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Axel T. Paul / Matthias Leanza (Eds.)

Comparing Colonialism: Beyond European Exceptionalism

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VERGLEICHENDE GESELLSCHAFTSFORSCHUNG

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Ed. by Axel T. Paul and Matthias Leanza



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Editorial

The topic of empire continues to keep the social sciences at large busy. After it had seemed for a long time as if the topic had definitely been handed over to historians, who are concerned with a past phenomenon that only occurs as a nostalgic reflex in the present, empires are suddenly also of interest again to the social scientists concerned with the present under quite different aspects. The question of whether the United States was and still is an empire and whether such imperial configurations were needed to maintain an international order after the multilateralism of the Cold War had come to an end played a crucial role in relaunching the debate about empires. A second layer of interest was informed by postcolonially inspired interest in the continuing mechanisms of earlier colonial empires now striking back in various ways and thus remaining present in today's seemingly post-imperial world. At a third level, observations that view empires as a rather loose association of rule with unfinished territorialization came to the fore in interpretations of empire as a more appropriate form of governance under conditions of global or at least transregional weakening or even dissolution of boundaries.

While we recently looked back at the similarities and differences between empires for the historical period from the eighteenth to the mid-twentieth centuries in a historically comparative thematic issue of this journal (no 3/2019), the current double issue, conceived from the perspective of historical sociology, is concerned with a geographically even broader comparison that seeks to revise the thesis of a European exceptionalism in the history of colonialism and imperialism that is often put forward implicitly rather than explicitly. This makes it necessary, first of all, to look for colonial imperial expansion also outside Europe and not to construct a “non-European world” as the target of expansion, as an overseas history, now out of fashion, did for a long time. This means not only to question the geography of comparative studies of empires, but also to reflect critically on their privileged time frame and to include examples that lie beyond the particular European expansion period that is often portrayed as starting in the fifteenth century. In

a third level, the nesting of empires is at stake, because the confrontation with imperial conquest from outside by no means put an end to state-building processes inside the imperially overformed regions, from which a whole complex of new questions about the relationship of the various empire-building processes can be derived.

Colonialism, in this perspective, is not a relationship between Europeans and non-Europeans, but a much broader, almost universal kaleidoscope of subjugation, settlement into regions other than the one of origin, and arrangements between external and internal elites. What distinguishes pre-modern forms of imperial rule and colony-building from those since the late eighteenth century, however, are (1) their positioning in struggles for dominance at a global scale, (2) the complicated blending between the formation of nation-states and ongoing attempts at imperial expansion, which can by no means be reduced to a teleology from empire to nation, and (3) the relationship between capitalist adventurism and political projects of empire building, which follow different logics but always interact.

To abstract these processes in such a way that they can be made available as theoretical elements to other disciplines requires at the same time a wide range of expertise for many case studies, an important selection of which is brought together in this issue. Specialists will read these case studies as enriching knowledge about individual empires, while the thematic issue as a whole, not least with its introduction by the editors and its afterword by Frederick Cooper, pursues an ambition that goes beyond the individual case and at the same time offers a broadening of perspective beyond meticulously deconstructed European exceptionalism and a contribution to a general theory of empires.

Matthias Middell / Katja Castryck-Naumann

Comparing Colonialism: Beyond European Exceptionalism. Introduction

Axel T. Paul / Matthias Leanza

Many of our interlocutors, when they first heard that we were preparing a special issue titled “Comparing Colonialism”, presumed that we intended to compare, once more, the various colonial endeavours of the European powers in the period roughly between Columbus’ arrival in the Caribbean and the last wave of decolonization that set in after World War II. When we then mentioned that the issue’s subtitle would read “Beyond European Exceptionalism”, they often assumed that we wanted to further “provincialize” Europe – as good, liberal Western academics regularly do – by criticizing the Eurocentric perspective on modern overseas empires, which implicitly perpetuates the “imperial episteme” as still hegemonic today. Both assumptions are not entirely false, but the thrust of our undertaking is a different one: the contributions presented in this volume aim at moving beyond an understanding of colonialism that revolves exclusively around the European overseas empires.

This endeavour has three main aspects. The first and presumably most obvious one is that it also considers non-European empires that, like their contemporaneous counterparts in Europe, pursued colonial policies. Japan’s expansion into Taiwan, Korea, and China starting from the late nineteenth century, Qing rule in Southern China, and the United States’ annexation of the Philippines after the Spanish-American War are all examples of this phenomenon.¹ But this is only one dimension of the intended enlargement of scope, namely the geographical one. The second, temporal aspect requires us

1 Already more than twenty years ago, the issue of the *International History Review* 20 (1998) on Manchu colonialism was paradigmatic for such an undertaking. See, in particular, the programmatic essay by Michael Adas, *Imperialism and Colonialism in Comparative Perspective*, *ibid.*, pp. 371–388.

to include pre-modern forms of colonialism as well, both within and beyond Europe. Apart from the Greek and Roman colonialism in antiquity, one could mention in this regard the medieval expansion of Northern Italian cities onto Mediterranean islands and coasts, the English conquest of Celtic lands, and, arguably, the Germanic colonization of North-Eastern Europe. Moreover, one could inquire whether the Persian and, still earlier, Mesopotamian empires acquired, possessed, and administered colonies. Outside of Europe and the Fertile Crescent, ancient India comes to mind as another test case for pre-modern colonialism, as do the West African empires of Mali and Songhai, the Inca realm, and, last not least, the Eurasian steppe empires. The third aspect is that broadening our perspective in this way, in turn, opens up new vistas on the European overseas empires. Not only did the majority of them maintain internal empires, sometimes with steep civilizational hierarchies, but they also encountered indigenous empires overseas, as was the case in various regions of the Americas or Africa.² In this respect, too, the history of European expansion was a history of imperial competition and elite cooperation. By refraining from taking European expansion as the standard model, or even exclusive form, of colonialism, we share, in a sense, what is widely held to be a postcolonial perspective, which challenges binary modes of thought that posit an insurmountable divide between “us” (in the West) and “them” (virtually everyone else).³ Some adherents of postcolonial theory might, nonetheless, reproach us for epistemological Eurocentrism, or worse, accuse us of trivializing the harm and suffering that Europeans have caused to others by raising the question of how exceptional their colonial ventures were. However, we understand our endeavour rather as a quest for culturally neutral or translatable concepts, suitable for clarifying empirical questions not because they spring from a particular geographical or social background, but because they allow us to detect common traits in things that, at first glance, might appear to belong to different categories. To be sure, this is not a one-way road. Concepts developed for making sense of events outside of Europe can prove to be superior to supposedly universal notions that, in reality, apply only to certain aspects of European history at best.

Without the assumption that we as human beings are capable of distancing ourselves from our particular historical backgrounds and social identities in order to collectively construct more reliable and comprehensive knowledge of our common world, there could be no sociology or other social sciences, and no historical science as we know it. Even purely narrative historiography cannot proceed without theoretical concepts that, to some extent, abstract from the specific case under consideration. If we persist in our

2 Some authors argue that a family resemblance between state formation in Europe and overseas expansion exists. Both could be described as colonial projects, albeit with different trajectories. For two now-classical accounts, see M. Hechter, *Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British National Development*, Berkeley 1975; E. Weber, *Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France, 1870–1914*, Stanford 1976. Medievalist R. Bartlett (*The Making of Europe: Conquest, Colonization and Cultural Change, 950–1350*, Princeton 1993) even maintains that “Latin Europe” as such was born out of various colonization movements in the High Middle Ages. The continent that later set out to conquer and colonize the world was already a product of internal conquest and colonization on this view.

3 For a concise discussion, see J. Go, *Postcolonial Thought and Social Theory*, New York 2016.

scientific endeavour, if we keep trying to illuminate hidden structures and processes, if it is indeed structure and process – and not the mere reproduction of our subjective sensations and experiences – that we are aiming at, we must generalize and objectify, even if there is no timeless truth and no knowledge that is not tainted by power. To be aware of this fact, does not mean giving up science altogether. On the contrary, it can encourage us and is, indeed, a prerequisite for improving our understanding of the world.

As historical sociologists, we therefore still deem it desirable to develop generalized theories – not, however, in the sense of a theory that claims to be able to encompass all of human history or the entire modern world, but in the sense of middle-range theories centred on specified topics. It is in this regard that the present volume brings together sociologists and historians, as well as other social scientists and area specialists to gauge the possibility of a theory of colonialism that includes, but also goes beyond, European expansion. Although no generally accepted theory of colonialism has yet been developed, a couple of conceptual building blocks exist that are more or less uncontroversial.⁴ Moreover, recent years have seen a remarkable revival of general interest in empires, creating a vibrant field of inquiry and scholarly debate across various disciplines.⁵ Both strands of research converge and substantially intersect without being identical.

The term “colony” can, for one, refer to a newly founded settlement, that is, the permanent occupation of formerly unclaimed or undefended land by a group of people coming from elsewhere.⁶ But a colony can also be a dependent territory inhabited by an indigenous population that is subdued, governed, and economically exploited by a foreign power. Moreover, the usually smaller colonizing group displays a strong sense of superiority over the usually more numerous native “others”, which can be expressed in terms of civilizational hierarchies or outright racism. In the colonizer’s gaze, it seems legitimate, if not downright imperative, to pressure, marginalize, and even destroy the indigenous groups and cultures using various means ranging from educational campaigns to genocide. The colonial subjects are typically made to submit through a combination of outright violence and credible threats to use force. The excessive abuses in many of the European overseas territories should, however, be understood, in many cases, as a

4 J. Osterhammel, *Colonialism: A Theoretical Overview*, Princeton 1997; T. v. Trotha, *Was war Kolonialismus?* Einige zusammenfassende Befunde zur Soziologie und Geschichte des Kolonialismus und der Kolonialherrschaft, in: *Saeculum* 55 (2004), pp. 49–95; F. Cooper, *Colonialism in Question: Theory, Knowledge, History*, Berkeley 2005.

5 E.g., A. Pagden, *Peoples and Empires: A Short History of European Migration, Exploration, and Conquest, from Greece to the Present*, New York 1998; D. B. Abernethy, *The Dynamics of Global Dominance: European Overseas Empires, 1415–1980*, New Haven 2000; D. Lieven, *Empire: The Russian Empire and Its Rivals*, New Haven 2001; J. Darwin, *After Tamerlane: The Global History of Empire since 1405*, London 2007; H. Münkler, *Empires: The Logic of World Domination from Ancient Rome to the United States*, Cambridge 2007; J. Burbank and F. Cooper, *Empires in World History: Power and the Politics of Difference*, Princeton 2010; W. Reinhard, *Die Unterwerfung der Welt: Globalgeschichte der Europäischen Expansion 1415–2015*, München 2016; K. Kumar, *Visions of Empire: How Five Imperial Regimes Shaped the World*, Princeton 2017; G. Paquette, *The European Seaborne Empires: From the Thirty Years’ War to the Age of Revolutions*, New Haven 2019. See also M. Middell, *Empires in Current Global Historiography*, which is the opening text of a special issue on *Empires Reconfigured* (ed. by M. Middell and Alessandro Stanziani), in: *Comparativ* 29 (2019), pp. 9–22.

6 For the history of this term, see the discussion in M. I. Finley, *Colonies: An Attempt at a Typology*, in: *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society* 26 (1976), pp. 167–188.

result of the colonizer's lack of effective control on the ground, rather than their alleged absolute power.⁷

Taken together, these attitudes, practices, and social dynamics constitute what Georges Balandier called the "colonial situation".⁸ Although Balandier coined the term to describe the European presence in Africa, it can be used as a conceptual framework for colonies in general. Apart from, or rather because of, the structural "apartheid" between the two groups, the colonial situation is, in principle, shaped by both: strategies of resistance on the part of the population (to be) subdued, including what James C. Scott calls "state evasion", and, at the same time, various forms of cooperation and alliances between the two groups.⁹ For former elites who wish to retain some influence or, conversely, for the losers of the *status quo ante* who now see their chance, working with the new rulers, or at least not against them, can seem to be an option worth pursuing. The same holds for ambitious individuals seeking to improve their situation. By the same token, the newly arrived colonizers, who have not yet established themselves and often possess only limited resources and instruments of power, rely heavily on cooperation or alliances with local elites and leaders.¹⁰

If understood as a form of domination, that is, a specific relationship of power and control, colonialism does not require the large-scale settlement of members of the ruling group. But they need to make their presence felt by the colonial subjects, if only through symbolic means such as deterrent punishments. In historical reality, however, the distinction between the two meanings of the word – settlement and dependency – was often blurred. Even in the first case, settlement was often preceded or accompanied by informal subjugation, as well as the expulsion or extermination of autochthonous inhabitants of the "new found" lands, a phenomenon of which the Phoenician and Greek colonization of the Mediterranean provides numerous examples.¹¹ For practical purposes, we therefore plead for a broad understanding of the term "colony", which includes not only formal dominions, but also organized and often only seemingly non-violent settlements, as long as there is some form of political or economic connection and support from the homeland.

Despite these general features of colonial rule, there are also traits that are unique to modern colonialism, or its historical consequences. The first trait can be found in the global spread of the idea and, if not the reality, then at least the pretension that the

7 Dierk Walter, *Colonial Violence. European Empires and the Use of Force*, New York 2017.

8 G. Balandier, *The Fact of Colonialism: A Theoretical Approach*, in: *CrossCurrents* 2 (1952), pp. 10–31; See also M. Mamdani, *Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism*, Princeton 1996; J. Vansina, *Being Colonized: The Kuba Experience in Rural Congo, 1880–1960*, Madison 2010.

9 J. C. Scott, *The Art of Not Being Governed: An Anarchist History of Upland Southeast Asia*, New Haven 2009, chaps. 5 & 6. See also R. Guha, *Elementary Aspects of Peasant Insurgency in Colonial India*, Durham 1999.

10 For a reappraisal of R. Robinson's (Non-European Foundations of European Imperialism: Sketch for a Theory of Collaboration, in: R. Owen and R. B. Sutcliffe (eds.), *Studies in the Theory of Imperialism*, London 1972, pp. 117–142); for the theory of collaboration, see T. Bührer et al. (eds.), *Cooperation and Empire: Local Realities of Global Processes*, New York 2017.

11 Frank Bernstein, "Ionische Migration" vs. "Große Kolonisation der Griechen", in: *Historia* 68 (2019), pp. 258–284.

natural, self-evident unit of political organization and representation is the territorially bounded nation-state. As John Breuilly suggests, in “modern” empires, in contrast to their “pre-modern” counterparts, the imperial centre is constituted by a separate national state.¹² When the former colonies gained independence, they adopted this political form, which gradually became the new global norm.¹³ It is hardly necessary to dwell on the conflicts and misery that this principle of global order has caused since then.¹⁴ Whatever the realities on the ground, with only a few exceptions, the surface of continents is now neatly divided into nation-states, each of them ruled in the name of a particular people. This was, most certainly, not the intention when Great Britain, France, and the other European powers set out to build their overseas empires.¹⁵ Although it was a widely held belief that only colonial dependencies would guarantee the security, prosperity, and political prestige of the nation, this did not imply that the colonial subjects should form national states of their own. But the result was precisely this.

Nonetheless, it would be wrong to assume that the flow of influence was a one-way street, which can be described in terms of a linear diffusion, without any “creative” adaptations to local conditions or complex interactions or feedback loops between core and periphery. Contrary to this view, the colonies served, in many ways, as laboratories for testing new forms of surveillance, administration, and business organization, and they provoked legal and political debates in Europe around issues of citizenship, the status of the oceans, and international order in general, to name just a few aspects.¹⁶ Moreover, decolonization was not a linear application of Western models of how to organize political communities. It led instead to various modifications of notions concerning nationhood and international order.¹⁷

A second, closely related, trait that distinguishes “modern” from “pre-modern” forms of colonialism is the fact that starting from the “long” nineteenth century at the latest, there was an entire system, or meshwork if you prefer, of colonial powers vying for global dominance.¹⁸ Of course, conflicts and even clashes between empires occurred in earlier times, too. But what distinguishes modern Europe’s imperial history from the trajectories of pre-modern, non-European empires is the fact that, in Europe, the constitution

12 J. Breuilly, *Modern Empires and Nation-States*, in: *Thesis Eleven* 139 (2017), pp. 11–29.

13 E. Manela, *The Wilsonian Moment: Self-Determination and the International Origins of Anticolonial Nationalism*, New York 2007; S. Pedersen, *The Guardians: The League of Nations and the Crisis of Empire*, Oxford 2015.

14 A. Wimmer, *Waves of War: Nationalism, State Formation, and Ethnic Exclusion in the Modern World*, New York 2013.

15 They conceived of themselves as imperial nation-states, separating citizens from subjects. See J. M. Fradera, *The Imperial Nation: Citizens and Subjects in the British, French, Spanish, and American Empires*, Princeton 2018.

16 See A. Escobar, *Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World*, Princeton 1985; A. Anghie, *Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law*, Cambridge 2005; M. Duffield and V. Hewitt (eds.), *Empire, Development & Colonialism: The Past in the Present*, Woodbridge 2009.

17 P. Chatterjee, *The Nation and Its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories*, Princeton 1994; W. Reinhard (ed.), *Verstaatlichung der Welt? Europäische Staatmodelle und außereuropäische Machtprozesse*, München 1999; A. Getachew, *Worldmaking after Empire: The Rise and Fall of Self-Determination*, Princeton 2019.

18 J. Osterhammel, *The Transformation of the World: A Global History of the Nineteenth Century*, Princeton 2014, chap. 8; B. Zupan and G. Lawson, *The Global Transformation: History, Modernity and the Making of International Relations*, Cambridge 2015, chap. 6.

of empires itself was essentially driven by the rivalry between nascent imperial powers and, later, a multitude of empires, that, before clashing in deadly wars, externalized their competition on a global scale. One might say that the scramble for Africa was only the last round in a race between European powers for political self-assertion. It was Europe that ruled large parts of the globe in the late nineteenth and first half of the twentieth century, but unlike in earlier cases no one imperial power dominated the area that, from an imperial point of view, constituted the world or the *ecumene*.

The third characteristic of modern colonialism that appears to be unique is its close links to capitalism. One does not have to advocate for a Marxist theory of imperialism, which, arguably, draws on all too simplistic notions of economic forces (or even “laws”) and political expansion and control, to acknowledge that for the first time in history a truly global economy emerged, as both a result and a motor of European expansion.¹⁹ If it did not obfuscate the fact that all of the empires generally subordinated the prosperity of their colonies to their own needs, one might be tempted to state that modern European imperialism was characterized by many empires, but only one economy. Paradoxically, pre-modern empires benefited directly from their colonies; if they did not, they gave them up or began to disintegrate. The European overseas empires, in contrast, typically did not start as politically planned projects, but rather as economic adventurism, which only after the fact led to formal empire-building.²⁰ But even then, it was by no means certain that the colonies paid off for the centre, which is not the same as saying that private profits were meagre. Similarly, to emphasize the global economic nature of modern colonialism is not to imply that it can explain what Kenneth Pomeranz calls “the Great Divergence”.²¹ To the extent that our current knowledge already allows us to decide this question, it appears that colonies did indeed play a role in safeguarding the economic supremacy of the European powers. But ultimately, internal factors, and primarily political ones, proved to be decisive.

As the preceding considerations demonstrate, it is almost impossible to reflect on defining features of colonialism, or rather colonies, without making repeated use of another key term: empire. As a first approximation, empire can be understood as “a system of interaction between two political entities, one of which, the dominant metropole, exerts political control over the internal and external policy – the effective sovereignty – of the other, the subordinate periphery”, as Michael Doyle suggests in his highly acclaimed study, which develops no less than a conceptual framework for studying both

19 J. Kocka, *Capitalism: A Short History*, Princeton 2006, pp. 54–94; F. Lenger: *Globalen Kapitalismus denken: Historiographie-, theorie- und wissenschaftsgeschichtliche Studien*, Tübingen 2018, pp. 1–48.

20 R. Robinson and J. Gallagher (with A. Denny), *Africa and the Victorians: The Official Mind of Imperialism*, London 1967; D. K. Fieldhouse, *Economics and Empire 1830–1914*, London 1973.

21 K. Pomeranz, *The Great Divergence: China, Europe, and the Making of the Modern World Economy*, Princeton 2000; P. O’Brien, *The Formation of States and Transitions to Modern Economies: England, Europa and Asia Compared*, in: L. Neal and J. G. Williamson (eds.), *The Cambridge History of Capitalism*, vol. 1, *The Rise of Capitalism: From Ancient Origins to 1848*, Cambridge 2014, pp. 357–402; P. Vries, *What Do We Know and Do Not Know About the Great Divergence at the Beginning of 2016*, in: *Historische Mitteilungen der Ranke-Gesellschaft*, 28 (2016), pp. 249–298.

pre-modern and modern empires.²² Empires that acquire and govern only one periphery are, however, rare, if they exist at all. Even Belgium, which might come to mind here, maintained several smaller possessions alongside the Congo (especially Ruanda-Urundi and a concession in Tianjin, China). Many empires throughout history encompassed a plethora of subjugated territories and peoples. They formed a kind of solar system, in which the centre is the sun and its dependent territories are the planets. Accordingly, empires are generally not enclosed by clear-cut borders, but form a field of forces, whose ordering effects diminish with growing distance from the core.²³ Moreover, in contrast to modern nation-states, they usually do not seek to build a unified identity. Instead, they tolerate cultural pluralism or reinforce, if not invent, ethnic differences in order to secure political fragmentation among the subjugated majority.²⁴ Empires manage, instrumentalize, and balance diversity without necessarily wanting to annihilate the particular identities of the various populations inhabiting their extended realms. As Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper put it, it is loyalty, not likeness that empires seek to achieve.²⁵ When loyalty crumbles, however, cultural differences can release centrifugal forces that lead to the formation of new states or nations along imperial fault lines.

At the same time, many empires integrate themselves by projecting a unifying idea or pursuing a historical mission, which appears to justify political expansion and the domination of foreign lands and peoples. In some cases, examples of which might include the Mesopotamian and much later Eurasian steppe empires, the imperial idea consisted of little more than a practical claim to supremacy over the known world. In the Roman Empire and its European heirs, but also in empires outside of Europe, such as China, the political elites developed more elaborate notions of imperial order, which, of course, was closely linked to the existence of written culture and scholarly discourse.²⁶ These ideological framings led to situations that were not so different from those in early nation-states, in which the cultural gap between the national heartland and its various provinces was gradually bridged, without ever vanishing entirely. Thus, as Krishan Kumar notes, empires and nation-states partly blend into each other, despite retaining structural differences.²⁷ This proximity between the two models of political organization is also evidenced by the fact that citizenship was not an invention of modern nation-states. Its genealogy – in the European context – can rather be traced back to antiquity.²⁸ Like all other imperial troops, the Roman legions used brute force to conquer foreign

22 M. Doyle, *Empires*, Ithaca 1986, p. 12. See also G. Steinmetz, *Empires and Colonialism* (2014), in: *Oxford Bibliographies*, DOI: 10.1093/obo/9780199756384-0090.

23 C. S. Maier, *Once Within Borders: Territories of Power, Wealth, and Belonging since 1500*, Cambridge, MA 2016, chap. 1.

24 As is often the case in colonial empires. See again Mamdani, *Citizen and Subject*, with regard to the European colonies in Africa.

25 Burbank and Cooper, *Empires in World History*, p. 12.

26 Münkler, *Empires*, chap. 4.

27 K. Kumar, *Nation-States as Empires, Empires as Nation-States: Two Principles, One Practice?*, in: *Theory and Society* 39 (2010), pp. 119–143.

28 F. Cooper, *Citizenship, Inequality, and Difference: Historical Perspectives*, Princeton 2018.

lands and to assert their claim to power. Roman citizenship was, however, a status that did not have to be forced upon the free, male inhabitants of the empire but was attractive in itself. It allowed one, or at least promised, to make claims on governments and authorities through participation in public affairs, and it provided a framework to settle private conflicts by recourse to impersonal law instead of sheer power. Later, the Roman emperors made Christianity into the state religion. The emperor thus became the political patron of a universalist and, in itself, expansionist religion, which could be adopted by anyone, man or woman, free-born or slave alike. In addition to bringing civilization to the world and leveraging the rule of law, the empire could now claim to back and advance the mission of the church. This missionary, universalistic pretension survived not only the Roman Empire but also Christianity's substitution for other beliefs, ideologies, and practices. Many of the modern empires, too, had a quasi-religious sense of mission.²⁹ Yet, even if an empire relies on a universal idea, it makes a fundamental difference how this idea is "lived" and put into practice, including the conditions under which subjects are deemed worthy of being human and allowed to become imperial "citizens", or at least not structurally disadvantaged denizens of the empire. To the degree that they do, we can speak of imperial rule; to the degree that they do not, a colonial situation emerges, which implies not only politically ascribed differences in formal status, but also civilizational hierarchies between "masters" and their "subjects". Colonial "lordship" is a special kind of domination, not least due to its disregard for internal differences within the subdued group, concerning for example wealth, social prestige, or gender, which are considered secondary to its presumed and, in fact, politically enacted "inferiority".

It is beyond dispute that empires existed long before the dawn of the modern era, and that they shaped the course of history outside of Europe and the Fertile Crescent, too. Colonialism, by contrast, is often thought of as being a specifically modern phenomenon, one, moreover, that was restricted to the European overseas empires. But on what grounds can such a distinction be made? And what would an alternative framework look like that extends our understanding of colonialism without running the risk of overburdening this term? These are the questions that *Krishan Kumar* discusses in the first contribution to this volume. Through a careful examination of Moses Finley's seminal article on the typology of colonies, *Kumar* discusses whether or not the distinction between imperialism and colonialism is meaningful and at what costs it can be drawn. Although *Kumar* concedes to Finley that his narrow definition of a colony – which requires large-scale settlement from people of the metropole – allows us to pinpoint the distinctiveness of modern colonialism, this comes at a high price. For all of their unique features, the European overseas empires were situated on a continuum with ancient and non-European empires, a fact that, on Finley's account, falls out of sight.

As *Martin Mauersberg* illustrates, however, colonialism can be traced back in the European context at least to antiquity. The so-called Greek colonization of the Mediterranean

29 A. Pagden, *Lords of all the World: Ideologies of Empire in Spain, Britain and France c. 1500–c. 1800*, New Haven 1998.

and Black Sea led to the foundation of independent settlements, *apoikiai*, which, despite certain cities' aspirations for hegemony, constituted autonomous political units, whereas the Romans built and expanded their empire through military outposts, *coloniae*, in newly conquered territories. In contrast to the multitude of Greek city-states, the Roman dependencies were thus part of an imperial formation centred on Latium, which more strongly resembles more recent forms of colonialism. By contrast, the Hellenic self-image formed in the wake of the Persian Wars portrayed neighbouring groups as culturally inferior, establishing a civilisational hierarchy between the Graeco-Roman world and the "barbarians". Roman citizenship law, in turn, gave freeborn men in the newly acquired territories the opportunity to become full-fledged members of the empire. These facts complicate the, at first glance, clear contrast between Greek and Roman expansion and make a more nuanced assessment necessary.

Similar complications must also be taken into account when considering the Muslim Arabs, who conquered the Middle East from the seventh century onward. As *Robert Hoyland* explains, the *muhājir* established in their fight against the "infidels" numerous garrison settlements, such as Basra and Kufa in Iraq, Fustat in Egypt, Ramla in Palestine, and Qinnasrin in Syria. These outposts served both as bases for the Arab armies and administrative centres from which they governed the conquered territories. Over time, the garrisons became thriving cities, shaped by substantial Muslim immigration and settlement. Various restrictions were subsequently imposed on the non-Muslim population and Muslim rule was legitimized by appealing to a divine mission. Taking these aspects together, early Islamic rule in the Middle East might be considered a form of colonialism. But *Hoyland* is quick to qualify this view by pointing to the fact that Islam – not unlike Roman citizenship law – provided the subjugated population with the possibility of conversion, thereby becoming members of the nascent Muslim community. This represents a clear difference with respect to the European overseas empires.

When, after the First World War, national movements of independence gained momentum in the Middle East, Arab nationalists compared Ottoman rule with the subsequent French and British administration, which was part of the newly established League of Nations mandate system. In this vein, the Arab states that subsequently formed projected themselves as successfully emerging from the struggle first against Turkish and then against French and British colonial domination. However, as *James A. Reilly* explains, focusing on the Ottoman Empire's rule over Syria, the polemical notion of "Turkish colonialism" is deeply flawed. Leaving aside the obvious fact that the Ottomans and their empire cannot simply be equated with the Turks, as popular perception has it, their style of governance did not amount to a colonial situation. *Reilly* elaborates on how the Ottomans installed a different kind of rule in Syria, which was imperial, but not colonial. Only in the late nineteenth century, when the Ottoman Empire became a semi-colony of the European powers and sought to "modernize" itself, did an Ottoman version of the civilizing mission begin to emerge.

The neighbouring Russian Empire, by contrast, did pursue colonial policies in its southern and eastern provinces. *Michael Khodarkovsky* argues that the Muscovite state which

had been expanding into the mid-Volga regions and Siberia since the mid-sixteenth century onwards can and indeed should be analysed within the same conceptual framework as is used for the European overseas empires. For example, state elites deemed non-Christian peoples to be culturally inferior and “other”, launched settlement programs in the frontier regions, and forcibly relocated insurgent groups. Not unlike the European overseas empires, the Russian Empire also relied heavily on alliances with indigenous elites who, more often than not, pursued their own agenda. There also existed a significant difference, however. In the Russian case, it was a matter of state-driven colonialism from the very beginning, whereas in the European overseas empires, non-state actors typically initiated colonial ventures and the state only stepped in when the situation on the ground was in danger of escalating. At the same time, the Russian state denied the colonial character of its rule and disguised itself as a unitary state.

Thus, in opposition to the so-called blue water thesis, according to which a sea (or other discrete geographical boundary) must separate metropole and periphery in order to assign the dependency status of a colony, land empires with a contiguous territory can also be colonial powers.³⁰ It is the quality or form of domination that is decisive, rather than spatial and environmental features alone. Such an understanding of colonialism can lead to the assessment that even within one and the same empire, certain dependencies are ruled in a colonial fashion while others are not. As *Matthew Mosca* claims, this was also the case in the Qing Empire. Taking into consideration the period from 1600 to 1860, *Mosca* makes visible the internal diversity of this vast and evolving empire. While the Qing expansion into Inner Asia started out as an imperial project that, over time, assumed an increasing colonial character, the rule in southern China leveraged more directly a colonial economic and political order. In Southeast Asia, by contrast, the state shunned away from immediate intervention, despite Chinese merchants, miners, and farmers exercising a growing influence on various branches of the local economy.

With the Inca empire, *Félix A. Acuto* and *Iván Leibowicz* introduce another case of a land-based empire outside of Europe that pursued colonial policies. Beginning as a small polity in the Peruvian highlands, the Incas expanded their realm across large parts of the Andean region since the fifteenth century. Tawantinsuyu – the Inca realm over the four regions of the world – soon became the biggest empire in the Americas before the arrival of the Europeans, encompassing a plethora of peoples. In a way that was not so different from the later Spanish *conquistadores*, the Incas pursued a colonial project that deeply disrupted and reshaped the indigenous cultures they encountered, including frequent deportations to secure political fragmentation. According to *Acuto* and *Leibowicz*, the driving force behind the Inca expansion was not, however, economic interests, security concerns, or the striving for political influence and prestige, as was evidently the case in

30 The phrase blue water, or salt water, thesis seems to have emerged in debates concerning the 1952 U.N. General Assembly Resolution 637 (VII) and the 1960 Resolution 1541 (XV) as a critique against the assertion delimiting the right to decolonization and self-determination to peoples from geographically distinct territories. See also D. Schorkowitz et al. (eds.), *Shifting Forms of Continental Colonialism: Unfinished Struggles and Tensions*, Singapore 2019.

the European overseas empires. Rather, it was a quest for the sacred. The Incas sought to bring order to chaos by connecting with supernatural forces and beings which were believed to dwell in the Andean landscapes.

When the Spanish conquerors arrived in the Americas shortly thereafter, they were surprised to encounter powerful empires and kingdoms that, to be sure, were different from the states they knew from home, but not beyond reasonable comparison. If they wanted to establish themselves here, they needed to make strong allies on the ground. Taking as an example Hernán Cortés – who vanquished the Aztec empire and subsequently became the most influential entrepreneur in the Americas – *Wolfgang Reinhard* elaborates on how European expansion was driven by a combination of individual initiative on the part of the aspiring colonizers and cooperation with indigenous agents and elites. In this way, oligarchical power networks emerged, at the expense of the excluded lower strata of society. This pattern was not unique to the early modern conquest of the Americas. Instead, it repeated itself, in many variations, throughout the entire history of European expansion, as *Reinhard* illustrates using numerous examples.

A plea for taking local agency seriously is also made by *Janne Lahti* in his paper on indigenous colonialism in the North American “Apache land”, which covered large areas along the Rio Grande. *Lahti* puts forward an interpretation of European-Amerindian relations that places both parties on the same analytical plane, that is, treating them equally as actors that shaped their own fate, but also heavily influenced each other. Apache land is understood, on this approach, as a shifting colonial zone, in which competing imperial projects, both European and Amerindian, clashed, but, from time to time, also reached a precarious equilibrium. As the text vividly illustrates, the Apache, Comanches, and Spanish all deemed each other inferior to various degrees. Moreover, they frequently enslaved, but also assimilated, members of the corresponding outgroups. *Lahti* concludes that this reflects the inherent ambivalence of colonialism as a social relationship, which encompasses both various forms of “othering” and close cooperation, if not incorporation.

The fact that the distinction between colonizer and colonized was often blurred, or at least possessed multiple historical layers with shifting positions in the dominance hierarchy, is also evident in the case of Rwanda. Even though the European colonizers treated Hutu and Tutsi as different ethnic or even racial groups, these were, initially, political and socio-economic categories with more or less fluid boundaries. Nonetheless, if one wanted to date the beginnings of colonialism in Rwanda in the late 1890s, when the Belgians and Germans came to the region, this would result in a biased, if not outright wrong understanding. As *Axel T. Paul* explains, the stratification between a cattle-breeding Tutsi minority that ruled over a mainly Hutu peasantry can itself be regarded as a form of colonial or quasi-colonial rule. From the mid-eighteenth century onwards, Rwanda became an imperial power that gradually extended its realm beyond its homeland in Nduga. In the frontier regions, the nascent Rwandan state tried and tested new modes of power and control, which the European colonizers then further exploited and enshrined.

Accordingly, colonialism is a dynamic relationship, encompassing various historical layers. In this vein, *Matthias Leanza* traces the divergent trajectories along which the German protectorate of Southwest Africa – the precursor of modern-day Namibia – evolved from the early 1880s until the First World War, when the troops of the Union of South Africa took over effective control. Arguing that the development of Southwest Africa ran through various stages, each with a distinctive character, *Leanza* elucidates how what is now Namibia initially became a German “sphere of influence” that, after having passed a critical turning point, gradually morphed into an “imperial borderland”, shaped by internal frontiers. After the war against the Herero and Nama, which caused a deep rupture in the German colonial project leading to far-reaching reforms, Southwest Africa was, then, on its way to becoming an “imperial province”, in which a core region crystallized and the civil administration further expanded. With each step, the protectorate’s character profoundly changed, which is why – *Leanza* concludes – it is crucial to understand colonial rule as a dynamic process that can take different paths.

In a similar vein, *Kate McDonald* emphasizes that colonialism is an evolving and multi-layered phenomenon. Surveying recent trends in English-language scholarship on Japanese imperialism and colonialism, she argues that the Japanese Empire was not a monolithic object, but a layered social formation, made up of multiple expansionist projects. Earlier historiography on the subject operated within a framework of Japanese exceptionalism. According to this view, Japan not only entered the “imperial game” comparatively late, but was also unable to appeal to racial hierarchies in the way that the European overseas empires did. As an Asian power ruling over other Asian nations, it was compelled to develop alternative forms of legitimation for colonial conquest and domination. As *McDonald* explains, this narrative has increasingly been called into question in recent years. More recent scholarship regards Japanese expansionism as part and parcel of a broader global trend – the emergence of imperial nation-states – and not as a historical outlier or “anomaly”. Equally important is the fact that Japanese colonialism was not restricted to (outlying) dependencies, such as Taiwan and Korea. The making of a Japanese nation-state can itself be seen as an imperial endeavour. This can be seen most clearly in the settlement of Ezo (present-day Hokkaidō) and the subjection of the Ainu people. *McDonald* regards another strand of research as even more promising: the historical investigation of liminal subject positions and border zones that transgressed colonial order.

Our tour of more than two thousand years of world history ends with an afterword by *Frederick Cooper*. He highlights the milestones reached, points out some of the detours taken along the way, and – most important – suggests promising destinations for future research.

* * *

Is colonialism then perhaps nothing more than a particularly pronounced form of imperial rule? Should we understand the distinction between the two to be a matter of degree

rather than of categorical difference? Despite all disparities and the diversity of viewpoints, the contributions to this volume, taken together, allow us to make the following generalizations: First, colonialism is not limited to modern overseas empires. Throughout history, within and outside of Europe, empires existed that pursued colonial policies. This should not lead us, however, to overtax our understanding of colonialism by equating the term with imperial expansion and rule as such. If the boundary between the indigenous and the ruling population is permeable, if the local cultures are tolerated and perhaps elements of their institutions and belief systems even absorbed into the centre, and – in connection with this – if the ruling people's sense of superiority is not absolute, but progressive integration is possible, then no colonial situation will arise. Conversely, this implies that a colonial relationship emerges whenever an alien group dominates a local society, pressures, marginalizes, or even destroys its culture, and, moreover, establishes a sense of superiority that seems to necessitate a strict separation of “masters” from “subjects”. This distinction is obviously meant as an ideal type in the Weberian sense of the word, which implies gradual transitions and intermediate forms in social reality. Nonetheless, it allows us to make sense of the diverse phenomena we encounter in this broad field of inquiry and opens up new vistas of comparison and scholarly investigation.

What's in a Name? Should We Distinguish Colonialism and Imperialism?

Krishan Kumar

ABSTRACTS

Obwohl im allgemeinen und zumeist auch akademischen Gebrauch nicht zwischen Kolonialismus und Imperialismus unterschieden wird, plädieren einige Wissenschaftler für eine klare analytische Differenzierung zwischen den beiden Begriffen. Ein bekannter Vertreter dieser Auffassung ist der Altphilologe Moses Finley, der im Besonderen den Begriff „Kolonie“ so definieren möchte, dass er sich von „Imperium“ unterscheidet. Sicherlich bringt ein solches Vorgehen Vorteile mit sich, vor allem um die Eigenheit des europäischen „Siedlungskolonialismus“ seit dem 15. Jahrhundert zu betonen. Dieser Artikel argumentiert jedoch, dass eine zu scharfe und vorilige Unterscheidung zwischen Kolonialismus und Imperialismus bedeutende Einbußen mit sich bringt. Sie schränkt die Möglichkeiten vergleichender Forschung erheblich ein, indem die meisten Imperien der Antike und nicht-westliche Reiche wie das chinesische ausgeschlossen werden. Es gibt jedoch über lange Zeiträume und weite Distanzen hinweg bedenkenswerte Kontinuitäten und Überschneidungen zwischen Imperien. Der moderne Kolonialismus ist eine Unterart von imperialer Herrschaft im Allgemeinen, kein von dieser getrenntes Phänomen, das eine besondere Behandlung nötig machen würde. Unsere Darlegungen wären ärmer, würden wir eine zu enge Definition von Kolonialismus zugrunde legen, welche uns die Sicht auf seine vielgestaltige Einbindung in die größere und längere Geschichte imperialer Formationen verstellt.

Though popular and much scholarly usage does not distinguish between colonialism and imperialism, some scholars have argued for a clear analytical distinction between the two. A prominent example is the classicist Moses Finley, who especially wishes to define “colony” in terms that would distinguish it from “empire”. There are certainly some gains from attempting to do this, notably in emphasizing the distinctiveness of European “settler colonialism” from

the fifteenth century onwards. But this article argues that there are also significant losses in trying to draw too hard and fast a line between colonialism and imperialism. It severely limits comparative possibilities, by excluding most of the empires of the ancient world as well as most non-Western empires, such as the Chinese Empire. There are considerable continuities and overlaps between empires across a wide swathe of space and time; modern colonialism is a sub-species of empires in general, not a separate experience requiring special treatment. Our accounts would be the poorer if we adopt too restrictive a definition of colonialism, blinding us to the many ways in which it fits into the larger and longer story of empire.

1. Colony and Empire

Although popular, and much scholarly, usage does not distinguish between colonialism and imperialism, some have felt the need to make such a distinction. The most systematic attempt has been made by the famous classicist, Moses Finley.¹ It is valuable because Finley's discussion is unusually comprehensive, covering many examples of empire, ancient and modern. It raises many of the questions commonly asked about imperial rule, and of the relations between rulers and ruled in empires. It allows us to ask, what might be gained, what lost, if we accept the distinction between colonialism and imperialism. In what ways are colonies different from empires, colonialism from imperialism? Do they operate according to different principles? How should that affect our study of empires? This paper will focus mainly on Finley's account, as providing one of the few attempts to deal systematically with this neglected area.

2. Defining Our Terms

We need first to establish some primary meanings of our terms, to understand their origins and common uses. For all Western cultures, the terms empire/imperialism and colony/colonialism derive from Rome and the Latin language. The first come from *imperium*, the second from *colonia*.

Imperium for the Romans meant more or less absolute rule, originally in the military, later in the state. Military commanders and rulers of empires – *imperatores* – have *imperium*. Fairly soon the state or territory could itself be described as an empire, as for instance the *imperium Romanum*, the Roman Empire. With that use, *imperium* acquired what at that time and later became the accepted meaning of empire, namely, a large state exercising authority over a multiplicity of peoples and territories.²

1 M. I. Finley, Colonies – An Attempt at a Typology, in: Transactions of the Royal Historical Society 26 (1976), pp. 167–188.

2 R. Koebner, Empire, Cambridge 1961, pp. 11–16; K. Kumar, Visions of Empire: How Five Imperial Regimes Shaped the World, Princeton, NJ 2017, pp. 7–13.

“Imperialism” is a different matter. Unlike empire, it does seem as if “imperialism” was late in coming, as if there was no felt need for it as a concept for a long time. According to the detailed study by Richard Koebner and Helmut Schmidt, it was in fact only in the mid-nineteenth century that the word “imperialism” first made its appearance, and then with the highly negative connotation that has marked its use for much of the time since.³ To turn then to *colonia*, the parent of “colony” and “colonialism”. The Latin word *colonia* stems from the verb *colere*, “to cultivate, to farm”. *Colonia* came from *colonus*, who was “a tiller, cultivator [of the ground], a farmer, a planter”, and also “a settler in a new country, an ‘outsettler, a colonist’”.⁴ Hence *colonia* came to mean a settlement of people who had been “planted” in a territory beyond their homeland.

While colony in this sense is relatively old, “colonialism”, like imperialism, is relatively new. According to the Oxford English Dictionary, “colonialism”, as “the practice or manner of things colonial”, was first used in the second half of the nineteenth century. Interestingly, unlike imperialism, colonialism did not initially have negative connotations, being used in a fairly neutral way. It took twentieth-century developments to give it its largely negative charge. It was in that pejorative sense that colonialism came to be the preferred term, supplanting imperialism, for many critics of the Western empires.⁵

3. Moses Finley on Colony and Colonialism

It is very much this etymology that Moses Finley draws upon in attempting to give “technical” meaning to the concepts of colony and colonialism, and to distinguish them from empire and imperialism. Finley lays out two main features of colonies. First, “for more than three hundred years, however much disagreement there may have been about the objectives of colonization or about the ways of governing colonies, there was complete agreement that a colony was a plantation of men, to which men emigrated and settled. *Colon* in French, *Siedler* in German, make the same point”.

Finley immediately adds a second characteristic. “There was also, in those three hundred years, complete agreement that a colony was not only a plantation but also a dependency of the country from which the emigration was initiated.” Colonization therefore cannot be equated with just any emigration – as say the Chinese diaspora in South-East Asia, or South Asians in East Africa or the West Indies.⁶

Finley is aware that his definition of colonies is not new, nor even particularly problematic. Indeed, he is at pains to stress its antiquity. But he is concerned that many people have not acted on the implications of it, and, especially in more recent times, have used colonies, colonization, and colonialism in loose and imprecise ways. What is particularly

3 R. Koebner/H. D. Schmidt, *Imperialism: The Story and Significance of a Political World, 1840–1960*, Cambridge 1965, pp. 1–26.

4 J. A. Simpson/E. S. C. Weiner (eds.), *Oxford English Dictionary*, 2nd edn, Oxford 1991, sv. “colony”.

5 S. Howe, *Empire: A Very Short Introduction*, Oxford 2002, p. 25.

6 Finley, *Colonies*, p. 171.

important for him is what his “technical” concept of colony excludes – where, despite both popular and scholarly practice, it is improper and misleading to apply the term. Thus, contrary to much common usage, Finley denies that we can speak of “colonies” in the ancient Greek world. That is because what are usually referred to as colonies in that context were not dependencies but independent communities. “The so-called Greek and Phoenician colonies of the eighth, seventh and sixth centuries B.C., extending from the coasts of the Black Sea to Marseilles and Carthage, were more peaceful enterprises in some instances, less in others, but what is essential is that they were all, from the start, independent city-states, not colonies.”⁷

“There can be no colonization without colonies.” Hence, also in the ancient world, Finley rejects as colonization “the extensive Macedonian and Greek migration into the territories of the Persian empire conquered by Alexander the Great”. This is because, after Alexander’s death, these communities became independent kingdoms, the Hellenistic kingdoms of Egypt, Syria, and others.⁸ But there seems no reason, on his definition, to deny that these were indeed Greek colonies while Alexander still ruled his empire, though admittedly his early death meant this was a short-lived empire.

On the same grounds – absence of dependency – Finley dismisses the concept of “internal colonization”, or “internal colonialism”. “No-one”, he says, “speaks of the colonization of the mid-west and west of the United States.”⁹ Finley must have been aware that there had been discussions of the “American Empire”, but since colonialism was not for him imperialism the westward movement of white Americans – clearing away the indigenous people as they went – did not constitute a case of true colonization. Conquest, *per se*, is not colonization. The settlers created communities that became Territories, then States of the Union, not dependent colonies.

If the exclusion of the overseas Greek settlements as colonies is provocative, then the exclusion as such of most of the European possessions in sub-Saharan Africa is probably the most controversial. Hundreds of books exist with titles such as “Colonialism in Africa, 1870–1960”.¹⁰ For many people, when they think of European colonialism, it is Africa that they principally have in mind.

Finley will have none of this. It follows directly from his definition of colony that most of Africa, though possessed by Europeans, was not colonized by them. That was because in the majority of cases few Europeans settled in the African territories. There were, that is, few European “plantations” in sub-Saharan Africa, hence few European colonies. Finley is prepared to accept that that one might designate as colonies those few areas where a significant number of Europeans were to be found, even if they were not – as they were not anywhere – a majority. South Africa is one such case, with its large numbers of Boers and British, so too are Kenya and Southern Rhodesia, with their relatively large British

7 *Ibid.*, pp. 173–174.

8 *Ibid.*, p. 173.

9 *Ibid.*

10 L. Gann/P. Duignan (eds.), *Colonialism in Africa, 1870–1960*, Cambridge 1969.

populations. So, “in my categorization, Kenya was a colony, Uganda and the Gold Coast were not. Nor were the Congo, Senegal and the Ivory Coast [...] The struggle for Africa was not, or at least not in large part, a struggle for colonies.”¹¹ The British had a few colonies in Africa, in the south and east; but none of the French, Portuguese, Belgian or German dependencies in sub-Saharan Africa can be called colonies.

The important qualification, in which a significant number of Europeans ruling over a majority of non-Europeans can be considered as forming a colony, allows Finley to designate as colonies a number of European settlements in North Africa, most prominently French Algeria. This is in one way problematic, since Algeria as Finley knows was not by the French themselves considered a colony but – since 1848 – as part of metropolitan France. Administratively it was in this sense similar to the situation in the United Kingdom of Ireland, Scotland and Wales, which Finley declares emphatically were not colonies but sub-divisions of the kingdom.

But, remarking airily that “administrative definitions are essentially unhelpful”, Finley goes on to say that though “Algeria was a fully incorporated department of metropolitan France, yet it was indubitably a colony.” This is because “in every respect other than the administrative, [the non-European] Algerians in the overwhelming majority still considered themselves, more than a century after the conquest, to be the exploited subjects, not so much of the metropolis as of the settlers backed by the coercive power of the metropolis.”¹² Finley here adds a crucial dimension to his idea of colony. It is now not so much, or not only – as in the case of the British in North America, Australia or New Zealand – a matter of the absolute number of Europeans, replacing or subjugating a diminishing number of indigenous peoples, and making themselves in time the majority. Now it becomes also or instead a matter of a certain relation between settlers and the indigenous people, as well as of the settlers and the metropolitan power. For him the “paramount distinction” among European overseas possessions “centres around the extent to which the settlers have both reasons and the power to determine policy, not only against the indigenous population but, even more important, against the metropolis”.¹³ Thus by this criterion, though not by the “majority rule”, South Africa, Rhodesia, Kenya, and Algeria, with their powerful settler communities, are colonies.

Finley here introduces considerations that might seem to threaten to undermine the old, early-modern, concept of colony that he wishes to bring back. It might be very difficult to determine that the power of the *colons* in Algeria, and their relation to the indigenous people, was *categorically* different from that of the admittedly thinner stratum of Dutch residents in the Dutch East Indies, and their relation to the indigenous Indonesians. Yet one is regarded as a colony, the other not. On the other hand, it is true that the French in Algeria, like the British in Kenya or Southern Rhodesia, regarded themselves as permanent settlers in their respective countries. They felt themselves as Maghribi, or as African,

11 Finley, *Colonies*, p. 184.

12 *Ibid.*, p. 187.

13 *Ibid.*, p. 186.

as the non-European populations, if in somewhat different ways. They and their families were there to stay. It was this consciousness that was expressed so powerfully in Algerian-born Albert Camus's posthumous novel "The First Man" his passionate proclamation of his Algerian identity. As the Algerian civil war of the 1950s dragged on, with atrocities on both sides, an anguished Camus insisted that France could not just leave Algeria to its fate in the hands of the Muslim majority. "She cannot, because she could never agree to throw one million, two hundred thousand Frenchmen into the sea."¹⁴

Probably, for Finley, each case has to be decided on its own merits, depending on the character of settler rule, and in particular perhaps the extent to which the settler community is long-standing, extending over several generations. For such European populations, the settled territory is home, as Algeria was for Camus, and as Kenya and Southern Rhodesia were for many British settlers.¹⁵ Such was not the case for the majority of British in India, or French in Indochina, or Dutch in Indonesia. Not only were they mainly a thin stratum of Europeans – administrators, soldiers, traders, engineers, missionaries, educators – sitting atop a population of millions of Asians. Most of them did not regard their stay in the East as permanent. They were there to do a job, to make some money, to get some experience, perhaps just to have an adventure. Unlike the old English couple in Paul Scott's novel "Staying On", who knew that they were exceptional in wishing to remain in India even after independence, most Europeans felt that they were just passing through. Home was Britain, France, or the Netherlands. Their children were usually sent to the home country for their education. After a certain time abroad in the Empire, they too expected to return to the homeland, to re-join their families and to continue a familiar pattern of life. That they were often disappointed in this – the home societies had changed in their absence – did not change their sense of who they were, and where they belonged.

For Finley, these people, and the territories they inhabited, did not form colonies but were components of *empire*. One senses that the main polemical thrust of Finley's contribution is in fact to draw a sharp line between colony and empire, colonialism and imperialism. He wishes to stop people speaking of the British Raj as a colony, or French Indochina as an example of French colonialism. The British, like the French and Dutch, and the Spanish and Portuguese before them, constructed empires, some of the largest in the world. But only some portions of those empires can be considered colonies. All empires are composed of dependencies; but only some dependencies – mostly a minority of them – are colonies. In the British Empire, India, "the jewel in the crown", was a resplendent part of empire but, according to Finley, it was never a colony.

Finley does not, at least in this article, concern himself with the properties of empires. His interest is in defining and delimiting colonies. What is left out, what many people mistakenly call colonies, he is happy to call empire, but more by implication than

14 A. Camus, *The First Man*, quoted in: C. Messud, *Camus and Algeria: The Moral Question*, in: *New York Review of Books*, 7 November 2013, p. 56.

15 See R. Bickers (ed.), *Settlers and Expatriates: Britons over the Seas*, Oxford 2014.

by detailed analysis. Part of the reason for that self-limiting restriction comes in the observation that “the semantics of colonial terminology have not been systematically investigated (unlike ‘empire’ and its cognates)”.¹⁶ In other words, we know pretty well what empires are; it is colonies we are confused about. That may be so; but for all the investigation of empire and imperialism we are still quite some way from agreement about these as well. The continuing disputes about “formal” and “informal” empire, and the differences between them, is just one example of an unfinished scholarly controversy. Be that as it may, and focusing on Finley’s main concern – colonies and colonization – we might ask, what is gained, and what lost, by accepting his restrictive definition of colony? Finley is at pains to return us to an older concept of colony. He feels that much has been lost in the plethora of terms that now feature in official, scholarly, and popular discourse. The British Colonial Office List of 1946, he says, “carries thirty-six main headings, which do not include all the colonies but do include protectorates and trust territories”. The historian and the sociologist, he argues, would do better to establish their own classification. “I shall assume”, he says, “without trying to defend, that there is value in a typology.”¹⁷ Even though, he admits, his “technical” definition of colony goes against “ordinary speech”, it has innumerable advantages for historians and sociologists dealing with a range of cases from ancient Greece to modern colonialism. The argument is that “for most of its history the term had its own specific denotation [...] encompassing specific, intrinsic elements that can be enumerated and examined over a range wide enough to take in, say, ancient Bologna or Narbonne and modern Australia or Mozambique.”¹⁸ This is a strong claim; is it persuasive? Are we better off for adopting Finley’s usage?

4. How Helpful is Finley’s Contribution?

One of the great strengths of Finley’s proposal is that it draws attention to the distinctive nature of European colonialism from about the sixteenth century onwards. General treatments of empire often incorporate modern European colonialism in their accounts without necessarily stressing how different it was from earlier episodes, and how consequential that difference has been. Modern European colonialism opened a new chapter in world history, one whose impact can still be seen and felt the world over. European conquests certainly involved older elements of empire, and indeed the aspiration to be a “new Rome” was common to nearly all the European empires.¹⁹ But the new thing, the unprecedented thing, was the scale and significance of the movement of Europeans to all the corners of the world – the creation, in other words, of colonies as Finley understands that term.

16 Finley, *Colonies*, p. 168.

17 *Ibid.*

18 *Ibid.*, p. 170.

19 Kumar, *Visions of Empire*, pp. 37–44.

No other subdivision of the human species has occupied so many parts of the earth as Europeans. The result has been the establishment of a large number of “neo-Europes” around the globe. People of European descent – European creoles – make up over ninety per cent of the population of Australia and New Zealand, over eighty per cent of the population of North America, and over three-quarters of the population of South America. There are or were substantial communities of Europeans in North and South Africa, and smaller pockets in Asia.²⁰

The established settler communities – in the Americas and Australasia, and parts of Africa – developed a distinctive pattern of life that differed in many respects from the smaller communities of Europeans in other parts of the European empires. This too is something that Finley’s concept brings out more clearly than those concepts that elide colony and empire. There were different attitudes and policies – often of a savagely exclusionary kind – towards indigenous peoples, leading to their expulsion from their homelands, sometimes to their near-extinction. This is part of what Michael Mann, noting the relative egalitarianism that prevailed among the settler communities, has called “the dark side of democracy”.²¹ This compares, say, with the attitudes of the British community in India or the French in Indochina, where awareness of the antiquity of the civilization, together with the relatively small size of the European communities, compelled generally a more cautious and often respectful attitude towards the native peoples.

There were differences also in the attitudes towards the homeland. The small European communities in most of Asia and sub-Saharan Africa continued to keep their metropolitan identities, as British, French, or German, often stressing them even more than their counterparts at home. That was to a good extent true for much of the time also of the larger settler communities, as has been clear in the extensive work that has now been done, in the case of the British Empire, on the “British World” of the white dominions.²² The American colonists insisted on their Britishness, and claimed the rights of “true-born Englishmen”, until their break with Britain. Australians, Canadians, New Zealanders, and British South Africans did similarly. But, like the Americans, when the time came, they did not find it difficult to declare their own identities, different from the metropolitan British, as Australians, Canadians, etc. In the established settler communities, where the residents saw themselves as there to stay, along with their descendants, it was inevitable that a new sense of the self would emerge, in environments and climates often wildly different from those of their home countries. This might often lead to clashes with the metropolitan authority, even before independence or autonomy was attained by settlers. This was less easy for those Europeans who had to keep themselves in readiness, sooner or later, for the return home.

20 J. Belich, *Replenishing the Earth: The Settler Revolution and the Rise of the Anglo-World, 1783–1939*, Oxford 2009, pp. 25–42.

21 M. Mann, *The Dark Side of Democracy: Explaining Ethnic Cleansing*, Cambridge 2005, pp. 70–98.

22 C. Bridge/K. Fedorowich (eds.), *The British World: Diaspora, Culture and Identity*, London 2003.

The term “colonial empire”, so ubiquitous in the literature, by eliding the two entities hides the distinctiveness of the modern European empires that – unlike most of the ancient or non-Western empires – laid down their presence in the world by settling – “planting” – large numbers of their own peoples on virtually every continent. The value of Finley’s exercise in classification lies above all in stressing that. The European imperial experience was in that respect unique, and it has had profound effects on the legacy of empire.

But what, on the other hand, might be lost in drawing so hard and fast a line between colony and empire? Does it prevent us from generalizing about the British or French empires, which contained both colonial and non-colonial elements? Is there no place for ideologies of empire, and concepts such the “civilizing mission” that not only found individual forms in the various empires but can also be held to have been a general European justification of empire?²³ The fact that so many scholars, as well as other commentators, feel no need to distinguish between colony and empire, suggests that in discussing empire in general we may unduly constrain ourselves if we insist too strongly on the distinction. The search for commonalities in the imperial experience is as important as the stress on differences. The European settler colony no doubt needs to be noticed for its special qualities. But it was also part of a wider movement of empire, one that saw itself in a particular tradition of empire, with its own hallmarks. For European rulers it was important to be included in the “family of empires”, to show that they understood what it was to be an empire.

In the European case, the hold of Rome was paramount.²⁴ For Europeans, Rome had invented empire. They studied it through the classical authors – Sallust, Vergil, Cicero, Plutarch, Tacitus – that formed the bedrock of the education of the European ruling class. Rome had wrestled with the problem of imperial citizenship, coming up with categories that were thought to be highly applicable to the European overseas empires, incorporating as the Roman Empire did “barbarous” peoples such as the Gauls and Lombards. The Roman Empire too had incubated Christianity, eventually adopting it as the state religion and thus ensuring its future and its widespread diffusion. Charlemagne’s Holy Roman Empire, in self-consciously reviving the Roman tradition, had confirmed this union of religion and empire. All European empires adopted this heritage, even after the division of Christianity into Catholic and Orthodox, Catholic and Protestant. Moscow might in the sixteenth century proclaim itself “the third Rome”, in succession to Rome and Byzantium, but whatever the differences, the promotion of Christianity was a common feature of all the European empires.

There are other problems with Finley’s attempt to erect a boundary between colony and empire. One concerns the concept of “internal colonialism”, which many have found illuminating in considering the development of certain societies, whether or not they had formal empires, and whether or not they had colonies (as Finley understands them).

23 S. Conrad, *German Colonialism: A Short History*, S. O’Hagan (trans.), Cambridge 2008, p. 137.

24 Kumar, *Visions of Empire*, pp. 37–73.

Thus the westward movement of the American colonists after independence may not have led to the establishment of colonies, but there certainly seems something “imperial” in the expansion to the Pacific, as noted earlier. The debate about the “American Empire” has many facets; but whatever its global aspects, a strong case can be made for considering America as at least a land empire, in this case perhaps comparable to Russia’s eastward expansion to the Pacific in the construction of its empire.²⁵ The United Kingdom has also already been mentioned as a land empire formed through internal colonialism. We might also consider the fruitfulness of the concept in relation to large multi-ethnic states such as India and Nigeria. Too strong an emphasis on the distinction between colony and empire, and between colonialism and imperialism, inhibits the search for comparisons and parallels that can often be highly instructive.

This points to the need not to overemphasize too much, as is common in much of the literature, the distinction between land and overseas empires. Some countries – Britain, Spain, France – in any case had both.²⁶ The two types of empire have their differences, no doubt, and some of these can be very important, but there are also continuities and similarities between them which should not be overlooked. This links to a similar observation that can be made about the equally common distinction between “ancient” and “modern” empires. Most ancient empires were land empires, though some, like the Roman Empire, had significant, though “near-abroad”, overseas possessions. Moreover, few possessed (Finley-type) colonies. There were settlements on occupied land, but they were usually incorporated directly into the state, as with the provinces of the Roman Empire. For Finley the ancient world is replete with empires and imperialism, but conspicuously lacking in colonies and colonialism.

If colonialism is the distinctive hallmark of modern empires, this view of settlements in the ancient world tends to make the empires of that world something very different from modern empires, and requiring perhaps separate treatment. At the very least that would vastly diminish the field for purposes of comparative analysis. Michael Adas has noted that

*the term ‘colonization’ has come to refer almost exclusively to historical processes involving western Europeans, or their settler progeny [...] Colonialism is deemed to be one of the global forces that has defined the modern age; empires are seen as modes of state expansion with an ancient lineage, increasingly anachronistic in an age of industrialization and high technology.*²⁷

One consequence of this persistent “Western-centrism”, Adas further observes, is to relegate many non-Western examples, such as China and Mughal India, to the archaic

25 M. Khodarkovsky, *Russia’s Steppe Frontier: The Making of a Colonial Empire, 1500–1800*, Bloomington, IN 2002; V. G. Kiernan, *America: The New Imperialism. From White Settlement to World Hegemony*, 2nd edn, London 2005.

26 K. Kumar, *Nation-States as Empires, Empires as Nation-States: Two Principles, One Practice?* in: *Theory and Society* 39 (2010) 2, pp. 119–143.

27 M. Adas, *Imperialism and Colonialism in Comparative Perspective*, in: *The International History Review* 20 (1989) 2, p. 371.

realm of empire. Western colonialism is world-spanning; “empires” are more restrictive cases of largely regional expansion, involving the conquest of neighbouring peoples and states (i.e., “empires” are almost exclusively land empires; overseas empires are “colonial”). The East had empire in abundance (“Oriental Despotism”); but, like the ancient world according to Finley, it lacked colonialism. This limits its role in world history. Adas suggests that this restrictiveness of approach does not just hide important points of similarity between Western and non-Western empires but, equally, interesting differences (some of which are contained in the contrast between land empires – both Eastern *and* Western – and overseas empires).²⁸

China is certainly a case in point. It is true that, despite the famed voyages of the Ming admiral Zheng He, China did not seize the opportunity to establish overseas colonies. The Chinese Empire remained a land empire – one of the largest in history. But that should not of course exclude China from any large-scale, comparative, account of empires, including the European overseas empires. This is particularly so if we do not treat the Chinese Empire as some sort of timeless, unchanging entity, with an uninterrupted, two-millennia lifespan from 221 B.C.E. to 1912 C.E. There were several marked discontinuities, most notably the Mongol conquest that established the Yuan Dynasty (1279–1368), and the Manchu conquest that of the Qing (1644–1912). During the Qing dynasty, especially in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, China expanded massively in Inner Asia, annexing Tibet, Mongolia, and Xinjiang. It also strengthened its hold over the south of the country, and it occupied the nearby island of Taiwan. By the end of the eighteenth century the Qing had more than doubled the size of the country. This was, in the eyes of many scholars today, “Manchu colonialism”.²⁹

Of course, “Manchu colonialism” is not colonialism in Finley’s sense. The Inner Asian territories were undoubtedly dependencies, but they did not involve plantations of significant numbers of Chinese from the homeland. But it is here that the narrowness of Finley’s concept of colony most glaringly reveals itself; or, perhaps more importantly, where the attempt to separate colony from empire most shows its limitations. One can, if one wishes, focus on the distinctiveness of settler life and the settler community. That is the strength of Finley’s approach, and the main justification for trying to revive the old – that is, the early-modern – meaning of the term colony. But it seems perverse to restrict colonialism to simply the establishment of these dependent settler communities, when, as the Chinese case clearly shows, empires can and do usually have both this type of colonialism (e.g. in Taiwan) and colonies in the wider and – today – more conventional sense, as in the Inner Asian dependencies. It is not just that colonies do not have to be overseas. Nor do they have to be composed of a majority of members of the metropolitan power. What is more important is the fact of dependency, and, more importantly, that they are in some important sense not a normal part of the metropolis.

28 Ibid.

29 Special issue “Manchu Colonialism”, *International History Review*, 20 (1998) 2, pp. 253–504; P. C. Perdue, *China Marches West: The Qing Conquest of Central Eurasia*, Cambridge, MA 2005.

What comes out in this discussion is the danger of seeking too precise a definition of colony, as attempted by Finley, and trying then to prise apart colony from empire. Colonies and colonization come in a variety of forms. Some take the form identified by Finley – plantations of large numbers of settlers. But others might involve a relatively small group of metropolitan people ruling over diverse groups, and yet living in ways that are clearly distinguishable from those of the metropolitan society. That would apply not just to China's Inner Asian colonies but also, say, the settlements of Russians in Central Asia and the Far East in the eastward drive of the tsarist Russian Empire. We have already considered America's westward movement as equally a kind of colonization, even though the settlers did not establish separate, autonomous, communities.

