London fog (1952), but hardly cover the experiences and approaches of urban communities beyond Western Europe and the United States. This article therefore seeks to provide a look at urban air pollution in a city outside the familiar frame of study: Mexico City. Long considered the city with the worst air quality world-wide, between the 1950s and 1970s Mexico City became the staging ground of new transnational research programmes and policy measures that sought to monitor urban air quality and take first action[1]. My focus here is particularly on Mexico City's involvement in the Pan American Air Pollution Sampling Network REDPANAIRE, short for its Spanish name *Red Panamericana de Muestreo Normalizado de la Contaminación del Aire*.[2] Planned in 1965,[3] this continental network was set up to monitor the most important contaminants and allowed the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO or

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1   Further information on the first attempts to monitor urban air pollution in Mexico City provide: H. Bravo A. / G. Viniegra O., Informe Preliminar Acerca de la Polución Atmosférica en la Ciudad de México, in: Revista Mexicana de Ingenieria y Arquitectura 38 (1959) 3, pp. 14–17 and H. Bravo A. / A. P. Báez / S. Lares, Estudio del Depósito de Polvo Por Gravedad en la ciudad de México, in: Ingeniería Química Junio (1960), pp. 26–28.

2   Interestingly, the English name for the Pan-American network was not well established among its participants. While an annual report of the CEPIS refers to it as Pan American Air Pollution Sampling Network, REDPANAIRE reports refer to it as *Pan American Air Pollution Monitoring Network*. Mexican researcher H. Bravo also spoke in one of his English papers of the *Pan American Air Monitoring Network*. See Centro Panamericano de Ingeniería Sanitaria y Ciencias del Ambiente, Annual Report 1970, Lima 1971, p. 11; Centro Panamericano de Ingeniería Sanitaria y Ciencias del Ambiente/Organización Panamericana de la Salud/Organización Mundial de la Salud, Pan American Air Pollution Monitoring Network REDPANAIRE. Preliminary Report of Results June 1967– December 1973, Lima 1974. Bravo's short paper was published under his second surname, probably because the editors were not familiar with naming customs in the Spanish speaking world. See H. Alvarez, Pan American Air Monitoring Network. In: T. Schneider / H. W. De Koning / L. J. Brasser (eds.), Air Pollution Reference Measurement Methods and Systems. Proceedings of the International Workshop, Bilthoven, December 12–16, 1977, Amsterdam 1978, pp. 95–97.

3   Pan American Health Organization, Annual Report of the Director of the Pan American Sanitary Bureau, Regional Office of the World Health Organization 1965, Washington, D.C. 1966, p. 74.

OPS for Spanisch: *Organización Panamericana de la Salud*) as well as the respective cities and countries to get a better grasp of the air pollution situation in the region.[4]

Based on contemporary documents, the article firstly sketches the origins of urban air pollution in Mexico City. It then explores when, how and why stakeholders operating on different governance layers became aware of the problem and how they sought to address the problem through the REDPANAIRE. Third, it explores Mexico City's participation in the Pan-American project and evaluates the importance of its participation. The article argues that Mexico City's participation in the REDPANAIRE was initially useful, since it allowed the Mexican capital to compare the extent of its urban air pollution with other participating cities and enabled valuable cooperation with actors and experts from different governance layers. By the time of withdrawal, Mexico City had achieved its main goals and moved forward to cope with another dimension of pollution which required more elaborate measures.

Researching Mexico City's participation in the REDPANAIRE is promising from a historian's standpoint, because research related to the Mexican capital's involvement was and still is scarce, mostly due to limited sources. Contemporary research, i.e. during the time of REDPANAIRE (1967–1980), on air pollution was mainly conducted by scientists from Mexico, such as chemist Humberto Álvarez Bravo, climatologist Domingo Ernesto Jáuregui Ostos and later on also Enrique Márquez Mayaudón, who, since the late 1950s, contributed significantly to create (global) awareness for Mexico City's air pollution through their extensive publications.[5] Furthermore, Ricardo Haddad, the founding

4   This was necessary because at the beginning of PAHO's regional programme, practically no country was aware, of the real magnitude of its air pollution problems. See R. Haddad: Contaminación del Aire. Situación Actual en la América Latina y el Caribe, in: Organización Panamericana de la Salud, Organización Mundial de la Salud, Centro Panamericano de Ingeniería Sanitaria y Ciencias del Ambiente (eds.) Simposio sobre Ambiente, Salud y Desarrollo en las Américas. México, D.F 29. de Julio al 2 de Agosto de 1974, Lima 1976, p. 2.

5   Their publications include Alvarez, Pan American Air Monitoring Network, pp. 95–97; H. Bravo / R. Torres, Situación Actual de la Calidad del Aire en México, in: H. Weidner / T.H. Hilker (eds.), Hacia una Conciencia Ecológica. Políticas de Calidad del Aire en América Latina, Caracas 1989, pp. 115–134; H. Bravo A., Las Bases para la Elaboración de Reglamentos para el Control, in: Centro de Educación Continua de la Facultad de Ingeniería de la Universidad Autónomo de México (ed.), Control de la Contaminación Atmósferica, Mexico D.F. 1971, pp. 1–96; H. Bravo A., Variación de Diferentes Contaminantes en la Atmósfera de la Ciudad de México, in: Asociación Argentina contra la Contaminación del Aire (ed.), Primer Congreso Mundial sobre Contaminación del Aire. Buenos Aires, 14–21 noviembre 1965. Actas. Tomo I. Buenos Aires 1966, pp. 89-90; H. Bravo Alvarez, Variation of Different Pollutants in the Atmosphere of Mexico City, in: Journal of the Air Pollution Control Association 10 (1960) 6, pp. 447–449; Bravo, Báez and Lares, Estudio, pp. 26–28; H. Bravo / A. Magaña / R. Magaña, The Actual Air Pollution Situation in Mexico City, in: Staub – Reinhaltung der Luft 39 (1979), pp. 427–428; Bravo Alvarez / G. Viniegra O., Informe, pp. 5–17; D. Klaus / W. Lauer / E. Jauregui, Schadstoffbelastung und Stadtklima in Mexiko-Stadt, Mainz 1988; E. Jauregui, The Urban Climate of Mexico City, in: Erdkunde 27, Heft 4 (1973), pp. 298–307; E. Jáuregui, Efectos de la Urbanización en el Clima del Valle de México, in: Momento Económico 41–42 (1988), pp. 6–7; E. Jauregui Ostos, Aspectos Meteorológicos de la Contaminación del Aire en la Ciudad de México, in: Ingeniería Hidráulica en México XXIII (1969) 1, pp. 17–28; Idem, Las Tolvaneras de la Ciudad de Mexico, in: Ingeniería hidráulica en México. Octubre–Noviembre–Diciembre (1960), pp. 60–66; Idem, El aumento de la turbiedad del aire en la Ciudad de México, in: Ingenieria Hidráulica en México Octubre – Noviembre – Diciembre (1958), pp. 9–18; Idem, La Meteorología y el Ambiente Urbano en la Ciudad de México, in: Instituto Mexicano de Recursos Naturales Renovables (ed.), Primer Seminario sobre Evaluación de la Contaminación Ambiental. Centro de Capacitación de Personal de la C.F.E., Atlihuetzia, Tlax., 21 a 24 de octubre de 1971. Aportación para la Comisión Preparatoria de México a la Conferencia de las Naciones Unidas sobre el Medio Humano Estocolmo, 1972, Mé-

father of the REDPANAIRE who managed and coordinated the network from its inception, edited its reports published on the REDPANAIRE.[6] His reports, together with annual reports of the Pan American *Center* for Sanitary Engineering and Environmental Sciences (CEPIS, short for Spanish: *Centro Panamericano de Ingeniería Sanitaria y Ciencias del Ambiente*), are another important source for this article as there are currently no records available in the Mexican *Archivo General de la Nación*. When it comes to recent publications, Brazilian Environmental Historians Lise Sedrez and Regina Horta Duarte have a critical look at the REDPANAIRE.[7]

By addressing Mexico City's history of urban air pollution, the article also seeks to contribute local perspectives on the historical evolution of global governance. According to Held and McGrew, the term global governance describes a complex system of "rule-making, political coordination and problem-solving which transcend[s] states and societies", operating at levels ranging from local to global. As such a system of rule-making, global governance "regulates and intervenes in virtually all aspects of global affairs", and

xico, D.F. 1972, pp. 19–24; E. Márquez Mayaudón, Actividades de la Secretaría de Salubridad y Asistencia en la Evaluación de la Contaminación del Aire, in: Salud Pública de México 14 (1972) 3, pp. 417–422; Idem, Aire Sucio. Contaminación, in: Salud Pública de México 12 (1970) 2, pp. 133–136; Idem, Anexo al tema IV. Relato de México. Necesidades Actuales y Futuras para un Programa Adecuado de Evaluación y Control. In: Centro Panamericano de Ingeniería Sanitaria y Ciencias del Ambiente / Organización Panamericana de la Salud / Organización Mundial de la Salud (ed.), Seminario Latinoamericano de Contaminación del Aire. Washington 1970, pp. 207–208; Idem, Contaminación Ambiental, in: Salud Pública de México XIII (1971) 2, pp. 133–140; Idem, La contaminación del aire, in: Salud Pública de México XII (1970) 1, pp. 45–50; Idem, Estado Actual de la Contaminación del Aire en la Ciudad de México, in: Salud Pública de México XI (1969) 1, pp. 99–104; Idem, Evaluación de la Contaminación del Aire en el Valle de México, in: Salud Pública de México XII (1970) 5, pp. 629–637; Idem, Información de la Calidad del Aire en algunas Ciudades del País. Datos de la Calidad del Aire en el País, in: Salud Pública de México 19 (1977) 4, pp. 501–535; Idem, Muestreo de Grandes Volúmenes de Aire en el Valle de México para determinar Concentración de Partículas en Suspensión, in: Salud Pública de México 19 (1977) 2, pp. 263–272; Idem, Red Computarizada Automática de Monitoreo del Aire del Valle de México (RECAMA), in: Salud Pública de México 17 (1975) 5, pp. 699–706; Idem, Tema III. Proyecciones Futuras del Problema, in: Centro Panamericano de Ingeniería Sanitaria y Ciencias del Ambiente/Organización Panamericana de la Salud/Organización Mundial de la Salud (eds.), Seminario Latinoamericano de Contaminación del Aire, Washington 1970, pp. 155–176.

6   The CEPIS issued several publications connected to the REDPANAIRE that either aimed to summarize and disseminate the results of the measurements or supported the memberstates in setting up stations: See Centro Panamericano de Ingeniería Sanitaria y Ciencias del Ambiente / Organización Panamericana de la Salud / Organización Mundial de la Salud, Red Panamericana de Muestreo de la Contaminación del Aire. Equipo y Materiales para sus Estaciones, Lima 1971; Centro Panamericano de Ingeniería Sanitaria y Ciencias del Ambiente / Organización Panamericana de la Salud / Organización Mundial de la Salud, Seminario Latinoamericano de Contaminación del Aire, Washington, D.C. 1970; Centro Panamericano de Ingeniería Sanitaria y Ciencias del Ambiente / Organización Panamericana de la Salud/OMS, Red Panamericana de Muestreo de la Contaminación del Aire (REDPANAIRE). Informe 1967–1974; Centro Panamericano de Ingeniería Sanitaria y Ciencias del Ambiente / Organización Panamericana de la Salud/OMS, Red Panamericana de Muestreo de la Contaminación del Aire (REDPANAIRE). Informe Final 1967–1980, Lima 1982; Centro Panamericano de Ingeniería Sanitaria y Ciencias del Ambiente / Organización Panamericana de la Salud / Organización Mundial de la Salud, Red Panamericana de Muestreo de la Contaminación del Aire. Manual de Operaciones, Lima 1970; Centro Panamericano de Ingeniería Sanitaria y Ciencias del Ambiente / Organización Panamericana de la Salud / OMS, Red Panamericana de Muestreo de la Contaminación del Aire. Resultados obtenidos Junio 1967–Diciembre 1970, Lima 1971; CEPIS/ OPS/OMS, Results 1967–1973.

7   See L. Sedrez / R. Horta Duarte, The Ivy and the Wall: Environmental Narratives from an Urban Continent, in: J. Soluri / C. Leal / J. A. Padua (eds.), A Living Past Environmental Histories of Modern Latin America, New York 2018, pp. 138–162.

is often composed of different actors, whose functional and spatial competences are often overlapping.[8] As Marc Frey, Sönke Kunkel, and Corinna Unger have argued, historical forms of global governance are closely connected to "the evolution of global development policy"[9] and the interplay between international organizations, non-state actors, and states.[10] Within this framework, international organizations "turned into influential producers and brokers of knowledge, whose reports, statistics, and conferences led to a global circulation of development ideas and doctrines"[11] – a process that was also at work in the field of urban air pollution as metropolises in developing countries sought to address the problem by cooperating with international organizations.

1. Mexico City – The City with the Worst Air Quality World-Wide

Situated in an elevated basin surrounded by mountains, Mexico City has for a long time faced the special challenge of urban air pollution, mainly because certain natural phenomena impede natural air cleaning mechanisms.[12] Winds typically only enter the valley through an open gap in the North, while mountains to the West, South and East of the city decelerate the wind's intensity and velocity and thereby highly restrict the city's air ventilation. At the same time, the bulk of Mexico's industry is situated in the North East

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8   D. Held / A. McGrew, Introduction, in: D. Held and A. McGrew (eds.), Governing Globalization. Power, Authority and Global Governance, Cambridge 2002, p. 8.

9   M. Frey / S. Kunkel / C.R. Unger, Introduction: International Organizations, Global Development, and the Making of the Contemporary World, in: M. Frey / S. Kunkel / C. R. Unger (eds.), International Organizations and Development, 1945–1990, London 2014, p. 4. – See also D. Held / A. McGrew, Preface, in: D. Held / A. McGrew (eds.), Governing Globalization. Power, Authority and Global Governance, Cambridge 2002, p. XI; Held / McGrew, Introduction, p. 9.

10 Frey / Kunkel / Unger, Introduction, pp. 4–8. – Also, M. Frey, Entwicklungspolitik, in: J. Dülffer / W. Loth (eds.), Dimensionen internationaler Geschichte, Berlin 2012, pp. 295–298 outlines the origins of development policy mentioning the Bruce Report as a milestone. Furthermore, A. L. S. Staples, The Birth of Development. How the World Bank, Food and Agriculture Organization, and World Health Organization Changed the World, 1945–1965. Kent 2006 explores the "birth" of development, though she focuses on the past World War II era.

11 Frey, Kunkel / Unger, Introduction, p. 8.

12 See Bravo / Báez / Lares, Estudio, p. 26; Bravo / Magaña / Magaña, Air Pollution Situation, p. 427; Centro Panamericano de Ingeniería Sanitaria y Ciencias del Ambiente, Informe Anual 1969, Lima 1970, p. 1, p. 8 and p. 20; CEPIS / OPS / OMS, Informe Final, p. 26; R. Haddad / J. J. Bloomfield, La Contaminación Atmosférica en América Latina, in: Boletín de la Oficina Sanitaria Panamericana 57 (1964) 3, pp. 241–246; Jáuregui Ostos, Efectos, p. 6; Jáuregui Ostos, Aspectos, p. 18; Jáuregui Ostos, Meterorología y el Ambiente Urbano, pp. 19–20; F. López de Alba, Políticas y estrategias de abatimieno y control de la contaminación atmosférica en la Zona Metropolitana de la Ciudad de México. De 2 al 6 Noviembre de 1987. Metepec, Puebla, México, México, D.F. 1987, pp. 14–22; E. Rapoport / I. López-Moreno, Algunos Problemas de la Ecología Urbana de la Ciudad de México, in: Programa Universitario Justo Sierra (ed.), El Desarrollo Urbano en México. Problemas y Perspectivas. Coloquio, México 1984, p. 241; M. Schteingart, Mexico City, in: M. Dogan / J. D. Kasarda (eds.), The Metropolitan Era. Vol. 2: Megacities, Newbury Park 1989, pp. 268–293, p. 281; Sedrez / Horta Duarte, Ivy and the Wall, p. 154, P. Ward, Mexiko-Stadt, in: L. Beckel (ed.), Megacities. Ein Beitrag der Europäischen Raumfahrtagentur zum besseren Verständnis einer globalen Herausforderung, Salzburg 2001, p. 239; World Health Organisation. Expert Committee on Environmental Sanitation, Air pollution. Fifth report of the Expert Committee on Environmental Sanitation. [Meeting held in Geneva from 18 to 23 November 1957], Geneva 1958, pp. 5–8.

of the City, emitting significant levels of air pollutants into the urban atmosphere.[13] *Tolvaneras* (dust storms), emerging due to deforestation and the desertification of lakes, are another phenomenon that causes air pollution in the Mexican capital, especially during the end of the dry season (October-April). In those months, dust particles, e.g. from the dried-out Lake Texcoco are often whirled up and transported through wind erosion to the city, where they deposit and impede visibility.[14] Lastly, inversions play an important role for Mexico's climate, too, since they fuel air pollution, restricted visibility, and smog especially during winter nights.[15]

Historically, the experience of little ventilation, *tolvaneras*, and inversions had for a long time been a central fact of life within Mexico City, which many residents were used to and had adapted to. Since the 1930s, however, a number of urban processes dramatically compounded their impact. By that time, many factories began to settle down in the Mexican Valley and through their emissions contributed to a substantial increase of urban air pollution.[16] Rapid population growth, too, fuelled air pollution, as it was accompanied by an increase in domestic combustion processes (heating, cooking, burning garbage).[17] Not least, since the mid twentieth century, an increasing number of motor

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13 Bravo / Báez / Lares, Estudio, pp. 26–28 also provide graphics to explain the phenomenon. Cf also: H. Bravo Alvarez, La Contaminación del Aire en México, México, D.F. 1987, p. 127; Comisión Preparatoria de la Participación de México en la Conferencia de las Naciones Unidas sobre el Medio Humano, Informe nacional, México 1971, p. 10; Haddad / Bloomfield, Contaminación, p. 246; Jáuregui Ostos, Meterorología y el Ambiente Urbano, p. 20; R. Lacy, La calidad del aire en el Valle de México, Mexico City 1993, pp. 41–42; G. Orozco Carricarte, Generalidades sobre la Contaminación Atmosférica, in: Instituto Mexicano de Recursos Naturales Renovables (ed.), Primer Seminario sobre Evaluación de la Contaminación Ambiental. Centro de Capacitación de Personal de la C.F.E., Atlihuetzia, Tlax., 21 a 24 de octubre de 1971. Aportación para la Comisión Preparatoria de México a la Conferencia de las Naciones Unidas sobre el Medio Humano Estocolmo, 1972, México, D.F. 1972, p.13.

14 Bravo Alvarez, La Contaminación, pp. 136–141 explains this phenomenon vividly, also a few other publications cover air pollution caused by tolvaneras such as: Bravo, Magaña and Magaña, Air Pollution Situation, p. 428; Comisión Preparatoria, Informe nacional, pp. 20–21; CEPIS / OPS / OMS, Seminario Latinoamericano, pp. 113–114; Jáuregui Ostos, Meterorología y el Ambiente Urbano, p. 22; Lacy, La Calidad del Aire, p. 42; López de Alba, Políticas y Estrategias, pp. 37–38; Secretaría de Salubridad y Asistencia, Situación actual de la contaminación atmosférica en el área metropolitana de la Ciudad de México, México ²1978, p. 32.

15 Bravo Alvarez, La Contaminación, p. 15, p. 26, pp. 131–132 and p. 275 who explains the phenomenon in detail, also referring to a graphic he drafted on p. 25. Also, P. R. Ehrlich / A. H. Ehrlich, Bevölkerungswachstum und Umweltkrise, Frankfurt am Main 1972, p. 163 and López de Alba, Políticas y Estrategias, p. 20 provide an excellent chart. Furthermore, several other publications explain the phenomenon such as: Bravo / Magaña / Magaña, Air Pollution Situation, p. 427; Comisión Preparatoria, Informe nacional, pp. 21–22; Jáuregui Ostos, Meterorología y el Ambiente Urbano, p. 21; Lacy, La Calidad del Aire, pp. 43–44; Orozco Carricarte, Generalidades, p. 13.

16 Bravo Alvarez, La Contaminación, p. 15; CEPIS / OPS / OMS, Seminario Latinoamericano, p. 77; Comisión Preparatoria, Informe nacional, especially p. 5 and p. 40; A. Gilbert, The Latin American Mega-City. An Introduction, in: A. Gilbert (ed.), The Mega-City in Latin America, Tokyo 1996, p. 1; Haddad, Contaminación del Aire. Situación Actual, p. 5; Haddad / Bloomfield, Contaminación, pp. 241–259; López de Alba, Políticas y Estrategias, p. 28; Parnreiter, Mexico City, p. 176–178; Secretaría de Salubridad y Asistencia, Situación, p. 13.

17 In a questionnaire on the occasion of the *Seminario sobre Contaminación del Aire*, which took place in Rio de Janeiro (Brazil) in 1968, Mexico listed further sources of its air pollution, including kitchen use in private households, refineries and the use of agricultural vehicles. The complete list can be found at CEPIS / OPS / OMS, Seminario Latinoamericano, pp. 113–114. Also, E. Beltrán, Palabras Inaugurales, in: Instituto Mexicano de Recursos Naturales Renovables (ed.), Primer Seminario sobre evaluación de la contaminación ambiental. Centro de Capacitación de Personal de la C.F.E., Atlihuetzia, Tlax., 21 a 24 de octubre de 1971. Aportación para la Comisión Preparatoria de México a la Conferencia de las Naciones Unidas sobre el Medio Humano Estocolmo, 1972, México, D.F. 1972, p. XIV; Bravo Alvarez, La Contaminación, p. 152; Centro Panamericano de Ingeniería Sanitaria y

vehicles emitted contaminants – a fact that was often ignored by developing countries because, compared to the Western world, the number of cars was still quite low. However, due to Mexico City's altitude, combustion residues had a more harmful impact on the atmosphere, therefore making vehicle combustions a topic that had to be discussed to attain better pollution control.[18]

The first signs of the serious extent of air pollution in Mexico City became tangible in the early 1950s when an incident in Poza Rica created national awareness for air pollution. On 24 November 1950, there was an accident at a local refinery, where unfiltered hydrogen sulfide (H_2S) intruded into the local atmosphere and affected the central nervous system and respiratory tract of 320 inhabitants. 263 of these persons suffered from slight intoxications, 45 were severely injured and 22 lost their lives.[19] Furthermore, photos taken in the 1950s in Mexico City proved that urban air pollution made the local population suffer.[20]

Since the mid-1950s, researchers and politicans began to address these problems, mainly by trying to measure the extent of air pollution within the city. National authorities involved in investigating air pollution were the Mexican Secretary of Health, the *Secretaría de Salubridad y Asistencia* (SSA), and its branch, the Industrial Hygiene Department *Dirección de Higiene Industrial* (DHI) which undertook and supported the first studies and measurements on pollution in the Mexican Valley.[21] Bravo, the head of the DHI's laboratory and researcher at the local UNAM University, conducted a first important study on air pollution in 1959/1960 based on a simple monitoring network with 28 stations that collected samples for a year.[22] In addition, climatologist Ernesto Jáureguei began to estimate the extent of air pollution in Mexico City by evaluating the visibility, publishing one of the first papers on these relationships with his paper on *El aumento de la turbiedad del aire en la ciudad de México*.[23] In his other publications, Jáuregui observed

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Ciencas del Ambiente, Informe Anual 1974, Lima 1975, p. 4; Haddad, Contaminación del Aire. Situación Actual, p. 5; M. E. Korc / R. Sáenz, Monitoreo de la Calidad del Aire en América Latina, Lima 1999, p. 1 list up further pollution sources.

18 CEPIS / OPS / OMS, Seminario Latinoamericano, p. 165; Alvarez, Pan American Air Monitoring Network, pp. 95–97; Bravo Alvarez, La Contaminación, especially p. 15, p. 127, pp. 143–144 and p. 275; Comisión Preparatoria, Informe Nacional, p. 19; CEPIS / OPS / OMS, Informe 1967–1974, p. 4; CEPIS / OPS / OMS, Informe final, p. 38; Haddad, Contaminación del Aire. Situación Actual, pp. 4–5; Haddad / Bloomfield, Contaminación, p. 246; López de Alba, Políticas y Estrategias, p. 28 and p. 34; Orozco Carricarte, Generalidades, pp. 14–15; Secretaría de Salubridad y Asistencia, Situación, p. 24, p. 32 and p. 62.

19 Haddad / Bloomfield, Contaminación, p. 246. They also mention similar incidents in Amatlán and Zacamixtle, which had already occurred in 1922. So does Bravo Alvarez, La Contaminación, p. 14. Furthermore, Ehrlich / Ehrlich, Bevölkerungswachstum und Umweltkrise, pp. 156–157 and Orozco Carricarte, Generalidades, p. 13 sketch the most important facts concerning the incidents.

20 Jáuregui O., Las Tolvaneras de la Ciudad de Mexico, pp. 61–64.

21 López de Alba, Políticas y estrategias, p. 29; Márquez Mayaudón, Actividades de la SSA, p. 418; Márquez Mayaudón, Información, p. 501; G. Viniegra, Dirección de Higiene Industrial, in: Salud Pública de México VI (1964) 6, pp. 1249–1260.

22 Further information on the study and first results provide Bravo / Báez / Lares, Estudio, pp. 26–28; Bravo Alvarez / Viniegra, Informe, pp. 5–17.

23 See Jáuregui Ostos, Aumento de la turbiedad, pp. 9–18.

that visibility had decreased significantly from 15-20 km in 1937 to approximately 2-4 km in 1966.[24]

By the mid-1960s, the Mexican Government took further steps. Firstly, in 1966 the DHI initiated its research programme; secondly, the DHI started training personnel, either through courses in Mexico or by sending them abroad with scholarships. Thirdly, the REDPANAIRE started its measurement activites in the Mexican capital in August 1967.[25]

In the following years, air pollution also became an important topic for the Mexican government, not least since Mexico was invited to join the Preparation Committees for the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (UNCHE).[26] The new Mexican President Luis Echeverría underlined in his inaugural speech that Mexico was ready to fight environmental problems. A large part of the air pollution monitoring measures were initiated during his term (1970–1976).[27]

2. Setting up the REDPANAIRE: The PAHO and the Launch of the First Comprehensive Monitoring Network

International environmental historians typically see the 1972 UNCHE as the moment when environmental issues were propelled to the international scene. A look at the issue of urban air pollution, however, shows that environmental themes had arrived long before on the agendas of international organizations. One of the first international organizations to address the air pollution problem in its development policy, for example, was the Geneva based World Health Organization (WHO) which dedicated its 1957 bi-annual Expert Committee on Environmental Sanitation meeting to air pollution. Experts assembled at the meeting discussed the topic extensively, provided a first and important definition of air pollution[28] and also stated that air pollution episodes could be

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24   Jáuregui Ostos, Meterorología y el Ambiente Urbano, p. 20 and the graphs documenting his research on 21. See also Bravo Alvarez, La Contaminación, p. 136.

25   Comisión Preparatoria, Informe Nacional, p. 31 and p. 35; Haddad / Bloomfield, Contaminación, p. 247; López de Alba, Políticas y Estrategias, pp. 29–30; Márquez Mayaudón, Actividades de la SSA, p. 418; Márquez Mayaudón, Contaminación Ambiental, p. 138.

26   During the first meeting of the Preparation Committee, Mexican delegate Mrs. Neoma de Castañeda chaired a working group on the Preparation of national reports. However, she did not take part in the second Preparation Committee. See UN General Assembly, Preparatory Committe for the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment. First Session. 10–20 March 1970. Report of the Preparatory Committe for the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment. A/CONF.48/PC/6, New York 1970, p. 4. For Mexico's participation in the remaining Committee meetings see UN General Assembly, Preparatory Committe for the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment. Second Session. Geneva, 8–19 February 1971. Report of the Preparatory Committe for the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment. A/CONF.48/PC/9, Geneva 1971, p. 48. UN General Assembly, Preparatory Committe for the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment. Third Session. New York, 13–24 September 1971. Report of the Preparatory Committe for the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment. A/CONF.48/PC/13, New York 1971.

27   See López de Alba, Políticas y Estrategias, p. 4 and pp. 29–32.

28   WHO Expert Committee, Air pollution, pp. 3–4 defined air pollution as "situations in which the outdoor ambient atmosphere contains materials in concentrations which are harmful to man or to his environment".

recognized not only by limited visibility and visible damage, but by strange smells, skin irritations or an acidic taste.[29] The Expert Committee encouraged not only institutions and agencies to undertake interdisciplinary research activities, but also wanted to assist developing countries to introduce monitoring programmes. This way, it encouraged environmental problems such as air pollution to become a field of development policy.[30]

Since the early 1960s, the PAHO, too, supported its member states to address the problem of air pollution, frequently pointing out in its reports that air pollution was a health threat that was becoming more and more evident in the major cities of the region.[31] In 1965, the PAHO's board also passed a resolution urging its director to pay attention to the increasing problems of air pollution in the region and to assist those countries and cities concerned.[32] Consequently, at the end of 1966, the PAHO decided to establish a permanent regional air pollution consultant,[33] making it one of the first international organizations to have staff that dedicated their work exclusively to environmental issues.[34] The post – which was initially a part-time job – was taken by Ricardo Haddad who had worked before as Deputy Director at the *Instituto de Higiene del Trabajo del Servicio Nacional de Salud* (Institute of Occupational Hygiene of the National Health Service) in Chile. His task was to promote activities to improve air quality. In the following years, he and his staff visited Latin American and Caribbean countries, where they talked to decision makers, informing themselves about the current state of air pollution and offered to help establish prevention and control programmes, and signed the first cooperation agreements.[35]

More important, since 1965 the PAHO also promoted the creation of a regional network of "a series of posts to measure air pollution in ten urban centres of Latin America"[36] – the REDPANAIRE, which, in the late 1960s and early 1970s, was the only air pollution

29   WHO Expert Committee, Air pollution, p. 4.
30   WHO Expert Committee, Air pollution, pp. 10 and p. 18.
31   CEPIS/OPS/OMS, Manual de Operaciones, p. 2; Haddad, Contaminación del Aire. Situación Actual, p. 1.
32   CEPIS/OPS/OMS, Informe Final, p. 5; CEPIS/OPS/OMS, Resultados 1967–1970, p. 3. – Interestingly, CEPIS, Informe Anual 1969, pp. 8–9 states that the PAHO had already in 1961 air pollution on its agenda, when it collaborated with the Chilean Instituto de Higiene del Trabajo y Contaminación Atmosférica.
33   The original name of this position was quoted as "Asesor en Contaminación del Aire", "consultor regional permanente", "Asesoría Regional en Contaminación del Aire" and "asesoría permanente en Contaminación Atmosférica". See CEPIS/OPS/OMS, Informe Final, p. 5; CEPIS/OPS/OMS, Resultados 1967–1970, p. 3; CEPIS/OPS/OMS, Seminario Latinoamericano, p. 2; Haddad, Contaminación del Aire. Situación Actual, p. 1.
34   The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank) installed the post of an environmental adviser in 1970. His task was to establish the Office of Environmental and Health Affairs (OEHA). See R. Wade: Greening the Bank: The Struggle over the Environment, 1970–1995, in: D. Kapur / J. P. Lewis / R. Webb (eds.), The World Bank. Its First Half Century. Vol. 2: Perspectives. Washington, D.C. 1997, pp. 618 and 731, but also an interview with James Lee, who was the first environmental adviser: B. Chokel, Transcript of interview with Dr. James Lee, April 4 1985, Washington, D.C. 1985.
35   Centro Panamericano de Ingeniería Sanitaria y Ciencias del Ambiente, Informe Anual 1972, Lima 1973, p. 2; CEPIS, Informe Anual 1969, p. 10; CEPIS/OPS/OMS, Manual de Operaciones, p. 3; CEPIS/OPS/OMS, Resultados 1967–1970, p. 5.
36   World Health Organization, The Work of WHO 1965. Annual report of the Director-General to the World Health Assembly and to the United Nations, Geneva 1966, p. 103.

monitoring network operating on a transnational level.[37] The REDPANAIRE pursued two major objectives. First, to obtain data through standardized measurements which would build a quantitative base that allowed governments and authorities concerned to get a deeper insight into the extent of air pollution. The evaluation of the results was thought to serve as a starting point for appropriate pollution control measures that would neither hinder the industrialization process nor surpass the financial and human resources of the cities and authorities concerned. Secondly, the REDPANAIRE wanted to raise awareness for air pollution and its consequences, sensitizing not only its participants, but also those officials and health authorities in Latin American and Caribbean cities and countries that had not signed up for the programme.[38]

Preparations for the REDPANAIRE started in 1965 when the PAHO began to buy simple equipment for ten monitoring stations. PAHO and later CEPIS underlined the importance of using affordable and accessible equipment because most countries of the region had only very limited financial and human resources. They hoped that a low-threshold access would encourage other countries and cities of the region to take part in the network.[39] CEPIS estimated that a city with 500.000 to 1.000.000 inhabitants would require between five to eight monitoring stations to get a general view of the air pollution's extent. Furthermore, PAHO and later CEPIS worked on a detailed manual to ensure that all members used the same monitoring equipment to compare results.[40]

Haddad and members of his *Asesoría*, which in 1968/1969 became integrated in the newly founded Pan American Center for Sanitary Engineering and Environmental Sciences (CEPIS) in Lima, also negotiated with national and regional governments of those cities concerned. CEPIS, which had been founded by PAHO in 1968, took over the responsibility for the REDPANAIRE and its coordination the following year.[41] From its seat in the Peruvian capital Lima, CEPIS offered scientific and technical assistance in the field of environmental issues. Subsequently, it also conducted research and pro-

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37   CEPIS, Annual Report 1970, p. 7; R. Haddad, Contaminación del Aire, in: Centro de Educación Continua de la Facultad de Ingeniería de la Universidad Autónomo de México (ed.), Control de la Contaminación Atmósferica, Mexico D.F. 1971, p. 19; CEPIS, Informe Anual 1969, pp. 9 and p. 11.

38   Alvarez, Pan American Air Monitoring Network, pp. 95–97; Centro Panamericano de Ingeniería Sanitaria y Ciencias del Ambiente, 30 años CEPIS 1968–1998. Frente a los Retos de un Nuevo Siglo, Lima 1998, p. 9; CEPIS, Informe Anual 1969, p. 2 and pp. 9–10; CEPIS, Informe Anual 1972, p. 20; CEPIS/OPS/OMS, Informe Final, p. 5 and p. 11; CEPIS/OPS/OMS, Manual de Operaciones, p. 2; CEPIS/OPS/OMS, Resultados 1967–1970, pp. 3–4; Haddad / Bloomfield, Contaminación, p. 249; Korc / Sáenz, Monitoreo, p. 2.

39   Alvarez, Pan American Air Monitoring Network, p. 96; CEPIS, Informe Anual 1969, pp. 9-10; CEPIS/OPS/OMS, Informe 1967–1974, p. 5; CEPIS/OPS/OMS, Resultados 1967–1970, pp. 3–6. – CEPIS/OPS/OMS, Manual de Operaciones, p. 2 and CEPIS/OPS/OMS, Resultados 1967–1970, pp. 134–146. list up all equipment required for one station and additional ones.

40   CEPIS/OPS/OMS, Informe Final, pp. 5–9 and p. 14; CEPIS/OPS/OMS, Manual de Operaciones, p. 3; CEPIS/OPS/OMS, Resultados 1967–1970, pp. 3–5; Haddad, Contaminación del Aire. Situación Actual, p. 2; Márquez Mayaudón, Información, p. 501.

41   Centro Panamericano de Ingeniería Sanitaria y Ciencias del Ambiente, Informe Anual 1975, Lima 1976, p. 5; Centro Panamericano de Ingeniería Sanitaria y Ciencias del Ambiente, Informe Anual 1976, Lima 1977, p. 9; CEPIS, Informe Anual 1969, p. 2 and 24; CEPIS, Informe Anual 1974, p. 1; CEPIS/OPS/OMS, Informe Final, p. 5; CEPIS/OPS/OMS, Manual de Operaciones, p. 1; CEPIS/OPS/OMS, Resultados 1967–1970, p. 5.

vided training programmes. This was very important as qualified personnel were scarce throughout the region.[42] Furthermore, CEPIS disseminated information through its publications and cooperated with other actors ranging from members of the United Nations family to local public utilities companies. It thereby contributed to achieving one of the aims of the REDPANAIRE: to create awareness.[43] Information included advice on how participating countries could create the infrastructure necessary to perform efficent prevention and control measures, emphasizing that prevention was better and more cost-effective than corrective measures.[44]

Beginning in April 1967, the first REDPANAIRE monitoring stations were installed with the help of PAHO's staff.[45] Those stations monitored pollution that occured in a 1 km radius, in some cases they even covered up to 5 km and initially monitored three main contaminants: settled dust, suspended dust and sulfur dioxide.[46] The methods employed for measuring were originally developed in England and used throughout Europe and parts of the US. While samples to monitor suspended dust and sulfur dioxide were taken daily, settled dust was measured once a month. However, pollutants orginating from motor vehicles were not included, since measuring them was technically and finan-cially not feasible.[47]

The first station in Santiago de Chile started its operation in June 1967, followed by the Brazilian cities Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo in July. Buenos Aires (Argentina), Lima (Peru), and Mexico City (Mexico) put their first stations into operation in August and Bogotá (Colombia) in November 1967. Jamaica, another founding member of the re-gional network, installed its first station in January 1968.[48] It was planned to extend the network and install stations in industrial and residential areas to get a better grasp of the pollution's extent.[49] It is important to mention that the local and national authorities were responsible for the operation of the REDPANAIRE monitoring stations as well as for the quality of the results. CEPIS' task was to coordinate the REDPANAIRE, provide technical assistance and "collect, analyze, process and disseminate the results".[50]

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42   CEPIS, Informe Anual 1971, Lima 1972, p. 1; CEPIS, Informe Anual 1973, Lima 1974, p. 10; CEPIS, Informe Anual 1977, Lima 1978, p. 14; CEPIS, Informe Anual 1969, pp. 2–3 and p. 9; CEPIS, Informe Anual 1972, p. 1; CEPIS, Informe Anual 1974, p. 1 and p. 4; CEPIS, Informe Anual 1975, p. 5; CEPIS, Informe Anual 1976, pp. 5 and p. 30; CEPIS/OPS/OMS, Informe Final, p. 14 and CEPIS/OPS/OMS, Resultados 1967–1970, p. 2.

43   CEPIS, Informe Anual 1969, p. 2; CEPIS, Informe Anual 1971, p. 1 and p. 7; CEPIS, Informe Anual 1973, p. 10; CEPIS, Informe Anual 1974, p. 1; CEPIS, Informe Anual 1975, p. 5; CEPIS, Informe Anual 1976, p. 5 and CEPIS, Informe Anual 1977, p. 14.

44   CEPIS/OPS/OMS, Resultados 1967–1970, pp. 4–5.

45   Ibid., p. 5.

46   CEPIS, Informe Anual 1969, p. 7 and CEPIS/OPS/OMS, Manual de Operaciones, p. 2.

47   CEPIS/OPS/OMS, Equipo y Materiales, p. 1; CEPIS/OPS/OMS, Informe 1967–1974, p. 4; CEPIS/OPS/OMS, Manual de Operaciones and CEPIS/OPS/OMS, Resultados 1967–1970, pp. 1–5.

48   CEPIS, Informe Anual 1969, pp. 9–11. and p. 24; CEPIS, Informe Anual 1971, p. 11 and p. 19; CEPIS/OPS/OMS, Informe final, p. 9; CEPIS/OPS/OMS, Resultados 1967–1970, p. 5; CEPIS/OPS/OMS, Results 1967–1973, p. 1.

49   CEPIS/OPS/OMS, Informe 1967–1974, p. 4 and p.49; CEPIS/OPS/OMS, Resultados 1967–1970, p. 7.

50   Alvarez, Pan American Air Monitoring Network, p. 95. See also: CEPIS/OPS/OMS, Informe 1967–1974, pp. 1–3; CEPIS/OPS/OMS, Informe Final, p. VII and pp. 13–14; CEPIS/OPS/OMS, Resultados 1967–1970, p. 5.

CEPIS had an agreement with the *Universidad Nacional de Ingeniería de Lima* (National University of Engineering in Lima) and used computers and programmes in their computer centre. Based on data obtained from REDPANAIRE's members, CEPIS periodically published reports which informed its member states about recent advances of the monitoring network and the state of air quality. The reports were published in Spanish – the first language of the vast majority of participants – and English. The latter enabled other non-members such as India, England, Iran and even Syria, to request copies and get insights into the monitoring activities in Latin America and the Caribbean.[51]

Beyond that, and based on the information published in its reports, CEPIS strove to improve the REDPANAIRE. Of great value in this regard was the *Comité Asesor en Contaminación Atmosférica*, a kind of advisory panel that evaluated the work of the REDPANAIRE and gave recommendations on the future of the network. The panel comprised experts from international organizations, the manager responsible for the REDPANAIRE, Ricardo Haddad, and representatives of participating countries, such as Mexico, which sent Enrique Márquez Mayaudón, a member of its environmental authority who was also engaged into local REDPANAIRE activities.[52]

3. Mexico City's Involvement in the REDPANAIRE

Given the magnitude of Mexico City's air pollution problems and the political will at local and national levels to address those air pollution problems, REDPANAIRE seemed to be a particularly suitable programme for the city to get a deeper insight into the extent of its air pollution and take further steps to enhance urban air quality.[53] Local administrations and researchers therefore actively pushed for its inclusion within the REDPA-NAIRE, making it a founding member of the network.[54]

The authority responsible for collecting and evaluating the samples of the 14 monitoring stations was initially with the DHI.[55] Between 1967 and 1974, Mexico City collected

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51   CEPIS, Informe Anual 1969, p. 19; CEPIS, Informe Anual 1971, p. 5 and p. 19; CEPIS, Informe Anual 1972, p. 24; CEPIS, Informe Anual 1973, p. 64; CEPIS, Informe Anual 1974, p. 5; CEPIS/OPS/OMS, Equipo y Materiales, p. 1 and CEPIS/OPS/OMS, Informe Final, p. VII.

52   CEPIS, Informe Anual 1974, pp. 4–5. – Márquez Mayaudón documented throughout the 1970s the current state of urban air pollution and related control activities in Mexico City. For his publications see note 5.

53   Alvarez, Pan American Air Monitoring Network, p. 95; CEPIS, Informe Anual 1969, pp. 9–10, CEPIS, Informe Anual 1973, p. 11; CEPIS/OPS/OMS, Informe Final, p. 5 and p. 11; CEPIS/OPS/OMS, Resultados 1967–1970, pp. 4–6; Haddad and Bloomfield, Contaminación, p. 249.

54   Further information on the stations provide: Dirección de Higiene Industrial, Medición de la Contaminación Atmosférica, in: Salud Pública de México. Epoca V. Volumen XI Número 5 Septiembre–Octubre (1969), pp. 669–671; L. E. Ehrlich, Administración del Recurso Aire en México, in: Organización Panamericana de la Salud / Organización Mundial de la Salud / Centro Panamericano de Ingenieria Sanitaria y Ciencias del Ambiente: Simposio sobre Ambiente, Salud y Desarrollo en las Américas. México, D.F. 29. de Julio al 2 de Agosto de 1974, Lima 1976, p. 224; López de Alba, Políticas y Estrategias, p. 31 and p. 42, Márquez Mayaudón, Actividades, p. 418; Márquez Mayaudón, Estado Actual, pp. 100–101; Márquez Mayaudón, Evaluación, p. 629.

55   The CEPIS report CEPIS/OPS/OMS, Resultados 1967–1970, p. 7 mentions the Sub-Secretaría de Salubridad, this was probably a typo because the Mexican Preparation Committee for the UNCHE and Mexican researcher Hum-

44.290 samples, which were roughly 30 per cent of REDPANAIRE's total samples by that time. Nearly half of Mexico City's samples far surpassed suggested reference levels.[56] Mexican researchers also stressed that the measured values even surpassed those of London or some US-American cities suffering from air pollution to illustrate the extent of Mexico City's miserable situation[57]. However, London and US cities had, by that time, more elaborate technical measures and laws which started to bear fruit, while Mexico City had not taken any measures at all to improve its urban air quality.

During its REDPANAIRE membership, Mexico City constantly strove to improve its air pollution monitoring, taking the results obtained as a basis for further measures. In doing so, it counted on CEPIS, which in turn cooperated with local authorities and the UNAM. Examples of the latter would be several training courses such as the *Curso sobre Contaminación del Aire* which took place at the end of 1971.[58] Contrary to other founding members of the REDPANAIRE, which just started with one single monitoring station, Mexico City purchased additional stations and soon had four stations in the first months of its operation.[59] Thus, Mexico City was able to cover different zones of the urban area – such as residential areas and industrial zones – and draw conclusions on the influence of disruptive factors on the air quality.

Based on the results obtained from the REDPANAIRE that indicated a significant degree of pollution, Mexico started to introduce a number of new pieces of legislation in the early 1970s, among them a federal law, the *Ley Federal para Prevenir y Controlar la Contaminación del Ambiente,* which was passed in March 1971.[60] This date is often considered as starting point for Mexico's environmental policy.[61] CEPIS considered the law to be a perfect example of legislation for other countries, which is unsurprising as it had supported the Mexican government in drafting the law.[62] Apart from arranging responsibilities and introducing the first measures to prevent and control pollution, the law provided a definition for contaminants and pollution.[63] The law was complemented

berto Bravo speak of the Secretaría de Salubridad y Asistencia. See Comisión Preparatoria, Informe nacional, p.5 and Bravo Alvarez, La Contaminación, p. 17. In 1970, the DHI was renamed to DHA, short for Dirección de Higiene del Ambiente. In 1972 the newly founded Subsecretaría de Mejoramiento del Ambiente (SSMA), the national environment authority, took over the responsibilty for air pollution control efforts. See Presidencia de la República de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, Acuerdo por el que se crea en la Secretaría de Salubridad y Asistencía la Subsecretaría de Mejoramiento del Ambiente, in: Salud Pública de México. Epoca V. Volumen XIV. Número 2 Marzo–Abril de 1972, p. 281; M. A. Gil Corrales, Crónica del Instituto Nacional de Ecología, México, D.F. 2009; Salud Pública de México, Nueva Denominación de la Dirección de Higiene Industrial, in: Salud Pública de México XII (1970) 4, pp. 567–567.

56 CEPIS/OPS/OMS, Informe 1967–1974, p. 10, pp. 32–33; CEPIS/OPS/OMS, Informe Final, p. 20–26, p. 33 and p. 42.
57 Bravo Alvarez, La Contaminación, p. 17; Comisión Preparatoria, Informe nacional, p. 31 and Jáuregui Ostos, Meterorología y el Ambiente Urbano, p. 24.
58 CEPIS, Informe Anual 1971, pp. 16–21; CEPIS, Informe Anual 1972, p. 21.
59 Haddad, Contaminación del Aire. Situación Actual, p. 5.
60 The *Ley Federal Para Prevenir y Controlar La contaminación Ambiental* is attached to Comisión Preparatoria, Informe nacional.
61 Bravo Alvarez, La Contaminación, p. 221; Secretaría de Salubridad y Asistencia, Situación, p. 61.
62 CEPIS, Informe Anual 1971, p. 11 and p. 19; CEPIS/OPS/OMS, Informe 1967–1974, p. 34; CEPIS/OPS/OMS, Resultados 1967–1970, p. 3.
63 Comisión Preparatoria, Informe Nacional, pp. 18–19.

through a regulation, the *Reglamento para la Prevención y Control de la Contammación Atmosférica producida por la Emisión de Humos y Polvos* on 11 September 1971. The regulation was criticized because it did not differentiate between certain types of industrial combustion processes and therefore lacked specificity. However, the regulation included specific pollution control activities aimed at reducing air pollution caused by industry and imposed severe fines for infringements.[64] In the same year, the federal government of Mexico also required new cars to be built with a crankcase ventilation system in the hopes of enhancing the air quality – this undertaking was not successful because the price-performance ratio was not satisfactory.[65] Additionally, in January 1972 the Mexican president established the *Subsecretaría de Mejoramiento del Ambiente* (SSMA) as a branch of the federal *Secretaría de Salubridad y Asistencia* (SSA). One of its purposes was to support the SSA in the field of environmental pollution prevention and control and to promote measures to reduce pollution originating from industrial sources.[66] This was a difficult endeavour, as the interests of state actors, urban population, industry and business conflicted, and the question of power arose.

In relation to other Latin American outfits, the SSMA had a considerable amount of staff from different academic disciplines and sufficient funds to work on the implementation of evaluation, prevention and control mechanisms. However, at the end of the 1970s, the SSA was still convinced that it was underfunded.[67] The weak points of the SSMA were in technological aspects and the qualification of personnel. In this regard, it received support from PAHO and CEPIS. In particular, CEPIS cooperated in its technical assistance programmes with local actors, such as the UNAM University. For instance, in 1971 they offered a course on air pollution control to qualify the much needed local personnel.[68]

At the end of 1972, the Mexican government also created the *Departamento de Monitoreo* to cope with the main problem of the REDPANAIRE – the lack of reliability. One of its first actions was the investigation of the validity of measurement procedures since the data obtained from the REDPANAIRE were technically deficient and not suitable to serve as a base for taking far-reaching decisions. Mexican authorities underlined that a major problem of the REDPANAIRE was that equipment and methodology were taken from Europe without adjusting them to local needs. Therefore, they were convinced that the methodology was not appropiate for Mexico City. As a first step, in 1972 Mexico

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64 See Bravo Alvarez, La Contaminación, p. 222; López de Alba, Políticas y Estrategias, p. 30; Reglamento para la Prevención y Control de la Contaminación Atmosférica originada por la Emisión de Humos y Polvos, in: Salud Pública de México XII, no. 5 (1971), pp. 873–883; Secretaría de Salubridad y Asistencia, Situación, p. 61.

65 Bravo Alvarez, La Contaminación, p. 17.

66 Ibid., pp. 221–222; Presidencia de la República de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, Acuerdo, pp. 281–282; Ehrlich, Administración p. 221; Gil Corrales, Crónica; López de Alba, Políticas y Estrategias, p. 30; Presidencia de la República de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, Acuerdo, pp. 281–282; Secretaría de Salubridad y Asistencia, Situación, p. 61.

67 CEPIS/OPS/OMS, Informe 1967–1974, p. 49; Secretaría de Salubridad y Asistencia, Situación, p. 61.

68 Interestingly, a manual with nearly 700 pages is still available and provides information on participants, lecturers and contents of the two-week course. See Centro de Educación Continua de la Facultad de Ingeniería de la Universidad Autónomo de México, Control de la Contaminación Atmósferica, Mexico D.F. 1971.