Finley's intervention was stimulating and productive, though it has not yet received the attention it warrants. It forces us to think more clearly about what we mean by many terms – colony, colonialism, colonial empires – that are common in the literature but are often loosely used as synonyms for empire and imperialism. There *is* something distinctive about colonies as Finley understands the term. They do seem – as Fieldhouse and others suggest – to mark a new departure in the imperial story, from about 1600 onwards.³⁰ European imperialism from that time, for all the continuities with past forms of empire, does seem to incorporate a new element, in the creation of dependent yet largely self-governing communities of settlers.

At the same time, it seems dangerously restrictive to carve out a separate intellectual domain of “colonies and colonialism”, as something demanding very different treatment from that we give to empire and imperialism. Colonies – of different kinds – are a part of empire. They only have existence as manifestations of an imperial drive. They do not form a self-sufficient universe. The very fact of dependency means that they exist in structures that go beyond them, that incorporate many diverse elements, and that have purposes and intentions that often offend one or more of its component parts. Empires are agglomerations, often untidy and unwieldy, but also with visions and ideologies that give meaning to their existence in the world, and the justification for their continued presence.³¹ The colonies that are part of them draw on these ideologies, even as they sometimes use them against the imperial centres themselves. We should beware of treating colonies as distinct from empires; they are part and parcel of them; their story is an imperial story; even when they separate from them, they carry the marks of their membership of empire well into their future.

30 D. K. Fieldhouse, *The Colonial Empires: A Comparative Survey from the Eighteenth Century*, 2nd edn, Houndmills 1982.

31 Kumar, *Visions of Empire*.

Of Archetypes and Special Cases: Colonization in Greek and Roman Antiquity

Martin Mauersberg

ABSTRACTS

Für „Comparing Colonialism“ bieten sich auch vormoderne Formen von Kolonisation an, wobei die griechische und römische Kolonisation aufgrund der Annahme eines besonderen Verhältnisses zur neuzeitlichen europäischen Kolonisation heraussticht: Die beiden antiken Kolonisationen wurden nicht nur als Beispiele von Kolonisation gesehen, sondern als inhärent „europäisch“ und somit als Vorläufer der modernen europäischen Kolonialreiche. Die Folge war die Verwendung eines anachronistischen Deutungsmusters bei der Rekonstruktion der beiden antiken Phänomene. Folglich hinterfragt der Aufsatz diese überkommene moderne Wahrnehmung und erläutert die Eigenheiten der griechischen und römischen Kolonisation: Sie bedeuteten primär die Gründung von Städten, und zwar nicht notwendigerweise in der Nachbarschaft von „Anderen“ oder mit dem Ziel der politischen Domination.

Pre-modern forms of colonization readily come to mind when “comparing colonialism”. Among them, the colonization undertaken by the Greeks and the Romans stands out, because of a longstanding assumption about their special relationship to modern European colonization. Greek colonization and Roman colonization were not merely seen as distinct exemplars of colonization, but also as inherently “European” phenomena and therefore as forerunners of Europe’s more recent exploits overseas – a perception which imposes an anachronistic interpretative framework. Consequently, the paper calls into question these well-established modern perceptions and examines the peculiarities of Greek and Roman colonization, which consisted, above all, in the establishment of cities, which were, however, not necessarily adjacent to “Others” or aimed at political domination.

1. Introduction

Handbooks on colonization occasionally include pre-modern forms of colonization when they try to establish a typology of this phenomenon. While, in the era of “post-colonialism”, non-European cases are also considered,¹ for a long time a Eurocentric perspective was responsible for the inclusion of the presumed ancestors of colonialism: the Greeks and the Romans.² At first glance, this paper is no exception: It describes the characteristics of Greek and Roman colonization as a part of an endeavour of “Comparing Colonialism”.

First, some preliminary definitions: “Greek colonization” and “Roman colonization” are modern framings. The first refers primarily to the settlement of the Mediterranean coasts by groups originating in the Aegean from the second half of the eighth century to the sixth century BC. “Roman Colonization” is the label for the foundation of *coloniae* in conquered regions starting from roughly the fifth century BC. Both cases primarily involved the establishment of cities. “Colonization” will primarily be understood in terms of the establishment of a double power relation: metropolises – colonies (here: cities) – local populations. This point of view allows us to condense the presentation of the two cases according to the plan of, first, highlighting their peculiarities in comparison with modern European colonization, and, second, juxtaposing traditional modern accounts with recent re-evaluations of these accounts.

Hence, the relations between metropolises and colonies will be defined as basic parameters, including the question of the reason for their being established. The relations between colonizers and colonized will also be defined, including the question how land was obtained and the issue of “othering”, i.e. if a dichotomisation of in- and outgroup was palpable. First, however, special emphasis will be placed on ancient accounts. Modern scholarship has tended to integrate extant ancient accounts into a modern interpretative framework, i.e. assumptions concerning the overall nature of the phenomenon of colonization, thereby suppressing some of the peculiarities of the two cases. The subsequent presentation of Greek and Roman colonization will combine those aspects that we know about these two cases with an outline of recent developments in contemporary scholarship, since there is a heightened awareness today concerning the retrojection of modern assumptions onto premodern cases. Consequently, we are witnessing the ongoing deconstruction of traditional views on Greek and Roman colonization, one of whose consequences is a debate about whether it is justified to use colonial terminology in relation to the Greeks.³

1 See C. Gosden, *Archaeology and Colonialism: Cultural Contact from 5000 BC to the Present*, Cambridge 2004; J. Osterhammel, *Kolonialismus. Geschichte – Formen – Folgen*, München 2009, pp. 8–15.

2 See M. Mauersberg, *Die „griechische Kolonisation“. Ihr Bild in der Antike und der modernen altertumswissenschaftlichen Forschung*, Bielefeld 2019; for modern perceptions of Roman colonization, e.g. see the essays in C. Edwards (ed.), *Roman Presences*, Cambridge 1999.

3 See H. Hurst/S. Owen (eds.), *Ancient Colonizations. Analogy, Similarity and Difference*, London 2005; G. R.

2. Ancient Perceptions

Our access to the way in which the Greeks and Romans themselves perceived their colonizations is hindered by the small number of surviving written sources. The biggest problem is caused by the absence of contemporary accounts: In the case of Greek colonization, the earliest extant works of ancient historiography explicitly addressing this phenomenon date to the fifth century BC, that is, up to 300 years after the events described. The situation is only marginally better for Roman colonization: The earliest, largely preserved historiographical works date to the second century BC. Thus, in the case of the earlier Roman *coloniae*, as well, our sources consist of retrospective descriptions. Historical information was often transmitted orally, which means that we enter the realm of oral tradition with all of its attendant problems, first and foremost the adaptability of content to contemporary perceptions and interests. Furthermore, ancient historiography is typically an interpretation of the past in line with contemporary axiomatics, as well as an emplotment that follows an overarching narrative aim.⁴ In both cases, archaeological and epigraphic evidence can alleviate this situation to a certain extent.

The modern framing of colonization is alien to the Greeks. Instead they spoke about the foundation (*ktisis*) of *apoikiai*, which roughly translates as “settlement away from home”.⁵ Generally speaking, nearly every Greek city (*polis*) was considered an *apoikia*, meaning that at some point in the distant past it had been founded by a migrant. This basic assumption also meant that *apoikiai* were not restricted to foreign regions, but were also founded in Greece itself. Almost as a matter of course, an *apoikia* claimed a particular *mētropolis* – literally “mother city” – as its origin (only the Athenians made an exception of themselves by claiming that they were sprung from the soil). One of the earliest extant examples of this phenomenon is from a fragment of a poem by Anacreon (c.580–c.485 BC), in which the city of Abdera is described as the “beautiful *apoikia* of the Teians”.⁶ As a consequence, relations of kinship and descent between *poleis* were addressed when talking about *apoikiai*.

Foundations were narrated as intentional acts of establishment, either by individuals or by *mētropoleis*. This also determined the perception of the causes of these foundations: If foundation narratives focused on individuals, then they prominently featured motives like political discontent or flight because of crimes. By contrast, if a community decided to send away some of its members, this was attributed to political strife or natural disasters. In either case, the Delphic oracle too could command a colony to be founded.⁷

Tsetskhadze / J. Hargrave, Colonisation from Antiquity to Modern Times: Comparisons and Contrasts, in: AWE 10 (2011), pp. 161–82.

4 See, e.g., J. Marincola, Authority and Tradition in Ancient Historiography, Cambridge 1997.

5 See M. Casevitz, Le vocabulaire de la colonisation en grec ancien. Étude lexicologique, Paris 1985, esp. pp. 120–121.

6 Anacreon fr. 505a (PMG) *apud* Strabo 14. 1. 30.

7 See C. Dougherty, The Poetics of Colonization: From City to Text in Archaic Greece, New York/Oxford 1993.

This genealogical perspective on the history of *poleis* was charged with the issue of power politics in Classical Greece (fifth and fourth centuries BC). After the Persian Wars, Athens and Sparta emerged as the two leading powers in Greece. Their struggle for hegemony (*hēgemonia* – from *hēgeomai*, to lead – was used alongside the term *archē* to denote political domination) culminated in the Peloponnesian War, which was eventually won by the Spartans. Thucydides, one of our main sources for Greek colonization, wrote against this background. A decisive factor in obtaining power was winning the allegiance of other cities, for which reference to common descent was considered the most solid foundation.⁸ Hence, *apoikia* were of special interest. Accordingly, Thucydides' excursus on the history of the Greek cities of Sicily deduced their loyalty from their pedigree.⁹ He was forced to concede, however, that the customary bonds between a *mētropolis* and its *apoikia* were in some cases no longer upheld because of short-term political interests.¹⁰ While cities were continually founded by Alexander the Great and his successors in the Hellenistic period (end of the fourth century to the first century BC), the term *apoikia* seems to have gone out of fashion. This might have been the result of the loss of specific *mētropoleis* as points of reference: The settlers were often of different origins and they owed allegiance to the king who founded the city and to his dynasty.¹¹

Modern colonial terminology derives from the Latin term *colonia*, which builds on the verb *colere*, designating the activity of cultivation. Accordingly, the *colonus*/settler was considered a farmer, as well as a soldier: *Coloniae* were perceived as having a military function, since they were outposts in conquered territories.¹² There was, however, no general term comparable to “colonization” for the establishment of *coloniae* considered as a whole.

The genealogical paradigm also applied to Roman perception of the past, only with the multitude of Greek *mētropoleis* replaced by Rome as the central focal point. Rome itself was also considered a *colonia*, founded by the mythical twins Romulus and Remus from Alba Longa (in 753 BC, as tradition has it – although there was no agreement about this date even in Antiquity). Alba Longa itself was assumed to have been founded by Ascanius, son of the Trojan fugitive Aeneas, which provided Rome with its Trojan pedigree. The foundation of Rome was depicted as an archetypical foundation: Romulus was supposed to have inaugurated the future practice of the Roman foundation of *coloniae* (along with other central elements of the Roman socio-political order): There was a formal *deductio*, the leading away of the settlers from Rome, and specific rites to be carried out when settling a conquered territory.

The extant historiographical works were written with knowledge of the Roman conquest of the Italian Peninsula and its rise as the dominant power in the Mediterranean. Dur-

8 See the so-called “Melian dialogue”: Thucydides 5. 84–116.

9 Thucydides 6. 3–5.

10 Ibid. 7. 57. 6–7.

11 See Mauersberg, Die „griechische Kolonisation“, pp. 113–173.

12 See J. R. Patterson, Colonization and Historiography: The Roman Republic, in: G. Bradley / J.-P. Wilson (eds.), Greek & Roman Colonization: Origins, Ideologies and Interactions, Swansea 2006, pp. 189–218, at 191–199.

ing this process, the *coloniae* were perceived as one of several factors contributing to the Roman success story. Since *coloniae* were considered to have been an element of Roman politics since its inauguration by Romulus, we must be aware that contemporary knowledge about the establishment of *coloniae*, as found in the extant sources, was retrojected onto earlier eras of Roman history.¹³ At the same time, we must account for the presence of a certain hindsight in these later historiographical narratives, which served, at least implicitly, to explain Rome's ascent as the dominant power in the Mediterranean¹⁴ – a process, which was seen as inevitable due to the superiority of the Roman political system, “typical” Roman virtues (like *virtus* – i.e. valor, that is virility – and piety) and the blessing of the gods.¹⁵

Increasing awareness of the constructedness of self-perception and its dialectical relation to the perception of others has shaken the humanities and social sciences over the course of the last decades: Identity has become a complex and contingent object. This is also true for classics. Especially in relation to the early historical phases, feelings of belonging must be envisaged as being community-centred, while a supraordinate common identity needed to evolve over time. Kinship, descent and common cultural markers helped to shape discourses of inclusion and exclusion,¹⁶ although an individual's social status or gender (e.g. intermarriage, although women were excluded from the citizen body) also potentially played a role in inter-community movement.

We know little about the self-perception of archaic Greeks or their views of outgroups. There is even a debate about whether we can properly speak of “Greeks”, that is, whether there was already an overarching Greek consciousness.¹⁷ The rare contemporary sources at our disposal, such as the Homeric epics, suggest that while markers like language or cultural differences helped to differentiate “we” from “they”, there does not seem to have been any stereotypical debasement of outgroups: They were rather perceived heterogeneously.¹⁸ It is noteworthy that relations of kinship and descent were also applied to non-Greeks, since they could be described as being descended from Greek heroes and foreign heroes could be seen as ancestors of Greeks.¹⁹ We know even less about the self-perceptions of local populations, who became neighbours of the Greeks, since only the latter's perceptions have been preserved in the extant sources.

13 See E. Bispham, *Coloniae deducere*: How Roman was Roman Colonization during the Middle Republic?, in: G. Bradley/J.-P. Wilson (eds.), *Greek & Roman Colonization. Origins, Ideologies & Interactions*, Swansea 2006, pp. 73–160, esp. 75–85.

14 See H. Mouritsen, *Hindsight and Historiography: Writing the History of Pre-Roman Italy*, in: M. Jehne/R. Pfeilschifter (eds.), *Herrschaft ohne Integration? Rom und Italien in republikanischer Zeit*, Frankfurt am Main 2006, pp. 23–37.

15 See G. Woolf, *Rome: An Empire's Story*, Oxford 2012, pp. 113–126.

16 On these mechanisms, see E. S. Gruen, *Did Ancient Identity depend on Ethnicity? A Preliminary Probe*, in: *Phoenix* 67 (2013) 1/2, pp. 1–22.

17 See J. Hall, *How “Greek” were the Early Western Greeks?*, in: K. Lomas. (ed.), *Greek Identity in the Western Mediterranean*, Leiden 2004, pp. 35–54.

18 See K. Vlassopoulos, *Greeks and Barbarians*, Cambridge 2013, pp. 161–225.

19 See E. S. Gruen, *Rethinking the Other in Antiquity*, Princeton 2012, pp. 223–243.

A more pronounced Hellenic self-perception in opposition to a generalized perception of outgroups (i.e. “barbarians”) probably developed around the fifth century BC as a result of the Persian Wars (early fifth century BC) and the subsequent ideological use of the political project of a war of retribution against the Persians in the struggle for hegemony in Greece. There was a tendency in the sources of the Classical era towards a stereotyped, negative perception of “barbarians” as being culturally inferior.²⁰ A sentiment of belonging to a greater Greek cultural community prevailed in the Hellenistic period, while the situation became more complex, as the conquests of Alexander the Great brought with them the task of ruling over multi-ethnic kingdoms. This led to ambivalent situations: We see, for example, the adaption of the Ptolemaic dynasty in Egypt to the Pharaonic style of rulership, while other Diadochi maintained their Greekness. Complex processes of integration and acculturation thus occurred, as well as accentuations of one’s own identity both on the side of the local populations and on that of the Greeks.

A similar development may have occurred in Rome, too. Early Roman self-perception correlated with the extension of its domination, especially when the Romans encountered groups speaking different languages outside of Latium. The apparent possibility of enfranchising outgroup members into their own citizen body suggests, in any case, that there was no unbridgeable dichotomisation. Once again, these early historical phases are difficult to penetrate, since we only have access to later descriptions, which were written from within a very different understanding of Roman civic identity. Nevertheless, it is remarkable that depictions of the foundation of Rome put an explicit emphasis on the “fact” that people with different origins gathered at Rome to build its community – an emphasis which also was pointed out by Greek observers, since it stood in contrast to a more restrictive policy concerning enfranchisement into the citizen body in the Greek *poleis*.²¹ This accentuation of inclusiveness may, however, have been a retrojection against the background of the enfranchisement all (free) inhabitants of Italy up to the Po Valley into the Roman citizen body, which brought an end to the Social War (91–88 BC) against rebellious Italian allies. A more rigorous distinction between “we” and “they” developed in the second century BC after the Second Punic War (218–202 BC), which included an increasing feeling of exclusiveness, even towards non-Roman Italians.²² At the same time, there was an ongoing process of integration into Roman citizenship, not least through the admission of non-Romans to *coloniae*.

Colonies were potentially an integrative factor (notwithstanding the violence and displacement that their establishment potentially brought with them) and a means of Hellenisation and Romanisation, at least in later historical phases. This implies that “othering” was never as rigid as in the modern colonization of the nineteenth and twentieth

20 See J. Hall, *Hellenicity: Between Ethnicity and Culture*, Chicago 2002, esp. 205–220; Vlassopoulos, *Greeks and Barbarians*, pp. 190–200.

21 See, e.g. Dionysius of Halicarnassus 2. 16.

22 See Bradley, *Colonization and Identity* pp. 161–187.

centuries with its, *in extremis*, racialized justification for the opposition between colonizers and colonized.

3. Greek “Colonization”?

The application of colonial terminology to the settlement of the Mediterranean coast by groups originating in the Aegean between the eighth and the sixth century BC is currently hotly debated in the scholarship. While consensus exists that there is a danger of retrojecting anachronistic conceptions, scholars disagree about how to respond to this threat: One side urges that we “eradicate” “chapters on ‘Colonization’ from books on early Greece” to allow a “proper understanding” of the phenomenon in question, to cite the battle cry of Robin Osborne;²³ the other side acknowledges the problems that colonial terminology and its connotations bring with it, but believes that the term can be defined more openly to match the specific case.²⁴

The definition of “colonization” is under scrutiny: Concerning the relation of a metropole to its colonies, it has become a matter of debate whether the earlier *apoikiai*, in particular, were established intentionally at all. Instead, a gradual process of settlement is envisaged: Accumulative settlements only eventually developed into fully-fledged Greek *poleis* – a process which was only retrospectively narrated as a deliberate foundation by one or at most two specific Greek metropolises, as a result of the attempt to create clear-cut genealogical webs between Greek *poleis*.²⁵ Thus, the colonial analogy is considered a hindrance, because of the fact that it connotes intentional foundation by a metropole. The traditional modern perception takes these ancient retrospective constructions as proof for intentional foundations, thereby suppressing the ancient interpretative framework, which served to create genealogies, and replacing it with the modern framework of telling a typical “colonial” story. Another underlying issue in this debate is the question of when the “precolonial” establishment of improvised settlements turned into the proper practice of colonial foundation: Scholars suppose either that this happened in the course of the Archaic period or that this process is relegated to its earliest beginnings, resulting in more or less fixed practices of establishing colonies from early on. Effectively this amounts to the question of whether there were already Greek *poleis*, in the sense of city-states, from the beginning, which could then function as *mētropoleis*, or whether the Greek city-state, as we know it from the Classical period, also developed gradually.²⁶

23 R. Osborne, Early Greek Colonization? The Nature of Greek Settlement in the West, in: N. Fisher/H. van Wees (eds.), *Archaic Greece: New Approaches and New Evidence*, London 1998, p. 269.

24 See Tsetschladze/Hargrave, *Colonisation from Antiquity to Modern Times*.

25 E.g. see C. Ulf/E. Kistler, *Die Entstehung Griechenlands*, Berlin 2020, pp. 44–48 and 92–95. Cf. e.g. I. Malkin, Exploring the Validity of the Concept of “Foundation”: A Visit to Megara Hyblaia, in: V. B. Gorman/E. W. Robinson (eds.), *Oikistes: Studies in Constitutions, Colonies, and Military Power in the Ancient World*, Leiden 2002, pp. 195–225.

26 On the issue of the development of the Greek polis in the Archaic period, see A. Duplouy, *Pathways to Archaic Citizenship*, in: A. Duplouy/R. W. Brock (eds.), *Defining Citizenship in Archaic Greece*, Oxford 2018, pp. 1–49.

Hence, even though we can account for 152 *apoikiai* by around 500 BC, it is uncertain how this phenomenon unfolded.²⁷

This debate also relates to the question of the possible causes of colonization. In modern scholarship, a debate long prevailed about whether overpopulation or trade were generalisable incentives for Greek colonization. Today, many scholars dismiss the idea of overpopulation: there is insufficient proof in the archaeological record of a massive population increase in the Archaic period. It seems more likely that there existed a mix of reasons driving settlers to emigrate, which must be determined for each *apoikia* separately. The possible push- and pull-factors include socio-political transformations in the *poleis*, among them social stratification, prompting groups of people to seek their fortunes elsewhere, and the integration of Greece into the Mediterranean web of trade contacts. Furthermore, the possibility of a colony being established for strategic reasons should not be dismissed, especially in the case of secondary colonies in the later Archaic period.²⁸

Regardless of one's positioning in the debate on accumulative versus intentional settlement, there is agreement that relations between metropolises and colonies were mostly rather loose. In both Antiquity and Modernity a mother-child metaphor has often been applied, suggesting an eventual emancipation counterbalanced by a bond of affection. Consequently, Greek colonization was considered to not really correspond to modern colonization. Interest in the Greek example only increased when the issue of the possible independence of colonies was on the table: It was the American Revolutionary War, in particular, which sparked scholarly preoccupation with Greek colonies. In the nineteenth century, the abnormality of the Greek colonies was explained by specific circumstances, whether the geographical distance between colonies and metropolises (given the conditions of ancient seafaring) or the supposition of a political particularism which lay in the "nature" of the Greeks. The Greeks were referred to as an exemplum in discussing matters of cultural, economic and civilizing progress – or even to criticize imperialistic policies. The modern legitimizing topos of a *mission civilisatrice*, in particular, could be illustrated with reference to its Greek forebears.

It was especially in the topical field of relations between the Greek colonizers and the local populations that the colonial paradigm filled the gaps left by the extant sources: Culturally and technologically superior Greeks were pitted against savage locals, who automatically absorbed the blessings brought to them (gladly reproducing later ancient perceptions of "barbarians"). This image has proved rather long lived: Even as a racialized definition of the term "people" disappeared from scientific discourse in the decades after the Second World War, the notion of the superiority of the Greeks prevailed. Only in recent decades has it increasingly been deconstructed, not least under the influence of postcolonial studies. Today there is an agreement that the earlier dichotomizing percep-

27 See the overview by G. R. Tsetskhladze, *Revisiting Ancient Greek Colonisation*, in: G. R. Tsetskhladze (ed.), *Greek Colonisation: An Account of Greek Colonies and Other Settlements Overseas*, vol. 1, Leiden 2006, pp. xxiii–xxxiii.

28 For an overview, see J.-P. Descœudres, *Central Greece on the Eve of the Colonisation Movement*, in: G. R. Tsetskhladze (ed.), *Greek Colonisation: An Account of Greek Colonies and Other Settlements Overseas*, vol. 2, Leiden 2008, pp. 289–382.

tion is inadequate: The cultural and technological gap was not as pronounced as suggested by the analogy with modern colonial stereotypes. There were rather heterogeneous forms of contacts, often without a dominant partner.²⁹ Furthermore, excavations of the earliest phases of settlement indicate instances of cohabitation – what this meant in relation to the constitution of the citizen body is, however, difficult to determine: Once again, the question is whether later practices can be retrojected onto the Archaic period. Heterogeneous contacts are mirrored in the extant sources when they discuss the acquisition of land: We find different possibilities ranging from the forceful expulsion of a local population to the granting of land by local rulers. In any case, the area controlled was at first locally restricted. An occasional extension of this control, as in the case of Syracuse in Sicily, was only a secondary development. This was done to the detriment either of local populations or other Greek *apoikiai*.

The classical period was marked by the struggle for hegemony between Greek *poleis*: Accordingly, bonds with already-existing *apoikiai* were tightened and exploited for the purposes of power politics, and there were also some new foundations, a great part of which were re-foundations of already-existing cities.³⁰ This was a policy which was, for instance, used by tyrants in Sicily, where the above-mentioned Syracuse, in particular, extended its domination by means of extensive resettlements.³¹ In this connection, one could also mention the Cleruchies of the so-called Athenian Empire (i.e. Athens at the height of its power between the Persian Wars and the end of the Peloponnesian War in 404 BC), although in a strict sense no foundation occurred.³² *Cleruchs* (literally “lot-holders”) obtained land, which could also be annexed from rebellious allies of Athens. They did not necessarily settle these plots, but could stay in Athens as rentiers.

The creation of a bond between a founder, who was also the ruler of the realm, and its (re)foundation was also the basis for the establishment of cities in the Hellenistic period, only now as part of the process of conquering and controlling territories.³³ The intentions and hence the outlay of these foundations varied: There was the strategic settlement of veterans by Alexander and his epigones, the Diadochi, the establishment of cities as administrative and economic infrastructure or the creation of royal residencies. Although, formally, the king was the founder, the initiative to establish a city could also come from his entourage (there are, for instance, also cases of queens who founded cities) or even from communities which were interested in acquiring the status of a *polis*. An incentive was provided by the fact that the rights of the town were negotiated directly with the ruler, including a certain degree of self-government. The composition of the

29 See C. Ulf, Rethinking Cultural Contacts, in: AWE 8 (2009), pp. 81–132.

30 See T. J. Figueira, Colonisation in the Classical Period, in: G. R. Tsetschladze (ed.), Greek Colonisation: An Account of Greek Colonies and Other Settlements Overseas, vol. 2, Leiden 2008, pp. 427–523.

31 See K. Lomas, Tyrants and the *polis*: Migration, Identity and Urban Development in Sicily, in: S. Lewis (ed.), Ancient Tyranny, Edinburgh 2006, pp. 95–118.

32 See A. Moreno, “The Attic neighbour”: The Cleruchy in the Athenian Empire, in: J. Ma/N. Papazarkadas/R. Parker (eds.), Interpreting the Athenian Empire, London 2009, pp. 211–221.

33 See G. M. Cohen, The Seleucid Colonies: Studies in Founding, Administration and Organization, Wiesbaden 1978; A. Mehl, Hellenistische Kolonisation, in: AWE 10 (2011), pp. 209–226.

population was quite heterogeneous, ranging from Greek and Macedonian military settlements to “foundations” in which there was no installation of Greek and Macedonian settlers, which actually made them titular. Moreover, relations among the settlers varied: There could be different citizen-statuses, in the case of mixed settlements according to ethnicity – with the possibility of an eventual integration (through acculturation or intermarriage) – while, in other cases, no legal distinctions can be discerned.

4. Roman Colonization

The fortunes of the Greek colonies were quite different: Some prospered and grew into regional powers, like Syracuse, while others vanished or were taken over. The Greek historian and geographer Strabo wrote in the first century BC: “Today all of it [Magna Graecia] – except Taras, Rhegion, and Neapolis – have become thoroughly barbarized, and are possessed by the Leukanians, Brettians, and the Campanians (in name, but in fact by the Romans, as they have become Roman).”³⁴

The situation Strabo describes here is the product of the process of taking control of the Italian peninsula by Rome, with the founding of *coloniae* being one means of administering this expansion.³⁵ Consequently, and in contrast to the Greek colonization, Roman colonization was assigned an archetypical role from the very beginning of the modern colonization process.³⁶

The early stages of Roman history are shadowy: As in the case of the early Greek colonies, we have at our disposal only sources which were written centuries later. In the Early Republic there seem to have been two options: A colony was founded either jointly by the Latin League, a league of Latin cities including Rome, or by one of the members itself. These first Roman colonies, which consisted of a small number of Roman settlers (the traditional number given by the sources is 300), were established inside Roman territory and probably served to promote urbanisation and protect the coastline, where they were predominantly settled.

After 338 BC, Rome took control over Latium and consequently the initiative to found Latin colonies (the sources provide different numbers, ranging from about 2,000 to 5,000 settlers). A distinction between Latin colonies and colonies of Roman Citizens seems to have been upheld, which had consequences for the legal status of the colonists relative to Rome: Those Romans who were sent out to Latin colonies lost their citizen rights (except for when they returned to Rome). Latin colonies were established outside Roman territory on conquered land, had an autonomous status and were treated as allies, as a result of which the colonists also served in the Roman army. Their positioning be-

34 Strabo 6. 1. 2 (trans. D. W. Roller).

35 A dated yet still useful overview is provided by E. T. Salmon, *Roman Colonization under the Republic*, London 1969; for a recent evaluation, see T. D. Stek/J. Pelgrom (eds.), *Roman Republican Colonization: New Perspectives from Archaeology and Ancient History*, Rome 2014.

36 See A. Pagden, *The Burdens of Empire: 1539 to the Present*, New York 2015, esp. pp. 1–44.

trays strategic aims; whether there was also a socio-political agenda (i.e. care for landless citizens), as suggested by the later extant sources, is debated in the scholarship.³⁷ With the growth of territory under Roman control, the distribution of colonies throughout Italy also expanded. Citizen colonies, by contrast, were smaller in size; the colonists remained Roman citizens and were governed by Rome, since these colonies were established on Roman territory with an uninterrupted connection to Rome.

In order to better understand this situation, some background information on the Roman political system is helpful: Each year, two consuls were elected as the highest magistrates in Rome. They were bestowed with *imperium*, the authority to exercise command, including the command of troops.³⁸ In the case of successful military campaigns against neighbouring groups, land was annexed. This land could either be distributed to Romans, let for rent to create public income, remain in public ownership for possible later assignments (to future colonies, for instance) or provide the basis for a new community, a *colonia*, in which case it was allotted to the settlers.

These settlers did not necessarily consist only of Romans, especially if there were not enough volunteers. Their ranks could be filled with members of non-Roman or even non-Latin communities. Hence, Latin colonies, in particular, also served to increase the manpower of the Roman military: Outgroup members were incorporated into the troops a colony was obliged to provide and landless Romans became landholders (military service required a certain amount of income, since soldiers needed to equip themselves).³⁹ *Coloniae* were founded either on virgin soil or as part of an existing settlement. In the latter case, the former inhabitants were either expelled or incorporated – their legal status being dependent on circumstances.

Colonies played an important role in the unification of Italy, not least as an integrating factor: Becoming part of a colony provided outgroup members with the possibility to eventually acquire Roman citizenship. Especially for local elites the threshold for integration into the Roman citizen body was low. At the same time, there are indications that local populations were used as labour force on the land possessed by the colonists.⁴⁰ Thus, social strata too must be added to the equation when determining the degree of integration.

How rigidly the distinction between Latin and citizen colonies was maintained and to what extent the basic properties that have been reconstructed were mandatory in practice is, however, debated: Scholars are divided about how seriously we should take categorisations which occur only in later sources, especially in relation to the Early Republic. Hence, as in the case of Greek colonization, modern reconstructions relied for a long

37 See Bradley, *Colonization and Identity in Republican Italy*, pp. 169–171.

38 See E. Meyer-Zwiffelhofer, *Imperium Romanum. Geschichte der römischen Provinzen*, München 2009, pp. 11–13.

39 On the integrative role of the Roman military, see M. Jehne, *Römer, Latiner und Bundesgenossen im Krieg. Zu Formen und Ausmaß der Integration in der republikanischen Armee*, in: M. Jehne/R. Pfeilschifter (eds.), *Herrschaft ohne Integration? Rom und Italien in republikanischer Zeit*, Frankfurt a.M. 2006, pp. 243–267.

40 See Bradley, *Colonization and Identity in Republican Italy*, pp. 171–177.

time on these later sources, which suggest a “state”-led colonization from the beginning.⁴¹ It is, however, possible that, for instance, members of the Roman elite founded colonies on their own initiatives.⁴²

The decades after the Second Punic War witnessed a new phase of Roman colonization: Instead of Latin colonies, it was increasingly citizen colonies with a similar number of settlers that were founded. This may have been a reaction to problems recruiting Romans for the foundation of Latin colonies: Among the possible reasons for this is an unwillingness to give up citizenship, as well as a reluctance to settle in now more distant and hostile parts of Italy. Additionally, the Second Punic War left its imprint on the Latins and other allies, too. Next to the retention (or acquisition) of Roman citizenship, an increase in the size of allotted land was another incentive for joining a *colonia*.⁴³

In the last decades of the second century BC, colonization acquired a new aspect. Since Rome now controlled Italy, the strategic role of colonies became less relevant: The founding of *coloniae* – now increasingly taking place outside of Italy as well – served to provide land for the Roman proletariat. In this era, participation in the establishment of colonies was more rigorously restricted to Roman citizens.

After the Punic Wars there existed another tool for managing conquered regions, especially as their distance from Rome grew: A *provincia* could be established in lieu of the imposition of individual agreements on populations which came under Roman domination, often backed by the establishment of colonies. The term *provincia* originally denoted the task a magistrate was assigned with, including its geographical scope. Only gradually did it develop into the “province” we are familiar with: a conquered region, transformed into an administrative unit and temporarily assigned to a magistrate. This became regular practice only from the second half of the second century BC onward.⁴⁴

In the first century BC, the in-trite elite struggle, which was embedded in the political system of the Roman republic, culminated in civil wars between powerful individuals. This also affected the establishment of colonies. *Coloniae* had already been used as a tool for internal power politics in the past: The powerful families of Rome competed for the highest magistracies of the Republic, since power, wealth, prestige and followers were acquired through such positions – especially when successfully leading military campaigns or establishing colonies. As military campaigns were undertaken in more and more distant regions and for longer periods of time, relations between generals and “their” legions became closer. One consequence of this development was that the returning generals sought to establish colonies for their veterans (whose social composition relative to the former citizen armies had changed through the increasing recruitment of volunteers). These colonies were established both inside of Italy, on land taken from political enemies

41 See Bispham, *Coloniae deducere*, pp. 81–83.

42 Patterson, *Colonization and Historiography*, p. 195.

43 See Patterson, *Colonization and Historiography*, pp. 199–202.

44 See Meyer-Zwiffelhofer, *Imperium Romanum*, pp. 12–24.

(Roman politicians, as well as allied Italians) or sometimes even bought, and outside of Italy, on conquered land in the provinces.

Both, *provinciae* and *coloniae*, were extensively used to expand and strengthen Roman control under Augustus, the first Roman emperor and the result of the metamorphosis of Octavian, who emerged victorious from the civil wars. It was only in the first century BC that the term *imperium* came to refer to the entirety of those regions over which the Romans exercised control (*imperium populi Romani*).⁴⁵ Augustus' successors followed his example: They settled veterans (but not only) in *coloniae* for strategic or economic reasons. Colonies continued to play an important role in the Romanisation of the Empire, by continuing to provide the possibility of obtaining Roman citizenship – a process which was ended when the emperor Caracalla extended citizenship to all free inhabitants of the Empire in 212 AD.

Although the beginning of this practice can already be found in the first century BC, it was the Roman emperors who increasingly granted the title *colonia* to already-existing cities without installing new settlers. This act brought prestige – by demonstrating closeness to Rome as its titular offspring – and certain privileges (e.g. the cities' elites could become eligible for election to the Roman Senate or the city could be exempted from taxes). Over time, this practice became more common than the “actual” foundation of *coloniae* and it is worth noting that the initiative to nominate titular colonies passed from the Emperors to the candidate cities themselves.

5. Conclusion

Colonization in Greek and Roman Antiquity primarily consisted in the establishment of cities. At least down to Classical era – and, in some cases, maybe even starting earlier – this act was able to serve the aim of political domination, as a tool which was constantly adapted to contemporary needs and conditions. Our knowledge concerning of the earliest phases of Greek and Roman colonization is, however, lacunary. What we know suggests more differences than similarities when compared with modern European colonization, especially in the Greek case. This is particularly true when it comes to relations with the local populations. Moreover, in contrast to our modern understanding, colonies were not exclusively planted among “others”, but also on territory belonging to the ingroup. “Othering” followed a complex and changing interrelation of self-perception and the demarcation of outgroups, which was never as pronounced as in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries: The integration of outgroups occurred regularly, although it was more pronounced in some eras and areas than in others. In this sense, ancient colonies were able to exercise a highly integrative function, furthering processes of Hellenisation and Romanisation.

45 See Meyer-Zwiffelhofer, *Imperium Romanum*, pp. 11–13.

The focus on the foundation of cities was quite coherent from an ancient perspective, since it concerned the relation of a colony to its origin, that is, its founder. This is even true for titular colonies – i.e. those not involving the installation of new settlers – since they were, at least symbolically, seen as foundations, initiating a specific relationship with their creator. When transposed onto Modernity and integrated into a modern colonial typology, things become complicated. In the Greek case, colonization as it was actually practiced in the Archaic period poses a problem, since the defining criterion of political domination is hard to find: The later foundations of the Classical and Hellenistic period would, however, qualify. Similarly, titular colonies become awkward, if we take the migration of settlers as another defining aspect of “colonization”.⁴⁶ One of the roots of this incoherence is a mistranslation of ancient terminology: Even in the heyday of ancient imperialist policies, the phenomenon only indirectly pertained to the domination of conquered regions, referring more specifically to the establishment of cities inside it. The terms *apoikia* and *colonia* referred in a way to the (legal) status of those territorially restricted settlements in relation to the metropolises, or rather rulers. The Romans, in particular, had in *provincia* a different institution for territorial rule. In Modernity, however, the term “colony” became to denote the occupied territory as well (while “plantation”, a possible alternative for colonial settlement, was relinquished).

46 See M. I. Finley, Colonies – An Attempt at a Typology, in: TRHS 26 (1976), pp. 167–188 concerning these issues. See also the “update” by M. Sommer, Colonies – Colonisation – Colonialism: A Typological Reappraisal, in: AWE 10 (2011), pp. 183–193.

Were the Muslim Arab Conquerors of the Seventh-Century Middle East Colonialists?¹

Robert G. Hoyland

ABSTRACTS

Im Laufe des siebten Jahrhunderts eroberten muslimische Araber erfolgreich Länder und Völker von Marokko bis Afghanistan; sie gründeten Städte in ihren neu gewonnenen Gebieten, ließen sich in diesen nieder, bauten Herrschaftsstrukturen auf und schöpften Ressourcen aus dem Hinterland ab, sowohl materielle als auch menschliche. Das klingt nach eindeutig kolonialistischem Verhalten, aber es gibt gute Gründe, hier innezuhalten und diesen Punkt genauer zu bedenken. Zunächst besteht das grundsätzliche Problem der Anwendung moderner Begriffe auf vormoderne Gegebenheiten. So ist es in einer Welt, in der Staaten klar definierte Grenzen haben, offensichtlich, wenn eine Macht in das Reich einer anderen eindringt. Aber wie stellt sich dies in einer Welt dar, in der Grenzen fließend sind und sich verschieben oder sogar als inexistent angesehen werden? Zudem sind die besonderen Umstände des Nahen Ostens zur Zeit der Spätantike zu beachten, die geprägt war von den um die Vorherrschaft ringenden Imperien Roms und Persiens. Kann man die muslimisch-arabische Bezwingung dieser Reiche und die Besetzung/Ausbeutung ihrer Gebiete als Kolonialismus beschreiben? Und welches Bild machten sich die muslimischen Araber selbst von ihren Eroberungen? Was waren ihre Absichten, und sollten wir diese in unsere Beurteilung ihrer Herrschaft miteinbeziehen? Diese und andere Fragen werden in diesem Aufsatz behandelt.

In the course of the seventh century Muslim Arabs successfully conquered lands and peoples from Morocco to Afghanistan; they founded cities in their newly acquired territories, settled

1 This article draws on material published in R. Hoyland, *In God's Path: The Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire*, New York 2015; the reader will find there more discussion of the sources and issues presented below. However, the book does not consider at all the question stated in the title, which is discussed here from a purely academic standpoint, without any agenda.

in them, ruled from them and extracted resources, both physical and human, from their hinterlands. This sounds like eminently colonialist behaviour, but there are reasons to pause and reflect on this point. There is the general problem of applying modern terms to pre-modern situations; for example, in a world where states have a clear sense of borders, it is more evident when one power trespasses upon the realm of another, but what about a world where borders are fluid and shifting or even seen as non-existent? Then there are the specific circumstances of the late antique Middle East, which was dominated by the empires of Rome and Persia, both of which aspired to supremacy. Can the Muslim Arab defeat of these states and occupation/exploitation of their lands be characterized as colonialism? And how did the Muslim Arabs conceive of their own conquests, what were their intentions and should we factor them into our assessment of the nature of their rule? These and other questions will be considered by this paper.

The subject of this article is one that still prompts debate today, especially in online magazines and forums. If one googles the title, lots of passionate blogs will pop up that advocate forcefully for one side or the other. Most often, they relate to ongoing debates, such as the Palestinians as victims or agents of colonial aggression, the Berber language as collateral damage or target of colonial oppression, sub-Saharan African enslavement, and the persecution of minorities, such as Yazidis, Kurds and various Christian communities.² Some theorists seeking to explain modern fundamentalist groups argue that they continue a tradition of Islamic imperialism that goes back to the original mission of the prophet Muhammad.³ Then there are those residents of the Middle East who worry that the narrative they are taught in schools portraying the seventh-century Muslim Arab conquerors not as imperialists, but as bearers of God's truth and conveyors of God's justice, who were welcomed wherever they went, may not be accurate.

Clearly, the answer to the question depends on how one defines colonialism. A number of dictionaries opt for a very simple definition, such as Collin's English Dictionary: "the policy and practice of a power in extending control over weaker peoples or areas", and Merriam-Webster's Dictionary: "the system or policy of a nation seeking to extend or retain its authority over other people or territories". But this does not tell us much and does not distinguish colonialism from other terms for domination, such as imperialism. Ronald Horvath adds a useful extra ingredient: "The important difference between colonialism and imperialism appears to be the presence or absence of significant numbers of permanent settlers in the colony from the colonizing power."⁴ There is a corollary to this definition, namely that the settlers from the dominating group will likely establish for themselves a set of favourable socio-legal and/or socio-economic conditions whereby

2 E.g. C. Ibekwe, Arab Colonialism since 640 AD, <https://www.abibitumi.com/community/education/chinweizu-arab-colonialism-since-640ad/>; M. Jaff, How Arab Colonialism Conquered the Middle East, in: Progress ME Magazine, 18 January 2018, <https://medium.com/progressme-magazine/how-arab-colonialism-conquered-the-middle-east-73a247c7465d>; D. Swindell, The Arab World is Guilty of Colonialist Reversal, in: The Times of Israel, 22 March 2018, <https://blogs.timesofisrael.com/the-arab-world-is-guilty-of-colonialist-reversal/> (all three accessed 22 February 2019).

3 In particular, see E. Karsh, *Islamic Imperialism: A History*, New Haven 2013.

4 R. Horvath, A Definition of Colonialism, in: *Current Anthropology* 13 (1972), p. 47.

they can maintain and even extend their dominance. In addition, the dominating group will likely invent a justifying narrative or ideology that explains and legitimates their continuing domination.

Objections to each of these three aspects of the definition of colonialism can of course be raised, and indeed have been, but they do have the advantage of offering some distinctiveness for the term and it seems worth seeing what insights they bring when applied to the Muslim Arab case.

1. Muslim Arabs as Settlers

One of the earliest surviving texts to come from the hand of the Muslim Arab conquerors is papyrus no. 558 in the collection amassed by Archduke Rainer in Vienna; it describes itself in its subject heading as a “receipt for the sheep given to the *magaritai* and others arriving with them as a down-payment for the taxes of the first fiscal year”. It is issued in the name of the Arab general ‘Abdallah ibn Jabir to two representatives of the local government in a town just to the south of modern Cairo and it is dated very exactly by two different dating systems – the Egyptian Christian era of the martyrs and the Islamic calendar – to 25 April 643 AD. It is written in Greek and Arabic, and is the earliest extant dated documentary text in Arabic that we possess.⁵

An interesting feature of this papyrus is its designation of the conquerors in the Greek part as *magaritai* (also written *mōagaritai*), which is how they are most commonly referred to in Greek documents of the seventh century. A clearly related term is found in Syriac literary texts from the 640s onwards, namely *mhaggrē*. Both terms are intended to convey the Arabic term *muhājir*, usually translated into English as “emigrant”, formed from the verb *hājara*, “to emigrate”. In the Qur’an it is often connected with fighting, as in verse 22.57: “Those who emigrate and are killed and die will be provided for” and 8.72 (and 8.74, 8.75): “Those who emigrate and fight with their own wealth and lives [...] they are allied to one another.” It is the word used in the foundation agreement drafted by the prophet Muhammad to specify those who left Mecca with him to start a new community in Medina and begin the war against the “infidels”, and he allegedly used it again in a prediction for the expansion of the community after him: “You will emigrate to Syria and conquer it.” Just as Muhammad established Medina as a base for the emigrants to settle in and to launch attacks against opponents, so his successors, the first caliphs, established garrisons for the Arab warriors outside of Arabia for the same purpose. They were designated as *dār hijra*, that is, an abode of migration, or *manzil jihād*, a base of war. And these two expressions together nicely capture the dual sense of the word *muhājir*: both a settler who has left his homeland and a soldier.⁶

5 A. Grohmann, *From the World of Arabic Papyri*, Cairo 1952, pp. 115–116.

6 For these and other references, see P. Crone, *The First-Century Concept of Hijra*, in: *Arabica* 41 (1994), pp. 352–387.

A substantial number of these garrison settlements were established in the Middle East in the course of the seventh century to house and supply the Arab armies and to administer and police the conquered territories. First, there was Basra and Kufa in Iraq and Fustat in Egypt. Then came Aqaba in Jordan, Ramla in Palestine, Qayrawan in Tunisia, Anjar in Lebanon, Qinnasrin in Syria, Wasit and Mosul in Iraq, and so on. Those who settled there were paid stipends from the taxes exacted from the local population and received a share of any booty so that they did not have to go out to seek their livelihood. The garrisons were generally founded at a short distance from an existing city and over a relatively short time, because of the great wealth of the Arab soldiers and the large numbers of prisoners-of-war that they brought back, these new settlements became thriving cities that soon replaced those that they had been built near to. The numbers of troops that they could accommodate varied, but it seems to have been substantial. A census of the garrisons of Kufa and Basra conducted around the year 670 by the superintendent of the military register revealed that they contained 60,000 and 80,000 fighting men respectively. This is certainly sizeable enough to satisfy Horvath's aforementioned "significant numbers of permanent settlers". And for the most part the settlement was indeed permanent, as he stipulated, with no evidence of any major reverse.⁷

Those who had made this commitment to leave Arabia and settle in the new garrisons, the *muhājirs*, were contrasted with the Bedouin (*badū*) or *a'rāb*, those who had chosen to maintain a nomadic life or had returned to it after finding that the garrison cities did not suit them. As one early governor of Iraq said: "A *muhājir* is never a nomad." Given that the fast-expanding nascent Islamic state needed military manpower, those who refused to migrate to the garrisons and serve in the army were denigrated, and the predilection for desert life was seen as pejorative. The prophet Muhammad is even said to have cursed "those who returned to the desert after their emigration" (*man badā ba'da l-hijra*), and it is an issue that crops up frequently in contemporary poetry. For example, one reluctant warrior observes of his beloved: "She knows that I am noble, but she is perturbed by the traces of nomadic yearnings (*a'rābiyya*) in a *muhājir*." And many still boasted of their adherence to an itinerant life in the wilderness despite all the material rewards of garrison life: "We are people of the desert, we do not deal in coins and settle in towns", or: "And he whom settled life has attracted, behold, what great men of the desert are we."⁸

One could also join the Muslim Arab armies even if one were not a Bedouin or not even in the Arabian Peninsula, but you did still have to physically relocate to a garrison city. Thus, Muhammad told his followers to invite the enemy to convert before engaging them in battle: if they accept, then "invite them to transfer from their abode to the abode of the emigrants" (*al-taḥawwul min dārihim ilā dār al-muhājirin*), and tell them that they will have the same rights and duties as the emigrants. Even if one was not going to fight,

7 M.J. de Goeje (ed.), A. ibn Yahya al-Baladhuri, *Futūḥ al-buldān*, Leiden 1866, p. 350 (census); Horvath, Definition, p. 47; on the first Islamic cities, see S. Denoix, *Founded Cities of the Islamic World from the Seventh to the Eleventh Centuries*, in: S. K. Jayyusi (ed.), *The City in the Islamic World*, vol. 1, Leiden 2008, pp. 115–139.

8 For these and other references, see S. Agha/T. Khalidi, *Poetry and Identity in the Umayyad Age*, in: al-Abhath 50–51 (2002–2003), pp. 55–120.

one had to relocate, the idea being that you needed to be in a place where Islam was properly practised. For example, the former pagan prophetess Sajah converted to Islam and emigrated from northeast Arabia to Basra. And there were other ways to help the cause besides fighting. The caliph ‘Umar I (634–644) held the best person to be a man endowed with a home, family and property who learns about Islam and who reacts by driving his camels to “one of the abodes of emigration” (*dār min dār al-hijra*), where he sells them and spends the money on equipment in the path of God, staying among the Muslims and aiding them against their enemy. Even as late as the reign of Caliph ‘Umar II (717–720), the idea that one must make a physical *hijra* was still there, as one can see in a decree that he proclaimed: “Whoever accepts Islam, whether Christian or Jew or Zoroastrian [...] and joins himself to the body of the Muslims in their abode, and who forsakes the abode wherein he was before, he shall have the same rights and duties as the Muslims.”⁹

There is of course some fuzziness with this view of the Muslim Arabs as colonial settlers. Arabia was contiguous to the Fertile Crescent, so it is not exactly comparable with the European establishment of colonies overseas. Moreover, Arabs had for centuries travelled and settled in the Fertile Crescent, though only in relatively small numbers and they had usually assimilated to the local culture. And finally, although the first Muslim rulers were based in Medina in Arabia, they moved their capital after three decades to Damascus and then Baghdad, and so they did not remain a remote governing elite for long. Nevertheless, the migration of some 200,000 to 300,000 Arab tribesmen to take up residence in the Middle East as troops and rulers inevitably had an enormous impact on the peoples that they conquered and governed.

2. Muslim Arabs Differentiated from the Subject Population

While the Muslim Arabs were mostly all soldiers in garrisons, they were naturally distinguished from the subject population by virtue of their status as conquerors and the fact that they paid no taxes, and indeed received money in the form of military pensions. As these pensions became increasingly restricted to those on active duty, rather than a reward for past service, and as the days of easy conquest and plentiful booty came to an end, more Muslims dropped out of the army to become civilians. However, they did not want to rub shoulders on an equal footing with the non-Muslim conquered peoples, and so restrictions were placed on the latter to emphasize their inferior status. These were mostly visual requirements that would distinguish them from Muslims (not using saddles on riding animals, wearing a distinctive belt, not bearing arms, not copying Muslim dress, headgear or hairstyles), limitations on promoting their religion (not building new synagogues or churches, not proselytizing, not holding large public processions, not obstructing conversion to Islam, sounding bells/clappers quietly and minimizing display

of crosses), some security requirements (not harbouring spies, reporting sedition) and a few economic measures (not selling alcohol to Muslims, limitations on holding high public office and, in particular, paying a designated non-Muslim tax). By the ninth century there had evolved an extensive body of legal rulings governing what non-Muslims could and could not do and how they should behave towards Muslims.¹⁰ Although there were of course numerous and frequent violation of these conditions, Jews and Christians and other non-Muslims did become a subordinate class, and yet were integrated within the Muslim legal system and granted protection. By the standards of the time, it was a relatively favourable setup, especially in contrast to medieval Europe where no such legal protection existed for non-Christian groups. Nevertheless, it was a clearly discriminatory system, and it had its roots in the fact that the Muslim Arab conquerors wished to distinguish themselves from those whom they had conquered. Given that it also had negative socio-economic implications for the non-Muslims, it inevitably impacted upon the life of that population and likely influenced its gradual diminution.¹¹

Although conversion to Islam removed this socio-legal discrimination, the Muslim Arab conquerors and their descendants still attempted to maintain a distinction between themselves and these converts, called *mawlās* (usually translated as “clients”, because they had to find a Muslim patron to endorse their conversion), by engaging in the practice, common among conquerors, known as “othering”, that is, stressing one’s superiority over other groups in terms of innate features, historical achievements, and so on.¹² Prejudice against these converts, because of their subject/conquered status combined with their non-Arab origins (so foreign immigrants in modern parlance), is extremely widespread in our sources and Arabic literature is replete with such sayings as: “The worst of people is the slave and the son of the slave, and the most miserable of people to walk on earth is the *mawlā* of a *mawlā*” or: “Nafi‘ ibn Jubayr ibn Mut‘im let a *mawlā* lead the prayer; when asked why, he said: ‘I wanted to abase myself before God by praying behind him’.” And according to the famous ninth-century jurist Ahmad ibn Hanbal, Arab superiority was built into Islam itself: “There is recognized for the Arabs their priority, their superiority and their precedence and also love for them, according to a saying of the messenger

10 The process and the legislation is described and discussed by M. Levy-Rubin, *Non-Muslims in the Islamic Empire: From Surrender to Coexistence*, Cambridge 2012.

11 There has not really been any study of the ways in which this discrimination affected the material life of those who endured it, though it is widely assumed that it is responsible for the drastic decline of Christian communities in the Middle East. For a comparative perspective, see A. Woolf, who argues that a differential legal system led to the gradual erosion of the status of the Britons vis-à-vis the dominant incoming Anglo-Saxons (*Apartheid and Economics in Anglo-Saxon England*, in: N.J. Higham (ed.), *Britons in Anglo-Saxon England*, Woodbridge 2007, pp. 115–129).

12 The most famous study of this phenomenon is E. Said’s *Orientalism*, New York 1978. One could argue that the *mawlā* in the Muslim Arab Empire was in a similar half-way position to the “Western Oriental gentleman” (i.e. wog) of European colonial society, but the *mawlā* was equal to the Muslim Arab in the eyes of the law and by the time of his or her children and especially grandchildren the distinction was lost, and had in any case all but vanished by the ninth century when it became no longer necessary to seek a patron to endorse one’s conversion.

of God: ‘Love of the Arabs is part of the faith, hatred of them is hypocrisy’.¹³ Over time, with increased conversion from non-Arab populations and more intermarriage among Muslims of all backgrounds, the descendants of the Muslim Arab conquerors were less and less able to retain their privileged position, but it is interesting to see how strongly the idea of Arab precedence maintained its hold within Islam. Even into the twentieth century Muslims in non-Arab lands, like India and Indonesia, liked to claim Arab descent, and many Arab leaders would affirm their claim to superior status, such as al-Bazzaz, prime minister of Iraq: “The fact that the prophet Muhammad was an Arab was not a matter of chance; a genius, he belonged to a nation of great abilities and qualities [...] It is clear that the Arabs are the backbone of Islam. They were the first to be addressed in the verses of revelation [...] Their swords conquered countries and lands, and on the whole they are as ‘Umar described them in a saying of his: ‘Do not attack the Arabs or humiliate them for they are the essence of Islam’.”¹⁴

3. The Muslim Arabs’ Justifying Narrative

The Muslim Arabs did not perceive/portray what they were doing as straight conquest and occupation/colonization. The word that was used to describe their military achievements by Muslim historians of the conquests was *futūḥ*, the plural of *fath*, which literally means “opening”. Why was this word used rather than one that suggested overcoming or victory or the like? If we turn to the Qur’an, we never find *fath*, or the associated verb *fataḥa*, used with the sense of conquest. Rather, it either has the common Semitic meaning of “open” or the Ethiopic and south Arabian sense of “to render judgement”; additionally, with the prepositions *‘alā*/unto or *li*/to, it has the sense of “to open up to” or “to bestow”. For example, verse 7.96 states: “If the people of the surrounding villages had believed and been God-fearing, we would have bestowed upon them/opened them up to blessings from heaven and earth”, and 35.2 speaks of “the mercy that God bestows upon people/opens people up to”. And it would seem to be this latter sense that was intended by the chroniclers of the Muslim Arab conquests when they chose to use the word *futūḥ* to characterize the Muslim Arab expansion. The victories were a sign of God’s favour, divine blessings for those who fought in His path and for His purpose. And this is stated explicitly in a number of Muslim-Christian disputation texts, where the Muslim interlocutor boasts to the Christian: “It is a sign of God’s preference for us that he has given us dominion over all nations.” This fits with the phraseology of the conquests: it is always said that God *fataḥa* a place *‘alā* X, where X is the name of the successful general.¹⁵

13 Al-Baladhuri, *Ansāb al-ashrāf*, vol. 4b, M. Schloessinger (ed.), Jerusalem 1938, p. 10; Ibn ‘Abd Rabbihi, *al-Iqd al-Farīd*, A. Amin et al. (eds.), Cairo 1940–1965, vol. 2, p. 260; Ibn Abi Ya‘la, *Ṭabaqāt*, M. al-Fiqi (ed.), Cairo 1952, vol. 1, p. 30.

14 J. Donohue/J. Esposito (eds.), *Islam in Transition*, Oxford 1982, p. 86.

15 F. M. Donner, *Arabic Fath as ‘Conquest’ and its Origin in Islamic Tradition*, in: *Al-‘Uṣūr al-Wuṣṭā* 24 (2016), pp. 1–14.

There were direct words that Muslim historians could have used to characterize the successes of Muslim conquerors, like *zāhar alghalaba ‘alā* or *qahara*, but the point that they patently wanted to make was that the victory was achieved not by the clever strategy of the human agent, but by the awesome power of God. The Muslim Arab conquests were God’s work, a reward for those who followed His messenger Muhammad and emigrated to fight the Lord’s fight, the ultimate aim being to extend God’s dominion over the whole world.¹⁶ The same is true when Muslim histories talk about rule. If they are speaking of Christian rule of formerly Muslim lands, such as the Byzantines in northern Syria in the tenth century and the Normans in Sicily in the eleventh century, they use terms such as “occupation” (*iḥtilāl*), whereas they designate Muslim rule of formerly non-Muslim countries as *amr* or *ḥukm*, which occur in the Qur’an with the sense of divine government. The suggestion is that the Muslims were running things on behalf of God, as is further implied by the fact that the Muslim sovereign is called the “deputy of God” (*khalīfat Allāh*).

However, this is classic conquerors’ propaganda and it is similar to the spin that European colonialists put on their own conquests, especially as set forth by the missionaries accompanying them.¹⁷ Thus Jan H. Boer of the Sudan United Mission declared: “Colonialism is a form of imperialism based on a divine mandate and designed to bring liberation – spiritual, cultural, economic, and political – by sharing the blessings of the Christ-inspired civilization of the West with a people suffering under satanic oppression, ignorance and disease.”¹⁸ One could, therefore, argue that both Muslim Arabs and Europeans told themselves that God was on their side in order to justify their military aggression and subsequent rule. Many European, and later American, colonialists put forward a more secular justification: that they conquered in order to bring order and enlightenment, liberty and equality, or freedom and democracy to their conquered subjects, but this is not so different from the Muslim Arabs’ assertion that they conquered in order to bring the truth of Islam and the equity of God’s rule.

4. Does Islam Make a Difference?

These three features – the settlement of large numbers of Muslim Arabs in the conquered lands, a discriminatory socio-legal system, and the elaboration of a justifying narrative – might be regarded as evidence for the idea that early Islamic rule was indeed a form of

16 Donner (Arabic Faith, pp. 9–10) concludes from this that we should not translate the word *faṭḥ* as conquest, but use a less violence-charged term, not appreciating the propagandistic/legitimizing use of the term in Muslim histories. More sensitive to this is D. Cook (The Muslim Man’s Burden: Muslim Intellectuals Confront their Imperialist Past, in: Israel Affairs 13 (2007), pp. 811–812). I do not thereby mean that conquerors are only ever being insincere; many will certainly have believed the narrative that they put out; the point is that their subjects are less likely to have bought into their message.

17 As is pointed out by Cook, Muslim Man’s Burden, p. 813.

18 Quoted in: T. Falola, Violence in Nigeria: The Crisis of Religious Politics and Secular Ideologies, Rochester, NY 1998, p. 33.

colonialism. Modern Muslims generally reject this assertion, arguing that they advanced the material and spiritual wellbeing of mankind by bringing Islam, the latest version of God's message, and that, even if there was short-term pain in the conquests, there was long-term gain in Islamic rule. This is obviously an extremely difficult proposition to evaluate, but is it true that Islam is of such a different nature to Western culture that we cannot really compare Muslim Arab rule and European rule?¹⁹

It seems to me that there is one particular way in which the Muslim Arab form of domination was very different from the European one, namely that Islam provided a means whereby the conquered could enter into and integrate within the conquest society, whereas there was no such automatic mechanism in the European case. Those conquered by the Muslim Arabs could join the ranks of the conquerors simply by converting to Islam. This porousness of the boundary between conqueror and conquered in the Islamic case was unusual; victors do not normally grant access to their echelons so easily, for they want to keep the privileges of conquest for themselves. European imperial powers did of course collaborate with local peoples in various ways, especially in order to obtain military support, administrative services, physical labour and the like, but it was difficult for the conquered to become "a European" or to enter the ranks of the Europeans on an equal basis (even indigenous women married to Europeans and their offspring tended to be viewed as inferior or an oddity). One could argue that Christianity also served as an integrative force, forging a bond between the Europeans and those they conquered. However, it was extremely difficult for the colonial subjects to have any impact upon official Christianity. In the case of the Muslim Arab conquests, by contrast, the fact that they occurred at the same time as the emergence of the religion of Islam, which was as yet very malleable and little defined, meant that the conquered people were able to participate in the elaboration of the religion and civilization of Islam in a way that was simply impossible for the conquered in the time of European expansion.²⁰

The Muslim Arab conquerors do not seem to have expected or planned for this to happen. God had ordained that the conquered people would be the Arabs' booty, not their equals. Thus the general Sa'd ibn Abi Waqqas encouraged his men on the eve of the Battle of Qadisiyya, in modern southwest Iraq, by pointing out to them: "This land is your inheritance, this is what the Lord has promised you. He made it over to you three years ago and you have been enjoying it and eating from it, killing its people, collecting taxes from them, and enslaving them until today."²¹ And so, he urges, they must fight hard or they will lose all these benefits. There is no sense in this and other similar statements that the conquered should have the chance to share in the good fortune of the conquerors. Later Muslim historians maintained that the conquerors had offered their opponents

19 Of course, there was no single type of European rule; it could be more religious (like the Spanish), more mercantile (like the Portuguese and Dutch), more secular (like the British and French), and inevitably there were numerous variations according to place and time. All forms are, however, sufficiently distinct from the Muslim Arab type of rule that the comparison remains valid.

20 This point is discussed at greater length in Hoyland, *In God's Path*, pp. 228–230.

21 M. ibn Jarir al-Tabari, *Ta'rikh al-rusul wa-l-muluk*, M.J. de Goeje et al. (eds.), vol. 1, Leiden 1879–1901, p. 2289.

the opportunity to convert before fighting them, but this is never mentioned in earlier sources. As the north Mesopotamian monk John of Fenek observed, writing in the 680s: “Of each person they required only tribute, allowing him to remain in whatever faith he wished.”²² But since neither the Qur’an nor Muhammad had put up any bar to conversion and given that it presented a clear route to partaking in the privileges of the conquerors, it was inevitable that many would seek to take advantage of it.

In the first century or so after the Arab conquests, when one had to find a Muslim patron in order to convert, there were few non-Muslims of status who converted, balking at having to submit themselves to those they had formerly looked down upon. However, this issue did not arise for those who had been taken captive, for they were assigned as booty to a Muslim Arab conqueror. Since, from early on, there was a distaste for the idea that a Muslim should be a slave, it was common that captives who had converted would be permitted by their Arab master to be freed, even if often with the requirement of a payment or continued performance of some services. Many of the female captives served as concubines, or sometimes became wives, and their offspring were counted as Muslim and usually as free persons. This meant, given the enormous numbers of prisoners-of-war captured in the course of the Arab conquests, that very soon there were more Muslims of non-Arab origin than there were of Arab origin. Initially everyone knew who they were, and ethnic Arabs looked down upon these ex-captive Muslims. But a few generations of urban living diluted these clear-cut distinctions and the term Arab largely shifted in meaning from a geographical-ethnic tie to a cultural-linguistic one (i.e. accepting the values/norms of Islamic society and speaking Arabic).

Inevitably these converts – and even more so their descendants, who had been born into Islam – wanted to explore and expand their new religion and to reconcile it with their former religion and culture (or what they knew of it from their parents), others to map the grammar of their newly acquired language, Arabic, and to augment its literary repertoire, and others again to situate their new community within the broader currents of world history. As noted above, these new converts faced prejudice in Muslim Arab society, but there were not really physical barriers; since Islam had no clergy and in its early stages had no colleges to restrict accreditation, scholarship was open to all who had the time, inclination and ability to pursue it. Numerous converts availed themselves of this opportunity and dedicated themselves to elaborating a new world view. There are too many to even begin to list them, but here are a few of the most famous: Muqatil ibn Sulayman (d. 767), a captive from Balkh, author of the earliest extant Qur’an commentary; Ibn Ishaq (d. 767), grandson of a captive from ‘Ayn al-Tamr in Iraq, author of the most famous biography of Muhammad; Ibn Jurayj (d. 767), grandson of a captive from Anatolia, and Sulayman al-A’mash (d. 764), son of a captive from Tabaristan, both prolific collectors of sayings of Muhammad; ‘Abdallah ibn al-Mubarak (d. 797), son of a Khwarizmian mother and Turkish father, author of one of the first Muslim creeds; Abu

22 S. Brock, North Mesopotamia in the Late Seventh Century: Book XV of John Bar Penkayē’s *Riṣ Mellē*, in: Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam 9 (1987), p. 61.

Hanifa (d. 767), son of a trader from Kabul, eponymous founder of a law school; Hasan al-Basri (d. 728), son of a captive from Maysan in Iraq, a celebrated Muslim ascetic; Hammad al-Rawiya (d. 772), son of a captive from Daylam, an expert on ancient Arabic poetry.²³ And here is where we see a very sharp distinction from the European colonial experience, since there are very few persons conquered by the Europeans who came to write books that reworked European culture in some way (or at least not until the post-colonial period). And there are extremely few texts from countries conquered by the Europeans dating to the pre-conquest period that went on to become part of mainstream European culture (again, not until post-colonial times), whereas numerous books from the cultures that the Muslim Arabs conquered were quickly translated into Arabic and became classics of Muslim literature.²⁴ To some extent, of course, this reflects the fact that the European conquerors possessed a much richer high culture than the Muslim Arab conquerors, who were subjugating peoples more advanced than themselves, but it also reflects the Europeans' lack of a mechanism to facilitate the assimilation of those they conquered.

The eastern lands of the caliphate (East Iran and Central Asia) were crucial in this process: they provided many of the scholars who would play a leading role in creating a new Islamic civilization, breaking it away from the narrow Judeo-Christian focus that it had had in Damascus and suffusing it with elements from this culturally syncretic world where Manicheism, Buddhism and Zoroastrianism had long co-existed. Since the Arab conquerors were relatively few and far from home in this region, many of them took Persian wives, began to speak Persian, attended Persian festivals like Nawruz, and so on. Ethnic and cultural allegiances became blurred and a Persianized Islam became the common idiom for a new elite. Tellingly, when Nasr ibn Sayyar, the Arab governor of the region, and Harith ibn Surayj, an Arab leader of a local insurrection, decided to negotiate peace in the 740s, they chose to represent them "men mindful of the Book of God", namely Muqatil ibn Hayyan, a lawyer resident in Balkh (in modern north Afghanistan), and Jahm ibn Safwan, a theologian resident in Tirmidh (on the Afghan-Uzbek border), both sons of Persian captives turned Muslim.²⁵

People like Muqatil ibn Hayyan and Jahm ibn Safwan are a good example of how quickly many of the conquered people became involved in the religious, cultural and political life of the world of the conquerors. If one examines the family histories of some of the main actors of this new regime, both Arab and non-Arab, one can see that in only three generations their whole social situation and cultural orientation has changed beyond recognition. To some degree that is the exciting thing about all empires, and in any imperial capital in history one can find characters who have gone from rags to riches, from

23 For references to these figures and for further discussion, see Hoyland, *In God's Path*, pp. 162–164.

24 For Greek secular works translated into Arabic see D. Gutas, *Greek Thought Arabic Culture*, London 1998. One of the earliest literary works to be translated into Arabic was the Indian collection of political fables known as *Kalila wa-Dimna*, which was enormously popular (it is now the subject of a major research project run by Beatrice Gruendler of the Free University of Berlin).

25 Al-Tabari, *Ta'rikh*, 2.1918–1919.

obscurity to fame or from servitude to high office in a single lifetime. But this seems to have happened on a particularly grand scale and at an accelerated rate in the case of the Muslim Arab Empire.

5. Conclusion

In my opinion this integrative dimension of the Muslim Arab conquests does make them different from the European colonial enterprise. Because the homeland of the Europeans was so far away from their colonies and because fewer Europeans relocated to them, the culture of the Europeans was relatively little affected by that of those they conquered; mostly the influence was one way, with the Europeans inflicting substantial changes upon the indigenous cultures that they ruled. In the Muslim Arab case the influence was two-way, with the conquered population participating in a very substantial way in the new Islamic civilization that emerged in the wake of the Muslim Arab conquests. Indeed, the Arabs soon felt that their culture had been overwhelmed by the conquered, who seemed to supplant them; “the Arabs fell, their strength disappeared and their ranks vanished”, as one complained, for non-Muslim Arabs could be found at every level of Muslim society below that of the caliph himself, who continued to be of the prophet Muhammad’s tribe of Quraysh.²⁶

One aspect of the Muslim Arab conquests that is comparable with that of the European conquests, however, is the havoc that both wrought upon local cultures. In the creation of a new civilization, many elements of the pre-conquest world were lost. Some was deliberate; for example, the Islamic antipathy towards non-Abrahamic religions meant that most of these were in general wiped out, or, as with Zoroastrianism, massively reduced. But much was incidental; a good example here is languages, such as Coptic and North African Latin, which were crushed in the stampede to use Arabic. Whatever way one answers the question about the seventh-century Muslim Arabs as colonists, it is worth bearing in mind that any large-scale imperialist venture will always have casualties.

Ottomans in Syria: “Turkish Colonialism”, or Something Else?¹

James A. Reilly

ABSTRACTS

Syrien unter der Herrschaft der Osmanen bietet Anlass, das Konzept von Kolonialismus zu hinterfragen. Über vier Jahrhunderte hinweg (1516–1918) herrschte das Osmanische Reich über die vorwiegend arabischsprachige Bevölkerung des syrischen Gebiets. Aufgrund der Ansiedlung neuer Bevölkerungsgruppen, der ökonomischen Ausbeutung durch Beamte und der Ko-optation von „kriegerischen“ oder „tribalen“ Gemeinschaften in die imperiale Ordnung hat die osmanische Herrschaft in Syrien eine zumindest oberflächliche Ähnlichkeit mit dem modernen Kolonialismus. Allerdings ist die Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches in Syrien komplizierter, als es die binäre Unterscheidung von Kolonisatoren und Kolonialisierten den Anschein erweckt. Denn das Osmanische Sultanat verwandelte sich selbst aus einem mächtigen vormodernen Imperium in einen bedrängten modernen Staat mit defensiver Haltung. Die osmanische Herrschaft in Syrien veranschaulicht weniger einen „türkischen Kolonialismus“ als vielmehr den Versuch einer älteren imperialen Herrschaftsordnung, sich den neuen und widrigen Umständen moderner Staatlichkeit anzupassen.

Syria under Ottoman rule offers material for interrogating the concept of colonialism. The Ottoman Empire governed the predominantly Arabic-speaking population of the Syrian lands for four centuries (1516–1918). Ottoman rule in Syria bears at least a superficial resemblance to modern colonialism, including implantation of new populations, economic exploitation by administrators, and co-optation of “warlike” or “tribal” communities into the imperial structure. But the story of the Ottoman Empire in Syria is more complicated than a binary colonizers-colonized vision allows. The Ottoman sultanate transitioned from a powerful pre-modern em-

1 The author thanks Lynne Viola and Victor Ostapchuk for their comments and suggestions.

pire to a beleaguered and defensive-minded modern state. Rather than representing "Turkish colonialism", Ottoman rule in Syria illustrates an instance of how an older imperial structure tried to adapt to new and unfavourable circumstances of modern statehood.

The Ottoman Empire ruled Syria for 400 years (1516–1918). The Ottomans' capital was at Istanbul and their administrative language was Turkish. Arab nationalists writing in the first half of the twentieth century decried 400 years of Ottoman oppression, and compared what they called Turkish rule to the French and British colonial administrations that followed the Ottomans' defeat in the First World War.² When Arab states subsequently obtained independence, nationalists hailed this achievement as one in which the Arabs had overcome successive colonialisms – first Turkish, and then its French and British successors.³

Conflating Ottoman ("Turkish") rule with French and British colonialism is untenable. Ottoman rule in Syria represented domination of a different kind, hearkening back to older forms of political authority that preceded modern colonialism. Even if ruling elites of the later Ottoman Empire harboured colonial-type ambitions, their state on the eve of the First World War had become a semi-colony and lacked the political or ideological resources to enact colonialist policies.

Colonies are not new, but "colonialism", as a systemic modern phenomenon, is usually dated to 1492 when Christopher Columbus, in the employ of the Spanish crown, made landfall in the West Indies and opened up an era of European overseas conquest and exploitation.⁴ Subsequent colonial empires varied widely in terms of their characteristics and rationales, but typically they consisted of lands separate from the home (later, "national") territories of the colonizing powers, governed by administrations whose methods and modes of governance were distinct from those used in the home territories.⁵ Colonies were of various types: commercial outposts, strategic points, and territories of colonial settlement.⁶ In its mature form (eighteenth century onward), European colonialism was characterized by large disparities in technology between colonizers and colonized, and by colonizers' confidence that they represented a superior culture and/or religion, destined to dominate and to remake the world in their own image.⁷

Colonialism studies acknowledge the difference between older types of empire and the modern phenomenon of colonialism. Older empires, including the Roman, Byzantine,

2 G. Antonius, *The Arab Awakening: The Story of the Arab National Movement*, Philadelphia 1939, p. 276.

3 A non-scholarly critique of the ubiquity of the phrase "Turkish colonialism" – *al-isti'mar al-turki* in Arabic – is at <https://mar7aba.com.tr/الاستعمار-التركي-مصطلح-تم-تسويقه-للا/> (accessed 6 June 2019).

4 N. MacQueen, *Colonialism*, Harlow 2007, p. xvii; J. Osterhammel, *Colonialism: A Theoretical Overview*, S. Frisch (trans.), 2nd edn, Princeton 2005, pp. 3–4.

5 MacQueen, *Colonialism*, p. 2; R. Tignor, Foreword, in: Osterhammel, *Colonialism*, p. x; Osterhammel, *Colonialism*, p. 9.

6 MacQueen, *Colonialism*, pp. 5, 13; Osterhammel, *Colonialism*, pp. 10–12; W. Reinhard, *A Short History of Colonialism*, K. Sturge (trans.), Manchester 2011, p. 1; Tignor, Foreword, p. ix.

7 MacQueen, *Colonialism*, p. 21; Osterhammel, *Colonialism*, pp. 15–16; Reinhard, *Short History*, p. 1.

Mughal, and Ottoman, sought to consolidate resources and to impose the dominion of a ruling class, group or stratum on subject populations. Typically, these older empires were territorially contiguous, or linked by bodies of water (such as the Mediterranean and Black Seas) that did not require ocean-going knowledge and technologies to traverse. Older empires' superior resources, organization, and tactics accounted for their military successes, but in lieu of a lopsided difference in technologies available to rulers and the ruled, subject populations might challenge their overlords given fortuitous circumstances and leadership. (An example from ancient Syria is illustrated by Zenobia, a queen of Palmyra who broke free of Roman vassalage and governed Syria in her own name for a brief period in the third century CE.) The older empires incorporated freshly conquered regions as provinces or comparable administrative units.⁸

Rulers of the older empires might compel populations to move from one region and settle in another to serve the rulers' interests. For instance, the early modern Ottoman Empire depended on mobile populations to bolster the sultanate's authority and defend its expanding frontiers.⁹ In the early seventeenth century Shah Abbas of Safavid Iran compelled Armenians of Julfa (in Azerbaijan, where Armenians dominated the silk trade with Ottoman Aleppo) to move to a newly established Armenian quarter in the Safavids' capital Isfahan.¹⁰ But these old empires did not practice colonialism in the modern sense. Ottoman practice in Syria illustrates this contention.¹¹ Unless otherwise noted, the word "Syria" is shorthand for "the lands of Syria", a designation that encompassed much of the western Fertile Crescent and is roughly equivalent to the historic Arabic toponym Bilad al-Sham, "the lands of Damascus". The boundaries of Bilad al-Sham were cultural, not administrative. They extended from Gaza in the south to Antioch and Aleppo in the north, encompassing the Mediterranean coastal regions in between and tapering off in the east where dry-farming steppes met the desert. The predominant language of Ottoman Syria's population was Arabic. During the country's 400 years of Ottoman rule, formal administrative divisions always included provincial capitals in Damascus and Aleppo. Mediterranean coastal areas were usually assigned to provinces based ephemerally in port towns: Tripoli, Sidon, Acre and finally Beirut. As for Jerusalem, from the 1870s onward it became the centre of a separate administrative unit, and a kind of forerunner for twentieth-century Palestine including the coast from Gaza to Jaffa. But as the translated Arabic phrase "lands of Damascus" suggests, that abundantly watered city located in a lush oasis was at the centre of the cultural and geographic understanding of Bilad al-Sham, even though the province of Damascus (in 1865 renamed Syria) administered only a part of these lands.

8 Osterhammel, *Colonialism*, p. 9.

9 R. Kasaba, *A Moveable Empire: Ottoman Nomads, Migrants and Refugees*, Seattle 2009, chap. 2, *passim*.

10 B. Masters, *The Origins of Western Economic Dominance in the Middle East: Mercantilism and the Islamic Economy in Aleppo, 1600–1750*, New York 1988, pp. 82–83.

11 Historical material on Ottoman Syria is taken from J. A. Reilly, *Fragile Nation, Shattered Land: The Modern History of Syria*, London 2019.

The Ottomans integrated the various Syrian provinces into the empire's administration. These provinces evolved in tandem with administrative changes in the wider empire. The Syrian lands were not governed separately or differently from the core regions of the empire (centred on Istanbul and its Balkan and Anatolian hinterlands). In the beginning, the Ottoman ruling elite were a distinct social caste – "official" Ottomans, males endowed with military status and rank, in a formal (and honorific) sense deemed to be slaves of the Sultan, and of various ethnic backgrounds; but all were versed in the Empire's administrative language, Ottoman Turkish. Few Syrians or Arabs numbered among them. But on the other hand, ranking Muslim legal and judicial figures drawn from local populations also exercised authority and complemented the official Ottomans. As for Christians and Jews, the sultanate recognized their clerics and gave them authority over their respective communities. Nevertheless, throughout the empire's cities sharia (Islamic law) courts served the general population as everyday adjudicators of civil law including property transactions, credit and debt, and morals disputes.

Muslim legal authorities – known as the *ulama*, "those with knowledge" – were men who hailed from respected local families and local colleges (*madrasas*). Their incorporation into the Ottomans' administration was a logical outcome of the *ulama's* training in Islamic law and jurisprudence. The *ulama* were linchpins of Ottoman rule in urban centres like Damascus and Aleppo. Although greedy or oppressive officials and corrupt *ulama* were part of Syria's social landscape, in the public mind their failings attached to individuals, not to the whole body of officialdom or *ulama*. Local *ulama* in service to the Ottoman sultanate did not face derision from their urban confreres as "collaborators" in league with alien rulers. On the contrary, the *ulama's* service to the sultanate burnished their credentials and enhanced their local influence. The sultanate's deference to, and dependence on, *ulama* turned the latter into de facto tribunes or spokesmen for local concerns and interests, even as Ottoman rule allowed many of them to accumulate huge fortunes.

Although the top judge in each Syrian province usually was a non-Arab (typically a Turkish speaker from the core Ottoman lands, referred to locally as a Rumi), the bulk of everyday legal matters was put in the hands of local Arabophone *ulama*.¹² They were the deputy judges, muftis (jurisconsults) and teachers who formed the consciousness of educated Muslims, and they numbered among the local notables whom the Ottomans cultivated. The most prominent Syrian *ulama* belonged to prestigious families whose claim to notability preceded the Ottoman conquest, or had been established independently of imperial patronage. *Ulama* dynasties served the sultanate and benefitted from association with it, but they were not creatures of the Ottomans to the same degree as were dynastic military families.

12 Rumi = Roman, since the Ottomans governed from Constantinople (Istanbul), the erstwhile seat of the Eastern Roman (Byzantine) Empire. The word "Rum" also was attached to Orthodox Christians, whose preeminent clerical figure was the Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople.

The rise of dynastic military families was another feature of Ottoman rule, or had become so by the eighteenth century. Over time, households of Ottoman officials sent to Syria and other Arab provinces put down local roots, adopted Arabic, and became “local Ottomans”. They were a kind of nobility of service, raised to authority on account of their utility to the ruling dynasty. The most fortunate of them, with the right combination of skill and imperial patronage, retained influence over many generations. Their continued loyalty to and dependence on the sultanate did not diminish the standing of local Ottomans, who came to be seen as a natural or normal part of the Syrian scene, as representatives of particular regional (as well as family) interests. The most famous Syrians in this category were the Azms, whose progeny frequently served as governors of Damascus for nearly a century from 1725 to 1807, and who continued thereafter to play significant roles in the province of Damascus (as aforementioned, renamed Syria in 1865). Like other local Ottoman-era military families, Azms’ political fortunes survived the empire’s collapse and some of them went on to hold positions in post-First World War Syria. The last Azm to hold high office in independent Syria was prime minister Khalid al-Azm, overthrown in the 1963 coup that brought the Baath party to power. The Azms were likely of Arab origin, but many other military families who came to wield local and regional authority across many generations were of Kurdish background, including the Yusufs of Damascus and the Barazis of Hama. Kurds’ salience in this role derived from their role as commanders or *aghas*, capable of mustering and commanding both regular and irregular troops, their authority reinforced by ties of community and kinship. In time, as Kurdish-origin military families settled in the major cities and participated in the Ottomans’ patronage system, they became Arabized.

Below the level of political elites, other non-Arabs and non-Syrians who settled in the country’s major urban centres also became Arabized and localized over time. The eclectic origins of Syria’s urban populations were taken for granted. Newcomers’ integration was facilitated by Ottoman-era institutions such as craft guilds, urban quarters and religious communities (in particular, for Muslims, the Sufi brotherhoods). Consciousness of class, ethnicity, clan and tribal affiliation was very much part of the social mix in both urban and rural Syria, but the dichotomy between “colonizers” and “colonized” that was (or became) a defining feature of modern colonialism was not part of the theory or practice of Ottoman imperial rule.

This was true even in cases where specific communities were transplanted to Syrian lands by government edict, usually to serve as “enforcers” in restive or tribally dominated rural areas. Two instances of such transplantations are Turcoman settlements established near Hama in the sixteenth century, and Circassian resettlement on Syria’s steppe plains in the nineteenth century. Turcomans were expected to secure trade routes against Bedouin raids and to form a loyal bulwark against rural banditry. Circassian resettlement three centuries later was Istanbul’s way of addressing the problem of imperial Russia’s dispossession of a Muslim population from the north-eastern shores of the Black Sea. The Ottomans founded Circassian communities to establish year-round administrations in Syrian frontier areas that had been under Bedouin tribal influence. Turcomans and

Circassians retained distinct ethnic markers (language, ethnic nomenclature, dress), but they were not colonizers equivalent to the white settlers in European colonies. They became part of Syria's population mix, and were not a self-perpetuating caste who exercised authority over the natives.

From the standpoint of Syrian urban opinion, Ottoman rule was normative. Although the Ottoman conquest of Syria in 1516–1517 defeated the Egypt-based Mamluk dynasty, Ottoman rule did not destroy a local ruling group or disempower the local ulama – to the contrary. As political pragmatists the Ottoman rulers ratified extant power relations in the country, and solicited the favour and goodwill of the ulama. The first major Ottoman monument built in Damascus was the conquering Sultan Selim I's shrine to the thirteenth-century Damascene mystic and theosophist Ibn Arabi. The next major public monument, built by Selim's successor Suleiman "the Magnificent", was a complex for housing pilgrims to Mecca as they travelled the imperial road from Anatolia to the Hejaz holy cities. Constructions like these aimed to bolster the sultanate's claims to authority based on its respect for Islamic norms and the ideal of "justice" embodied in the concept of sharia. Political power brokers in and around Syria's cities, and the Muslim scholars who dominated the country's literary life, viewed the sultanate's authority as legitimate and jostled to earn positions within it.¹³

Even widespread rural rebellions in northern Syria during the seventeenth century, known as the Jelali (Celali) revolts, were not anti-sultanate in an ideological sense. A principal figure in the disturbances, a Kurdish military leader in the region of Aleppo named Ali Pasha Janbulad, wanted Istanbul's acknowledgment of his family's position. During a pause in hostilities he accepted the Ottomans' offer to become governor of Aleppo. Other rural strongmen of this era – for instance Fakhr al-Din II Maan, who centuries later was repackaged and marketed as a Lebanese proto-nationalist – strove to become recognized members of Istanbul's tax-farming hierarchy.

In some places and among some communities there were indeed ideological elements of opposition to the Ottoman sultanate, where communities and their leaderships rejected the sultanate's claims of legitimacy. For these communities the Ottomans and their local allies were intrusive and hostile outsiders. This hostility and alienation reflected a rural-urban division, where country people experienced Ottoman city-based authority as alien, grasping, brutal and oppressive. The sultan and his servants, including the sultanate's local and regional allies, were seen through the lens of *zulm*, oppression, making their rule fundamentally unjust and illegitimate. These hostile attitudes are mostly discerned from behaviours, since targeted populations rarely left written records of their own. Mountain peasant communities acknowledged the authority of their local sheikhs, who vied with rivals for the sultanate's recognition (for instance, the Mount Lebanon strongman Fakhr al-Din II cited earlier). But rural mountain communities on the losing side of such struggles were exposed to the depredations of sultanate-sanctioned officials.

13 Cf. Reinhard's argument that colonialism is marked by a sense of "alterity" between rulers and ruled, between outsiders as opposed to natives (Reinhard, *Short History*, p. 1).

For instance, in the early nineteenth century mountain peasants in the hills east of Tartus and Jabla (who were Alawites, members of a dissenting Muslim religious community) underwent repeated ordeals of violence and murder at the hands of Tripoli-based Janisseries (Ottoman infantry) who made them targets of attacks, raids and beheadings done in the sultan's name. And whilst the leading Shiite Muslim military families in Mount Lebanon and the Beqaa Valley manoeuvred within the Ottomans' patronage system, the dense Shiite peasant populations further south in Jabal Amil (between Mount Lebanon and the hills of Galilee) looked to their own quasi-independent sheikhs for legitimate leadership. In the case of these Shiite populations, we have a unique written record from a literate farmer and his son in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. They compared the Ottoman pashas to pharaoh, who in the Quran is an unjust, oppressive and illegitimate ruler. Finally, although pastoral nomads (Bedouins) were symbolically incorporated into the sultanate's rule through Istanbul's recognition of a "Commander of the Steppe" responsible for ensuring safe passage of pilgrims and trade, other pastoral nomads challenged symbols of Ottoman power and did not fear to attack and devastate officially escorted caravans (as famously happened in 1757).

So Ottoman rule in Syria did not meet the criteria of modern colonialism. Broad swathes of urban society accepted the sultanate as legitimate, including ulama whose writings are the principal sources we have for the Muslim majority's worldview. Acceptance of the Ottomans' claims to legitimacy extended to urbanites' rural allies, who sought official support and recognition for their roles as tax farmers and rural intermediaries. However, the sultanate's assertions of legitimacy were more tenuous in rural areas and carried no weight at all in some places and among some communities. These negative memories and sentiments of disaffection supplied material for anti-Ottoman and anti-Turkish narratives in the nationalist era. But hostile twentieth-century voices were raised in opposition to an empire that had not, in the main, adopted modern colonialist discourse and practice.

Even though modern colonialism generally featured territories separate from the ruling or national core, this generalisation alone cannot peremptorily rule out a colonial relationship between the Ottoman Empire and Syria. By way of example, the overland expansion of Russia had become a colonial undertaking by the eighteenth century.¹⁴ A discussion of the Ottomans in Syria needs to consider how their governance of contiguous overland territories compared and contrasted with Russia's.

Moscow's domains constituted an empire that expanded overland and annexed contiguous territories, extending eventually the Pacific Ocean and jumping the Bering Strait to Alaska. Historians generally consider Russia to have turned into a colonial state (no longer "just" an empire) in the eighteenth century. Muscovy had emerged from the political system left by the invading Mongols, as a Christian tributary to the Muslim Golden Horde and their Chingizid successors. (The last of these were the Tatars of the Crimean

14 M. Khodarkovsky, *Russia's Steppe Frontier: The Making of a Colonial Empire, 1500–1800*, Bloomington 2002, pp. 2–4, 184–187.

Khanate.) Although Ivan the Terrible proclaimed himself "emperor" (tsar) in 1547, and official Russia began to fashion a self-understanding as the imperial successor to Rome and Constantinople, the Crimean Tatars held onto an older political memory of Russia as a supplicant polity, and Moscow engaged in the politics of the steppe frontier as one among many political actors jousting for supremacy, wooing allies and signing agreements that were still called (as a legacy of the old Golden Horde political arrangements) *shert'* (from Arabic *shart*).¹⁵ However, by the early eighteenth century Russia's elites began to understand their state not just as another empire, but as a Christian European empire entrusted with a mission to bring Christianity and civilisation to peoples who had neither. Religious identity (Islam, Christianity, animism) had long been among the political and social markers in politics of the steppe, but now it became (in Russian hands) the difference between civilisation and backwardness, a sign of „European-ness“ and of Russia's version of what (in the Anglosphere) later would be dubbed the "white man's burden" to uplift backward races.¹⁶

This transformation in official Russian attitudes went hand in hand with dramatic improvements in Russian capabilities. The Russian government established the fortress, later town, of Orenburg as an outpost of colonial expansion in 1734. Contemporaries hailed as a "gate to the East" and compared Orenburg's establishment to the Spanish exploration or discovery of America.¹⁷ To defend themselves against their erstwhile Muscovite vassal, the once-powerful Crimean Tatars had to rely more and more on the Ottomans, who nonetheless after a disastrous war surrendered Crimea to Russia in 1774. Imperial Russia's colonialist era had well and truly begun. Its behaviour in the steppes marked a sharp contrast to the more traditional frontier politics followed by the Ottomans and their Persian/Iranian counterparts. According to historian Michael Khodarkovsky, Russia's success was due „[...] to Western methods of colonization. Unlike the Persians who were content to launch occasional punitive campaigns to compel their putative subjects to submit tribute, or the Ottomans, who only sporadically fortified their frontiers and brought in occasional settlers, the Russian government proceeded in a systematic fashion to incorporate the new territories and peoples into the empire's military, political, economic and administrative system.“¹⁸

No comparable (colonialist) transformation occurred in the Ottoman Empire's relationship to the Syrian lands. In the nineteenth century the Ottoman Empire itself was becoming a semi-colony: imperial in form but subject to European restrictions in practice. After 1881, European creditors controlled a significant chunk of the Ottoman budget through the Ottoman Public Debt Administration.¹⁹ European protégés and citizens were immune to Ottoman laws. Some parts of the empire, though nominally under Ottoman rule, were administered in fact by one or another of the European powers

15 Ibid., pp. 55–56, 91; personal correspondence from Victor Ostapchuk, 5 July 2019.

16 Khodarkovsky, *Russia's Steppe Frontier*, pp. 2–3, 176, 184–189, 225.

17 Ibid., pp. 156–161.

18 Ibid., p. 225.

19 E. Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History*, London 1994, pp. 88–89.

(Bosnia-Herzegovina, Egypt, Cyprus) or by local authorities who were clients of European powers (Bulgaria). European oversight restricted Ottoman sovereignty in Mount Lebanon (1861) and was set to do the same in Eastern Anatolia (Armenia) in 1914.²⁰ Europeans built and owned most of the modern infrastructure in the Ottoman lands, including Syria, such as ports, railways, and utilities. The promise of oil in Ottoman Iraq led to the formation of the European-controlled Turkish Petroleum Company, which was reorganized after the First World War as the British-dominated Iraq Petroleum Company.²¹ The Ottoman Empire, its lands and its resources had become targets of European colonialist expansion.²²

Ottoman elites in the nineteenth century wished for their state to be treated as a peer by the European Great Powers. Reform-minded Ottoman officials pushed through a series of legal and administrative changes designed to turn the sultanate into a modern state, with aspirations of becoming part of the post-Vienna Concert of Europe.²³ These reform measures culminated in the promulgation of an Ottoman constitution in 1876, which established an elected parliament and designated Ottoman Turkish as the language of parliamentary business. The nineteenth-century reforms did in fact create a modern state (and a military) that endured through the First World War, and whose cadres went on to form the Turkish Republic in 1923. During the last Ottoman decades, Ottoman Turkish elites adopted attitudes that overlapped with those associated with colonialism. For instance, the old empire did not much care what subject populations thought, as long as they fulfilled their fiscal obligations and acquiesced to the sultanate's authority. The later Ottoman state, in contrast, sought to create a sense of active loyalty to the homeland and the government, to spread modern education and literacy, and to cultivate pro-regime consciousness among the general population.²⁴

These are not necessarily characteristics of colonialism but of nation-building, and in the twentieth century they became a universal set of expectations among postcolonial nation-builders in the Middle East and elsewhere. But in the late-Ottoman context, reformist elites had a sense that they were hobbled by the "backwardness" of their populations, especially (but not only) Arabic-speakers in mountainous or rural regions.²⁵ As enlightened elites (Arabic *mutanawwarin*), Ottoman administrators and educators adopted their version of the "white man's burden", namely, a self-appointed mission to raise the cultural level of backward populations. For "enlightened" Ottoman elites this was particularly true of nominal or heterodox Muslim communities who needed to be taught the "correct", Ottoman version of Islam which, among other things, emphasized

20 Ibid., p. 120.

21 P. Sluglett, *Britain in Iraq: Contriving King and Country*, New York 2007, pp. 67–75.

22 Reinhard, *Short History*, pp. 226–230.

23 S. Deringil, *The Well-Protected Domains: Ideology and the Legitimation of Power in the Ottoman Empire 1876–1909*, London 1998, p. 136.

24 State-run education in the late Ottoman Empire is the subject of B. Fortna, *Imperial Classroom: Islam, the State, and Education in the Late Ottoman Empire*, Oxford 2002.

25 U. Makdisi, *Ottoman Orientalism*, in: *American Historical Review* 107 (2002) 3, pp. 770–771.

loyalty to the sultan as the supposed caliph of Sunni Muslims around the world. The opening of the Imperial Museum in 1869 was part and parcel of the sultanate's efforts to represent civilisation, progress and science in the nineteenth-century world, challenging European monopoly claims to this cultural capital, and asserting Istanbul's position at the civilisational apex of the Ottoman lands.²⁶ As part of its quest to be accepted as a peer Great Power in the era of colonialism, the Ottoman government participated in the Berlin Conference of 1884 which partitioned Africa among the colonial powers. Ottoman statesmen went so far as to identify with Europeans' "civilizing missions" in Africa, comparing them to Istanbul's duty to "spread the 'light of Islam' into 'savage' regions".²⁷ There are parallels here with the colonialist Russian attitude toward the "backward" and non-Christian segments of Central Asian populations who, it was claimed, needed the civilizing mission of Russia and the Orthodox church delivered through the expansion of Russian power and the colonial transformation of incorporated societies. But taken as a whole, Ottoman efforts have more in common with post-colonial nation-builders who sought (often against heavy odds) to create nation-states out of countries that were anything but.²⁸ Aspiring postcolonial national leaderships might well pursue policies that amount to "internal colonialism" (and the Turkish Republic's treatment of its Kurdish populations has been characterized as such), but the late nineteenth and early twentieth century Ottomans' goal was not to turn the general population into "Turks".²⁹ Rather, it was to strengthen and favour the empire's Muslim majority to make them bulwarks of the Ottoman state against Christian subjects/citizens (especially ethnic Greeks and Armenians) whose loyalty they doubted. In this respect, and in this era, the Istanbul government treated Syrians well and cultivated their loyalties, offering local families and power brokers integration into Ottoman institutions and state practices. It would be as if Great Britain had sought to extend citizenship, voting rights and parliamentary representation to the populations of India, or France to the entire population of Algeria (not just to Algeria's Christians and Jews).

When the Ottoman Empire collapsed and Arab nationalists in Syria worked to build a post-Ottoman future, they defined their aspirational Syria against the Ottoman past. This was an ideological project that obscured the inconvenient fact that most Arab administrators and military officers from Syria had continued to serve the empire until its final defeat, whether they were providing their services out of conviction or pragmatism. In the post-1918 world, nationhood and national self-determination became the cur-

26 Ibid., pp. 783–784.

27 Deringil, *Well-Protected Domains*, p. 148.

28 This was not just a post-colonial phenomenon. Prior to the First World War, advocates of centralisation and cultural homogenisation in France used the colonialist trope of a "civilizing mission" to refer to areas of the country that were not yet fully integrated into national life (E. Weber, *Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France 1870–1914*, Stanford 1976, chap. 29).

29 Reinhard, *Short History*, pp. 1–2; Kendal, *Kurdistan in Turkey*, in: G. Chaliand (ed.), *A People Without a Country: The Kurds and Kurdistan*, 2nd edn, New York 1993, pp. 72–73.

rency of political legitimacy (or of claims to legitimacy) and Arab Syrians did not want to be left behind.

Unfortunately for nationalists' aspirations, the victorious French and British had other plans. France created a Syrian state (or a multiplicity of Syrian states, for a while) but Paris worked assiduously to discourage the creation of a Syrian nation. When nationalists finally did achieve full independence for Syria in 1946, it was less because of their innate strength than it was on account of French weakness, including Britain's insistence (during the Second World War) that Charles De Gaulle's Free French administration should promise independence to Syria and Lebanon. In national histories the Ottoman past receded into a kind of caricature, or a foil against which to demonstrate the virtues and struggles of the oppressed Syrian and Arab nation.

The Ottomans were not altruists. They were after all builders and rulers of an empire, and during the First World War the Ottoman Turkish leadership implemented a genocidal "final solution" to the empire's Armenian national question. But whatever else Ottoman rule in Syria may have represented, it was not colonialism but an example of an older empire that ultimately could not stand up to the new forces of nationalism, industrialisation and expansionist European imperialism in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

A Colonial Empire Without Colonies: Russia's State Colonialism in Comparative Perspective

Michael Khodarkovsky

ABSTRACTS

Dieser Aufsatz vertritt die These, dass das Russische Reich ein sich selbst verleugnendes Kolonialreich war. Ähnlich wie bei anderen europäischen Imperien besaßen auch Russlands Politik und Herrschaftspraktiken einen kolonialen Charakter. Dies trifft in besonderem Maße auf die asiatischen Teile des Imperiums zu, wo sich die russische Expansion von einem Nicht-Siedlungszu einem Siedlungskolonialismus hin entwickelte. Allerdings leugnete der russische Staat im Gegensatz zu den anderen europäischen Imperien konsequent und absichtsvoll seinen kolonialen Charakter. Das Russische Reich unterschied sich von seinen europäischen Entsprechungen durch die dominante Rolle des Staates und einen Typ von Staatskolonialismus, den die europäischen Imperien erst zu einem viel späteren Zeitpunkt praktizierten.

This paper argues that the Russian empire was a colonial empire in denial. Similar to other European empires, Russia's policies and practices were colonial in nature. It was particularly so in the Asian parts of the empire, where Russian expansion evolved from a non-settler to a settler form of colonialism. However, unlike other European empires, Russian authorities consistently and consciously denied Russia's colonial nature. What distinguished the Russian empire from its European counterparts was the dominant role of the state and a type of state colonialism that European empires began to practice at a much later stage.

This essay seeks to recover the traces of the colonial discourse in Russian imperial historiography and place the history of Russian expansion in the south and east in the colonial framework usually reserved for the West European empires. Russia's expansion into the regions populated by various non-Christian peoples presented Russia with a similar set of colonial challenges that were confronted by the European powers. But in contrast to most of the European colonial experiences, in autocratic Russia it was the State that first and foremost managed the colonial affairs, while at the same time denying the empire's colonial nature. If one considers that European colonial empires evolved from ones largely reliant on their commercial private arms to ones mostly administered by the state, Russia's state colonialism, from this vantage point, preceded the European one. In fact, it was an unprecedented role of the State that distinguished the Russian empire from its European counterparts.

During the mid-sixteenth century, Moscow's rapid expansion into the regions of the mid-Volga and Siberia with their animist and Muslim population transformed Moscow from an insignificant principality into one of the first early modern empires. At the same time as the Muscovite state was expanding eastward, the Spanish empire was increasing its possessions in the New World. Later, the Spanish imperial conquests would be characterized as "colonial", while the post-sixteenth century Muscovy is neither referred to as an "empire", nor its conquest and rule over a large non-Christian population are commonly considered "colonial".

How does one account for such a conceptual difference? Traditional views hold that Russia was different from the European overseas empires because it expanded into the contiguous territories, with the exception of its short-lived American colonies, and therefore Russia was a continental empire. I suggest that beginning from the mid-sixteenth century Russia was both a continental and colonial empire. The undoing of the rigid classification of Russia as a continental empire helps to consider Russian historical experiences alongside European overseas empires.¹

We shall consider later how the myths of the Russian empire came into existence and why, throughout the centuries, the imperial government officials and Russian historians consistently refused to see Russia as a colonial empire.

1. Defining Colonial in Russia

But first what is an empire and which empires can be considered colonial? Any short discussion cannot do justice to the enormous literature on empires and colonialisms that continues to be a burgeoning field.² Suffice it to say, however, that empire by defini-

1 W. Sunderland approaches the same topic with the thesis opposite of the one I offer below. He maintains the argument for the absence of colonial institutions in Russia but speculates that a Colonial Office might have emerged by the early twentieth century (W. Sunderland, *The Ministry of Asiatic Russia: The Colonial Office That Never Was but Might Have Been*, in: *Slavic Review* 60 [2010] 1, pp. 120–150).

2 For a succinct summary of the evolution and applications of the term "Colonial", see B. Badie / D. Berg-Schlosser / L.

tion requires a political structure in which one dominating political entity conquers and rules the other. The resulting political structure is conceptualized as a multipolar entity with the centre and one or several peripheries. The line of separation between the centre and periphery is usually political but could also coincide with the ethnic, national, or religious boundaries. Thus, Napoleon's conquest of the neighbouring Spain, Italy, and Germany made France an empire.

While all conquests could produce empires, not all empires are colonial. A colonial empire is defined by possessing a specific periphery whose inhabitants are conceptualized as inferior, primitive, barbaric, or generally "the Other" that can be both exploited and improved. Conceptualizing an empire as colonial requires a perception of difference between the metropolis and periphery that is articulated in terms of religion, civilisation, race, or a lack of sovereignty. Returning to the previous example, Napoleon's conquests in Europe created an empire but not a colonial one. By contrast, the result of his short foray into Egypt was a colonial empire, not because his troops crossed the body of water but because they faced a non-Christian society perceived as radically different and inferior.

It was in this sense, reflecting the European sense of superiority over the non-Christian peoples and the confidence in their destiny to bring them Civilisation and Christianity, that in the nineteenth century the term "colonial" began to be applied retroactively to the early European overseas conquests.³ From this vantage point, with the mid-sixteenth century conquests of the large animist and Muslim population, the Muscovite state, like Spain and Portugal but long before England and France, became an early modern colonial empire.

Throughout the centuries that followed, Russia's Asian territories presented successive Russian governments with the typically colonial challenges: ruling societies with vastly different social organisation (nomadic, semi-nomadic, tribal and clan structures), confronting linguistic diversity and legal pluralism, and devising policies to convert, educate, and civilize their colonial subjects. The fact that Moscow and later St. Petersburg had never conceived of themselves as the colonial empires is another matter to be considered below.

2. Russia's Imperial Sonderweg

To understand some of the reasons for a lack of a political articulation of colonialism and the endurance of the imperial myths in Russia, one needs to begin with a brief survey of the historiography and ethnography in the Russian empire. No Russian intellectual of the nineteenth century could avoid addressing the core issues of the Russian identity:

Morlino (eds.), *International Encyclopedia of Political Science*, 1st edn, London 2011, pp. 302–306. For a comprehensive overview of the subject, see J. Burbank/F. Cooper, *Empires in World History: Power and the Politics of Difference*, Princeton 2011.

3 J. H. Elliott, *Empires of the Atlantic World: Britain and Spain in America, 1492–1830*, New Haven 2006.

what was a Russian state, Russian nation, and Russian empire? Were these notions synonymous? If not, what was the relationship among them?

Writing in the wake of Russia's triumph over Napoleon, Russia's first official court historian, Nikolai Karamzin exalted Russia as a great European empire, and he lionized the alleged conqueror of Siberia, Yermak, as "the Russian Pizarro". But it was an influential writer and historian, Mikhail Petrovich Pogodin, who was the first to address the issues of the Russian empire in earnest. Writing in 1837, while a professor of Russian history at the Moscow University, he compared the conquest of Siberia by Yermak in 1581 with the conquest of South America by Hernan Cortés: "We have discovered one-third of Asia. Is that not worthy of a celebration similar to America's discovery by Christopher Columbus?"⁴

But if the Russians observed the obvious parallels between the Russian conquest of Siberia and the Spanish conquest of the Americas, they also noticed how a series of wars of independence ended the Spanish rule in the Americas and brought about the sovereign states of Latin America. If Russia's conquest of Siberia was similar, would the Russian empire follow the same path?

No, argued Pogodin. This was where the Russian experience diverged from the West. The Western states, he claimed, were founded on conquest, which resulted in enmities and divisions. In Russia, by contrast, a peaceful union of different peoples emerged because the empire came together through a voluntary unification (*prizvanie*).⁵ In other words, similarities with the West were welcome as long as they confirmed Russia's equal greatness, but when it came to the perceived weaknesses of the West, Russian experiences offered emphatic contrasts.

A historian and a government official, Pogodin was a controversial figure: some contemporaries considered him a Slavophile, others saw him as a Westerniser. Yet his views captured the cognitive dissonance of Russian historiography: Russia was both similar to the West and different. In other words, Russia was unique. The Slavophiles wanted Russia to preserve the difference and uniqueness, the Westernisers wished to erase the difference and make Russia similar to the West.

What is remarkable that whether liberal or conservative, Westerniser or Slavophile, the overwhelming majority of the nineteenth-century Russian intelligentsia accepted Pogodin's postulate. They maintained that Russia's expansion avoided the violence associated with European empires and that the Russian empire was fundamentally benevolent towards its imperial non-Christian subjects. This imperial paradigm conveniently excluded millions of the indigenous people who were killed by Russian arms and expelled through Russian policies as the empire expanded into Siberia, the North Caucasus, and Central Asia. Such cognitive dissonance was not in itself unique to Russia, and many European empires also believed in the munificent nature of their colonial enterprises. What was

4 P. Miliukov, *Glavnye techeniia russkoi istorii mysli* (The Main Currents of Russian Historiography), reprint, Moscow 2000, p. 363; Y. Slezkine, *Arctic Mirrors. Russia and the Small Peoples of the North*, Ithaca 1994, p. 77.

5 *Ibid.*, p. 364.

different, however, that Russia juxtaposed itself to the Western empires and denied the colonial character of its own.

For conservative historians, such as Sergei Platonov, there was only one Russia populated by Russians. But even for liberal historians, Russia was either a reluctant empire destined to expand and colonize available lands (Vasilii Kliuchevskii) or one that pushed towards its natural frontiers (Sergei Soloviev). All concurred that Russia's expansion was inevitable, and that the mission to civilize the savage and perfidious peoples along the imperial frontiers demanded conquest and eventual russification.

3. Russia as a Frontier Society

To understand the dynamics of the Muscovite-Russian empire, I propose to look at Russia as a quintessential frontier society. Muscovy emerged on the fringes of several major civilisations: the eastern fringes of the Roman Christian one, the northern fringes of the Byzantine, and the north-western fringes of the Islamic civilisations. In the west, Moscow encountered sovereign states with clearly drawn territorial boundaries. But in the south and east, no similarly defined states and borders existed. Instead, along the vast expanse of Eurasian steppe and Siberian forest, Moscow confronted tribal alliances of various nomadic and semi-nomadic peoples.

These open frontiers were not easily delineated or defended. As a result, not only had Moscow found itself under the Mongol rule for over two centuries but even long after the Mongols, Russia was subjected to raids and depredations from the remnants of the Golden Horde and other nomadic newcomers. Unable to defend itself in the conditions of the open steppe, Moscow suffered considerable material losses and above all the loss of hundreds of thousands of people captured and sold on the slave markets of Central Asia, North Caucasus and the Crimea. It is estimated that between 1500 and 1700, over two million people in the East European periphery were captured and sold into slavery. This is more than a number of slaves transported from Africa during the same time. Raiding activity and slave trade were so profitable that keeping peace was all but impossible.⁶

On the other hand, the need to defend itself and the absence of the well-defined borders were a constant invitation toward further expansion and conquest. From the middle of the seventeenth century, Moscow embarked on the construction of the fortification lines, a combination of forts and natural impediments intended to stop the nomadic raids. This Russian version of *limes* became a major tool of Russian expansion. In time, the new fortification lines replaced the old ones followed by the peasant and Cossacks colonization, so that by the late eighteenth century the lines separated the newly conquered from the native territories in the North Caucasus and northern Kazakhstan.

6 D. Kolodziejczyk, *The Crimean Khanate and Poland-Lithuania: International Diplomacy on the European Periphery (fifteenth – eighteenth centuries)*, Leiden 2011, p. XIV.

Historically, Russia was conquering new lands at a pace much faster than the government's ability to colonize them, and the peopling of the frontier regions often remained an insurmountable challenge. The empire was chronically short of people, in particular the East Slavs capable or willing to resettle and colonize the new regions. It was for this reason that Catherine the Great invited tens of thousands of colonists from Germany, Serbia, and other parts of Europe to settle the newly conquered lands of the Black Sea region that Catherine named, New Russia. It was also for this reason that the government allowed priests, merchants, and Cossacks to purchase, convert to Christianity, and hold in serfdom the non-Christians in the frontier regions. The fact that this decree was a remarkable violation of the exclusive privilege of the Russian nobility to purchase and own serfs spoke volumes of the government's priorities and intentions.⁷ Regardless of these efforts, St. Petersburg could only boast of a limited success in the European part of Russia: in the mid-Volga, where by the late nineteenth century the number of Slavic settlers almost matched the non-Christian population, and in the northwest Caucasus, where throughout the 1860s and 1870s Russia ethnically cleansed the region by deporting the indigenous Adyge population to the Ottoman empire.⁸

While Russia's fortification lines were the *de facto* borders of the empire, Russia's claims of sovereignty over its numerous neighbours extended far beyond the fortification lines. The only *modus operandi* for Moscow in the southern and eastern borderlands was to insist that the native population immediately submit to the tsar and become his loyal subjects. In the mid-sixteenth century, in addition to assuming the mantle of the Byzantine emperors and crowning themselves as tsars, the Muscovite rulers also asserted their right to the title of khans of the Golden Horde. But claiming legitimate authority over the numerous non-Christian peoples, who previously formed a part of the Golden Horde, also meant adhering to the traditional Mongol political practices. Thus, it was not accidental that Moscow conceptualized its relations with the peoples in the eastern and southern borderlands in terms distinctly different from those used in the empire's western territories and that these terms were of Turko-Mongol origin. The suzerain versus subject relationship was the only way the tsar, who considered himself a universal sovereign, could conceptualize his relationship with the non-sovereign, non-state organized societies. In this regard, Russia's application of the concept of a universal sovereignty in its Asian borderlands was similar to those of the Ottomans and Chinese.⁹

7 Arkhiv vnesheinei politiki Rossiiskoi imperii (The Archive of the Foreign Affairs of the Russian Empire), F. 119, op. 5, 1755g, d. 17, ll. 17–20; for a detailed discussion of the slave trade, see M. Khodarkovsky, *Russia's Steppe Frontier: The Making of a Colonial Empire, 1500–1800*, Bloomington 2002, pp. 21–26.

8 *Memuary generala Musa-Pashi Kundukhova (1837–1865) (Memoirs of the General Musa-Pasha Kundukhov)*, in: *Zvezda* 8 (2001), pp. 100–123; C. King, *The Ghost of Freedom: A History of the Caucasus*, Oxford 2008, pp. 73–91.

9 G. Karman, *Sovereignty and Representation: Tributary States in the Seventeenth-Century Diplomatic System of the Ottoman Empire*, in: G. Karman/L. Kuncevic (eds.), *European Tributary States of the Ottoman Empire in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries*, Leiden and Boston 2013, pp. 155–186; J. L. Millward/L. J. Newby, *The Qing and Islam on the Western Frontier*, in: D. S. Sutton/H. F. Siu/P. K. Crossley (eds.), *Empire at the Margins: Culture, Ethnicity, and Frontier in Early Modern China*, Berkeley 2006, pp. 113–134; L. K. Shin, *The Making of the Chinese State: Ethnicity and Expansion on the Ming Borderlands*, Cambridge 2006, pp. 62–63.

For almost three centuries since Moscow's early conquests in the 1550s the Russian government relied on several specific terms to define its relationship with the peoples in the south and east of the expanding empire. All of these terms were traditionally used in the Turko-Mongol world to describe a broad range of relationships. In time, Moscow succeeded in redefining these terms and suffusing them with the meaning of its own. Thus, a *shert*, traditionally understood as a peace treaty, became an oath of allegiance to the tsar, an *amanat*, an exchange of hostages with the status of eminent guests, became a one-way hostage taking, a *yasak*, a form of a barter transaction, became a tribute, and the Muscovite rulers' own traditional tribute to the native chiefs morphed into presents and annuities now generously bestowed by Moscow. Taken together with a systematic and deliberate mistranslating of the written and oral communications with the indigenous peoples, these terms became a set of colonial tools intended to turn the formerly independent peoples into Russia's subjects.¹⁰

The reality, however, was different. The native chiefs and their elites understood their relationship with Moscow in different terms. They projected onto Russia the conceptual framework of their own societies characterized by a high degree of political differentiation and independence of the elites from their nominal chief. Instead of a suzerain, they conceived of Moscow as their ally and saw their relationship with Moscow as that of a military and political alliance between the older (Moscow) and younger (local chief) brothers. Not surprisingly, misinterpretations and different expectations on both sides resulted in numerous conflicts.

Moscow's expansionist policies were marked from the very beginning by one overriding concern: securing the political loyalty of the local peoples. From Russian point of view this was accomplished through a ritual idiom of pledging an allegiance to the Russian sovereign. But the government's official rhetoric of self-aggrandizement and the ritual of allegiance, which portrayed the natives as the subjects of Moscow, persistently failed to recognize that the reality differed substantially from the official language. The government preferred to deny the uncomfortable fact that Russia's relationship with the local chiefs was more akin to a military-political alliance of unequal but independent rulers.

4. Colonial Incongruities

The contradictions were apparent. In reality, the Russian empire included colonial regions and peoples, which the government considered an integral part of the empire. To the Russian government officials, however, it seemed that the colonial empires were only the ones embodied by the European empires and their overseas possessions. In his proposal submitted to the Senate in the 1760s, a Russian general and senator, N. I. Muravev, advocated the expansion of Russia's commercial interests. To do so, he argued, Russia had to become a colonial empire like its European counterparts. With great admiration,

10 For a detailed discussion of these issues, see Khodarkovsky, *Russia's Steppe Frontier*, chap. 2.

Muravev described the sweat and sacrifices of the Portuguese, Spanish, French, English, and Dutch in establishing their colonies in the East. But the Russian empire was already in Asia, he insisted, and therefore, creating colonies there and expanding commerce the way the Europeans did, was only natural.¹¹

How best to exploit and administer their colonies was on the mind of many European officials in the 1760s. Ironically, while the Spanish government considered how to transform its colonies into a model of the British commercial empire, the British were increasingly attracted to the centrally controlled empire on the model of the Spanish. Lord Halifax, the President of the Board of Trade between 1748 and 1761, presented successive administrations with the far-reaching colonial administrative reforms that would enable London to create a cost-effective empire. Madrid, on the other hand, wanted to transform Spain's American possessions into British-style "colonies".¹²

Only in the nineteenth century did various Russian officials begin to cautiously voice suggestions that the term "colony" could be applied to certain parts of the Russian empire. For example, the Russian Finance Minister, Egor Kankrin (Georg von Cancrin), argued in the 1820s that Georgia should be treated as an economic colony. Likewise, some nineteenth-century Siberian intellectuals and administrators insisted that Siberia was a Russian colony. Without denying the Russian roots of the Siberians, this "Siberian separatism" promoted an idea of the self-governing Siberian nation similar to Britain's Australian colonies. At the time, both Siberia and Australia had much in common as the penal colonies of their empires.¹³

But the most persistent voices, advocating the existence of a colony in the Russian empire, came from Russian officials familiar with the state of affairs in the recently conquered Central Asian territories. In the early 1870s, the Russian governor-general in Central Asia, Konstantin von Kaufman, compared the Russian Turkestan with the British India and concluded that Russian Turkestan too should be designated a colony. A generation later, the Russian Senator, Count Konstantin Konstantinovich von der Pahlen, dispatched from St. Petersburg in 1908 to review and write a comprehensive report of the region, similarly argued that Turkestan was "a colony within the empire". A few years later, the last governor of Turkestan, General A. N. Kuropatkin argued likewise. Yet, in all cases, the response from Petersburg was the same: the Russian empire had no colonies.¹⁴

11 Gosudarstvennaia Peterburgskaia biblioteka. Rukopisnyi otdel (The State Petersburg Library. The Manuscript Division) F. 87; Ermitazhnogo sobraniia, "Zapiska Senatora N. I. Muraveva o razvitiu kommersii i putei soobshcheniia v Rossii" (A Memo of the Senator N. L. Muravev Concerning the Development of Commerce and Communication in Russia), ll. 30–32. I am grateful to Guido Hausmann, who generously shared this reference with me.

12 Elliott, *Empires of the Atlantic World*, pp. 302–303.

13 W. Pintner, *Government and Industry during the Ministry of Count Kankrin 1823–1844*, in: *Slavic Review* 23 (1964) 1, pp. 46–62.

14 D. Brower, *Turkestan and the Fate of the Russian Empire*, London 2003, pp. 22, 37; A. Khalid, *Culture and Power in Colonial Turkestan*, in: *Cahiers d'Asie centrale* 17/18 (2009), pp. 413–447; A. Morrison, 'Sowing the Seed of National Strife in This Alien Region': The Pahlen Report and Pereselenie in Turkestan, 1908–1910, in: *Acta Slavica Iaponica* 31 (2012), p. 7.

At the same time as officials in Petersburg refused to consider a notion of colony within the Russian empire, they continued to rule over numerous non-Christian peoples and regions through the various arms of the Ministry of the Foreign Affairs or the War Ministry. For example, throughout the nineteenth century, the empire's Asian territories were administered by the Asiatic Department, founded by the imperial decree of 19 April 1819 as a part of the Ministry of the Foreign Affairs. The Department was charged with dealing in "matters related to Asia and the Oriental non-Christian population".¹⁵

The French too, among other European powers, ruled Tunisia and Morocco through the Ministry of the Foreign Affairs. But with the exception of Algeria, which was considered to be an integral part of France, Paris regarded its North African territories as protectorates and ruled them as such. Russia, by contrast, made no distinction between colonies and protectorates and considered all conquered lands as an integral part of the Russian empire.¹⁶

No wonder that denying the existence of colonies, Russia, of course, had to deny the existence of the colonial institutions as well. In reality, however, the Asiatic Department was similar to the colonial institutions of other European empires, which throughout the second half of the nineteenth century consolidated various colonial functions, previously dispersed among several government departments, into national Colonial Offices: the British Colonial Office, the French *Ministères des Colonies*, the Spanish *Despacho Universal de Indias*, or the German *Reichskolonialamt*. Prior to the emergence of the Colonial Departments, most colonial functions were given to the Departments of Navy and War in Britain and France, and the Council of the Indies in Spain.

The absence of clearly defined colonial institutions in Russia was in some ways similar to the dispersal of the foreign and colonial administrative functions among Russia's imperial neighbours in Asia. Like Russia, the Qing China too considered all conquered territories as an integral part of its empire and communicated and ruled the frontier regions through multiple means: the civil and military bureaucracy, individual officials communicating in secret code directly with the court, and the office of Lifan Yuan in charge of relations with Mongolia, Tibet, and parts of southern China. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs formally appeared in China for the first time in 1901.¹⁷ Likewise, the Ottoman empire lacked any official office in charge of the foreign matters until the mid-nineteenth century. While Re'is ül-küttab (literally "the chief scribe"), the head clerk of the Imperial Council, de facto presided over the Ottoman relations with foreign powers, the government did not formally recognize his foreign affairs responsibilities until 1792. After the establishment of the Ottoman Foreign Ministry in 1836, the position of Re'is ül-küttab was finally given a new title of a Foreign Minister (Hariciye Naziri). Thus, it

15 Upravlencheskaia elita Rossiiskoi imperii. *Istoriia ministerstv, 1802–1917* (The governing elite of the Russian empire. *The History of the Ministries, 1802–1917*), Sankt-Petersburg 2008, pp. 74–75. For more on the Asiatic Department and Asiatic Committee in the War Ministry, see A. Marshall, *The Russian General Staff and Asia, 1800–1917*, London 2006, pp. 26–37, 176–177.

16 J. Ruedy, *Modern Algeria: The Origins and Development of a Nation*, Bloomington 2005, pp. 45–78.

17 See D. Schorkowitz/C. Ning (eds.), *Managing Frontiers in Qing China: The Lifanyuan and Libu Revisited*, Leiden 2017.

was only with the establishment of the Western-style foreign ministries that the Qing and Ottomans would borrow and apply to their own experiences the Western concepts of “an empire”, “a civilizing mission”, and by implication “a colony”.¹⁸

The Russian empire faced similar dilemmas as other European empires in controlling and governing the territories populated by the non-Christians. From early on, however, Russia chose a different approach. Some Western European empires relied on the privately financed companies to administer the colonies: the British and Dutch East India Companies operated in Asia, or the Hudson Bay Company in North America, to mention a few well known examples. Others, like the Spanish and Portuguese, relied on a combination of state, church and private governance. By contrast, St. Petersburg put faith solely in the state administration of the new territories. The only exceptions were the short-lived charters given to the Stroganoff brothers to explore Siberia in the 1560s and to the Russian-American Company in Alaska, which was founded in 1799 as the first joint stock company in Russia to survive for two decades before being disbanded and put under the government control.¹⁹

In short, while the colonial rule of most European empires evolved from the one administered by the private companies to the one placed under the control of the state in the nineteenth century, Moscow, similar to its imperial counterparts in Istanbul and Beijing, placed its colonies under a firm government control from the sixteenth century onward.

5. Between Assimilation and Acculturation

The predominance of state interests in Russia’s expansion meant that the Russian administration encountered traditional colonial challenges earlier than most European empires. Throughout the centuries of Russia’s colonial expansion, the Russian government’s paramount concern was how best to achieve the loyalty of the indigenous non-Russian elite. In the initial stages of conquest and annexation, the native elites usually enjoyed their traditional independence, but their ultimate integration into the empire eventually implied their Russification and conversion to the Orthodox Christianity. For this reason, in the late eighteenth century, the Russian administrators increasingly called for founding the schools for the sons of the local elite.

In time, the institution of hostages evolved to produce Russia’s indigenous colonial elite. Russian authorities demanded that the native elites send their sons to the imperial capi-

18 S. Deringil, *The Well-Protected Domains: Ideology and the Legitimation of Power in the Ottoman Empire, 1876–1909*, London 1999, pp. 150–165; C. P. Giersch, *Asian Borderlands: The transformation of Qing China’s Yunnan Frontier*, Cambridge, MA 2006, p. 209–211; H. Inalcik, *Reis-ül-Küttab*, in: *Islam Ansiklopedisi (The Encyclopedia of Islam)*, vol. 9, Istanbul 1940–1986, pp. 671–683.

19 M. Khodarkovsky, *The Non-Christian Peoples on the Muscovite Frontiers*, in: *Cambridge History of Russia*, vol. 1, Cambridge, UK 2006, pp. 317–337; I. Vinkovetsky, *Russian America: An Overseas Colony of a Continental Empire: 1804–1867*, Oxford 2011. On an absence of trade companies and a tight bind between the government and Siberian merchants, see E. Monahan, *The Merchants of Siberia: Trade in Early Modern Russia* Ithaca 2016, pp. 111–144, 223–242.

tal to be educated at the emperor's court or in Russia's prestigious military schools. The formation of the special non-Russian units of the imperial guard in the 1820s sought to serve the same purpose – to educate and acculturate young men from distinguished indigenous families. By the early nineteenth century, the Russian authorities were increasingly relying on an acculturated indigenous elite, whom they brought to the imperial capital to be educated and groomed for service among their own kin. While the assimilation and conversion to Orthodox Christianity were preferred, a fully assimilated native – typically a young convert to Christianity, educated in Russian who also looked and acted like one – could have commanded little authority in his native society. Thus, the Russian government became increasingly interested in a different type of an acculturated native – one who could represent Russian interests and simultaneously remain influential in his own society. He might wear a Russian military uniform or a civilian dress of a Russian administrator but he remained a part of his native society, spoke the local language and practiced Buddhism or Islam. In other words, the Russian empire needed a greater number of the cultural interlocutors, who could serve as the conduit for transferring the Russian legal, political, and cultural idioms into the indigenous environment.²⁰

This new colonial elite, consisting of men raised in their indigenous societies and then educated in St. Petersburg or Kazan, became a conduit for the modern ideas of ethnicity and nationalism. At different time, various representatives of this elite created the alphabets for the indigenous languages, collected and wrote down the local folk tales, compiled the codes of the customary law, and authored the embryonic history of their people.²¹

One finds a somewhat different evolution of the cultural mediators in the Ottoman empire. In the western borderlands, the Ottomans relied on the Phanariotes, wealthy Greek Orthodox families representing the Ottoman diplomatic and commercial interests in Europe, and on the institution of the *devshirme*, a levy in children from among the Christian population under the Ottoman rule. The *devshirme* were taken to the Ottoman court, educated, assimilated and made into the loyal servants of the empire. In the eastern borderland of the Ottoman empire, the Porte also made a belated effort to create a colonial elite but without much success. In order to train and educate the sons of the tribal notables from among the Arabs, Kurds, and later Albanians, the Ottoman authorities founded Mekteb-i Ashiret-i Hümayun (The Imperial Tribal School) in Istanbul in 1897. The school closed its doors in 1907.²²

Earlier than European empires, Russia's policies intended to create the official Islam. Catherine the Great was the first to channel Islam into the governmental structures by

20 This is one of the central themes in M. Khodarkovsky, *Bitter Choices: Loyalty and Betrayal in the Russian Conquest of the North Caucasus*, Ithaca 2011.

21 Among those who created the historiographic and literary tradition and therefore an embryonic national identity for their own peoples were Shora Nogma and Khan Giray for the Adyges of the North Caucasus, Mirza Fath Ali Akhundov for the Azeris, Dorzhi Banzarov for the Buriats, Chokan Valikhanov for the Kazakhs, to mention a few.

22 E. Rogan, *Ashiret Mektebi Abdülhamid II's School for Tribes (1892–1907)*, in: *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 28 (1996), pp. 83–107.

founding in 1788 a Muftiat, known at the time as the “Muhammedan Spiritual Assembly”, followed by the similar institutions in other Muslim parts of the empire: the Crimea in 1831 and the Caucasus in 1872. By contrast, both Britain and France preferred to rely on courts and legal institutions to achieve the same purpose. Thus, at the moment when Catherine sought to harness Islam into the state institutions, the British in India under Warren Hastings attempted the same by translating the local laws and compiling them into an official legal code, while the French resolved in 1854 to create a centralized Islamic court system in Algeria.²³

Yet, even if the Russian state became involved in colonial affairs much earlier, those who governed had a very limited knowledge of those whom they were governing. Despite the early contacts with the non-Christian peoples, Russia’s knowledge of their customs, languages and laws remained minimal for a long time. By contrast, the European powers invested early in the studying of the local languages, the ethnographic accounts of their colonial subjects, and of their laws.

The pragmatic focus of the Russian state on how to rule the colonial population and the absence of a public discourse on the related issues meant that the idea of a *mission civilisatrice* articulated as a policy matter among the “savage peoples” emerged in Russia relatively late. In the minds of Russian officials this could be done in a variety of ways: settling the nomadic peoples and introducing them to farming, making the indigenous population dependent on Russian goods, counting on the Russian peasant settlers to expose the natives to a Russian way of life, introducing Russian law among the natives, and not least, encouraging the local elite to visit St. Petersburg, so as “to impress upon the half-savages the greatness of the Russian empire”.²⁴

Perhaps the ultimate way of civilizing the savages was converting them to Christianity. In Russia, the missionary activity from the onset was under the tight control of the state, which equated conversion with a political loyalty of the new subjects. Throughout the centuries, Russian missionary work vacillated between benign neglect and forced conversions. The state offered tax-exemptions and rewards, commuted criminal sentences, and bestowed privileges on the new converts. Conversely, those who refused to convert saw their land confiscated, privileges taken away, and opportunities denied throughout much of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Periods of relative tolerance towards the non-Christians, during the reign of Catherine the Great and in a post-reform period in particular, were inevitably followed by a renewed pressure to convert into the Russian Orthodox Church.

Until the 1830s, Russia had no missions in the Western sense of the word, i.e. a religious settlement among the indigenous population with an intention to convert and educate

23 A. Christelow, *Muslim Law Courts and the French Colonial State in Algeria* (Princeton, NJ 1985), pp. 20–26; B. S. Cohn, *Colonialism and its Forms of Knowledge*, (Princeton, NJ 1996), pp. 57–75.

24 O. E. Sukhikh, *Imperiia napokaz, ili imperskii opyt vospitaniia vernopoddanicheskikh chuvstv v kazakhskoi znati v 18–19 vv.* (Empire’s showcase or the imperial experience of inculcating the subordinate feelings among the Kazakh elite in nineteenth – twentieth centuries), in: N. G. Suvorova (ed.), *Aziatskaia Rossiia: liudi i struktury imperii* (Asian Russia: people and structure of the empire), Omsk 2005, pp. 154–155.

the natives. Until 1870, when the Orthodox Missionary Society was finally founded in Russia, the Orthodox Church had no specific office in charge of the missionary activity. As a result, Russia's missionary efforts produced large numbers of nominal converts with superficial, if any, knowledge of Christianity.²⁵

One of the problems was that in Asian parts of the Russian empire the imperial frontiers were amorphous and fluid; they did not always coincide with the administrative borders of the state. The imperial frontiers evolved into the stable borders only when Russia reached the borders of other sovereign empires and states: the Ottoman empire in the Caucasus, Iran and the British empire in Central Asia, and Qing China in southern Siberia and Far East.