City decided to base the operation of its 14 REDPANAIRE stations on the methodology developed by the US-American Environmental Protecion Agency (EPA) because it thought it would be more reliable.[69]

However, since the change of methodology did not lead to the significant improvement Mexico City hoped for, local authorities decided to substitute their 14 manual REDPANAIRE monitoring stations with an automatic computer-based network which would provide more valid data. Obviously, the Mexicans were aware that such an endeavor would require financial and personal resources beyond their means. Therefore, they decided to apply for development aid. CEPIS and PAHO supported Mexico City and the federal government to file an application for a comprehensive environmental project to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) by sending a short-term consultant that evaluated the air pollution-related questions. The consultant was probably Ricardo Haddad. The centrepiece of the project was a computerized automatic monitoring system.[70]

After minor adjustments, the UNDP agreed to support Mexico's endeavour. The new system, officially known as *Red Computarizada Automática de Monitoreo Atmosférico del Valle de México* but shortened in daily life to *Red Philips* because of the manufacturer of the monitoring system, was – by that time – the most expensive and elaborate in Latin America.[71] The UNDP also provided international experts in the field of air pollution, supported courses to train personnel that operated the monitoring stations and allocated scholarships allowing Mexican graduates to pursue masters and PhD degrees abroad that would allow them to take over future leading positions in the field of air pollution control. Furthermore, resources of the UNDP project were used to create an inventory of pollution sources. The project also comprised monitoring stations for other Mexican cities affected by air pollution, namely Monterrey and Guadalajara.[72] Throughout the project, CEPIS supported the Mexican authorities.[73] Thus, the monitoring stations of the *Red Philips* were spread all over Mexico City and some industrial areas in the north of the city.[74]

With the *Red Philips*, which was able to monitor additional contaminants, Mexico City hoped to obtain more exact measurement results. Contrary to the REDPANAIRE, the *Red Philips* had at least an internal calibration. Moreover, it used measurement methods

69   Bravo Alvarez, La Contaminación, p. 17; CEPIS, Informe Anual 1972, p. 28; CEPIS, Informe Anual 1976, p. 9; López de Alba, Políticas y Estrategias, pp. 31–33 and p. 42.

70   Bravo / Magaña / Magaña, Air Pollution Situation, pp. 427–428; CEPIS, Informe Anual 1972, pp. 21–28; CEPIS, Informe Anual 1973, p. 78, CEPIS, Informe Anual 1974, p. 5; CEPIS/OPS/OMS, Informe 1967–1974, p. 34; CEPIS/OPS/OMS, Informe Final, p. 33; CEPIS/OPS/OMS, Resultados 1967–1970, p. 2; Haddad, Contaminación del Aire. Situación Actual, p. 6.

71   Philips, Air-monitoring networks – a growing market, in: Environmental Protection News No.2 (1977), pp. 7: "the total cost amounts to USD 1,5 millions" and Philips, Mexico City Air-Monitoring Network goes on-line, in: Environmental Protection News No.3 (1976), pp. 1–2.

72   Bravo Alvarez, La Contaminación, p. 11; Haddad, Contaminación del Aire. Situación Actual, p. 8 and López de Alba, Políticas y Estrategias, p. 9 and p. 36.

73   CEPIS, Informe Anual 1972, pp. 25–29; CEPIS, Informe Anual 1973, p. 78; CEPIS, Informe Anual 1974, p. 5.

74   López de Alba, Políticas y Estrategias, p. 42.

that were certified by the EPA and allowed international comparisons of results.[75] As a result of its efforts to set up the *Red Philips*, Mexico City canceled its participation in the REDPANAIRE. This underlines the fact that Mexico City was ahead of the times. During the 1970s, it became clear that there would be an international monitoring network, the GEMS (Global Environmental Monitoring System), and that sooner or later, most Latin American and Caribbean states would have to convert their manual monitoring stations to automatic ones.[76]

However, since neither the manual monitoring stations of the REDPANAIRE nor the automatic stations of the *Red Philips* had sufficient calibration mechanisms, the system did not deliver the results the Mexican authorities had hoped for.[77] Furthermore, the transmission of the measurements via telephone was often interrupted or deficient. Therefore, the *Red Philips*, which comprised 20 fixed and two mobile monitoring stations in the Mexican Valley, stopped operating in the second half of the 1970s.[78] Certainly, the technical deficiencies were not the only reason for stopping the monitoring of pollutants. The changing political situation, too, played an important role: While during the presidency of Echeverría (1970–1976), environmental issues were relatively important, the administration of President José López Portillo (1976–1982) did not pay much attention to pollution problems. Either the post-Stockholm euphoria ebbed away, or it was the fact that Mexico struggled with a severe economic crisis which required the full attention of the political leaders. Most of the environmental policy measures undertaken by López Portillo failed: Between 1976 and 1982 the *Red Philips* was de facto out of order.

4. Conclusion

After 13 years of operation and having expanded the network from eight stations in eight cities in 1967 to 153 monitoring stations in 48 cities in 1980, as documented in table 1, the REDPANAIRE ceased its activities in 1980 with the publication of the its final report, the *Informe Final*.

The surrounding political troubles notwithstanding, the monitoring network had completed its mission. It had contributed to a better understanding of the real magnitude of the air pollution problem in the major cities of the Americas by collecting data on the extent of air pollution and raising awareness for the air pollution complex.[79] Following the end of REDPANAIRE in 1980, some of the existing stations were integrated into a

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75   The *Red Philips* was also able to monitor nitrogen oxides, carbon monoxide and ozone, See López de Alba, Políticas y Estrategias, pp. 32–33 and 42.

76   CEPIS, Informe Anual 1976, p. 10; CEPIS, Informe Anual 1978, Lima 1979, p. 15; CEPIS, Informe Anual 1979, Lima 1980, p. 16; CEPIS / OPS / OMS, Informe Final, p. 38.

77   López de Alba, Políticas y Estrategias, p. 31.

78   Bravo / Torres, Situación Actual, p. 119; Bravo Alvarez, La Contaminación, p. 17; López de Alba, Políticas y Estrategias, pp. 32–34; Márquez Mayaudón, Información, p. 502.

79   CEPIS / OPS / OMS, Informe Final, pp. 11–12 and p. 38.

world-wide monitoring network called GEMS, which was established in the 1970s by the WHO and the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) with support of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and the World Meteorological Organization (WMO). Since 1978, CEPIS and PAHO closely cooperated with GEMS and supported the implementation of monitoring stations that were compatible with the new monitoring system. It furthermore disseminated information and collected the samples from the already upgraded monitoring stations.[80]

While the Mexico City's overall air quality did not improve significantly between the late 1950s and early 1980s, participation within the REDPANAIRE did offer the city an excellent opportunity to internationalize its fight against urban air pollution. The REDPANAIRE encouraged Mexico (City) to network within the global governance framework, allowed Mexico City to benefit from development aid and technical assistance, and helped create (global) awareness. Last but not least, taking part in the REDPANAIRE helped Mexico (City) to solidify its urban development policy in the field of the environment, raising awareness for an extreme dimension of air pollution that outstripped the problems of other Latin American and Caribbean states.

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80   For further information on the GEMS see CEPIS, Informe Anual 1979, p. 16; CEPIS, Informe Anual 1975, p. 8; CEPIS, Informe Anual 1976, p. 10; CEPIS, Informe Anual 1977, p. 15; CEPIS, Informe Anual 1978, p. 15; CEPIS/OPS/OMS, Informe Final, p. 38; H. W. De Koning, Global Air Quality Monitoring, in: T. Schneider / H.W. De Koning / L. J. Brasser (eds.), Air Pollution Reference Measurement Methods and Systems. Proceedings of the International Workshop, Bilthoven, December 12–16, 1977, Amsterdam 1978, pp. 127–132; Korc / Sáenz, Monitoreo, p. 3.

Table 1: Development of the REDPANAIRE[81]

year	no. of stations	no. of participating cities	no. of participating countries	no. of stations in Mexico City
1967	8	7	6	4
1968	15	9	8	7
1969	22		8	9
1970	29	14	10	11
1971	52	23	13	11
1972	62	24	13	14
1973	88	26	14	14
1974	93	30	14	14
1975	93	30	15	
1976	120	30	15	
1977	120	40	16	
1978	120	30	15	
1979	118	48	19	
1980	153	48	18	

81 The number of stations quoted in the publications often differ from each other. Probably they are referring to different months of the respective year. Following publications provide information on the development of the transnational monitoring network: Alvarez, Pan American Air Monitoring Network, p. 95; CEPIS, Informe Anual 1969, p. 11; CEPIS, Annual Report 1970, p. 7; CEPIS, Informe Anual 1971, p. 5 and p. 11; CEPIS, Informe Anual 1972, pp. 17–18; CEPIS, Informe Anual 1973, pp. 10–12; CEPIS, Informe Anual 1974, p. 4; CEPIS, Informe Anual 1976, p. 46; CEPIS, Informe Anual 1977, p. 8 and 14; CEPIS/OPS/OMS, Informe 1967–1974, p. 1; CEPIS/OPS/OMS, Informe Final, p. 9, p. 16, and p. 42; CEPIS/OPS/OMS, Equipo y Materiales, p. 1; CEPIS/OPS/OMS, Results 1967–1973, p. 1; R. Haddad, Contaminación del Aire, in: Centro de Educación Continua de la Facultad de Ingeniería de la Universidad Autónomo de México (ed.), Control de la contaminación atmósferica, Mexico D. F. 1971, S. 1–31, p. 20; Haddad, Contaminación del Aire. Situación Actual, p. 2; R. Haddad/C. R. Bartone/A. Velazco, Situación de la contaminación del aire en los países bolivarianos. Resultados consolidados REDPANAIRE 1967–1980, in: Asociación Venezolana de Ingeniería Sanitaria y Ambiental. Sección Venezolana de AIDIS (ed.), Criterios de calidad ambiental. I Congreso Bolivariano y III Congreso Venezolano de Ingeniería Sanitaria y Ambiental. Agosto 28 Septiembre 2/1983. Tema IV: Residuos Líquidos, Sólidos y gaseosos, Caracas 1983, s.p and p. 6; López de Alba, Políticas y Estrategias, p. 31.

German-African Entangled Histories[1]

Geert Castryck

Ten years ago, Olaf Kaltmeier, Ulrike Lindner, and Angelika Epple convened a workshop on "*Entangled Histories: Reflecting on Coloniality and Postcoloniality*" at the University of Bielefeld (29 May 2010). One year later, an issue of *Comparativ*, based on this workshop, made a case for entangled histories of colonialism and postcoloniality.[2] This tenth anniversary seems a good occasion to look back and to assess entangled histories of colonialism published in Germany over the past couple of years. I leave it in the middle in how far this workshop and journal issue triggered the practicing of entangled histories of colonialism in Germany or rather signalled it, but either way, it marked a turning point in how colonial history is dealt with in German academia.

The issue contained six research articles dealing with coloniality and postcoloniality in Latin America, South Asia and Africa. After a comparative conceptualization of coloniality and postcoloniality on the three continents, more than half of the remaining

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contributions dealt with Africa. Out of eight authors, seven were Germans affiliated to German-language universities and one was from Sri Lanka and worked in the Netherlands. Given this combined German and African focus, this review article is also primarily concerned with German-African entangled histories of colonialism and postcoloniality, giving passing attention to a few entangled histories having no direct link to Africa. Practicing entangled histories of colonialism between Africa and Europe myself, I have met most of the people who were involved back then. However, at the time, I missed it completely. One month before the workshop, I had moved to Leipzig from Belgium, a country not less affected by colonialism and colonial history than Germany. I did not yet have a clue what was on the agenda of German colonial historiography. As much as the German move towards entangled history was shaped in a German historiographical context, my own trajectory had been an emancipation from a national starting point as well. In more than one regard, the move towards entangled history departs from domestic perspectives, as will be further demonstrated in the remainder of this review article.

What is meant by entangled history of colonialism, though, needs to be addressed first. In the introduction to the aforementioned Comparativ issue, Epple and Lindner emphasize entanglements between motherlands and colonies (spaces) and between colonizers and colonized (people). They also highlight the possibility of comparison by looking at various regions and different empires. And they take the question to a meta-level by referring to different conceptualizations of coloniality, postcoloniality, and the entanglements between them. It is not fully clear if entanglement is understood as a one-on-one translation of the German "Verflechtung" (interwovenness, intertwinement) or if they also hint at the English subtext of being enmeshed/convoluted/warped. Either way, entanglements of spaces and of people, entanglement as enhanced comparison, and conceptual entanglements provide a stimulating range of paths towards histories of colonialism that overcome national or imperial containers.

This call for entangled histories of coloniality and postcoloniality could build on manifold inspiring publications in the first decade of the century, making a plea for transnational approaches, for global histories of imperialism, or for postcolonial reflections on Europe's colonial entanglements. Limiting this brief overview to initiatives with a German connection, Jürgen Zimmerer had drawn the line from colonial genocide to Holocaust,[3] Sebastian Conrad and Jürgen Osterhammel edited a volume on imperial Germany in a global context,[4] Frank Hadler and Matthias Middell edited a Comparativ issue calling for a transnational entangled history of East Central Europe,[5] and Shalini

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[3] E.g. J. Zimmerer, "Colonial Genocide and the Holocaust. Towards an Archaeology of Genocide", in: Genocide and Settler Society: Frontier Violence and Stolen Indigenous Children in Australian History, ed. by A. Dirk Moses, New York 2004, pp. 49–76. Also see his 2011 monograph: J. Zimmerer, Von Windhuk nach Auschwitz? Beiträge zum Verhältnis von Kolonialismus und Holocaust, Münster 2011.

[4] S. Conrad / J. Osterhammel (eds.), Das Kaiserreich transnational. Deutschland in der Welt 1871–1914, Göttingen 2006.

[5] F. Hadler / M. Middell (eds.), Verflochtene Geschichten: Ostmitteleuropa. Leipzig 2010 (= Comparativ 20 [2010] 1/2).

Randeria, on one occasion together with Sebastian Conrad, promoted postcolonial per-spectives in order to come to shared histories.[6] However, the combination of entangle-ment, colonial history and a postcolonial approach sets the 2010/11 call by Kaltmeier, Lindner, and Epple apart from the invaluable examples set before.

Since, several research projects have been initiated at German universities, tackling the challenge of producing an entangled history of colonialism, primarily between Germany and Africa. Admittedly, this way of phrasing it (Germany versus Africa) gives a wrong impression of the individual books under scrutiny in this review article. None of them juxtaposes Germany as a whole with Africa as a continent, nor do they take Germany as unit of analysis. Notwithstanding, a German part of the equation and an African part of the equation is what they do have in common, even if the cases at hand are always spatially more specific, focusing on specific regions, towns, border zones. The spatial pre-cision appears to be as characteristic for entangled histories as the above-mentioned de-parting from a particular domestic frame of reference, a frame that is not abandoned but complemented, juxtaposed and intertwined with other frames. Entangled history, thus, seems to be a way to escape methodological nationalism, without cutting the ties with a national heritage, or more precisely, it is a way to come to terms with laden aspects of this heritage, by reframing them in their enmeshed, convoluted, warped entanglements beyond the deceivingly neat national cocoon.

In the remainder of this review article, I mainly discuss two monographs and one edited volume, based on the questions (1) how they employ entangled history, and (2) how they address (post)coloniality. Besides, I give passing attention to a few publications, coop-erations and expositions, which touch upon at least one dimension of German-African entangled histories of colonialism.

1. Imperial Frontier Zones

Dörte Lerp's *Imperiale Grenzräume: Bevölkerungspolitiken in Deutsch-Südwestafrika und den* östlichen *Provinzen Preußens 1884–1914*[7] juxtaposes German policies of space and population control in Prussia's eastern provinces (today in Poland) and in German South West Africa (today Namibia) in the three decades before the First World War (although the final chapter also addresses labour and mobility in and out of Prussia's eastern prov-inces during the war). Spaces, central actors (people), and comparison are three organiz-

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6   S. Randeria, "Geteilte Geschichte und verwobene Moderne", in: J. Rüsen/H. Leitgeb/N. Jegelka (eds.), Zukunft-sentwürfe. Ideen für eine Kultur der Veränderung, Frankfurt am Main 2000, pp. 87–96; S. Conrad/S. Randeria (eds.), Jenseits des Eurozentrismus. Postkoloniale Perspektiven in den Geschichts- und Kulturwissenschaften, Frankfurt am Main/New York 2002, especially the introduction: S. Conrad/S. Randeria, "Einleitung: Geteilte Ge-schichten – Europa in einer postkolonialen Welt", pp. 9–49.

7   For a review of this book, which does not assess it as a German-African entangled history, see M. Hedrich: Rezen-sion zu: Lerp, Dörte: Imperiale Grenzräume. Bevölkerungspolitiken in Deutsch-Südwestafrika und den östlichen Provinzen Preußens 1884–1914. Frankfurt am Main 2016, in: H-Soz-Kult, 09.06.2017, <www.hsozkult.de/publica-tionreview/id/reb-23520>.

ing principles of the book, which are reminiscent of the above-mentioned paths towards entangled histories of colonialism.

Concerning *space*, Lerp investigates how practices of rule ordered space and how territorial population policies were grafted upon these spatial orders. The decisive spatial instrument of control in her analysis is "Grenzraum", which plays with the ambiguity between "zonal frontiers" and "clear-cut boundaries" (p. 42, drawing on Johannes Paulmann). "Grenzraum" can either refer to a spatial policy of expansion and occupation or to separation and exclusion, it can refer to an area of labour recruitment and settlement or to checkpoints and procedures of containment, and it can be applied on the territorial scale of nation state or empire or on the level of urban planning and segregation. These deliberate ambiguities are reflected in the book structure, which (after an introduction and a historical background chapter) is divided into four parts: (1) "Grenzziehungen" (drawing the boundaries/frontiers), (2) "Siedlungskolonialismus" (on colonial settlement within Europe and overseas), (3) "Die geteilte Stadt" (the segregated city), and (4) "Entgrenzung" (on expansion and migration).

The entry-point to this research are practices of rule ("Herrschaftspraxen"), or more precisely population policies, which the author seeks to reconstruct through a combination of an actor-oriented approach and scrutinizing legislation and implementation. The difference in treatment between the African and the German parts of this entangled history becomes most apparent in the presentation of the central actors (*people*), their relations and associations, and their influence on regulation and implementation. For the Prussian policies in the East, we get to know the most active and influential lobbyists, their initiatives and their contentions, their successes and tenacity, and even in some cases the evolution of their positions over time. Geographical and German-nationalist circles predominate in the analysis, yet the reconstruction of their actions allows the author to present the eventual legislation and its implementation as the outcome of networking, lobbying and mobilization by central actors. For the imperial policies in German South West Africa, the reconstruction of population policies and spatial ordering primarily depends on the legislation (see for instance p. 105) and on sparse reports by colonial officers (see for instance p. 195). Certainly, this is due to a profoundly different source base, but it does result in a book containing considerably more detail and more nuance on German colonialism in Poland than on German colonialism in Namibia. Notwithstanding, both Namibian and Polish people remain anonymous masses, and the same is true for the German settlers in both frontier zones. Nevertheless, the author consistently analyses Prussian policies in the East at par with German policies in Africa, i.e. as colonialism in both cases. The focus on a specific domain (population policies) and on well choses spaces (imperial frontiers/border zones) in both the European and the African part of the German empire qualifies this study as an entangled history of colonialism, although one can question if we observe European-African entanglements or rather inner-German national-imperial ones.

The author does not call her research an entangled history but positions it at the intersection of *comparative* history and history of transfers. In the historical background

chapter, she juxtaposes the division of Poland with the scramble for Africa. Throughout the four main chapters of the book, she consistently poses the same questions, addresses the same problems, follows the same heuristic logic for both cases. Obviously, she is not to blame that the sources do not allow to tackle the questions and problems in the same way. Searching the same thing does not automatically result in finding the same thing. The author admits that she hardly found direct transfers between both cases, neither between people nor between spaces. However, she did uncover revealing parallels, shared thoughts, and to a lesser extent relevant differences (e.g. resistance against too many Polish workers in the German heartlands versus a desire to mobilize as many African workers as possible throughout the African colonies). She, thus, established similarities rather than connections between East Central Europe and South West Africa. The few connections that did appear were mainly between colonial contexts in Africa.

Zooming in on the individual chapters, we see a wide range of policies aimed at controlling people and space. In the chapter on bordering ("3. Grenzziehungen"), the author scrutinizes the trade-off between control of migration and mobilization of labour, primarily concerning the Polish provinces of Prussia. Applying the same reading grid to German South West Africa, she comes to the convincing interpretation that the genocide on Herero and Nama was executed as a spatial programme, as a plan for spatial organization, accumulation of space, and a collective death sentence through exclusion from vital spaces (e.g. waterholes) (p. 97). Whereas, at least in the first decade of the twentieth century, the degree of severity still differed between the two areas of imperial bordering, it is noteworthy that already at the time, contemporaries considered overseas colonies and "internal" colonial lands together (p. 115). This becomes particularly apparent in the policies for settler colonialism ("4. Siedlungskolonialismus"). In this chapter, the mobile people, whose mobility is controlled through policies of population control, are German nationals. Settlement, whether in the Polish provinces or in South West Africa, is a means towards national expansion by influencing the dominant population in the frontier zones ("Grenzräume") (p. 150).[8] Thus, Prussian and imperial governments constructed the relation between state, space and people. The same happened in a highly concentrated fashion in towns, where hygiene and disease were used as a legitimation to control population and space – exemplified by case studies of segregate Posen (Poznań) and Windhoek ("5. Die geteilte Stadt"). The final and shortest chapter ("6. Entgrenzung") illustrates the coming together and contradictions of the different dimensions of imperial population policies in the forced migration, the forced labour recruitment and military expansion during the First World War. Although a highly informative and well researched chapter as such, it is out of tune with the rest of the book, because it is at odds both with the indicated timeframe of the book (1884-1914) and with the thus far consistent attempt to pose the same questions for the Prussian eastern provinces and

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8   For a more detailed analysis of the colonial frontier and territorialization policies, see the ongoing research by J. Decker "Lines in the sand: railways and the archipelago of colonial territorialization in German Southwest Africa, 1897–1914" (draft paper).

for German South West Africa. Throughout the book, as mentioned before, there is an imbalance in the treatment of both cases, which can be attributed to differences in the source base. In the final chapter, however, the attention for the African side of the story is cosmetic at best.

Nevertheless, *Imperiale Grenzräume* is a well researched, original and inspiring entangled history of German policies of space and population in Prussia's eastern provinces and in German South West Africa. Hitherto, these two regions were not only geographically, but also historiographically far apart, as Lerp aptly puts it (p. 332). The entanglements she laid bare are not so much direct connections or transfers, but rather shared imperial mindsets (p. 320). More than likely, these mindsets were not confined to the German national-imperial context, as becomes clear in the few examples of inter-colonial entanglements in Southern Africa (for instance on p. 268). However, the German case is particularly revealing for parallel colonialism in Europe and Africa.

2. Malaria and Statehood

Displaying colonialism at work in Europe and Africa is also what the second reviewed monograph, Manuela Bauche's *Medizin und Herrschaft: Malariabekämpfung in Kamerun, Ostafrika und Ostfriesland (1890–1919)*[9], does. The opening paragraph already pins down what the book is about – and what it does not pretend to be. Commenting on an 1898 quote from the famous German bacteriologist and epidemiologist Robert Koch, Bauche incisively points out that his train of thought was instrumental for German imperialism: "we" have to get malaria under control *in order to* implement imperial rule ("Herrschaft") in "our" colonial property. Even a leading medical doctor understood the medical challenge to combat malaria as subservient to imperial rule. Accordingly, Bauche analyses the German anti-malaria policy as a tool of empire, as an insightful take on the establishment of modern statehood, and not as a study in historical medicine.[10]

Just as Lerp, Bauche interprets her object of study both in Germany and in Africa. She focuses on five towns where malaria was endemic at the time: Dar es Salaam and Tanga in German East Africa, Duala in Cameroon, and Wilhelmshaven and Emden in East Frisia. All three areas had recently been acquired by the German imperial respectively Prussian state. Like Lerp, she consistently poses the same questions, addresses the same

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9 For reviews of this book, which do not assess it as a German-African entangled history, see W. Bruchhausen, Rezension zu: Bauche, Manuela: Medizin und Herrschaft. Malariabekämpfung in Kamerun, Ostafrika und Ostfriesland 1890–1919. Frankfurt am Main 2017, in: H-Soz-Kult, 30.03.2018, <www.hsozkult.de/publicationreview/id/reb-25972>; R. Forsbach: Rezension von: Manuela Bauche: Medizin und Herrschaft. Malariabekämpfung in Kamerun, Ostafrika und Ostfriesland (1890–001919), Frankfurt/M.: Campus 2017, in: sehepunkte 18 (2018), Nr. 7/8 [15.07.2018], <http://www.sehepunkte.de/2018/07/29908.html>.

10 In his review for H-Soz-Kult, Walter Bruchhausen regrets that the book primarily deals with the establishment of statehood rather than with health and medical care. His personal expectation comes along with a misreading of Bauche's central argument, assuming that statehood was established in order to enable epidemic control, rather than the other way around.

problems, and follows the same heuristic logic for all her cases. She avoids creating a German-African dichotomy, also highlighting differences between Wilhelmshaven and Emden and between Duala and Dar es Salaam/Tanga as well as similarities and connections between the malaria campaigns in German, Cameroonian and Tanganyikan towns. More explicitly than Lerp, Bauche draws inspiration from post-colonial critique on European history – rather than mere critique on colonialism – and more successfully than Lerp, she manages to uncover direct personal connections rather than only parallels and similarities. Nevertheless, she also has difficulties giving an active voice to the "objects" of the anti-malaria policies. Despite being aware of this problem (see for instance p. 38–39), the sources do not allow her search for subaltern voices to reach beyond dissident bacteriologists, German nurses in East Frisia and East Africa, local elites in Duala, anonymous assistants and intermediaries in the malaria campaigns in East African towns, and equally anonymous inhabitants of the wokers' neighbourhood "Transvaal" in Emden.[11] Overall, in showing how the malaria control policies buttressed the establishment of modern statehood, the author makes sense of the entanglements between colony and metropole and of the construction of difference through knowledge production and population control as two sides of the same story. Both in the colonies and in the metropole there are centres and there are peripheries. Grasping this, is the fruit of writing an entangled history.

Manuela Bauche identifies her approach as one of entanglement (p. 17 and footnote 20 in particular). She distinguishes between personal, practical and discursive connections between her different cases (p. 26). When it comes to boundaries, she likewise acknowledges that these are spatial and discursive at the same time. These conceptual and theoretical reflections make clear that her findings have a relevance beyond the "German" cases at hand. She furthermore highlights the present-day relevance of her research by pointing to the importance of a critical understanding of long-lasting views of the world. After a theoretical and methodological introduction, the book has four chapters: "Malaria" framing the history and practices of malaria campaigns, "Bewegung" highlighting the importance of travelling and stations, "Neuordnung" dealing with the local implementation of new governing orders, and "'Modernität' und Exklusion" addressing the social and spatial divisions implemented through modernization discourses. In the chapter on malaria control, the author demonstrates how making people free of disease is substituted for making spaces free of disease, thus illustrating a profound entanglement of people and spaces which goes well beyond the (separate) entanglements of people and entanglements of spaces Epple and Lindner called for. Not healing the sick, but making the sick harmless for people in other places turns out to be Koch's imperial aim. Controlling people's bodies, controlling their living spaces, and controlling their movements together with spatial and discursive dividing become the backbone of disease control (p. 54–56). For the sake of establishing modern statehood, a spatial order with Berlin at the

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11   It is noteworthy that this unhealthy part of town, across the canal, is named after an African – more specifically South African – land.

centre and diverse peripheries as fields of experimentation was installed (cf. p. 62).[12] The Berlin-based Robert Koch and his *Königlich Preußische Institut für Infektionskrankheiten* was the spider in the web as far as malaria was concerned.

However, in order to implement this centralized statebuilding policy, the German imperial state relied on local intermediaries and depended on the obedience or acceptance by subordinate masses. Bauche stresses "race" and class much more than nation and ethnicity as decisive divisive criteria – although class and national difference in fact often converge, as in the case of Dutch and Italian immigrant workforce in Transvaal (Emden). "Against this background, it becomes clear that it is not so much a question of defining specific practices as essentially colonial or essentially metropolitan, but rather of looking at the intricacies of knowledge and practices in which the metropole and the colony coalesce to one coherent field." (pp. 120–121).[13] Summing up, Manuela Bauche delivered a convincing and consistent entangled history of coloniality, integrating one German imperial space of action and redefining its (relative) centres and peripheries beyond a misleading European-African scheme (p. 345).

Empirically, this study could be qualified as inner-German (also the policies in Africa were German policies), yet by being postcolonially reflexive, contributing to the mission of provincializing Europe, the book's relevance reaches well beyond German history. This being said, it should be noticed that entangled history is not only about reaching beyond national histories, it is also – and importantly so – about finally properly understanding national histories, by no longer putting them in an epistemological quarantine, which blends out decisive parts of what constituted that history. Thus, entangled history is both a way to overcome and to enhance national histories.

3. Collective Entangled History Projects

Complementing the monographic entangled histories reviewed above, there are several initiatives trying to address the entanglement of colonial histories in cooperation. Rather than researching entanglement, research itself is entangled or at least juxtaposed and confronted between German researchers and researchers from former German colonial territories. Moreover, the question in how far the shared or divisive colonial past is still present in the public space today, is addressed in dialogue. Entangled history is thus not only a heuristic approach to a research object but also an organizational challenge to come to terms with entangled pasts together. There are two dimensions to this togetherness: (1) bringing researchers from Germany and from former German colonies in

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12   This observation is reminiscent of H. Tilley, Africa as a living laboratory. Empire, development, and the problem of scientific knowledge, 1870–1950, Chicago 2011, although this work does not figure in the book's list of references.

13   German original: "Vor diesem Hintergrund wird offenbar, dass es weniger darum gehen kann, spezifische Praktiken als essentiell kolonial oder essentiell metropolitan zu definieren, sondern vielmehr das Geflecht an Wissen und Praktiken in den Blick zu nehmen, in dem sich Metropole und Kolonie zu einem zusammenhängenden Feld konstituierten."

Africa (and the Pacific) together, and (2) bringing researchers and public together, both in Germany and in Africa.

There have been several initiatives over the past couple of years addressing this convolution of entangled history in one way or another. Similar to the monographic research projects already assessed, it is remarkable that these initiatives are spatially specific, tackling more or less well-defined regions or towns like Westphalia, Hamburg, the Cameroonian Grasslands, the German Rhineland, or the South Pacific.[14] I address two projects, tackling German-African entangled histories of colonialism collectively.

In the beginning of 2018, Jürgen Zimmerer convened a conference on Hamburg's colonial legacies and memories under the title: *Confronting the Colonial Past! 'Askari', Lettow-Vorbeck and Hamburg's entangled (post-)colonial legacies* (28 February–2 March 2018).[15] Not a two- or more-sided relation was at the heart of this conference, but Hamburg and its manifold colonial and postcolonial entanglements were. This fits the aforementioned observation that entangled history is not only about comparison and about overcoming dominant frames of reference, but also about enhancing our knowledge about a specific town (or region or nation) by considering its entanglements.

All the same, entanglements with Africa figured prominently and there were several contributors from Africa. Oswald Masebo from the University of Dar es Salaam delivered one of the conference's keynote lectures on "Entangled Histories of Dar es Salaam and Hamburg". An artistic ensemble from Windhoek presented a visual art project about the Herero-Nama genocide in Namibia.

The conference also included a public part on how to deal with Hamburg's (post-)colonial legacy. The combination of reaching out to the public, prominently including African partners, addressing the present-day consequences of colonial legacies (including how to deal with colonial art collections or with human remains), and indeed taking a specific space (here Hamburg) as vantage point characterize this collective take on colonial and post-colonial entanglements.

Probably the most elaborate collaborative example of German-African entangled history, is the research project on topographies of transcultural memories between the history department of the Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf and the department of applied foreign languages at the University of Dschang (Cameroon). The project started in 2015 and resulted in two exhibitions (in Düsseldorf in 2016 and in Dschang in 2018), a website (www.deutschland-postkolonial.de), a documentary film and city tours, as well as a collective publication *Koloniale Verbindungen – transkulturelle Erinnerungstopografien:*

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14   I mention Westphalia and the South Pacific, referring to the volume: S. Hensel/B. Rommé (eds.), Aus Westfalen in die Südsee: Katholische Mission in den deutschen Kolonien, Berlin 2018. As the book neither concerns German-African entanglements nor involves cooperation with partners in the South Pacific, I do go deeper into this project. Nevertheless, it does underscore some characteristics of collective entangled history projects: the regional focus, the combination of research and public activities (in this case an exhibition in Munster), and an interest in colonial traces (in this case ethnographic and photographic collections).

15   For a conference report, see M. Hedrich, Tagungsbericht: Confronting the Colonial Past!, Askari', Lettow-Vorbeck and Hamburg's entangled (post-) colonial legacies, 28.02.2018 – 02.03.2018 Hamburg, in: H-Soz-Kult, 21.08.2018, <www.hsozkult.de/conferencereport/id/tagungsberichte-7823>.

Das Rheinland in Deutschland und das Grasland Kameruns (transcript, 2019), edited by Albert Gouaffo and Stefanie Michels.[16] The value of the project lies primarily in the interdisciplinary, transnational and multimedial collaboration, much more than in direct research results.

The cooperation between historians and linguists, between Germans and Cameroonians brought this project close to tackling Epple and Lindner's fourth path towards an entangled history of colonialism: the meta-level of entangled conceptualizations of coloniality and postcoloniality. Drawing on Britta Schilling, who in turn is inspired by Ann Laura Stoler, the editors argue against an idea of "colonial amnesia" (having forgotten the colonial past) and instead argue to recognize "colonial aphasia" (lacking the vocabulary to speak about the colonial past). This project demonstrates that the conceptual entanglement, the exchange of memories and understandings, provides a path to escape the speechlessness on colonialism.

This collaborative project set the example to face the challenge of coloniality and postcoloniality together, entangled between the German Rhineland and the Cameroon Grasslands. The book gives a good idea of the partners involved in the project, but is more valuable as a collaborative format to emulate, than as a convincing contribution to research on colonialism and postcoloniality. What comes out is a project between equal partners in different disciplines and areas, spatially specific both in Germany and in Cameroon, implemented in both places, used for educational purposes and reaching out to the public through multiple media, as well as paying attention to colonial collections and recollections in Dusseldorf and in Dschang.

4. Conclusion

Ten years along the road since Epple, Kaltmeier, and Lindner made their call for entangled histories of coloniality and postcoloniality, several convincing entangled histories have been undertaken. On the one hand, the monographs by Dörte Lerp and Manuela Bauche put entangled history into practice by choosing precise thematic and spatial foci, consistently posing the same questions and addressing the same problems for the different areas under scrutiny. Whereas Lerp managed to draw interesting parallels in comparing population control in Prussia's eastern provinces and in German South West Africa, Bauche could identify both direct connections and differences between anti-malaria campaigns in German, Cameroonian and East African coastal towns.

On the other hand, collaborative projects centred around specific places or areas in Germany and in Africa used entanglement as a method to cope with (post-)colonial legacies. Confronting German and African takes on coloniality and postcoloniality, combining

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16   For a review of this book, which does not assess it as a German-African entangled history, see J. Häfner: Rezension zu: Gouaffo, Albert; Stefanie Michels (Hrsg.): Koloniale Verbindungen – transkulturelle Erinnerungstopografien. Das Rheinland in Deutschland und das Grasland Kameruns. Bielefeld 2019, in: H-Soz-Kult, 20.09.2019, <www.hsozkult.de/publicationreview/id/reb-28158>.

academic disciplines but also arts and archival and museum collections, and exchanging with the public and in the public space illustrate that entangled history is not only a research approach but also a public performance and a political statement.

Having written this review article at a time when fruit and vegetable harvests, textile workshops and meat processing factories, cramped with exploited workers from Africa and Eastern Europe, led to COVID-19-lockdowns in German, Spanish and English districts, and at a time when Black Lives Matter-protests manifest themselves across Europe (and beyond), I cannot help but being baffled by the parallels between Lerp's and Bauche's research and the present-day situation. The task is not to divulge the truism that the world is entangled, but to scrutinize how it is entangled, which asymmetries underpin global entanglements, and how they are reproduced over and over again. Entangled history is not merely a way to make comparisons or see connections between the own town, area or nation and some outside counterpart, but entails a fundamental revisiting and reinterpretation of the own history in light of its entanglements. As such, an entangled history of colonialism is at the same time a postcolonial history of the self.

REZENSIONEN | REVIEWS

Reviewed by
Constanze Weiske, Göttingen

Vitus Huber's recent contribution titled "Booty and Conquista" is presenting a rich and insightful reassessment of European colonization. Focused on the so-called *Conquista* of New Spain between the 1520s and 1542/1543, this monograph aims to offer "a new explanation for the world historical process of the *Conquista*" and in particular "a sharper view on [..., its] preconditions, procedures and manifestations" in order to illuminate "the blind spot of previous research" (p. 359). Selectively compared to other colonial spaces, Huber frames his examination conceptually as a political economy of the Spanish appropriation process in contemporary Mexico. In particular, the author examines the practices and discourses of booty acquisition and distribution, as well as the narrative strategies of the Spanish conquistadores before the Spanish Crown in order to justify their shares.

Starting with the assumption that previous explanations of the Spanish appropriation in the Americas were either focused on its "medieval, feudal character" or as "emerging early capitalist configurations", which would have had "disguised the constitutive entanglement of both", the historian of the early modern period argues that Spain's *Conquista* of New Spain is best explained by having a closer look on the distribution of booty among the 20 conquistadores of New Spain (p. 32), since the procedure and result of this distribution process have had "resulted in dynamics, which had mainly determined the further course of the conquest" (p. 167). Accordingly, Huber conceptualizes his research as a political economy of the *Conquista*, defined as "specific entanglement of political and economical schemes of incentive and reward", which would have had "decisively determined the terms of behaviour and utterances of the actors" (p. 24). Therefore, booty is defined in a broader sense, encompassing precious metals and lands "on which the [Spanish] Crown raised the claim of the Quinto Real" and thus "specifically numbered [her] share" (p. 157), but also enslaved Indigenous Peoples and encomiendas. Also considered are "medium to long-term social betterment by

honour, title and ennoblement qua act of grace" (p. 24, see also pp. 171–172).

Based on historical sources collected in both Spain (Archivo General de Indias in Sevilla and Simancas, Archivo Histórico Nacional, Biblioteca Nacional de España, and Real Academia de la Historia in Madrid) and Mexico (Archivo General de la Nación, Archivo General de Notarías de México, Instituto Nacional de Antropología e Historia), Vitus Huber in three subsections of the book consequently traces the process of booty acquisition, distribution and justification, namely chronological order (I.), agreement (II.) and transfer (III.). Arguing that booty had presented a "constitutive element" in the formation of conquistadores groups (pp. 106–113), the historian, in particular, examines the "resulting dynamics on the side of the conquistadores" (pp. 167–168). In particular highlighted is the case of Hernan Cortés, who had mobilized his group in Cuba, before embarking to San Juan de Ulúa in Yucatan on 21 April 1519 and marching to Tenochtitlan on 16 August 1519 (p. 105).

Moreover, Huber reviews various subsequent cases of booty distribution following the logic of distributional justice in terms of gold, silver, precious metals and slaves in Michoacán (Mexico-City), Nicaragua/Panama-City, Cajamarca, Cartagena, and Santa Marta between 1522 and 1538. Those cases are finally set into comparison with the practices of the *Reconquista* of the Iberian Peninsula from the Moors. He concludes that both the *Conquista* of New Spain and the *Reconquista* of Iberia are structurally equal in practices and postulates while the distribution of the encomiendas in New Spain emerged

in a "modified" form (p. 234). Moreover, transfer practices from Iberia to New Spain occurred in terms of the so-called Quinto Real. Derived from the practices of the *Reconquista* and, surprisingly, presumable originated from pre-Islamic, respectively Arabic booty practices, Huber argues that this share of a fifth had played a "central function" during the *Conquista*, since it was legitimizing the forays and power of the Spanish Crown (pp. 58–59).

Finally, the historian of the University of Bern turns to the shift from the economy of booty to the economy of grace. Accordingly, the logic of the economy of grace had been applied in the narratives strategies of the conquistadores to justify their shares before the Spanish Monarchs and had resulted "in the extension of colonial offices and entities" (p. 32). In addition, Huber points to the particular relevance of the economy of grace in the distribution of land, which was applied by the Spanish Crown since 1531, as the European monarchs had treated the "conquered lands" as an "integral component of the property of the Castilian Crown" and distributed them among its subjects as usufruct either as "graceful donations" (*donativos graciosos*) or "royal mercies" (*mercedes reales*) (p. 215). In contrast, Hernan Cortés had conducted the first distribution of land in New Spain according to the logic of booty distribution (p. 215). Consequently, Huber emphasizes the relevance of the economy of grace as "constitutive for the territorial expansion and the process of *empire building*" (p. 223, Italics in Original), which however remains unquestioned in terms of the lawfulness of those Spanish "conquest" practices in the light of the European colo-

nial law of the time, in particular the legal writings of Francisco de Vitoria.

In sum, the book presents an insightful and rich perspective on Spanish practices during the colonization of New Spain, but remains as the authors states "inevitable eurocentric" in character, since Europe would have had presented "the starting point of the schemes of incentives and rewards of Spanish expansion" (p. 32), while the historical sources are limited in what they tell us about indigenous peoples. Though acknowledging current trends of the New Conquest History of Matthew Restall and the efforts of transnational and global history to revise Eurocentric narratives, Huber is limiting his considerations about indigenous peoples to their role in the Spanish booty practices of the repartimiento and encomienda (pp. 175–185; 225–235) and as partners of alliances with the Spanish conquistadores, in particularly the Triple Alliance of the Aztecs (pp. 97–103). Thus, the variety of indigenous peoples in the research area remains little reflected and their position as equal and sovereign actors neglected. Likewise, the Eurocentric perspective becomes visible in the unquestioned treatment of the concept of "Conquista", the uncritical acceptance of the Spanish conquest myth and unaddressed question of the lawfulness of Spanish colonial (land) acquisition practices according to the then valid Spanish colonial law and the corresponding Indigenous Peoples' law.

Jeremy Black: Geographies of an Imperial Power. The British World, 1688–1815, Bloomington: Indiana University Press 2018, 308 S.

Rezensiert von
Benedikt Stuchtey, Marburg

Jeremy Black ist ein beneidenswert produktiver Historiker, dessen Liste allein an Buchveröffentlichungen nahezu 120 Titel beinhaltet (Stand Sommer 2019). Darunter sind Bücher über den Holocaust und den Kalten Krieg, die Sklaverei, die Grand Tour in Italien, historiographiegeschichtliche Studien und Gesamtdarstellungen der britischen Geschichte. Will man gleichwohl einen Arbeitsschwerpunkt ausmachen, so liegt dieser zum einen in der Militärgeschichte und zum anderen im „langen" 18. Jahrhundert Großbritanniens zwischen Glorreicher Revolution und Wiener Kongress.

Auch der vorliegende Titel wendet sich dem Britischen Empire zu und bleibt der klassischen eurozentrischen Sichtweise verhaftet, weil die Rahmendaten kaum die nicht-europäische Perspektive auf die Geschichte der „British World" berühren. Im Mittelpunkt der Aufmerksamkeit steht entsprechend ein „metropolitanes" Vorgehen insofern, als Black die Frage stellt, wie sich die britische Macht und imperiale Autorität weltweit aufgrund der im „Mutterland" ansässigen und sich im Laufe des 18. Jahrhunderts zunehmend professionalisierenden Geographie durchsetzte. Die Durchdringung Nordamerikas, Irlands

und Schottlands sowie Indiens sei letzten Endes auch technischer Natur gewesen. Denn ohne das Wissen um Längen- und Breitengrade, ohne das Festlegen von Räumen und Zeiten und ohne die Entwicklung eines sich verwissenschaftlichenden, geographischen Wissens wäre dem Empire das Erringen weder der politischen, kulturellen und wirtschaftlichen noch der geostrategischen, maritimen Vorherrschaft gelungen.

Man wird diese Feststellung nicht als umwerfend neu bezeichnen können. Black hat sie in zahllosen seiner früheren Bücher bereits getroffen, darunter in „Maps and History" und „Maps and Politics" (beide 1997), sowie in „Geopolitics and the Quest for Dominance", einer der zwölf Buchtitel aus dem Jahr 2015, wie sein Schriftenverzeichnis verkündet. Dass Geographie und die Beschaffung geographischer Informationen einen maßgeblichen Einfluss auf die Erfassung der kolonisierten Welt ausübten, liegt so auf der Hand wie dies mit anderen Frühformen naturwissenschaftlichen Arbeitens ebenso der Fall war. Auch die Medizin war davon selbstverständlich nicht ausgenommen.

Interessant und relevant aber ist das gegenseitige Spannungsverhältnis zwischen den europäischen, hier britischen und den nicht-europäischen Raumvorstellungen. Ohne eine eingehendere theoretische und methodische Auseinandersetzung mit Raumkonzepten und deren Bedeutung für die Kolonial- und Imperialgeschichte ist das Studium der geographischen Relationen indessen kaum perspektivenreich. Blacks zum einen zwar materialgesättigte, zum anderen jedoch theorieferne Vorgehensweise ist daher, je weiter das Buch sein Argument immer wieder wiederholt,

durchaus ermüdend. Denn der Entfaltung des Arguments fehlt die Zugrundelegung einer konzise entwickelten Fragestellung, die weiter führen würde als lediglich zu der Behauptung, im 18. Jahrhundert habe sich Großbritannien mit Hilfe von Statistiken und geographischen Vermessungen einen Wissensvorsprung vor seinen europäischen Konkurrenten erarbeitet.

In der Summe geht Blacks Anspruch, Historikerinnen und Historiker müssten sich am Fach der Historischen Geographie beteiligen, deshalb ins Leere, solange er nicht von einem stringenten theoretischen Gerüst gestützt wird und stattdessen unzählige Anekdoten sprunghaft und konzeptlos aneinander reiht. Als William Guthrie im Jahr 1770 seine „Geographical, Historical, and Commercial Grammar" veröffentlichte, trat der Vertraute des berühmten Samuel Johnson und Autor für das „Gentleman's Magazine" an die Öffentlichkeit mit der Anregung, Geschichte und Geographie in Studium und praktischer Anwendung stärker miteinander zu verflechten.

Geographie aber war selbstverständlich nicht lediglich als „natürliche" zu verstehen, sondern auch als „moralische" und als „politische". Das ging auf eine bestens etablierte Tradition auf den britischen Inseln zurück, mit der nicht nur, aber maßgeblich William Petty begonnen hatte („The Political Anatomy of Ireland", 1691). Petty erhält bei Jeremy Black bedauerlicherweise keine Erwähnung. Dabei war es dieser „Surveyor-General of the Kingdom of Ireland" und Freund von Thomas Hobbes, der erstmals einen topographischen Überblick über die irischen Ländereien verfasst hatte. Karl Marx betrachtete ihn als einen der Vorväter des modernen volkswirtschaftlichen Denkens. Marx erkannte

sofort, dass Pettys Bericht, den noch Oliver Cromwell in Auftrag gegeben hatte, die Basis für umfassende Umverteilungen von Land legte. Auf seiner Grundlage wurden diejenigen Katholiken enteignet, die sich am Aufstand von 1641 beteiligt hatten, und im Gegenzug jene dafür belohnt, wenn sie sich neutral verhielten. Die intime geographische Kenntnis des Landes, seines Wertes und der Besitzverhältnisse auf der gesamten Insel bildeten mithin eine zentrale Voraussetzung für die Politik der Herrschaft, ob in den Händen Cromwells oder seiner Nachfolger, die gleichermaßen Irland als eine Kolonie betrachteten. Wie schnell sich nämlich die Besitzverhältnisse änderten, zeigen die Statistiken Irlands für das frühe 18. Jahrhundert, als lediglich fünf Prozent des Landes bei den Katholiken verblieben.

In den anderen kolonialen Besitzungen des Britischen Empires waren diese Verhältnisse vergleichsweise ähnlich. Black geht dabei von einer in sich geschlossenen britischen Welt des 18. Jahrhunderts aus, einer Welt der Aufklärung, die nach innen wie nach außen eine nachgerade konkurrenzlose Überlegenheit aufgebaut habe: nach innen über neue Formen des Wissens, auch des geographischen, und über die Presse, sowie nach außen über die militärische und maritime Stärke. Nun ist es nicht unkompliziert, die vielen und gänzlich unterschiedlichen Aspekte auf einen Nenner zu bringen, jenen Nenner nämlich, der sie systematisieren würde. Aber Black hat sich dagegen entschieden, weil er argumentiert, die Zeitgenossen, mit denen er sich befasst habe, hätten auch die unterschiedlichsten Erfahrungen gleichzeitig und ohne das Privileg nachträglicher Ordnung machen müssen. Die

Folge ist eine bunte Sammlung verstreuter Reflexionen, die sowohl den enzyklopädischen Anspruch, alles, was jemals im 18. Jahrhundert im britischen Empire eine noch so kleine Bedeutung gehabt habe, zu erwähnen, verfolgt, als auch der großen Narrative des vermeintlich unaufhaltsamen Aufstiegs Großbritanniens Rechnung tragen will. Daraus ergeben sich Kapitelüberschriften wie „Responding to Novelty" (6), „Responding to the Transoceanic World" (7) oder „Responding to Coal and Commerce" (8), nachdem der Autor zuvor den „öffentlichen Raum", „Tourismus", „Religion" und „Kultur" behandelt hat. Auch dürfen Untersuchungen über London und das Londoner gesellschaftliche Leben, die großen Landhäuser sowie Edward Gibbons und Edmund Burkes politisches Denken nicht fehlen.

Was indessen fehlt, ist die Perspektive der kolonisierten, nicht-europäischen Menschen. Als sei das Empire eine vom „Mutterland" sauber zu trennende Angelegenheit, wird die Welt der Siedler und Soldaten, der Händler und Reisenden erwähnt. Aber die Welt der Menschen in Amerika und Indien, in Irland und auf den karibischen Inseln, die mit den „geographies of an imperial power" konfrontiert wurden, bleibt außen vor. Man muss sich wünschen, sie in einem der zukünftigen Bücher von Jeremy Black berücksichtigt zu finden.

Joshua Meeks: France, Britain, and the Struggle for the Revolutionary Western Mediterranean (= War, Culture and Society, 1750–1850), Cham: Springer Nature / Palgrave Macmillan 2017, 212 S.

Rezensiert von
Matthias Middell, Leipzig

Während die gesamte, von Rafe Blaufarb, Alan Forrest und Karen Hagemann herausgegebene Buchreihe zur Wirkung von Kriegen auf Kultur und Gesellschaft den längeren Trends zwischen der Mitte des 18. und der Mitte des 19. Jhs gewidmet ist, begrenzt sich die an der Florida State University eingereichte Dissertation von Joshua Meeks auf eine viel kürzere Periode von lediglich drei Jahren, nämlich die Zeit von 1793 bis 1796. In dieser Zeit wechselte die Dominanz im westlichen Mittelmeer gleich mehrfach und lässt sich deshalb gut als Beispiel für den globalen Konflikt zwischen England und dem revolutionären Frankreich analysieren. Völlig zurecht macht Meeks auch darauf aufmerksam, dass keineswegs nur die beiden Großmächte involviert waren, sondern vor allem Spanien, aber auch mehrere kleinere italienischen Staaten ihre Interessen nachdrücklich zur Geltung zu bringen versuchten.