No less difficult was it to draw distinction between a metropolis and periphery. Of course, such a border was a subjective product of the Russian mentality and kept moving further away from the centre. By the early nineteenth century, the mid-Volga region colonized for centuries by the Slavic settlers was seen as an inseparable part of the Russian metropolis. Likewise, the northwest Caucasus, whose population of the indigenous Adyge peoples was forcefully resettled or deported between 1860 and 1880, by the early twentieth century was seen as a true Russian region belonging to the Kuban Cossacks.

In 1914, on the eve of the First World War, government official publication "Asiatic Russia" proclaimed that the "lands of Asiatic Russia are an indivisible and inseparable part of our state and at the same time our only colony."²⁶ Nothing illustrated the cognitive dissonance of the Russian empire better than this statement. After centuries of denial and prevarications, the Russian officials readily admitted that Russia was a colonial empire, and that its territories in Asia constituted such a colony. Yet these colonial lands and peoples remained an indivisible part of Russia.

Russia's persisting contradiction between a colonial empire and a unitary state has never been resolved. Five years after the imperial government was swept away by the revolutions of 1917, the Bolsheviks offered their own radical solution by reconstituting the former empire as a new polity – the USSR. The Bolsheviks admitted the colonial nature of the Russian empire, condemned it as "a prison of the peoples", and promised the non-Russian peoples equal status within the new socialist union. But by the late 1930s, the revolutionary approach towards resolving the old interethnic and national rivalries was dissipating.²⁷ After the Second World War, the official references to the imperial Russia as a colonial empire were dropped. Instead, the authorities emphasized a historical role of the Russians in civilizing the empire's non-Russian peoples. Thereafter, until the

25 For more on these issues, see R. Geraci and M. Khodarkovsky (eds.), *Of Religion and Empire: Missions, Conversion and Tolerance in Tsarist Russia*, Ithaca and London 2001; A. N. Kefeli, *Becoming Muslim in Imperial Russia: Conversion, Apostasy, and Literacy*, Ithaca 2014.

26 *Aziatskaia Rossiia: Izdanie Pereselencheskogo upravleniia glavnogo upravleniia zemleuстроitva i zemledeliia* (Asian Russia: A publication of the resettlement agency of the main agency of the agricultural affairs), St. Petersburg 1914, 1:viii, quoted in: A. Masuero, *Territorial Colonization in Late Imperial Russia: Stages in the Development of a Concept*, in: *Kritika* 14 (2013) 1, p. 52.

27 F. Hirsch, *The Empire of Nations: Ethnographic Knowledge and the Making of the Soviet Union*, Ithaca 2005; T. Martin, *The Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the USSR 1923–1939*, Ithaca 2001.

collapse of the USSR in 1991, Moscow ignored any notion that Russia was a colonial empire and that, like many other empires, it too was forged in blood. Instead, the Soviet ideological machine produced an image of the Russian empire's benevolent rule over the numerous non-Russian peoples, who chose to submit to Russia voluntarily. Thus, it was only natural that the Soviet ideologists maintained that this "eternal friendship of the peoples" provided for a perfect union in the USSR. But the union, of course, proved less than perfect, when in December of 1991, the Soviet Union peacefully dissolved along the multiple national and ethnic lines.

Finally unshackled from the Soviet dogmas, the colonial historiography grew rapidly in the post-Soviet space in the last decade of the twentieth century. But almost immediately after Mr. Putin assumed the presidency in 2000, this line of questioning began to wither, replaced by the old Soviet canards about the friendship of the peoples, this time in one united Russia. More recently, in a continuous search for an ideology to fit the present-day Russia, the Kremlin resurrected the idea of Eurasianism.

First formulated in the circle of the Russian emigres in the 1920s and 30s, Eurasianism was an attempt to reconcile the old historic tensions: Russia was a nation-state in Europe and a sprawling colonial empire in Asia; Russians were a dominant ethnicity yet outnumbered by the non-Russians; the Orthodox Christianity was the state religion but in a country where one-third of its population belonged to other faiths. Eurasianism was a new vision of Russia that historically, geographically, and culturally belonged to both Europe and Asia.²⁸ Today, a refurbished Eurasianism serves the Kremlin to promote its own nationalist and anti-Western agenda, to tear Russia away from Europe's liberal democratic traditions, to resurrect Russia's presumed greatness, and to pave the way for Russia's Sonderweg.

6. Conclusion

In this essay I attempted to re-examine Russia's imperial heritage, to place it into a wider European perspective, and to show that both in theory and practice Russia was a colonial empire. I argued that Russia's conquest and rule over the vast Asian territories and their non-Christian population represented a form of European colonialism, that Russia practiced a state colonialism from the outset, and that Russia's statist form of colonialism preceded most of the European colonial empires, which evolved into the government-run colonial systems only in the nineteenth century. Yet in contrast to the European colonial powers, the Russian imperial authorities consistently refused to identify their empire as colonial. In this sense, Russian imperial rulers were more akin to their counterparts in Asia – the Ottomans, the Safavids and Qajars in Persia, and the Qing in China. While all these empires ruled over a large and heterogeneous population within their domains,

28 See M. Bassin/S. Glebov/M. Laruelle (eds.), *Between Europe and Asia: The Origins, Theories, and Legacies of Russian Eurasianism*, Pittsburgh 2015.

they did not conceive of themselves as colonial empires. The term “colonial” was reserved for the European empires solely.

Russian tsars saw themselves as universal rulers with an autocratic power over each and every being within the imperial domain. Recognizing colonial territories, by definition, implied a different status within the empire, a form of self-rule and de-centralisation that could lead away from the state control, and thus was unacceptable to the authorities. And because Russia's expansion throughout the centuries was fundamentally driven by geopolitical objectives, occasional arguments by Russian officials in favour of a colony, as a more efficient commercial enterprise, were routinely dismissed.

Unlike the rapid colonization of the New World by the European settlers or China's borderlands by the Han Chinese (with the exception of Tibet and Xinjiang) Russia could never escape a daunting demographic challenge. Given the size of the empire, the East Slavic population was simply insufficient to settle and achieve a demographic dominance in the non-Slavic regions, particularly those with large numbers of Muslims. As a result, the imperial policies once again were riddled with ambiguities. While formally relying on the settler model of colonialism, the Russian government faced an incongruous reality on the ground.

The Russian empire was a diverse multi-ethnic and multi-religious political body with large colonial populations. Such an empire demanded complex political, social and legal mechanisms that were not easily reconciled with the streamlining and homogenizing tendencies of an autocratic police state. Herein lies a historic paradox and dilemma of Russia as a nation-state and a colonial empire. Understanding the colonial nature of the Russian empire and the kind of state colonialism that it practiced provides new insights into both Russia's past experiences and present ambitions.

Imperialism and Colonialism in the Qing Context

Matthew W. Mosca

ABSTRACTS

Dieser Aufsatz entwirft einen Rahmen für die Verwendung der Begriffe „Imperialismus“ und „Kolonialismus“ zur Analyse des Qing-Reiches, indem die politischen Ziele des Qing-Staates auf die wirtschaftliche und demographische Zentralstellung der chinesischen Kernprovinzen innerhalb des Imperiums bezogen werden. In Innerasien begrenzte der staatlich gelenkte Imperialismus zumeist das Eindringen han-chinesischer Migranten und ihrer wirtschaftlichen Netzwerke. In den überwiegend nicht han-chinesischen Regionen Südchinas hingegen förderten staatliche Maßnahmen vielfach die Ansiedlung von Migranten und Formen kulturellen Wandels, die eine koloniale Dynamik aufwiesen. Südostasien wurde ebenfalls stark durch das Wirtschaftswachstum und die Abwanderung aus den chinesischen Kernprovinzen beeinflusst, aber hier verhinderte das mangelnde Interesse des Qing-Staates die Entstehung einer Dynamik, die jener des europäischen Kolonialismus geähnelt hätte. Nach 1860 gab der Qing-Staat zunehmend die Bemühungen auf, die Interessen verschiedener Bevölkerungsgruppen auszugleichen, und ging zu einer Kolonialpolitik über, die alle Teile des Reiches so eng wie möglich an die Kernprovinzen zu binden versuchte.

This paper outlines a framework for using the concepts of imperialism and colonialism to analyse the Qing empire, by relating the political goals of the Qing state with the economic and demographic centrality of China proper within the empire. In Inner Asia, state-driven imperialism often restricted the penetration of Han Chinese migrants and economic networks. In predominantly non-Han regions of southern China, by contrast, state policies often promoted migrant settlement and cultural transformation in forms that reflected a colonial dynamic. Southeast Asia was also deeply influenced by China proper's economic growth and out-migration, but here the lack of Qing state interest prevented the emergence of a dynamic resembling that of European colonialism. After 1860, the Qing state increasingly abandoned efforts to balance the interests of various subjects, and shifted to a colonial policy of integrating all parts of the realm as closely as possible with China proper.

The Qing empire existed in some form for over 300 years, from Nurhaci's early efforts to unify the Jurchens to the abdication of its last emperor in 1912. During this period, it devised a range of administrative structures for the diverse parts of its realm, which it regularly adjusted and occasionally transformed. This short essay does not attempt to detail the course of Qing expansion and administration, or to systematically compare the Qing with other empires. Neither does it offer an overview of the ample comparative scholarship that has emerged in the past decades, although it relies heavily on some of this work. Rather, it sketches one possible framework for using the concepts of imperialism and colonialism to analyse aspects of the Qing empire. Covering so great a span of time and space in a short paper precludes the level of detail and nuance this effort would ideally require, but reveals dynamics obscured by a narrower temporal or spatial scope.

Defining "imperialism" and "colonialism" involves notorious historiographical complexity. For heuristic purposes, this essay draws a contrast between them. Imperialism here describes an order in which a central ruling elite conquers territories and peoples regarded as fundamentally different for the purposes of augmenting its resources and increasing its security. Economically, imperial policy does not favour one component region over others, although private enterprise might exacerbate regional disparities. Ideologically, an empire in this definition does not rank its subjects in civilisational hierarchies. Colonialism, by contrast, is here taken to be a subset of imperialism in which imperial control is intended to favour one component of the empire at the expense of others via transfers of wealth and resources. This could take several forms: settler colonialism, in which the state supports the movement of one imperial population onto the lands of another; or trade networks centred on one part of the empire that dominated commerce and resource extraction in others. Colonialism also posits a hierarchy of civilisational forms to justify a political and legal order treating subjects unequally.

No facet of Qing rule perfectly fits either of these ideal types, but contrasting them allows us to isolate the two primary drivers of Qing expansion and influence. One was the Qing state itself. From its earliest decades, Qing rulers had conceived of their realm as a complex of subject states and peoples. Qing emperors recognized that their Han Chinese, Mongol, Tibetan, and other subjects required regionally-specific forms of rule. These forms were built from elements of existing local administration, suitably modified and supplemented to meet the imperial demand for control and security.

The second source of Qing power was the enormous growth of the empire's Han Chinese population and economy. After Qing armies crossed the Great Wall in 1644, Han Chinese accounted for more than 90 per cent of the empire's population. From a demographic and economic standpoint, they were the chief beneficiaries of the Qing order. By 1700, the Han Chinese population had reached 150 million, equal to the preceding Ming dynasty at its peak; by 1800, it had doubled to at least 300 million, and by 1850 it neared 450 million, a "remarkable demographic expansion" that was "virtually un-

precedented in the history of the premodern world”.¹ Although in time this population growth would generate serious environmental and economic difficulties, in the period between 1700 and 1800 it indicated a “boom” in which China’s economy became larger, more prosperous, and more commercialized.²

The relationship of the Qing state and its burgeoning Han Chinese population was complex. In many ways, their interests aligned: stability solidified the rule and finances of the state just as it increased the security and prosperity of farmers and merchants. Moreover, China’s sophisticated merchants sometimes aided the operations and logistics of government. Still, Qing emperors never forgot that for many of their Chinese subjects, Manchu rule was unwelcome. Nor did they see their realm as an iteration of China in which non-Han subjects were outsiders. In this context, the absolute demographic and economic predominance of China proper within the empire posed two risks. Any form of Han Chinese organisation or activity beyond state oversight threatened to become a vector of anti-Qing mobilisation. Also, Han Chinese expansion into non-Han regions of the empire threatened in the short term to trigger indigenous unrest, and in the long term to unsettle what the Qing government regarded as the optimal balance between component territories. In certain contexts, then, the perceived interests of the state and its Han Chinese population could diverge or even clash.

This paper examines three configurations of this complex and uneasy partnership between 1600 and 1860, before the transformative administrative changes of the dynasty’s last decades. First, it considers Qing expansion in Inner Asia, which over the course of more than a century reached from Manchuria to the Himalayas and the edge of Kazakhstan. This was an imperial project, but one that contained elements that assumed an increasingly colonial form. Inner Asia is then contrasted to large regions of southern China where policies inherited from the Ming had granted indigenous elites’ considerable autonomy. Qing approaches to this region, though complex and varied, in many places supported a colonial economic and political order. Finally, this paper considers Southeast Asia, a region in which the Qing state shunned territorial expansion. Long-term Han Chinese overseas migration, although discouraged by officials, surged in the eighteenth century as Chinese merchants, miners, and farmers came to dominate sectors of the Southeast Asian economy. Unbacked by state support, China’s economic influence in the region did not take on a political dimension, in stark contrast to the growth of contemporary European empires in Asia.

1. Qing Policy in Inner Asia

Any generalisation about Inner Asia, a vast and diverse region including Manchuria, Mongolia, Tibet, and Xinjiang, requires more qualification than can be offered here.

1 R. von Glahn, *The Economic History of China: From Antiquity to the Nineteenth Century*, Cambridge 2016, p. 347.

2 *Ibid.*, p. 322.

In the early decades of Qing expansion from southern Manchuria, the founding rulers Nurhaci and Hong Taiji used several strategies to gain the submission of parts of the fragmented political world of southern Mongolia. Marriage alliances, the conferral of Qing aristocratic ranks, patronage of Tibetan Buddhism, the judicious application of force, and the evolution of rules for military discipline into bonds of political subordination gradually transformed relations between equals into “tutelage”.³ The new Qing order conciliated Mongol aristocrats even as it subjected them to coercive methods of control. Apart from those incorporated into the Eight Banners and moved to Beijing to serve in central political and military offices, Mongol subjects remained on the steppe, generally preserving their nomadic pastoralist livelihood. The Qing government divided the Mongols into units loosely based on existing political allegiances, assigned them territories, and designated from among their ruling aristocracy a *jasagh* responsible for enforcing Qing laws and regulations. This system controlled the powerful Mongolian aristocracy, prevented large-scale rebellion, and formed a reservoir of Mongol troops who could be deployed in campaigns. Within this framework, *jasaghs* retained wide latitude to govern their territory. In different permutations, this *jasagh*-banner system extended to virtually all peoples regarded as Mongols by the Qing state, spanning Qalqa (northern) Mongolia, the Oirats of Qinghai, and what became northern Xinjiang. Alternative modes of administration devised for Tibet, the Tarim Basin, and parts of Manchuria, were also based on appointing members of local elites to govern their subjects with considerable autonomy under Qing oversight.

Culturally, legally, and economically the Qing state in Inner Asia prioritized what it regarded as the interests of these local elites and, by extension, their subjects. Before the last decades of the dynasty, there was no effort to promote the study of the Chinese language or the Confucian canon among Inner Asian peoples. To the contrary, Qing political legitimacy in Mongolian and Tibetan territories rested partly on its claim to promote and protect Buddhism. Mongol subjects were also permitted their own criminal and civil law based largely on indigenous principles. In the rare instances when a group of Inner Asian elites was collectively deemed untrustworthy, as for example with the Caqar Mongols, they were placed under centrally-dispatched Manchu or Mongol officials. Before 1860, there were very few instances of Inner Asians being placed under the jurisdiction of Han Chinese bureaucrats.

Qing expansion in Inner Asia was imperial rather than colonial, an effort to expand its power and security by absorbing territories and peoples. Domination of Inner Asia was not pursued for economic reasons, nor did Qing rulers believe that these lands would cover the full cost of their administration. To be sure, from the very beginning of their imperial project Qing rulers and officials had been quick to identify resources that could be exploited to fund their state, but maximizing the fiscal potential of these lands was not

3 N. Di Cosmo, *From Alliance to Tutelage: A Historical Analysis of Manchu-Mongol Relations before the Qing Conquest*, in: *Frontiers of History in China* 7 (2012) 2, pp. 175–197.

their priority.⁴ In Inner Asia, the Qing state generally tried to exclude Han Chinese migrants, even when their activities might have generated more revenue than pastoralism or harvesting ginseng, fur, and other commodities. After a brief period when Han Chinese agricultural migration into Liaodong was officially encouraged, the Kangxi emperor in 1680 “made the exclusion of Han commoner settlers a primary objective of Qing rule in the northeast”.⁵ His successors before 1860 upheld or strengthened this policy. As Christopher Isett has noted, “Han exclusion” generated “tension between imperial and bureaucratic interests”: officials in neighbouring provinces recognized parts of Manchuria and Mongolia as potential outlets for migration, an argument Qing emperors acknowledged but rarely accepted.⁶ Beyond the relatively small Liaodong plain, the Qing state took even firmer measures to restrict access. These imperial policies were never entirely effective. Patrols and checkpoints could be evaded and illegal migration and resource poaching were never be entirely halted.⁷ Still, the imperial state did its utmost to insulate Inner Asia from the growing demographic and economic influence of China proper.

In Mongolia, the situation was more complex, partly because the Qing state was somewhat more prepared to accept Chinese agricultural activity if this involved seasonal migration rather than permanent settlement. Moreover, in certain contexts in southern Mongolia, banner administrators were willing to lease land for settlement to Chinese agricultural entrepreneurs, often in order to pay debts they had incurred to Chinese merchants. The spread of such settlement in Mongolia was uneven: some territories bordering China proper and suitable for agriculture, particularly those inhabited by the Qaracin, Ordos, and Tümed Mongols, attracted considerable migration. Others, notably the colder, more arid, and more remote lands of the Qalqa Mongols north of the Gobi, were less appealing.⁸

When reasons of state seemed to demand it, however, the Qing was prepared to acknowledge, and even encourage, a role for Chinese economic activity in Inner Asia. This was particularly true in the case of Xinjiang, a vast northwestern territory organized under Qing control between 1755 and 1759. Earlier, during his campaigns against the Jungghars, the Kangxi emperor had promoted military colonies in strategic sites to ease the problem of supplying steppe campaigns. In Xinjiang, between 1761 and 1781, military colonization was augmented by a programme of promoting Han Chinese civilian settlement. In time, civilian settlers, many recruited by entrepreneurs, became the largest group of agricultural settlers in Xinjiang.⁹

4 N. Di Cosmo, *The Manchu Conquest in World-Historical Perspective: A Note on Trade and Silver*, in: *Journal of Central Eurasian Studies* 1 (2009), pp. 43–60.

5 C. M. Isett, *State, Peasant, and Merchant in Qing Manchuria, 1644–1862*, Stanford 2007, p. 32.

6 *Ibid.*, pp. 8–9.

7 S. Kim, *Ginseng and Borderland: Territorial Boundaries and Political Relations Between Qing China and Chosŏn Korea, 1636–1912*, Berkeley 2017, pp. 77–103.

8 P.-E. Will, *Bureaucracy and Famine in Eighteenth-Century China*, E. Forster (trans.), Stanford 1990, pp. 45–46; C. Atwood, *Encyclopedia of Mongolia and the Mongol Empire*, New York 2004, pp. 93–95.

9 P. C. Perdue, *China Marches West: The Qing Conquest of Central Eurasia* Cambridge, MA, 2005, pp. 344–357.

Military and civilian colonization proved unable to relieve the region's fiscal burden, and Qing administration in Xinjiang depended on a "silver lifeline" of tax revenues sent from China proper.¹⁰ In the 1760s, the Qing state decided to permit Han Chinese merchants to operate in Xinjiang. Taxes and internal duties on their commerce, in tea, cloth, rhubarb, and jade, offset some of the cost of the garrisons securing Qing rule. Despite attempts to restrict their numbers and prohibit permanent settlement, the Qing military apparatus would have had difficulty functioning without this merchant presence.¹¹ Han Chinese merchants also came to play an increasingly important role in Mongolia after 1700. Three large trading firms facilitated the commercialisation and monetisation of the Mongolian economy, making them crucial partners for local aristocrats and Qing garrisons. Because they were "necessary to operating a large-scale, complex administrative apparatus in Mongolia", they received official backing.¹² Although trade between Qing Inner Asia and non-Qing territory was sometimes in the hands of Kashmiri or Central Asian merchants, economic exchange between Inner Asia and China proper was almost entirely in the hands of Chinese merchants.

As Han Chinese civilians became more numerous in Inner Asia, the Qing state was forced to adjust its administration. Operating on the principle that concentrations of these civilians needed to be overseen by Han Chinese officials, it devised a complex system of overlapping jurisdictions for parts of Manchuria, Mongolia, and Xinjiang. Indigenous populations and Chinese migrants were expected to live apart, often under different legal regimes, but mixed cases were to be settled by deliberations between provincial bureaucrats and Inner Asian elites, following rules devised in Beijing. Over time, to facilitate this mixed legal order, the separate code promulgated for Qing Mongolia was adjusted to align it more closely with that used in China proper.¹³

Simply put, we can see two broad trends at work. For the Qing state, territorial expansion involved a compromise between Beijing's need for control and the established administrative norms of local elites. It was not intended to acquire territories specifically for economic development, to increase the revenues flowing to the centre, or as a prelude to profound cultural or demographic transformation. In practice, this vision was increasingly hard to sustain, as Inner Asia became an attractive frontier for the growing population of the northern provinces of China. Although in some cases the Qing state itself recruited Han merchants and settlers for its own ends, in most cases it was reluctantly forced to compromise with unsanctioned migration it would have preferred to halt. In short, the increasing economic and demographic integration of parts of Inner Asia with China proper was a bottom-up trend that ran counter to the vision of the Qing state.

10 J. A. Millward, *Beyond the Pass: Economy, Ethnicity, and Empire in Qing Central Asia, 1759–1864*, Stanford 1998, p. 58.

11 *Ibid.*, pp. 109–112.

12 C. Atwood, *Partners in Profit: Empires, Merchants, and Local Governments in the Mongol Empire and Qing Mongolia* (unpublished paper), p. 17.

13 D. Heuschert, *Legal Pluralism in the Qing Empire: Manchu Legislation for the Mongols*, in: *The International History Review* 20 (1998) 2, pp. 310–324.

2. Qing Colonialism in Southern China

The Ming provinces that became one component of the Qing realm in 1644 were far from homogeneous. Several, particularly in the south, contained regions with large non-Han indigenous populations. Western scholarship has highlighted comparisons between Qing policy toward these regions and European colonialism in the Americas.¹⁴ Both cases saw the expropriation of indigenous land for agricultural and resource development by immigrants, backed by a state that hoped this would further its economic and security interests. And in both, the state and settlers viewed indigenous peoples as requiring education and cultural transformation.

Analysis of Qing policy in southern China can begin with the pioneering framework devised by John Shepherd to analyse the fluctuating policies of the Qing state toward the plains of western Taiwan. The Qing had captured this territory in 1683 to eliminate a Ming loyalist proto-state, the Zheng regime. Only with difficulty was the Kangxi emperor persuaded to incorporate these lands into Fujian province, making them part of the realm. As Shepherd argues, Qing administrators faced an enduring policy dilemma. For advocates of colonization, encouraging Han Chinese migrants to farm Taiwan's western plains would generate tax revenue and make local administration fiscally self-supporting. Opponents argued that large-scale migration increased the likelihood of both Han Chinese and aboriginal rebellion, raising security costs beyond what tax revenue gains could offset. The Kangxi emperor initially reduced Taiwan's Han population by deporting former Zheng soldiers, and thereafter remained cautious about encouraging settlement. His son the Yongzheng emperor, by contrast, endorsed an activist programme of migration and agricultural development. Although the Qianlong emperor resumed his grandfather's more cautious approach, the state could not totally halt migration.¹⁵

To govern Taiwan, the Qing state attempted to balance its interests with those of both Han settlers and aboriginal villages. It prohibited Han penetration of the mountainous regions that constituted the majority of the island's territory, which lowered security costs. On the plains, it implemented a policy whereby aboriginal villages could lease fields to Han settlers, who would pay them rent and also assume the tax obligations of the cultivated land. This allowed an uneasy coexistence between the two groups. As Shepherd notes, the Qing state did not believe that Han Chinese settlers in Taiwan were necessarily more political reliable than the indigenous population. Although it did not seek to protect indigenous peoples as an end in itself, it did consider their interests in order to minimize armed unrest. Despite restrictive policies, migrant farmers continued to flow to Taiwan from land-poor Fujian, and officials were therefore forced to retrospectively legalize Han movement into previously closed areas.¹⁶

14 For examples of comparisons between Qing and European colonial practices see the works of Hostetler, Teng, Herman, Shepherd, and Wade, cited below.

15 J. R. Shepherd, *Statecraft and Political Economy on the Taiwan Frontier, 1600–1800*, Stanford 1993.

16 *Ibid.*, p. 306.

While this calculus between migration and security can be applied to other parts of southern China, additional factors complicate the issue. Outside of Taiwan, the Qing inherited a range of administrative forms, known as the “*tusi* system”, that granted considerable autonomy to indigenous leaders (*tusi*). At their largest, *tusi* territories were akin to small kingdoms nestled within Chinese provinces. Some *tusi* territories were attractive for their agricultural potential, or mineral and timber resources. Soon after crossing the Great Wall in 1644, Qing emperors launched an aggressive, China-wide campaign to promote land reclamation and increase tax revenues. From the standpoint of Beijing, many southern provinces appeared to have an abundance of unused agricultural land. In *tusi* territories, John Herman has argued, this land reclamation push became “settler colonialism – a state-sponsored form of colonialism that seeks to replace a territory’s original inhabitants with settlers who embody the cultural and institutional characteristics endorsed by the state”.¹⁷ Although the Kangxi emperor was well aware that this migration might spark an indigenous backlash, he concluded, unlike in Taiwan, that frontier settlement was the best way to promote territorial incorporation and strengthen central control, with tax revenue only a secondary consideration.¹⁸

The Yongzheng emperor accelerated a late-Kangxi policy of aggressively seeking mineral and timber resources in the southwest. Whereas the Kangxi emperor had tried to weaken powerful *tusi* and align them more closely to the Qing state, the Yongzheng emperor and his energetic governor-general Ortai experimented in Yunnan and Guizhou with a new policy that would replace indigenous political leaders with regular provincial bureaucrats. Their goal was to “extend Qing control over the vast internal frontier rich in copper, timber, and land”.¹⁹ In a process of “state activism” characterized by “extreme levels of brutality”, Ortai used the Qing military to enforce a massive transfer of economic resources from indigenous control.²⁰ Although the Qianlong emperor showed less appetite for eliminating *tusi*, the overall pattern of resource-driven Han migration continued. Qing rule had a dramatic impact on the politics, economy, and demography of southern China. James Lee has estimated that in southwest China, primarily the two provinces of Yunnan and Guizhou where Yongzheng-era activism had centred, the population quadrupled between 1700 and 1850, from 5 to 20 million, primarily driven by Han migrants attracted by economic opportunities connected to the mining industry. In Yunnan, annual copper production rose from 650 tons in the 1720s to around 9,500 tons in the late 1760s.²¹ By 1800, the area under indigenous *tusi* control had shrunk in Yunnan from

17 J. E. Herman, *From Land Reclamation to Land Grab: Settler Colonialism in Southwest China, 1680–1735*, in: *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies* 78 (2018) 1, p. 97.

18 *Ibid.*, p. 111.

19 J. Herman, *Collaboration and Resistance on the Southwest Frontier: Early Eighteenth-Century Qing Expansion on Two Fronts*, in: *Late Imperial China* 35 (2014) 1, p. 95.

20 *Ibid.*, p. 80.

21 C. P. Giersch, *Cotton, Copper, and Caravans: Trade and the Transformation of Southwest China*, in: E. Tagliacozzo/W. Chang (eds.), *Chinese Circulations: Capital, Commodities, and Networks in Southeast Asia*, Durham, NC 2011, p. 43.

about 50 per cent of the provincial territory to 25, and in Guizhou from 66 per cent to 33.²²

From one standpoint, this was simply a more dramatic manifestation of the trend evident in Inner Asia: Han Chinese settlers, driven by land pressure in more densely-settled parts of China proper, moved into non-Han territory in pursuit of better livelihoods. From the perspective of the Qing state, however, the situation was different. While in Inner Asia the state tried to restrict migration, in southern China it frequently encouraged it. For rulers in Beijing, Han Chinese access to lands previously under indigenous control fulfilled various goals: more tax revenue, the settlement of a rapidly-growing population, access to necessary metals, and the more secure incorporation of what had once been close to foreign territory within Chinese provinces.

In Manchuria and Mongolia, emperors tried to maintain and restore “an embodiment of uncorrupted nature” in a region toward which they felt a close connection.²³ They sought to maintain existing ecologies and indigenous ways of life, even if this protection entailed interventionist regulation that was far from “natural”. In *tusi* lands, by contrast, Qing emperors sometimes noted that indigenous peoples and Han Chinese were entitled to equal protection, but had no special concern for preserving existing ecologies, lifestyles, or cultures. To the contrary, they tried to inculcate Confucian moral and political norms among young members of the indigenous elite, which has been described as a “civilizing mission”, aiming at cultural “assimilation”.²⁴ Although increased state control was one ambition of this mission, Han Chinese and Manchus seemed to have shared the view that indigenous cultures were primitive and deviant.²⁵ In sum, while the perceived interests of Qing imperialism in Inner Asia only rarely aligned with Han Chinese economic activity, in southern China the goals of the state and the interests of Han Chinese migrants merged into a colonial form that effected dramatic transformations.

3. The Qing Empire, Chinese Migration, and Southeast Asia

Although no ecological barrier clearly delineated the two regions, the Qing state did not expand beyond the southern provinces of China into Southeast Asia. Its Ming predecessor, by contrast, had invaded Annam (northern Vietnam) in 1406, relinquishing it only after decades of fierce opposition. The Yongle emperor had simultaneously directed large naval expeditions into the South China Sea and Indian Ocean. These were chiefly to expand the reach of Yongle’s imperial prestige, though some have suggested that the

22 J. Lee, Food Supply and Population Growth in Southwest China, 1250–1850, in: *Journal of Asian Studies* 41 (1982) 4, pp. 711–746.

23 J. Schlesinger, *A World Trimmed with Fur: Wild Things, Pristine Places, and the Natural Fringes of Qing Rule*, Stanford 2017, p. 169.

24 L. Hostetler, *Qing Colonial Enterprise: Ethnography and Cartography in Early Modern China*, Chicago 2001, pp. 114–116.

25 E. J. Teng, An Island of Women: The Discourse of Gender in Qing Travel Writing about Taiwan, in: *The International History Review* 20 (1998) 2, pp. 353–370.

Ming hoped to control strategic nodes of Asian maritime trade in a form similar to that later adopted by the Portuguese.²⁶ This early Ming presence in maritime Southeast Asia was state-driven, and private trade was banned. The partial legalisation of overseas commerce in the late sixteenth century generated an alternative model for Chinese political influence in Southeast Asia. Powerful Fujian-based commercial networks, most notably the Zheng family enterprise, used armed ships to fight off competitors and secure the coast under loose Ming oversight. This enterprise increasingly resembled a quasi-state, and by the time Zheng Chenggong seized southwestern Taiwan from the Dutch in 1662, he may have envisioned building “a maritime Chinese empire”, starting with a demand that the Spanish governor of the Philippines become his tributary.²⁷ Unbacked by the formidable resources of China proper, this vision proved too ambitious to realize. Still, Xing Hang argues, for a time the Zheng regime not only followed a trajectory similar to that of the Dutch East India Company in Southeast Asia, but indeed outcompeted it commercially. When Qing forces finally overcame the Zheng regime, the Kangxi emperor reluctantly incorporated Taiwan into Fujian province. However, he did not share either the early Ming interest in expanding south into Southeast Asia or the late Ming tolerance for a militarized company of traders active in that region.

In the decades after 1644, the Zheng regime had dominated China’s overseas trade. Recognizing the coast of southern China as a bastion of Ming loyalist opposition, the Qing implemented a draconian coastal quarantine. After the elimination of the Zheng regime in 1683, the Kangxi emperor became confident enough to legalize private maritime trade, a decision that permitted its volume to grow enormously. Still, the belief that overseas Chinese posed a security threat persisted. In 1717, the Kangxi emperor restored the ban on maritime trade with Southeast Asia, a restriction lifted only after a decade. Rules on migration were further relaxed by the Qianlong emperor, but although the Qing state came to tolerate overseas Chinese commerce and migration, it never encouraged or materially supported it, and migrants remained wary of the state.²⁸

Chinese migration to Southeast Asia intensified in the eighteenth century. Miners moved south of the Qing border in search of metal deposits. Tens of thousands worked in northern Vietnam alone, while others went by sea to the Malay peninsula and Borneo.²⁹ As shopkeepers and tradesmen, many settled or sojourned in the Philippines, Java, Siam, Vietnam, and elsewhere. Commercial routes expanded to become channels for agricultural migration. Chinese fleeing chaos in south China were “the first group of pioneers of colonization and settlement in southern Vietnam”.³⁰ In Java, Chinese entrepreneurs and

26 G. Wade, *The Zheng He Voyages: A Reassessment*, in: *Journal of the Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society* 78 (2005) 1, pp. 37–58.

27 X. Hang, *Conflict and Commerce in Maritime East Asia: The Zheng Family and the Shaping of the Modern World, c. 1620–1720*, Cambridge 2015, p. 145.

28 P. A. Kuhn, *Chinese Among Others: Emigration in Modern Times*, Lanham 2008, pp. 87–97.

29 A. Reid, *Chinese on the Mining Frontier in Southeast Asia*, in: *Chinese Circulations*, pp. 21–36.

30 C. A. Chen, Mac Thien Tu, and Phrayataksin: *A Survey on their Political Stand, Conflicts and Background*, in: *Proceedings: Seventh IAHA Conference, Bangkok 1979*, vol. 2, p. 1536.

labourers developed the sugar industry in the hinterland of Batavia. In the Philippines, their involvement in trade, urban crafts, and agriculture made Manila “an advance position of the Fukienese economy”.³¹

Far from a unified cohort, overseas Chinese were divided by dialect and native place. Without political support from their homeland, overseas Chinese carved out only a few small autonomous polities. Perhaps the most successful was the enclave of Ha-tien, on the eastern shore of the Gulf of Thailand, founded around 1700 by a migrant from Leizhou. A number of other small independent or semi-autonomous communities were formed by Chinese on the Malay peninsula and Borneo. These small settlements were founded for specific economic purposes, notably maritime trade, mining, planting, or even piracy, and built quasi-state organisations for self-government and defence rather than territorial expansion. All were eventually absorbed by the growing power of “big states” such as Vietnam and Siam, or the expanding Dutch and British empires.³² For overseas migrants in the seventeenth and eighteenth century, finding a niche as entrepreneurs and administrators in a symbiotic relationship with an Asian state or European colony was more common than seeking political independence. Leonard Blussé has called Batavia a “Chinese colonial town” from its inception: Dutch governors recruited Chinese inhabitants, granted them considerable internal autonomy, and relied on them for construction, revenue, trade, and, increasingly, agricultural development.³³ Chinese-operated shipping also enjoyed a dominant position in Southeast Asia’s “Chinese century” between 1720 and 1820.³⁴

For the purposes of this essay, the Chinese presence in Southeast Asia offers insight into Qing imperialism as a whole. The legalisation of overseas trade and de facto acquiescence to long-term migration lowered coastal security costs by reducing the attraction of smuggling, raised tax revenue, and most importantly helped the livelihood of those in crowded coastal provinces. Manchu emperors were not exceptionally harsh regarding overseas Chinese activity, and in fact were more flexible than their Ming predecessors. For their part, overseas Chinese also benefitted from this order, and there is little evidence that they were actively anti-Qing after 1700. Indeed, Qing emperors were ultimately more comfortable with the Chinese entrepreneurs seeking profit beyond the empire in Southeast Asia than with those expanding their networks in Qing-dominated Inner Asia. Arguments promoting migration as a mode of relieving pressure on China proper were accepted for the coast far more readily than for Inner Asia. Before 1860, more Chinese could be found in Manila, Batavia, and Bangkok than in Lhasa, Urga, and Ili.

31 L. Blussé, *Chinese Century: The Eighteenth Century in the China Sea Region*, in: *Archipel* 58 (1999), p. 119.

32 Chen, Mac Thien Tu, pp. 1565–1568; Y. Sakurai/T. Kitagawa, *Ha Tien or Banteay Meas in the Time of the Fall of Ayutthaya*, in: K. Breazeale (ed.), *From Japan to Arabia: Ayutthaya's Maritime Relations with Asia*, Bangkok 1999, pp. 150–220.

33 L. Blussé, *Batavia, 1619–1740: The Rise and Fall of a Chinese Colonial Town*, in: *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 12 (1981) 1, pp. 159–178.

34 Blussé, *Chinese Century*, pp. 123–129; A. Reid, *Chinese Trade and Southeast Asian Economic Expansion in the Later Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth Centuries: An Overview*, in: N. Cooke/T. Li (eds.), *Water Frontier: Commerce and the Chinese in the Lower Mekong Region, 1750–1880* Lanham 2004, pp. 21–34.

From the standpoint of imperial power, it is tempting to see the critical role of overseas Chinese in aiding Asian states and European colonial empires as a lost opportunity for the Qing. Indeed, it might be suggested that it was precisely here that the Qing missed the transitions to “modern” (i.e., maritime and commercial) colonialism and allowed expanding European states to grow powerful at its expense. To be sure, Qing policy in Southeast Asia does highlight an unusual disjuncture between the Qing state and the far-flung and powerful influence of China’s migrant merchants, miners, and farmers. The reluctance to use the Han Chinese presence as a vector for territorial expansion likely stemmed in part from caution (shared by the Ming) toward becoming reliant on a transient community of doubtful political loyalty, beyond the easy reach of the state’s China-based security apparatus. The frontier society of Taiwan was particularly turbulent and prone to rebellions. This, arguably the Qing empire’s only overseas possession, symbolized the vulnerabilities of this model of expansion for a state with a strong desire for political supervision. For their part, overseas Chinese showed no desire to draw the Qing state presence outward to sea.

A focus on policy, however, perhaps misses the larger insight to be drawn from Southeast Asia. By 1800, as Jonathan Schlesinger has observed, “merchants from Inner Asia to the Pacific had oriented themselves toward the Chinese interior”, generating “commodity booms” (and attendant environmental problems) in Borneo and Sulawesi as well as Xinjiang and Manchuria.³⁵ Whether the Qing state wanted to halt it, encourage it, or remained ambivalent, its ability to channel and control the migration of China’s growing population grew increasingly limited over the course of the eighteenth century. If we view the Qing empire in Asia-wide perspective, it could be argued that even the great political heft of the Qing state paled beside the enormous influence of China’s prosperous market and rising population.

4. Conclusion

Qing imperialism and colonialism can be analysed through the complex relationship between two distinct layers. The Qing political project was basically imperial. It aimed to increase the power, security, and resources of the state. Even if one concedes that the richest parts of China proper were conquered chiefly for their wealth, the case for Qing colonialism there is limited. Han Chinese merchants dominated China’s economy from top to bottom. Although China’s land and tax revenues paid the Eight Banners, the core cohort of imperial functionaries, this modest redistribution did not enrich the Manchus as a group, and indeed they grew increasingly impoverished. Beyond China, the Qing state did not target territories for expansion because it believed that those lands would profit the treasury or benefit the economy. Although revenues drawn from China proper underwrote much of the Qing military infrastructure in Inner Asia, Qing rule did not

attempt to make either China or Inner Asia wealthier at the expense of the other. Neither did it target either region for cultural transformation; to the contrary, the Qing imperial mission in Inner Asia explicitly sought to protect and purify (according to its own criteria) existing religious systems and moral values. As understood by the state, appropriate internal divisions were crucial for the preservation of the empire.

Lifting off this state structure, we can also consider the Qing realm as a demographic and economic entity. On this plane, China proper was so predominant that the empire can be seen as a Chinese core surrounded by regions that were less densely populated, less productive, and less commercialized. Whether colonialism is defined narrowly as agricultural settlement by migrants, or more expansively as external economic forces penetrating a periphery and bringing it into a subordinate relationship with a core area through commerce and resource extraction, virtually all colonial activity within and around Qing territory drew its impetus from the struggle for livelihood by the empire's rapidly-growing Han Chinese population.

To a considerable degree, the expansive energies of these two faces of the empire operated separately. Territorial growth was not meant to address the needs of China's growing population, nor did the outward movement of China's population remain within, or serve to extend, the boundaries of Qing control. Still, these planes of activity were not entirely distinct. Although state policy represented the most significant check on the Han Chinese presence in Inner Asia, it also set the conditions allowing that presence to gradually expand. In Southeast Asia, the Qing state remained nominally opposed to permanent migration, but its relaxed coastal order facilitated the "Chinese century". In southern China, uniquely, there was a strong alignment of interest, and sustained mutual support, between the state and migrants.

For all of its energy and effectiveness, the Qing state was ultimately reshaped by the pull of the empire's economic and demographic core. The ideological vision of a realm of distinct parts, articulated most explicitly during the long reign of the Qianlong emperor (1735–1796), was preserved after 1800 as much by institutional inertia as imperial enthusiasm. The fatal blow to this old order landed in the 1860s, as the catastrophic Taiping Rebellion (1851–1864) limited the state's ability to finance or reinforce its Inner Asian garrisons just as its control was challenged by Russian imperialism and internal uprisings. In a fundamental shift, the Qing state came to associate its political interests in Inner Asia with Han Chinese migration and the models of administration employed within China proper. In 1884, the reconquered Xinjiang was converted to a province, its governors henceforth Han Chinese. Manchuria was legally opened to private settlement, inaugurating one of the largest migrations in history and culminating in the establishment of three provinces in 1907. By its last decade, before its abdication in 1912, the Qing state hoped to survive by harnessing, rather than restricting, its Chinese inhabitants, and by shifting from a form that was in principle imperial to one that was colonial. The consequences of this decision, which cannot be discussed here, profoundly changed the subsequent history of China.

In Pursuit of the Sacred: Understanding Inka Colonialism in the Andes

Félix A. Acuto / Iván Leibowicz

ABSTRACTS

Das Inka-Reich (Tawantinsuyu) war das größte Reich in den Amerikas vor Ankunft der Europäer. Während des 15. und der ersten Jahrzehnte des 16. Jahrhunderts gelang es den Inkas, weite Regionen der südamerikanischen Anden zu erobern und eine Vielzahl von Gruppen und Gemeinwesen zu unterwerfen. Die Inkas dehnten ihr Reich jedoch nicht aus dem alleinigen Grund aus, Ressourcen abzuschöpfen und Reichtum anzuhäufen. Sie entwickelten zudem, wenn auch in unterschiedlichem Maße, ein koloniales Projekt, das darauf abzielte, die politischen, wirtschaftlichen, kulturellen und religiösen Institutionen und Praktiken der Kolonisierten umzugestalten. Ohne Frage war der Inka-Kolonialismus unter anderem geprägt von Zwangsarbeit, der gezielten Umsiedlung von Menschen sowie der Abschöpfung und Produktion von Grundnahrungsmitteln und Luxusgütern. Dennoch vertreten wir in diesem Aufsatz die These, dass die Expansion in die Andenregion den Inkas vor allem dazu diente, dem Heiligen zu begegnen und sich mit ihm zu verbinden. Das Expansionsbestreben der Inkas war eine besondere Art der Gralssuche, durch die sie ihre Macht aufbauten und ihre Herrschaft legitimierten.

The Inka Empire, or Tawantinsuyu, was the largest ancient empire in the Americas. During the fifteenth century and the first decades of the sixteenth century, the Inkas managed to conquer vast regions of the South American Andes, subduing a variety of groups and polities. But the Inkas did not expand their realm for the sole purpose of extracting resources and accumulating wealth. To various degrees, they developed a colonial project that aimed at reshaping the political, economic, cultural and religious institutions and practices of the colonized. There is no doubt that Inka colonialism involved, among other things, *corvée* labour, the strategic relocation of people(s) and the exploitation and production of staple crops and luxury goods. Nevertheless, we argue in this paper that, above all, the Inkas expanded into the Andean region to meet and relate to the Sacred. Inka expansionism was a sort of religious quest through which the Inkas built up their authority and legitimized their rule.

1. Introduction

During the fifteenth century and the first decades of the sixteenth century AD, a small polity from the Cuzco region, in the Andean highlands of south Peru, managed to expand over a wide territory to become the largest ancient empire of the Americas. When the Spanish conquistador Francisco Pizarro and his men arrived on the north coast of Peru in 1532, looking for the kingdom of “The Birú”, according to the information they had gathered in Panama, Pizarro realized that this “kingdom” was actually larger and more powerful than he had first thought. Tawantinsuyu, as the Inkas called their empire, stretched for more than 4,200 km: from south Colombia to central Chile and Mendoza province in Argentina, and from the Pacific coast, through the Andean highlands, to the eastern wooded lowlands.

Students of Tawantinsuyu have always wondered what motivated the Inkas to advance over foreign lands and to dominate other indigenous societies. We address this issue in the first section of the paper, discussing how scholars have typically explained Inka expansionism. But what happened once the Inkas conquered and subjugated other regions and their inhabitants? In the second section, we describe the principal strategies that the Inkas employed to occupy different lands and to control a variety of political organisations across vast regions of South America. We must take into account that Tawantinsuyu was not simply an imperial force going to war against other groups, conquering their territories and taxing them and/or extracting resources from their lands. Rather, the Inkas implemented a complete colonial project. It would be germane at this point, then, to briefly discuss the differences between imperialism and colonialism.

While imperialist endeavours occupy lands principally in order to extract (and to secure the extraction of) resources to support the core of the empire, colonialism implies a more complex relationship between foreign invaders and local subjects. In contrast to imperialism, which does not profoundly involve itself in local affairs, colonialism includes: 1. the direct territorial occupation of the conquered lands and the installation of administrative infrastructure, 2. strategies oriented towards the re-structuring of indigenous political organisations and institutions, 3. the re-organisation and re-orientation of the local economy, especially the transformation – and usually the intensification – of production, the co-option of native labour and intervention in the redistribution of resources, 4. the development of policies focused on the cultural transformation of the subject, or at least of certain key strata within local society. This last element is probably the most important facet of colonial domination. Through the diffusion of their cultural practices and interactions, their worldview and their knowledge, which are presented as being superior to indigenous ones, colonial rulers seek the identification of their subjects with those who control and oppress them. In theoretical terms, whereas imperialism involves the use of power in a Weberian sense – that is, the capacity to impose one’s imperial will despite resistance – colonialism is characterized by strategies of domination, which require obedience and a certain degree of voluntary submission to authority, without the need for coercion and repression – although symbolic and ritual violence can be employed.

As Antonio Gramsci has discussed – using the concept of hegemony – colonial forces seek to gain consent and legitimacy through cultural and ideological strategies, which intend to present the goals and interests of the rulers as those of the subjects. In other words, colonialism involves the attempt to impose upon the bodies and minds of the colonized the ways, ideas and categories of their rulers. Successful colonial domination is achieved when subjugated peoples perceive themselves through the categories and forms of knowledge imposed by those who dominate them.

The third section of this paper is oriented in this direction, emphasizing the cultural, symbolic and, especially, religious aspects of Inka colonialism. We claim that searching and connecting with the sacred were the principal motives that drove Inka expansion across the Andes. The Inkas sought to create narrow links between them and the supernatural entities that dwelled in the Andean landscapes alongside human communities, to appropriate, transform and Inkanize their cult, as well as to mediate the relationship between their subjects and the sacred by incorporating all supernatural entities into a large network under Inka control. Finally, in the conclusion, we discuss the reasons why the Inkas pursued this goal, arguing that this is how they built up their authority and legitimated Tawantinsuyu's position and dominance in the ancient Andean world.

2. Discussing Inka Expansion

Three main reasons are evoked to explain why the Inkas left the Cuzco area to advance into and dominate different regions in a quite short period of time. A number of scholars have argued that security was what fostered Inka expansionism.¹ At different moments throughout Tawantinsuyu's history, the Inkas found themselves threatened by other groups, some of which had developed a significant degree of political complexity. During the Late Intermediate Period (1000–1438 AD), the Inkas were an emergent political organisation, struggling for power and lands in the south Andes of Peru. There were other groups, such as the Chankas, Canchis, Canas, Qollas, and Lupacas, who also participated in this dispute, some of which were even more powerful than the Inkas. Each of these groups attempted to progress by establishing alliances with certain of their neighbours and engaging in hostilities with certain others. This situation of alliance building and escalating struggle constituted fertile ground for the emergence of broad and powerful military coalitions.² It was in this context of political and military instability and tensions that the Inkas began their expansion, first, over areas near Cuzco, the capital of the Inkas, in order to secure the wellbeing of the city and its inhabitants. The war and the ensuing victory over their neighbours the Chankas, which would later be-

1 J. Rowe, *Inca Culture at the Time of the Spanish Conquest*, in: J. Steward (ed.), *Handbook of South American Indians*, Vol. 2: *The Andean Civilizations*, Washington, DC 1946, pp. 183–330; also see R. A. Covey, *How the Incas Built their Heartland*, Ann Arbor 2006.

2 G. Conrad/A. Demarest, *Religion and Empire: The Dynamics of Aztec and Inca Expansionism*, Cambridge, UK 1984, p. 280.

come a mythical episode in the history of Tawantinsuyu, was a watershed in this process. The Inkas emerged strengthened from this foundational event, which allowed them to face down the powerful Qolla, Lupaca, and Pacajes chiefdoms of the Titicaca region, who represented a major threat to the Inkas. The triumph over these three large political organisations, the occupation of their lands and the appropriation of their shrines and mythical places of origin, catapulted the Inkas to a dominant position in the south Andes. New threats to Inka power would eventually emerge from other regions and groups (for example, from the coast and the north Andes), threats to which the Inkas – now with a large and well-organized army – would respond in the same way: by striking the first blow, defeating these groups and expanding the borders of Tawantinsuyu.

Some years ago, Conrad and Demarest proposed a very interesting explanation for Inka expansionism.³ According to these scholars, it was a system of split inheritance that motivated and propelled Tawantinsuyu's growth. After the death of an Inka ruler, one of his sons, usually the one who, in addition to having been conceived by the ruler's sister and principal wife, displayed better aptitude for leadership, was appointed as the new emperor or *Sapa Inka*. However, the new ruler did not inherit his father's possessions. He was not entitled to his father's palaces in Cuzco, his servants or his royal estates in nearby valleys.⁴ All of these properties went to the royal family, or *panaca*, of the deceased emperor, which included all of his offspring through the male line. As a matter of fact, the real owner of these possessions was still the mummy of the dead emperor, and the main function of his *panaca* was to serve as his royal court, to conduct festivities and rituals in his honour and to protect his mummified body. Stripped of the lands, palaces, servants and material goods that would allow him to live according to his rank, and without even a royal family of his own, the split inheritance system forced the new emperor to found his own *panaca* and to acquire new arable lands, resources and subjects who would pay tribute and deliver material goods to him and his recently created royal lineage. Insofar as the lands surrounding Cuzco and the people who lived in them had been seized and subjugated by previous emperors, and thus belonged to their powerful *panacas*, newly appointed *Sapa Inkas* had no other solution than to conquer new territories and to seek out lands, resources and servants in more distant areas.

A third way in which Inka colonialism has been explained has emphasized the economic and logistical aspects of imperialism. Drawing on functionalist approaches and cost/benefit models – and taking into account the fact that there is an intimate link between the evolution of social complexity and increasing energy capture – a group of scholars has claimed that some sort of inertia produced Tawantinsuyu's expansion.⁵ When the Inkas

3 Ibid.

4 See T. A. Abercrombie, *Pathways of Memory and Power: Ethnography and History among Andean People*, Madison 1998, p. 632.

5 T. D'Altroy/T. K. Earle, *Staple finance, wealth finance and storage in the Inka political economy*, in: T. LeVine (ed.), *Inka Storage System*, Norman 1992, pp. 31–61; T. K. Earle/T. D'Altroy, *The Political Economy of the Inka Empire: The Archaeology of Power and Finance*, in: C. Lamberg-Karlovsky (ed.), *Archaeological Thought in America*, Cambridge, UK 1989, pp. 183–204.

were just another small chiefdom competing for lands and resources in the south Andes of Peru, their limited political and social structures did not require the expenditure of large quantities of energy. But, with every new territory that they conquered, the Inkas became involved in a series of commitments that required the capture of more and more energy. The security, control, and administration of the newly absorbed territories, the extraction of natural resources and local labour, the construction of imperial settlements and roads, the development of Inka-sponsored projects and, finally, expenditures relating to ritual activities and feasting in order to lubricate the relationship with local elites, required great quantities of energy that the Inkas could only obtain by conquering new lands and subduing other groups. In other words, the ever-growing imperial machinery seems to have forced the Inkas to continually expand the frontiers of Tawantinsuyu and thus to find the resources needed to finance and consolidate their authority over already-occupied lands.

3. Inka Colonial Strategies

Tawantinsuyu's colonialism was not just about expansion, but also about the development of policies designed to cementing Inka rule. Historical and archaeological scholarship on Tawantinsuyu has discussed the different strategies the Inkas employed to secure their domination, to develop activities and projects and to control subjected groups. One of the most remarkable of these strategies was the extraction of indigenous labour through the *mit'a* system.⁶ Once the Inkas conquered a region, they declared their ownership of all land and all resources, before immediately returning them – in an act of apparent generosity – to indigenous communities, while keeping for them and for the Sun, their principal deity, some lands and certain key resources. As new rulers, they demanded that native communities reciprocate Tawantinsuyu's generosity by sending people to work on Inka lands or at different tasks, which included military services, craft production, herding, construction and attending to Inka facilities, among others. Even though some people became directly attached to Tawantinsuyu, becoming full-time workers, and although the Inkas allowed coastal groups to pay their tribute in material goods, there is general agreement that the Inka economy was based on *corvée* labour.⁷ The forced relocation of ethnic communities was another common Inka colonial policy.⁸ The Inkas divided rebellious societies, resettling part of them in faraway regions. These displaced families were, in turn, replaced with allied groups. This constituted a two-fold

6 T. D'Altroy, *The Incas*, Oxford 2002, p. 408; J. Murra, *La organización económica del Estado Inca*, Buenos Aires 1978, p. 270.

7 M. Rostworowski, *Redes económicas del Estado inca: el "ruego" y la "dádiva"*, in: V. Vich (ed.), *El Estado está de vuelta: desigualdad, diversidad y democracia*, Lima 2005, pp. 13–47.

8 J. Murra, *La organización económica del Estado Inca*, Buenos Aires 1978, p. 270; F. Pease, *The Formation of Tawantinsuyu: Mechanisms of Colonization and Relationship with Ethnic Groups*, in: G. Collier/R. Rosaldo/J. Wirth (eds.), *The Inca and Aztec States, 1400–1800*, New York 1982, pp.173–98.

strategy. On the one hand, the Inkas pacified a region by disassembling native resistance and by affecting the social reproduction of these communities, while, on the other hand, they obtained full-time labour. These resettled populations, known as *mitmaq-kuna*, found themselves away from their territories, as well as their obligations toward their communities and political leaders, becoming attached personnel for the Inkas. There were even regions, such as the Cochabamba Valley in Bolivia, that were fully vacated and whose population were replaced with *mitmaq-kuna* communities.

Inka domination throughout the Andes was secured, in the majority of the cases, through the direct and effective occupation of provincial lands, which entailed the construction of large administrative centres, ritual facilities, productive enclaves and two highly important material structures: an extended network of roads, also known as *qhapaqñan*, and storerooms, or *qollqas*.⁹ The use of *qhapaqñan* was forbidden to non-Inka people. Only Inka nobility, officials, messengers and the army were permitted to use it. The Inka road system also included resting places, or *tampu* – located approximately one day's travel away from each other – where travellers could find accommodation and provisions. *Qhapaqñan* played a highly significant role in the mobilisation of the Inka army and in holding Tawantinsuyu together. *Qollcas*, too, were key to Inka colonialism. Rows of storerooms, where the Inkas kept a variety of material goods, were present in every major Inka centre and in every *tampu*. Food – for supporting *mit'a* workers and imperial officers or for offering during ceremonial activities – tools and raw materials for craft activities (textile, ceramic, lithic, metallurgy, etc.), weapons, construction materials and other such items were the plethora of things the Inkas stocked up to use in their colonial activities.

In order to lubricate relations with subjugated communities, especially with native elites, the Inkas hosted ceremonial events where they toasted with brewed corn beer or *chicha*, offered generous quantities of food and distributed presents among the participants.¹⁰ These acts of hospitality and generosity were not only necessary, but expected because they fulfilled the mandatory reciprocity that has characterized Andean sociality. The exchange of help and care – between relatives, members of a community, members of a political unit, or between people and supernatural entities – has been a key structuring principle of Andean social life.¹¹ But requesting the aid or services of another implies, first, offering something in return and, second, the obligation of eventual repayment with the same type of aid or service. The Inkas could not avoid this rooted system and, although they were a dominant force, they were able to extract local labour only when they engaged in this game of reciprocal exchanges. Many studies on Inka colonialism have focused precisely on the interactions the Inkas established with subordinate elites,

9 J. Hyslop, *The Inka Road System*, New York 1984, p. 377; J. Hyslop, *Inka Settlement Planning*, Austin 1990, p. 393; T. LeVine (ed.), *Inka Storage System*, Norman 1992, p. 385.

10 J. Murra, *On Inca political structure*, in: V. Ray (ed.), *Systems of Political Control and Bureaucracy in Human Societies*, Seattle 1958, pp. 30–41.

11 C. J. Allen, *The Hold life Has: Coca and Cultural Identity in an Andean Community*, Washington, DC 1988, p. 312.

in order to extract labour and to obtain other favours from provincial communities and political organisations.¹²

4. Sacred Entities and Inka Colonialism

Although there are interesting arguments about Inka expansionism, and albeit we agree that the extraction of local labour, the relocations of ethnic communities, the sponsorship of ceremonial events, the distribution of food and gifts among local elites and the construction of infrastructure that guaranteed the effective occupation of provincial lands were all Inka colonial strategies of paramount importance, in this paper we formulate an alternative explanation.

Since ancient times, human communities in the Andes have shared their world with a variety of sacred entities known as *wak'as*. From the perspective of Andean animist ontology, landmarks that stand out from the surrounding landscape due to their unique features (i.e. prominent mountains, volcanoes, caves, lakes, confluences of rivers, salt flats, strange boulders, waterfalls and springs), but also certain human-made structures (such as funerary monuments, ancient ruins, temples and mummified bodies), are supernatural beings that dwell alongside people in the Andean territories.¹³ These entities possess human-like characteristics, such as animacy, agency, volition, personality and moods, and have specific abilities, for example divination, power over the weather and over certain animals or natural resources. Some of these entities are protectors of specific human communities, providers of water or givers of fertility. The latter is precisely the case of Earth Mother, or *Pachamama*, the most important and overarching of the Andean *wak'as*. People acknowledge the powers and prowess of *wak'as*, and they know that they benefit human communities, but they also know that, when upset, *wak'as* can be dangerous and are capable of harming people or their possessions. It is therefore very important to maintain a harmonious relation with them. People must treat *wak'as* with respect and affection. They must nurture them, request their permission, feed them and pay homage to them.

12 C. Costin/T. K. Earle, Status Distinction and Legitimation of Power as Reflected in Changing Patterns of Consumption in Late Prehispanic Peru, in: *American Antiquity* 54 (1989) 4, pp. 691–714; T. D'Altroy / C. Hastorf (eds.), *Empire and Domestic Economy*. New York 2001, p. 378; Earle/D'Altroy, *The Political Economy of the Inka Empire*; C. Morris, *The Infrastructure of Inka Control in the Central Highlands*, in: G. Collier / R. Rosaldo / J. Wirth (eds.), *The Inca and Aztec States, 1400–1800*, New York 1982, pp. 153–70; among others.

13 T. Bray, *Andean Wak'as and Alternative Configurations of Persons, Power, and Things*, in: T. Bray (ed.), *The Archaeology of Wak'as: Explorations of the Sacred in the Pre-Columbian Andes*, Boulder 2015, pp. 3–20; Z. Chase, *What is a Wak'a? When is a Wak'a?*, in: T. Bray (ed.), *The Archaeology of Wak'as: Explorations of the Sacred in the Pre-Columbian Andes*, Boulder 2015, pp. 75–126; R. Randall, *Qoyllur Rit'i, An Inca Fiesta of the Pleiades: Reflections on Time & Space in the Andean World*, in: *Bulletin de l'Institut Français d'Études Andines* 11 (1982) 1–2, pp. 37–81; M. van de Guchte, *The Inca Cognition of Landscape: Archaeology, Ethnohistory, and the Aesthetic of Alterity*, in: W. Ashmore/B. Knapp (eds.), *The Archaeologies of Landscapes: Contemporary Perspectives*, Oxford 1999, pp. 149–168.

In this paper, we claim that what drove the Inkas to conquer other territories was not the desire to acquire lands for royal families, to seize natural resources, to co-opt indigenous labour or to secure their possessions against aggressive competitors. We maintain that it was these sacred entities that motivated expansion and shaped Inka colonialism. More specifically, Tawantinsuyu's quest was: 1. to establish a direct, physical relationship with these sacred entities, 2. to appropriate, transform and Inkanize the cult of *wak'as* and 3. to incorporate all *wak'as* into one large network under Inka control. Inka colonialism orbited around these main goals and every colonial strategy was subsidiary to it. Put bluntly, the Inkas were not particularly interested in military achievements, in conquering new lands, in controlling resources or in establishing any kind of relationship with other indigenous groups. These were necessary steps they had to take in order to achieve their main purpose: creating a close link with the sacred.

Early colonial historical documents registered the profound interest that the Inkas had in the sacred entities of the Andes. During the second half of the sixteenth century and the first decades of the seventeenth century, the Spanish Catholic Church, following the procedures of the Inquisition, sent priests to the New World to find, report and destroy cultic objects and idols. These priests, who travelled the Andes searching for *wak'as*, gave testimony of the connection between sacred places and objects and the Inkas. This is the case of Father Cristobal de Albornoz who, in his report about the Andean *wak'as*, writes:

*After the Inkas [...] conquered all provinces including from Chile to Pasto [...] they tried to know the amount of people in the province and the things that supported them, their possessions, gold and silver and clothing they had, they tried to know about the wak'as, the shrines they worshiped and the order they had to offer and make sacrifices to them [...] And many of these wak'as [the Inkas] honoured with many services and livestock and cups with gold and silver, offering themselves in the shape of gold and silver figurines and other figurines of rams [llamas] and other animals and gold and silver birds, and offering them and burning all the provisions they used, and giving them rich dresses that they sent to make for the occasion.*¹⁴

The principal tactic that the Inkas employed to establish a narrow relation with *wak'as* was to bring them to Cuzco. According to Rowe's historical studies, "Each province of the empire was required to send one of its principal cult objects to Cuzco every year. The provincial cult objects were installed in all honour in the chief temple of the state religion, where they served at the same time as hostages for the good behaviour of their worshippers and as reminders that Cuzco was a religious centre for the entire empire."¹⁵ When provincial *wak'as* were impossible to transport to Cuzco, such as in the case of

14 C. Albornoz, Instrucción para descubrir todas las guacas del Pirú y sus camayos y haciendas, in: *Journal de la Societe des Americanistes* 56 (1967) 1, pp. 17–39, at 17.

15 J. Rowe, What kind of settlement was Inca Cuzco?, in: *Ñawpa Pacha* 5 (1967), pp. 59–75, at 63.

natural features, the Inkas used a different strategy. In these cases, they sought to settle right next to them, on top of them or to place them inside a building compound.¹⁶

While indigenous communities generally honoured sacred entities from afar, due to the risks that being near them involved, the Inkas travelled and settled in *wak'as'* territories. *Wak'as* had (and still have) their lands and possessions (for example, animals such as foxes, hawks, condors, pumas or vicuñas). But because these territories are rugged and untamed, visiting and traversing them was, and still is, a quite dangerous enterprise that people have usually avoided. There are numerous tales in the Andes of reckless individuals who entered a *wak'a's* realm without asking permission and without the necessary protection, and who were swallowed by the sacred entity never to be seen again. Due to this situation, Andean indigenous communities and persons have preferred to interact with these supernatural beings from a safe distance, naming them during rituals (naming them implies inviting them) and employing, in the safety of their settlements, miniatures (which are considered extensions of the *wak'as* themselves) to praise them. However, this was not the case with the Inkas, who not only visited the *wak'as'* lands, but also materially transformed these lands with roads and buildings.

This is the case with mountains, especially those that, due to their imposing height and permanently snowy summits, stand out in the landscape. Andean indigenous communities considered that the summit of these special mountains were *pacarinas*, places of origin of their mythical ancestors, founders of local communities and lineages.¹⁷ In some cases, mountains themselves have been considered powerful ancestors, or *Apus*. On almost every prominent mountain in the Andes – mountains that indigenous people still recognize as tutelary entities today – there is an Inka road leading to the peak. On the summits of these mountains, which are considered the very head of the *Apu*, archaeologists have identified Inka architecture and offerings of various kinds, including sacrificed and buried children dressed in exquisite Inka-elite clothing.¹⁸

Inka architecture, artefacts and symbols have been found in close association with other paramount Andean sacred places, such as, to name a few, the sculpture of the god Viracocha (the creator) in Cacha in the south Peruvian highlands; Titikala, the sacred rock in the Island of the Sun in Lake Titicaca, out of which – according to Andean indigenous mythology – the Sun, the principal deity and ancestor of the Inkas, first emerged;¹⁹ the wooden idol at Pachacamac, one of the most prestigious Andean oracles and religious centres of the Peruvian south coast;²⁰ Lake Chinchaycocha in the Junín region of Peru, a lake that natives considered their *pacarina* and on whose shores the Inkas built a huge provincial capital of 79 ha, in an area poor in resources and isolated from native

16 J. Reinhard, *Machu Picchu: Exploring an Ancient Sacred Center*, Los Angeles 2007, p. 200.

17 T. Besom, *Of Summits and Sacrifices: An Ethnohistoric Study of Inka Religious Practices*, Austin 2009.

18 Ibid.

19 B. Sillar, *Caminando a través del Tiempo: Geografías Sagradas en Cacha/Raqchi*, Departamento del Cuzco (Perú), in: *Revista Andina* 35 (2002), pp. 221–245.