Die leitende Fragestellung des Buches ist die nach einem grundsätzlichen Wandel im internationalen System und die Ablösung der Mächtegleichgewichts-Strategie, die im 18. Jahrhundert dominiert hatte, durch einen Konflikt zwischen revolutionären Mächten und einer (politisch weitgefassten) Gegenrevolution, der unvermeidlich in einen totalen Krieg geführt habe.[1] Diese These von der wachsenden Bedeutung ideologischer Überzeugungen für die Formulierung von Kriegszielen und für die Kultur der Kriegsführung zieht der Verfasser jedoch in Zweifel, indem er anhand seines Untersuchungsraumes darauf verweist, dass Frankreich zuweilen durchaus als stabilisierende Kraft eintrat, während die Briten das gerade errungene Gleichgewicht in Frage stellten. Das westliche Mittelmeer eignet sich für die Überprüfung dieser Annahme besonders gut, weil hier die Kriegsgegner beinahe von Anfang an in einem Stellungskrieg gefangen waren, da England zur See dominierte und Frankreich die Hegemonie zu Land behielt. So galt es eher durch diplomatische Bemühungen als durch militärische Kraftanstrengungen Verbündete zu finden, um das Kräfteparallelogramm zu den eigenen Gunsten zu verschieben. Dabei war ideologische Prinzipienfestigkeit zugunsten der oder gegen die Grundsätze der neuen revolutionären Ordnung weniger wichtig für das Eingehen von Allianzen als die Gelegenheit zur Vergrößerung des eigenen Spielraums (im Falle der kleinen italienischen Mächte) oder der Erhalt eines schwindenden internationalen Gewichts (wie ihn das spanische Empire erlebte). In aller Vorsicht distanziert sich Meeks von der Idee einer alleinigen Steuerung des „First Total War" durch Ideologien. Dieser eher pragmatische Erwägungen der Kriegsgegner in den Blick nehmenden Perspektive ist es auch zu verdanken, dass der Verfasser nicht nur nationale Kriegs-

ziele, sondern auch die lokalen und regionalen Konfigurationen genauer besichtigt und in ihrer Wirkung auf den Wechsel der Allianzen würdigt.

Heraus kommt ein komplexes Bild vom Auf und Ab des Kriegsglücks, das in sechs Kapiteln ausgebreitet wird, wobei das auf die Einleitung folgende Kapitel 2 eine Schilderung der vorrevolutionären Situation bietet, Kapitel 3 Korsika während der ersten vier Jahre der Revolution seit 1789 in den Mittelpunkt stellt und das Anwachsen einer Entfremdung zwischen der Insel und Paris beobachtet. Kapitel 4 folgt der Diskussion in London über die Formierung der ersten Koalition und die Frage, ob man gegen Frankreich oder gegen die Revolution in den Krieg ziehe, was wiederum Folgen für die Formulierung von Zielen und die Festlegung des Zeitpunktes haben musste, zu dem die britische Regierung ihre Ziele als erreicht ansehen und einen Friedensschluss ins Auge fassen konnte. Da diese Frage aber letztlich offen und unter den Teilnehmern der Koalition umstritten blieb, ließ sich kein roter Faden finden, an dem entlang der Einsatz militärischer Mittel geplant werden konnte. Der Fall von Toulon und die Hinwendung der Briten zur Etablierung eines neuen Staates mit dem englisch-korsischen Königreich, mit dessen Hilfe sie sich bis 1796 in der Region halten konnten, bildet den Fokus von Kapitel 5, während Kapitel 6 den Italienfeldzug der Franzosen und den Wettbewerb mit Spanien in der Region behandelt, an dessen Ende die Annäherung zwischen Paris und Madrid stand, die London mit dem (in Kapitel 7 ausführlicher untersuchten) Frieden von San Ildefonso isolierte und es Napoleon ermöglichte, den französischen Einfluss über

die italienische Halbinsel auszudehnen. Mit dem Scheitern der italienischen Staaten und insbesondere der Toskana bei ihrem Streben nach Neutralität und mit der Wiederrichtung der französischen Dominanz über Korsika schloss das Kriegskapitel im westlichen Mittelmeer – während es an anderen Stellen Europas und der Welt noch fast zwei Jahrzehnte fortdauerte.

Ob sich, wie der Verfasser schreibt, deshalb gleich das westliche Mittelmeer als ein solches Zentrum des Konflikts betrachten lässt, das erlaubt, über dessen Gesamtcharakter zu entscheiden, oder ob es doch eher ein Nebenkriegsschauplatz blieb, lässt sich allein anhand der vorliegenden Studie kaum entscheiden, denn der Verfasser begrenzt sich auf die allerdings beeindruckend gründliche Auswertung der Archive in Paris, La Courneuve und Kew Gardens sowie der Überlieferung im Departement Korsika, blendet aber die anderen Kriegsschauplätze weitgehend aus, wenn sie ihm nicht direkt in der konsultierten diplomatischen Korrespondenz entgegentreten. Auf diese Weise entsteht eine sehr zuverlässige Regionalstudie, wenn man denn einen Teil des Mittelmeeres als separate Region auffassen kann, die in Einleitung und Schlussfolgerungen die Bezüge zu allgemeineren Kontroversen der Revolutionshistoriographie herzustellen versucht. Dabei nimmt der Verfasser sowohl Bezug auf die ältere Idee der atlantischen Revolution als auch auf die (neuere) eines globalen Modells der Krise von Imperien, die beide zwar den Zusammenhang von Metropole und Kolonien in den Mittelpunkt rücken, die mediterrane Peripherie allerdings kaum näher betrachtet haben.

Die Argumente, die Joshua Meeks sammelt, um zu belegen, dass sowohl Eng-

lands als auch Frankreichs außenpolitische Eliten entscheidende Lektionen für ihr Verständnis künftiger internationaler Politik in den frühen Konflikten im westlichen Mittelmeer lernten, sind nicht von der Hand zu weisen, bedürfen allerdings auch noch der weiterführenden Beweisführung anhand der Debatten, die um spätere Konflikte geführt wurden. Der auf den letzten Seiten des Buches ausgebreitete Vergleich im Umgang Napoleons und der britischen Regierung mit Korsika und Malta liefert dafür bereits wichtige Stichworte. Die umstandslose Integration in ein französisches Modell von Staatlichkeit und Verfassung blieb letztlich von kurzer Dauer, so wie auch dem englisch-korsischen Königreich keine lange Existenz beschieden war.

Die Revolutionsdekade hatte die Idee nicht nur nationaler Souveränität fest im kulturellen Repertoire der Nachgeborenen verankert, sondern auch jenen, die sich mit der faktisch an alte imperiale Gewohnheiten erinnernden Eingliederung in eine solche nationale Einheit nicht anfreunden wollten, einen Zukunftshorizont eröffnet – die Behauptung von Eigenständigkeit und Souveränität, wenn sich Gelegenheit dazu bieten sollte. Die Krise der Imperien am Ende des 18. Jh.s beantworteten die Großmächte mit einem neuartigen Imperialismus, der auch im 19. und in beträchtlichen Teilen des 20. Jh.s einer vollständigen Dekolonisierung entgegenstand und an vielen Stellen überhaupt erst eine effiziente koloniale Herrschaft durchzusetzen in der Lage war. Das Konzept, demokratische Nationalisierung nach innen mit undemokratischer Kolonisierung zu verbinden und Nationalstaaten mit imperialen Machtsphären zu etablieren, erwies sich für mehr oder minder lange Zeit als

Erfolgsmodell, zeigte aber auch schon in seinen Anfängen eine Porosität, die Joshua Meeks mit seiner Regionalstudie für das westliche Mittelmeer sehr gut greifbar gemacht hat. Der Erfolg des Italienfeldzuges beeindruckte die Zeitgenossen Napoleons bis zur Bewunderung, aber das imperiale Konstrukt, das ihm entsprang, war trotzdem nicht von langer Dauer.

Anmerkung

1 David A. Bell, The First Total War. Napoleon's Europe and the Birth of Warfare as We Know It, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2007.

Josep M. Fradera: The Imperial Nation. Citizens and Subjects in the British, French, Spanish, and American Empires. Translated by Ruth MacKay, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 2018, 416 p.

Reviewed by
Megan Maruschke, Leipzig

Historians have long positioned the French Revolution as the moment when modern nations emerged. In contrast, global history narratives show that the nineteenth century was a period characterized by the co-existence of both empires and nations.[1] New imperial history has further stressed the endurance of empire throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, showing to what extent empire influenced and made possible the development of metropolitan societies. And thus,

the nation (state) is produced in the context of empire. The historiography of the Atlantic Revolutions has yet to catch up. Despite the connectivity, circulations, and entanglements explored during the age of revolutions (circa 1770–1830), now often studied through the "global turn," the classic narrative "from empire to nation state" still closes the revolutionary story. Important interventions have outlined how these revolutions (American, French, Haitian, and Spanish American independence) have taken place within the context of empire, but have not fully outlined how empires were reformed during revolution, especially during revolution in the metropole in the case of the French empire.[2]

Josep M. Fradera's *The Imperial Nation: Citizens and Subjects in the British, French, Spanish, and American Empires* fills an important gap by bringing these research traditions together in an ambitious synthesis and positioning his findings in global history. Translated by Ruth MacKay, this monograph is a revised and abridged version of La nación imperial: derechos, representación y ciudadanía en los imperios de Gran Bretaña, Francia, España, y Estados Unidos (1750–1918) published in two-volumes in 2015. Fradera is professor of modern history at Pompeu Fabra University in Barcelona and is a scholar of the Spanish Empire. This book puts Fradera's extensive knowledge of the Spanish empire into a comparative context with other empires that experienced or were impacted by the successive waves of political revolutions that started during the 1770s. This book is an important contribution to and should be essential reading in all three historiographical traditions: global history, imperial history, and Atlantic history.

The central thesis of this book is that the Atlantic revolutions between circa 1780 and 1830 were key to the successive reform of empire throughout the long nineteenth century. The American and French revolutions in particular contributed to the demise of monarchic, composite empires but, in their wake, new empires "of a different sort" that did not exclude national developments emerged (p. 1). Under monarchic empires, subjects had various rights and obligations depending on their place and socio-economic position. Political revolutions shook this system to the core by advocating citizenship characterized by equal rights. Fradera seeks to elucidate how these polities, despite espousing the rights of man, maintained their colonies and expanded their empires over the course of the nineteenth century. They did so by applying constitutions and laws in the metropoles while enforcing different laws or constitutions in the colonies. To describe this, Fradera uses the French term *spécialité* and positions the French experience during and following the Revolution as a formative one for nineteenth century empires.

Importantly, France grapples with the colonial question during the French Revolution and haltingly experiments with extending its constitution and citizenship to the colonies in what Fradera terms an *imperial constitution*. This attempt serves as a model for Spain's later constitutional experiment to maintain its American colonies. But during the ensuing revolutionary cycle, the US frees itself from Great Britain, Haiti breaks free of France, and most of Spanish America is lost to Spain. Despite these massive territorial and commercial losses, these states reform how

they manage their empires despite revolutionary upheaval and the emergence of "natural rights" at home. In their wake, *colonial constitutions* come to define the nineteenth century empire whereby the colonies are excluded from the rights present in the metropole. These revolutions are therefore key moments in defining the imperial metropole.

In a book about how empires were reformed during and following the age of revolution, the Haitian revolution could be given more weight for two reasons. First, the radical demands of black men and women on Saint Domingue to abolish slavery and be included in the French empire as equals influenced the contours and outcomes of the French revolution. Second, the African inspiration for the ideals of Haiti's revolution deserves some treatment in a book largely focused on European empires and European transfers of knowledge.[3] Haitian actors surely played a key role in defining what kind of empire was possible during and after the age of revolutions.

However, the comparison Fradera develops is extremely convincing. Though he is primarily a Spanish historian, my sense is that the book is weighted much more through the French experience of both revolution, constitutional experiments, and imperial reform. This work overcomes comparative imperial studies that position the British empire as a model (e.g. p. 128). Instead, by relying on global, entangled approaches in his case studies, Fradera also shows to what extent imperial agents observed and learned from (and even copied) how other empires dealt with colonies by creating special laws. His argument is strengthened by the di-

versity of his cases. Britain may not have had a constitution or undergone political revolution during the period in question, but Britain still enforced regulations and forms of representation that distinguished between colonial and metropolitan territories. Furthermore, he made an uncommon decision to include the United States into his narrative – at a time when American scholarship and debate on empire appears to be booming – though the US did not have formal colonies during much of the nineteenth century. Still, its treatment of African Americans, free and enslaved, as well as indigenous people are a compelling form of *spécialité* as the US expanded westwards during the nineteenth century. And finally, the US inherited and drew on the legacy of Spain's special laws in its former colonies after 1898.

Fradera concludes that Britain, France, Spain, and the US were transformed into imperial nations during the global, but particularly transatlantic, crisis that faced monarchic empires during the late eighteenth century. These empires were different from their predecessors as their legitimacy in expanding and ruling distant peoples was derived from the nation and therefore from "the definition of who formed part of it and who, on the contrary, was merely a subject and therefore liable to other rules" (p. 236). Though this process started in the Atlantic, his conclusion is cautionary about in how far the concept of imperial nation may be extended to further. Though certainly other nineteenth century empires appear to mirror the developments presented in this book, Fradera cautions that these cases merit intense empirical studies on their own (especially

pp. 239–240), which is worth thinking through.

This synthesis is a significant contribution to the history of the complex, entangled relationship between empire and nation from the late eighteenth and into the twentieth century. Though Fradera begins with the Atlantic Revolutions as a key moment in the shifting form of empire, this book is much more than an Atlantic history. The case studies he develops – Britain, France, Spain, and the US – are not characterized by a focus on the "Atlantic" in the nineteenth century. The cases presented here all receive their treatment and are presented convincingly in an overlapping, chronological fashion. Additionally, he brings other European empires into the discussion. His arguments are not overly simplified; he invokes both continuities and legacies of the monarchic empires to understand what comes in their wake, though he also stresses rupture and transformation. I will refrain from a chapter by chapter account of this detailed work, though Fradera masters a dense account of these four empires' expansion and competition, revolutionary reforms, and their use of the colonial *spécialité*. Still, such a complex synthesis may prove difficult reading for undergraduate students who might be less familiar with the material.

Regarding the finer points, the index is helpful and sufficient, though not extensive. The bibliography is impressive and consists of literature mainly in English, Spanish, and French, and is therefore an excellent resource for scholars. This well-researched book deserves attention from advanced scholars in the fields already mentioned: global history, imperial history, Atlantic history, as well as historians of

the various Atlantic and European revolutions. Fradera's impact should be most felt in the historiography of the age of revolutions in a global context, which has largely overlooked empire and has not questioned or explained empires' continued existence following national revolutions.

Notes
1   J. Osterhammel, The Transformation of the World: A Global History of the Nineteenth Century, Trans. P. Camiller, Princeton 2014, pp. 392–468.
2   J. Adelman, An Age of Imperial Revolutions, in: The American Historical Review 113 (2008) 2, pp. 319–340; J. Burbank / F. Cooper, Empires in World History: Power and the Politics of Difference, Princeton 2011, pp. 219–250. For the global turn, see S. Desan / L. Hunt / W. M. Max Nelson (eds.), The French Revolution in Global Perspective, Ithaka 2013.
3   J. K. Thornton, "I Am the Subject of the King of Congo": African Political Ideology and the Haitian Revolution, in: Journal of World History (1993) 4, pp. 181–214.

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Ulrich Hofmeister: Die Bürde des Weißen Zaren. Russische Vorstellungen einer imperialen Zivilisierungsmission in Zentralasien (= Quellen und Studien zur Geschichte des östlichen Europa, Bd. 88), Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag 2019, 419 S.

Rezensiert von
Rudolf A. Mark, Hamburg

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Die vorliegende Arbeit ist aus einer Wiener Dissertation im Rahmen des DFG-Projekts „Imperiale Herrschaftsausübung im osmanischen und russländischen

Reich: Die Umsetzung der Modernisierungs- und Integrationspolitik in Südosteuropa und Zentralasien im 19. Jahrhundert" hervorgegangen. Sie wurde mit zahlreichen Preisen – darunter dem Fritz Theodor Epstein-Preis des Verbandes der Osteuropahistoriker*innen ausgezeichnet. Jörg Baberowskis Vorschlag aufnehmend, die Politik des Zarenreichs und der Sowjetunion in ihren nichtrussischen Gebieten unter dem Aspekt der Zivilisierungsmission zu betrachten, will Hofmeister dies am Beispiel der von Zarenreich eroberten Regionen Zentralasiens untersuchen. Damit soll ein Desiderat der Forschung beseitigt werden. Mit seiner Studie möchte der Verfasser zudem weiteren Aufschluss über die Beweggründe der russischen Eroberung Zentralasiens liefern.

Die Arbeit basiert auf rund 300 zeitgenössischen russischen Texten, die explizit oder implizit Vorstellungen einer „zivilisatorischen Verpflichtung Russlands in Zentralasien" (S. 53) beinhalten. Dabei will der Verfasser in Anlehnung an M. Foucault und andere in seiner Untersuchung den Diskurs nicht unbedingt repräsentativ abbilden, sondern speziell solche Argumente beleuchten, die im zeitgenössischen Diskurs als Extrempositionen wahrgenommen wurden bzw. die „Grenzen dessen markieren, was gesellschaftlich akzeptabel war" (S. 23).

Das Textkorpus besteht aus Dokumenten, Tagebüchern, Memoiren, Zeitungs- und Zeitschriftenartikeln, zeitgenössischen historiographischen Werken usw., die zum großen Teil publiziert vorliegen, aber auch in Archiven in Moskau, St. Petersburg und Taschkent eruiert wurden.

Gegliedert ist die Arbeit in sieben Kapitel, denen jeweils eine Zusammenfassung folgt. Ein Anhang bietet neben Quellen- und Literaturverzeichnis, einem Register sowie Kurzbiographien zitierter Autoren auch Farbtafeln zur Illustrierung des Dargestellten.

Der Einleitung folgt ein Kapitel zum theoretischen und historischen Hintergrund sowie zur Definition des Begriffs „Zivilisierungsmission". Ausgangspunkt ist eine Diskussion der normativen bzw. deskriptiven Verwendung des Wortes Zivilisation und dessen Semantik, die in Kombination mit der Idee der Mission auch ein expansionistisch-dynamisches Element erhält. Es wird nach Hofmeisters Darlegung durch vier Grundannahmen konstituiert: 1. die Existenz eines universalen Fortschrittsmodells, 2. die Überlegenheit der eigenen Kultur, 3. die Gleichheit der Menschen und ihrer Entwicklungspotenziale sowie 4. der Glaube, dass der Fortschritt der „rückständigen" Kultur durch Intervention der eigenen Zivilisation befördert werden könne. Im Weiteren folgt ein Abriss der Genese der Zivilisierungsmissionsidee seit ihren ersten noch vorsäkularen Erscheinungsformen in der frühen Neuzeit.

Im dritten Kapitel „Die diskursive Konstruktion zivilisatorischer Differenz" werden die Entstehung des Zivilisationsbegriffs im Russischen und dessen Deutungen im Kontext der Rolle und des Selbstverständnisses des Zarenreichs als Kolonialmacht analysiert und illustriert. Nicht ganz unerwartet kommt der Verfasser dabei zu der Erkenntnis, dass Kolonialherren und Kolonialisierte eine zivilisatorische Kluft trennte, die jedoch angesichts der Unsicherheiten über die russische Identität und der vermeintlichen Dankbarkeit der Eroberten für die zivilisatorischen Segnungen überwindbar erschien.

Kapitel vier und fünf sind der Debatte über Gestalt, Inhalt, Umsetzung und erhoffte Ergebnisse der Zivilisierungsmission gewidmet. Berührt werden hier die administrative Neugestaltung des Generalgouvernements Turkestan, die materiellen Verbesserungen im Bereich der Infrastruktur, die insgesamt ungenügenden Investitionen in ein Bildungssystem, das Verbot christlicher Missionierung angesichts der bedrohlichen Mobilisierungspotentiale einer als „fanatisch" apostrophierten islamischen Bevölkerung, die „Zivilisierung" der Nomaden durch Sesshaftmachung sowie die problematischen Beziehungen zu deren Eliten. Das Resümee des Verfassers, russische wie westeuropäische Kolonialbeamte hätten gleichermaßen versucht, politisch die richtige Balance zwischen Einbindung und Distanzierung von der einheimischen Bevölkerung zu finden, seien aber auch eigene Wege gegangen, bleibt etwas unbestimmt. Dass dabei das Zarenreich „einen eigenständigen Beitrag zur Formulierung eines gesamteuropäischen Kolonialdiskurses" (S. 179) geleistet habe, erscheint jedoch sehr fraglich. Hofmeister mochte dies gesehen haben, wenn er einschränkend hinzufügt, dass der Diskurs „auch von spezifisch russischen Erfahrungen geprägt" (S. 179) gewesen sei.

Das sechste Kapitel ist der Kritik an der russischen Zivilisierungsmission, den Einwänden gegen Konzept und Praxis der zarischen Kolonialpolitik sowie den konkurrierenden Reform- und politischen Erneuerungsbewegungen an der Jahrhundertwende gewidmet. Der Dschadidismus oder der aus dem Osmanischen Reich Zentralasien erreichende Panislamismus wurden damals als die gefährlichsten Strömungen identifiziert. Hofmeister weist zugleich darauf hin, dass schon sehr früh kritische Stimmen die Sinnhaftigkeit der imperialen Zivilisierungsbestrebungen aus ganz unterschiedlichen – materiellen, moralischen und politisch-ideologischen – Gründen in Zweifel gezogen haben. Zudem wird hier die (zentrale) Frage in den Blick genommen, wer nach gängiger zeitgenössischer Auffassung eigentlich die „Pioniere des russischen Geistes" gewesen seien, die als „Zivilisationsträger" (S. 247) hätten fungieren können. Hier kamen angesichts zahlreicher Defizite und einer in sich gespaltenen Kolonialgesellschaft nur wenige Vertreter der Zivilisationsmacht in Frage, wie Hofmeisters Analyse deutlich macht. Zudem bestand ein Teil des Problems in der Tatsache, dass in den Augen der Eroberer allein schon die Etablierung der zarischen Herrschaft eine „ordentliche und gerechte Verwaltung und damit die Voraussetzung für baldigen Wohlstand" zu garantieren schien (S. 259). Gleichzeitig liefern Äußerungen der Kolonisatoren aber auch Belege für das Gegenteil. Denn der den Russen fast flächendeckend entgegengebrachte hartnäckige Widerstand – vor allem seitens der Nomadenbevölkerung (Frauen eingeschlossen) – legte zu Recht eine andere Sichtweise nahe.

Zu Beginn des 20. Jh.s befand sich dann die Kolonialverwaltung Turkestans längst in einer Legitimationskrise, die durch die Ereignisse von 1905 weitere Brisanz gewann. Deren Sprengkraft sollte sich später zeigen.

Mit „Neustart ab 1916" und die „Zivilisierungsmission in sowjetischer Form" sind die Ausführungen des letzten Kapitels überschrieben. Sie bieten einen Ausblick auf den Neubeginn, der 1917 mit

der sowjetischen Machtübernahme alte Zivilisierungskonzepte in neuer Form zur Anwendung brachte. Und man kann dem Verfasser nur zustimmen, wenn er abschließend hervorhebt, dass die Bolschewiki ihre Modernisierungsmission viel ernster betrieben hätten als ihre zarischen Vorgänger.

In seinen Schlussbetrachtungen resümiert Hofmeister, die Darstellung Zentralasiens ähnele den Kolonialdiskursen der westlichen Großmächte, wie sie von Edward Said beschrieben wurden. Die Region sei als „rückständiges, passives, irrationales Gegenbild zu Russland konstruiert" (S. 339) worden, um die Herrschaft des Zarenreiches zu legitimieren. Daran stimmt allerdings nur der Nebensatz. Ein wie auch immer gezeichnetes Gesamtbild lässt sich nicht wirklich nachweisen. In der Arbeit werden zahlreiche Facetten, Vorstellungen, Ideen, Wahrnehmungen und Wünsche zitiert, die prima vista ein solches suggerieren, aber nicht konstituieren. Sie stammen nämlich aus verschiedenen Zeiträumen und unterschiedlichen Kontexten. Dies ist auch wenig erstaunlich, denn Hofmeisters Studie hat keinen russischen Masterplan zur Reifikation einer russischen Zivilisierungsmission eruieren können. Es gab nicht einmal kohärente Vorstellungen oder – mit den Worten des Senatsrevisors Graf Palen von 1908 – eine leitende Idee über Turkestan und dessen Status im Imperium. Eine solche konnte es auch nicht geben, da Russland, wie Hofmeister zu Recht hervorhebt, nicht der Zivilisierungsidee wegen die mittelasiatischen Khanate erobert hat. Sie diente nur als „Unterfütterung anderer, handfesterer Argumente" (S. 61).

Auch wenn in der Arbeit Unsicherheit über die Gründe der russischen Eroberung angedeutet werden, an der Tatsache merkantiler, handelspolitischer und spätestens seit Beginn des 19. Jh.s auch machtpolitischer Interessen des Zarenreiches in Zentralasien bestehen in der Historiographie inzwischen keine ernsthaften Zweifel mehr. Erstaunlicherweise werden aber die im „Great Game" neben Afghanistan im Zentrum stehenden Khanate Kokand, Buchara und Chiva in der Studie nur en passant erwähnt. Es waren aber nicht Frauenrechte, Bildungseinrichtungen und die technischen Errungenschaften Europas, die Russland durch die Steppe nach Transoxanien trieben, sondern der seit Peter I. verfolgte Plan, die Khanate und den mittelasiatischen Handel zu beherrschen. Dessen ungeachtet liefert Hofmeisters verdienstvolle Studie den Beweis, dass die „imperiale Zivilisierungsmission" Russlands lediglich eine Floskel zur Verschleierung imperialistischer Ziele war.

Kristine Moruzi / Nell Musgrove / Carla Pascoe Leahy (eds.): Children's Voices from the Past. New Historical and Interdisciplinary Perspectives, Cham: Palgrave Macmillan 2019, 342 S.

Rezensiert von
Martina Winkler, Kiel

Die Herausgeberinnen sprechen mit ihrem Buch ein Thema an, das für die Kindheitsgeschichte so zentral wie schwierig ist: Dieser Forschungsbereich wird in

außergewöhnlich großem Maße von top-down-Perspektiven beherrscht. Wir schreiben meist Geschichten von Institutionen (Schulen, Familie) und/oder Diskursen (visuelle Kindheitsdarstellungen, Debatten über „problematische Kinder"), nur sehr selten aber treten Kinder tatsächlich als historische Akteure auf. Der wichtigste (und für Historiker dieses Feldes besonders frustrierende) Grund dafür liegt in der problematischen Quellenlage. Kinder gehören zu den Bevölkerungsgruppen, die in einem relativ geringen Maße Quellen hinterlassen haben. Dass die dennoch fraglos in großer Zahl entstandenen Tagebücher, Briefe, Sammelalben, Schulhefte und Zeichnungen heute kaum zur Verfügung stehen, liegt vor allem daran, dass solch „Kinderkram" lange Zeit nicht ernst genommen wurde. Dies ändert sich nur langsam, und die Reaktion von Archivaren, fragt man sie nach von Kindern produzierten Quellen, schwankt zwischen Überraschung und Schuldbewusstsein, meist aber gefolgt von einem entschiedenen Kopfschütteln.

Im Vorwort setzen die Autorinnen sich jedoch nicht nur mit dieser praktischen Problematik auseinander, sondern vor allem mit wissenschaftshistorischen, theoretischen und methodologischen Fragen. Dabei diskutieren sie die enge Verbindung von Kindheitsgeschichte mit einer starken postmodernen Orientierung am Diskurs. In diesem Zusammenhang sei – generell und in der Kindheitsgeschichte im Besonderen – der Anspruch auf die Erforschung authentischer Erfahrung aufgegeben worden. Das vorliegende Buch soll nun versuchen, die „voices" von Kindern hörbar zu machen. „Voices" sind hier definiert als „the opinions, emotions and behaviours of young people. In other words, this refers to what young people *actually* thought, felt and did rather than what they were *expected* or *assumed* to think, feel and do" (S. 12, Hervorhebungen im Original). Dass es aus der Perspektive kulturhistorischer und diskursorientierter Geschichtswissenschaft ungewöhnlich, ja fast alarmierend erscheint, von „tatsächlichen" Gedanken und Gefühlen zu lesen, sei einmal dahingestellt. Bemerkt werden sollte jedoch, dass die Behauptung, Kindheitsgeschichte generell vernachlässige „tatsächliche" Kinder zugunsten des Diskurses, die zahlreichen sozialgeschichtlichen Arbeiten zur Kindheitsgeschichte beispielsweise des Mittelalters oder des 19. Jh.s ignoriert.

Die eigentliche Frage aber ist natürlich, welche Erkenntnisse die einzelnen Beiträge liefern. Thematisch sind sie ausgesprochen breit und spannend angelegt: Es geht um britische Fürsorgeinstitutionen des 18. und 19. Jh.s, um Schulkinder im China zur Zeit des Großen Sprunges nach vorn, um jugendliche Facebook-Akteure und Geflüchtete in australischen Internierungslagern heute (nicht wirklich „voices from the past") oder männliche Jugendliche im kolonialen Senegal. Ähnliches gilt für die Quellenauswahl und die Ansätze: Gearbeitet wird mit Briefen, Zeichnungen, oral-history-Interviews, visuellen Darstellungen von Kindern, für die Schule geschriebenen Texten sowie Berichten und Protokollen von disziplinierenden Institutionen. Höchst lesenswert ist dabei der Text von Kelly Duke Bryant, die Essays senegalesischer Schüler um die Jahrhundertwende analysiert. Die Autorin zeigt, wie sich Kinder den an sie gestellten Anforderungen anpassen, indem sie die „richtige" Sprache und Umgangsformeln anwenden,

zugleich aber eigene Visionen und Selbstbilder in ihre Texte einweben. Die etwa 12- bis 14-jährigen Jungen schrieben fiktive Bittbriefe, in denen sie sich als Beamte der kolonialen Verwaltung imaginierten. Die Texte machen Strategien der Selbstdarstellung und vor allem Selbstverortung deutlich: Abgrenzung von Traditionen und Akzeptanz der administrativen Strukturen, zugleich aber auch eine starke Identifikation mit dem Herkunftsdorf und der eigenen Familie. Bryant gelingt es, Texte von Kindern, die zudem von Erwachsenen in Auftrag gegeben wurden, zu einer wertvollen historischen Quelle zu machen. Und, so fragt man sich: weshalb denn auch nicht? Von Erwachsenen geschriebene Texte sind keineswegs immer auf Eigeninitiative entstanden, sondern spiegeln selbstverständlich die Erwartungen und Normen ihrer Umwelt – was sie übrigens nicht weniger wertvoll als Quelle macht, sondern eher interessanter.

Auch Greg T. Smith arbeitet mit „bestellten" Briefen: Texten, die ehemalige Bewohner eines Heims für deviante und gefährdete Kinder der britischen Philanthropic Society im 19. Jh. über ihr Leben schrieben. Smith betont dabei besonders die Vielfalt der Briefe, die darin geäußerten Gedanken über den eigenen Lebensweg, Pläne und Wünsche. Generell wird in diesem Buch deutlich, dass Kinder nicht als homogene soziale Gruppe betrachtet werden können, sondern dass Kategorien wie Klasse, Rasse, Gender oder Alter mitgedacht werden müssen – auch dies sollte selbstverständlich sein, ist es aber nicht immer.

Shih-Wen Sue Chen und Kristine Moruzi haben bei der Quellensuche Glück gehabt und analysieren die Leserbriefe an britische Kinderzeitschriften. Dabei mögen die einzelnen Wünsche und Vorlieben, die in den Briefen deutlich werden, nicht übermäßig überraschend sein. Spannend sind aber Erkenntnisse darüber, wie sich Kinder in einer Kultur, in der sie gesehen, aber möglichst nicht gehört werden sollten, Informationen und Rat zu beschaffen suchten. Die Autorinnen zeichnen das überzeugende Bild eines halböffentlichen Kommunikationsraumes für Kinder.

Melissa A. Brzycki nutzt in ihrer Darstellung straffällig gewordener Kinder im China der 1960er Jahre hingegen Berichte von Kommissionen und Ämtern. Auch aus diesen hier auf überzeugende Weise analysierten Texten sind hochinteressante Informationen über Kinder als – in diesem Falle widerständige – Akteure zu sammeln. Wenn die Methode eher an die Herangehensweise von Sozialhistorikern aus den 1970er und 1980er Jahren erinnert, ist dies kein Manko, sondern ein Zeichen dafür, dass die Kindheitsgeschichte wohl doch nicht so hilflos ist wie zuweilen behauptet.

Hervorzuheben ist schließlich der Aufsatz von Susan Eckelmann Berghel über die emotionale Rhetorik junger Menschen in den USA und deren Nutzung während der politischen Auseinandersetzungen der 1960er Jahre. Hier entsteht das überzeugende Bild einer neuen politischen Strategie (von Berghel als „affective citizenship" bezeichnet), die auf einen Generationswechsel und ein Aufbegehren gegen Erziehungsnormen der 1950er Jahre hinweist.

In einigen anderen Texten hingegen wird das Grundproblem der Quellenarbeit erneut und zuweilen auf enttäuschende Weise deutlich. Wieder und wieder wird betont, dass die vorgestellten Quellen von

Kindern keinen einfachen Zugang zur Wahrheit böten – als träfe dies in irgendeiner Weise auf „erwachsene" Quellen zu. Besonders bedauerlich ist bei einigen Texten das Fehlen einer historischen Fragestellung. Die Wiedergabe von Erfahrungsberichten ehemaliger Pflege- und Heimkinder und die Einordnung in die Theorien Alice Millers (Deirdre Michell) mag diesen Überlebenden die lang vermisste Stimme geben; ein historischer Erkenntnisgewinn ist jedoch kaum zu erkennen. Generell ist die starke ethische und politische Ambition des Buches nicht durchgehend glücklich umgesetzt. Allyson Stevensons Beitrag über die Briefe eines indigenen Mädchens aus Kanada beispielsweise arbeitet ausgesprochen wenig mit den Texten selbst, sondern schreibt letztlich eine (gar nicht uninteressante) klassische top-down-Geschichte. Dann aber werden die Quellen ohne überzeugende Interpretation, aber mit ständig wiederholten Adjektiven wie „powerful" oder „determinate" zu einem Beweisstück postkolonialer Gegennarrative stilisiert. Auch in Mary Tomsics Text zu Zeichnungen kommen die eigentlichen Quellen viel zu kurz.

Insgesamt handelt es sich um ein lesenswertes Buch, das viele Denkanstöße liefert zu einem höchst relevanten und längst noch nicht gelösten Problem der Kindheitsgeschichte – und damit letztlich der Geschichtswissenschaft generell.

Benjamin Lieberman / Elizabeth Gordon: Climate Change in Human History. Prehistory to the Present, London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2018, 236 S.

Rezensiert von
Martin Bauch, Leipzig

Die beiden US-amerikanischen Autor*innen der vorliegenden Einführung in die Klimageschichte, der Zeithistoriker Benjamin Lieberman und die Geowissenschaftlerin Elizabeth Gordon, gehen auf kaum 200 Seiten ein Vorhaben an, das äußerst ambitioniert ist. Sie präsentieren einen gleichermaßen historisch wie prähistorisch und geowissenschaftlich fundierten Überblick über Mensch-Klima-Interaktionen seit den frühesten Anfängen menschlichen Lebens über die Früh- und Vorgeschichte, die klassischen Epochen schriftlich dokumentierter Historie bis in die Gegenwart. Zwangsläufig ist ihre Perspektive dabei durchgehend global (mit Schwerpunkten auf Europa und Ostasien), ohne dass sie die besonderen Herausforderungen einer globalen Klimageschichte eigens thematisieren. Zusätzlich kontextualisieren sie noch laufende Kontroversen um den anthropogenen Klimawandel: Energiewenden, *geo engineering* und Klimaabkommen vor *Fridays for Future* und der Greta-Thunberg-Ära. Damit ist die angestrebte thematische wie chronologische Breite deutlich größer als sehr viel umfangreichere Einführungen wie das von Sam White, Christian Pfister

und Franz Mauelshagen herausgegebene „Palgrave Handbook of Climate History"[1] oder auch Mauelshagens epochal zugeschnittene, stärker methodisch argumentierende Einführung.[2]

Die Zielgruppe des Bandes sind sowohl Wissenschaftler, die sich einen ersten Überblick zum Thema verschaffen wollen, als auch – und, so darf man vermuten, hauptsächlich – amerikanische *undergraduates*, für die eine niedrigschwellige, aber umfassende Heranführung an das Thema bisher nicht vorliegt. Diese Ziele erreichen die Autor*innen in beneidenswert konziser Argumentationsdichte. Die quasideterministische Engführung früherer Beiträge – wie John L. Brookes Monographie[3] – vermeiden sie geflissentlich: „With very few exceptions, no historical event be attributed to a single cause" (S. 2). Und es bleibt nicht beim Vorsatz, sondern die Offenheit historischer Prozesse wird wieder und wieder betont – freilich um den Preis, dass die manchmal sehr faktographischen Durchgänge durch spezifische historische Epochen, etwa die Antike und das sogenannten „Roman Climate optimum" (S. 58–61) ganz verschwimmen lassen, welche Rolle klimatische Faktoren nun eigentlich für den Aufstieg des römischen Imperiums gespielt haben könnten. Das notwendigerweise knappe Eingehen auch auf globale Schlüsselperioden der Klimageschichte, etwa das viel diskutierte „Late Antique Little Ice Age" (LALIA), dem nur ein Abschnitt gewidmet wird, der zudem die möglichen Verbindungen zur Justinianischen Pest komplett ausklammert, ist sicher ein Schwachpunkt des Buches.

Auch Schlüsselkonzepte von Vulnerabilität und Resilienz werden zwar eingeführt (S. 6), aber doch fast nie so intensiv am konkreten historischen Beispiel diskutiert, dass klar würde, wie man methodisch historische Klimafolgen von anderen Faktoren abgrenzen könnte. Die große Leistung der Einführung ist es, auf sehr viele relevante klimahistorische Publikationen – wenn auch nur in englischer Sprache – hinzuweisen. Freilich fällt es gelegentlich schwer, nicht-anglophone Forschungsdiskurse unter der vorgenommenen Überformung wieder zu entdecken: Ist man – als Mediävist mit europäischem Fokus wie der Rezensent – nun angetan, dass eine sehr spezifische Quelle wie der Aufruf zum Wendenkreuzzug vom Anfang des 12. Jh.s diskutiert wird, der Neusiedler mit Verweis auf die reichen Lande der slawischen Heiden östlich von Elbe und Saale motivieren wollte? Oder fragt man zu beckmesserisch, warum dieses Dokument hier ungebräuchlich als „Magdeburg charter" attribuiert wird und ob seine Heranziehung in der Klimageschichte überhaupt gerechtfertigt ist?

Erfreulich ist, dass gelegentlich historische Quellen direkt zum Sprechen gemacht werden, etwa die Klage des Matthew Paris über meteorologische Ungunst und Hungersnot im Nachklang der Samalas-Eruption in der zweiten Hälfte der 1250er Jahre – ein globalhistorisch relevantes Klima-Ereignis par excellence –, auch wenn es schmerzt, einen der bedeutendsten Chronisten des Jahrhunderts zu „a monk" (S. 108) reduziert zu sehen. Relevanter ist freilich, dass fundamentale, durchaus anglophone Studien zu diesem Ereignis[4] nicht integriert wurden.

Trotz dieser Einwände im Detail: Die hier getroffene Vorsortierung und in Teilen auch kritische Einordnung der umfänglich, wenn auch nicht abschließend er-

schlossenen klimahistorischen Forschung ist eine beträchtliche Leistung. Welche Themen, Epochen und Ereignisse relevant sind für die historische Erforschung von Mensch-Klima-Interaktionen, wird meist sehr zuverlässig wiedergegeben; die notwendige Orientierung, die eine Einführung ihren Nutzer für den Erstkontakt mit dem Thema geben soll, ist also auf der thematisch-bibliographischen Seite zweifellos gegeben.

Wie man Klimageschichte reflektiert selbst betreibt, lernen die Leser nicht, auch wenn die Verfasser*innen immer wieder auf Fallstricke aufmerksam machen. Grundlegende Verweise auf konzeptionelle Ansätze in der Umweltgeschichte[5] unterbleiben. Was man sich von der Einbeziehung einer Geowissenschaftlerin erhoffen dürfte, nämlich eine dringend notwendige, kritische Einschätzung der Möglichkeiten und Grenzen von naturwissenschaftlich generierten Proxydaten im Wechselspiel mit schriftlicher Überlieferung und archäologischen Befunden, bleibt in der Diskussion der konkurrierenden Methoden und divergierenden Zeitskalen (S. 2–5) unterbelichtet. Dabei ist gerade diese Frage fundamental, wenn man in der klimahistorischen Forschung die vor-instrumentellen Epochen einbezieht. Nicht zuletzt legen neuere Ansätze der Klimageschichte wie der *consiliant approach*[6] darauf großen Wert, drohen doch beim unreflektierten Gebrauch von Proxydaten massive Ungleichgewichte innerhalb der Deutungshoheit der beteiligten Disziplinen.[7]

Vielleicht sind die monierten Lücken der Preis, den man für eine chronologisch wie auch disziplinär so ausgreifende, zugleich vom Umfang her auch für Studierende noch bewältigbare und zudem gut lesbare Einführung bezahlt, die von zwei Autor*innen alleine erbracht wird, ohne für jeden chronologischen Abschnitt Fachleute heranzuziehen. Mit den genannten Einschränkungen – und gerade im Hinblick auf das Neuland, das das rezensierte Werk beschreitet – ist Lieberman und Gordon zweifellos ein sehr beachtlicher Wurf gelungen, an dem man gerade in der Lehre künftig kaum vorbeikommen wird. Eine konzeptionell-methodische Heranführung an eine globale Klimageschichte über alle Epochen oder gar Disziplinen hinweg steht jedoch noch aus.

Anmerkungen

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5 H. Haberl u. a. (Hrsg.), Social Ecology. Society-Nature Relations across Time and Space, Heidelberg 2017; R. Hoffmann, An Environmental History of Europe, Cambridge 2014, S. 5–11.

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7 T. P. Newfield / I. Labuhn, Realizing Consilience in Studies of the Pre-Instrumental Climate and Pre-Laboratory Disease, in: Journal of Interdisciplinary History 48 (2017) 2, S. 211–240.

Matthias Middell (ed.): The Routledge Handbook of Transregional Studies, Abingdon: Routledge 2018, 407 p.

Reviewed by
George Lawson, London

This fascinating volume provides a showcase for "transregional studies", an undertaking that combines global history with area studies, geography and sociology. It builds on a number of trends across the humanities and social sciences, particularly critiques of Eurocentrism and methodological nationalism, in order to highlight the importance of cultural encounters and spatial interactions to a range of issue-areas, from migration to music, and from development to diplomacy. The book highlights the spatial dimensions of these boundary-crossing interactions. If global history is concerned with the entanglements of peoples, institutions and ideas, and if area studies explores the character of particular geographies, transregional studies highlights the ways in which cross-boundary entanglements are central to how geographical formations of various kinds are generated and contested.

The book is a major undertaking, consisting of 70 chapters by scholars representing diverse traditions and issue-areas. It is divided into ten parts, each of which has an introductory commentary that sets the scene for the chapters that follow. Individual chapters are relatively short; I suspect most readers will dip in-and-out rather than read the volume cover-to-cover. Tak-

en as a whole, the volume demonstrates that regions should not be understood as stable, separate containers, but as the product of "mobilities of all kinds" (p. 11): "people, goods, currencies and capital, cultural patterns and ideas, viruses, or winds and waters" (p. 3). Not only do these diverse mobilities connect apparently distinct places, they also "produce new spatial constellations" (p. 58), from the idea of the Atlantic as a spatial complex to the notion of global religions and world literatures.

This is an immensely thought-provoking volume, which contains a great many insights. One example is the point, made by Geert Castryck (p. 92), that "the spatial imagination itself becomes an arena of global spatial action". One does not have to think too hard or too long to see how powerful such imaginaries can be, from late 19th and early 20th century dreams of an Anglosphere that could unite the (white) English speaking peoples, to today's Brexiteers, who combine a "little England" mentality with imperial nostalgia – a Global Britain 2.0 that will revive British power beyond the confines of rigid geographical alignments, such as that represented by the European Union (EU).

That assessment notwithstanding, one question I have is whether transregional studies is meant to serve as an umbrella for an assortment of approaches and issue-areas, or whether it is intended to be a new paradigm that can unify these approaches and issue-areas. If the former, then the volume works well. If the latter, it is not clear what serves as the intellectual, conceptual and analytical cores of such a project. There is nothing offered in this volume, for example, to match the scale of ambition represented by World Sys-

tems Theory, whose advocates see it as a means of unifying the social sciences. The view of transregional studies offered in this volume is more flexible, perhaps necessarily so. After all, the spatial complexes represented in the volume vary greatly, from historical empires to today's special economic zones. The spatial logics of these 'regions' are quite different. Empires, for example, were complex networks of trading posts, garrisons and settlements. The British imperial web included direct-rule colonies (e.g. India after 1857), settlement colonies (e.g. Australia), protectorates (e.g. Brunei), condominiums (e.g. Sudan), bases (e.g. Gibraltar), treaty ports (e.g. Shanghai), and spheres of influence (e.g. Argentina). This does not look much like the spatial logic of Shenzhen or Cayman Enterprise City, let alone that of universities, entrepreneurs and truth commissions, all of which are the subject of chapters in the book.

It would also have been interesting to see a little more comparison between these diverse spatial complexes. For example, imperial spaces are trans-scalar assemblages. So too are the 'complex intersections of territoriality and supraterritoriality' (p. 312) represented by internet governance, a topic that is expertly examined in the volume by Jan Aart Scholte. Yet these two types of trans-scalar assemblages are forged through quite different spatial imaginaries and practices. They also present quite different challenges. For one thing, technology is hyper-mobile, making it difficult to regulate and tax. It hops and skips between geographies, leaving a "polycentric" footprint (p. 317), one that is part of a complex architecture that reaches beyond that conjured by empires. Do the two relate? If so,

how? Not only would such comparisons have made for a rich intellectual exercise, they would have also given the volume a little more coherence. As things stand, the tremendous diversity of the book is both its greatest strength and, I think, its only drawback.

I would also have liked to see a little more attention paid to my home discipline, International Relations (IR). One of the central concerns of IR is territoriality. And, in the contemporary world, something unusual is happening to territoriality. On the one hand, a range of populists are trying to "take back control", reterritorializing competences around trade, law, migration, and the like. On the other hand, the world is home to an ever-thickening space of international administration. Banking, securities, insurance, accounting, auditing, corporate governance, insolvency, creditor rights and money laundering are now subject to international standards by bodies ranging from the G20 to the Financial Stability Board. These developments are not limited to the Euro-Atlantic world; witness the institutional infrastructure supporting a range of south-south ventures, from the BRICS to the Belt and Road initiative. In this way, convergent and divergent pressures are co-present in the contemporary world. And they are fostered by spatial imaginaries and practices that are well worth examination. A British south Asian, for example, can hold both British citizenship and an EU passport (for now), listen to American music, eat Indian food, work as part of a global supply chain, and send remittances to their "home" country. These multiple spatial identities and practices are central to the functioning of contemporary world politics. They should,

I think, also be central to the agenda of transregional studies.

Kris Bezdecny / Kevin Archer (eds.): Handbook of Emerging 21st-Century Cities, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 2018, 451 p.

Rezensiert von
Friedrich Lenger, Gießen

Die anzuzeigende Publikation erfüllt die wichtigsten Erwartungen, die man gemeinhin an ein Handbuch richtet, nicht. Weder bietet es eine Kodifizierung gesicherten Wissens, noch stellt es eine Handreichung dar, mit deren Hilfe sich der Gegenstand umfassend erschließen ließe. Ersteres erlaubt wohl der Gegenstand – Städte, meist Großstädte des 21. Jh.s – noch nicht. Aber eine systematische Orientierung hätte gleichwohl angestrebt werden können, obwohl das Adjektiv „emerging" nicht nur im Titel sondern auch in allen fünf Abschnittsüberschriften Verwendung findet. Aber was da auftaucht oder zum Vorschein kommen soll, bleibt einigermaßen nebulös. Und das obschon die Herausgeber in einem knappen einleitenden Beitrag zumindest andeuten, welche Herausforderungen von der Verlagerung der Urbanisierungsdynamik in den asiatischen und afrikanischen Raum für eine Begrifflichkeit ausgehen könnten, die in Geographie, Soziologie und Stadtplanung gleichermaßen von weit zeitlich zurückreichenden europäischen Entwicklungen geprägt ist. Diesen Herausforderungen und der Aufgabe, einen Sammelband zu aktuellen städtischen Entwicklungen überzeugend zu strukturieren, wird man indessen nicht gerecht, wenn man sich damit begnügt, „working toward a more holistic conceptualization of what cities are, and can mean, as the world continues to rapidly urbanize" (S. 5).

Dies zeigt gleich der erste Abschnitt, welcher der „emerging city theory" gewidmet ist. Denn was die spezifisch theoretische Qualität der hier versammelten vier Aufsätze ausmacht, bleibt unklar. So diskutiert John Lauerman die Planung sportlicher Großereignisse wie der Olympischen Spiele als Werkzeug städtischer Politik, Patrick Moriarty und Damon Honnery die Schwierigkeiten bei der Schaffung ökologisch nachhaltiger Städte, während Richard Bower die Cittaslow-Bewegung vorstellt, deren Ziele aber eben nicht auf die Urbanisierungsdynamiken in Asien oder Afrika bezogen werden, sondern an je einem australischen und finnischen Beispiel illustriert werden. Und Mitherausgeberin Bezdecny beteuert, „the city will be THE site of contestation in the 21st century" (S. 81), ohne dass der durch ihren Beitrag abgeschlossene Theorieteil viel zum Verständnis dieser vielschichtigen Konflikte oder ihres spezifisch städtischen Charakters beigetragen hätte.

In den folgenden vier Abschnitten des Handbuchs tritt dann zumindest die nichtwestliche Welt etwas stärker ins Profil. Yin-wah Chu ordnet die aktuelle Urbanisierungsplanung der chinesischen Volksrepublik in einen größeren zeitlichen Zusammenhang ein und zeigt zum einen, dass die seit den 1950er Jahren über das Meldewesen gesteuerte Verhinderung des

Sesshaftwerdens ländlicher Migranten in den Städten zwar abgemildert, aber nicht aufgehoben worden ist, und erwartet zum andern, dass die in jüngster Zeit verfolgte Stärkung des Massenkonsums auch stadträumlichen Niederschlag finden wird. Daran schließt der Folgebeitrag, der dem Einfluss Chinas auf die afrikanische Entwicklung nachgeht, nicht wirklich an, zumal der Fokus hier auf der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung insgesamt liegt. Direkter sind die Bezüge in Rumi Aijaz` Beschäftigung mit der Qualität städtischen Lebens in Indien, die indessen aufgrund ihrer umfassenden Anlage bei sehr begrenztem Umfang oft – so hinsichtlich der städtischen Umweltbelastungen – an der Oberfläche bleiben muss. Einen ganz anderen Schwerpunkt hat dann der Schlussbeitrag des zweiten Abschnitts, der vergleichend vor allem den Stand des „e-government" in Seoul, Singapur und Shanghai betrachtet.