20 M. Rostworowski, *Pachacamac y el Señor de los Milagros. Una Trayectoria Milenaria*, Lima 1992, p. 214.

settlements;²¹ Samaipata, a large carved rock saddle (300 metres long and 60 metres wide) located in eastern Bolivia, in the transition between the highlands and the great plains of the eastern Amazonian lowlands;²² and the important Cañari *wak'a* at Ingapirca at the northern edge of Tawantinsuyu, an astronomically aligned rock stela, painted red and associated with a collective ancestral tomb, the resting place of a Cañari priest and ten other people.²³ In the first case, the Inkas surrounded the *wak'a* with a series of monumental buildings. On the Island of the Sun, at Pachacamac and in the Junín region, they installed conspicuous ceremonial facilities right next to the sacred objects/entities. In the case of Ingapirca, the Inkas absorbed the Cañari shrine within a major Inka centre. Even the *wak'as* themselves were modified by the Inkas. This happened with the rock saddle of Samaipata – where, following the local tradition of carving the rock, the Inkas sculpted their own symbols – and with Titikala – which the Inkas clothed in a richly decorated textile.

But the Inkas' presence has not been detected only at these highly prestigious and widely revered sacred places. The Inkas also interfered with more modest *wak'as*. For instance, a few years ago Chilean archaeologists reported the case of a Diaguita rock art site associated with a burial ground that underwent transformations during the Inka occupation of the area. In this case, the Inkas took great care to incorporate their own symbols into this site, to which local communities had assigned sacred meaning for centuries and which was connected with their ancestors.²⁴ In the Potosí and Chuquisaca regions of Bolivia, which were particularly rich in mineral resources, the Inkas seem to have been more interested in local shrines than in exploiting these resources.²⁵ Archaeological research in these two regions has verified the persistent articulation between Inka sites and native sacred places. On practically every consecrated hill in the region there is evidence of Inka presence. The Inkas appropriated and re-signified these native shrines either by setting up a solid ritual platform on their summits, by building a whole ritual centre in direct connection with them or by changing their names from the local Aymara to the Inka Quechua language.

The colonial advance of the Inkas across the Andes also entailed the reconfiguration and Inkanisation of the cultic activities associated with the *wak'as*. A radical strategy in this regard was the total (or the partial, but strategic) erasure of native presence.²⁶ Through

21 B. Bauer/C. Stanish, *Ritual and Pilgrimage in the Ancient Andes: The Islands of the Sun and the Moon*, Austin 2001, p. 330.

22 R. Matos, *Pumpu: Centro administrativo Inka de la Puna de Junín*, Lima 1994, p. 327.

23 A. Meyers/I. Combès (eds.), *El Fuerte de Samaipata. Estudios arqueológicos*, Santa Cruz de la Sierra 2015, p. 192. M. Ziolkowski/R. Sadowski, *Informe acerca de las investigaciones arqueoastronómicas en el área central de Ingapirca (Ecuador)*, in: *Revista Española de Antropología Americana* 14 (1984), pp. 103–125.

24 A. Troncoso, *El Arte de la Dominación. Arte Rupestre y Paisaje Durante el Período Incaico en la Cuenca Superior del Río Aconcagua*, in: *Chungará* 36 (2004), pp. 553–561.

25 P. Cruz, *Huacas Olvidadas y Cerros Santos. Apuntes Metodológicos sobre la Cartografía Sagrada en los Andes del Sur de Bolivia*, in: *Estudios Atacameños* 38 (2009), pp. 55–74.

26 F. A. Acuto/I. Leibowicz, *Inca Colonial Encounters and Incorporation in Northern Argentina*, in: S. Alconini/R. A. Covey (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of the Incas*, New York 2018, pp. 333–354; Z. Chase, *The Inca State and*

the destruction of local buildings and objects – especially ritual facilities – and their replacement with Inka ones, the Inkas not only redesigned and re-signified the cultic activities oriented towards a particular *waka* in their own ways, but they also re-wrote history. Like in other oral societies, memory and history in the Andes was (and still is) embodied in the tales and myths people narrate and transmit on different occasions, but they were also materialized and made visible in the landscape, recreated through monuments, shrines and objects (even mummified human bodies), bringing the past into the present.²⁷ By dwelling on and experiencing the territory, people became knowledgeable about their world and the achievements of their ancestors. Thus, when the Inkas wiped out material mnemonic devices, they denied indigenous communities access to their memories and, therefore, to their past. These communities were then erased from history. Nevertheless, the Inkas were not always able to enforce forgetfulness by destroying local architecture and material memories. In other cases, they chose to ignore the local presence by avoiding passing near indigenous areas or settlements. Scholars have noticed that in many regions the Inkas selected areas that were practically uninhabited, away from local towns, to settle their centres and infrastructure.²⁸ Strangely enough, these areas were poor in resources and logistically marginal. We have argued that the Inkas chose these empty and peripheral locations because they sought to construct, free from interference, their own colonial landscape.²⁹ This seemingly odd selection of areas scarce in resources, poorly connected and distant from the main native political, economic and cultural centres, enabled the Inkas to avoid indigenous influences on their colonial microcosms, on the activities they conducted there and on the people who lived at or visited the Inka sites. The Inkas preferred locations that served as a blank canvas, allowing them to build a landscape of their own, estranged from local social and cultural life and divorced from vernacular history.

A final relevant aspect of this process of the Inkanisation of the *wakas* and the cultic activities oriented towards them was the transformation of the relationship between sacred entities and their worshipers. During Inka-sponsored ritual activities and pilgrimages to sacred landmarks, the Inkas became those who contacted, talked, summoned and paid homage to sacred beings, displacing local people and relegating them to a passive role.³⁰ Through the strategic use of architecture designed to impede indigenous people from

Local Ritual Landscapes, in: S. Alconini/R. A. Covey (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of the Incas*, New York 2018, pp. 519–540.

- 27 L. Bengtsson, *The Concept of Time/Space in Quechua: Some Considerations*, in: *Etnologiska Studier* 42 (1999), pp. 119–127; C. McEwan/M. van de Guchte, *Ancestral time and sacred space in the Inca state ritual*, in: R. Townsend (ed.), *The Ancient Americas: Art from Sacred Landscapes*, Chicago 1992, pp. 359–371; S. Niles, *The Shape of Inca History: Narrative and Architecture in an Andean Empire*, Iowa City 1999, p. 344.
- 28 Hyslop, *Inca Settlement Planning*, p. 393; R. Matos, *Pumpu: Centro administrativo Inka de la Puna de Junin*, Lima 1994, p. 327; C. Morris, *The Infrastructure of Inka Control in the Central Highlands*, in: G. Collier/R. Rosaldo/J. Wirth (eds.), *The Inca and Aztec States, 1400–1800*, New York 1982, pp. 153–70.
- 29 F. A. Acuto, *The Materiality of Inka Domination: Landscape, Spectacle, Memory, and Ancestors*, in: P. Funari/A. Zarankin/E. Stovel (eds.), *Global Archaeology Theory: Contextual Voices and Contemporary Thoughts*, New York 2005, pp. 211–235.
- 30 Acuto/Leibowicz, *Inca Colonial Encounters*; Chase, *The Inca State*.

interacting directly with their own *wak'as*, Tawantinsuyu asserted its authority. During staged ritual performances, the Inkas – metaphorically and materially – assumed the role of intermediaries who linked indigenous peoples and their *wak'as* through their performative bodies and their ritual devices.

Not only archaeological investigations, but also early colonial documents confirm that the Inkas introduced important transformations into the ritual activities directed toward Andean sacred entities, both in terms of ritual performances and ceremonial infrastructure. The priest Bernabé Cobo, who visited the sanctuaries on the Island of the Sun, reported that

*[...] the people of the Island of Titicaca saw the Sun come up one morning out of that crag with extraordinary radiance. For this reason, they believed that the true dwelling place of the Sun was that crag, or at least that crag was the most delightful thing in the world for the Sun. Thus a magnificent temple, for those times, was constructed there and dedicated to the Sun, although it was not so magnificent as it was after the Incas enlarged it and enhanced its fame [...] this Inca had many buildings constructed in order to enlarge and lend more authority to this shrine. The former temple was augmented with new and impressive buildings. In addition, it was ordered that other buildings be constructed for other purposes; these included a convent for mamaconas [chosen women].*³¹

A final important aspect of the relationship the Inkas intended to establish with the supernatural entities of the Andes was the creation of a large network that bound together, materially and symbolically, all of the *wak'as* and then bound these to Tawantinsuyu. Every *wak'a* that the Inkas incorporated into this network was connected through the *qhapacñan* and received high-quality, Inka-style material offerings. The Inkas took great care in constructing, in close connection with the *wak'as*, a specific set of ritual buildings, a sort of trademark of Inka colonialism. Everyone who undertook a pilgrimage to these sacred places found a ritual scenario bearing Tawantinsuyu's stamp.

More important still is how the Inkas bound all of the *wak'as* together through a pan-Andean ritual known as *qhapachucha*.³² Certain special occasions motivated the Inkas to travel to the different corners of their large empire to pay homage to every single *wak'a*. *Qhapachucha* began in Cuzco, where the Inkas planned the kinds of offerings that they would make to each *wak'a*, according to its relevance and power and the importance of its native worshipers to the Inkas' political strategy. Among these gifts were special children, who were prepared and ritually transformed into "sons of the Sun", the Inka's main deity and mythical ancestor, and who, in the process, became linked to the lineage of the Cuzco elite.³³ Once the preparations and celebrations in Cuzco were completed,

31 B. Cobo, *Inca Religion and Customs*, R. Hamilton (trans.), Austin 1990 [1653], p. 279, 91–93.

32 Besom, *Of Summits and Sacrifices*; I. Farrington, *The Concept of Cusco in: Tawantinsuyu 5* (1998), pp. 53–59; McEwan/van de Guchte, *Ancestral time*.

33 Farrington, *The Concept of Cusco*.

pilgrimage parties left the capital and travelled simultaneously to nearby and to faraway regions to meet and honour the animated sacred entities.

5. Conclusion

Why did the Inkas pursue this systematic (and almost obsessive) search to connect with the supernatural beings that dwelled in the Andean landscapes alongside human communities?

The Inkas' core objective was to bring order to chaos.³⁴ We must take into account the fact that Andean identity came to be constituted in counterpoint to the identity of the "savage" peoples of the Amazonian lowlands. For the peoples of the highlands, and especially for the Inkas, the eastern, wooded lowlands represented the uncivilized past, the chaos and wildness that needed to be isolated and confined.³⁵ In front of the Spaniards, the Inkas presented themselves as the civilisers of the Andean world.³⁶ According to Inka discourses, everything was barbaric, unstable and out of control before Tawantinsuyu, and the Inkas came to bring order, wisdom, peace and prosperity. In order to avoid obscurity and chaos, and to prevent the Andean world becoming the uncivilized Amazonian lowlands, supernatural forces needed to be contained and organized.

When the Inkas travelled across the territories of the *wak'as*, when they branded these territories with their roads and buildings, when they settled next to or directly on top of sacred landmarks, when they constructed rock platforms and buried offerings at the summits of the most sacred tutelary mountains, when they surrounded these powerful non-human animated entities with buildings and when they clothed *wak'as* with fine textiles – all activities that local communities usually avoided due to their riskiness – the Inkas not only showed that they were able to tame and to bring order to these unstable and dangerous territories, but they also presented themselves as transcending humanity. Inka agency lay beyond human agency because they had the ability to be with and to manipulate the *wak'as* without any consequences or harm. This is precisely where Inka authority resided. We must take into account that people, *wak'as* and landscape were symbolically, socially and even physiologically entangled and interdependent.³⁷ Hence,

34 C. J. Allen, Ushnus and Interiority, in: F. Meddens/K. Willis/C. McEwan/N. Branch (eds.), *Inca Sacred Space: Landscape, Site and Symbol in the Andes*, London 2014, pp. 71–77; J. Jennings, The Fragility of Imperialist Ideology and the End of Local Traditions, an Inca Example, in: *Cambridge Archaeological Journal* 13 (2003) 1, pp. 107–120; S. Ramírez, Negociando el Imperio: El Estado Inca como Culto, in: *Bulletin de l'Institut Français d'Études Andines* 37 (2008), pp. 5–18; Sillar, *Caminando a través del Tiempo*.

35 Randall, *Qoyllur Rit'i*.

36 P. Cieza de León, *The Incas of Pedro Cieza de León*, H.de Onis (trans.), Norman 1959 [1553], p. 516; Cobo, *Inca Religion and Customs*.

37 Allen, *The Hold Life Has*; J. Bastien, Qollahuaya-Andean Body Concepts: A Topographical-Hydraulic Model of Physiology, in: *American Anthropologist* 87 (1985), pp. 595–611; Chase, What is a Wak'a?; J. Earls/I. Silverblatt, *La realidad física y social en la cosmología andina*, in: *Actes du XLII Congrès International des Americanistes* 4 (1978), pp. 299–326; G. Fernández Juárez, *Enfermedad, moda y cuerpo social en el altiplano aymara: Un "boceto" de inspiración colonial sobre modelos de identidad en los Andes*, in: *Revista Española de Antropología Ame-*

controlling the *wak'as*, or relationships with them, entailed controlling their human worshippers.

Finally, by materially and symbolically penetrating and marking the sacred landscapes of their subjects, the Inkas inscribed themselves into local mnemonic devices and, therefore, into indigenous history. History is cyclical in the Andes. In contrast to the Western worldview, people from the Andes understand that the past is in front of them, because it is visible, while the future lies behind, because it is unknown and cannot be seen.³⁸ The past is present in the Andean territories (in the double sense of being there and being in the temporal present). In this sense, when the Inkas transformed and embedded themselves in the sacred ancestral landscapes of their subordinates, in their material memories, they became a part of vernacular history: what was visible and, hence, known.

This was especially the case with holy mountains. As we explained, indigenous communities held that the summit of these mountains were their *pacarinas* (the places where their mythical ancestors emerged to found local communities and lineages, and where they returned to dwell as tutelary entities). The Inka occupation of these high-altitude areas implied, in some way, the appropriation of the mythical history of their subordinates. The construction of ritual buildings and the interment of “sons of the Sun” on the summits of sacred mountains metaphorically expressed that these places had become the permanent residence of the Inkas, who in this way supplanted local mythical ancestors. The pilgrimage from Cuzco to these sacred summits may have represented the return of the ancestors to their *pacarinas*. Through the symbolic and material appropriation of these summits, the Inkas seem to have affirmed that they had always been there and that they were part of the natural order of things – that is, part of nature and part of the supernatural order. Seeking to transform indigenous beliefs and history, the Inkas positioned themselves as a natural nexus between the past and the present. They thus legitimated their dominion by transforming themselves from foreign conquerors to returning ancestors.

ricana 28 (1998), pp. 259–281; C. Greenway, Objectified Selves: An Analysis of Medicines in Andean Sacrificial Healing, in: *Medical Anthropology Quarterly* 12 (1998) 2, pp. 147–167.

38 Allen, *The Hold Life Has*; Randall, *Qoyllur Rit'i*.

Agency, Cooperation, and Oligarchy – The Origins of Colonialism

Wolfgang Reinhard

ABSTRACTS

Die notwendigen Bedingungen für die erfolgreiche europäische Expansion und Kontrolle sind zahlreich. Eine hinreichende Bedingung für ihren Erfolg besteht indes in einer Kombination von tatkräftiger Initiative, Kooperation und Oligarchie. Zunächst ist Kolonialismus beinahe nie die Folge eines Masterplans einer bestimmten Regierung, sondern vielmehr der individuellen Initiative von Entdeckern, Händlern, Missionaren oder Banditen. Weiterhin haben koloniale Herrscher aus geographischen, politischen und nicht zuletzt finanziellen Gründen keine andere Wahl, als Soldaten, Verwalter und Bedienstete aus der einheimischen Bevölkerung zu rekrutieren. Schließlich ist Kolonialismus in vielen Fällen das Resultat einer gemeinsamen Machtausübung durch europäische und lokale Oligarchien auf Kosten der indigenen Subjekte.

There were plenty of necessary conditions for successful European expansion and control. But the sufficient condition for success involves a combination of agency, cooperation and oligarchy. Colonialism is almost never the consequence of a master plan formulated by a particular government, but, as a rule, results from the initiative of individuals, such as explorers, merchants, missionaries – and bandits. Furthermore, for geographical, political and – last but not least – financial reasons colonial rulers had no choice but to recruit soldiers, administrators and servants from the indigenous population. Finally, in many cases, colonialism resulted in the combined domination of European and indigenous oligarchies at the expense of native subjects.

Notwithstanding today's inflationary memorial culture, the year 1519 may well serve as a starting point for our discussion. It is worth recalling the intrusion of Spanish conquer-

ors into the Aztec capital of Tenochtitlan which started in that year.¹ As early as 1511, shipwrecked Spaniards began arriving among the Maya following rumours that beyond the recently occupied Island of Cuba, countries even richer than the notorious Golden Castile of Panama were to be discovered. Accordingly, the governor of Cuba Diego de Velazquez prepared further *entradas*. These were “multifunctional” expeditions of discovery and commerce, which, if necessary, could however be extended to privateering, slave hunting or even to conquest. After two attempts had failed, Velazquez sent another fleet there under the command of Hernán Cortés.

This petty nobleman of modest origins not only profitted from his legal expertise, but also became a wealthy *encomendero* first on Española, then on Cuba – wealthy enough to equip seven of the ten ships of his fleet from his own pocket. Because Velazquez did not trust him, Cortés ultimately decided to start off on his own. He became the greatest of the *conquistadores*, a courageous leader with strength of mind, a natural talent for politics with outstanding tactical capacities and, above all, a complete lack of scruples. He was able to outmaneuver Velazquez, to win over the forces the latter had sent to replace him, and even to gain the favour of Emperor Charles V, despite the fact that Juan Rodriguez de Fonseca, a leading figure in the field of “Indian” policy, happened to be a friend of Velazquez’. The foundation of the city of Veracruz and his election as *capitan general* of this city made Cortés, in a semi-legal way, an independent player who was now able to begin his march on Tenochtitlan.

Cortés did not take on the role of Quetzalcoatl, the deified ancient ruler of the former leading tribe of the Toltecs, as an established legend has it. But he quickly learned how to use the advantages provided by the repressive structure of the Aztec system of governance. As the liberator of peoples who had suffered under Aztec tyranny, he was able to win new allies, while, at the same time, shamelessly outplaying the different factions. Native allies were necessary when the disappointed Aztecs – no longer concerned about their ruler Moctezuma, who was kept in Spanish captivity – almost exterminated the fleeing Spaniards during the *noche triste* of 30 June 1520. A year later, Cortés returned, along with an anti-Aztec coalition, and conquered Tenochtitlan – which in the meantime had suffered a smallpox epidemic – transforming it into a Spanish colony. As the first imperial governor, he managed over the course of the following years almost to double the extent of the former Aztec empire.

After successful plotting and lobbying, his first visit to Spain in 1529 led to his appointment as commander-in-chief, along with the awarding of the title of *marqués* and a feudal property of 11,000 square kilometers containing approximately 200,000 inhabitants. But he did not remain governor of New Spain. He was considered simply a much too powerful competitor to the crown. Instead, on the basis of his *encomiendas*, he became

1 For this paper in general, see W. Reinhard, *Die Unterwerfung der Welt: Globalgeschichte der europäischen Expansion*, 4th edn, München 2018; for the Spanish conquest, see V. Huber, *Beute und Conquista: Die politische Ökonomie der Eroberung Neuspaniens*, Frankfurt am Main 2018 and V. Huber, *Die Konquistadoren: Cortés, Pizarro und die Eroberung Amerikas*, Munich 2019.

the greatest entrepreneur in the Americas, engaged in lucrative mining and agricultural operations, the production of silk, cotton and sugar, trading in sugar and slaves and running workshops, inns and shipyards – in short, he represented a paradigmatic case of effective colonialist agency based upon individual initiative, whereas institutions and political authorities did not react immediately, but rather late or not at all.

It was not only in the case of Cortés that agency proved its value through successful cooperation. Cooperation, however, quite often started with information gathering. In 1519, Geronimo de Aguilar, one of two survivors of the 1511 shipwreck, escaped to Cortés' Spaniards, whereas his companion preferred to stay with the Maya. For this reason, Aguilar became the prototype of the intercultural broker, who provided Cortés with the necessary information about the unknown country. Subsequently, however, one of the twenty female slaves presented as a gift to the Spaniards at Tabasco became a key figure of the Conquista not only because of her knowledge of Nahuatl, a language that Aguilar himself did not know, but also in her capacity as Cortés' lover and advisor. Her name was Malinali Tenepal or Malintzin, hispanized as Malinche and baptized as Doña Marina. The details of her political activity are unknown, but some suggest that she used her influence to settle accounts. But no indigenous source documents negative feedback and her continuous presence in the "Lienzo de Tlaxcala" and other pictorial manuscripts demonstrates competent intercultural cooperation. In 1525, she was officially married to one of Cortés' companions, whereas Cortés himself married a lady from the high Spanish nobility. Each of his two matches produced a son called Martín, which was the name of Cortés' father.²

The agency of Doña Marina was an outstanding, although not unique case of cooperation between Spaniards and indigenous women. This was self-evident in the most basic sense. This does not refer to female cooks as some pious authors would have it. A modern historian even proposed a kind of alternative history of the Conquista and claimed the Spaniards conquered the new world not so much with the sword but – *sit venia verbo* – with their genitals!³ Cortés' men did indeed father numerous children. Cases of brutal rape are documented; love affairs are not – which does not mean that they did not exist. Neither the anticolonial paradigm of the Amerindian woman as a "tortured victim" nor the legend of the Indian as an "ever-willing prostitute" reflects historical reality. In America, as well as in Europe, women could be taken as booty, as a prize for the victors, or as a symbolic token when alliances were confirmed. Active political agency, however, was usually restricted to men.

From the indigenous perspective, alliances with powerful new overlords were no problem, because the political systems were not radically different. At the same time, the Spaniards needed indigenous allies for their conquests and for the establishment of colo-

2 C. Wurm, *Doña Marina, la Malinche: Eine historische Figur und ihre literarische Rezeption*, Frankfurt am Main 1996.

3 R. C. Padden, *The Hummingbird and the Hawk: Conquest and Sovereignty in the Valley of Mexico, 1503–1541*, Columbus 1967, pp. 229–230.

nial rule. Without his Amerindian troops, Cortés might have been able to conquer a city or two, but not more. Today, the defeat of Tenochtitlan is considered to be the result of a coalition of anti-Aztec forces. It was stabilized by military success, on the one hand, and by Cortés' clever diplomacy, on the other. The technical superiority of Spanish arms did not last very long, because both sides rapidly learned from each other. The battles were no longer transcultural wars in the true sense of the word. With their crossbows, guns and stabbing steel swords – instead of Aztec-style cutting swords – the Spaniards could launch shock attacks. Their Amerindian allies did the rest, killing and probably also cannibalizing their adversaries after the victory.⁴

As the first allies of Cortés, the people of Tlaxcala remained in a privileged position. They were exempt from the obligation to pay the general tribute required of Amerindians, they were not subjected to the exploitation system of the *encomienda* and their settlements were only cautiously adapted to the new rules of government. Apparently, their social order remained intact. With good reason, they considered themselves not mere allies, as other Mexicans were, but even co-victors. Spanish encroachments were met with expansive embassies addressed to the crown, but also by careful self-hispanisation. As early as 1540, they had the documents of their council, the *cabildo*, printed and in 1549 they bought a clock for one of their towers. But eventually they also fell victim to the demographic catastrophe and continuous Spanish expansion.

Pedro de Alvarado, a former leading companion of Cortés, was also only able to conquer the highlands of Guatemala with the assistance of several thousand Nahua warriors who had been hired by Alvarado's brother. The survivors settled in what is now Antigua and immortalized their exploits in a new pictorial manuscript.

Successful colonial expansion results, first of all, from the individual agency of men like Cortés or Alvarado and, second, from their cooperation with indigenous partners. But the decisive factor was a third one, namely, *who* these partners were. Not only did Cortés have three of his "bastard children" legitimized by the pope, among them Martin, the son of Doña Marina. In addition, Moctezuma's first daughter, *Tecuichpochtzin* (cotton flower), was baptized in 1521 as Doña Isabel. She was initially compelled to marry the two Aztec successors to her father, before then being married twice to followers of Cortés – in the meantime, in 1527, having an illegitimate daughter with the latter. Finally, having been widowed twice, she married another Spaniard in 1532. In addition to the son from her first marriage, she had five children with him. Previously, she had been Cortés' concubine, along with two of her sisters, and in 1529 she had a daughter with him. As the daughter of a *rey natural*, she received a hereditary *encomienda* which ultimately became the largest in Mexico. Tremendously rich, she became a self-confident member of colonial Spanish society, an exemplary wife and a pious benefactress.

However, Doña Isabel was not an exceptional case. Francisco Pizarro also kept an Inca princess as concubine, who ultimately married his half-brother Hernando. As soon as

4 See R. Hassig, *Mexico and the Spanish Conquest*, Norman 2006.

power relations had become clear, indigenous and Spanish elites were ready to establish arrangements to their mutual advantage. Native elites were quickly integrated. Without any problems, the Mexican *altepetl*, the traditional urban community, was able to adopt the constitution of Spanish cities. Perhaps the former native prince had to be removed after the nomination of a Spanish *gobernador*. Other than that, the established oligarchy of the local *pipiltin*, the Mexican nobility, remained in position, but was gradually hispanized. In the Inca Empire, local or regional chiefs, the *curacas*, were established as general authorities. In addition, the traditional scattered settlements were forcibly replaced by 614 closed villages containing 1.5 million people. When, in 1555, the Peruvian Spanish elite offered 7.6 million pesos to the crown to make the *encomiendas* heritable, an assembly of the *curacas* increased the offer to 7.7 million. The crown avoided taking a decision, but the power constellations were obvious: The lords of the land were and remained the allied indigenous and Spanish oligarchies.

Thus we arrive at a threefold, preliminary conclusion: First, the European expansion began with private, rather than governmental initiative; Second, success depended on cooperation with the natives; Third, this cooperation resulted in an alliance between the indigenous and the European elites at the expense of the indigenous lower classes. From the perspective of theoretical logic, all three activities can be summarized as three varieties of *agency*. In addition, our conclusion is applicable beyond the period of 1519, because it can be generalized and therefore amounts to a kind of general explanation of the entire process of expansion.

Concerning the first argument, we can – with good reason – assume that even in the nineteenth century and even in the case of the leading expansionist power, Great Britain, politicians neither followed a master plan nor took the initiative, but simply reacted to challenges as they arose. As a rule, European expansion was the consequence of the informal activity of individual agents and not of the formalized action of national power politics. European powers normally reacted afterwards and rather tardily. Nevertheless, in remarkable contrast to this realist conclusion, colonial powers managed – and to some extent still manage – to present their historiographies in terms of deliberate national expansion. Therefore, our critical approach may additionally help to deconstruct the still-dominant paradigm of nationalist historiography.

Private agents acted as individuals, families, groups and networks. Where necessary, they created their own organisations. Profit-seeking was an essential, but not the sole motive of expansion. And profit-seeking as a rule remained socially and culturally embedded. The individual agent as such might qualify as an “entrepreneur”, if this category were not already occupied by a narrow economic perspective. Instead, I want to speak of enterprising and adventurous people in general who are able and willing to independently take advantage of any economic or social opportunity. We meet such people in Antiquity and the Middle Ages, long before the great European Expansion. *The Odyssey* describes the early Phenicians accurately. Greeks and Scandinavian Vikings, merchants from the Hanseatic towns and medieval Italian cities belonged to the same tribe as Portuguese seafarers and the participants in Castilian *entradas*. The latter were able to practise their

various activities, however, already during the Iberian Reconquista, not to mention the medieval English conquest of Ireland.

Maritime republics such as Venice organized navigation and practiced a policy of conquest, but always in a symbiotic relationship with private economic interest. The fourth crusade from 1202 to 1204 was transformed into a Venetian raid and the booty was distributed among the Venetian dynasties. Colonies of the Republic remained an exception. Genova, the notorious rival of Venice, also conquered her colony of Chios using the resources of a trading company. The shareholders had to fit out the ships and, in return, participated in this *mabona*. Because the Giustiniani family dominated among the shareholders, Chios finally became their family colony. Even the Republic of Genova itself was controlled by the Banco di San Giorgio belonging to the leading families, with the consequence that other Genovese colonies also fell under their administration.⁵

It is certainly an unusual perspective to consider medieval urban republics in general as nothing other than the result of aggregate economic self-interest. But the postmodern outsourcing of state responsibility was a self-evident practice in premodern history. Just remember the flourishing business of military entrepreneurs between the Middle Ages and the seventeenth century.

The Portuguese and Spanish crowns were in a strong position, at least insofar as their competence to legitimize private achievements was concerned. This was the intention of the papal bulls in favour of Portugal issued between 1452 and 1456, as well as of the so-called “partition of the world” between Spain and Portugal by the pope in 1493. As in the days of the Reconquista, the Spanish kings were subsequently obliged to confirm conquests in the New World which, however, were performed without the engagement of the crown. Nevertheless, the kings were able to appropriate the results. In contrast, in the case of Portugal the monarchs were running businesses and ships, in particular, by themselves. But the “crowned capitalists” of the sixteenth century despite their political competitive advantage still resembled private entrepreneurs, because their armed fleets in the Indian Ocean did not fight for territorial conquest but for commercial strongholds. In addition, their aggressive monopolistic policy resembles a mere interim of state engagement between a half-century of private activities on the coasts of Africa, on the one hand, and, on the other, the re-privatisation of the spice trade after 1570 – and definitively after 1642, when it was no longer profitable.

Even the achievements of Prince Henry, unjustly called “the navigator”, who was the driving force of the enterprise until his death in 1460, were authorized by a crown monopoly in 1441, but remained his private affair. As grand master of the Order of Christ, he possessed the necessary means to finance his activities. A strictly limited crowd of Portuguese and foreign investors, Italians in particular, only appeared when the first slaves from Africa were put on the market. After the discovery of and trade in Africa had turned profitable, they were rented out for the first time to private enterprise in 1469.

5 See P. Feldbauer et al. (eds.), *Mediterraner Kolonialismus. Expansion und Kulturaustausch im Mittelalter*, Essen 2006.

Seafarers from outside Iberia managed to partake of the booty as pirates, either with letter of marque or without one. The French pirate Jean Fleury stole the treasure of the Aztecs on his corsair cruises. His English successors the Drake, Hawkins and Raleigh even achieved the status of national heroes. John Hawkins entered the slaving business to please his investors, among them Queen Elizabeth I, as a quasi-private profit seeker. The Portuguese empire of trade in the Indian Ocean was first undermined through spontaneously created small companies from Northwestern Europe. But around 1600 a new organisational pattern was invented, a privileged society or “chartered company” which would subsequently demonstrate the superiority of private over public enterprise. In 1602, with some political support, the Dutch founded the United East India Company, the V.O.C., to establish a monopsony on spices. A monopoly in Asian trade was also included, but, *nota bene*, of Dutch trade with Asia along with autorisation for the necessary subsidiary political and military activities. Originally, the company’s privilege was limited to a fixed period of time. But, in the end, the V.O.C. became the first great, permanent shareholding company in history. The English East India Company was founded as early as 1600, but its transformation into a permanent organisation took more time. In the seventeenth century, the Dutch were stronger, but in the eighteenth century the positions were inverted.

This recently invented self-organisation of capital proved extremely successful. Therefore, new companies sprang up everywhere. In the beginning, however, policy was not only engaged in the service of capital, but apparently capital had to serve political interests as well, because the first settlement colonies in French and English North America were also organized as privileged shareholding companies established by the respective crowns. The English monarchy was strong, but nevertheless lacked the necessary funds for an active expansionist policy. Therefore, once again individual or collective private interest took the lead and was legitimized and privileged by the crown, but in the end the settlers took over.

In contrast, Asia’s strongest trading companies, the Dutch on Java and the British in India, rather coincidentally – but very successfully – moved from trade to territorial dominance. And whereas the Dutch Indies became property of the Dutch state in 1816, British India remained company property until the catastrophe of 1857. In the meantime, soldiers in the service of the company, but acting on their own initiative, had extended company government over the entire sub-continent. First, in Bengal, robbery on a massive scale took place. John Parry once called this generation “the new conquistadores” of India. In the nineteenth century, it was still possible for an adventurer like James Brooke to acquire the principality of Sarawak on Borneo, which became a British protectorate but was still governed by his family until 1946.

In theory, the modern nation-state which has achieved its final perfection since the eighteenth century could not tolerate such private agency. The state became the most powerful invention of mankind, superior to any of its competitors, including even the great empires of Asia which until recently had ranked as an equal match for Europe. The

increasing space-time contraction produced more conflict, more violence and ever more imperialist expansivity. The regular outcome was obvious:

*Whatever happens we have got
The Maxim-Gun and they have not.*⁶

Nevertheless, there was little change so far as the usual sequence of events and the key role of private initiative and activity were concerned. This amazing situation is explained by the fact that colonial policy led to financial losses for most state budgets, whereas profits were made by private agents. If politicians dared to risk colonial engagement and annexation, the expenses at least needed to be kept as low as possible. Thus, Bismarck, for example, tried to use chartered companies as a means to make profiteers pay for the cost. But this provided them with additional chances, which they would not have had before. As was previously the case, the expansion of Europe was promoted by individuals who were interested in economic and social profit or by their respective networks. Take the case of the Opium War. From a macro-economic point of view, Britain needed the export of opium from India to China to pay for tea exports and, in this way, to equalize the balance of exchange. When China finally started to fight the established corruption of the opium traders and had Indian opium burned, the British opium merchants resorted to their well-provided political “war chest” and asked for a micro-economic compensation of GBP 22 million, because the British agent at Kanton had no choice but to hand over the opium. Since the Melbourne cabinet did not have this money, they started a minor war instead, because China had violated the sacred principles of private property. Via Lord Palmerstone the opium merchant Jardine had a ready-made plan for war presented to the cabinet. Opium was not even mentioned; instead the opium business even expanded, because the Chinese market was now open and, via the acquisition of Hong Kong, Britain had a means of keeping the door open in the future – a paradigmatic case of private problems at the periphery which, through private intervention in London, were resolved by violent political expansion.

Quite often, private expansive initiatives turned violent right from the beginning. A famous example of this was the private pseudo-development of the Congo basin initiated by King Leopold II of Belgium. Starting from 1878, following the king’s instructions, the adventurer and traveller Henry Morton Stanley had used dubious contracts and ruthless brutality to establish control over the country on the Great River. The subsequent atrocities in Leopold’s private colony in Congo are well known. Less well known is the exploitation of the French Congo and of parts of German Cameroon which was not much different.

On a smaller scale, but with comparable brutality, the philosopher and historian Carl Peters showed off as colonial pioneer and member of the German master race. All German colonies began on the basis of private initiative, but in no case were the initiators

6 H. Belloc, *The Modern Traveller*, London 1898, p. 42.

able and willing to secure peace and order. Their chartered companies also failed. In contrast, conflicts increased, quite often because of the activities of these pioneers. Thus, the imperial government was finally compelled to take over. But even in those cases where self-organizing interests ultimately precipitated government takeovers, the basic impulse of the expansion of Europe originated from various forms of private agency and not from the calculation of the power politics of central governments.

Having replaced nationalist historiography by the paradigm of individual agency, our second argument concerns cooperation. Both arguments derive from the epistemological replacement of systems theory by the theory of action or, more concretely, by the replacement of the history of structures by a new history of events. As a result, the traditional binary epistemological code, which left no alternative between all-powerful, colonialist perpetrators and helpless, colonized victims, has become outdated. Even the classical theory of dependency was exposed as a racist construct, because it did not trust in the creative agency of the subjugated.

Even before the “peripheral turn” of David Fieldhouse in 1973, Ronald Robinson had, in 1972, suggested for a second time a fundamental change in historiography, when he published his study “Non-European Foundations of European Imperialism: Sketch for a Theory of Collaboration”.⁷ This impulse, however, did not bear fruit before the 1980s because of a kind of moral blockade. First of all, the notion of “collaboration” had to be translated neutrally as “cooperation”.

Long before Vichy France, collaborators were considered criminal traitors of their nation. But this simplistic distinction between bad and good characters is rather dubious and, historically speaking, completely anachronistic. Nevertheless, because of this taboo, it is all but easy to study the cooperation between indigenous people and Europeans without bias. Of course, the relationship between Cortés and Malinche was unequal and problematic, but it was nevertheless a case of successful cooperation and therefore correctly preserved as such in subsequent history. One of Mexico’s highest mountains bears her name. But as a result of fragmentary sources, Malinche became largely disconnected from her historical reality and ended up being portrayed either, positively, as the paradigmatic founding mother of a people of *mestizos* or, negatively, as the paradigmatic traitor to her people. “*Malinchismo*” became a term for any kind of foreign alienation, including critics of the Mexican oil company PEMEX.⁸

However, she was never accused of being a traitor before the nineteenth century. Obviously, this kind of accusation is, in every case, a product of nationalism and the modern state. Traitors to a nation simply cannot exist before the age of nations, because national treason is a modern category, and therefore obviously anachronistic when applied to most of the European expansion.

7 J. Gallagher/R. Robinson, The Imperialism of Free Trade, in: *Economic History Review* 6 (1953), pp. 1–15; R. Robinson, Non-European Foundations of European Imperialism: Sketch for a Theory of Collaboration, in: R. Owen/B. Sutcliffe (eds.), *Studies in the Theory of Imperialism*, London 1972, pp. 117–142.

8 Wurm, Doña Marina, pp. 164, 195–198.

Of course, treason was always prosecuted by law, but laws can change and are quite often just a matter of definition. Even Judas Ischariot, the biblical prototype of a traitor, has had his defenders. At the same time, to accuse somebody of treason has always been much too easy. Just remember the term *Volksverräter* (traitor of the nation) which was chosen as the *Unwort* (non-word) of 2016.⁹ Certainly, some traitors are uncovered, but more often they are simply produced artificially through the employment of the media. Obvious cases of treason are rare whereas the role of the media is continuously increasing.

The cooperation of indigenous people with Europeans was not largely qualified as treason until decolonization. It was created retrospectively, because in most cases the point of reference, the modern nation-state, did not exist and needed first to be invented. Namibians and even British Indians needed first of all to realize their new identity as Namibians or Indians. This change in discourse simply happened at different points in time. During the wars of the nineteenth century, a native New Zealander was identified as a *kupapa* when he was able to avoid engagement. In the meantime, such a person has come to be considered a traitor to the established Maori nation.¹⁰

People were loyal neither to the state, which still did not exist, nor to an empire, which perhaps existed but did not matter, and was quite often considered repressive and exploitive. They were loyal to their families and, in addition, to the smaller and larger social groups of people to whom they were related. This is the meaning of the controversial debate on the so-called African “tribes”. People behaved correspondingly and used the European expansion to further their interests. They reacted following power relations by cooperation or, if necessary, even by assimilation. This behavior was not only reasonable but – to use a deliberately anachronistic term – also politically correct. Nevertheless, the consequences might remain ambiguous, in particular when indigenous people and Europeans had different concepts of cooperation.

However, the problem of cooperation was limited to colonies of domination, because mere strongholds, as well as colonies of settlement, were by definition under exclusive European control. But Latin American colonies stood for a mixed type characterized by a larger or smaller numbers of white settlers together with a more or less “silent” majority of *indigenas*. Under the conditions of early modern Iberian monarchies this was the only possible arrangement, because complete colonies of domination presuppose the complete modern state which, however, did not reach its final stage of development before the eighteenth century. It is not by coincidence that British rule in India started at that time.

Modern British India was controlled by not more than several thousand European officials, in British and French Africa by a few hundred. And most of them held no permanent position, but were appointed for a limited period of time. This practice was

9 Cf. www.unwortdesjahres.net (accessed 10 August 2020).

10 V. O'Malley, Uncle Toms and *Kupapas*: “Collaboration” versus Alliance in a Nineteenth-Century New Zealand Context, in: T. Bühner et al. (eds.), *Cooperation and Empire: Local Realities of Global Processes*, New York 2017, pp. 144–168.

possible, first, because steamships, telegraph cables and the Suez Canal had reduced communication time to some days or weeks, whereas earlier it had taken years. Second, everyone involved knew that the reduced number of European administrators corresponded to the readiness for action of European military, which could be called in at any time. Third, it was only under these two conditions that the overwhelming number of indigenous personnel and, at the lowest level, even indigenous self-administration became the normal practice in colonies of domination.

Around 1940, 20 million Nigerians were governed by 386 white officials and hundreds of millions of Indians in 1909 by not more than 1,142 members of the Indian Civil Service, who were 95 per cent British. In addition, there existed after 1893 a Provincial Civil Service of Indians, with 1,827 members and, in 1887, 21,466 lower Indian administrators were counted. Whereas British India remained the most precious jewel in the crown, most other colonies belonging to all of the other powers remained lossmaking. Thus, they were to be governed with as little expense as possible, employing financially neutral self-administration. This was the true secret of the famous British “indirect rule” over Indian and African princes, an arrangement which, by the way, had been practiced long before by the ancient Romans, the Spaniards and the French. It was the consequence not of British political wisdom, but of British thriftiness.

Innumerable inferior officials of the former Mughal Empire could simply take over or adopt similar tasks, whereas in Africa this was possible only in exceptional cases, such as parts of Uganda, Nigeria and present-day Ghana. Instead, as a rule, the British, French and other colonial powers governed through authorized chiefs, whom they had confirmed or appointed. Despite all of their differences these individuals were the backbone of European domination over Africa.

The colonial military forces were controlled in a similar way, with the possible exception of European shock troops. Indians remained excluded from the ranks of the officers, but, nevertheless, the *esprit de corps* of indigenous military units was carefully maintained. During the two world wars, the compulsory cooperation with Indians and Africans expanded to gigantic dimensions. 2.5 million Indians served Great Britain during the Second World War, 180,000 were killed or became prisoners of war. 160,000 West Africans fought for France, 100,000 of them against Germany, 30,000 died. The British employed 374,000 African soldiers together with 165,000 unarmed pioneers and service personnel. Here, at the latest, it became obvious to what extent European rule depended on indigenous cooperation.

Third, it is also clear enough at this point that the cooperation of Europeans with natives, and even with indigenous elites, might have had equal weight, in reality, but must not necessarily be understood to include equal status or to have remain unchanged over time. The lords of Tlaxcala, the Nizam of Hyderabad in the eighteenth century and many others believed they had control over the situation and considered the Europeans to be dependent junior partners – they were mistaken. In India and elsewhere, European domination was established only after a prolonged period of open and indecisive mutual interaction.

In Africa, the final decision did not occur until the nineteenth century. The European slave trade, in particular, was based on reciprocity, because most slaves were bought by Europeans, but caught and sold by Africans. This unambiguous and well-structured mutual relationship amounted to an alliance of African and European elites to exploit the downtrodden of Africa. African kings and businessmen caught the slaves and sold them with – to use modern jargon – 50 per cent collateral damage. But European merchants bought and sold the slaves, European sailors carried them to America, and other Europeans, together with a few Amerindians and Afro-Americans, bought them and kept them on their plantations.

Once again, our findings are obvious, not exceptional. The symbiosis of the indigenous and Spanish elites of Mexico and Peru as a strategic element of Spanish rule has already been mentioned.

Finally, even decolonization follows the same rules of elite circulation and elite convergence. New Europeanized elites learned their overlords' business until – for whatever reason – they were able to take over from them. Decolonization happened through appropriation. However, quite often a hostile takeover became a friendly takeover in the end, with little change for those at lower levels. Sometimes the end was worse than the beginning, when former victims began to become perpetrators. Most probably, it is not an oversimplification to consider Western colonialism in general as a system of alliances between European and indigenous elites at the expense of extra-European and sometimes even European non-elites.

From the perspective of global history, our arguments have produced a sketch of a general theory of European expansion. The general process of expansion history produced a rather long and changing list of necessary conditions of success, which are given but do not explain the entire process. Notable examples include, for instance, the extraordinary maritime penetration of Europe, the notorious transcultural curiosity of Europeans, the activity of Catholic and later also of Protestant missionaries, and the development of the modern power state in Europe. The sufficient condition of success, however, consists in the convergence of three basic factors, which initiated the expansive process and kept it going: 1. The dynamics of individual Western agency; 2. The effective cooperation of European and native agents; 3. The key role of alliances between European and indigenous elites.

Apache Land: Indigenous Colonialism on North America's Borderlands

Janne Lahti

ABSTRACTS

Dieser Aufsatz hinterfragt die Idee, dass es ein europäisches Monopol auf den Kolonialismus gibt, indem er die „Kolonialität“ und das Siedlungsgeschehen im nordamerikanischen Grenzland zwischen Apachen, Komantschen und Spaniern im 18. Jahrhundert thematisiert. Im Zentrum steht die Idee eines Apachenlandes als eines sich verschiebenden und umkämpften kolonialen Gebiets, eines Mosaiks vielfältiger kolonialer Bestrebungen, verwickelter Allianzen und Feindschaften. Apachen, Komantschen und Spanier waren an Expansionsprojekten, Akten der Ausgrenzung und Vernichtung, Umsiedlung und Assimilation beteiligt. Die Apachen selbst waren Expansionisten; im Zusammenspiel eigener Aktionen und rivalisierender Expansionsbestrebungen erweiterten sie ihre Stammgebiete, schrumpften und zerbrachen diese. Das Land der Apachen war ein Raum, der durch koloniale Projekte immerfort neu gestaltet wurde, die nicht etwa von Euroamerikanern diktiert oder dominiert wurden.

Challenging the idea of colonialism as a European monopoly, this article uses a colonial and settler-colonial lens to frame a discussion of eighteenth-century North American borderland histories involving Apaches, Comanches and the Spanish. It centres on the idea of a shifting and contested colonial zone – Apache land – as a mosaic of competing colonial projects and intricate networks of friendship and enmity. In this zone, the Apaches, Comanches and the Spanish engaged in expansionist projects and invidious distinction, as well as elimination, replacement and assimilation. The Apaches were expansionists whose homelands enlarged, contracted and fragmented over time as a result of rival expansionist projects and the Apache's own designs. Consequently, Apache land was a space being constantly remade by colonial projects that were not dictated or dominated by Euro-Americans.

A 1759 map of North America's borderlands marks a sizable area along the Rio Grande in New Mexico and Texas as "Terra Apachorum" – "Apache land". West of this "Terra Apachorum" the map places "Apacheria" and "Apachi di Xila", denoting present-day Arizona-New Mexico border areas, while toward the northeast, beyond Spanish Santa Fe, New Mexico, there is in this map the territory of "Apachi Vaqueros".¹ Designating Apache land as a large, yet fragmented swath of territory suggests three key facets of Apache history often overlooked by historians. First, the Apaches were expansionists, whose homelands enlarged, contracted and fractured over time, as a result of rival expansionist projects and Apache designs. At its maximal extent, Apache land stretched from north of the Platte River on the Great Plains (present-day Nebraska) to the deserts and mountains of Sonora and Coahuila in the south, and from present-day Arizona in the west deep into Texas in the east. Second, Apache land was a mosaic of plural sovereignty, a contact zone characterized by intricate networks of friendship and enmity between vibrant indigenous populations and Euro-Americans. Third, Apache land was a space that was constantly remade by colonial projects that were not dictated or dominated by Euro-Americans. In fact, Apache land was very much a setting for indigenous colonialism. Traditionally, historians writing on white-indigenous relations at the heart of the North American continent have positioned these histories in relation to the master narrative of Euro-American expansion, taking as their coordinates the northern realm of New Spain's imperial conquest or the westward expansion of the United States. From this perspective, indigenous powers have often occupied the margins of history. Typecast as wild or noble savages, Apaches, Comanches and many other indigenous polities have been approached as obstacles the white colonizers needed to face and conquer, or "pacify". In recent years, however, revisionist scholars such as Juliana Barr, Ned Blackhawk, Brian Delay, Pekka Hämäläinen and Karl Jacoby have examined different, fluid and liminal, shapes and spaces of violence that intersected with the paradigm of Euro-American imperial rivalries or US expansion, but did not necessarily confine themselves to either master narrative. They have taken indigenous power seriously, looking at imperial rivalries and power relations from indigenous viewpoints, in the process making colonization a dialectical process with strong indigenous activity. They have shown that indigenous power could even eclipse European colonization, as Hämäläinen did when he made a case for the Comanches' building a hegemonic empire on the Southern Plains in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.²

1 J. B. Homann/E. Homann, *Regni Mexicani seu Novæ Hispaniæ, Floridae, Novæ Angliæ, Carolinae, Virginiae, et Pennsylvaniae, nec non insularvm archipelagi Mexicani in America septentrionali*. [Noribergæ Homann Erben, 1759], <https://www.loc.gov/item/74690812/> (accessed 13 April 2020).

2 J. Barr, *Peace Came in the Form of a Woman: Indians and Spaniards in the Texas Borderlands*, Chapel Hill 2007; N. Blackhawk, *Violence Over the Land: Indians and Empires in the Early American West*, Cambridge 2006; B. Delay, *War of a Thousand Deserts: Indian Raids and the U.S.-Mexican War*, New Haven 2008; P. Hämäläinen, *The Comanche Empire*, New Haven 2008; K. Jacoby, *Shadows at Dawn: An Apache Massacre and the Violence of History*, New York 2008.

Still, few writers before this article have explicitly framed and interpreted the intersecting and unstable relations in the borderlands by centring the idea of a shifting and contested colonial zone – Apache land – and by placing the Apaches at the centre of analysis, stressing indigenous colonialism. What does it mean, then, to write about indigenous colonialism? Typically, as historical processes and as analytical tools, colonialism – as well as settler colonialism – is connected nearly exclusively with the globe-spanning expansions of European powers and their offspring states during the modern era. Yet, this approach is problematic, as it makes Europe exceptional, enabling it to monopolize colonialism, instead of seeing colonialism as a nearly universal phenomenon in human history. While it comes in many shapes and sizes, at its core colonialism involves an expansionist unit, or in this case three: Apaches, Comanches and Spanish. Colonialism, in general, and also on Apache land comprised conquest and control of other peoples' land and lives – involving the rule of difference and invidious distinction based on race, ethnicity, gender, religion or some other marker of differentiation. On Apache land, invidious distinction was practised by all parties: Comanches and Apaches saw the Spanish as inferior people, while the Spanish divided the natives into *barbaros* (wild) or peaceful people, using lifestyle and religion as measurements. And all parties enslaved, but also assimilated members of the other groups, blurring the line between us and them while creating multi-ethnic colonial communities.³ Colonialism habitually carries a marked tension between assimilation and incorporation of subject peoples, on the one hand, and their othering, differentiation, expulsion and extermination, on the other.⁴ Apache land too was a fluid colonial world grounded on othering and assimilation, as well as replacement and elimination.

As a distinct form of colonialism, settler colonialism is – as its key theorist, the anthropologist Patrick Wolfe, argues – preoccupied with replacement and access to territory, the land itself. It includes conquest, long-range migration, permanent settlement (or at least the intent to do so), the elimination and substitution of natives and the reproduction of one's own society on what used to be other people's lands. While Wolfe maintains that settler colonialism introduces “a zero-sum contest over land”, and is characterized by a “logic of elimination”, a sustained institutional tendency to eliminate the natives, he emphasizes that “settlers come to stay: invasion is a structure not an event” or a series of isolated events.⁵ Yet settler colonialism often seems less mechanical than Wolfe sug-

3 The Spanish social system divided people by *casta*, which equated social class to skin colour, with darker skin attached to manual labour and slavery, and whiter skin linked to honour and wealth. The main terms to describe ancestry, and thus social status, were *español* (Spanish), *indio* (Indian), *mestizo* (mixed Spanish-Indian), *mulatto* (Spanish-Black), *zambo* (Indian-Black), *coyote* (dark-skinned mestizo) and *castizo* (light-skinned mestizo) (R.A. Gutierrez, *When Jesus Came the Corn Mothers Went Away: Marriage, Sexuality, and Power in New Mexico, 1500–1846*, Stanford, 1991; J. F. Brooks, *Captives and Cousins: Slavery, Kinship, and Community in the Southwest Borderlands*, Chapel Hill 2002).

4 My definition of colonialism adopts notions from P. Chatterjee, *The Nation and Its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories*, Princeton 1993; A. Loomba, *Colonialism/Postcolonialism*, New York 1998; N. Thomas, *Colonialism's Culture: Anthropology, Travel, and Government*, Cambridge 1994.

5 P. Wolfe, *Land, Labor, and Difference: Elementary Structures of Race*, in: *American Historical Review* 106 (2001),

gests and it certainly can be overturned like any other historical form of rule (as shown by the expulsion of settlers from French Algeria, for example). Furthermore, Wolfe's explanation not only indicates that the American West remains settler colonial today, but foregrounds white Anglo expansion as the principal motor of settler colonialism. The latter represents a very common belief, since settler colonialism is usually associated with, to use historian James Belich's wording, "the rise of the Anglo world" during the long nineteenth century, the making of the American West and the "British Wests" principally in Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa. Unquestionably, this constitutes the standard interpretation of settler colonialism.⁶

However, it might be helpful to think of alternate readings that question and complicate the racial and temporal coordinates of settler colonialism in North America and also render the distinction between settler colonialism and other forms of colonialism less self-evident, making things more conjectural, intersectional and layered than Wolfe's staple definition of the concept. Recent literature has already identified settler colonialism in numerous places outside the Anglo world, including Japanese Hokkaido and Korea, Chinese Manchuria and Taiwan, Hawaii (subject to both American and Asian settler colonialism), French Algeria, many Latin American countries, Portuguese Mozambique, Russian Caucasus and Siberia, German Southwest Africa and the German East (German-Polish borderlands). In short, settler colonialism as a historical process seems integral to the making of an integrated and interlinked global order of empires.

But while scholars are beginning to recognize that settler colonialism can be employed to study non-white expansionists (at least Japan and China, so far), the question whether there historically could have existed indigenous settler colonialism or whether it makes sense to rethink indigenous expansionisms through the settler-colonial lens has not so far interested scholars. Still, by looking at Apache land in the eighteenth century we can detect efforts to substitute the previous residents, attempts to capture terrestrial spaces with the intention of making them one's own and plans to eliminate, through violence and assimilation, the previous residents. Even if Apache land was not invariably settler colonial, it would seem to be inherently colonial, subject to conquest, exploitation of labour and resources and invidious distinction, as Apaches, Comanches and the Spanish engaged in differentiation and the imposition of their form of rule over subject peoples. Perhaps looking at North America's indigenous powers through a settler-colonial lens, or as any kind of colonialism, could be seen as anachronistic, insensitive or even racist. But if we, as scholars, are going to take indigenous powers seriously, if we are to place indigenous historical actors on the same analytical field as non-indigenous expansionists, we need to be able to also ask these kind of questions pertaining to histories of conquest. We need to link indigenous groups to the global orders that empires created, and not only as objects, or victims, of colonialism, but as active participants, contesting and

esp. p. 868; P. Wolfe, *Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native*, in: *Journal of Genocide Research* 8 (2006), esp. p. 388.

6 J. Belich, *Replenishing the Earth: The Settler Revolution and the Rise of the Angloworld*, Oxford 2011.

engaging in colonialism. Otherwise we risk continued indigenous marginalisation from global colonial histories.

This essay uses the colonial and settler-colonial lens to highlight episodes of borderland histories, involving Apaches, Comanches and the Spanish as the principal cast. More precisely, it provides two snapshots of the shifting contours of power in Apache land. First, it zooms in on Texas in the mid-1700s, discussing how the Lipan Apaches faced colonial replacement and substitution, destruction and diaspora when caught between two expansionist empires. The Lipans were squeezed in from the north by the explosively expansionist Comanches, in the process of cementing their Plains empire grounded on a new lifestyle of equestrian buffalo hunting and horse pastoralism, and the Spanish from the south, who had made more tentative advances into Texas. Driven off their lands, the Lipans were also taken as slaves by both the Comanches and the Spanish, while also being subjected to conversion to Christianity by the Spanish. The second snapshot shows different Apache groups, mainly Mescaleros and Chiricahuas, courted by the Spanish in the 1780s to settle down in reservations located in the immediate proximity of Spanish *presidios* (military forts) throughout northern Sonora and Nueva Vizcaya. Here the question is primarily of Apache efforts to build an expansive raiding economy exploiting the Spanish settlements and of Spanish endeavours to eliminate the Apaches as competition through assimilation, of turning free raiders into tame, sedentary people under Spanish rule, and via deportation of Apaches as slaves throughout the Spanish American empire. Narrating the colonial implications of this brand of the civilizing mission and enslavement, tools in the arsenal of colonizers worldwide, the focus is on the disparity between Spanish and Apache colonial aims and on the gap between colonial policies and realities.

1. Colonization and Substitution on the Southern Plains

Several groups of anxious and hurried Lipan Apaches arrived from the north to the newly established San Saba mission in Texas. Most of the Apaches just stopped for the night and then headed south, wanting to get as far away as possible from the Comanche tide heading their way. Meanwhile, at San Saba rumours circulated of a massive Comanche army preparing to attack the mission. At dawn on 16 March 1758, an estimated two thousand Comanches, and their indigenous allies, including Tonkawas and Caddos, besieged the mission. Then they attacked. Pillaging the mission and its herd, and burning the buildings down, the Comanches put on a fierce demonstration of their power. Aggressive shouting, gun-firing, the thundering of hooves, coupled with fierce-looking war dresses made for a striking spectacle. In awe at the display unfolding before his eyes, Fray Miguel de Molina related how “I was filled with amazement and fear when I saw nothing but Indians on every hand”. Their painted faces were “adorned with pelts, tails of wild beasts [...] [and] deer horns”. Finding no Apaches at San Saba, the Comanches did discover plenty of evidence of the Apache-Spanish alliance. Eager to dissolve this alliance – which was a potential impediment to their expansion – the Comanches still killed only

eight people at San Saba, indicating that displaying their power and instilling fear across this section of Apache land poised for conquest was their primary goal.⁷

The sacking of San Saba reflected the level of confidence and assertiveness the Comanches had reached after a half-century of colonial expansion on the Southern Plains, a process during which these semi-sedentary mountain dwellers had reinvented themselves as mounted buffalo hunters and horse pastoralists. While the Comanches, as Pekka Hämäläinen claims, did not establish settler colonies or engage in direct power over subject peoples, they did turn the flow of Spanish colonial northward advancement (from Mexico City) on its head.⁸ And they methodologically conquered vast sections of Apache land from the Arkansas River to the Rio Grande, making much of the land their own and crushing and supplanting several Apache groups in the process. It was this colonial dislocation that spread from the Plains that had made many Apache groups seek alliances with the Spanish in New Mexico and Texas.

In hindsight, the Apache-Comanche conflict looks predictable. It involved two powerful groups inclined toward expansion, who envisioned new ways of life at the expense of other peoples by controlling and utilizing the massive open grasslands of the Southern Plains. There is little doubt that their colonial clash was about the land: who controlled the water and the grasses, and who had access to trade networks spanning all of the edges of the Plains. Moreover, as in more classic cases of settler colonialism the parties involved did not see that there existed enough of land to share as the Comanche-Apache wars took on some of the characteristics of Wolfe's zero-sum contest over land.

The Apache vision for life on the Plains was economic diversification. They expanded eastward, attempted equestrianism and hunted bison. Yet, unlike the Comanches, they also irrigated fields of maize, beans, squash and other food items along the river valleys of the Plains. This bound them to certain locales, where they set up villages and built houses, for the better part of the year. One of the Apache villages that the Spanish knew well was El Cuartejejo, some 330 miles northeast of Santa Fe (the Spanish centre in New Mexico) occupying the high plains of modern-day western Kansas. There, the Apaches exploited the farming knowledge of Pueblo refugees, who had escaped New Mexico after the 1680 revolt, which temporarily threw the Spanish out. Furthermore, the Apaches not only fought, but ranked other peoples, enslaving some and assimilating others. In the early 1700s, Lipans and Mescaleros incorporated the Jumanos, a once powerful native group in Texas. Further north, the Apaches pushed the Pawnees east along the Platte River area, taking and selling Pawnee slaves to the Spanish in New Mexico, and kept the Wichitas at bay in the Red River region.⁹

7 Quoted in: L. Simpson/P. Nathan (eds.), *The San Saba Papers: A Documentary Account of the Founding and Destruction of San Saba Mission*, Dallas 2000, p. 74, 85; Barr, *Peace Came*, pp. 180–184.

8 Hämäläinen, *Comanche Empire*, pp. 4–5.

9 *The Diary of Juan de Ulibarri to El Cuartejejo, 1706*, in: A. Thomas (ed.), *After Coronado: Spanish Exploration Northeast of New Mexico 1696–1727*, Norman 1935, pp. 59–76. On the Apaches' absorbing of the Jumanos, see G. Andersson, *The Indian Southwest, 1580–1830: Ethnogenesis and Reinvention*, Norman 1999, p. 114.

While the Apaches on the Plains never fully embraced equestrianism, which handicapped their mobility, the Comanches certainly did. An assortment of hunter-gatherers from the Rocky Mountains and the Great Basin, the Comanches moved to the Southern Plains remaking themselves in the process, adopting and perfecting a mounted way of life that led them to carve out an empire at the expense of the Apaches and the Spanish. The Comanches saw in the Southern Plains grasslands a perfect environment for the horses they had stolen and traded from the Spanish in New Mexico. Their herds increased rapidly, allowing for a more efficient way of hunting and the utilisation of the one seemingly abundant natural resource on the Plains, the bison. Yet the Comanches needed space for their imperial vision. Enlarging horse herds, raised for both domestic use and as trade exports, required access to the sparse water and grass on the Plains. These same rich river valleys were also crucial for the Apaches' fields and for their much smaller horse herds. Comanches also recognized the value of wide trade and alliance networks between northern New Spain and French Louisiana. They acquired weapons from the French, gained access to carbohydrates via the New Mexico trade (a bison diet was heavy in protein) without having to farm themselves. While they also incorporated subject peoples as kin and slaves, the Comanches became the preeminent suppliers of captives, selling hundreds of Apaches as slaves to the Spanish. They also made alliances with the Utes to their west and the Tonkawas, Taovays and others to their east, using this combined force against the Apaches. Their population increased, they could mount efficient cavalry attacks and they could move fast, so that the enemy was unable to find or catch them. With the Comanches' full-blown mobile colonization coming their way, the Apaches were short of horses, weapons and allies, as well as being bound to their fields and villages, and thus easier to find. While their semi-sedentary life made the Apaches vulnerable to cavalry attacks, the fragmentary nature of Apache society also made organizing resistance less effective.¹⁰

Between the 1710s and 1760s, the Comanches' all-out colonization project wrested control of massive amounts of Apache land and eliminated the Apaches – killing, enslaving and supplanting them. These wars were about the land and its resources, and who would control both of these. The first colonial war zone was the upper Arkansas River basin in the 1710s and 1720s, then the Llano Estacado in the 1730s and 1750s, followed by the takeover of sections of western and southern Texas in the 1750s and early 1760s. Besides the Comanches, the French, allied to the Pawnees, were present on the eastern fringes of the Plains to take advantage of Apache weakness. Typically, the fully mounted Comanches advanced at a frightening pace, causing devastating havoc among the Apaches and forcing the survivors to abandon their homelands. In the north, the game looked set already in 1719, with thousands of Apaches on the run. For example, the Jicarilla Apaches retreated from the Plains to northern New Mexico, reportedly looking, often

10 Diary of the Campaign of Governor Valverde, in: A. Thomas (ed.), *After Coronado: Spanish Exploration Northeast of New Mexico 1696–1727*, Norman 1935, esp. pp. 130–133; Hämäläinen, *Comanche Empire*, pp. 23–32; W. Wedel, *Central Plains Prehistory*, Lincoln 1986, pp. 135–151.

in vain, for protection from the Spanish. They pleaded for a mission, even pledging themselves vassals of Spain in 1723. In 1724, the Comanches sacked La Jicarilla, in the present-day Texas Panhandle. This cluster of Apache villages, teeming with refugees from the Plains Apache groups, was the site of a massive, desperate, nine-day-long battle. By 1726, the Jicarillas had completely abandoned their plains homes, settling in the vicinity of Pecos and Taos pueblos in New Mexico and subjecting themselves to Spanish rule. Other Apache peoples were also on the run. The Palomas, one of the easternmost Apache clusters, who possibly resided north of the Platte River in the Sand Hills of present-day Nebraska, retreated to join the Cuarteletejo Apaches. The Palomas had lost their lands for good, as the Cuarteletejos soon would.¹¹ What appears to be the last mention in the (Spanish) historical record of El Cuarteletejo as Apache land comes from 1727.¹² After that, it was part of the Comanche empire.

Comanche aggression had reduced Apache life to a misery of horror and poverty. The physical and mental blow was devastating. Families were torn apart as Comanches captured Apache women and children (and some men), assimilating some of them and selling others into slavery. The latter ended up in Spanish homes, silver mines in the interior, French Louisiana or even Cuba.¹³ Those captives who were lucky enough were given the privilege of becoming Comanches, renouncing their former identities and adopting the language and customs of their colonizers. Numerous Apaches faced merciless death at Comanche hands, while thousands of exiled Apaches endured a desperate diaspora, forfeiting their lands and seeking refuge among Apache kin and the Spanish. The old and the weak could not escape and warriors who survived were humiliated by their ordeals and loss, at being unable to defend their loved ones and their own lands. By the 1760s, the bulk of Apache land had been lost. The Spanish were also in dire straits.