Ähnlich heterogen und wenig direkt auf die Abschnittsthematik bezogen sind auch die übrigen Beiträge des „Handbuchs". Als „spaces of emerging economies" werden etwa drei auf der arabischen Halbinsel im Bau befindliche Planstädte begriffen, die indessen weniger hinsichtlich ihrer ökonomischen Funktion als ihrer Nachhaltigkeitsstandards verglichen werden. Nimmt eine dieser Planstädte gerade einmal sechs Quadratkilometer in Anspruch, behandelt Owiti A. K'Akumu die Urbanisierung der Armut für den gesamten afrikanischen Kontinent. Das bleibt notgedrungen recht allgemein und lässt sich nicht sinnvoll mit der sich anschließenden Analyse William G. Holts in Beziehung setzen, der – gestützt auf eigene planerische Erfahrung in drei ärmeren amerikanischen Südstaa-

tengemeinden – demonstriert, wie dort andernorts unerwünschte „toxic industries and intrusive activities" (S. 219) angesiedelt werden. Das im Folgebeitrag thematisierte Phänomen grenzübergreifender Metropolregionen hat zweifellos eine starke ökonomische Komponente, auch im besonders brisanten und ins Zentrum gerückten Fall von San Diego-Tijuana. Da Peter D. A. Wood in einem späteren Abschnitt (zu „spaces of emerging social dynamics") die Probleme von „border cities" noch einmal angeht, bleibt auch hier die Verortung innerhalb des Bandes rätselhaft. Den damit bereits angesprochenen Abschnitt eröffnet hingegen Ravi Ghadge, der am indischen Beispiel kritisiert, dass Armutsbekämpfung und Inklusion lediglich als Begleiterscheinungen von Wachstumsprogrammen einen Platz fänden. Wiederum ganz andere Räume, auch was ihre Skalierung angeht, nehmen Vitor Peiteado Fernandez und Christiana Saldana in den Blick. Während Fernandez soziale Bewegungen in Spanien vorstellt, die ihr „Recht auf die Stadt" einklagen, präsentiert Saldana – auf der Basis informativer Haushaltsdaten – für einen drei Quadratmeilen großen Teil von downtown Los Angeles die Loftifizierung als Teil der Gentrifizierung. Ihr aufschlussreicher und instruktiv illustrierter Beitrag bildet insofern eine Brücke zum fünften und letzten Abschnitt, als auch hier drei von vier Beiträgen Segregationsmuster in US-amerikanischen Städten behandeln und auch der vierte mit Kopenhagen einer zweifellos westlichen Stadt gewidmet ist. Das ist auch und gerade bei einem Fokus auf „spaces as emerging technologies" alles andere als selbstverständlich. Denn die stadträumlichen und stadtpolitischen

Folgen der hier vor allem betrachteten internetbasierten Technologien sind ja nicht nur in westlichen Städten eklatant. Das sei an zwei afrikanischen Beispielen nur angedeutet: Wenn dort in vielen Städten ein nur schwach entwickeltes Bankenwesen mit der nahezu universellen Verbreitung des Smartphones zusammentrifft, macht e-banking eben den Aufbau eines herkömmlichen Filialsystems weitgehend überflüssig. Und die Digitalisierung des Antragswesens in der öffentlichen Verwaltung hat zumindest das Potential, einige wohl etablierte klientelistische Strukturen im städtischen Bauwesen zu schwächen.

Einmal mehr zeigt sich also, dass dem vorliegenden Band eine überzeugende Struktur fehlt. Was hier geboten wird, ist kein Handbuch, sondern ein Sammelsurium von Aufsätzen zu aktuellen städtischen Entwicklungen in verschiedenen Weltregionen (unter Ausschluss Osteuropas und Südamerikas). Das ist hier und da anregend, oft aber in seiner Struktur- und Zusammenhanglosigkeit ärgerlich.

Eileen Boris / Dorothea Hoehtker / Susan Zimmermann (eds.): Women's ILO. Transnational Networks, Global Labour Standards and Gender Equity, 1919 to Present, Leiden: Brill Publishing 2018, 412 p.

Reviewed by
Nicole Bourbonnais, Geneva

This collection provides a thorough overview of the shifting position of women – and of concerns about women's work, gender equity, and gender policy – within the International Labor Organization (ILO) from 1919 to the present. The editors' introduction provides a clear and concise overview of the evolution of these questions within the organization and the central points of conflict. The following chapters are written by an interdisciplinary group of scholars (including historians, political scientists, jurists, sociologists and women activists), and take a variety of approaches: some focus in on particular individuals, some trace the development and spread of a particular policy or standard within the organization or across different country case studies, while others focus on the ILO's relationship with other activist groups and international organizations.

One tension that comes up repeatedly revolves around the longstanding debate in labour circles over whether women workers should be given special protection or treated equally to men before the law. On the one hand, special protection against night work or to accommodate maternity could help prevent abusive practices and recognize the particular needs of women, who still play the primarily role in reproduction and caregiving in most contexts. On the other hand, such policies could reinforce gendered segregation, reduce work opportunities for women, and undermine the overall goal of equality. The contributions explore how this debate manifested in multiple contexts. At a 1919 Women's Congress covered in Chapter 1, for example, American activists argued that "equality of women to kill themselves by night work is not equality to us" (p. 35), while the Nordic delegation countered that one should respond by banning night

work for men as well, rather than conceding to special protection for women. Several chapters challenge the idea that pro-protectionist actors should be considered "reluctant" feminists (p. 77); their approach was in some cases strategic (p. 82), or focused on equality of results over equality in legislation (p. 36, p. 99). In any case, as the editors point out in the introduction: "both gender-neutral and gender-differentiated regulations in labour law can have gendered consequences that can be detrimental to or advantageous for (some) women" (p. 19); one needs to look beyond ideology to explore the impacts of different approaches in practice. As the final chapter of the book (Chapter 14) insightfully points out, the current framing of this debate – in which "maternity" is usually seen as an obstacle to employment for women, or a "temporary handicap" in need of protection – does little to contend with the issues raised by a growing transnational surrogacy industry in which maternity itself is essentially a form of (often informal) work.

Several of the chapters challenge the dominant historical narrative of transnational women's organizing as a field led by and concerned solely with the problems of white Western women. While racism, colonialism, and inequalities in representation created very real limitations, some labour feminists did manage to form east-west and north-south alliances from early on, recognizing the differences between their situations but also finding cause to work together. Members of a network between ILO and the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) produced analyses of African women's working lives in the late 1950s and early 1960s that an-

ticipated the "Women in Development" (WID) paradigm but also incorporated sophisticated critiques of women's unpaid labour, agency and difference more characteristic of later "Gender and Development" (GAD) perspectives (Chapter 6).We also see how women from the "Global South" acted not only as objects of study but as activists and creators of labour standards. Women from India and Cuba were present at working women's congresses as early as 1919 (Chapter 1), African women actively shaped the studies of the ILO/ICFTU in the 1960s (Chapter 6), larger trade unions built on pre-existing women's organizations in Africa (Chapter 12), and women from the Global South were the driving force behind the Home Work Convention of 1996 and Domestic Workers Convention of 2011 (Chapter 7).

One of the book's central contributions lies in its ability to make visible the multiple ways women engaged actively with the ILO, despite their formal exclusion throughout most of its history. Although they made up only five to ten per cent of delegates and technical advisors until the mid-1990s (p. 207), women inserted their voices as experts and researchers, by pressuring national delegations, and by writing letters directly to the Director-General. It is indeed remarkable to see women's determination to engage with an organization that repeatedly marginalized their voices and concerns. There are some great stories on offer here: for example, of feminist Tanaka Taka agreeing to read the remarks of the Japanese Government delegate before the Commission on the Employment of Women, only to deliver her own scathing critique of Japanese employers instead (p. 43). The fact that many of these wom-

en's appeals had marginal success or were painfully slow-moving, however, makes it seem perhaps somewhat optimistic to claim there was something one might call a "women's ILO," as indicated by the book's title. The impression that comes across instead is of an institution that remained thoroughly patriarchal and masculinist in orientation until the very recent past, despite women's best efforts to transform it: in other words, a story of "women and the men's ILO."

While the role of patriarchal ideas and structures come up in several contributions, it would have been interesting to have a full chapter dedicated to a gender analysis of masculinity within the organization. How did male leaders position themselves, what variety of masculinity did they put forth, and how was it reproduced in the language, policies and standards of the institution, beyond those which dealt specifically with women/gender? Were there any conflicting or alternative masculinities on offer? Is the shift in membership more recently a result of a transformation of the gendered identity of the ILO as a whole, or simply a result of pressure from women within and outside the organization? The book also would have benefited from a methodological chapter, exploring the different sources held in the ILO's archives and the stories they can – and cannot – tell. This could have provided an opportunity to engage more actively with questions around feminist methodology in the archives and in the study of international organizations more broadly.

Overall, however, this is a comprehensive and rigorous discussion of women as both subjects and objects of the ILO. It will be valuable to anyone working on the history of international organizations, transnational activism, gender and labour activism, and/or the intersections between race, class, and gender in the twentieth century.

Cristina E. Parau: Transnational Networking and Elite Self-Empowerment. The Making of the Judiciary in Contemporary Europe and Beyond, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2018, 339 p.

Rezensiert von
Helmut Goerlich, Leipzig

Fragt man einen führenden indischen Verfassungsjuristen, also den Vertreter eines Landes, das eine geschriebene Verfassung besitzt, was zur unverzichtbaren Tradition der dritten Gewalt im indischen nationalen Verfassungsrecht gehört, so antwortet er u.a., dass die Gerichte, und nicht zuletzt der Supreme Court of India, nach ihrem Ermessen jede Rechtsfrage aufwerfen und entscheiden können. Dies ist offensichtlich ein Teil der spezifischen Common Law-Tradition in diesem Lande. Für jemanden, der nicht aus dieser Tradition kommt, sind ähnliche Vorstellungen u. U. befremdlich. Daher wird man auch geneigt sein, die juristische Rechtfertigung für derlei umfassende Befugnisse nicht für sich gelten zu lassen, sondern berufssoziologische Gründe für eine solche, zunächst einmal als juristische Doktrin präsentierte Rechtsauffassung zu suchen.

Das tut die vorliegende Studie über europäische Grenzen hinweg. Verfasst hat es

eine Autorin, die aus einer allenfalls der Tradition des geschriebenen Rechts im Sinne des französisch-romanischen Rechts kommt. Dort sind solche umfassenden Befugnisse von Gerichten schon deshalb fernliegend, weil man auch die Befugnisse der Gerichte sieht als geschriebene, mithin positiv-rechtlich umrissene; sie also nicht als originäre Befugnisse der dritten Gewalt zu verstehen, die diese selbstständig auszulegen befugt sind. Die Autorin beschreibt ihren Weg von Rumänien in den Westen und seine Tradition im Vorwort selbst und deutet an, welche nur allmählich zu bewältigenden Schwierigkeiten damit verbunden waren. Für einen Juristen, der die Ausbildung im in seinem Fach im nationalen Verfassungs- und im Europarecht erhalten hat und durch eine Reihe von Studienaufenthalten in angelsächsisch geprägten Ländern seinen Horizont ergänzt hat, stellt sich dann allerdings folgende Sorge ein: Wenn nun Maßstäbe berufssoziologischer Untersuchungen zugrunde gelegt werden, so bleibt die normative Seite der Handlungsorientierung der betreffenden Berufsgruppe sozusagen außen vor. Geht man so vor, so kann das nur zu ihm verständlichen Ergebnissen führen, wenn diese Maßstäbe und diese Handlungsorientierung strikt getrennt bleiben und weiterhin jeweils für sich gelten. Anderenfalls verleiten die soziologischen Ergebnisse zur Missachtung der normativen Bindungen des Handelns der betreffenden Berufsgruppe. Anders formuliert, Richterinnen und Richter mögen elitäre Gruppen bilden und über Grenzen hinweg Verständigungen erreichen, um eine koordinierte Rechtsentwicklung zu ermöglichen. Das entbindet sie aber in keiner Weise von den normativen Anforderungen, die an ihre Entscheidungspraxis und deren Begründungen gestellt sind. Mit diesen Vorbemerkungen soll es sein Bewenden haben.

Nun zu dem Buch selbst. Es befasst sich vorzugsweise mit Staaten von Zentral- und Osteuropa, also den baltischen Staaten, den Mitgliedern der Visegrad Gruppe und den Staaten, die aus Jugoslawien hervorgegangen sind, also Staaten, die nicht alle der Europäischen Union beigetreten sind, sich ihr aber doch annähern. Zugleich arbeitet das Buch in einem Umfeld, das auch von der amerikanischen Debatte um richterlichen Aktivismus, demokratische Legitimation und einer angemessenen Rolle des Rechts in Demokratien geprägt ist, eine Debatte, die von Namen wie Hirschl, Tushnet und inneramerikanisch sehr viel früher Ely sowie deren Schriften geprägt ist oder war. Außerdem sieht die Autorin schon in der Einführung, dass es sich bei den Staaten, die sie sich ausgesucht hat, um solche handelt, deren Recht in der kontinentalen Civil Law-Tradition der romanischen Länder ruht, also eine eher zurückhaltende Ausübung der Befugnisse der dritten Gewalt favorisiert. Dabei verbindet sich diese Debatte und diese Ausgangsposition dieser Staaten, ihrer Juristen und ihrer Politikwissenschaftler mit der Flut der Vorbehalte gegen die europäische Integration in der EU und teils auch über den Europarat, die normative Maßstäbe entwickeln, fortbilden und durchsetzen. Eine aufklärerisch positionierte Kritik daran ist es, die ihre Rechtfertigung im Wege einer Kritik an einer Elite findet und so den gesamten Kontext von Recht, Profession und Rechtsprechung in Frage stellt. Diese Eliten-Kritik vollzieht sich nach einer Einführung zu Argumentationsstil

und Methoden in zwei großen Teilen: Teil I präsentiert die transnationale „Network Community", ihren Umkreis, ihre Identität und ihre Solidarität sowie ihre Arbeitsweise, „in action". Teil II befasst sich mit dem Paradigma der Juridifizierung und seinen Schablonen, also Fragen der Kontrolle oder den Entgrenzung der dritten Gewalt, der elitären Arroganz, wenn man das so sagen kann, die eine intellektuelle und eine moralische Superiorität beansprucht und die Maßstäbe ihrer Schablonen verallgemeinert allen im europäischen Umfeld auferlegt. Daran schließen Folgerungen an, die das Buch zusammenfassen. Abrundet das eine Kritik der Netzwerke der befassten Eliten. Alles wird mit einer Fülle von Belegen versehen vorgetragen, beginnend mit den englischen Verfassungskonflikten des 17. Jh.s, an den führende Juristen wie Sir Edward Coke als Richter oder Autor beteiligt waren, über die amerikanische frühe Verfassungsentwicklung hin zum vollen richterlichen Prüfungsrecht und dann bis in den New Deal und seine Bewältigung durch richterliche „Verfassungspolitik", der Kontrolle der auswärtigen Gewalt heute selbst in Großbritannien durch den neu geschaffenen Supreme Court des Vereinigten Königreichs und eine Vielzahl europäischer Entscheidungen, die der Rechtsfortbildung durch Gerichte dienen angesichts einer gelähmten oder schlicht defizitär ausgestatteten demokratischen Struktur. Das alles ist ein altes Lied. Es tritt allerdings in neuem Gewand auf. Und es bedarf daher einer sorgfältigen Auseinandersetzung, zumal es Gegnern der europäischen Integration, des westlichen Verfassungsstaates und damit auch einer freien öffentlichen allgemeinen und auch wissenschaftlichen

Debatte die Büchsen spannt. Dabei führt das Werk diese Entwicklungen sämtlich zurück auf das amerikanische Modell umfassender richterlicher Befugnisse, wie wir Europäer es wahrnehmen. Allerdings ist dieses Modell umfassender Zuständigkeit für Europa keineswegs durchgängig prägend geworden. Sofern man überhaupt von einem solchen Modell sprechen kann, so sind seine Grundlagen in England gelegt, dort aber gerade mit sehr viel Umsicht gehandhabt worden. Und auch die kontinental-europäischen Verfassungen haben sich dem amerikanischen Modell nicht ungeprüft ergeben. Zudem sind umfassenden Konzeptionen der dritten Gewalt in vormals kolonialen Gemeinwesen eher anzutreffen, sie etwa in den heutigen Vereinigten Staaten und in Indien. Das hängt damit zusammen, wie mir scheint, dass das Recht zuerst durch zunächst oft reisende höhere Richter repräsentiert wurde, nicht durch andere öffentliche Organe, da diese noch gar nicht eingerichtet waren oder aber oft korrupt, gewaltsam und wenig überzeugend agierten. Einen solchen Hintergrund haben auch Rezeptionen von Elementen des richterlichen Prüfungsrechts und deren Fortbildung in Europa nicht, auch nicht in dem von dem Buch zugrunde gelegten Rechtsraum. Und gegen die Schablonen der Autorin, die aus dem amerikanischen Modell der dritten Gewalt gewonnen sind und deren Rolle als Ursache richterlicher Anmaßungen sprechen aber ganz elementare Konsequenzen modernen säkularen Rechts.

So ist der Kritik zunächst entgegenzuhalten, dass auch der moderne demokratische Souverän nicht selbst Recht sprechen kann. Wie schon die klassische Entscheidung aus der Feder von Sir Edward Coke

1607, den auch die Autorin zitiert, sagte, der Souverän, damals James I, kann nicht selbst richten, dies deshalb, weil rechtliche Entscheidungen erfordern, dass die Entscheider lange Studien und Erfahrung – long study and experience – hinter sich haben, um das Recht zu erkennen und seinem Verfahren gemäß als Produkt künstlicher Intelligenz, also nicht etwa natürlicher Vernunft, zu erfassen (Prohibitions Del Roy, 77 E.R. 1342 oder 12 Co.Rep. 63, auch zur Unterscheidung des Rechts als Produkt von artificial reason, nicht bloßer natürlicher Vernunft). In anderen Worten, Recht ist Sache einer professionell qualifizierten Personengruppe, nämlich der professionellen Richterschaft, nicht etwa nur der Laienrichter und gewiss nicht des bloßen Machthabers.

Zweifellos handelt es sich dabei, zumal in den angelsächsischen Ländern, um eine säkulare professionelle Elite, die einen gewissen Habitus pflegt. Und zweifellos stellen sich dann Fragen der professionellen Selbstreflexion, des eigenen Anspruchs, mit dem sich diese Gruppe umgibt, bis hin zu elitärer Arroganz. Auch in der Civil Law-Tradition sind solche professionellen Gruppen anzutreffen. Und es trifft zu, dass sie gemeinsame Standards entwickeln, insbesondere durch die europäische Ebene, die ihre professionellen Tätigkeiten immer wieder erreichen. Das gilt besonders für eine kleine elitäre Minderheit hochqualifizierter Juristen auf in den verschiedenen Funktionen ihres professionellen Lebens in Ländern mit unterschiedlicher Tradition und in den europäischen Institutionen, wobei allerdings anzumerken ist, dass es auch andere derartige Funktionseliten mit internationalem Einschlag gibt, etwa aus dem Management der Wirtschaft heraus, in der internationalen Politik und dank der nationalen und internationalen Bürokratien sowie nicht zuletzt in der immer international angelegten Wissenschaft. Und das Verhalten solcher Gruppen kann man untersuchen. Das kann auch ergeben, dass die Gruppe in Selbstüberschätzung agiert, sowie dass daraus professionelles Fehlverhalten erwächst. Man kann aber nicht in Frage stellen, dass die Aufgaben dieser Gruppe und die Bindungen dieser Gruppe in Ausübung ihres Amtes unbeachtlich oder nicht weiter von Bedeutung sind. Verfällt man dieser Frage, so kann hinter den Antworten, die man präsentiert, schlichter, allerdings akademisch verbrämter Populismus stehen. Ist es so, so greift man die gegebene Rechtsordnung an, nicht das Fehlverhalten dieser Gruppe. Ich fürchte, mein Eindruck trügt nicht, dass das vorliegende Werk in diese Falle geraten ist. Es desavouiert damit sich selbst als wissenschaftliches Werk. Den Rechtsordnungen des westlichen Verfassungsstaates, denen das benutzte Material entnommen ist und in dessen Umkreis Gespräche geführt worden sind, wird damit nicht gedient. Dann geht es nicht nur das Fehlverhalten einer professionellen Elite, sondern um die Wertschätzung dieser Ordnungen selbst. Es gibt gute Gründe dafür solche Studien als interdisziplinäre Projekte anzulegen und dadurch zu vermeiden, das Kind mit dem Bade auszuschütten, sowie es hier geschehen ist. Vor solch einem Missgeschick schützen auch nicht die elitären Studienorte, Stipendien und akademischen Einrichtungen, an denen die Autorin arbeitet oder teilhat. Das zu benennen ist ohne Ansehen der Person und ihrer derartigen Ausweisungen nobile

officium des Rezensenten, auch wenn es nicht leicht fällt.

Mirko Petersen: Geopolitische Imaginarien. Diskursive Konstruktionen der Sowjetunion im peronistischen Argentinien (1943–1955), Bielefeld: Transcript Verlag 2018, 376 S.

Rezensiert von
Michal Zourek, Brünn

Das Buch von Mirko Petersens, ursprünglich als Doktorarbeit verfasst und an der Universität Bielefeld verteidigt, widmet sich der Rolle der Sowjetunion in der Politik von Juan Domingo Perón. Der analysierte Zeitraum beginnt mit dem Militärputsch vom Juni 1943, an dem auch der damalige Oberst Juan Perón beteiligt war, und endet mit seinem Sturz im Jahr 1955 durch einen weiteren Militärputsch. Trotz der großen Menge an verfügbarer Literatur über den Peronismus macht der gewählte Ansatz von Petersen aus seiner Arbeit ein Werk, das zweifellos große Aufmerksamkeit von Historikern und Politologen verdient.

Die Arbeit führt uns zu einer Reihe von Fragen zu Themen, die in der Geschichtsschreibung kaum untersucht wurden. Im Allgemeinen haben die meisten Arbeiten über den Kalten Krieg in Lateinamerika hauptsächlich den amerikanischen Einfluss in der Region berücksichtigt. Obwohl in den letzten Jahrzehnten neue Arbeiten über den Einfluss der Länder des kommunistischen Blocks entstanden

sind, konzentrierten sich diese besonders auf die Verbindungen mit der internationalen kommunistischen Bewegung. Darüber hinaus konzentriert sich die Aufmerksamkeit der Forscher auf die Zeit nach der kubanischen Revolution von 1959 oder zumindest auf die Zeit nach Stalins Tod, d. h. nach 1953.

Petersens Buch setzt ein Verfahren fort, dass die politische Sprache von Peron analysiert, die aus spezifischen Symbolen im damaligen öffentlichen Raum besteht. Zu früheren Arbeiten, die mit diesem Ansatz arbeiteten zählen *Mañana es San Perón* (1994) von Mariano Plotikin, *Perón o muerte* (1986, 2004) von Silvia Sigal und Eliseo Verón oder *Los dos príncipes* (2009) von Alejandro Groppos. Die genannten Autoren untersuchen zwar zentrale Aspekte des peronistischen Diskurses, beschränken sich jedoch weitgehend auf die nationale Ebene und greifen die globalen Zusammenhänge im peronistischen Diskurs nicht auf.

Peterson fügt den internationalen Kontext auf eine sehr neuartige und originelle Weise hinzu. Sein Ziel ist es zu beweisen, dass die Sowjetunion wesentlich zum Aufbau des Peronismus beigetragen hat. Im Mittelpunkt seiner Analyse steht der Diskurs, der auf den Theorien von Ernesto Laclau und Chantal Mouffe basiert. Da die Arbeiten dieser beiden Denker rein theoretisch sind, ergänzte Peterson mehrere methodologische Ansätze.

Da die diplomatischen und wirtschaftlichen Beziehungen zwischen dem peronistischen Argentinien und Moskau nicht von Bedeutung waren, mag es überraschen, die große Aufmerksamkeit, die die peronistischen Politiker und Medien dem fernen Land schenkten. Den Worten von

Mary Kaldor nach, die den Kalten Krieg als „imaginären Krieg" bezeichnete, zeigt Petersen, dass die Sowjetunion den peronistischen Diskurs in Bezug auf die Sozial-, Wirtschafts-, Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik sowie nationale und kulturelle Identitätsfragen beeinflusst hatte. Der Autor betont vor allem die Verwendung der Begriffe „Totalitarismus" oder „Imperialismus", die für die Peronisten ein wichtiges diskursives Instrument für die Konstruktion des Imaginären über die Sowjetunion darstellten.

Petersens Analyse basiert auf einer Vielzahl von Materialien. Erstens sind Perons schriftliche Reden zu erwähnen, da diese bei der damaligen politischen Rede eine wichtige Rolle spielten. Außerdem achtet er auf die diskursiven Interventionen anderer peronistischer Akteure sowie auf parlamentarische Debatten. Das ermöglicht eine stärke Konzentration auf den Konflikt mit der Opposition. Die Peronisten bezogen sich auf die Sowjetunion nicht nur in Streitgesprächen mit der Kommunistischen Partei Argentiniens, sondern auch in der Politik, die sich gegen die größte Oppositionspartei, die Radikale Partei, richtete.

Eine Schlüsselrolle bei der Kontextualisierung und Schulung politischer Debatten spielte die Presse. Petersen konzentriert sich im Detail auf zwei peronistische Zeitungen (*Democracia y La Epoca*) und die Stellungnahmen der drei Oppositionszeitungen (*La Nación*, *La Prensa*, *La Hora*). Um den öffentlichen Diskurs besser zu erklären, untersucht der Autor auch die internen Dokumente der Regierung, insbesondere die Kommunikation zwischen dem argentinischen Außenministerium und der argentinischen Botschaft in Moskau.

Natürlich war das Verhältnis zwischen dem Peronismus und der Sowjetunion von mehreren Transformationen geprägt, die sowohl aus der argentinischen Innenpolitik als auch aus der internationalen Entwicklung resultierten. Die argentinische Regierung unterhielt diplomatische Beziehungen zur Sowjetunion, die im Gegensatz zu anderen lateinamerikanischen Ländern nie ausgesetzt wurden. Während der Regierungszeit von Perón schloss Argentinien als erstes lateinamerikanisches Land ein Handelsabkommen mit Moskau ab. Trotzdem betrachtete die peronistische Regierung, die ihre Außenpolitik als „dritte Position" definierte, die Sowjetunion als eine Bedrohung. Die Angriffe nahmen vor allem zu Beginn des Koreakrieges zu. Einer der großen Vorzüge des Buches ist, dass es die Motivation und die Konsequenzen dieser Veränderungen erklärt.