In the 1700s, Spain's imperial dreams and efforts throughout its "New World" empire met their match in Indigenous powers ranging from the Araucanians in the south to the Comanches and Apaches in the north.¹⁴ Indigenous powers stopped the Spanish advance, refused to be incorporated into the empire and adopted and invented practices of violence – including lightning raids for plunder and slaves – that made the Spanish look weak. Apaches and Comanches inverted the relationships of power and the tide of history that Europeans since Columbus and the conquistadors had imagined as proper and normal. North of the Rio Grande in Texas, the Spanish were rightly concerned about losing their foothold. There was a shaky presence of isolated missions and thinly popu-

11 W. Dunn, *Apache Relations in Texas, 1718–1750*, in: *Texas Historical Association Quarterly* 14 (1911), p. 220; Hämäläinen, *Comanche Empire*, pp. 32–36; E. John, *Storms Brewed in Other Men's Worlds: The Confrontation of Indians, Spanish, and French in the Southwest, 1540–1795*, London 1975, pp. 246–255.

12 J. Gunnerson/D. Gunnerson, *Apachean Culture: A Study Unity and Diversity*, in: K. H. Basso/M. E. Opler (eds.), *Apachean Culture History and Ethnology*, Tucson 1971, p. 12.

13 There existed wide-ranging trade networks in human captives, linking French Louisiana to the silver mines of Spanish Mexico and the sugar fields of Cuba via the Comanches, Apaches and other indigenous groups, who both sold slaves and were enslaved themselves (see A. Reséndez, *The Other Slavery: The Untold Story of Indian Enslavement in America*, New York 2016).

14 D. Weber, *Barbaros: Spaniards and their Savages in the Age of Enlightenment*, New Haven 2006.

lated forts, which displayed a rather lethargic outlook if it was meant to prove a dynamic Spanish drive for expansion. For what was actually the world's largest empire at the time, it was a poor showing. Realizing their weakness, the Spanish envisioned an Apache barrier to protect San Antonio and other south Texas settlements from the Comanches. To this end, they engaged in diplomatic talks, offering Lipan Apaches gifts and supplies. They also set up San Saba, a mission where the Lipans would reside and become civilized under the friar's tutelage, coupled with a nearby presidio, where the Apaches would join the Spanish as brothers-in-arms against the Comanches.

The Lipans also entertained an alliance with the Spanish, being chronically short of allies in the face of the Comanche-led coalition. Already in 1743, the Comanches pursued Lipans to the vicinity of San Antonio, which made many Lipans seek protection from the Spanish missions and ask for new ones to be established. The contrast with their earlier reactions is striking. In the 1710s, when the Spanish showed up in the midst of Lipan lands, building missions for the sedentary Indians and setting up a presidio at San Antonio, the Lipans soon raided these settlements. The Spanish were interlopers who disrupted the Lipans' expansionist designs, often revolving around trade in horses and slaves up northeast toward the French, the Caddos and the Pawnees.¹⁵ But, four decades later, the Lipans were ready to join the Spanish, as the Comanches had taken over their trade networks. Both the Lipans and the Spanish stood to gain by coming together, by publicizing their alliance and their shared determination to combat and counter the seemingly unstoppable Comanche conquest heading in their direction. Perhaps it was thought that the mere existence of this alliance would make the Comanches back off. It did not.

After the sacking of San Saba in 1758, the Comanches continued their advance. Making the Apache diaspora from the Plains complete, in 1766 a force of some four hundred Comanches and their allies stormed the mission San Lorenzo de la Santa Cruz, a Lipan refuge southwest of San Antonio. Surviving Lipans fled in panic, some joining the Mescalero Apaches east of Pecos River, others crossing the Rio Grande into the mountains of Coahuila. By 1759 an estimated 2,500 diasporic Apaches lived between the Rio Grande and the Santa Rosa Mountains in Coahuila. There, the formerly powerful and expansionist Lipans were far enough away from the Comanches. Halting their flight, the Lipans built alliances with the Spanish, while also structuring a new economy by raiding ranches on both sides of the Rio Grande.¹⁶

In the 1770s, the Comanches controlled the Plains from the Arkansas Valley to San Antonio. And the Spanish recognized this, realizing that the Apaches were a losing bet. One of the advocates for a drastic change in Spanish colonial policy was the veteran officer Marqués de Rubí, appointed by the viceroy from Mexico City to inspect the

15 S. Robinson, *I Fought a Good Fight: A History of the Lipan Apaches*, Denton 2013, pp. 52–54.

16 Hämäläinen, *Comanche Empire*, pp. 60–61; John, *Storms*, pp. 361–362, 369, 380; Robinson, *I Fought*, p. 89; C. Tunnell/W. W. Newcomb, *Lipan Apache Mission: San Lorenzo de la Santa Cruz, 1762–1771*, Austin 1969, pp. 167–172.

northern territories. Rubí's report from 1768, following his inspection tour, claimed that much of the Spanish empire in the north was a sham, an imaginary shadow-dominion inferior to the Apaches and the Comanches. He proposed abandoning any ideas of expansion, drawing a line of defence from Gulf of California to El Paso del Norte and via Rio Grande to the Gulf of Mexico. What he suggested would have meant the Spanish withdrawal from Texas (except San Antonio), the opening of diplomatic ties and trade with the Comanches and the expulsion of the Lipans from every mission and other Spanish locale, and driving them into the hands of their merciless Comanche enemies in the north. This, Rubí thought, would be interpreted by the Comanches as a sign of good will, and would make them look favourably on the Spanish. It would also bring about the total destruction of the Lipans. For Apache survivors, if there were any, Rubí recommended their removal to the interior provinces of New Spain, where, far removed from Apache land, they could be fully civilized and assimilated into Spanish society.¹⁷ While Rubí's recommendations were not followed as such, they met with approval in the upper echelons of the Spanish administration, and brought about a realisation that the Spanish had failed at empire-building. One of the things they had been unable to prevent had been the large-scale diffusion of European imports to independent expansionists indigenous peoples. Now, both the Comanches and the Apaches countered Spanish colonialism using muskets, iron-tipped lances and horses.¹⁸ Spain needed to go on the defensive, not only in Texas but along the length of its northern frontier.

2. Conquest and Assimilation in the Desert

In 1787, several Mescalero and Faraone Apache groups continued to seek relief from the intense Comanche pressure, opting to relocate further southward, leaving the Plains altogether and heading towards the Chihuahua Desert. They frequently approached Spanish commanders at posts in Nueva Vizcaya. On 22 May 1787, one group at El Paso del Norte told the Spanish officers that they feared the Comanches, since they had just recently wiped out a big Mescalero outfit. Once they settled at San Elizario and Presidio del Norte, these Apaches, scarred by colonial aggression, stuck close by and wanted Spanish escorts for protection when venturing toward the Plains for their buffalo hunts.¹⁹ Their old hunting domains were now under Comanche occupation and thus the buffalo excursions often proved lethal. Hence, the Mescaleros needed to reinvent themselves. Unlike the Comanches' reinvention on the Plains as equestrian buffalo hunters, this Mescalero reinvention was done out of necessity. Yet, like the Comanches, the Mescaleros intended it to be an empowering and expansionist move. When the American explorer Zebulon

17 Rubí's ideas are discussed in M. Moorhead, *The Apache Frontier: Jacobo Ugarte and Spanish-Indian Relations in Northern New Spain, 1769–1791*, Norman 1968, pp. 116–117; John, *Storms*, pp. 434–441.

18 Hämäläinen, *Comanche Empire*, p. 64.

19 M. Babcock, *Apache Adaptation to Hispanic Rule*, Cambridge 2016, p. 117; Moorhead, *Apache Frontier*, pp. 207, 218, 220, 238.

Pike met Mescaleros in one of the Spanish dwellings, he immediately noted how the Apaches “spirit was not humbled [...] necks were not bowed to the yokes of their [Spanish] invaders”.²⁰ The Mescaleros and the Faraones started to support themselves as raiders of Spanish cattle, horses and mules in Coahuila and Nueva Vizcaya. They also became mobile mountain dwellers, who gave up – or at least seriously limited – their farming when relocating to the higher ground in the rugged mountain ranges in southern New Mexico and western Texas. There they could hide from their Comanche and Spanish enemies, and launch storming raids across the region.

Many Apaches who survived the loss of their Plains homelands joined their kinsmen in a southward push against the northern edge of the Spanish empire, creating a war-zone hundreds of miles wide cutting through Sonora, Nuava Vizcaya and Coahuila. Apache raiders punctured the leaky Spanish defences, conducting raids that penetrated every more deeply into the interior. Raiders expanded Apache land at Spanish expense, while keeping their distance from the Comanches. In the process, the Apaches paralysed much of the Spanish mining industry and brought about a decline of commerce and the abandonment of numerous settlements. In northern Sonora escalating Apache assaults pushed toward Tucson, causing the distressed O’odham Indians to congregate into larger villages for defence and to relocate westward into the deserts and out of the Apaches’ reach. It looked like the Spanish empire would fold again, this time in the face of Apache power.²¹

Seeking new options, the Viceroy of Northern Provinces, Bernardo de Gálvez, in 1786 and the Commandant General Pedro de Nava, in 1791, put into place a set of policies, whereby the Spanish invited Apaches to live in newly set-up reservations near Spanish settlements, providing regular provisions to those Apaches who would voluntarily settle down and waging war and enslaving those who did not. Provisions included corn or wheat, cigarettes, sugar, salt and meat as regular items, as well as Spanish clothing, weapons and horses as tokens of goodwill and trust. It was in many ways an enticing offer, containing much of what the Apaches already took by raiding. The Spanish sought to take advantage of existing Apache needs and to create new ones that could be satisfied only through reliance on the Spanish.²² This was a volatile mix as Apaches used the system to their own ends, subverting Spanish intentions. Indeed, the Apaches turned the colonial relations envisaged by the Spanish on their head, by viewing Spanish provisions as payments for letting the Spanish live on Apache land, and by making the reservation system an indicator of Apache, rather than Spanish, empowerment.

The goal of the Spanish was to eliminate competition, since assimilation was meant to bring an end to Apache sovereignty and to change their lifestyle. The idea was to keep the Apaches under close surveillance, at or near (i.e. within a radius of twelve miles of)

20 Z. Pike, *Journal of the Western Expedition*, in: D. Jackson (ed.), *The Journals of Zebulon Montgomery Pike Letters and Related Documents*, Norman 1966, pp. 401.

21 A. Alonso, *Thread of Blood: Colonialism, Revolution, and Gender on Mexico's Northern Frontier*, Tucson 1995.

22 Moorhead, *Apache Frontier*, pp. 121–128.

the Spanish presidios in order to subject them to regular inspections. Provisions were meant to be temporary, to be given until the Apaches could support themselves via farming and ranching. Over time, it was thought that the Apaches would become more civilized and industrious sedentary farmers, casting off their “Apacheness” and adopting new identities, acculturating themselves as Hispanized settlers to the lower tiers of the multi-ethnic, hierarchical Spanish communities, much like other Indians had done over the course of Spanish colonial expansion in the Americas. This was very much a case of colonial civilizing mission, fitting the parameters of a worldwide effort where the – usually Euro-American – colonizers engaged the colonized with the intention of elevating them to civilized standards. The Spanish would lead this civilizing mission through personal example as well, by treating the Apaches cordially and with honour, teaching them Spanish-style good behaviour.²³ While the Spanish evidently did not extinguish Apache religious or social practices (such as marriage), they did push for conversion to Christianity and wanted Apache boys to attend Spanish schools, seeing these as important steps in elevating the Apaches from barbarity toward civilisation. They also aimed to change Apache notions of masculinity by curtailing independent military activities, and instead to harness Apache military skills for the service of the Spanish by employing them as auxiliaries and scouts.²⁴

By the 1780s, the Apaches and Spaniards had a long history of meeting in many different contexts that blended intimacy and violence. Their interactions varied from being enemy expansionists in combat to intense trade relations, temporary and localized peace pacts, ad hoc military alliances against the Comanche and individual assimilation, often as captives in Spanish households or in Apache communities. Thus, moving in together was not that far-fetched idea, and those Apaches who lived closest to the Spanish picked up the Spanish language, manners and dress. For instance, members of the Compá family (Chiricahuas) lived inside the presidio walls at Janos, Nueva Vizcaya, attending its school and becoming literate in Spanish. A highly respected family, they were able to move between the Apache and Spanish worlds, gaining leadership positions in the Apache communities.²⁵

In 1793, approximately 2,000 Apaches, Mescaleros, and Faraones, as well as the more western Chiricahua and Tonto, Pinal, and Aravaipa Apaches, had settled on eight *establecimientos* (reservations), situated near presidios along New Spain’s northern frontier. Extending from Tucson (present-day Arizona), Bacoachi, and Fronteras in Sonora, to Sabinal in New Mexico, and Janos, Carrizal, San Elizario, and Presido del Norte in Nueva Vizcaya (modern Chihuahua and Durango),²⁶ the reservations effectively formed a kind of demarcation line, where the outer rim of the Spanish colonial realm clashed up against Apache land. While hoping to assimilate the Apaches, the Spanish also continued

23 W. Griffen, *Apaches at War and Peace: The Janos Presidio, 1750–1858*, Norman 1998, pp. 99–101, 105.

24 *Ibid.*, pp. 77, 106.

25 W. Griffen, *The Compás: A Chiricahua Apache Family of the Late Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth Centuries*, in: *American Indian Quarterly* 7 (1983) pp. 21–49.

26 Babcock, *Apache Adaptation*, p. 2.

to differentiate them. They not merely waged military campaigns against non-reservation Apaches, but continued enslaving them. In fact, during the reservation era, it is possible that as many as 3,000 Apaches were enslaved and deported from Apache land toward Mexico City and Cuba. Dehumanizing them, the Spanish referred to these Apaches as *piezas* (pieces).²⁷

Those Apaches who had settled down in the reservations actually continued moving. In theory, Apaches needed passports to leave the reservation to hunt or travel, and when doing so they were expected to leave their families behind (essentially as hostages).²⁸ In reality, many Apaches stayed on the reservations when it suited them. With permission or without, Apaches also moved from one reservation to the next, and joined independent Apaches against the Spanish, as well as the Spanish as allies against free Apache groups. Some used their Spanish language and cultural skills to hide their identities while moving through Spanish settlements. Many who had suffered from Comanche onslaughts probably just blended in, moved out of harm's way, cast off their Apache identity, and began to identify themselves as Hispanics. Some also found room in this liminal colonial space to join Spanish society on the basis of individual assimilation, such as through intermarriage. But many Apaches simply stayed away from the reservations for good, and it has been estimated that while perhaps as many as fifty per cent of Mescaleros sought security on the reservations, only ten per cent of Lipans did the same.²⁹

In sum, Apaches used the reservation system to sustain and protect their families without giving up their independence or their expansionist raiding. Peace continued to be elusive in the contested colonial realm of Apache land. The reservation line was crossed by both Spanish forces seeking to destroy independent Apaches to the north and by cells of Apache raiders, seeking to exploit other groups' material resources and labour by raiding for, and partaking in "contraband" trade in, horses, weapons, captives and clothing on both sides of the line. Mobile Apache groups displayed a kind of colonial mindset towards the sedentary Spanish. While they were not interested in direct rule over subject peoples, they othered the Spanish as an inferior people, colonial subjects, and viewed raiding the Spanish sedentary peoples as their right. In Apache minds, Spanish villages, farms, ranches, wagon trains, mining camps and even military posts amounted to something like a vast chain of supply repositories. They existed basically as a means for Apaches to acquire food and other materials from any location most convenient for them. In the process, the Apaches saw the Spanish as inferior, as weak and effeminate men whom they could beat and dominate even using just rocks as weapons. Indicating a specific ethnic ranking, Apaches also referred to the Spanish as "herds" or "crops" from which they harvested their spoils, as the historian Mark Santiago writes.³⁰ This mindset was clearly remembered even generations later. When interviewed by the teacher and

27 M. Santiago, *The Jar of Severed Hands: Spanish Deportation of Apache Prisoners of War, 1770–1810*, Norman, 2011, pp. 5, 13, 201–203.

28 Griffen, *Apaches*, p. 100.

29 Babcock, *Apache Adaptation*, p. 2.

30 Santiago, *Jar of Severed Hands*, p. 13.

historian Eve Ball in the 1940s, Ace Daklugie, a Chiricahua Apache, spoke of his ancestors way of seeing things: “Did not their enemies have great herds of horses and cattle? Why should they [Chiricahuas] go hungry with abundance of food in their own land.” He also added that “didn’t the Mexicans [Spanish] owe them a livelihood” as they had invaded Apache land, killing game and using Apache water, grass and soil.³¹ Here also lay the predicament. The Apaches were becoming more and more dependent on items they could only obtain from outsiders. In fact, their whole lifestyle as mobile mountain dwellers relied on raiding the resources of sedentary subject peoples.³²

3. Conclusion

The reservation system lasted for a generation in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century. By feeding the already sizable Apache appetite for Euro-American commodities, the Spanish unintentionally generated the conditions for a new phase of colonization once these provisions disappeared following Mexican independence. Later on, the Spanish saw this reservation era as a time of peace and prosperity, in stark contrast to the violence that resulted when the reservations were shut down in the 1830s and as the Apaches, alongside the Comanches, launched grand raiding excursions deep into Mexico’s interior.³³ That phase of colonialism in Apache land culminated with the US invasion and annexation of northern Mexico in the 1840s.

Long before the US settler empire reached it, Apache land was a contested and shifting setting for rival, divergent claims by indigenous and Euro-American groups, a colonial zone where power and relations were renegotiated and recalibrated through violence and diplomacy. Apache land witnessed efforts from expansionists groups to supplant previous residents and capture terrestrial spaces with the intention of making them their own. It saw indigenous and Euro-American attempts at ethnic differentiation, competing lifestyles and colonial elimination, from violent extermination to assimilation. Apache land was subjected to conquest, exploitation of natural resources and human captives, long-range migration, substitution and the reproduction of one’s own society on what used to be other people’s lands. In short, Apache land was a colonial space.

31 E. Ball/N. Henn/L. Sanchez, *Indeh: An Apache Odyssey*, Provo 1980, p. 34.

32 J. Lahti, *Wars for Empire: Apaches, the United States, and the Southwest Borderlands*, Norman 2017.

33 DeLay, *War of a Thousand Deserts*.

Colonizing Colonizers: On the Colonial Transformation of “Pre-Colonial” Rwanda

Axel T. Paul

ABSTRACTS

Schon bevor Rwanda in den letzten Jahren des 19. Jahrhunderts eine deutsche Kolonie wurde, übte das vorkoloniale ruandische Königtum über sein westliches Grenzland seinerseits eine quasi-koloniale Herrschaft aus. Hier entstanden Modelle und Methoden der Herrschaft und Ausbeutung, die unter europäischer Kolonialherrschaft zur Blaupause für Ruandas pseudo-traditionelle Gesellschaftsstruktur wurden. Indes war es der europäische Kolonialismus, der Ruandas vorkolonialen Imperialismus in einen Fall von innerem Kolonialismus transformierte. Der erste Teil des Aufsatzes behandelt die allgemeinen Gründe für die Entstehung von Staatlichkeit in Afrika des Zwischenseengebiets. Der zweite Teil beschäftigt sich mit dem Aufstieg und der inneren Dynamik des ruandischen Reiches von der Mitte des 18. Jahrhunderts bis zur Ankunft europäischer Eroberer. Der letzte Teil schließlich skizziert, inwieweit es die europäische Präsenz in Ruanda der ruandischen Monarchie ermöglichte, nicht nur zu überleben, sondern ihren Anspruch auf souveräne Herrschaft faktisch zu untermauern.

Even before Rwanda became a German colony in the final years of the nineteenth century, the pre-colonial Rwandan kingdom ruled over western frontier territories which had already acquired a quasi-colonial status. Here, models and methods of domination and exploitation were developed that, under European colonial rule, came to serve as the blueprint for Rwanda's pseudo-traditional socio-political structure. Yet, it was European colonialism which transformed Rwanda's pre-colonial imperialism into a case of internal colonialism. The first part of the paper deals with general reasons for the development of statehood in interlacustrine Africa. The second part focuses on the rise and inner dynamics of the Rwandan empire from the mid-eighteenth century until the arrival of the European conquerors. The last part outlines to what extent the European presence in Rwanda enabled the Rwandan monarchy not only to survive, but to live up to its pretension to be the sovereign ruler of the country.

In October 1996, the former president of Rwanda Pasteur Bizimungu gave a speech to the diplomatic corps in his country, in which he declared that at least parts of the Congolese Kivu provinces, namely the regions settled by Kinyarwanda-speaking Banyamulenge, historically belonged to the “ancient nation of Rwanda”. These regions, supposedly part of the Rwandan state since the sixteenth century, had been cut off, he maintained, only by colonial, i.e. European, decision.¹ The background to his speech was the incipient First Congo War, in which Rwandan- and Ugandan-backed rebels from eastern Congo, first and foremost the Banyamulenge, rose up to resist discriminatory pressures from the Congolese central government in Kinshasa and to eventually overthrow the Mubutu regime.² Bizimungu held that Rwanda did not lay claim to any pre-colonial Rwandan territory; his government, however, not only supported – and probably even directed – the Banyamulenge uprising, but Rwandan troops also invaded Congo to seek out and destroy militias composed of Rwandan Hutu *génocidaires*, who, after their defeat in July 1994, had fled westwards into the countryside, where they regrouped and now threatened to hit back.

In the Rwandan genocide of 1994, between 500,000 and 800,000 Tutsi were killed by Hutu militias, the police, the army, and ordinary civilians. Whereas many early media reports “explained” the genocide with recourse to ancient ethnic hatred between the two groups, there can be no doubt that the genocide was not a spontaneous outbreak of ingrained rancour, but, on the contrary, well planned, prepared, and consciously set in motion by the political rulers of the day.³ It was their desperate attempt to ward off military defeat by the invading Tutsi-dominated Rwandan Patriotic Front.

Strictly speaking, Hutu and Tutsi are, or at least initially were, not different ethnic groups. They speak the same language, have a common history and cultural background, and they inhabit the same region. It was a European, colonial invention to see and treat them as two different tribes or even races, with different geographical and biological genealogies.⁴ Nevertheless, neither the distinction as such, nor its fundamental character, are the outcome of European machinations, whether conscious or unconscious. When Europeans first penetrated the area of what is now Rwanda in the 1890s, they encountered a society that was already split into a ruling, cattle-raising Tutsi minority and a subdued Hutu peasantry. Tutsi and Hutu were primarily political and, at the same time, socio-economic categories, indicating high or low status, wealth or precariousness, and above all power or impotence. The ruling, tribute levying, aristocratic class consisted of Tutsi herders, whereas the bulk of assessable peasantry was considered to be – and increasingly regarded itself – as Hutu. The European assumption that all Tutsi were rulers

1 Quoted from D. Newbury, *Irredentist Rwanda: Ethnic and Territorial Frontiers in Central Africa*, in: *Africa Today* 44 (1997) 2, pp. 211–221, on p. 215.

2 See G. Prunier, *Africa's World War: Congo, the Rwandan Genocide, and the Making of a Continental Catastrophe*, Oxford 2009.

3 See S. Straus, *The Order of Genocide: Race, Power, and War in Rwanda*, Ithaca 2006.

4 See J.-P. Chrétien, *Hutu et Tutsi au Rwanda et au Burundi*, in: J.-L. Amselle/E. M'Bokolo (eds.), *Au Cœur de l'ethnie: Ethnies, tribalisme et état en Afrique*, Paris 1985, pp. 129–165.

was, however, wrong. In fact, there was a considerable number of poor, farming, and non-ruling Tutsi, just as there were some wealthy, cattle-owning, and, at least formerly, politically influential Hutu families. But in the late nineteenth century, to be part of the aristocracy meant to be – or to have become – Tutsi; on the other hand, to be personally dependent on those who were not kin, dutiable, and obliged to work for members of the aristocracy or “state officials” had become a kind of class fate for the Hutu. Even if being Hutu did not yet signify belonging to a tribe of servants, the term was used to designate the servile status of a person.

This pronounced class distinction was fully developed under King Rwabugiri, who ruled Rwanda when the first Europeans entered his realm.⁵ But as much as they erred when they considered the Hutu to be of a different race, they also erred when they deemed Rwabugiri, and the Rwandan kings in general, to be unopposed, that is, monarchs who were as autocratic as they were legitimate, and who ruled over a politically and territorially uniform state with a culturally homogenous, though socially stratified or even racially segregated population.

As one might imagine, there were seldom clear-cut, continuous borders encircling the kingdom, although these existed in areas where Rwanda faced other polities that were equally well integrated on the political level, or where rivers, marshes, and other natural barriers limited any further encroachment. In the main, and most notably in the west, Rwanda was surrounded by frontiers, by peripheral territories, which were already touched by central Rwandan influence or even power, but which still did not effectively belong to the kingdom, inasmuch as their inhabitants were able to withdraw from, or even subvert, economic and political demands, as well as the cultural claims of the royal court, its ministers, and its henchmen. Rwanda, at least from the mid-eighteenth century onwards, was an imperial power that continuously and successfully extended its reach far beyond its original core in Nduga, a region south of the Nyabarongo bend.⁶

Notwithstanding areas that were only formally subjected, or rather older polities within the realm, King Rwabugiri extended his claim to power even beyond the borders of modern Rwanda. Yet, his campaigns did not reach as far as the Itombwe mountains, northwest of Lake Tanganyika, a region to which the “Rwandan” Banyamulenge, mentioned earlier, had previously fled from Rwandan warfare, but he definitely fought to the west of Lake Kivu.⁷ Other outer frontier areas, like Kinyaga, situated between the southeastern shores of Lake Kivu and the Nile-Congo watershed, which runs some fifteen kilometres farther eastwards parallel to the lake, had, however, acquired a quasi-colonial

5 See J. Vansina, *Antecedents to Modern Rwanda: The Nyiginya Kingdom*, Madison 2004, pp. 36–38, 75, 134–139. This book is the authoritative history of the pre-colonial Rwandan state.

6 For a general statement on the relatedness of the evolution of states and imperialism see K. Ekholm/J. Friedman, “Capital” Imperialism and Exploitation in Ancient World-Systems, in: *Review 6* (1982) 1, pp. 87–109.

7 See D. Newbury, *Les Campagnes de Rwabugiri: Chronologie et bibliographie*, in: *Cahiers d'études africaines* 14 (1974) 53, pp. 181–191.

status even before the Germans made Rwanda their colony in 1897.⁸ It was here, at the Rwandan frontier, where models and methods of domination and exploitation were developed that later, under European colonial rule, became the blueprint for Rwanda's neo- or pseudo-traditional socio-political structure, which classical texts of functionalist anthropology depicted as age-old.⁹ Moreover, it was European colonialism which turned not only Rwanda's pre-colonial peripheries and enclaves into Rwandan state territory, but which helped to transform Rwanda's pre-colonial imperialism into a case of "internal colonialism", meaning that a not only politically but supposedly also ethnically or culturally superior minority ruled over a second-class majority, while inhabiting the same territory.¹⁰ This, at least, is the argument that I will develop in three steps.

The first part of this paper will deal with the general reasons for the development of statehood in interlacustrine Africa. The second part will focus on the rise and inner dynamics of the Rwandan empire from the mid-eighteenth century until the reign of Rwabugiri. In the last part, I will outline the way in which the European presence in Rwanda enabled the Rwandan monarchy not only to survive, but to live up to its pretension to be the sovereign ruler of the country.

I.

Around 1000 CE, the Bantu expansion from northwest sub-Saharan Africa south-eastwards to the Indian Ocean had reached east Africa, including the vast highland plateaus around Lake Victoria.¹¹ Pottery and iron metallurgy were practised, as were cattle-breeding and the cultivation of grain. Farmers and herders lived alongside each other. The east African highlands between the central African rain forest and the far eastern savannahs and coastal areas are a climatically favoured region. Their altitude lies continuously more than 1,000 meters above sea level, which makes their climate perceptibly cooler than that of the savannahs. The absence of large forests east of the Nile-Congo divide indicates that there is less precipitation than in central Africa proper, but the annual rainfall, mainly during two rain seasons of up to 1,000 mm or more, is sufficient to maintain intensive farming, leaving enough pasture for cattle grazing aside. As far as linguistic, archaeological, botanical, and zoological data show, there were no major trans-continental

8 See C. Newbury, *The Cohesion of Oppression: Clientship and Ethnicity in Rwanda, 1860–1960*, New York 1988, pp. 23–70.

9 See J.-J. Maquet, *Le Système des relations sociales dans le Ruanda ancien*, Tervuren 1954.

10 The best treatment of the usefulness and validity of the concept of internal colonialism is D. Schorkowitz, *The Shifting Forms of Continental Colonialism: An Introduction*, in: id./J.R. Chávez/I.W. Schröder (eds.), *Shifting Forms of Continental Colonialism: Unfinished Struggles and Tensions*, Singapore 2019, pp. 23–68, on pp. 35sq., 42–52.

11 An excellent overview of the regional developments this paper deals with is given by D. Newbury, *Precolonial Burundi and Rwanda: Local Loyalties, Regional Royalties*, in: *International Journal of African Historical Studies* 34 (2000) 2, pp. 255–314; for this section, see moreover J.-P. Chrétien, *The Great Lakes of Africa: Two Thousand Years of History*, New York 2003, pp. 85–137.

migrations after 1000 CE that might substantiate the “Hamitic hypothesis”, according to which culturally and politically advanced, African herding tribes, originally from the northeast and only subsequently “blackened”, conquered and civilized “inferior”, indigenous, “properly” African farming peoples.¹² There has been, however, a geographically minor migration of Luo-speaking and thus, in fact, “north-eastern” tribes, who in the late fifteenth century seized Bunyoro in modern day western Uganda and founded the Babito dynasty. The expansionist drive of Babito-Bunyoro was responsible for the spreading of militarized, politically centralizing polities in the intralacustrine region, and thus indirectly for the later rise of Rwanda.¹³ Yet, it was not, in the first instance, migrations, but internal developments – albeit apparently caused by the climate¹⁴ – in the societies of the east African plateau, which explain their successive transformation from rather egalitarian to more stratified or “conical” forms of political organisations.¹⁵ Before these processes set in – and for many communities even long after and, in some cases, well into the European colonial era – the pseudo- or trans-familial clan was the predominant form of social association. The exogamic clan not only encompassed factual kin, but different families or lineages that were organized and “ruled”, as if they were a large family. Farming clans owned their land collectively, “because” their ancestors had once cleared the territory. The fields were nevertheless cultivated along family lines, and it was one of the two main duties of clan heads to supervise and, if need be, rearrange the partitioning of the land. A clan head did this in close consultation with other lineage elders, among whom he was only the first. His second important task was to conduct the fertility rites, in which he was once again aided by his peers. The cattle-raising clans were not really organized differently, except insofar as, due to their semi-nomadic lifestyles, their territorial claims were less stable, and their male members militarily more experienced. The favourable conditions of the plateaus allowed these communities to prosper, not least by nourishing a growing population. On the other hand, cyclical or enduring climatic shifts, especially from the seventeenth century onwards, which culminated in recurring droughts and famines, forced the clan societies to simultaneously move west and “upwards” towards higher, still rainier, and more fertile areas. These ecological conditions put heavy strain on the affected communities and led to various conflicts, both within and between them.¹⁶ First, the lands on the eastern slopes

12 See E. R. Sanders, *The Hamitic Hypothesis: Its Origin and Functions in Time Perspective*, in: *Journal of African History* 10 (1969) 4, pp. 521–532.

13 Chrétien, *Great Lakes*, pp. 101sq., 147sq.

14 With regard to Buganda, see C. P. Kottak, *Ecological Variables in the Origin and Evolution of African States: The Buganda Example*, in: *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 14 (1972) 3, pp. 351–380; P. Robertshaw / D. Taylor, *Climate Change and the Rise of Political Complexity in Western Uganda*, in: *Journal of African History* 41 (2000) 1, pp. 1–28.

15 On the concept of the “conical clan-state” see S. Breuer, *Der Staat: Entstehung, Typen, Organisationsstadien*, Reinbek 1998, pp. 41–45.

16 The following argument is essentially based on E. J. Steinhart, *Herders and Farmers: The Tributary Mode of Production in Western Uganda*, in: D. Crummey / C. C. Stewart (eds.), *Modes of Production in Africa: The Precolonial Era*, Beverly Hills 1981, pp. 115–155; and Chrétien, *Great Lakes*, pp. 142–145.

of the Nile-Congo crest were not empty. Foraging and horticultural tribes lived in the then still forested areas, which were subsequently cleared. It goes without saying that the ensuing quarrels could not always be resolved peacefully. Second, the farmers who arrived first claimed the newly opened-up fields as theirs. Latecomers often had to acknowledge the property rights of their predecessors and to ask for a kind of land lease. Moreover, quite often it was not whole clans that migrated, but single families. Thus, in the “colony”, i.e., the new western settlement, the egalitarian, balanced relationships between the families of a single clan could give way to – at least economically – asymmetrical, lopsided relationships between families of different clans. Similar developments will have occurred in the ancestral territories too, where population pressure and migration made the redistribution of cultivation rights necessary. Third, farmers and herders, on the plateaus, as well as both along and upon the successively developed slopes, had to find ways of switching from a complementary to an integrated and intensified form of production. In principle, at least, it is more productive to manure fields by selectively grazing cattle, instead of letting them lay fallow for a season, and thereby to have two instead only one harvest a year. Likewise, a mixed food base, containing milk and meat, as well as vegetarian dishes, is more nutritious than a diet deriving exclusively from herding or farming. In order to realize such benefits, however, solutions have to be found and enforced, for example, concerning whom is allowed to use, or even merely cross, which stretch of land at what time of the year. Moreover, new forms of exchange and interaction between farmers and herders had to be institutionalized.

In such a situation, where the clan organisation of society comes under strain or even disintegrates, where imbalances in material wealth increase, where new property claims arise, where collective interests clash and disputes escalate into violent conflicts, authoritative arbiters or political leaders are likely to step forward and, ultimately, to be accepted. It was the opposing trends, on the one hand, of population growth thanks to generally favourable conditions and, on the other hand, recurring economic crises due to climatic or ecological shocks that enabled the establishment of political authorities, who were capable not only of mediating, but of deciding and resolving conflicts in which they themselves were not directly involved.

The new African “kings” were first of all judges. They inherited this role from the clan heads. But because they were no longer assumed to be akin to their “subjects”, they could not only arbitrate among equals but also claim to decide collective affairs. To be sure, in historical reality the differences between a clan leader and a king might have been blurred. There will have been mighty clan chiefs as well as only “titular” kings. Kingdoms or “the state” do not arrive on earth like a meteorite. The first kings were as dependent on the consent of the lineage or family heads above which they formally stood as earlier clan leaders had been. They relied on their advice, since they needed their support in order to carry out the fertility rites. But they nevertheless represented a new – in this case political – social type, since they not only bear a title – in Kinyarwanda *mwami* –

but are also supposed to have come from elsewhere,¹⁷ that is, to not be of the same kin, precisely because this enabled them to succeed in resolving the social and also natural crisis that the founding myths regularly imagine the community to have been trapped in. That they are believed to be of a different "breed" is further indicated by the fact that they are often allowed or even obliged to practice homosexuality and incest.¹⁸ Like their clan predecessors, they importantly reenacted the return of order and fertility, but, in addition to these, they also functioned as a medium for transcendental powers, i.e., even if they are no gods, they are as close to them as they are to men.¹⁹ It is this special status, this new religious legitimization that indicates that the kings usurped and acted on enhanced prerogatives.

But it was not only the kings that tilted the former balance. It was also the herders as a group who became socio-economically, and thereby politically, more dominant. The reason for this is simple and, in the last instance, also related to the ecologically enforced increase in productivity. In search of better weather conditions, both farmers and herders had to move westwards. Herders, however, are fundamentally more mobile than farmers. It is much easier to abandon grazing grounds than tilled fields. This does not imply that herders necessarily arrived earlier in the west than farmers, but it does mean that herders had a structural advantage when it came to moving on, and thereby to avoiding or at least postponing disasters. Additionally, semi-nomadic herders, who often tend to raid cattle, as well as to raise it, are militarily superior to stationary farmers. Their way of living regularly involves fighting, or at least violent skirmishes, and, in turn, allows them to flee imminent dangers much more swiftly than sedentary lifestyles do.

Moreover, their "capital" is mobile too. Even in dire straits, it is not inevitably destroyed. It is most likely that this "capital advantage", plus the greater susceptibility of intensified agriculture to natural or social disruptions, account for the cultural upgrading of the cow.²⁰ For herders and farmers alike the cow became the most prestigious "social currency", which had to be paid out in matrimonial transactions or for penal compensation, and which not only embodied wealth, but symbolized status too. (Even today, in Rwanda and Burundi, "you are as beautiful as a cow" is a valid compliment from a lover for his beloved.) Owning and, moreover, being able to give a cow signified economic security and social respectability. Obtaining a cow, on the other hand, signified benevolence and protection on part of the donor, but also decisively imposed the constraint to be grateful and even dependent on the part of the recipient. One has to keep in mind

17 See L. de Heusch, *The King Comes from Elsewhere*, in: A. Jacobson-Widding (ed.), *Body and Space: Symbolic Models of Unity and Division in African Cosmology and Experience*, Uppsala 1991, pp. 109–117.

18 On this point, see in a comparative perspective E. Sagan, *At the Dawn of Tyranny: The Origins of Individualism, Political Oppression, and the State*, New York 1985, chap. 19.

19 For Breuer, Staat, p. 39, this switch in affiliation is the decisive criterion for distinguishing chiefdoms from states.

20 Chrétien, *Great Lakes*, pp. 184–187; more generally P. Bonte, "To Increase Cows, God Created the King": The Function of Cattle in Interlacustrine Societies, in: J.G. Galaty/P. Bonte (eds.), *Herders, Warriors and Traders: Pastoralism in Africa*, Boulder 1991, pp. 62–86; J.-N. Nkurikiyimfura, *Le gros bétail et la société rwandaise: Evolution historique des XII^e–XIV^e siècles à 1958*, Paris 1994, pp. 44–73, 102–119.

that there existed no markets, where everyday goods or food were traded.²¹ Exchange did take place, but it was the rules of reciprocity, and not the bargaining involved in barter, by which the game was played. To give generously, especially to give a cow, did not mean to be charitable and altruistic; it meant to upgrade one's status, to accumulate, *nota bene*, spendable capital and to "buy" loyalty.²²

And it seems, as if Ruganzu Ndori, the founder of the Rwandan kingdom, or rather its ruling Nyiginya dynasty, a historically attested figure of the late seventeenth century, in invading Rwanda's central region Nduga from the north, owed his victories over local lords as much to his wealth in cattle, as to his military genius and the fighting prowess of his warriors.²³ By accepting his gifts of cattle, they gave up their autonomy and became his dependents, without, however, giving up their factual authority over their people.

II.

Throughout the interlacustrine region kingdoms sprung up. Yet, not every corner of the area became part of such an "early state".²⁴ Rather, a multiplicity of smaller and greater polities – some of the smaller ones still organized on the basis of clans, some under the leadership of primarily ritualistic chiefs, some of the greater ones already under the sway of kings – existed alongside each other. Their relationships were partly peaceful, partly bellicose; there existed tributary ties between less and more powerful polities as well as "diplomatic" and matrimonial exchanges between "equals". One entity, however, the aforementioned Bunyoro kingdom under the Babito dynasty became particularly powerful and vast. Already in the sixteenth century, the Bunyoro campaigns touched the territory of modern-day Rwanda and later even crossed the Kagera, which currently separates north-eastern Rwanda and southern Uganda from Tanzania. These campaigns, as with most of the wars that were fought from the seventeenth century onwards by all of the mightier kingdoms of the highlands, did not primarily, if at all, aim at conquering foreign lands and enlarging the territory of the realms, but at raiding and bringing booty back home. Nevertheless, Bunyoro became a large kingdom – in fact, the largest in the region – whose power and military range sufficed to intimidate its neighbours and force those who wanted to remain independent to rearm too.

Thus it was not the climate alone that led the communities of interlacustrine Africa on the path to statehood. Once some of them started to organize politically, others had to follow or to risk soon being overwhelmed. The fact that, in the nineteenth century,

21 See, though for the commercial networks of nineteenth century, Chrétien, *Great Lakes*, pp. 191–199.

22 With regard to Burundi, see A. A. Trouwborst, *L'organisation politique en tant que système d'échange au Burundi*, in: *Anthropologica* 3 (1961) 1, pp. 65–81.

23 Vansina, *Antecedents*, pp. 46–48; for a general statement, see H. Hess, *Die Entstehung zentraler Herrschaftsinstanzen durch die Bildung Klientelärer Gefolgschaft: Zur Diskussion um die Entstehung staatlich organisierter Gesellschaften*, in: *Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie* 29 (1977) 4, pp. 762–778.

24 On the concept see H. J. M. Claessen/P. Skalnik, *The Early State: Models and Reality*, in: id. (eds.), *The Early State*, The Hague 1978, pp. 637–650.

Buganda, Rwanda, and Burundi had become the most powerful kingdoms in the area was the contingent outcome of two hundred years of interregional warfare. Yet, contrary to the dynastic myths of the Rwandan court and its later and first historiographer Alexis Kagame the Rwandan kingdom did not exist prior to the seventeenth century.²⁵ Rather, its founder Ruganzu Ndori and his men probably fled from the campaigns of Bunyoro. They nonetheless emulated some of its policies, which meant, on the one hand, raiding and plundering weaker communities and polities and, on the other hand, making them dependent and even tributary through the "power of the cow".

Ndori not only conquered Nduga and instituted the Nyiginya dynasty, probably by deposing legitimate former lords. He also, and more importantly, laid the foundation of the Rwandan state by forming a Rwandan army. One might even say that with and since Ndori, the army became the state. For his campaigns and also the control of the realm he did not rely any longer on the temporary recruitment of herders or farmers, but on standing, regularly trained troops, who were ideally recruited as children or youths already. Upon accession to power, Ndori's immediate successors still dissolved existing armies and constituted new ones. But, especially for this reason, the warriors were personally loyal to the reigning king. They owed their privileged status and thus obedience to him, not to their families, lineages, or clans. Moreover, Ndori divided his troops into separate armies and granted them land, which they could exploit. Likewise, he compartmentalized the kingdom into provinces, which were overseen by provincial chiefs. These were in charge of collecting tributes and foodstuffs, as well as prestige goods, from the local population and of sending them to court.²⁶

The whole eighteenth century was characterized by an ongoing militarisation, a continuous expansion of the realm, and the increasing prominence and power of the central court.²⁷ These processes reinforced one another. The growing army procured rich booty and territorial gains, the spoils of war enriched the court, and an enlarged realm necessitated enhanced control and an invigorated administration.²⁸ By the end of the century, the Rwandan army encompassed approximately 12,000 men, who were, since the time of King Rujugira (c. 1770–1786), also stationed all over the country, especially in places where Rwanda bordered other powerful kingdoms, like Burundi in the south or Gisaka in the east. Moreover, when not in combat, the military needed to be supplied; at first it was special corporate groups, the so-called "social armies", and later the ordinary peasantry that had to shoulder this burden. The king also claimed the right to distribute land

25 See A. Kagame, *Un abrégé de l'ethno-histoire du Rwanda*, 2 vols, Butare 1972 and 1975; on Kagame, who, on the one hand, belonged to the Rwandan Tutsi high nobility and, on the other, became one of the first ordained Rwandan priests and leading intellectuals, see C. Vidal, *Sociologie des passions: Rwanda, Côte d'Ivoire*, Paris 1991, pp. 62–83.

26 See Vansina, *Antecedents*, pp. 58–65.

27 *Ibid.*, p. 123.

28 Thus, rather unsurprisingly, corroborating the logic of the "extraction-coercion cycle" in a non-European context, too (see S. E. Finer, *State- and Nation-Building in Europe: The Role of the Military*, in: Ch. Tilly [ed.], *The Formation of National States in Western Europe*, Princeton 1975, pp. 84–163).

to his troops, thereby circumventing, if not abolishing, the traditional prerogative of the clan heads to do so.²⁹

And he bound his staff, his provincial, and army chiefs to him, mainly through so called *ubuhake* “contracts”, which were cattle-based and clientelistic.³⁰ These arose when a richer and more powerful cattle-raising patron gave a cow to a lower client – in the beginning a herder who was already an influential man too – in return for which the latter owed regular “gifts” and services to the former. In principle, at least, the client for his part thus obtained the protection of the patron, of which the cow was the symbol. The “material” price that the client had to pay over and above the tributes he sent to his patron was, however, the “formal” renunciation of his property rights over all his cattle, should the patron be in need of it to restock his herds. These *ubuhake* ties could be interlaced so that client B of patron A could be patron B of client C and so forth. First and foremost, through the establishment and deployment of armies, but also through the delegation of power to civil administrators, the Rwandan kings managed to place themselves at the pinnacle of the *ubuhake* pyramid and to claim to be not only the proprietor of the whole land, but also of all Rwandan herds. Yet, the kings were not almighty. They could not dispose of the military aristocracy, which rose to power and prosperity in the same way as the kings themselves.

In principle, the aristocracy and the administration of the realm were one and the same thing. Both had military roots or were still involved either in warfare or in organizing the supply of troops. Officially, they were in charge of executing the king’s orders, creaming off much of the agricultural surplus, and purveying it to the court. Nevertheless, they were able and even allowed to keep a considerable portion of the tributes and corvée for themselves. In practice, they led their armies and ruled their provinces rather autocratically.

On the other hand, the perpetually ambulant king’s court had become the centre of the polity, where one needed and wanted to be, if one had political ambitions. It was here that the wealth of the country literally accumulated, where local and also “foreign” prestige goods, like jewellery from west of Lake Kivu or glass beads, cowry shells, pieces of copper and brass, and even cotton from the Indian ocean were held and displayed. The court was supplied with filled stocks of cereals, tubers, and legumes, as well as large cattle enclosures. There were specialist hand workers for the construction of huts, the weaving of fabrics, baskets, and mats, forgers, and tool and weapon makers. The court housed not only the king, the influential “king mother” (who was not the biological mother of the king, but one of his wives, who had been chosen to take care of the heir of the throne), (one of) his spouses, and his personal entourage, but also the ritual advisers and their families. And the court was the place where the king properly held court, where he met and instructed his ministers, where political decisions were taken, where he received delegations, and where he dispensed justice. All of this was reason enough for the land-

29 See Vansina, *Antecedents*, pp. 68–73.

30 On *ubuhake*, see Maquet, *Système*, pp. 151–154; C. Newbury, *Cohesion*, pp. 75sq., 133sq.; Nkurikiyimfura, *Gros bétail*, pp. 119–140; Vansina, *Antecedents*, pp. 47sq.

based aristocrats to regularly visit the court. Whoever wanted to know and, moreover, influence what was going on had to be close to the king. But like many of their colleagues in other parts of the world, the kings also demanded that his lords send him their sons to let them be militarily trained and taught “Rwandan” culture, i.e., court etiquette and history, but, in practice, he kept as them as hostages too.³¹

But, again, neither in the eighteenth nor in the nineteenth century were the kings the undisputed rulers of their realm. There remained insubordinate aristocrats and repeated violent succession struggles and coups. Yet, kingship as such had become strong enough to have become the trophy which even, and especially, the most ambitious families were vying for. In fact, it is the shifting power balance between the king and the aristocracy in combination with the competition between powerful aristocratic families and factions that explains the remarkable territorial expansion of the kingdom and also the intensified exploitation of its subaltern population.³²

One of the main instruments used to extend one’s influence, by the king, as well as by his officials and subordinates, were cows in general and *ubuhake* ties in particular. Much easier than breeding them, however, was stealing them from beyond the “borders” of the realm. Sometimes these incursions entered into territories that were politically not yet as integrated and centralized as Rwanda, if they were in any sense. Sometimes they entered neighbouring kingdoms that were similarly organized and able to offer organized resistance. The former situation applies first of all to the western regions beyond the Nile-Congo divide, the latter to the eastern borderlands. Here, in the east, the campaigns came closer to a war proper between two opposing armed groups or polities, while, in the west, raids predominated.³³ The kings were engaged in both, but raids were undertaken on the “private” initiative of field commanders and provincial office holders too.

In the main, Rwanda’s imperialistic behaviour has to be explained with recourse to this inner dynamic of enhanced elite competition, and, secondarily, by its successful self-assertion against external competitors. A preceding imperialistic “mission”, a civilisational ideal or even ideology which should be spread to “other people”, or more simply a “secular” grand design that has consciously been laid out in advance and subsequently pursued by the court cannot be identified. Between the east and the west, however, there was a rather tragic dialectic at work, through which the victims of Rwandan warfare became the spearhead of Rwandan colonization.

Two states against which Rwanda intermittently fought for decades were Ndorwa in the northeast and Gisaka in the east. The first was eventually defeated in the eighteenth century, yet, the second more or less successfully managed to preserve its independence vis-à-vis Rwanda well into the era of European colonialism. But the devastation wrought in both theatres of war were horrible and lasting, making settlement, farming, and even herding in the afflicted areas a hard, if not impossible, business. Thus, starting with the

31 See *ibid.*, pp. 79–90; more generally Chrétien, *Great Lakes*, pp. 166–170.

32 Vansina, *Antecedents*, pp. 96sq., 129.

33 *Ibid.*, pp. 153–162.

campaigns of Rujugira in the eighteenth century, Tutsi herders from Ndorwa and Gisaka began to flee westwards through central Rwanda. They climbed and crossed the western mountain range and settled in Kinyaga and Bugoyi, along the eastern shores of Lake Kivu, and, even further west, amongst a culturally heterogeneous and politically still disunited population. Here, however, they were perceived and eventually also behaved as Rwandan settlers who had and who developed cultural and political ties to the centre. On the one hand, they actually despised the food (or its preparation), the language (or its pronunciation), and the allegedly boorish manners of locals, as well as their lack of epic poems. On the other hand, either they were already affiliated with other Tutsi patrons in Nduga, or they were actively looking for their protection. To the extent that the relationships between the “refugees” and central Rwandan strongmen developed, the court and its stewards also seized the opportunity, offered assistance, sent cows, established ties, and eventually named or even installed officials.³⁴

The result was not only the incremental annexation and political integration of the peripheral “colonies” into the realm, but also a growing social stratification between “foreign” Tutsi lords and a second-class indigenous population. Thus, even if there was no explicit colonial project, a situation with colonial traits slowly evolved in the western periphery of the Rwandan kingdom, insofar as a power differential between a foreign minority and a local majority consolidated and an effective, although not necessarily intentional, “Rwandization” of the local culture took place. In contradistinction from a typical “colonial situation”, however, the peripheral or “colonial” territories were not governed differently from the centre.³⁵ The court instead tried to extend its influence. Yet, it was here, at the frontier, that Rwandan government structures first evolved into what later became to be seen, at least in the eyes of many European colonialists and a good number of mid-twentieth century anthropologists too, as the traditional “premise of inequality”.³⁶ It was here where the subordination of the local, culturally supposedly inferior peasant population by and to central and even east Rwandan herders became an ethnicized hierarchy that radiated back into the core regions of the realm. Eventually, the incorporation of the colonial frontier resulted in an inner Rwandan colonialism, namely an also and not least culturally legitimized rule of a distinctive Tutsi aristocracy over a majority of mainly Hutu peasants.

Another but related outcome of the infighting between the king and aristocracy was the intensification of state power as such and, by implication, of the exploitation of the ordinary population.³⁷ An officeholder was obliged to assure the mobilisation of war-

34 See D. Newbury, “Bunyabungo”: The Western Rwanda Frontier, c. 1750–1850, in: I. Kopytoff (ed.), *The African Frontier: The Reproduction of Traditional African Societies*, Bloomington 1987, pp. 162–192; C. Newbury, *Cohesion*, pp. 22–37; Vansina, *Antecedents*, pp. 120sq.

35 See G. Balandier, *La situation coloniale: approche théorique*, in: *Cahiers internationaux de sociologie* 11 (1951), pp. 44–79.

36 “The Premise of Inequality in Ruanda” (A Study of Political Relations in a Central African Kingdom, Oxford 1961) is the title of the English translation of J.-J. Maquet’s representative study “Le système des relations sociales dans le Ruanda ancien.”

37 Vansina, *Antecedents*, pp. 126–133, 162sq.; generally, C. Newbury, *Cohesion*; a condensed version of the book’s

riors for the king's armies and to exact tributes for the court, while, at the same time, being, if not formally, then at least factually, entitled to enrich himself. The ruler's glory gleamed on his delegates too. Thus, the struggle for a commanding post in the army or the provincial administration was as fierce as the competition for cows. Both offices and cows were at once prestige goods and a non-, or at least not so, violent instrument for amassing wealth. But since the number of aristocratic aspirants for honourable and rewarding posts was higher than the number of offices, it was a "solution" that, during the nineteenth century, was widely taken advantage of, to increase their number and to diversify the tasks and competences of their incumbents.

One should not overestimate the formality and coherence of the administrative system, but there are, nonetheless, hierarchical levels and specific functions that can be distinguished. We mentioned already the provincial and the army chiefs. Both types of functionaries were appointed by the king and could be found throughout the core region, with the army chiefs being installed also in and along contested border zones. In the nineteenth century, two more offices below that of province chief were established: that of the district land chief and of the district cattle chief. Their holder's tasks consisted in levying material dues, recruiting manual labour for work on royal and official estates, and arbitrating "civil" conflicts, often over land rights. Even if they were not sent from outside, but appointed locally, they nonetheless depended on the court and were not obligated to legitimize their actions and decisions vis-à-vis the local population. Notwithstanding occasional epidemics and famines, there was steady demographic growth in the heartland, as well as a continuous trickle of westward migration undertaken by parts of the peasantry into the still less populous and more fertile areas along Lake Kivu. This movement, frequently by single families rather than whole lineages, had the effect that the land chiefs, on the one hand, could redistribute vacant fields – or keep them for themselves – and, on the other hand, were obliged to carve out plots for arriving migrants, through which the latter became their clients. Political relationships thus substituted for familial ones, the individual calculation of benefits for the collective balancing of risks and odds.

Three further institutional innovations from the second half of the nineteenth century exacerbated the socio-economic inequality. The first was the introduction of reserved herding domains by means of which the king rewarded deserving warriors, devoted followers, and other favourites.³⁸ These were pastures over which the endowed had exclusive rights of utilisation. Even minor herders had to fear being evicted from their grounds, which aggravated land scarcity and triggered migration. The second administrative novelty was that the provincial chiefs, whose position had been weakened by the installation of the land and cattle chiefs, appointed, at a third level, hill chiefs.³⁹ Often, these

argument can be found in C. Newbury, *Ethnicity in Rwanda: The Case of Kinyaga*, in: *Africa* 48 (1978) 1, pp. 17–29.

38 Vansina, *Antecedents*, pp. 131–133.

39 C. Newbury, *Cohesion*, pp. 108, 113sq., 132sq.

were not local residents, in addition to being personal clients of their superiors. They interfered in the everyday life of the populace and effectively boosted its “tax” burden. The third innovation was the introduction of *uburetwa*, a corvée of up to a half of the total working time for the provincial chiefs, which, moreover, was explicitly imposed on “Hutu”, i.e. non-Tutsi, peasants alone.⁴⁰ Even if it is difficult to quantify the total amount of labour and agricultural surplus that went to “the state”, or rather its functionaries, there can be no doubt that large parts of the population were severely exploited by their Tutsi lords even before the Europeans appeared on the scene. The emergence of a landless class of day labourers hiring themselves out to whomever gave them food speaks for itself.⁴¹ The at least relative impoverishment of the majority of the population did not, however, prevent *uburetwa* from splitting the mass of subalterns themselves into a majority Hutu class of underdogs and a minority of less-disadvantaged Tutsi. Yet, these profound socio-structural changes did not take place because the ruling class had a clear intention to intensify the exploitation of the population. Rather, rifts in the ruling class and the fierce, excessively violent struggle of King Rwabugiri, who reigned from 1867 to 1895, to liberate kingship from the restraining influence of mighty aristocratic clans had the effect of decomposing the “ordinary people” too, of dissolving their traditional social units and bonds and creating new “ethnic” blocks of society. The picture that has been, and obviously must be, drawn of the last decades of nineteenth century Rwanda is one of a horrible, extremely bloody civil war.⁴² Moreover, the situation was aggravated in the early 1890s by the double blow, first of a rinderpest that killed up to 90 per cent of the cattle and secondly a smallpox epidemic that raged among the population.⁴³ Rwabugiri reacted to the loss of his herds by the reckless requisitioning of surviving cattle from his clients, as well as other herders, great and small. The *ubuhake* patrons among them were eager to make their damages good by collecting the livestock of their dependents. The result was not only an overthrow of the agrarian ownership structure, but also a severe food crisis. It cannot really come as a surprise, then, that there were a number of Hutu revolts against the Tutsi domination in the south and in the north, which were eventually quelled, and widespread millenarian expectations of a returning survivor king in the east.⁴⁴ Even some of the first Europeans who entered the area at around the same time were welcomed as redeemers, most spectacularly probably the Austrian geographer Oscar Baumann.⁴⁵

40 Ibid., pp. 140–142; Vansina, *Antecedents*, pp. 134–136.

41 Ibid., p. 130.

42 See *ibid.*, pp. 180–195.

43 See C. Newbury, *Cohesion*, pp. 118sq.; Vansina, *Antecedents*, pp. 175sq.

44 See *ibid.*, pp. 136–138.

45 See O. Baumann, *Durch Massailand zur Nilquelle: Reisen und Forschungen der Massai-Expedition des deutschen Antisklaverei-Komitee [sic] in den Jahren 1891–1893*, Berlin 1894, pp. 78–88.

III.

There can be no doubt that European colonialism in Rwanda did not alleviate the living conditions of the indigenous population. In fact, it further increased exploitation and limited voluntary migration and personal liberty in general. But it did not affect all Rwandans in the same way, it did not even disadvantage all of them. As paradoxical as it might seem at first glance, it was the court, the Rwandan monarchy, that was the first winner of European colonialism. Even when the Rwandan kings in the late 1920s finally fell into disregard, the then-ruling Tutsi class still benefitted from the formal sovereignty of their colonial masters, before the Belgians and the Catholic church switched their patronage in the late 1950s and let the Hutu claim power in the pre-independence revolution of 1959.⁴⁶ This is not the place to recount the whole of colonial and post-colonial Rwandan history. I will concentrate instead on the German and the early Belgian colonial phase.⁴⁷ What were the shifts and continuities in the way Rwanda was ruled, when and after the Europeans assumed, at first only formally, but then successively also enacted overlordship? More specifically, how did the advent and support of the Europeans allow the Rwandan monarchy not only to survive, but to win the civil war and moreover to consolidate both its territorial dominion and its arbitrary access to the population?

The coup of Rucunshu, as well as its aftermath, show that the monarchy was wobbling on the brink of disaster, but that powerful factions at court were still very much calculating how they could change the tide.⁴⁸ From the beginning of the 1890s onwards, plagues, diseases, famine, and expropriations shook the country. In 1895, King Rwabugiri died on one of his many campaigns. His son Rutarindwa was heir to the throne. However, this went against the interests of the powerful Ega lineage, which cleverly capitalized on a defeat of the officially always victorious Rwandan troops against a contingent of Belgian soldiers that, coming from the Congo Free State, had set up a military post at the southern end of Lake Kivu in 1896. The Rwandans attacked and tried to oust the foreigners, but had no chance of success against the rifles of the Europeans and were killed by the hundreds. Kanjogera, one of late Rwabugiri's wives, and her brothers from the Ega lineage blamed King Rutarindwa for this disastrous rout, managed to overthrow him, and installed their underage son and nephew Musinga on the throne.

The background to the European intrusion was a border dispute between the Belgian king and Germany that had only preliminarily been settled at the Berlin Africa Conference of 1884/85.⁴⁹ It was only after the "private" exploratory expedition of Count

46 One of the best accounts of the revolution is still R. Lemarchand, *Rwanda and Burundi*, London 1970, pp. 93–286.

47 See A. L. Des Forges, *Defeat is the Only Bad News: Rwanda under Musinga, 1896–1931* [1972], Madison 2011; I. Kabagema, *Ruanda unter deutscher Kolonialherrschaft 1899–1916*, Frankfurt am Main 1993; C. Newbury, *Cohesion*, pp. 118sqq.; I. Nsengimana, *Le Rwanda et le pouvoir européen (1884–1952). Quelles mutations?*, Bern 2003; J. Rumiya, *Le Rwanda sous le régime du mandat belge (1916–1931)*, Paris 1992; a good overview is H.-W. Schmuhl, *Deutsche Kolonialherrschaft und Ethnogenese in Ruanda, 1897–1916*, in: *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 26 (2000) 2, pp. 307–334.

48 See Des Forges, *Defeat*, pp. 3–23; Kabagema, *Ruanda*, pp. 55–63; Vansina, *Antecedents*, pp. 173–179.

49 See W. R. Louis, *Ruanda–Urundi, 1884–1919*, Oxford 1963, pp. 3–97.

Götzen in 1894, during which the latter even met with Rwabugiri, that the Germans realized what they stood to lose, if they accepted Belgian claims to Rwandan territory east of Lake Kivu. Ignorant of the inner Rwandan power struggle, they thus sent a now-official military expedition to the Rwandan king to “offer” him a charter of protection. Captain Ramsay, who led the expedition, was in fact welcomed, albeit mistrustfully, at the court in 1897, which surprisingly accepted the charter and the German flag. Ramsay even sealed a blood pact with someone who pretended to be the king, but actually only represented the still underaged Musinga.⁵⁰

It is most likely that the court accepted the German “request” of protection not simply because it feared a further defeat. The Germans themselves, knowing well that they were not able to militarily subdue the Rwandan kingdom, wanted an alliance. The latter had surely learnt the lesson that military resistance against the Europeans was futile, but the Rwandans additionally must have thought that the Germans had expelled the Belgians from Kinyaga. So why not ally with those who seemed to have rather peaceful intentions and were obviously superior to the belligerent others? As a matter of fact, the Belgians had retreated sometime earlier, but not because they feared the Germans or had even been struck by them, but because they were fleeing mutinying African soldiers from another Belgian contingent, who roamed the area. In the eyes of the Rwandan court, however, the Germans had made their presence felt on behalf of the kingdom. To become their ally could only be profitable, even if it meant accepting their occasional presence and bizarre rituals of deference. This was a price the Rwandan usurpers were evidently willing to pay, for it not only helped them to finalize the coup, but also promised them the consolidation of their power over the land and its people.

The German colonial domination over Rwanda lasted until 1916, when Belgian troops marched into Kigali, the seat of the German residency. During these first two decades of colonialism, only a handful of Europeans lived in Rwanda, most of them neither soldiers nor administrators, but missionaries, who in 1900 began to found missions throughout the country, at first in regions that were not yet under the firm grip of the king.⁵¹ Notwithstanding the most recent – and many earlier – usurpations of the throne and the brutality of its reign, the monarchy was still a religiously legitimated institution. They thus had much greater reservations about accepting representatives of a proselytizing foreign religion in their realm than the politically rather reserved representatives of the colonial super-power. There is no doubt that the Germans decisively interfered in Rwandan politics, but, first of all, there were only few of them and, secondly, they did so in favour of the king. As long as the king remained loyal, they did not question

50 See H. Ramsay, Uha, Urundi und Ruanda, in: *Mittheilungen von Forschungsreisenden und Gelehrten aus den Deutschen Schutzgebieten* 10 (1897), pp. 177–181; H. Ramsay, Über seine Expeditionen nach Ruanda und dem Rikwa-See, in: *Verhandlungen der Gesellschaft für Erdkunde zu Berlin* 25 (1898), pp. 303–323.

51 See Des Forges, *Defeat*, pp. 24–69; G. Mbonimana, *L'Instauration d'un royaume chrétien au Rwanda (1900–1931)*, University of Leuven, PhD thesis 1981, pp. 84–113.

his authority over his subjects, even after they had learnt that it was not as absolute and geographically uninterrupted as they had assumed in the beginning.⁵²

On the contrary, they wanted to rely on, and even strengthen, the local elites in order to make them materially and politically interested in the colonial situation. The aim was to eventually benefit smoothly from the sometimes only imagined, as well as real riches of the colony.⁵³ Inasmuch as the Europeans succeeded in establishing a mutually advantageous indirect rule, a limited number of European officers, commanding gun-carrying, very often non-European troops, sufficed to uphold the colonial order.⁵⁴ And, in fact, the German-Rwandan and later, though with a different twist, Belgian-Rwandan cooperation thrived. The Belgians installed over and alongside the local chiefs, their own district administrators and formally trained Rwandan, i.e., Tutsi, clerks, augmented and standardized the exactions, pursued a policy of economic valorisation of the colony,⁵⁵ and, last but not least, deposed King Musinga in 1931, not in order to abolish kingship altogether, but to let the Catholic church crown a baptized Christian king.⁵⁶ Even if one might argue that through this act one religious legitimation has simply been supplanted by another, it in fact made visible that the usefulness of the Rwandan monarchy for establishing a European colony had finally come to an end.⁵⁷ This, however, did not mean that "the Tutsi", or rather a new class of colonially appointed (sub)chiefs and schooled clerks of aristocratic Tutsi origin, no longer effectively ruled and exploited a "negatively integrated", qua common abatement ethnicized Hutu majority.⁵⁸ And it did not mean that the revolution of 1959 ended the internal colonialism that had come into being. The revolution, though less the event itself than the ensuing political development of independent Rwanda, instead of revising the social order, simply inverted the top and bottom positions. Moreover, it is questionable whether the ethnic split has really been overcome in post-genocide Rwanda.⁵⁹

Long before, however, the Germans had helped the kingdom, primarily in order to actually occupy, subdue, and integrate provinces and territories that it claimed, but without effectively ruling it.⁶⁰ By colonizing Rwanda, they territorially secured its frontiers

52 In fact, attentive observers realized from early on that Musinga's or the Tutsi's rule were not undisputed (see R. Kandt, *Caput Nili: Eine empfindsame Reise zu den Quellen des Nils* [1904], Berlin 1921, p. 203; J. Czekanowski, *Forschungen im Nil-Kongo-Zwischengebiet*, vol. 1: *Ethnographie: Zwischenseengebiet Mpororo – Ruanda*, Leipzig 1917, pp. 252sq.).

53 See Kabagema, *Ruanda*, pp. 104–121, 143–179.

54 See T. von Trotha, *Koloniale Herrschaft: Zur soziologischen Theorie der Staatsentstehung am Beispiel des "Schutzgebietes Togo"*, Tübingen 1994, pp. 32–84; M. Pesek, *Koloniale Herrschaft in Deutsch-Ostafrika: Expedition, Militär und Verwaltung seit 1880*, Frankfurt am Main 2005, pp. 233–265.

55 See Rumiya, *Le Rwanda*, pp. 145–163, 217–234; Nsengimana, *Le Rwanda*, pp. 445–490.

56 Des Forges, *Defeat*, pp. 211–240; Mbonimana, *L'Instauration*, pp. 327–336; Rumiya, *Le Rwanda*, pp. 169–189.

57 R. Lemarchand, *In Search of the Political Kingdom*, in: id. (ed.), *African Kingdoms in Perspective: Political Change and Modernization in Monarchical Settings*, London 1977, pp. 1–32.

58 Exactly this is what the title of C. Newbury's book "The Cohesion of Oppression" alludes to.

59 See S. Straus/L. Waldorf (eds.), *Remaking Rwanda: State Building and Human Rights after Mass Violence*, Madison 2011.

60 See J.-P. Chrétien, *La Révolte de Ndungutse (1912): Forces traditionnelles et pression coloniale au Rwanda allemand*, in: *Revue française d'histoire d'outre-mer* 59 (1972) 217, pp. 645–680; A. L. Des Forges, "The Drum is

and brought the still existing, politically autonomous enclaves into line. The definite extension of central Rwandan administrative structures to and ultimate annexation of peripheral regions, the elimination of politically still autonomous units and their traditional Hutu leaders, who only formally recognized the power of the Rwandan king, the latter's replacement by Tutsi chiefs, who were either loyal to or even sent by the court, the replacement of previously only occasional respectful gifts to the king by regular levies and forced labour, and, finally, in particular, the quelling of open revolts of marginalized Tutsi aristocrats, still powerful Hutu chiefs and charismatic neo-traditional, as well as millenarian, rebels would not have been possible without the material – and military – help from the German and, incidentally, from very early on, also the Catholic colonialists. These, namely the order of the White Fathers – “white” because of their cowl, not their skin; Rwandans rather considered Europeans to be red – having been expelled from Buganda in the course of the religious wars of the late nineteenth century, had their own agenda of founding a Christian kingdom in Africa among newly converted, fervent, and devout believers, not yet corrupted by modernity.⁶¹ The Catholic missionaries regularly clashed with the German, mostly Protestant, in fact religiously rather indifferent, authorities, and sometimes even sided with oppressed or not yet colonized Hutu – among whom they were forced to set up their first stations – but, in the end, even before they cooperated more smoothly with the Belgians (if not vice versa), supported the German colonial policy.

The Belgians too, engaged in securing the territorial integrity or rather rounding of the kingdom. After the First World War, the British occupied and claimed parts of eastern Rwanda, including the formerly independent kingdom Gisaka, for themselves, since they wanted to construct (the never-realized) Cape-to-Cairo railroad solely on “British” territory and thus “needed” eastern Rwanda to connect British Uganda to British Tanganyika.⁶² The Belgians and the White Fathers were eager to support the supposedly historically warranted rights of the Rwandan court to Gisaka, which had, in fact, only recently been subdued by Rwanda and only reluctantly accepted its fate. Contrary to what had become known to the European authorities and missionary ethno-historians of Rwanda, to wit that the Rwandan kingdom was geographically and politically not as great and consistent as the first rumours, European speculations, and court histories would have it, the Belgians now accepted the Rwandan pretensions. In the end, they were able to successfully protect its colony, in general, and the labour potential of the eastern provinces, in particular. Likewise, the Catholics rallied behind the court and even fudged their historiographies to prevent British Protestant missionaries from taking over.⁶³ In the main, however, the Belgian imprint on Rwanda's internal colonialism

Greater than the Shout: The 1912 Rebellion in Northern Rwanda, in: D. Crummey (ed.), *Banditry, Rebellion and Social Protest in Africa*, London 1986, pp. 311–331.

61 See I. Linden/J. Linden, *Church and Revolution in Rwanda*, Manchester 1977; Mbonimana, *L'Instauration*.

62 See Rumiya, *Le Rwanda*, pp. 81–129.

63 See D. Newbury/C. Newbury, *Bringing the Peasants Back In: Agrarian Themes in the Construction and Corrosion of Statist Historiography in Rwanda*, in: *American Historical Review* 105 (2000) 3, pp. 832–877, on pp. 848–850.

was to spread central Rwandan administrative structures all over the country, to further disrupt traditional, pre-political solidarity groups in favour of individualized relations of subordination, to aggravate the tax burden and labour obligations of the peasantry and to enhance the coercive capacities of the local chiefs. They demanded individual workloads and imposed new and standardized, partly even monetarized levies, while ignoring or even accepting the fact that their Rwandan Tutsi executives still insisted on the delivery of traditionally rather unregulated, qua “supra-colonial” backing even inflated tributes. *Uburetwa* is a case in point. It was a form of extended compulsory labour that was introduced under Rwabugiri and imposed on Hutu only. The Belgians believed – or wanted to believe – that *uburetwa* was a traditional service, which they first did not dare to reduce and then to abolish because, as it was assumed, such a measure would undermine the traditional authority of the chiefs.

Of course, it will not and cannot be disputed that the Europeans racialized the difference between Hutu and Tutsi, that they mistook these two socio-economic or socio-political groups to be different races or at least to have different cultural and geographic origins. But the difference as such, the asymmetry between a ruling and also culturally superior Tutsi minority and a second-rank, economically dependent, and politically unfree majority, called “Hutu”, is no colonial invention. It was the Europeans who prevented the Nyiginya dynasty, at least, from sinking, if not the whole Rwandan state from disintegrating, but they “only” froze a social setting, in which the ruling class already had begun to perceive itself as ethnically superior. What the court did or achieved with the aid of, if not by instrumentalizing, the Europeans was to turn the assumed Tutsi supremacy into a kind of internal colonialism, which applies when there is not only domination, but an ethnically justified, not necessarily racial, but at least culturally ascribed, subordination of one group to another. To repeat, this is not meant to redistribute blame or even historical responsibility for the genocide, but to sensitize us to the basically clear fact that “colonialism proper” is no European specialty and that European colonialism, as momentous as it was and still is, did not always interrupt, but sometimes rather reinforced pre-colonial – in this case colonial – trends. Thus, contrary to ex-president Bizimungu’s claim, European colonialism did not amputate a pre-colonially vaster Rwandan state; in reality, it consolidated an expanding, but staggering small empire, whose indigenous power holders exchanged their ambiguous “foreign” ambitions for the firm exploitation of internal “foreigners”.

Colonial Trajectories: On the Evolution of the German Protectorate of Southwest Africa

Matthias Leanza

ABSTRACTS

Kolonialismus manifestiert sich in einer Vielzahl von Formen. Durch vergleichende Fallstudien können wir diese systematisch erforschen. Komparative Studien tendieren jedoch dazu, Temporalität und Wandel nur unzureichend zu berücksichtigen, insofern sie sich auf wiederkehrende Muster konzentrieren, um zu bestimmen, was für einen bestimmten Fall – im Gegensatz zu anderen Fällen – typisch ist. Dieser Aufsatz befasst sich daher mit folgender Frage: Wie können wir dem sich entwickelnden, fortwährender Veränderung unterliegenden Charakter der Vergleichsgegenstände gerecht werden, ohne eine systematische Betrachtung unmöglich zu machen? Zu diesem Zweck wird der Begriff der „kolonialen Trajektorien“ diskutiert, der es erlaubt, prozess-sensible Typologien zu entwickeln. Dieses Argument wird anhand einer – in drei Schritten erfolgenden – Rekonstruktion der Entwicklung des „Schutzgebietes“ Deutsch-Südwestafrika, Vorläufer des heutigen Namibia, erläutert. Obwohl dieser Aufsatz nicht selbst komparativ angelegt ist, spannt er einen konzeptionellen Rahmen auf, der es erlaubt, Muster soziopolitischen Wandels im kolonialen Kontext zu vergleichen.

Colonialism manifests itself in a variety of forms. Through comparative case studies, we can systematically explore these varieties. However, by focusing on recurring patterns in order to determine what is typical for a given case, in contrast to other cases, comparative studies tend to neglect temporality and change. Hence the question arises: How can we acknowledge the evolving nature of the objects of comparison without rendering systematic accounts impossible? In order to answer this question, I will discuss the notion of “colonial trajectories”, which allows us to create process-sensitive typologies. I will illustrate this argument by tracing – in three steps – the evolution of the German protectorate of Southwest Africa, the precursor of present-day Namibia. Although this essay is not itself comparative, it does lay out a conceptual framework for comparing patterns of socio-political change in a colonial context.

Colonialism is not a single or uniform phenomenon but encompasses a wide array of manifestations. How colonial empires establish themselves and exercise power varies considerably, both between them and within them. Comparative case studies allow us to explore these varieties systematically. On this basis, we can elaborate generalized typologies and theories, which help us to structure complex historical data.¹ However, there are also problems associated with this approach. The objects of comparison are not always independent of each other but may interact or even represent different aspects of one and the same object. This fact is particularly apparent in the case of the European overseas empires, whose dynamics were deeply intertwined. Thus taking a comparative approach might run the risk of treating those empires as if they were isolated cases, rather than part of the same international order. Another issue concerns temporality and change. By focusing on recurring patterns in order to determine what is typical for a given case, in contrast to other cases, comparative studies tend to emphasize what remains stable over time, or they pick out a single episode and treat it as representative of the entire process. As a result, they create snapshot-like images of what are, in reality, dynamic and evolving structures.

Both of these concerns – that is, the issues of entanglement and evolution – should not be understood as objections to a comparative approach per se. Nonetheless, they must be considered and dealt with when comparing regimes of colonial rule. This essay more narrowly addresses the second concern: how can we capture the temporal character of the objects of comparison without making systematic accounts impossible? In order to answer this question, I will discuss the notion of “colonial trajectories”. As I will explain in the first part of the paper, by charting colonial (or imperial) trajectories, process-sensitive typologies can be created that reflect the dynamic character of colonial (or imperial) forms of domination. In the second part, I will illustrate this argument by tracing – in three steps – the evolution of the German protectorate of Southwest Africa, the precursor of what is now Namibia (for a justification of the case selection, see the next section). This essay is thus not itself comparative, but it does lay out a conceptual framework for comparing patterns of socio-political change in a colonial context.

1. Towards Processual Typologies of Colonial Rule

In a seminal article published in 1976, the classical scholar Moses Finley outlined a typology of colonies.² Given the inconsistent use of this term in both everyday speech and legal parlance, he recommended that historians and sociologists establish their own classification. If used as a technical term, Finley argues, “colony” presupposes political

1 E.g. G. Steinmetz, *The Devil's Handwriting: Precoloniality and the German Colonial State in Qingdao, Samoa, and Southwest Africa*, Chicago 2007; J. Go, *Patterns of Empire: The British and American Empires, 1688 to the Present*, New York 2011.

2 M. I. Finley, *Colonies – An Attempt at a Typology*, in: *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society* 26 (1976), pp. 167–188.

dependence, which rules out independent settlements. Only if the newly conquered, or otherwise acquired, lands are subordinated to the political institutions of the home country can a colonial relationship be said to emerge. Accordingly, the Greek and Phoenician “colonisation” of the Mediterranean led to the establishment not of colonies but of independent city-states.

However, according to Finley, political subordination to the government of the metropole is only a necessary, and not a sufficient, condition for a colony to exist. A second feature must be added: large-scale migration from the core polity into the subjugated region. Without the significant and permanent presence of members of the ruling power, an outlying dependency cannot be described as a colony in the proper sense. At least this is what Finley suggests here, reverting directly to the original meaning of the word. Derived from the Latin *colonia*, meaning “settled land, farm, landed estate”, a colony was originally an ancient Roman settlement outside Italy. “Colony” became broadly synonymous with overseas dependencies only in the second half of the nineteenth century.³ Against this backdrop, Finley concludes provocatively that “the late nineteenth-century struggle for Africa was largely not a struggle for colonies”.⁴ Put in more formal terms, he suggests using “dependency” as the generic term and “colony” as one of its subcategories, reserved for those peripheries of an empire that are settled by a substantial number of people from the metropole.

Although such a narrow definition has advantages, it creates more problems than it solves. If we were to accept that substantial parts of what is commonly referred to as “colonial Africa” did not constitute colonies in the proper sense, we would then find ourselves in the peculiar situation of having to invent new terms for these and similar imperial dependencies that we could no longer call “colonies”. One way of dealing with this issue is to extend and further differentiate our understanding of the category of “colony”, without overstressing it by including every manifestation of structural inequality and dominance between political communities. Colonies of settlement might be the archetypal colonies, but they are not the only possible form. We also find colonies of exploitation and trading outposts, typically set up on the peripheries of expanding empires. At the same time, the concept is still specific enough to leave room for other, non-colonial dependencies. As Jürgen Osterhammel notes with regard to provinces such as Bohemia under the Habsburgs or Macedonia within the Ottoman Empire: “Not all imperial peripheries were colonies, and colonial frontiers were not equally dynamic in all empires. Colonialism is but one aspect of nineteenth-century imperial history”.⁵ Not every imperial dependency falls under the category of a “colony”, and yet there are more than merely colonies of settlement.

3 Ibid., p. 170.

4 Ibid., p. 171.

5 J. Osterhammel, *The Transformation of the World: A Global History of the Nineteenth Century*, P. Camiller (trans.), Princeton, NJ 2014, p. 431.

However, as useful as this typology is for structuring a vast and complex field of inquiry such as the study of empires, there is a danger of subsuming individual cases under these general types without sufficiently acknowledging the immense variety within each category. Moreover, like other typologies, too, it struggles to capture temporality and change. A dynamic and evolving reality is represented through a fixed set of classes. These issues are also apparent in the field of settler colonial studies, which has increasingly gained traction in recent years. According to the Australian anthropologist Patrick Wolfe, one of the main proponents of this approach, “settler colonialism is a specific social formation and it is desirable to retain that specificity”.⁶ In the same vein, Lorenzo Veracini not only distinguishes settler colonialism from (non-settler forms of) colonialism but also treats the two as opposing concepts in his influential account. While in colonialism, a foreign minority rules over a “native” population, settler colonialism “is premised on the domination of a majority that has become indigenous”, meaning immigrant settlers.⁷ Moreover, Wolfe and Veracini both argue that settler colonialism operates as a zero-sum game.⁸ This would ultimately lead to the elimination of the native Other through assimilation and forced relocations, frontier homicide, and mass killings. In this connection, Wolfe has coined the term “structural genocide”. According to this theory, the “logic of elimination” that is inherent to settler societies can flare up into “genocidal moments” when circumstances allow.⁹

The problems with this approach are twofold. First, both Wolfe and Veracini employ a highly generalized notion of settler colonialism, which draws too sharp a contrast with other forms of colonial domination. Consequently, little room is left for gradual transitions and intermediate forms. Second, the historical process itself is almost entirely reduced to a mere epiphenomenon. It appears that for Wolfe and Veracini, the structural “logic” inherent to settler colonialism predetermines – top down – the sequence of events. If one agrees that this notion is problematic, what would an alternative approach look like? How can we take into account the evolving character of colonies and empires, including extended periods of transition, without abandoning systematic categorisation and comparisons?

One possible answer is to reconstruct the trajectories along which colonies and empires evolve in order to develop – bottom-up – categories that reflect the resulting pattern of change. A “trajectory” is defined as a phase of slow-moving, incremental change that can be interrupted by “turning points” that drastically alter the course of development.¹⁰ In this vein, Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper trace the dynamics of empires in world

6 P. Wolfe, *Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native*, in: *Journal of Genocide Research* 8 (2006), pp. 387–409.

7 L. Veracini, *Settler Colonialism: A Theoretical Overview*, Basingstoke 2010, p. 5.

8 Wolfe, *Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native*, p. 387; Veracini, *Settler Colonialism*, p. 33.

9 Wolfe, *Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native*, p. 402–403.

10 See A. Abbott, *Time Matters: On Theory and Method*, Chicago 2001, pp. 240–260. As Abbott points out, the relationship between trajectories and turning points is a fractal one: phases of transition unfold along a specific trajectory and smaller turning points often alter the predominant course of development.

history. Instead of assuming a linear progression from the empire to the nation-state, as modernisation theory commonly does, they track much more intricate patterns of development and change at a macro-historical level. “A focus on empires, their repertoires of rule, and their intersecting trajectories”, explain Burbank and Cooper, “thus revises conventional chronologies and categories and helps us see how, when, and where world history took new directions.”¹¹ The present essay illustrates how this conceptual framework can be utilized to create typologies that reflect the evolving nature of the phenomena they seek to represent. However, instead of considering entire empires over long periods of history, as in Burbank and Cooper, the scope here will be more limited, comprising a single colony – the German protectorate of Southwest Africa.

Bordered by the Orange River in the south, the Kunene and Okavango Rivers in the north, the Kalahari in the east and the Atlantic Ocean in the west, colonial Namibia covered an area one-and-a-half times as large as the German Empire before the First World War. By European standards, it was sparsely populated, containing roughly 200,000 inhabitants before the Germans arrived. In 1884, Southwest Africa – or, more precisely, only parts of the coastal area at first – became a German *Schutzgebiet* (protectorate). The German Empire lost de facto control over Southwest Africa during the First World War. After the war, the Treaty of Versailles stipulated that Germany had to cede its overseas territories to competing powers as League of Nations mandates. Thus what was to become modern-day Namibia remained under South African rule – with changing legal status and administrative organization – until independence in 1990.

In the following three sections, this essay traces the trajectories along which German Southwest Africa evolved before the First World War. This case is particularly appealing for those interested in revising conventional categories and chronologies. Southwest Africa is commonly perceived as Germany’s sole settler colony. Although this categorisation is not wrong, it might not capture the change and evolution the protectorate underwent. European settlements began rather sluggishly at first. It was not until the late 1890s and more pronounced after the war against Herero and Nama from 1904 to 1907 that they gained momentum. For this reason alone, it would be misleading to subsume the entire history of German Southwest Africa under the category of “settler colonialism”. Moreover, although it is true that the mounting tensions between settlers and Herero after the 1896–1897 Rinderpest (cattle plague) led to the violence in early 1904, the further escalation of the conflict was the result of strategic decisions taken by the metropolitan elites. What explains the course of events during the war is not a binary opposition between settlers and the indigenous population. Instead, at least three sets of actors must be taken into account. Finally, the reforms launched after the war brought about significant change (which, for the colonial subjects, were mostly for the worse). While the category of “settler colonialism” is misleading for, say, the first decade of German rule

in Southwest Africa, it also obscures structural transformations that occurred in the last two decades before the Union of South Africa occupied the protectorate.

2. Establishing a Sphere of Influence

Like other latecomers in the race for global dominance, Germany expanded overseas at roughly the same time as its nation-state was forming. After the 1870–1871 Franco-Prussian War, the German lands (with the exception of Austria) became unified under Prussian hegemony. The challenge facing the newly established state was to create an integrated nation that found its place within the Concert of Europe. At the same time, however, throughout its history, Imperial Germany remained a Prussian-dominated empire.¹² The situation of the Poles in the eastern parts of Prussia can even be interpreted as a case of “internal colonialism”.¹³

German overseas expansion must be understood against this backdrop. Colonial pressure groups considered it a sign of national greatness and cultural superiority to rule additional territories overseas. Friedrich Fabri, former head inspector of the Rhenish Missionary Society in Barmen and one of the founders of the German Colonial Association, further argued that the “acquisition” of colonies would help to alleviate domestic problems by creating new opportunities for investment and providing farmland for German settlers.¹⁴ Conversely, leading factions of the country’s political and military elite, including Reich Chancellor Bismarck, considered this an unnecessary adventure. As they saw it, Germany first needed to consolidate itself as a nation and redefine its role as a great power in Europe before considering expanding into “far-off lands”. In 1881, Bismarck expressed his position on the subject as follows: “As long as I am Reich Chancellor, we will not pursue a colonial agenda. We have a fleet that cannot operate [...] and we must not have any vulnerable points in distant parts of the world that will fall to the French as booty as soon as it gets started.”¹⁵

Unsurprisingly, German colonialism was initially not a state-driven project. The momentum came from the colonial movement, which coalesced through private associations and trading companies. It included figures like the far-right-wing Carl Peters, a trained historian and philosopher who, in 1884, founded the Society for German Col-

12 For the simultaneity of nation building and empire formation in modern German history, see S. Berger, *Building the Nation among Visions of German Empire*, in: S. Berger / A. Miller (eds.), *Nationalizing Empires*, Budapest 2015, pp. 247–308.

13 P. Ther, *Imperial instead of National History: Positioning German History on the Map of European Empires*, in: A. Miller / A. J. Rieber (eds.), *Imperial Rule*, Budapest 2004, pp. 47–66; S. Conrad, *Globalisation and the Nation in Imperial Germany*, S. O’Hagan (trans.), Cambridge 2010, chap. 3.

14 F. Fabri, *Bedarf Deutschland der Colonien? Eine politisch-ökonomische Betrachtung*, Gotha 1879.

15 H. v. Poschinger, *Fürst Bismarck und die Parlamentarier, Dritter Band 1879–1890 (Unterredung mit Grafen von Frankenberg im Winter 1881)*, Dresden 1894, p. 54 (own translation). See also H. Gründer, *Geschichte der deutschen Kolonien*, Paderborn 2012, chap. 3.

onisation in Berlin.¹⁶ The association's purpose was "to identify and acquire suitable colonisation sites".¹⁷ Later that year, its members organized their first expedition to East Africa, where they signed "protection treaties" with African leaders.¹⁸ At the other end of the spectrum were businessmen, interested in opening up new markets by investing in areas of the world not yet been incorporated into the capitalist system. Economic expansion, however, often entailed political expansion, as happened at a remarkable pace in colonial Namibia. In 1882, Adolf Lüderitz, a tobacco dealer from Bremen, informed the German Foreign Office that he intended to purchase a stretch of the coastline north of the Orange River in order to establish a trading outpost.¹⁹ He asked that his company be put under state protection. This status was to include protection against the British who, in 1878, had occupied the strategically important Walvis Bay on the Atlantic coast. Lüderitz wanted not only to avoid British import tariffs but also to exploit any mineral deposits he found in the territory. For this reason, official recognition from the German state seemed highly desirable.

Reluctant to get involved in this matter, the Berlin authorities made a generic promise to support Lüderitz if he could establish himself on the ground. At Bismarck's instigation, the British Foreign Office was immediately informed of this arrangement, emphasizing that Germany had no intention whatsoever of acquiring formal colonies.²⁰ Meanwhile, Lüderitz went about creating facts on the ground. Through his agent, he purchased the bay of Angra Pequena, including five miles of the interior, from Nama "captain" Joseph Frederics of Bethanien in spring 1883. Only three months after the first purchase, the territory expanded as the result of another sales contract. "Lüderitzland" now stretched all the way south to the mouth of the Orange River, and from the coast 20 miles inland. After concluding the agreement, Lüderitz maintained that the measurement was not in English miles – as he had led the other side to believe – but in German geographical miles, which were much longer (7.5 kilometres per mile versus 1.6 kilometres per mile). Shortly after these events, the British government changed its mind. Heavily influenced by the Cape Colony's lobbying for a "South African Monroe Doctrine", the authorities in London now claimed the entire territory from the southern border of Portuguese Angola down to the Orange River as Great Britain's natural sphere of interest. In response, the German government also changed course by dispatching a gunboat to the region and granting Lüderitzland official state protection in April 1884.²¹ The short summer of informal empire came to an end.

16 A. Perras, *Carl Peters and German Imperialism 1856–1918: A Political Biography*, Oxford 2004.

17 C. Peters, *Aufruf der "Gesellschaft für Deutsche Kolonisation"*, auf ihrer Gründungsversammlung am 28. März 1885 angenommen, in: W. J. Mommsen, *Imperialismus: Seine geistigen, politischen und wirtschaftlichen Grundlagen: Ein Quellen- und Arbeitsbuch*, Hamburg 1977, pp. 124–125, here p. 124 (own translation).

18 M. Pesek, *Koloniale Herrschaft in Deutsch-Ostafrika: Expeditionen, Militär und Verwaltung seit 1880*, Frankfurt am Main/New York 2005, pp. 168–179.

19 H.-U. Wehler, *Bismarck und der Imperialismus*, München 1976, pp. 265–267.

20 *Ibid.*

21 *Ibid.*, pp. 270–275.

The immediate result, however, was not formal empire.²² Instead, what arose was a German sphere of influence. As American diplomat and political scientist Paul S. Reinsch noted in 1902, the concept of a sphere of influence “is distinguished from occupation in that it does not involve material possession, nor the immediate creation of the machinery of government”. Its primary purpose is a negative one, namely to ensure “that no other power or nation except the one in whose favour the sphere of influence exists shall be permitted to exert any political authority within a certain territory”.²³ According to this definition, a sphere of influence is more indicative of virtual claims in the diplomatic realm than actual presence on the ground. This lack of effective control makes spheres of influence vulnerable to both the aspirations of competing empires (prepared to create diplomatic tensions) and the resistance of the local population.

As early as the summer of 1884, the Cape Parliament, at London’s urging, decided to annex the entire coastline up to Portuguese Angola. Germany responded by sending military ships to the region, in a successful move to pre-empt the Cape Colony.²⁴ Spurred by his success, Lüderitz soon acquired, through an agent, claims to the Santa Lucia Bay in the Zulu Kingdom. He envisioned a colony for German settlements that stretched from the Atlantic to the Indian Ocean.²⁵ Before long, however, Lüderitz ran out of money. The consortium that had bought his land in Southwest Africa – mainly in order to prevent the British from getting their hands on it first – showed no interest whatsoever in taking on administrative tasks. But the German Empire did not opt out of its engagement at this point. On the contrary, the authorities in Berlin reinforced their commitment by appointing, in 1885, an imperial commissioner for Southwest Africa. Accompanied by two assistants, the diplomat in question, Heinrich Göring, established the first German administration in Otjimbingwe later that year. Supported by local missionaries familiar with the region and a small police unit, the delegation concluded a half-dozen “protection treaties”. Although no agreements were reached with the kingdoms in the north, or the powerful Witbooi Nama in the south, the German Empire now considered all of Southwest Africa to be its sphere of interest.²⁶

Due to its unstable internal construction, this sphere collapsed in autumn 1888. On multiple occasions, Nama “captain” Hendrik Witbooi – who had his own designs for dominating central Namibia and, therefore, refused to enter into a “protection treaty”

22 For the transition from informal to formal empire, see J. Gallagher/R. Robinson, *The Imperialism of Free Trade*, in: *The Economic History Review* 6 (1953), pp. 1–15; D. K. Fieldhouse, *Economics and Empire 1830–1914*, London 1973.

23 P. S. Reinsch, *Colonial Government: An Introduction to the Study of Colonial Institutions*, New York 1902, p. 103.

24 Wehler, *Bismarck und der Imperialismus*, pp. 276–281.

25 Great Britain hastily set up the Bechuanaland Protectorate in 1885 to thwart a further German (and Boer) expansion. The driving force behind this decision was Cecil Rhodes, who was a member of the Cape Parliament at the time and later became its Prime Minister. See H. Zins, *The International Context of the Creation of the Bechuanaland Protectorate in 1885*, in: *Pula: Botswana Journal of African Studies* 11 (1997), pp. 54–62.

26 H. Drechsler, “Let Us Die Fighting”: The Struggle of the Herero and Nama against German Imperialism (1884–1915), B. Zöllner (trans.), London 1980, pp. 26–29, 31–32; Wehler, *Bismarck und der Imperialismus*, pp. 275–289. The Caprivi Strip in the northeast became part of the protectorate only with the Helgoland-Zanzibar Treaty of 1890.

– and his men attacked various Herero groups and raided their livestock. Maharero, the supreme chief of the Herero tribal confederacy, eventually terminated the agreement with the Germans. He justified this on the grounds that Germany was apparently unable to protect his people from the mounted Nama commandos, who were equipped with firearms. As a result, the German delegation decided to retreat to British Walvis Bay.²⁷

3. Internal Frontiers and Escalating Violence

At this point, the protectorate of Southwest Africa existed only on maps, representing claims more than realities. The German parliament debated whether these claims could or should be upheld, a controversy that was further fuelled by the 1888–1889 Abushiri Revolt in the East African protectorate.²⁸ Bismarck's chief concern continued to be stabilising Germany's position within the European state system. He even pondered abandoning the African colonies altogether.²⁹ Shortly afterwards, however, the German government sent to the region an expedition of 20, headed by Curt von François, to restore colonial rule. François often pursued his own agenda and repeatedly exceeded his powers, causing discontent in Berlin. Nonetheless, in the first two years of his mission, he managed to re-establish the station in Otjimbingwe, build a stronghold in Windhoek, and reinstate the “protection treaty” with the Herero.³⁰ Taken together, these events represented a critical turning point in the protectorate's development.

German Southwest Africa was henceforth on a different trajectory. It slowly morphed into an imperial borderland, shaped by wars of conquest, an expanding colonial administration, and European settlements.³¹ The frontiers defining this borderland were, however, internal rather than external. That is to say, imperial expansion took place within an already-established sphere of interest as recognized by the European states. By keeping the claims of competing empires at bay, this sphere created a niche in the international system, allowing German colonizers to focus on subjugating local societies.

Several attempts to extend the German borderland further south to encompass all of the Nama territories failed. As we know from Witbooi's detailed records, François met with the Nama “captain” in 1892 in order to persuade him to bow to German rule.³² However, Witbooi refused, pointing out that he did not intend to give up the sovereignty of

27 Drechsler, “Let Us Die Fighting”, pp. 38–42; Wehler, *Bismarck und der Imperialismus*, pp. 289–292.

28 T. Bühner, *Die Kaiserliche Schutztruppe für Deutsch-Ostafrika: Koloniale Sicherheitspolitik und transkulturelle Kriegsführung 1885 bis 1918*, München 2011, pp. 54–57.

29 Wehler, *Bismarck und der Imperialismus*, pp. 408.

30 M. Wallace (with J. Kinahan), *A History of Namibia: From the Beginning to 1990*, London 2011, pp. 121–127. See also C. v. François, *Deutsch-Südwest-Afrika: Geschichte der Kolonisation bis zum Ausbruch des Krieges mit Witbooi April 1893*, Berlin 1899, chaps. 3–5.

31 For the European's strategy of small wars, see B. Vandervort, *Wars of Imperial Conquest in Africa, 1830–1914*, London 1998.

32 H. Witbooi, *The Hendrik Witbooi Papers* (No. 68 Record of the Meeting between Witbooi and Curt von François, Hoornkrans, 9 June 1892), A. Heywood and E. Maasdorp (trans.), Windhoek 1995, pp. 84–89. For this episode, see also Steinmetz, *The Devil's Handwriting*, pp. 146–168.

his people. Moreover, he questioned the entire notion of “protection” as it was constantly put forward by the Germans. In his eyes, “protection” was being used as a euphemism for subjection. “It is thus: when one chief stands under the protection of another”, Witbooi explained to François, “the underling is no longer independent, and is no longer master of himself, or of his people and country.”³³ The conflict escalated in the following months. In April 1893, in a surprise attack at Hornkrans, François and his men killed between 80 and 150 of Witbooi’s people, among them many unarmed women and children. Despite pushing back through various raids on German posts, the Witbooi were compelled to surrender in 1894, after the *Schutztruppe* (protection force) had been increased by several hundred men, now under the command of Theodor Leutwein.³⁴ In the following years, the German troops established a dozen new military stations, most of them in the protectorate’s central and southern regions. Over time, these outposts acquired more and more characteristics of civil authorities, albeit without a complete separation of the two branches. Nonetheless, the expanding military frontier gave rise to a colonial administration, spreading over large parts of the country.³⁵ At no point, however, did the colonial authorities hold an effective monopoly on violence. In governing the protectorate, the representatives of the German state relied heavily on cooperation with African leaders. Leutwein, who in 1898 became Southwest Africa’s first governor – the governor’s seat was in Windhoek –, skilfully forged a web of political alliances, from which the parties involved sought to benefit to various degrees.³⁶ Most of the societies in the northern regions were organized into small kingdoms and remained largely autonomous. On the Ovambo alluvial plain, by far the most densely populated area in the protectorate, the colonial authorities never managed to establish direct rule. The frontiers of the German Empire’s borderland in Southwest Africa remained permanently behind the borders of its sphere of influence as marked on the map.³⁷ As the military frontier expanded, a settler frontier slowly emerged. Despite various efforts to attract German settlers to Southwest Africa in the early 1890s, relatively few people went to build a new life there, far from home and in unfamiliar surroundings.³⁸ Nonetheless, by 1902, about 2,500 Germans and another 2,000 people of European descent, mainly Boers from the Cape, resided in colonial Namibia, mostly in and around Windhoek. Roughly 800 of these were farmers; the rest included traders and craftsmen. As an immediate result of the 1896–1897 Rinderpest, the semi-nomadic Herero pastoralists inhabiting central Namibia lost up to 90 per cent of their stocks.³⁹ Thus many Herero began working for the Europeans as labourers, herders, or domestic servants.

33 Witbooi, *The Hendrik Witbooi Papers*, p. 86.

34 H. Bley, *Namibia under German Rule*, H. Ridley (trans.), Hamburg 1996, pp. 27–32.

35 Wallace, *A History of Namibia*, pp. 148–154.

36 H. Bley, *Namibia under German Rule*, part 1; J.-B. Gewald, *Herero Heroes: A Socio-Political History of the Herero of Namibia 1890–1923*, Athens 1999, chap. 2.

37 Wallace, *A History of Namibia*, pp. 97–102, 199–203.

38 Bley, *Namibia under German Rule*, pp. 73–119; B. Kundrus, *Moderne Imperialisten: Das Kaiserreich im Spiegel seiner Kolonien*, Köln 2003, pp. 44–55.

39 Bley, *Namibia under German Rule*, pp. 124–129; Gewald, *Herero Heroes*, chap. 4.

Amid this closer contact, the white settlers hardly missed an opportunity to assert their alleged racial superiority. The colonial authorities generally turned a blind eye to settler violence or imposed merely symbolic punishments, thus exacerbating the already tense situation.⁴⁰ Another contributing factor was the dubious business practices of German traders. They readily provided credit for weapons, alcohol, and other goods but charged exorbitant interest rates. Members of the Herero elite often repaid their debts by transferring land titles, which created further tension.⁴¹

The Herero uprising that struck central Namibia in January 1904 must be understood against this backdrop.⁴² The primary targets were farmers and traders whose reckless behaviour – as detailed above – had become intolerable to the once-wealthy pastoralists. During the following weeks and months, the initial uprising expanded into a full-scale war.⁴³ The gradual settlement of central Namibia caused a deep rupture in the colony's precarious order, giving rise to a new military frontier, an active battle line. This frontier drove approximately 60,000 Herero – men, women, and children alike – and their remaining livestock into the north. They began gathering at the foot of the Waterberg Plateau from around May onwards, hoping to negotiate a peace deal with Governor Leutwein.⁴⁴

What the Herero did not know was that, in the meantime, Lieutenant General Lothar von Trotha had been sent to assume command of the colony after the German government became increasingly frustrated with the sluggish pace of the war. In previous missions, which took him to East Africa in the 1890s and China during the Boxer Rebellion, von Trotha had proven himself a hardliner. His appointment was controversial among senior members of the government, but the kaiser ultimately decided to make von Trotha commander in chief of German forces in Southwest Africa.⁴⁵ To the authorities in Berlin, the increasingly isolated von Trotha presented himself as having the situation fully under control. In reality, however, his initial strategy of encircling the Herero at the Waterberg and forcing them to surrender failed.⁴⁶ Due to the German troops' poor coordination, most of the Herero who did not die during the battle in mid-August managed to flee eastwards into the Omaheke, the western extension of the Kalahari. After several attempts at hunting them down failed, von Trotha issued his notorious "annihilation order" in October 1904. The order stated that the Herero were no longer considered Ger-

40 M. Häussler, *Der Genozid an den Herero: Krieg, Emotion und extreme Gewalt in Deutsch-Südwestafrika*, Weilerswist 2018, chap. 2.

41 S. Kuss, *German Colonial Wars and the Context of Military Violence*, A. Smith (trans.), Cambridge, MA 2017, p. 42.

42 On the causes of war, see K. Bachmann, *Genocidal Empires: German Colonialism in Africa and the Third Reich*, Berlin 2018, pp. 38–57.

43 Kuss, *German Colonial Wars and the Context of Military Violence*, pp. 37–45.

44 I. V. Hull, *Absolute Destruction: Military Culture and the Practices of War in Imperial Germany*, Ithaca 2005, chap. 1; Häussler, *Der Genozid an den Herero*, chap. 3.

45 Bley, *Namibia under German Rule*, pp. 155–169; Häussler, *Der Genozid an den Herero*, pp. 118–132.

46 My account draws on the studies of Kuss, *German Colonial Wars and the Context of Military Violence*, pp. 45–52; Hull, *Absolute Destruction*, chap. 2; Häussler, *Der Genozid an den Herero*, chaps. 4 & 5; Bachmann, *Genocidal Empires*, pp. 57–87.

man subjects and that no prisoners were to be taken. The Herero were to leave the colony for good, and it was implied that the Omaheke was the sole exit route. By this time, however, most of the Herero who had fled eastwards were presumably already dead. According to a recent study, roughly 1,000 Herero managed to reach British Bechuanaland in this way, and another 2,000 escaped to the Cape Colony. Still others – how many is unclear – found their way back into the protectorate.⁴⁷

After the events at the Waterberg, various Nama groups in the south also began taking up arms.⁴⁸ With only a few hundred combatants, the battle-hardened Nama commandos waged a fierce guerrilla war against the German troops, who had to be reinforced several times. Despite commanding up to 14,000 soldiers, the German Empire needed another two-and-a-half years to win the increasingly unpopular war. In early 1905, the German troops started to establish a camp system modelled on the British concentration camps of the Second Boer War.⁴⁹ There approximately 17,000 Herero and Nama were held captive, most of them women and children. The internment camps served both as a method of punishment but also as a means to buy time: the German authorities were unsure how to deal with the colony, which was in shambles.

4. Envisioning a Self-Sustaining Overseas Province

Together with the Maji Maji War (1905–1908) in East Africa, the escalating violence in the Southwest African protectorate plunged the German colonial project into crisis. The government dissolved the parliament in 1906 after it refused to provide further funds for the war in Southwest Africa. The elections held the subsequent year were overshadowed by the colonial issue. In response to this crisis, the authorities in Berlin promised comprehensive reforms.⁵⁰ In 1907, the Colonial Department of the Foreign Office was reorganized as a separate central authority and became the Imperial Colonial Office. Its newly appointed head, the liberal Bernhard Dernburg, a former banker and executive specialized in redeveloping big businesses, travelled to Africa twice to acquaint himself with the situation on the ground.⁵¹ Ending colonial rule, however, was not on the table. The new approach aimed instead at transforming the protectorates into stable and self-sustaining provinces of a “Greater German Empire”. The overseas territories were supposed to become less dependent on the German state through economic assistance and political reform.

47 Numbers according to Bachmann, *Genocidal Empires*, p. 77.

48 *Ibid.*, pp. 90–98.

49 *Ibid.*, pp. 98–112. See also J. Kreienbaum, “Ein trauriges Fiasko”: Koloniale Konzentrationslager im südlichen Afrika 1900–1908, Hamburg 2015.

50 E. Grimmer-Solem, *Learning Empire: Globalization and the German Quest for World Status, 1875–1919*, Cambridge 2019, chaps. 8 & 9.

51 U. Lindner, *Koloniale Begegnungen: Deutschland und Großbritannien als Imperialmächte in Afrika 1880–1914*, Frankfurt am Main/New York 2011, pp. 139–151.

There is a bitter irony in the fact that a core element of the reform process in Southwest Africa consisted of three “native ordinances” issued in 1907. Their preparation had already begun before Dernburg’s appointment. One of the main initiators was Governor Friedrich von Lindequist, who succeeded von Trotha at the end of 1905 and later became Dernburg’s deputy in the Berlin Imperial Colonial Office. Although these regulations were, in some respects, a continuation of older developments reaching back to the pre-war period, they helped change the course of the colony’s evolution.⁵² Before the ordinances came into effect, the Herero and Nama territories were first confiscated and a police zone established as a designated area for European settlement.⁵³ This zone encompassed most of the southern and central regions, whereas the populous northern regions remained outside the borders of police protection. Thus the borderland’s expansionist drive came to a halt, and a core region crystallized.

Within the police zone, the authorities were concerned with restricting the freedom of movement of Africans. After the war, many Herero travelled through central Namibia in search of relatives to rebuild their communities and thus regain the ability to self-organize as a social group.⁵⁴ The German authorities wanted to prevent this by any means necessary, while simultaneously accommodating the settlers by creating an African proletariat deprived of any means of production. The native ordinances stipulated that every African above seven years of age had to register with the local authorities. Travel to other districts was allowed only with a special permit. Furthermore, the regulations prohibited African settlements from consisting of more than 10 families and required their remaining cattle to be confiscated unless an exemption had been granted for livestock breeding. If they did not have a documented livelihood, Africans could be charged with vagrancy; thus, in practice, they were obligated to work for Europeans. Even within the police zone, however, the German authorities never managed to enforce these rules systematically.⁵⁵ The colonial administration was far from being the well-ordered police state envisioned by the regulations.

In fact, the Germans needed cheap labour if they wanted to successfully transform Southwest Africa into a self-sustaining province of a stable overseas empire. In 1908, diamonds were discovered several miles east of Lüderitz Bay, and they soon became the colony’s primary source of revenue. The growing mining sector was, however, labour-intensive and required a further extension of the railroads. To meet the demand for labour, the authorities endeavoured to recruit contract workers from the northern regions and thereby integrated them, at least economically. Military conquest and direct rule were still out of

52 J. Zimmerer, *Deutsche Herrschaft über Afrikaner: Staatlicher Machtanspruch und Wirklichkeit im kolonialen Namibia*, Münster 2004, chap. 2.

53 G. Miescher, *Namibia’s Red Line: The History of a Veterinary and Settlement Border*, Basingstoke 2012, chap. 2. For the *Landespolizei* established in 1905/07, see J. Zollmann, *Koloniale Herrschaft und ihre Grenzen: Die Kolonialpolizei in Deutsch-Südwestafrika 1894–1915*, Göttingen 2010; M. Muschalek, *Violence as Usual: Policing and the Colonial State in German Southwest Africa*, Ithaca 2019.

54 Wallace, *A History of Namibia*, pp. 183–189.

55 Zimmerer, *Deutsche Herrschaft über Afrikaner*, chap. 4.

reach.⁵⁶ Simultaneously, a growing number of Europeans became interested in settling in the colony, including many former soldiers who had stayed after the war. By the First World War, up to 15,000 people of European descent resided in Southwest Africa, with a total population of 69,000 in the police zone. The increasing number of settlers made it necessary for the authorities to concede them greater rights to participate in the government. Organs of communal self-government and a state council were installed, which bolstered settler sovereignty.⁵⁷ This trajectory was, however, brought to an abrupt halt as the result of an external event. In 1915, troops of the Union of South Africa occupied the neighbouring German colony as part of the hostilities of the First World War. The Great War might have originated in the European state system, but it was fought out between global empires and directly affected the German overseas territories.

5. Conclusion

As this article has explained, the protectorate of Southwest Africa evolved along a specific trajectory sequence. First, in the 1880s, parts of what is today Namibia became a German sphere of influence. This sphere can be understood as a weakly institutionalized political space, only loosely attached to the metropolitan state and in which the colonizing group has only scant presence on the ground. The German Empire was, however, able to stake its claims this way and kept competing empires at bay. Since it quickly became apparent that the leading non-state actors were unable or unwilling to run the protectorate, the state reluctantly decided to take control. It did so cautiously at first and then, after having explored various alternatives, more decisively, this time sending not only a small delegation but also actual troops to the region.

Consequently, from the late 1880s onwards, Southwest Africa was in the process of morphing into an imperial borderland. However, its defining frontiers were internal rather than external. That is to say, within the diplomatically established boundaries of the protectorate, the German colonizers gradually expanded the scope of on-site control through a combination of small wars and alliances with African leaders. As the military frontier expanded, Europeans slowly settled in central Namibia, putting increasing strain on indigenous societies. It took less than a decade for this conflictual situation to escalate into massive violence. After Governor Leutwein's strategy failed to produce the desired outcome, the metropolitan elites took control. In Lothar von Trotha, Berlin found a proven hardliner who subsequently steered the fate of the protectorate, resorting to increasingly cruel methods.

The Berlin authorities responded to this crisis with comprehensive reforms. The new approach aimed at transforming the troubled colonies into stable provinces of a prosperous overseas empire. In Southwest Africa, the administration first established a police zone

56 Ibid., pp. 211–228.

57 Wallace, *A History of Namibia*, pp. 197–199.

as the designated area for European settlements. A rigid system of indentured labour was subsequently introduced, and the tribal organisation of the Herero was severely weakened. The fluid and highly contentious frontiers of the borderland era solidified, and a core region crystallized, separating itself from the areas that were treated, for the time being, as an “internal exterior”.

With each step, the protectorate’s character changed fundamentally. If one wanted to subsume the entire sequence of trajectories along which the colony evolved under a single category, as “settler colonialism”, this would obscure the profound shifts and transformations shaping its course. However, the argument here is not merely that more specific classifications are needed to better reflect the complexity of the subject. These categories must also capture the dynamic character of the protectorate, its changing shape, and its developing organisational structure. The categories of “sphere of influence”, “imperial borderland”, and “imperial province” thus ought not to be understood as a loose series of concepts. Rather, they represent an evolutionary sequence: the latter social formations – as described by these categories – developed out of and build upon the previous ones without being a necessary outcome of the process. They gradually unfolded as “creative” responses to disruptive events and crises that threatened the continued existence of the protectorate. Thus, understanding the transition between them is as important as identifying their differences. What remains as an object of comparison, then, are the divergent paths along which colonies and empires evolve.

Looking for Empires: Japanese Colonialism and the Comparative Gaze

Kate McDonald

ABSTRACTS

Dieser Aufsatz durchmustert Trends der jüngeren englischsprachigen Literatur über japanischen Imperialismus und Kolonialismus. Die Ansätze der anglophon-vergleichenden Beschäftigung mit dem japanischen Kolonialismus haben sich in den letzten Jahren verschoben. Eine erste Generation stellte den inter-imperialen und inter-regionalen Vergleich in den Mittelpunkt. Neuere Untersuchungen entwickeln ihre Vergleichskategorien hingegen aus einer empirisch fundierten Analyse schwelennaher und grenzüberschreitender Phänomene. Insgesamt wird das japanische Imperium nicht mehr als einzigartiges Gebilde oder Summe spezifischer Beziehungen zwischen Metropole und Kolonien dargestellt. Vielmehr wird die Untersuchung des Kolonialismus innerhalb des japanischen Imperiums als Entwirrung der Fäden angegangen, welche die vielen japanischen Imperien ausmachten und immer noch ausmachen. Tatsächlich ist die spannendste vergleichende Forschung diejenige, die sich ausdrücklich gar nicht als komparative versteht, das Feld gleichwohl aber dazu zwingt, die Möglichkeiten und Grenzen komparativer Wissensproduktion neu einzuschätzen.

This article surveys trends in recent English-language studies of Japanese imperialism and colonialism. Anglophone scholarship on comparative Japanese colonialism has shifted approaches in recent years. The early generation of comparative scholarship emphasized inter-imperial and inter-regional comparison. Newer scholarship builds comparative categories from the grounded analysis of liminal and transgressive subjects. Overall, the field increasingly represents the Japanese empire not as a singular phenomenon or a collection of distinct colony-metropole relationships. Instead, the field approaches the study of colonialism in the Japanese empire as an act of untangling the threads that made, and continue to make up, the many Japanese empires. The most exciting comparative work is that which does not explicitly define itself as comparative at all, yet which forces the field to re-evaluate the possibilities and limits of producing knowledge through comparison.

Anglophone scholarship on comparative Japanese colonialism has shifted approaches in recent years. The early generation of comparative scholarship emphasized inter-imperial and inter-regional comparison. Newer scholarship builds comparative categories from the grounded analysis of liminal and transgressive subjects. Overall, the field increasingly represents the Japanese empire not as a singular phenomenon or a collection of distinct colony-metropole relationships. Instead, the field approaches the study of colonialism in the Japanese empire as an act of untangling the threads that made, and continue to make up, the many Japanese empires. The most exciting comparative work is that which does not explicitly define itself as comparative at all, yet which forces the field to re-evaluate the possibilities and limits of producing knowledge through comparison.

In the article that follows, I trace the emergence of a comparative perspective that treats the Japanese empire as empires plural. I situate this phenomenon in the context of Anglophone scholarship on Japanese colonialism over the past several decades as well as recent scholarship in the field of comparative colonialism. The first three sections introduce the “anomaly” approach, which has been the traditional approach to analysing the Japanese empire in comparative frame. These sections discuss three ways in which the field has challenged and continues to struggle with a comparative framework that is defined by a quest for Japanese difference. The first section shows how recent scholarship challenges the idea that the Japanese empire was an anomaly among modern empires by focusing on the changing nature of imperialism in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. These works highlight the constitutive role of Japanese imperialism in shaping the new international order. The second section shows how other scholars have turned to the idea of settler colonialism to challenge the notion of Japanese anomalousness. These scholars situate Japanese colonialism within a global field of empire and settler colonialism. Yet, as the third section argues, there is tension in the field of Japanese settler colonial studies between works that reintroduce the anomaly idea through the concept of the Japanese empire as a unique example of “coloured imperialism”, and works that argue that the racial consciousness and racism of Japanese colonialism makes Japanese settler colonialism a part of the late nineteenth and early twentieth-century world, not distinct from it. The final section shows how some scholars have crafted a new comparative framework that abandons the anomaly ideal in favour of an approach that treats the Japanese Empire as a plural project, that is, as Japanese *empires*. Within the overarching structures of settler colonialism and the new, global imperialism, the historical phenomenon of “Japanese imperialism and colonialism” featured a wide variety of subject positions. Works which adopt the empires plural approach suggest that the most rigorous comparative frame is not Japanese empire versus another empire (e.g. “Western empires”, “British Empire”, or “American Empire”), but between and across subject positions.

1. The Empire of Nation-States

The first phase of Anglophone research on Japanese imperialism compared Japanese imperialism to “Western imperialism”. Beginning with Mark R. Peattie and Ramon H. Myers’ *The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895–1945*, Anglophone historians sought to distinguish Japanese imperialism by comparing it against a European model. For Peattie, the Japanese empire was an “anomaly” among empires. One, Japanese leaders had been subject to the semi-colonialism of “unequal treaties”. They knew first-hand the significance of treaty and territory to geopolitical power. Two, the Japanese empire was “late” to the game of imperialism. There were few unclaimed territories in Asia. Three, Japan’s “most important colonies, Taiwan and Korea, were well-populated lands whose inhabitants were racially akin to their Japanese rulers with whom they shared a common cultural heritage”.¹ Japanese colonial policies and imperial discourse incorporated this racial and cultural affinity.

On the surface, all of these points are accurate. Japan did not claim Taiwan, its first formal colony, until 1895. By that point, the British, French, and Dutch empires were well established in East, Southeast, and South Asia. There was little land to be claimed under the *terra nullius* model. The Qing Court, while technically still sovereign, bore the burden of multiple unequal treaties, which significantly undermined Chinese sovereignty. Having just emerged from their own subordination to unequal treaties, Japanese leaders were intimately familiar with the havoc that extraterritoriality and the denial of tariff autonomy wreaked on a state’s ability to protect itself economically and therefore also militarily. They were equally familiar with the role that these treaties played in boosting the political, economic, and military power of imperial states. To put it bluntly, Japanese leaders recognized that there were colonized nations and imperial nation-states. The Japanese government pursued the latter status in its domestic and foreign policy throughout the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. By the time Japan claimed its second formal colony, Korea, in 1910, Japanese leaders had used warfare, unequal treaties, and informal imperialism to establish Japan as an imperial power in Asia and a “Great Power” on the global scene.²

Japanese colonial governance and imperial discourse promoted the idea that Japanese people shared a racial and cultural affinity with Koreans and people of Chinese descent in Taiwan. Japanese colonialists legitimated the colonization of Korea in part through the theory of Japanese-Korean common ancestry (*nissen dōsoron*). Indeed, the official term for the colonization of Korea was “annexation”, a concept that referenced the notion that colonization was returning Koreans and Japanese people to their ancestral state of

- 1 M. Peattie, Japanese Attitudes toward Colonialism, 1895–1945, in: R. Myers/M. Peattie (eds.), *The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895–1937*, Princeton 1989, p. 6. See also K. McDonald, *Placing Empire: Travel and the Social Imagination in Imperial Japan*, Berkeley 2017, p. xiv.
- 2 A. Iriye, Japan’s Drive to Great Power Status, in: M. Jansen (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Japan*, vol. 5, Cambridge 1989, pp. 721–782.

togetherness.³ In Taiwan, Japanese colonialists argued that Japan would be successful in Taiwan where previous, European colonialisms had failed because Japanese and Chinese people were “same script, same race” (*dōbun dōshu*).⁴ As the empire expanded and inter-imperial conflicts in Asia intensified, the government adopted the notion of the Japanese empire as an empire of Asians for Asians, in contrast to Western empires, which were rooted in white supremacy.⁵

While the chronology and discourses of modern Japanese colonialism are not in dispute, more recent scholarship pushes back on the idea that the timing and race consciousness of Japanese colonialism make the Japanese empire an anomaly among modern empires. Instead, newer scholarship recognizes that the structure, discourse, and racial politics of Japanese imperialism were co-constituted with the emerging global order of imperial nation-states. Quite in contrast to the imperialism that came before, the legitimacy of late-nineteenth-century empire relied not only on the recognition of the state’s authority by its subjects but also increasingly on the multilateral, international recognition of a given state’s authority over its claimed territory. Thus, Japan’s modern empire was one instantiation of a transnational, global practice of colonization and empire-building that looked outward to the authority of treaties and nascent international law as well as inward for legitimacy.⁶ Japanese leaders sought to achieve recognition of Japan’s empire in a global order that was increasingly equating civilisation with a global order of territorial nation-states, and working assiduously to establish a framework of diplomatic practice and international law that would affirm the necessity of colonialism in this new context.⁷ As Alexis Dudden argues, “international terms won the twentieth century”.⁸

Japanese colonialism played an important role in defining the terms of the new global imperial order. In this sense, the anomaly was not Japanese imperialism but rather the new imperialism and colonialism of the late-nineteenth and twentieth centuries. This new imperialism sought to establish a clear legal basis for colonialism within a framework of international relations that recognized the fundamental sovereignty of the nation-state. Japan’s colonization of Korea is perhaps the best example of this. In the case of Korea, Japanese officials and international legal scholars worked assiduously to establish a vocabulary and diplomatic practice that would lead to the legalization of colonialism in international law. Japanese officials prosecuted a long campaign to have Korea recognized as a protectorate of Japan. The process culminated in the Second Japan-Korea Treaty of 1905, which declared Korea to be a protectorate of Japan. It was subsequently

3 P. Duus, *The Abacus and the Sword: The Japanese Penetration of Korea, 1895–1910*, Berkeley 1998, pp. 417–422.

4 E. Tai, *Kokugo and Colonial Education in Taiwan*, in: *positions: east asia cultures critique* 7 (1999) 2, pp. 503–540.

5 S. Saaler / J. V. Koschmann (eds.), *Pan-Asianism in Modern Japanese History: Colonialism, Regionalism, and Borders*, London 2007.

6 P. Duara, *Sovereignty and Authenticity: Manchukuo and the East Asian Modern*, Lanham 2003.

7 M. Auslin, *Negotiating with Imperialism: The Unequal Treaties and the Culture of Japanese Diplomacy*, Cambridge, MA 1999; S. Chatani, *Nation-Empire: Ideology and Rural Youth Mobilization in Japan and Its Colonies*, Ithaca 2018; S. Konishi, *Anarchist Modernity: Cooperatism and Japanese-Russian Intellectual Relations*, Cambridge, MA 2013; McDonald, *Placing Empire*.

8 A. Dudden, *Japan’s Colonization of Korea: Discourse and Power*, Honolulu 2004, p. 27.

reaffirmed at the second International Hague Convention of Peace in 1907, when representatives of Korean Emperor Gojong asked the conference to repudiate the treaty as coerced and therefore illegal, and the conference refused to admit the Korean presentation. As a result, “the text of Japan-Korea relations between 1904 and 1910 became legal precedent through the terms ‘admitted in the practice of civilized States’”.⁹ The work of Japanese officials to establish a racial or ethnic basis for imperial expansion dovetailed with the work of other political leaders to enshrine the territorial nation-state as the basis for legitimate government and international relations. When U.S. President Theodore Roosevelt was awarded a Nobel Peace Prize for his work facilitating the negotiations for the Treaty of Portsmouth, which ended the Russo-Japanese War, he argued that establishing clear claims of sovereignty over the world’s territory would bring peace – especially if these distributions of sovereignty placed “backward” states under the control of civilized nation-states.¹⁰ The Treaty, which became one of the foundational documents of the legal order of twentieth-century imperialism, subsequently granted Japan control over the island of S. Saghalien (J: Karafuto), and its Ainu inhabitants, the Russian railway concession and overwhelming administrative authority over much of Manchuria, and recognized Korea as a protectorate of Japan.

2. Settler Colonialism and the Modern Japanese State

Emerging global and transnational frameworks of imperial and colonial practice shaped Japanese approaches to colonialism and were shaped by Japanese efforts to establish an internationally recognized empire. Scholarship on Japanese imperialism has increasingly highlighted the global and transnational nature of nineteenth and twentieth century empire to argue that the structure of Japanese colonialism was not a particularly or uniquely “Japanese” structure. As part of this challenge, historians of modern Japan and the Japanese empire have re-evaluated earlier, modernisation theory approaches to modern Japanese history, which drew a distinction between Japanese modern state-building, presumed to represent a normal process of civilisational development, and Japanese expansionism, which was treated as a failure of modernisation.¹¹ Early critiques of this division demonstrated the intertwined nature of the history of “modern Japan” and the history of “the Japanese empire”.¹² More recent approaches identify settler colonialism as a foundational component of Japanese modernity.¹³ In so doing, they challenge the

9 Dudden, *Japan’s Colonization of Korea*, p. 73.

10 T. Roosevelt, Nobel Lecture, 5 May 1910, <https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/1906/roosevelt/lecture/> (accessed 7 August 2020); S. Konishi, *Anarchist Modernity*, p. 157.

11 The most famous example of this framework is E. O. Reischauer, *What Went Wrong*, in: J. Morley (ed.), *Dilemmas of Growth in Prewar Japan*, Princeton 1971, pp. 489–510.

12 E. Oguma, *Tan’itsu minzoku shinwa no kigen: ‘Nihonjin’ no jigazō no keifu*, Tokyo 1995; E. Oguma, *‘Nihonjin’ no kyōkai: Okinawa, Ainu, Taiwan, Chōsen, shokuminchi shihai kara fukki undō made*, Tokyo 1998; L. Young, *Japan’s Total Empire: Manchuria and the Culture of Total War*, Berkeley 1998.

13 S. Lu, *The Making of Japanese Settler Colonialism: Malthusianism and Trans-Pacific Migration, 1868–1961*, Cam-

distinction between an “internal” and an “external” colonialism in Japan, and situate the many Japanese colonial projects within a global history of conflicts over race and capital driven by settler colonialism.¹⁴

Japanese settler colonialism was transnational in structure and global in scope. It continues to the present day. Central to recognizing settler colonialism as foundational to the modern Japanese state has been recognizing Ezo, rather than Taiwan, as the modern Japanese state’s first official colonial claim. The new Meiji government claimed Ezo, now the prefecture of Hokkaidō, in 1869. Ezo was and is home to many Ainu people, who call the land *Ainu mosir*. The Ainu people who lived and live on Ezo had been subordinated to the early modern Tokugawa state since the mid-eighteenth century. During that period, they retained hunting, fishing, and trading rights, and were recognized as a distinct community with a distinct political structure in their own right. At the same time, the Matsumae domain, which the Tokugawa shogunate granted the privilege and duty of controlling commerce with and access to Ezo, also moved to consolidate international recognition of the Tokugawa shogunate’s sovereignty over the island, introduced devastating diseases, and asserted economic authority.¹⁵

With the establishment of the Meiji state, however, the terms of Japan’s imperial formation changed. The colonization of Ezo in 1869 proceeded on the grounds of *terra nullius*. As Katsuya Hirano argues, “the new form of subjection in the modern era deprived the Ainu of their means of sustenance – the land, water and forest – and hunting and gathering way of life”.¹⁶ In this sense, imperialism per se was not new to the Japanese state. Settler colonialism was. The emphasis on territorial sovereignty, wage labour, and accumulation, as well as a newfound sense of the “dispensability” of the Ainu people themselves, distinguished the modern state’s colonialism from the imperial formation that had previously structured relations between *wajin* (people identified culturally and socially with the Tokugawa political order) and Ainu.¹⁷ Recent scholarship also attends to the history of Japanese imperial formations and capital accumulation in the Ryūkyū Kingdom, which the Satsuma domain subordinated to the Tokugawa political order in

bridge, UK 2019; E. O’Dwyer, *Significant Soil: Settler Colonialism and Japan’s Urban Empire in Manchuria*, Cambridge, MA 2015.

- 14 M. Mason, *Dominant Narratives of Colonial Hokkaidō and Imperial Japan: Envisioning the Periphery and the Modern Nation-State*, New York 2012.
- 15 E. Boyle, *Imperial Practice and the Making of Modern Japan’s Territory: Towards a Reconsideration of Empire’s Boundaries*, in: *Geographical Review of Japan Series B* 88 (2016) 2, pp. 66–79; B. Walker, *The Conquest of Ainu Lands: Ecology and Culture in Japanese Expansion, 1590–1800*, Berkeley 2001.
- 16 K. Hirano, *Settler Colonialism and the Making of Japan’s Hokkaidō*, in: E. Cavanaugh/L. Veracini (eds.), *The Routledge Handbook of the History of Settler Colonialism*, New York 2016, p. 327.
- 17 K. Hirano, *Thanatopolitics in the Making of Japan’s Hokkaidō: Settler Colonialism and Primitive Accumulation*, in: *Critical Historical Studies* 2 (2015) 2, pp. 191–218; D. Howell, *Territoriality and Collective Identity in Tokugawa Japan*, *Daedalus* 127 (1998) 3, pp. 105–132; M. Mason, *Dominant Narratives of Colonial Hokkaido and Imperial Japan: Envisioning the Periphery and the Modern Nation-State*, New York 2012, pp. 7–10.

1609 and the modern state colonized in 1879.¹⁸ The Ryūkyū Kingdom is now Japan's Okinawa Prefecture.

New scholarship on Japanese colonialism demonstrates that Japanese settler colonialism had a transnational structure and a global scope. As Eiichiro Azuma argues, Japanese settler colonialism was “borderless settler colonialism”.¹⁹ Japanese settler colonialism extended beyond the boundaries of the Japanese empire. Within the empire, Japanese colonial governance promoted “conventional settler colonialism” – a settler colonialism premised on “native elimination” – in Hokkaidō and the central, mountainous regions of Taiwan. In Korea, Okinawa, Manchuria, and urban, plains areas of Taiwan, colonial governance promoted a more conventional colonialism, in which other concerns such as industrial development and political control “prevailed over the goal of land seizure and community-building based on native elimination”.²⁰ But settlement efforts did not stop at the boundaries of the empire. Elite emigration societies and private companies encouraged Japanese farmers to settle in Canada, the U.S. West and Hawai'i. After the Gentleman's Agreement in 1907 closed the United States to further Japanese emigration, the focus on transpacific settlement shifted to South America.²¹

These new approaches to Japanese settler colonialism encourage us, as Jun Uchida argues, “to think about settler colonialism as a global formation shaped in locally specific contexts, and to push the growing scholarly discourse on settlers beyond European examples”.²² As Azuma and Lu argue in their respective studies, Japanese migrants, by virtue of racist laws in North America and the timing of their arrival, were often excluded from property ownership or otherwise funnelled into factory work. In response, Japanese settler colonial discourse recognized wage labour as well as land acquisition as positive accumulation that fostered the economic and political security of the state. This expansive definition of accumulation and a discourse of overseas migration as a solution to Japan's “Malthusian crisis” tie Japanese migration to Hawai'i and California, Japanese migration to Hokkaidō and Manchuria, and Japanese migration to South America together into a coherent phenomenon. Japanese settlers imagined themselves to be pioneers of Japan's overseas development regardless of the sovereign status of the destination territory – and the state agreed. Thus, the empire celebrated those who migrated to Hawai'i, California, or Brazil as “heroes” of Japan's overseas development. In many cases, these “transmigrants” returned in the 1920s and 1930s to lend their experience to growing Japanese settler colonies in Manchuria and Micronesia.²³ As a whole, Japanese settler colonial-

18 W. Matsumura, *The Limits of Okinawa: Japanese Capitalism, Living Labor, and Theorizations of Community*, Durham 2015, pp. 27–48.