Wie bereits erwähnt, hat der Autor mit einer Vielzahl von Dokumenten gearbeitet, die uns ein repräsentatives Bild geben. Vielleicht hätte sich Petersen mehr auf die Kulturpropaganda der Sowjetunion und ihre peronistische Zensur konzentrieren können. Es wäre beispielsweise sehr interessant, auf das narrative Kino und seine Auswirkungen auf die argentinische Bühne durch die Analyse der zeitgenössischen Kritiker zu achten. Auf diese Weise könnte man die Veränderungen, die Perón gegenüber den kommunistischen Ländern vorgenommen hat, klar erkennen. Zwischen den Hauptmotivationen dieser Änderungen zählen die Probleme der argentinischen Wirtschaft und die Notwendigkeit der Suche nach neuen Märkten. Während 1950 und 1951 sowjetische Filme verbo-

ten waren, besuchten zahlreiche sowjetische Delegationen das 1954 erstmals stattfindende Filmfestival in Mar del Plata und wurden in Peróns Residenz empfangen.

Mirko Petersens Arbeit ist ein wertvoller und sehr inspirierender Beitrag zur Erforschung des Kalten Krieges. Sie ermöglicht uns, auf originelle Weise über dessen Auswirkungen in Lateinamerika nachzudenken und gleichzeitig einige wenig bekannte und überraschende Aspekte zu entdecken.

Samir Amin: Modern Imperialism, Monopoly Finance Capital, and Marx's Law of Value, New York: Monthly Review Press 2018, 248 p.

Reviewed by
Hartmut Elsenhans, Leipzig

Amin's book constitutes a courageous attempt to combine his observation of rising mass incomes in capitalism with the basic structures of Marxist theory. This attempt is laudable because it demonstrates the fundamental contradictions within Marx's Capital in a variety of essential dimensions to a reader familiar with Marx's work.

Amin starts with the problematic of proportional growth between consumption goods industries and investment goods industries in case of so-called enlarged reproduction. From Marx's increasing the numbers for variable capital, he deduces that already Marx had seen that capitalism requires for its smooth growth rising mass incomes. A constant value of variable capi-

tal together with productivity increases as inevitable result of accumulation is interpreted by Amin as cheapening of subsistence goods.

Identical and more so rising values of variable capital represent therefore greater quantities of subsistence goods. This might, however, not have been the view of Marx, as he presents in the third volume of capital the tendency of the profit rate to fall with constant values of variable capital. If this represents higher real wages, his only result is the (neoliberal) golden rule of growth in capitalism: When capital productivity declines, real wages have to increase at a lower rate than national income. His profit rate falls because wages have risen too much, if we follow Amin.

Amin establishes from his innovative interpretation of identical numerical values for variable capital representing rising incomes the necessity of rising demand as a basic condition of proportional and crisis free growth of capitalism. This allows dealing with an ancient problem of Samir Amin, Rosa Luxemburg's critique of Marx's schemes of enlarged production. He proposes his old solution, the proportionate distribution of labour between the two departments and the realisation of the surplus on the basis of credit advanced to the entrepreneurs. This is exactly not the problematique of Rosa Luxemburg: she asked why entrepreneurs should invest, from where the additional demand has to come which justifies investing in higher capacities of production. Amin does not exploit his argument against Luxemburg by saying that, in opposition to her, he assumes that capitalists have to accept rising wages.

This allows introducing two further arguments. Skipping the Luxemburg question, he can maintain the argument that capitalists are basically interested in unlimited accumulation. As they have no own interest in rising wages, Amin introduces the growth of department III, the service sector.

His description of the department III resumes well established critiques of the wastefulness of services in modern capitalism, although he has to admit that many activities of the expanding services are highly useful, like education. Linking up with Baran and Sweezy he argues against increasing selling costs, without discussing the old argument about „transport workers" contributing to value formation. Despite underlining the importance of the difference between surplus creating labour and unproductive labour paid out of the surplus, a definition of the productive and the non-productive aspects of department III workers is missing, despite Amin's justification of higher labour values of work having required more education, which implies the value creation in department III.

Amin ends up with a basically underconsumptionist inevitable crisis, because capitalists limit wage expansion and compensate the increasing productivity from the demand side by monopolistic competition and the expansion of the third sector, especially the state. He overlooks the disputed status of the Wagner law of increasing state expenditure.

For Samir Amin's argument about capitalism's incapacity to be regulated by popular forces, it would however be important to show that surplus absorption by the expansion of department III provides capitalists with economic advantages, rising mass incomes would not provide them. Otherwise social reformism of the social-democratic type would save capitalism with positive results for the masses.

According to Amin, however, the impending crisis cannot be avoided because labour cannot increase salaries as much as necessary, although wages increase according to Amin. We so not Learn about limits to wages increases. Amin does not discuss the necessity of saving capitalism from the capitalists in order to make it work smoothly, although his particular arguments do not say anything else than the necessity of imposing real wage increases against the short-sightedness and particularistic interests of the capitalists.

Quite in line with his basic argument he rejects Marx's argument about all accumulation leading to a decline in the profit rate, rightly arguing about productivity increasing despite capital accumulation. However, in the details of his argument there is not even capital accumulation in the Marxist sense, as the organic composition of capital does not increase in his modelling. Constant capital increases just in line with variable capital, according to his definition in line with real wages.

Nevertheless, over long parts of the book he assumes that capitalist accumulation takes place also in labour value terms This becomes visible when he mentions the tendency of the profit rate to fall as a possibility which then is explained by a scarcity of surplus available for remunerating capital at the previous higher profit rate. Quite in line with Marx's original argument the efficient countertendency are wage decreases. By saving Marx schemes of reproduction against Luxemburg with the argument of

necessarily increasing wages he abandons Marxist theory of crisis of the third volume of Capital. He re-establishes it with the argument of a tendency to unlimited accumulation, which would be possible only if the growth of department III constitutes capital accumulation and not „wasteful" consumption.

In order to save the rejection of capitalism as not in the interests of the great masses the tendency of rising wages is confined the Imperial North which feeds its mass consumption by exploiting the global South.

Breaking with the principle that labour values depend on socially necessary labour, he argues that worldwide all labour has the same value, neglecting Marx's argument about more productive labour exchanging at the international level as more intensive. The rise of the BRICS by deliberately keeping their exchange rate below purchasing parity, hence deliberately searching for being exploited in order to grow, hence the Chinese success model already applied by South Korea and Taiwan, cannot be taken account of. As Amin does not draw his conclusion about the necessity of rising wages and the stability of the organic composition of capital to its logical end, he deduces that these countries are deprived of labour value/surplus they could invest. Because of unequal exchange to the detriment of newly industrialising countries, these countries lack surplus and cannot overtake the imperialist countries, which enjoy the imperial rent.

Their competitiveness on the world market indicates however that the enterprises earn a profit rates sufficient for enlarged reproduction.

Once more, Amin does not take carry through his basic argument about the necessity of rising wages in capitalism, that capitalism is malleable and can be put to the interests of the great many provided that they use their number for exercising influence. He avoids the conclusion that social reform and empowerment of labour are essential for capitalism but presents a vague discourse about socialism which he tries to render credible by appallingly regular disparaging unquoted opponents to his Marxism as vulgar economists.

Kiran Klaus Patel: Projekt Europa. Eine Kritische Geschichte, München: C. H. Beck Verlag 2018, 463 S.

Rezensiert von
Carlo Hohnstedter, Leipzig

Im August 2018, dem Erscheinungszeitpunkt von Kiran Klaus Patels „Projekt Europa", halten das zwei Jahre alte Ergebnis des Brexit-Referendums, die Uneinigkeit der EU-Mitgliedsstaaten einen Kompromiss für eine gemeinsame Asyl- und Migrationspolitik zu finden, ein erstarkender Rechtspopulismus und Nationalismus in den europäischen Parlamenten sowie der Justizabbau in Polen, Ungarn und Rumänien die Europäische Union (EU) und die europäische Medienöffentlichkeit in Atem. Diese 2010er Dekade scheint in der öffentlichen Wahrnehmung als das Jahrzehnt der multiplen und nicht enden wollenden europäischen Krisen in das

Geschichtsbuch eingehen zu wollen. Die Wirtschafts- und Finanzkrise, die Staatsschuldenkrise, die Eurokrise, die Migrationskrise, die Krise der Rechtsstaatlichkeit und Demokratie sowie eine zunehmende EU-Skepsis werden gebetsmühlenartig in den verschiedenen Presseerzeugnissen und Talkshows wiederholt, sobald das Thema auf die EU schwenkt. Evergreens, wie das vermeintlich bürgerferne, undemokratische, bürokratische und den Nationalstaaten ihre Kultur raubende Moloch-Brüssel oder ein Anti-Elite-Diskurs vervollständigen die, durchaus auch produktiv-stimmenden, Melange an einer verstärkten Auseinandersetzung mit dem Thema der Europäisierung im Jahr vor der Wahl zum Europäischen Parlament 2019. In dieser reizvollen Gemengelage, in der es andererseits mit der Remain- und der Pulse of Europe-Bewegung nach langer Zeit wieder lautstarke proeuropäische Töne auf den Straßen zu hören gibt, ist auf dem populärwissenschaftlichen Publikationsmarkt ein neuerlicher Boom an Büchern zu beobachten, welche einem breiteren Publikum wahlweise die Arbeitsweise der EU-Institutionen, die Geschichte Europas (oftmals lediglich als westeuropäische Geschichte der EU und ihrer Vorgänger) oder die Herausforderungen und Schwächen, vor denen die Union steht, zu erklären versucht.

In einem Genre, wie diesem – dem Europa-Sachbuch – indem es auf dem Buchmarkt nur zwei Extreme zu geben scheint: den pessimistischen, dystopischen Verriss, der den Untergang der EU herbeischreibt und dabei nahezu alle tagespolitischen Meldungen sowie vermeintliche historische Sollbruchstellen als apokalyptische Reiter der Desintegration zusammenträgt

einerseits und andererseits die emotional-pathetische Lobeshymne der Alle-Menschen-werden-Brüder-Einigung, die gern garniert wird mit euphorischen Utopien über baldige visionäre Schritte einer noch stärkeren Integration und Demokratisierung des „europäischen Traums" – in diesem Genre stellt Patels „Projekt Europa. Eine Kritische Geschichte" eine Rarität der Nüchternheit, Abgewogenheit und historischen Kontextualisierung dar, ohne dabei tröge, verbittert oder überakademisierend zu wirken.

Der aus dem Südwesten Deutschlands stammende Professor für Europäische Geschichte des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts an der Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München Klaus Kiran Patel schrieb auf gut 360 Fließtext-Seiten ein, trotz seines hochangesiedelten Verkaufspreises, in vielerlei Hinsicht über den akademischen Gebrauch hinausreichendes und dabei trotzdem an virulente öffentliche Debatten anschlussfähiges Sachbuch, welches entgegen dem inflationären Gebrauch des Krisenbegriffs und der momentanen Krisenhysterie, die Ahistorizität dieser Aufregung um momentane Desintegrationserscheinungen aufzeigt. Zugleich schlägt er nicht in dieselbe Kerbe anderer Bücher über die Geschichte der Europäisierung, welche die Geschichte Europas gern auf eine Institutionengeschichte der EU, losgelöst von anderen europäischen, nordatlantischen und internationalen Institutionen, reduzieren. Auch vermisst man glücklicherweise in „Projekt Europa" ein Narrativ, welches die Europäische Kommission, stellvertretend für die Union, gern in ihrer Selbstkonstruktion anführt; ein Narrativ der ahistorischen und allzu teleologischen und unvermeidlichen

Entwicklung der ever closer union. Der renommierte Historiker für europäische Zeitgeschichte machte es sich zur Aufgabe zu ergründen, wie es die damalige Europäische Gemeinschaft für Kohle und Stahl (EGKS) als älteste Vorgängerin der heutigen EU und später die Europäische Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft (EWG) und die Europäische Gemeinschaft (EG) es schafften, trotz einer Fülle anderer internationaler Organisationen, welche nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg gegründet wurden (wie dem Europarat, der Europäischen Freihandelsassoziation (EFTA) oder der Organisation für europäische wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit (OEEC) oder selbst dem Rat für gegenseitige Wirtschaftshilfe (RGW)) und die sich allesamt einer gewissen Art der Europäisierung verschrieben hatten, als die, aus heutiger Sicht, wirkmächtigste und nahezu hegemoniale Organisation aufzusteigen.

In acht Kapiteln, von denen laut dem Autor lediglich die ersten beiden chronologisch gelesen werden sollen, bevor eine individuelle Benutzung nach jeweiligem Interessensschwerpunkt begangen werden kann, bettet Patel die EGKS, EWG, EG und letztlich die EU stets ein in ein Geflecht anderer internationaler Organisationen (wie beispielsweise der NATO) und globalhistorischer Entwicklungen im Zeitalter des Kalten Krieges, einer zunehmenden Dekolonialisierung und Globalisierung. Nur wenige Redundanzen durchziehen dabei das Werk, welches durch geschickte Kontextualisierung gängige Erzählstränge über die EU zur Überprüfung stellt. Dabei werden Narrative über die EU als friedens- und sicherheitsstiftend, durch transnationalen wirtschaftlichen Kontakt wachstums- und wohlstandsmehrend, wertorientiert und normensetzend sowie als technokratische und bürokratische Einrichtung mit wenig Möglichkeiten der Einflussnahme durch die Mitgliedsstaaten, mit der historisch-messbaren Datenlage abgeglichen.

Durch Patels Verweise auf historische Wirtschafts- und Sozialdaten, zum Teil auch auf eigene Berechnungen, ein umfangreiches Fachliteratur- und Pressestudium sowie den Blick in die Institutionen- und Vertragsgeschichte erfährt der/die aufmerksame Leser/in, dass die EG in den ersten Jahrzehnten ihrer Existenz eine eher nachrangige, aber deswegen nicht marginale Rolle in der Friedenssicherung gespielt haben soll. Ähnlich solle es um die wohlstandsmehrende Wirkung in den drei Nachkriegsjahrzehnten bestellt gewesen sein – so soll sie das wirtschaftliche Klima in den Mitgliedsstaaten wohlwollend beeinflusst, aber noch lange nicht zu den Quantensprüngen, wie in anderen Weltregionen, beigetragen haben. Gemeinsame und hohe demokratische wie rechtsstaatliche Werte verträte die historische EG eher nach Außen als nach Innen. Die Implementierung von Normen für den gemeinsamen Markt und eine einheitliche Politikdurchsetzung soll stets – und nicht erst in unseren Tagen – von Beispielen der Langsamkeit und der eigenwilligen Adaption in Zentrum und Peripherie geprägt gewesen sein.

Kritisch anzumerken, bei allen erfrischenden Verweisen auf außereuropäische Parameter und Verbindungslinien der Europäisierung, ist jedoch die starke Westeuropa-Zentrierung des Patel'schen „Projekt Europa". Eine angemessene Einbettung der Geschichte des Europas östlich des „Eisernen Vorhangs" ist auch diesem

Werk nicht gelungen. Weiterhin sind die Abbildungen und Tabellen nicht immer optimal passend in den Textfluss integriert und zum Teil mit Erklärungen, die einem breiteren Publikum keinen ausreichenden Verständnisschlüssel liefern, versehen.

Nichtsdestoweniger besonders empfehlenswert im universitär-lehrenden Kontext für angehende Neuzeit-Historiker*innen aller Schwerpunkte, European und Global Studies Studierende sowie Soziolog*innen und Politolog*innen, aber besonders auch, einem teleologischen Geschichtsverständnis aufsitzende, Jurist/innen sind in diesem Werk der Prolog und die Kapitel eins „Europa und die Europäische Integration" sowie das siebte Kapitel „Desintegration und Dysfunktionalität". Gewinnbringend für alle, die der Imagination einer umweglosen, linearen Geschichte der europäischen Integration anhängen, sind die Gegenüberstellung der Entwicklungen der EWG in ihrer Konkurrenz und Kooperation mit der EFTA, die früh gescheiterten Pläne zur Errichtung eines bundesstaatlichen Europas oder die bis heute nicht realisierte

Europäische Verteidigungsgemeinschaft. Ebenso stimmt nach der Patel-Lektüre der Brexit weniger trübsinnig, wenn man sich die Austritte Algeriens und Grönlands aus der EWG bzw. der EG vergegenwärtigt; es erscheinen weiterhin aktuelle Beispiele der schleppenden Integration und Normumsetzungen weniger außergewöhnlich und dysfunktional für die Union, wenn man diese Phänomene durch einen Blick in die Geschichte zu normalisieren versucht.

Der auf den ersten Blick reißerisch und somit durchaus verkaufsfördernd erscheinende Untertitel „Eine kritische Geschichte" beschreibt bei eingehender Beschäftigung mit der Monografie diese durchaus treffend. Der im Blätterwald seltene analytische Blick Patels vermag es, die aufgeschlossenen dystopisierenden Pessimisten einzufangen und die Utopisten mit einem vorsichtigen Optimus nicht gänzlich auszubremsen, diese aber zumindest für das Nachweisbare und somit Realistische zu erden. Einem Kursbuch, für engagierte Einsteiger, gleich gehört „Projekt Europa" in jedes gut ausgestattete Sachbuchregal.

ANNOTATIONEN

Tamara Chaplin / Jadwiga E. Pieper Mooney (eds.): The Global 1960s. Convention, Contest, and Counterculture, London / New York 2018, 300 pp.

This collection of rather impressionistic descriptions of the decade between formal decolonization in Africa and last vibrations of the 1968 revolt is co-edited by Tamara Chaplin, Professor of Modern European History at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign who is known for her publications on French cultural history, and Jadwiga E. Pieper Mooney, Professor of Modern Latin American History at the University of Arizona who has mainly published on gender relations in Chile. Both have brought together 14 authors who have chosen a specific dimension of the decade and who explore this dimension by focusing on a specific region or country in the world. The book thus opens with a chapter on Bourguiba and Senghor to introduce the legacies of colonial history for the now upcoming period of new hopes and initiatives in independent sub-Saharan Africa (Burleigh Hendrickson). The chapter, however, has to accommodate at the same time a short review of the worldwide students' movement, almost every reader will expect from such a book devoted to the 1960s. This is followed by an 18

pages long study of the "socialist scramble for Africa" which already in its title refers to Zbigniew Brzezinski's analysis of the Soviet bloc as suffering from more and more internal conflict and fragmentation (Nick Rutter). The relationship between second and third world is used to introduce at the same time the transformation of the socialist camp from homogeneity to porousness. This principle applies to all the following chapters as well – the editors have invested a lot to compose a volume that fascinates with unexpected angles from which already well-known subjects are presented, with exotic place where stories start that have been told already several times but not in that perspective. This first of all introduces a broad readership to globality in the sense that traditional narratives can be recognized but are sufficiently alienated to go beyond the commonly known. It decentres such stories and convinces the reader that it is worth to look at places that are normally not in the focus when studying topics such as national sovereignty (for which Steffen Bruendel selects the British rule over Northern Ireland) or world views and phantasies of creating the new man (which is analysed by Milinda Banerjee with regard to the Naxalite political activists in West Bengal). In contrast, the global erotics of the French sexual revolution may

be seen as a rather conventional perspective but Todd Shepard connects the theme in a very interesting way to the end of the French-Algerian war in 1962. In contrast and at the same time as a welcome complement, Jing Jing Chang looks at patterns of masculinity through the lens of martial arts films making Hong Kong known as a place of popular cinema production where the Cold War gender stereotypes play out in a particular way. Alejandro J. Gomez-del-Moral explores the confrontation of Franco's dictatorship over Spain and the emerging consumer society which resists more and more to traditional form of disciplinization. In Karen L. Ishizuka's analysis of Asian-Americans looking at the Vietnam War very personal identification with the subject comes to the fore and we learn that the seemingly exotic configurations being at the centre of attention in this volume exist already for quite some time so that they impact on the biographies of mid-career academics.

Jérôme Bourdon with his study of Israel's image in the 1960s and Maha Nasser's investigation into the leftist vocabularies among Palestinian citizens of Israel remind us of conflictual constellations that last since the global 1960s and make the period to a certain extent a close neighbour exactly at the moment when the activists of this time demission. The volume will certainly serve as an introduction to a turbulent decade for students who have been born after the millennium but it is also an important complement to the existing research literature on the many facets of a time when – to mention an element of stability in a period of turmoil – Brazilian football was so dominant that it won three times out of four possibilities the world

championships: 1958 in Stockholm, 1962 in Santiago, and 1970 in Mexico-City.

Matthias Middell

Ngonlardje Kabra Mbaidjol: African Countries and the Scramble for China. A Contribution to Africa's Preparedness and Rehearsal, Leiden / Boston: Brill 2019, xvii + 190 pp.

This is a manifesto for developing Sino-African relations rather than an academic book. The author, Ngonlardje Kabra Mbaidjol, is a Chadian diplomat joined the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) agency in 1984. Among others he is a former UNHCR regional representative in the Central African Region (2000–2003), director of the New York UN High Commissioner for Human Rights office (2007–2009), director of the UNHCR Ethics Office in Geneva (2009–2012), and chairperson of the Ethics Committee of the UN Food and Agriculture Organisation (2010–2015). He holds a PhD from the University of Geneva's Graduate Institute of International Studies and Development (1985). Since 2012, he is working as an international consultant, based in New Jersey.

In this lean book (the main text, divided into eleven chapters, stretches over just 158 pages), Mbaidjol calls "for strategic" thinking of African states in engaging with the People's Republic of China to benefit from economic and financial cooperation. The book is premised on the assumption that China "is nowadays a respectable global economic partner" (p. x). It offers "competitive trade opportunities, high investment returns, and other mutually

advantageous ties" (ibid.). The book takes what some may would call a "refreshing" stance against any critical perspective on Sino-African relations. Rather than engaging with this scholarship – which, by the way, certainly represents the mainstream of academic work on this topic, and not just in the West –, Mbaidjol constructs a position which allegedly "condemns" or even "bans" Sino-African relations. It remains unclear whether this is an academic or a political position, and where it comes from. Writing against this "position", the author furthermore claims that African countries are not yet fully prepared to engage with China. This statement, too, is not substantiated, but simply dropped as a pre-given.

From this vantage point, Mbaidjol introduces the 1955 Bandung Conference as the asserted historic beginning of South-South relations (chap. 2), then continues to discuss the nature of the Non-Aligned Movement (chap. 3) and the BRICS (chap. 4). These chapters could have provided an opportunity to seriously engage with some academic debate, but the author only very superficially refers to some texts, if at all (and the criteria for selecting these references remain unclear). The remaining chapters are dealing with China and its Asian neighbours and Asian regional institutions (chap. 4 and 5) as well as Chinese foreign aid, trade, and foreign direct investment in Africa (chap. 7, 8, and 9). The core of the argument is presented in chapters 10 on "gaps and opportunities in Sino-Africa Relations" and 11 on "harmonizing legal and administrative infrastructures in Africa".

In this book, "Africa" usually appears as a collective. There is little understanding, or interest, for historically different kinds of relationships between single African states and China; as there is also no attempt to understand the history of the relations between African countries and China as developed by the Organisation of African Unity (1963–2002) and its successor, the African Union, or the various regional economic communities. Interestingly, the author always talks about "Sino-African" relations, rather than considering "Afro-Chinese" relations.

The book is published in a series called "International Comparative Social Studies", edited by Mehdi P. Amineh. Like in many of the by now 49 volumes published in this series, there is little "comparison" involved in this particular book. Copy editing missed a number of issues, to start with in the first line of the text China is referred to as the "Popular Republic"!

Finally, there is a stark contrast between the length of the bibliography (pp. 159–184) and the rather minimalistic references to any academic debate in the text. The bibliography only serves as a token; the author does not know the academic debate and he clearly has no interest in it. The majority of references is a list of are loveless glued monographs – journal articles or publications in edited volumes do not exist. Mainly, Mbaidjol draws on (few) sources and news accessed through the internet – which are mainly meant to serve his memory. Quite surprisingly the book has received some acclaim, though only politically (see, for instance, *Research Africa Reviews* 3 [2019] 3, pp. 41–43). In short, written from a practitioner's point of view this text provides some legal and strategic orientation for connoisseurs of strengthened Sino-African relations, void

of any critical academic reasoning or discussion current political debates in many African countries about relations with China. While in many places, the levels of enchantment have certainly increased, the conditions for engagement between African countries and China certainly still call for a serious academic debate.

Ulf Engel

Robert A. Olwell / James M. Vaughn (eds.): Envisioning Empire: The New British World from 1763 to 1773, London: Bloomsbury Academic 2019, 256 pp.

The edited volume, Envisioning Empire, captures the imperial moment of 1763, the end of the Seven Years' War. The prominent contributors to this volume, all situated at universities in the US and UK, were asked to think of this moment without the hindsight of the approaching American Revolution and other longer-term repercussions of the Seven Years' War. Instead, the chapter contributions investigate different plans and visions for empire from a variety of perspectives as new subjects and new territories fell under British rule in 1763.

Indeed, while the American Revolution has been studied recently as a result of clashing visions of the British Empire, it makes sense to take a step back and ask how the multiple actors from various sites in the British Empire envisioned the Empire in the decade that preceded the war. A recent monograph from S. Max Edelson, The New Map of Empire, asks some

parallel questions to this volume through the lens of mapmaking endeavors that accompanied imperial reform agendas for British America. This Bloomsbury volume does not tackle the history of cartography, but does ask how actors such as imperial agents and local elite, some with competing agendas, envisioned empire after 1763 in a more expansive lens, both topically and geographically.

The book contains eight chapter contributions as well as an introduction and an epilogue, each single-authored by one of the two editors. The slim volume manages to shed light on how central themes were reimagined for the British empire post-1763 such as religion, trade, company rule, and subjecthood; moreover, the volume also incorporates regional perspectives from India, Africa, North America, and Britain. Most successfully, the volume brings together Indian and North American developments and does a good job of including local power structures like princes and Native communities. Local elite are not eclipsed here by the focus on Britain; rather, British visions of empire are altered by these encounters and accommodations. The book has an index but unfortunately no collective bibliography.

This book is recommended for historians of the British Empire, the American Revolution, Atlantic Empires, British India, and neighboring topics. Though contributors were asked to think small in terms of the limited timespan the volume addresses, 19th century historians will also find inspiration in this pivotal imperial moment.

Megan Maruschke

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