19 E. Azuma, *In Search of Our Frontier: Japanese America and Settler Colonialism in the Construction of Japan's Borderless Empire*, Berkeley 2019, p. 6.

20 *Ibid.*, p. 6; P. Barclay, *Japanese Empire in Taiwan*, in: D. Ludden (ed.), *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Asian History*, New York 2020.

21 Lu, *The Making of Japanese Settler Colonialism*, pp. 69–98.

22 Uchida, *Brokers of Empire*, p. 19; C. Elkin and S. Pedersen (eds.), *Settler Colonialism in the Twentieth Century: Projects, Practices, Legacies*, London 2005.

23 Azuma, *In Search of Our Frontiers*, p. 3.

ism suggests the need to incorporate rather than exclude Japanese examples. As Azuma argues, rather than simply monopolizing land, “the formative process of constructing a new Japan was inseparable from the triangular relationship that encompassed not only land-grabbing settlers and dispensable indigenes but also pre-existing non-Japanese residents and other competing immigrant-settler groups”.²⁴

3. Race and the Comparative Frame

Race was central to the history of Japanese settler colonialism. Within the global and transnational structure of “later imperialism”, Japanese colonial governance and imperial discourse emphasized Japan’s unique position as a “coloured” empire.²⁵ Central to Japanese colonial policy in the formal Japanese empire – and, indeed, dear to the hearts of many colonial bureaucrats – was the idea that Japan had a moral obligation to use its empire to eliminate anti-Asian racism around the globe. In the context of settler colonialism beyond imperial borders, the idea that Japanese settlers were ambassadors of Japanese civility gendered Japanese emigration policy. Migrant women were placed under special scrutiny, while laws governing inter-marriage within the empire cast men as the bearers of Japanese national identity.²⁶ Fukuzawa Yukichi, Japan’s most famous liberal intellectual of the Meiji period, argued that Japanese success as settlers in North America would further the urgent project of carving Japan out of Asia in the minds of white imperialists, equating Japanese people with white people and demonstrating the superiority of Japanese people to Chinese people.²⁷ The rise of the Japanese empire, particularly after Japanese forces defeated Russian forces in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905, lent increased urgency to this mission as “yellow peril” discourse exploded around the white imperial world.

In the development of Japanese colonial policy, racial thinking and knowledge production played a central role. Colonial governments partnered with Japanese historians, geographers, and anthropologists to incorporate the land, peoples, and pasts of the regions under Japanese rule into a racialized schema of civility and savagery, which legitimated the superiority of the Japanese nation and state vis-à-vis its Ainu, Ryūkyūan, indigenous Taiwanese, Taiwanese Chinese, Micronesian, Korean, and Chinese subjects.²⁸ This knowledge would also, colonial scholars and bureaucrats argued, illuminate the precise

24 Ibid., p. 6.

25 R. Tierney, *Tropics of Savagery: The Culture of Japanese in Comparative Frame*, Berkeley 2010.

26 S. Burns/B. Brooks (eds.), *Gender and Law in the Japanese Imperium*, Honolulu 2014; B. Mihalopoulos, *Sex in Japan’s Globalization, 1870–1930: Prostitutes, Emigration and Nation-Building*, London 2011.

27 Azuma, *In Search of Our Frontiers*, pp. 44–47.

28 S. Tanaka, *Japan’s Orient: Rendering Pasts into History*, Berkeley 1993; H. Pai, *Constructing “Korean” Origins: A Critical Review of Archaeology, Historiography, and Racial Myth in Korean State Formation Theories*, Cambridge, MA 2000; P. Barclay, *Outcasts of Empire: Japan’s Rule on Taiwan’s Savage Border*, Berkeley 2017; M. Tamanoi, *Knowledge, Power, and Racial Classifications: The “Japanese” in “Manchuria”*, in: *Journal of Asian Studies* 59 (2000) 2, pp. 248–276.

interventions that the colonial governments should take in order to lead Japan's many colonized peoples out of savagery and into civility. Japanese colonialism was, as one of its chief architects Gotō Shinpei defined it, "scientific colonialism".

Some comparative studies analyse Japanese imperialism as a case of "coloured imperialism", "triadic imperialism", or "subaltern imperialism". These terms attempt to capture the contradictions between the Japanese state's enthusiastic embrace of "national imperialism" and the ideological imperative to justify the Japanese empire's inequality and violence as "Asian" liberation.²⁹ Other scholars argue that these frameworks perpetuate the "anomaly" approach under a different name. What appears to be "mimicry" on the micro scale is "co-constitutive" on the macro scale. As Christopher Hill argues, the idea that the Japanese empire appropriated Western imperialism's racial and (racialized) civilisational hierarchies "imposes a synchronic structure on a diachronic phenomenon: a geographically extensive, tangled history, involving several empires, of which the literature of Japanese imperialism was a part".³⁰

Attending to the global and regional contexts of Japan's settler colonialism, critical scholarship approaches race as a dynamic mechanism for acquiring and achieving political and economic power rather than a pre-existing feature of inter-imperial or settler colonial relations. As Jun Uchida argues in the case of Korea, settler colonial power was "a practice rather than an attribute".³¹ Japanese settlers in Korea used the malleability of racial discourses of identity to develop their own power and political identity in opposition to colonized Koreans *and* the Japanese colonial government in Korea. In Taiwan, Japanese settlers who came from the colonized prefecture of Okinawa mobilized racial discourses of inclusion and exclusion to lay claim to an ethnic Japanese identity, and the political power that came with it, vis-à-vis the island's Chinese population, which was generally speaking far better capitalized than settlers from Okinawa, and the indigenous peoples who lived on the land that settlers sought to occupy.³² Race likewise played a central role in Japanese capitalism's strategies of primitive accumulation, as the colonial and metropolitan governments deployed racialized notions of difference and inferiority to justify the exploitation of Korean, Chinese, and indigenous labourers.³³

Other historians of Japanese imperialism and colonialism are turning to frameworks built on transpacific comparisons and connectivities to incorporate the racial consciousness of white empires into the analytical frame. These works argue that Japanese imperi-

29 Tierney, *Tropics of Savagery*, p. 18; K. Inoue, *A Little Story of Settler Colonialism: Imperialist Consciousness and Children's Literature in the 1920s*, in: H. Lee / M. Mason (eds.), *Reading Colonial Japan: Text, Context, and Critique*, Stanford 2012, p. 191; J. Sand, *Subaltern Imperialists: The New Historiography of the Japanese Empire*, in: *Past & Present* 225 (2014) 1, pp. 273–288. For "national imperialism", see Chatani, *Nation-Empire*, pp. 4–5.

30 C. Hill, *Review of Tropics of Savagery: The Culture of Japanese Empire in Comparative Frame*, in: *Journal of Japanese Studies* 38 (2012) 1, p. 162.

31 J. Uchida, *Brokers of Empire: Japanese Settler Colonialism in Korea, 1876–1945*, Cambridge, MA 2011, p. 30.

32 H. Matsuda, *Liminality of the Japanese Empire: Border Crossings from Okinawa to Colonial Taiwan*, Honolulu 2018, pp. 59–78.

33 M. Driscoll, *Absolute Erotic, Absolute Grotesque: The Living, Dead, and Undead in Japan's Imperialism, 1895–1945*, Durham 2010; K. Kawashima, *The Proletarian Gamble: Korean Workers in Interwar Japan*, Durham 2009.

alists' and colonialists' attentiveness to race makes Japanese settler colonialism a part of the late nineteenth and early twentieth-century world not distinct from it. The Japanese colonization of Hokkaidō, Okinawa, and Taiwan positioned Japan as one of the key players in a "global field of imperialism" that was intensely concerned with crafting a racial basis for political and economic exploitation.³⁴ European and American colonialists and imperialists were as focused on the racial and racist character of their empires as Japanese imperialists were. Indeed, the success of Japanese imperialism and its pan-Asianist rhetoric pushed the American empire to reformulate its own discourses of race and nation, particularly during World War II.³⁵ The racial consciousness of Japanese imperialists provides an avenue for challenging the distinction between "coloured imperialism" and "imperialism". After all, white is a colour. It is a colour with a history, too. As Marilyn Lake and Henry Reynolds argue, the distinction between a white and non-white empire is itself a product of "the global ascendancy of the politics of whiteness". White empires "recast the previous multiplicity of nations, races, and religions – Aryan, Caucasian, Chinese, Hindu, Kanakas, Islanders, Malays, Blacks, Lascars, Moslems, Japanese – in binary terms as 'white' or 'not-white'".³⁶ Accepting a binary distinction between white and non-white empires furthers the already long life of a comparative frame that was not only rooted in European imperialism, but was also a central tool in its reproduction.

4. Empires Plural

If we set aside comparative frameworks based on a quest for Japanese anomalousness, what do we work with instead? The newest generation of scholarship on Japanese imperialism and colonialism argues that when thinking comparatively, the Japanese empire should be approached as a plural project. These works show that within the overarching imperial and global structures of Japanese colonialism, there was such a variety of subject positions that the appropriate comparative frame is not empire to empire, but this subject position to that subject position. As Tristan Grunow writes in a review of new works in the field, "Moving forward scholars must continue to [...] recover the personal histories of obscured peoples across the empire and to rediscover their lives as complicated, diverse individuals, not simply as colonized subjects."³⁷ Imperial subjects, too. More often than not, a Japanese emigrant's destination defined whether or not his (or her)

34 J. Go, *Global Fields and Imperial Forms: Field Theory and the British and American Empires*, in: *Sociological Theory* 26 (2008) 3, pp. 201–229.

35 T. Fujitani, *Race for Empire: Koreans as Japanese and Japanese as Americans during World War II*, Berkeley 2011; G. Horne, *Race War! White Supremacy and the Japanese Attack on the British Empire*, New York 2004; Y. Onishi, *Transpacific Antiracism: Afro-Asian Solidarity in 20th-Century Black America, Japan, and Okinawa*, New York 2013.

36 M. Lake / H. Reynolds, Introduction, in: id. (eds.), *Drawing the Global Colour Line: White Men's Countries and the Question of Racial Equality*, Melbourne 2008, p. 9.

37 T. Grunow, *Pushing the Margins: New Perspectives on the Modern Japanese Nation*, in: *The Journal of Asian Studies* 79 (2020) 2, p. 501.

history would be analysed as part of Asian-American history or Japanese colonial history. “Like migration routes themselves, which must be established and learned”, write Martin Dusinberre and Mariko Iijima, “the historiographical pathways toward studying Japanese ‘colonists’ and ‘emigrants’ became institutionalized in scholarly associations and department nomenclature – and can only be unlearned with great difficulty”.³⁸ In short, grappling with the geographic, social, and political complexity that shaped the lives of colonized and imperial subjects is precisely the point of “empires plural”. As Dusinberre and Iijima conclude, we must attend to the many histories of “what empire *did* rather than what it *was*”.³⁹

Japanese colonialism established discourses of regional and racial comparison grounded in capitalist measures of moral value, contributed to the reterritorialization of Asia and the Pacific as a source of commodities and labour, enabled new patterns of movement and meanings of mobility, restructured social relations, and transformed the environment. The life histories of colonized, semi-colonized and metropolitan Japanese subjects offer a way of approaching the history of Japanese colonialism through intertwined “social sites” rather than a hierarchy of scaled comparisons.⁴⁰ These works analyse how individuals negotiated their lives and livelihoods in a social world shaped by capitalism, colonialism, and imperialism.

The empires plural approach characterizes studies with topics as disparate as a history of labour migration from Okinawa to Taiwan; the story of a Japanese pirate queen in the South China Sea; transnational anarchist networks in modern Japan; and the life history of a Hokkaidō settler colonial daughter turned documenter of Japanese-mandate life in Micronesia turned icon of the post-war anti-nuclear movement.⁴¹ Empires plural scholarship analyses the “transgressive” mobilities of previously un- or under-studied groups, such as non-elite Japanese women, who moved through informal networks that at times crossed the jurisdictional and administrative boundaries of the state and challenged discursive constructions of Japan and Japanese people as the bearers of security and strength in Asia.⁴² This scholarship also emphasizes the liminal: the places and peoples who demarcate the edge of Japan when seen from one perspective and who appear fully contained within Japan when seen from a different perspective. For example, Okinawa’s Yaeyama Island was “the Southern Gate” of Japanese expansion and the border zone between nation-empire when seen from the “inner territory” (*naichi*) of Japan, as the metropole was known. Yet, as Hiroko Matsuda shows, from the perspective of urban,

38 M. Dusinberre / M. Iijima, Transplantation: Sugar and Imperial Practice in Japan’s Pacific, in: *Historische Anthropologie* 27 (2019) 3, pp. 330–331.

39 *Ibid.*, p. 333.

40 S. Marston / J. Jones III / K. Woodward, Human Geography without Scale, *Transactions of the British Institute of Geographers* 30 (2005) 4, p. 422.

41 Matsuda, *Liminality of the Japanese Empire*; D. Ambaras, *Japan’s Imperial Underworlds: Intimate Encounters at the Borders of Empire*, Cambridge 2018; Konishi, *Anarchist Modernity*; C. Eubanks, *The Art of Persistence: Akamatsu Toshiko and the Visual Cultures of Transwar Japan*, Honolulu 2019.

42 Ambaras, *Japan’s Imperial Underworlds*, p. 8.

colonial Taiwan, Yaeyama was not part of the metropole but rather Taiwan's economic and cultural periphery.⁴³

Attention to transgression and liminality recasts the narrative world in which scholars of Japanese imperialism and colonialism define the choices and consequences of their subjects' lives. In so doing, these works move away from comparisons based on fixed hierarchies of scale to ones based on encounter, itineraries, social networks, and discursive communities. In this framework, there are many globals, constituted within multiple time scales. ann-elise lewallen argues, for example, that Ainu women's cloth-making constitutes a critical act of self-fashioning and empowerment, which has its origins in gendered practices of resistance to early modern imperialism and draws its meanings from the contemporary institutional and cultural lexicon of the global Indigenous Peoples movement. "Heritage textiles" crafted by Ainu women, she shows, "serve as important markers of indigeneity and point toward a mode of expression instantly legible to fellow Indigenous delegates, government representatives, and observers".⁴⁴ Moreover, ethno-racial hierarchies and the directionality of social mobility were site specific. In one telling example from the work of Kirsten Ziomek, in 1919 Pedro Ada, resident of the Japan's League of Nations Mandated Territory in Micronesia, finds himself the first in his family to study abroad in Japan – the imperial metropole. Yet this was not a step up. Rather it was a step down: "All of his older siblings had studied abroad in Germany. But because Pedro was the youngest, by the time it was his time to study abroad, they did not have enough funds to send him to Europe."⁴⁵ The result of an empires plural approach is not always alterity. Sayaka Chatani's analysis of the recorded and oral history of individuals from multiple colonial and metropolitan contexts who joined youth groups (*seinendan*) and, later, volunteered for the Japanese Imperial Army, demonstrates how the structures of and desires for social mobility produced a remarkable uniformity of action among a highly diverse population of youth in rural Japan and Japan's colonies.⁴⁶

Scholarship that embraces "empires plural" is fundamentally comparative. As Katherine Hayes and Craig Cipolla write, "a comparative approach can identify common concepts and categories but can also be used to deconstruct common (received) concepts and categories".⁴⁷ Comparative analysis, in other words, is as much an act of identifying the limits and possibilities of comparison as it is an act of comparing historical phenomena. The fruits of comparative analysis are self-referential: they open comparative analysis up to new possibilities. Scholarship that treats the Japanese empire as a collection of "Japanese empires" juxtaposes and sutures histories across regional, temporal, and conceptual categories. In so doing, it suggests new categories, such as transgressive mobilities,

43 Matsuda, *Liminality of the Japanese Empire*, pp. 41–57.

44 a. lewallen, *The Fabric of Indigeneity: Ainu Identity, Gender, and Settler Colonialism in Japan*, Santa Fe 2016, p. 25.

45 K. Ziomek, *Lost Histories: Recovering the Lives of Japan's Colonial Peoples*, Cambridge, MA 2019, p. 265.

46 Chatani, *Nation-Empire*.

47 K. Hayes/C. Cipolla, *Re-Imagining Colonial Pasts, Influencing Colonial Futures*, in: id. (eds.), *Rethinking Colonialism: Comparative Archaeological Approaches*, Gainesville 2015, p. 3.

liminality, individuals as “sites” of empire, and global assemblages. These new categories create new units for comparison, within, without, and across the received geohistorical boundaries of “the Japanese empire”.

5. Conclusion

The empires plural approach poses challenges for comparative analysis. The story world is fractured. The unifying frameworks we identify at the macro scale dissolve into a muddle of contradictory actions and relationships at the microlevel. At the same time, empires plural provides a valuable and necessary corrective to a comparative frame grounded in a priori categories of cultural, ethnic, and regional difference and hierarchy. It is a grounded approach to comparative colonialism, whose findings should change how we construct macro-frameworks of comparison.

The field is already well on its way to revising one of the most pernicious macro-frameworks for comparative analysis: the Japanese empire as a racial anomaly among empires. In the comparative study of Japanese colonialism, race, culture, and ethnicity no longer suffice as a priori evidence of historical difference. These categories cannot explain the actions of Japan’s colonized subjects nor the actions of Japan’s colonizers. We now know too much about how the lives of Japan’s colonizing and colonized subjects shaped the production of categories of racial and cultural difference over the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and how these categories were manipulated locally to account for the wide variety of practices of economic exploitation in which Japanese subjects, colonizing and colonized, participated. The Japanese empire, like other contemporaneous examples, was *colouring* not coloured.

There is more work to be done. The empire of nation-states is still with us. The field continues to advocate for more rigorous knowledge of empire by expanding the range of people whose lives we analyse as Japanese colonial history and by diversifying how we define their lives as sites of empire. There is also the related work of continuing to counteract the methodological impulse to use 1945 as the end of empire. The lives of our individual historical subjects continued across this historiographical boundary. Japanese colonialism did, too. Anglophone scholarship in this vein has been a part of the field since at least 1979, when John W. Dower published his critical biography of Yoshida Shigeru.⁴⁸ It continues in new form today with many of the studies discussed above. Scholars write with great insight about how the legacy of empire created specific conflicts in post-war Japan. But the study of the post-war period has yet to grapple with how we might incorporate Japan into a field of “comparative postcolonialism”. At the minimum, carrying forward “empires plural” means embracing “Japans plural”, too. Key to this work will be using the history of post-war Japanese relations with Asia and histories of

48 J. Dower, *Empire and Aftermath: Yoshida Shigeru and the Japanese Experience, 1878–1954*, Cambridge, MA 1979.

labour migration to develop a more comprehensive understanding of the possibilities for postcolonial histories of Japan. Recent works underscore the necessity of this approach.⁴⁹ More are on the way.

49 See H. Mizuno/A. Moore/J. DiGioia (eds.), *Engineering Asia: Technology, Colonial Development, and the Cold War Order*, London 2018; E. Chung, *Immigration and Citizenship in Japan*, Cambridge 2010.

Afterword

Frederick Cooper

This collection of articles amply fulfils the goal of expanding the horizons of the study of colonialism, both in space and in time. In covering a time period of over 2000 years and spanning the globe from East Asia to South America, it answers some important questions and raises others that deserve reflection.

The editors are aware of the sensitivity of the topic, concerned that they could be accused of “trivializing the harm and suffering that Europeans have caused to others by raising the question of how exceptional their colonial ventures were”. The study of colonialism is necessarily fraught with ethical and political issues. As Krishan Kumar notes in his article, the terms colony or colonial are old, but the addition of an “ism” dates to the second half of the nineteenth century, marking the process of acquiring and maintaining colonies as an identifiable object of criticism and defence.¹ Just as the horrors perpetrated in the Shoah are in no way mitigated by recognizing the genocides of Southwest Africa (1904), Armenia (1915–1917), or Rwanda (1994), the specificity of European colonization in sixteenth-century South America or twentieth-century Africa is if anything underscored by situating it in relation to a larger history. Otherwise, one risks reproducing Eurocentrism by the presumption that only Europeans produced actions with consequences. It has taken a great deal of effort, by activists as well as historians, to gain widespread acceptance that colonization was an intrinsic part of European history, and now that “global” or “world” history is getting so much attention, the importance of colonization in such a context deserves the kind of examination it receives in these pages.

1 Not that this was the first time colonization had come in for criticism, resistance, and rebellion. In the European context, Diderot and other Enlightenment figures were notable for denouncing the human devastation of French colonial rule and citing it as evidence of the monarchical regime’s unfitnes to govern. See S. Mathu, *Enlightenment against Empire*, Princeton 2003; J. Pitts, *A Turn to Empire: The Rise of Imperial Liberalism in Britain and France*, Princeton 2005.

The contribution of this collection of articles leads me to three types of remarks: 1. What the articles amply demonstrate, 2. The zones of ambiguity they bring out, and 3. The conceptual problems in the texts themselves.

The first contribution is easily conveyed. Whatever the complexities of definition—amply discussed in these essays, if not with perfect agreement—editors and authors have made a persuasive case that there is a phenomenon to be studied more widespread than something done by European powers to other parts of the world from the fifteenth century onward. The broadest consensus is that colonization entails the establishment of some form of domination of a political entity over societies that are in some way distinct and that this process entails the long-term denigration of the people being colonized. Invidious distinction-making against the outsider, the barbarian, or the “other” is not a phenomenon of recent history.² When invidious distinction becomes a, if not the primary, basis of a mode of governance, we can speak of a “colonial situation”.³ That these criteria are met in such varied contexts as the Inca Empire of the fifteenth century, Russia under the Tsars, and the precolonial kingdom of Rwanda expands our thinking about the range of ways in which political power and social distinction-making operate historically. As these articles move beyond the “is it or isn’t it?” question, they provide even more revealing insights.

That Ottoman Syria wasn’t colonial (James Reilly) and parts of Tsarist Russia were (Michael Khodarkovsky) are defensible propositions, but more interesting is the way the Ottomans combined rule over Syria as a province with a more colonial tendency in other parts of the empire⁴ and the capacity of Russia’s Tsars to rule all its peoples, ethnic Russians included, in autocratic ways, even employing non-Russians in high positions, so that its colonizing tendencies existed within a broader politics of difference. The Qing dynasty, of non-Han origin but ruling through a combination of Manchu, Mongol, and Han “banners” as well as a largely-Han bureaucracy, incorporated some territories fully into its system, kept others in a more distant form of subordination, and refrained from “colonizing”, in the sense of incorporating into a formal apparatus of administration, a wider region in East and Southeast Asia in which Han Chinese had established “colonies” in the sense of ethnically defined enclaves (Matthew Mosca). Kate McDonald shows that Japanese empire was neither an anomaly among colonizing powers nor engaged in mimicry of them, but perpetrated a shifting variety of colonizing practices in Korea, Taiwan, Hokkaido, and Okinawa that fall within the range of subordinating and racializing strategies of other empires around the globe. Félix Acuto and Iván Leibowicz

2 Racial distinction in particular is not new. It takes many forms, but a key question is how such distinctions shape and are shaped by politics. Jean-Frédéric Schaub, *Race Is about Politics: Lessons from History*, L. Vergnaud (trans.), Princeton, NJ, 2019; F. Bethencourt, *Racisms from the Crusades to the Twentieth Century*, Princeton 2014.

3 A pioneering and still-valuable analysis (as the editors note) of what constitutes a “colonial situation” is G. Balandier, *La situation coloniale: Approche théorique*, in: *Cahiers Internationaux de Sociologie* 11 (1951), pp. 44–79.

4 Reilly’s discussion of Syria might be read alongside M. Minawi, *The Ottoman Scramble for Africa: Empire and Diplomacy in the Sahara and the Hijaz*, Stanford 2016 and T. Kuehn, *Empire, Islam, and Politics of Difference: Ottoman Rule in Yemen, 1849–1919*, Leiden 2011.

on the Inka and Axel Paul on Rwanda bring out revealing cases of polities that eventually became the victims of European colonization after have produced in their own pasts structures of political domination, economic exploitation, and institutionalized distinction. As with the Aztecs (Wolfgang Reinhard) European colonizers could in some instances exploit in the process of conquest the distinctions within empires they were conquering, and it only became clear over time that the new distinctions that European empires were imposing would be even more invidious and would institutionalize and racialize hierarchy on a wider scale than the imperial formations they replaced.

The second contribution of these essays pushes on these insights. The collection brings out the ambiguous and changing relationship between different forms of imperial power. The specific place of “the colonial” within the more all-embracing category of “the imperial” is discussed throughout this special issue, and most authors bring out the overlap, ambiguity, and, most important, the dynamic tension between the two categories. The concept of empire entails the expansion of a political entity across space and it entails differentiation among the components of the enlarged political entity. If expansion ends up reducing difference – through cultural blending, assimilation to dominant patterns, or extermination – the result is a large but relatively homogeneous state; calling it an empire serves little purpose. But distinction, even durable distinction, is not necessarily invidious distinction. The rulers of empire are not always a “people” or a “society” – they could be a dynasty or a self-perpetuating elite within a wider social category. For this reason, the definition of empire of Michael Doyle – much cited, including in the introduction – is misleading, for it presumes the prior existence of separate societies and then arranges them in a dominant-subordinate relationship, when those social boundaries might themselves be the products, not the prior basis, of empire-building.⁵ The concept of “colonial” becomes most useful when accentuating the sharpness of distinction between two categories of people that are historically produced – often with considerable effort and uncertainty.

In these terms, empire-building entails the possibility of producing a colonial situation, but does not necessarily do so. If empires exercise power over space in multiple ways, the temptation to expand entails the temptation to subordinate. Colonization becomes part of the repertoire of power of an empire. For reasons that Kumar explains, colonization might entail settlement, but defining it in such terms misses out on the varied nature of imperial repertoires: encouraging settlement may be one form of extending power—based on intermediaries with a close social relationship to the power elite back home—but imperial rule may also entail the annexation of territory, the extraction of material resources, the subordination and exploitation of indigenous peoples, and the co-optation of indigenous elites into administering “their” people. Both the colony of

5 The definition I prefer puts the accent on the reproduction over time of distinction within an incorporative polity: “Empires are large political units, expansionist or with a memory of power extended over space, polities that maintain distinction and hierarchy as they incorporate new people.” J. Burbank/F. Cooper, *Empires in World History: Power and the Politics of Difference*, Princeton 2010, p. 8.

settlement and the colony of exploitation can produce the invidious distinctions that are the hallmark of a colonial situation. Both may exist side by side within a single empire, alongside other forms of differential governance as well.⁶ As McDonald shows in the case of Japan, colonization as settlement was not exclusively directed to colonies of Japan, but to the colonies of other powers or independent states, fulfilling similar objectives of spreading Japanese influence and easing population pressure in the home islands. Such was also the case in late nineteenth century Germany: German settlers were more likely to “colonize” territory (at the expense of indigenous peoples) in Brazil or Argentina as in Germany’s newly acquired colonial territories.⁷

On the edge of the line between the imperial and the colonial were possibilities for incorporation that did not amplify invidious distinction even if it did not produce equivalence or equality. The Roman Empire, as Martin Mauersberg demonstrates, brought in people by violence and looked down on “barbarians”, but it also provided access to citizenship through various mechanisms (after 212 AD to all male and non-slave inhabitants of the empire), established pathways for selected members of conquered societies to gain high positions, and created a structure of provinces quite different from a metropole-colony binary. The Arab empires were incorporative in quite a different way, designating, as Robert Hoyland shows, a recognized place for Jews and Christians but not as equals to Muslims. Different as these examples are, they suggest the possible persistence of inclusionary mechanisms in empires, even when they do not produce equality or assimilation. On the colonial end of the spectrum, the sharpness of distinctions produced a political form that was more unstable than that of long-lasting empires like that of Rome (nearly two millennia if one combines its eastern and western manifestations) or the Ottomans (600 years), or the succession of Chinese dynasties that kept claiming the Mandate of Heaven of their predecessors (two millennia). Colonial rule could evolve, sometimes rapidly, in three directions. 1. If the colonizing powers made an effort to integrate incorporated territories or undertook seriously a civilizing mission, colonization became in theory self-liquidating. Looked at collectively, the colony might become an imperial province equivalent to others; looked at individual by individual, assimilating the colonized could result in a relatively homogeneous polity. 2. If a colony-metropole distinction was accentuated, the polity risked rebellion and secession. In a colony of settlement, the settlers might decide that the rulers of their territories of origin were extracting more than they were providing and that the colony should secede – the pattern of the Americas in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Where colonial rulers

6 What is called “settler colonialism” stands out most clearly when separated from the rest of the repertoire of an imperial power, notably when settlers cease to be part of a colony, that is when they break free of the metropole, establish themselves as a territorial state, and take into their own hands the task of subordinating the indigenous population, as in the United States after 1783 or Israel after 1948. This strategy was also attempted in vain by Rhodesians in 1965, when the imperial power would no longer guarantee white domination and only a declaration of national independence – taking Rhodesia out of the British Empire – might preserve the dominant power of white settlers.

7 S. Conrad, *Globalisation and the Nation in Imperial Germany*, S. O’Hagan (trans.), Cambridge 2010.

exercised power through a small and rotating bureaucracy and army and the co-optation of indigenous intermediaries, there was the risk of an uprising of the oppressed or an effort at creating a new type of polity by those intermediaries who had a measure of power but were blocked from achieving more and were in a position to take advantage of any faltering in the external basis of colonial authority. This pattern resulted in the collapse of European colonial empires after World War II. 3. If the colonizing power could stave off the second alternative, it might claim to be following the first alternative but defer it indefinitely, that is claiming to be preparing people for self-rule and continuing to insist that they were not ready for it. This was the claim of British and French rulers in much of the twentieth century, until they found that the power to defer was not in their hands. The usefulness of a concept such as colonialism lies not just in helping us to place historical instances into categorical slots, but also in enabling us to see how forms of power move in different directions. These essays have presented us with a set of examples of the ambiguous and changing relationship of empire and colony, as well as of the relationship between the settlement and exploitation of colonized territory. There are some differences in perspective among the authors, but much more important is the accumulation of examples of historical change. Reinhard points out that in the time of Cortez (early sixteenth century) it was not clear that there was a specific Spanish project of colonization. Cortez and other conquistadors operated to a large extent on their own, using the recruitment of indigenous allies and marriage alliances as well as their own ability to inflict violence to destroy an existing imperial structure and gain power. Only with the Spanish crown's ability to "appropriate the results" (Reinhardt's phrase) did the process produce what one might call a colonial empire. Janne Lahti provides a stimulating discussion of warfare and enslavement involving Apache, Comanche, and Spanish polities in a turbulent situation where borders were unclear and contested, and where it was for some time uncertain where dominant power lay. Whether all the forms of arrogant assertion of power and superiority, going as far as the enslavement of people, should be considered "colonial" is questionable, but in the case of Spanish rulers, the consolidation of power slowly developed, so the nature of that power became less ambiguous. The label colonial in this case then provides the useful service of underscoring the long-term reproduction of relations of social superiority and inferiority. Matthias Leanza also reveals a history of colonization that didn't begin with a colonizing project – Germans in Southwest Africa – but became one in the context of rivalry among rival powers with an interest in the region. The early ambiguities of power did not lessen the importance of violence; on the contrary the limited means Germany had to impose a colonial order on this region was a factor behind its turn to genocidal violence. By insisting that the category of colony applies to a range of situations, the editors and authors have shown that we have a useful conceptual apparatus not only for classifying political forms, but for examining how they change in different directions.

My third set of remarks focus on issues that these texts open up, but where I don't think the editors and some of the authors have gone as far as they might in pushing their own insights. The first and most important concerns the well-worn distinction between

“modern colonialism” and its “pre-modern counterparts” that makes its way into the introduction (p. 227), a distinction also made in Kumar’s, Reilly’s, and McDonald’s chapters but not particularly important to the other authors. We certainly need tools to understand change, but why should our conception of change be defined in binary terms and why should this distinction, both banal and problematic in regard to Europe, be applied all over the world in a text that is trying to get beyond Eurocentrism? Let us recognize the significance of the concept of “modern” in relation to colonialism is best seen not as an analytic descriptor but as a claim, an assertion first of European superiority, then an insistence by colonized people that they too could be “modern” and were therefore entitled to equal consideration.⁸

Social scientists and historians have a tendency to pin down processes in time and space—the age of revolution or the age of empire, modern Europe vs late-developing Africa. What the study of empires over time reveals is how phenomena overlap and coexist. Empire as a political form survived as long as it did because imperial rulers could shift among different elements of a repertoire without being tied to the idea that a uniform set of political practices should apply. That also meant that different forms of empire shared historical space into the twentieth century, competing with each other, influencing each other, maintaining different strategies of rule among themselves as well as within each one.⁹ The once-conventional “from empire to nation-state” narrative no longer reflects a consensus among historians of either empires or nationalism and cannot account for the range of political possibilities that were in play into the second half of the twentieth century, if not the present.¹⁰

The arguments made by Paul and Leanza work better if one gets away from insistence that colonialism as *practices* of rule constituted a new form of colonial empire in the nineteenth century, and focuses instead on changes in what could be *imagined*. We know – pace Benedict Anderson – that imagined communities in the nineteenth and twentieth century have taken many forms, from the Greater Britain of like-minded white men spread around the world to diasporic imaginings – pan-African, pan-Arab, pan-Slavic—whose relationship to territory was not fixed – to demands for different kinds of federation. The national idea was only one of these ideas, and in imperial capitals and colonial peripheries it was not necessarily the most attractive. By Paul and Leanza’s own

8 One of the most articulate claims to being a modern colonizer, as France is plunging into colonial expansions, is P. Leroy-Beaulieu, *De la colonisation chez les peuples modernes*, Paris 1874. This book went through many editions in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

9 It is not clear why Paul and Leanza claim that modern colonialism, as opposed to earlier imperial formations, was characterized by open rivalry among empires. Interempire conflict is an old story – think of the conflict among the Byzantine, Persian, and Arab empires from the eighth century onward. Nor are the empires in conflict in the late nineteenth century similar in their structure or their relationship to national projects. The Austro-Hungarian, Russian, and Ottoman empires (old?) were sufficiently engaged with British, French, and German empires (new?) to be part of the dynamic that led to World War I (and earlier the Crimean War).

10 I have written elsewhere about the inadequacies of “modernity” and “nation-state” as analytical concepts. F. Cooper, *Colonialism in Question: Theory, Knowledge, History*, Berkeley 2005. On the overlap of national and imperial histories see Burbank/Cooper, *Empires in World History*, and S. Berger/A. Miller (eds.), *Nationalizing Empires*, Budapest 2015. This overlap is acknowledged by both Paul and Leanza and Kumar.

admission, the nation-state only “gradually” became the norm of international discourse after colonial rule came to an end—in other words with the death of “modern colonialism” rather than its coming into being.

We come back to the attachment of the “ism” to “colonial”. It was the range of possibilities, not a linear pathway to one of them, that distinguished most of the 19th and 20th centuries. That included the development of a vocabulary to claim a “not-empire”—a way of criticizing not just the rule or misrule of a particular imperial power but the legitimacy of the empire form itself. Between the imagining of alternatives and the actuality of any of them lies a lot of history, including the rise of imperial powers as different as the Nazis and the Soviets, a wide range of political movements in the empires, and two world wars. The UN only issued its declaration repudiating the legitimacy of colonial rule in December of 1960. Along the way to that general agreement (although it still fell short of consensus), colonialism was slowly being defined as an object of contention by both its critics and its defenders, and both in relation to and in tension with the actual repertoires of rule in colonial empires.

When McDonald contends that Japan in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century was constructing itself within an “emerging global order of imperial nation-states”, she makes the valuable move of putting Japan into a wider conversation, but the concept of “imperial nation-state” gives a misleading view of both the nature of the global order, as I have argued above, and the particularities of Japan.¹¹ Japan, as she demonstrates, was experimenting with varied forms of imperial governance predicated on the fact that sovereignty is not an either-or phenomenon but can be layered, shared, and divided, as in Japan’s protectorate in Korea at century’s turn or France’s protectorate in Tunisia in the same time period.¹² As Japanese ideologues worked with a variety of formulations to portray both the racial commonality of Asians and Japan’s privileged position among them, they were revealing how much the relationship between the imperial and the national and between the ruling and the ruled was manipulable and contested rather than intrinsic parts of a global order.

In short, the historical study of different colonial regimes reveals a range of pathways, some followed, some proving to be dead ends. We need to track, as most of the articles here do, those pathways.

11 McDonald is not the only scholar to use the term “imperial nation-state” in regard to the nineteenth or early twentieth century. The “imperial” makes good sense, but the hyphen in “nation-state” gives an anachronistic fixity to a historical process in which the relationship of state and nation was ambiguous and contested – in France or Britain as much as in Asia. That the relationship was still in question in the 1950s – and that federation and confederation were seen as alternatives to both colonial empire and the nation-state, see F. Cooper, *Citizenship between Empire and Nation: Remaking France and French Africa, 1945–1960*, Princeton 2014.

12 International law, as it was evolving at this time, was premised on the non-equivalence of different polities, but recognized that imperial rule did not entail a duality between a totalizing sovereignty and its absence but recognized divided and layered notions of imperial control, including colonies, protectorates, dominions, extraterritorial jurisdictions, spheres of interest, and so on. On the particularities of the protectorate, see M. D. Lewis, *Divided Rule: Sovereignty and Empire in French Tunisia 1881–1938*, Berkeley 2014 and more generally J. Sheehan, *The Problem of Sovereignty in European History*, in: *American Historical Review* 111 (2006), pp. 1–15.

Paul and Leanza are surely right that the story of colonization in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries is closely linked to the history of capitalism, but they don't tell us what that link was. Capitalism developed in the context of empire, not the other way around. The sugar and tea that kept early industrial workers going came from slave plantations in colonies, and without the force only empires could deploy over long distances the risk of losing valuable plantation zones to rival empires or to slave revolt would have made the project untenable. It was the fiscal-military regime that empires produced in their rivalry with each other that made it possible to produce and protect the extended linkages that enabled capitalist development. Paul and Leanza comment that European imperialism involved many empires but one economy. If one wants to call it one economy, what capitalism produced was a fragmented and differentiated one. Colonial regimes did much to keep it that way, in their rivalries with each other, their attempts at privileging commerce within an imperial formation, their maintenance of a division of labour between metropole and colony, and their strategies for subordinating colonial labour.¹³ The most important point is not that the world economy was one, but that European powers, and the scholars and ideologues connected to them, were able to represent it as one through the apparently universal concept of the market. The combination of the sheer extent of European colonization with the liberal doctrines of economic universality and individualism was a potent one. But the lack of correspondence of the doctrine with colonial practices made for a dynamic situation in which European pretensions to universality were increasingly turned against themselves, by activists within colonies and by elites at home who actually took the ideology seriously. In economic and political terms, what went on in colonies at the beginning of the twentieth century was as varied, complex, and disjointed as in empires of the past, a concatenation of old and new technologies of governance, of shared and distinct habits of rule, of localized systems of production integrated into or distanced from commercial and finance capital to differing degrees. What was beginning to emerge was world-wide debate over political economy, some of it in terms of European liberalism and socialism, much of it in the languages of different places, intersecting with or rejecting to differing degrees the discursive structures that colonization had extended.¹⁴

13 Prasannan Parthasarathi presents a fascinating argument about how Britain at first used its imperial power to channel Indian-produced textiles into networks of commerce it controlled, then proceeded to destroy the Indian textile industry in the interests of metropolitan producers. P. Parthasarathi, *Why Europe Grew Rich and Asia Did Not: Global Economic Divergence, 1600–1850*, Cambridge 2010. On the connection between empire and capitalist industrialization, see K. Pomeranz, *The Great Divergence: China, Europe, and the Making of the Modern World Economy*, Princeton, NJ 2010.

14 U. Mehta, *Liberalism and Empire: A Study in Nineteenth-century British Liberal Thought*, Chicago 1999 is right that liberalism and colonialism complemented each other, but so did liberalism and anti-colonialism. Indeed, debates over slavery and colonialism were crucial to allowing liberals to posit a world in which individuals acting in markets, voting booths, and other “universal” institutions would constitute a normative basis for a just society, a stance whose relationship with political practices has been the subject of endless debates. See also A. Sartori, *Liberalism in Empire: An Alternative History*, Berkeley 2014.

By the middle of the twentieth century, not only had the decades of critique made the object more definable, but attacking it was becoming an attainable goal. European states emerged diminished militarily, politically, and ideologically from World War II; challenges to colonial rule, beginning in Indonesia, Indochina, and India, were more acute than anything European rulers had previously faced; and two powers with an imperial reach but which claimed to be different from other empires (the United States and the Soviet Union) provided alternative models and mechanisms of support.

Thinking about the problem in these terms helps us understand the problem the scholars who put together this volume face: the object of their study has, since the end of World War II been defined normatively, by a political process that made colonialism both identifiable and excisable. Once the colonial game was up, the colonizing powers – Britain and France most obviously – wanted to see themselves in much more national terms than had been the case before they gave up most of their colonies (aside from periodic bouts of imperial nostalgia). And the liberated peoples of Africa and Asia also wanted to define themselves as something other than the victims of colonization. When, in part because of disillusionment with how the project of decolonization turned out, “post-colonial” critique came into vogue in the 1980s and thereafter, the colonial was still being defined more normatively than sociologically – it was European colonial empire that was held responsible for the present-day after effects of colonial rule. That is why the task this collection of articles has undertaken is both important and a challenge. The editors and authors have made a strong case, in terms of history and as political sociology, for the widespread significance of the category of “colony”, for the importance of variations within the category, and – most interesting of all – for the volatility of the phenomenon in question. They have avoided going too far in the other direction: to find “coloniality” in any relation of inequality, in any form of distinction-making. The most important and the most difficult issues lie in the particulars: how, precisely, is the power to categorize and to denigrate exercised? By whom and against whom? Such questions push us deeper into the study of colonialism, but also beyond, for attaching the label can obscure as well as illuminate. If colonialism is everywhere, it is nowhere. To compare colonialisms is to see the common threads, to recognize the different patterns, and to understand the limitations of the concept, that is to examine the complexities of power as it is actually exercised.

FORUM

Globalisation of Alpinism in the Twentieth Century: Publicity, Politics, and Organisational Endeavours

Jon Mathieu

ABSTRACTS

Die Globalisierung des Alpinismus begann im späten 19. Jahrhundert und setzte sich während des ganzen 20. Jahrhunderts fort, wenn auch in komplexer, kontextabhängiger Weise, mit Rückschlägen und unterschiedlichen Geschwindigkeiten auf verschiedenen Ebenen. Der vorliegende Artikel untersucht diesen Prozess mit einer Kontrastmethode. Zwei Aspekte der Globalisierung des Alpinismus werden einander gegenübergestellt: ein zentraler Schauplatz, bestehend aus denkwürdigen Bergbesteigungen, die viel öffentliche Aufmerksamkeit auf sich zogen, und eine wenig beachtete internationale Organisation abseits der großen Bühne. Zu den Beispielen gehören die Besteigungen der Eigernordwand, des Pik Lenin, Pik Stalin und Mount Everest. Die organisatorischen Bemühungen werden durch die *International Climbing and Mountaineering Federation* veranschaulicht. Ich vertrete die These, dass die Unterschiedlichkeit der beiden Globalisierungsstränge vor allem an ihrem Verhältnis zu Politik und Macht lag.

After its emergence in the late nineteenth century, the globalisation of alpinism continued throughout the twentieth century, albeit in a complex, context-dependent manner, with setbacks and different speeds at different levels. This article aims to investigate this process by way of contrastive exemplification. Two aspects of the globalisation of alpinism will be contrasted: a centre stage, constituted by memorable ascents, the object of intense public attention and interest; and a little-noticed offstage area in international organisation. The examples include the climbing of the Eiger North Face, Lenin Peak, Stalin Peak, and Mount Everest. The organisational endeavours are illustrated by the *International Climbing and Mountaineering Federation*. I

will argue that it is mainly their relation to politics and power that makes these two strands of globalisation so different.

1. Introduction

In 1907 the *Alpine Club* in London celebrated its fiftieth birthday and, to mark the occasion, presented a survey of the mountaineering associations that had been created since its foundation and more or less following its example. The survey testified to the success of organised alpinism in many parts of the world. From New Zealand to Africa and the United States of America, mountain enthusiasts had gathered to promote their new sports culture. The distribution, of course, was far from balanced. For China the survey registered one single association founded in 1899 by German speaking emigrés (*Tsingtau Bergverein*), whereas nearly 150 associations were listed for Europe, many of them created in recent years.¹ The beginning of the new century experienced also an increase in long-distance mountaineering. In 1922 the British made the first serious attempt to “conquer” Mount Everest, identified as the highest peak of the world in the mid-nineteenth century. The attempt had become possible because Tibetan authorities, deciding about the northern access, were under political pressure and had to put aside their religious concerns against climbing. The expedition was under the leadership of a general and comprised a military escort, a film maker, and a great number of local porters, cooks, and other assistants, with around 300 pack animals, apart from the group of mountaineers. The attempt ended in tragic failure, yet the movie *Climbing Mount Everest* could be shown back home as an exciting record.²

After its emergence in the late nineteenth century, the globalisation of alpinism continued throughout the twentieth century, albeit in a complex, context-dependent manner, with setbacks and different speeds at different levels. The following article aims to investigate this process by way of contrastive exemplification. Two aspects of globalisation of alpinism will be contrasted: a centre stage, the object of intense public attention and interest; and a little-noticed offstage area in international organisation. I will argue that it is mainly the relation to politics and power that makes these two strands of globalisation so different. Climbing difficult mountains generated a great deal of publicity, particularly for the first ascents, and was closely linked to political feelings and authorities, whereas the organisation of international alpinism with its emphasis on general rules and safety measures had much less potential for attention and political use. Both processes were driven by rapid, revolutionary innovations in the areas of communication and transport, but these innovations played out in different ways. While the politicised centre-stage was moving fast and pushed globalisation, the offstage area lagged behind and followed the

1 A. J. Mackintosh, *Mountaineering Clubs*, in: *Alpine Journal* 23 (1907), pp. 542–570. – All quotes are given here in English (own translation).

2 P. H. Hansen, *The Dancing Lamas of Everest: Cinema, Orientalism, and Anglo-Tibetan Relations in the 1920s*, in: *The American Historical Review* 101 (1996) 3, pp. 712–747.

general trend. A few years ago, the political scientist Pepper D. Culpepper launched a fruitful empirical and theoretical debate about the difference between “noisy” and “quiet” business power, the first active in the domain of medialised politics, the second in the domain of lobby work behind the scenes.³ It is a similar duality that will be explored here in a very different field and setting.

The first section of the article looks at memorable moments in global alpinism and how they reached a larger audience and how they related to politics. The examples adduced are the Eiger North Face in Switzerland, the Pamir summits in the Soviet Union, and Mount Everest on the border of Nepal and China. Afterwards we shall turn to the very different history of the most representative association in this field, the *International Climbing and Mountaineering Federation*, which was founded in 1932 but only developed a global outreach much later. For both parts I can partially draw on a recently established research tradition which puts the history of alpinism in political and cultural contexts and no longer focuses on the technicalities of first ascents or on the self-description of club achievements.⁴ The conclusion of the article returns to the general argument of “noisy” and “quiet” strands of globalisation and their particular figuration of power. Globalisation is seen here as the historical process of expansion, multiplication and acceleration of worldwide interactions. Spatially remote factors gain in importance in relation to regional and local factors, not only on a functional level, for example through commodity-chains, but also in the minds and reflections of the people involved.⁵

2. Publicising and Politicising the “Historic” Moments

“Four Men on Unscaled Alps Wall, Waiting for Dawn to Reach Peak”, *The New York Times* informed its readers on 24 July 1938, on page 23. In a few lines the article made it clear that the “Eigerwand” was a terrifying wall, and that the four young men were in a dramatic situation, “huddled tonight in stormclouds at an altitude of 12,700 feet”. The next day the short news were moved to the front page, the tension heightened: “CLOUDS HIDE FATE OF 4 ON ALPS CLIFF”. The all-clear was given one day later, again on the front page: “CLIMBERS CONQUER DREAD EIGER PEAK”. Now the men were also assigned nationalities and family names: two Austrians, Harrer and Kasparek, and two Germans, Vörg and Heckmair, had reached the peak.⁶ In London, *The Times* reported on the Eiger adventure with three articles too, announcing the conclu-

3 P. D. Culpepper, *Quiet Politics and Business Power. Corporate Control in Europe and Japan*, Cambridge 2011.

4 Two examples: A. Pastore, *Alpinismo e storia d'Italia. Dall'unità alla resistenza*, Bologna 2003; P. H. Hansen, *The Summits of Modern Man. Mountaineering after the Enlightenment*, Cambridge 2013.

5 Standard publications are J. Osterhammel/N. P. Petersson, *Globalization. A Short History*, Princeton 2009, and L. Hunt, *Writing History in the Global Era*, New York 2014; for mountain regions see J. Mathieu, *The Third Dimension. A Comparative History of Mountains in the Modern Era*, Cambridge 2011, and idem, *The Globalisation of Mountain Perception: How much of a Western Imposition?* in: *Summerhill. Indian Institute of Advanced Study Review* 20 (2014) 1, pp. 8–17.

6 *The New York Times*, 24 July 1938, p. 23; 25 July, p. 1; 26 July, p. 1.

sion even a day earlier than the New York paper. The British tone was reserved: “Their feat was certainly a daring one, but it does not open a new road to ordinary climbers.”⁷ In fact, the first ascent of the Eiger North Face was part of a series of dramatic events starting in 1932 and resulting, prior to success, in nine deadly accidents. There was a heated, polarised discussion about the justification of this “sensational” and “suicidal” alpinism, overlaid by the tension in international politics soon leading to war. German climbers in particular were inspired by the nationalist sporting culture propagated by the Nazi-regime. During the climb in 1938, the *Führer* appears to have demanded reports on an hourly basis, and after the event he claimed the “victory” for the Third Reich.⁸ By this time, the media sector in industrialised countries consisted of a differentiated socio-technical system: newspapers and journalists of many kinds, national and international press agencies, wired and wireless telegraphy, telephone, radio transmission, print distribution, fixed and movable visual technologies.⁹ The media system had its own dynamics and routines, but in single cases contingency played a considerable role. The information about the Eiger event reached *The New York Times* through a “wireless” message by Clarence K. Streit, a foreign correspondent of the paper assigned to the League of Nations in Geneva. It can be assumed that he was not on site in the Bernese Oberland, but other non-Swiss media – like the *Münchener Neueste Nachrichten* and Hitler’s daily, the *Völkischer Beobachter* – sent special reporters.¹⁰ Again a heated dispute over the role of publicity and visualisation arose. The illustrated media produced a considerable number of detailed, emotional reports. Journalists got the impression that the Eiger event had found “the greatest attention and recognition in the entire world”, and this opinion is passed on by modern historiography, often quite generous with superlatives.¹¹ However, if we take the global measure seriously, we should ask: How many of the people living in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, making up around 70 percent of the world population,¹² possibly knew about the event? In other words: media coverage of the Eiger exploit was important – by Western standards.¹³

The Eiger North Face is a vertical arena so that climbers are visible from its foot where a busy hotel industry had developed since the nineteenth century and a mountain train

7 C. Quast, *Die Wand der Wände. Ein Vergleich der Presseberichterstattung zur Eiger-Nordwand-Durchsteigung 1938*, Universität Dortmund (Grin online) 2002, p. 36.

8 The most comprehensive book is by D. Anker (ed.), *Eiger. Die vertikale Arena*, Zürich 2008, for the Nazi context pp. 220–225; on this point also R. Amstädter, *Der Alpinismus. Kultur, Organisation, Politik*, Wien 1996, pp. 466–468. An earlier edition of Anker’s book is available in English: *Eiger. The Vertical Arena*, Seattle 2000.

9 A survey in A. Briggs/P. Burke, *A Social History of the Media. From Gutenberg to the Internet*, Cambridge 2009.

10 R. Rettner, *Eiger. Triumphe und Tragödien 1932–1938*, Zürich 2008, p. 242; Quast, *Wand der Wände*, p. 32.

11 Quast, *Wand der Wände*, p. 31 (Frankfurter Zeitung: “in der ganzen Welt grösste Beachtung und Anerkennung gefunden”); Anker, otherwise prudent, claims that no mountain of the planet has produced a stronger public echo than the Eiger (Anker, *Eiger*, p. 10).

12 Estimate based on M. L. Bacci, *A Concise History of World Population*, Chichester 2012, p. 25 and the source there indicated.

13 The best-known report on the Eiger climb is by H. Harrer, *The White Spider. The Story of the North Face of the Eiger*. Translated from the German, London 1959; but the book was late in coming and its success in many languages might have been influenced by the fame of the author, gained previously with his Tibetan adventures.

brought in people from many countries. Very different was the setting in the Pamir (Tajikistan), adjacent to the Karakoram and the Himalayas, and more than 3,000 kilometres away from Moscow, the centre of the newly formed Soviet socialist empire. In the 1920s, the Pamir region was sparsely populated and largely unknown to Russian elites, traditional or revolutionary. Historian Eva Maurer has shown how mountaineering expeditions entered this remote territory and opened it up for the state. Within a short period, a political pantheon unfolded on the mountain region with “Pik Stalin” as the highest peak (nearly 7,500 metres above sea level), “Pik Lenin” as the next one, and a number of summits named after a variable set of Soviet party leaders. The large-scale expeditions were organised by the Academy of Sciences, which was put under intense pressure to produce useful knowledge for socialism. Mountaineering had a tradition from the Alps and the Caucasus and was now mainly organised in a section of the *Association for Proletarian Tourism and Excursions* (Obščestvo proletarskogo turizma i ékskursij). The association struggled for a correct line in view of the new men to be born by the Revolution. “Bourgeois” alpinism was considered rotten and decadent. “We do not go into the mountains against the backdrop of snow and a blue sky to play up as heroes, peak-eaters, supermen, record-seekers, as those who want to separate themselves from all things earthly”, declared a leader. Collectivism should supplant separatism and individualism in every domain.¹⁴

In this first period, national borders were still relatively open. The 1928 expedition was a German-Soviet cooperation and should produce, among other things, reliable maps of the Pamir. Its success depended to a large degree on media coverage. Many of the participants published reports and illustrated travelogues not only in specialised journals but also in big dailies like *Izvestija*, *Pravda* or *Večernaja Moskva*. The film production engaged an entire team, working with the latest Western technology. It resulted in a 45-minute staged documentary that let the audience to believe that Pik Lenin, then still the highest peak known, had been reached by socialist mountaineers (in fact, also for weather reasons, it was climbed by Germans, after their Russian colleagues had already left).¹⁵ The 1933 expedition had a decisively Soviet character, and went a few hundred metres higher up to Pik Stalin, where an automatic radio and weather station was placed. The news of the climb was directly transmitted to *Izvestija*. In a later book, a publicity specialist for the expedition explained to the Tajik porters why the station was essential. “I say that workers in Moscow and Leningrad and people like them, farmers in all the corners of the Soviet Union, can follow the expedition in the newspapers, that I send telegrams to the most important, biggest paper, that I would write a book about the expedition, and in that book each of them would appear”.¹⁶ The expedition reached the highest point of the huge empire, yet not the top of the Soviet social hierarchy. At the October Revolu-

14 E. Maurer, *Wege zum Pik Stalin. Sowjetische Alpinisten, 1928–1953*, Zürich 2010, pp. 77–143, quote p. 91; the quoted leader, Vasilij Semenovskij, had been in Swiss exile in the pre-war period, when Lenin was in Switzerland too, and had worked as a certified mountain guide (*ibid.*, p. 94).

15 *Ibid.*, pp. 120–122.

16 *Ibid.*, pp. 126–129, quote p. 138.

tion Parade in 1933 three posters, each 120 metres long, announced the “Victory in the Arctic, in the Desert, in the Stratosphere”. The climbers were victorious too, but not included among these first rank heroes and actors of modernity.¹⁷

One last example: the first successful ascent of Mount Everest by the New Zealander Edmund Hillary and the Nepalese-Indian Tenzing Norgay in 1953. That was also the year of Stalin’s death, which brought uncertainty to his peak, later to be renamed “Pik Kommunizma” (Communism Peak). Soon activities around Everest would contribute to a certain opening of the Soviet Union, but the ascent was announced only by a short note in *Izvestija*.¹⁸ In many parts of the world, and particularly in the countries of the climbers and in the centre of the newly formed British Commonwealth, the event was big news. The official film, *The Conquest of Everest*, began with the summit photograph and then switched to London on 2 June, when the news of the ascent coincided with the coronation of Queen Elizabeth II. The streets were packed with crowds waving British flags, and the narrator of the film solemnly proclaimed: “And to add to the cheers, the newspapers reported an extra of extras. Britain had one new victory: Men had climbed Mount Everest”.¹⁹ On the international level, however, this statement was far from uncontested, as various nations laid claim to the first ascent as their own. Peter H. Hansen has reconstructed the turbulent “first descent of Everest” in detail. Controversies arose, for example, about priority: Who of the two climbers had been first on the summit? On the Indian subcontinent most people voted for Sherpa Tenzing. When the expedition triumphantly returned to Kathmandu, a “Tenzing Ballad” was sung in the streets, and posters showed a vigorous Tenzing pulling an exhausted Hillary to the top.²⁰ Besides the various self-affirmations, observers saw the event also as a unifying symbol of international cooperation and the spirit of humanity. After all, the flag of the United Nations had been planted on Everest (beside the British, Nepalese, and Indian flags). The Secretary-General expressly stated that this has given “our U.N. flag new glory”.²¹

Since the interwar “historic” climbing moments the media landscape had changed. By 1953, earlier technologies had become more powerful, reaching wider audiences, and new technologies began to conquer the public realm. Television was overcoming its experimental phase and the broadcast interruption during wartime, and events like the ascent of Everest contributed to the further spread of the technology. Many people were eager to watch the heroes with their own eyes. During their visit to Britain, after their success, the climbers were interviewed by the press, by radio, and by the BBC Television

17 Ibid., pp. 130–131; the first climber of the Pik Stalin was Evgenij Abalakov; probably for hierarchical reasons he had to wait long for the recognition of his feat in the Soviet audience (ibid., pp. 131–132).

18 E. Maurer, Cold War, “Thaw” and “Everlasting Friendship”: Soviet Mountaineers and Mount Everest, 1953–1960, in: *The International Journal of the History of Sport* 26 (2009) 4, pp. 484–500, here p. 487.

19 P. H. Hansen, Confetti of Empire: The Conquest of Everest in Nepal, India, Britain and New Zealand, in: *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 42 (2000), pp. 307–332, here p. 307.

20 Ibid., pp. 308–312.

21 Ibid., p. 331.

Service.²² Tenzing attracted much attention, but he found himself in a particular “sub-altern” position. It was decided that he was to receive the George Medal by the Queen, the highest civilian award for bravery. His colleague Hillary on the other hand – native of a British settler colony, member of the Commonwealth, white but not quite British – got the high honour of knighthood.²³ The delicate “post-production” of the Everest ascent continued in New Zealand. For many fellow citizens, Hillary became the icon of a new identity. Indeed, later he would replace the Queen on New Zealand’s five dollar bill. Once again Tenzing did not fit easily into the programme. The official government gift reflected both his “indigenous” status and the exceptional publicity of the climb: It was a collection of press articles and telegrams about the ascent bound in a volume with pictures of the New Zealand Alps and a gold embossed cover with a Maori sign of rank.²⁴ In the second half of the twentieth century, Everest continued to occupy the minds of a great many around the planet. It functioned as a global focus of attention and increasingly stirred the imagination about possible personal performance and success. In the last decade of the century, the chroniclers in Kathmandu estimated around three hundred climbing attempts, ninety summit victories and five or six deaths on Everest each year.²⁵ News of the growing Everest community was frequently in the media, acting as an unmistakable driver of globalisation in mountaineering. Taken together, the twentieth century showed the intimate relationship between the daring feats on the planet’s steep walls and high summits, the public attention, the media coverage and the political use by the most diverse actors. A very different configuration can be found in another strand of globalisation. It is at this “quiet” networking for alpinism that we look in the next section.

3. International Networking and Organisation

Since the late nineteenth century, most of the prominent mountaineering associations developed an international outlook. The attempt of the Alpine Club in London to register all the associations around the planet in 1907, mentioned at the beginning of this article, is one example of that trend. The relationships between the associations were marked both by their shared passion for mountaineering and by group rivalry, the latter being driven also by increasing nationalism before World War I.²⁶ The German and Aus-

22 Ibid., p. 323; for British television at that time: Briggs/Burke, *Social History*, pp. 213–214; A. Abramson, *The History of Television, 1942 to 2000*, Jefferson 2003, p. 57.

23 Hansen, Confetti, pp. 313–314.

24 Ibid., p. 328; for the “indigenous side” of Everest mountaineering, see also S. B. Ortner, *Life and Death on Mt. Everest. Sherpas and Himalayan Mountaineering*, Princeton 1999.

25 R. Salisbury/E. Hawley, *The Himalaya by the Numbers. A Statistical Analysis of Mountaineering in the Nepal Himalaya*, Seattle 2012; S. K. Nepal/Yang (Sunny) Mu, *Mountaineering, Commodification and Risk Perceptions in Nepal’s Mt Everest Region*, in: J. Higham/G. Musa/A. Thompson-Carr (eds.), *Mountaineering Tourism*, London 2015, pp. 250–264.

26 Rivalry was particularly strong where national ambitions regarded overlapping territories, see S. Morosini, *Il meraviglioso patrimonio. I rifugi alpini in Alto Adige/Südtirol come questione nazionale (1914–1972)*, Trento 2016, pp. 21–50.

trian Alpine Club (*Deutscher und Österreichischer Alpenverein*, DuÖAV) was by far the largest of the clubs. In the same year 1907 it numbered no fewer than 78,500 members, whereas the British Club, for example, remained below 700 members.²⁷ The British did not lack self-confidence in this period of high imperialism, but the Germans, based on this huge quantitative difference, considered themselves in a leading position. The head of the alpine library expressed the hope that his association, inspired by recent successes in intercontinental mountaineering, could create a comprehensive organisation: “A World-Mountain-Association (*Weltgebirgsverein*) under the hegemony of the DuÖAV, that would be the ultimate and most splendid goal of all the mountain-friendly endeavours, that would be the shining fulfilment of their boldest and most beautiful dreams.”²⁸ It was indeed a bold and unrealistic dream, but occasional conferences of international mountaineering had been held since the 1870s on the initiative (not under the hegemony) of various clubs. The massive global war suspended international contacts for some time. Such contacts revived quite rapidly during the post-war decade, when the League of Nations was created in Geneva. At two conferences in Eastern Europe in 1930 and 1931, the wish to establish a permanent agency for international cooperation and exchange in mountaineering was clearly pronounced. It was to be founded a year later at a meeting in Chamonix. The president of the French Alpine Club set high goals for this endeavour. The shared sentiment of the mountaineers should act as a counterweight to the political and economic controversies dividing the peoples, he wrote in the invitation and asked the participants to engage in the task of rapprochement.²⁹

On 27 August 1932, in the Hotel Majestic of Chamonix, the decision was taken “unanimously and with great enthusiasm” to create an organisation, a bit later to be called *Union Internationale des Associations d’Alpinisme* UIAA, in English rendered as *International Union of Mountaineering Associations*. (The name changed, currently it is called *International Climbing and Mountaineering Federation*). The tasks should be encompassing: the study and solution of all general mountaineering problems, particularly the encouragement of the young, the development and standardisation of trail markers, the posting of avalanche warnings, the protection of mountain shelters from vandalism, the establishment of a system for rating climbing difficulties, and so on. Delegates from eighteen countries were present in the assembly, two of them not from Europe (United States and New Zealand). However, seven of these countries did not join the UIAA immediately, and the

27 W. A. B. Coolidge, *The Alps in Nature and History*, London 1908, p. 244; see also A. Gidl, *Alpenverein. Die Städter entdecken die Alpen*, Wien 2007, a broad presentation of the DuÖAV from the 1860s to 1918.

28 A. Dreyer, *Der Alpinismus und der Deutsch-Österreichische Alpenverein. Seine Entwicklung – Seine Bedeutung – Seine Zukunft*, Berlin 1909, p. 160; in 1909 a suggestion for an overarching mountaineering club came also from the French, see *Dictionnaire des Alpes*, ed. by Sylvain Jouty, Grenoble 2006, p. 726.

29 P. Bossus, *Les cinquante premières années de l’Union Internationale des Associations d’Alpinisme / The First Fifty Years of the International Union of Mountaineering Associations*, Geneva 1982, p. 70; the English translation on pp. 67–106 is not always accurate, but can be checked against the French original on pp. 7–47; there is also a Spanish version of this booklet produced by the *Federación Española de Montañismo*; a personal view on these fifty years, with quite a few historic photographs, is provided by G. Tonella, *50 anni di alpinismo senza frontiere. La storia dell’UIAA*, Milano 1983; there seems to be also a German version of this text which I was unable to trace.

two countries from overseas soon left the Union on the grounds of being too remote. The members of the first Executive Committee were all European and included three presidents of major Alpine Clubs. The general political tension was on the rise (five months later Hitler would be appointed Chancellor of Germany), and the important nations distrusted each other. Thus no president was elected for the UIAA. Instead the assembly assigned the role to the Swiss, representing a small and neutral state, and the Swiss Alpine Club appointed the president of its Geneva section: Egmond d’Arcis.³⁰

Though he would hold the chair of the UIAA as an “eternal” president, not very much is known about Egmond d’Arcis (1887–1971). He came from a noble or ennobled family with the title of Count, and worked as a journalist and correspondent, often for British newspapers, mainly *The Times*. He had written a booklet about Great Britain during World War I, and later published sporadic articles on mountain topics also in Swiss journals and magazines. He joined the Geneva section of the Alpine Club in 1905. An obituary described him as valuable alpinist and lover and protector of mountains. In a speech he once expressed the view that the ideals of alpinism were akin to the culture of medieval chivalry.³¹ In the beginning, Egmond d’Arcis was elected president of the UIAA until 1936. At the general assembly of 1935 in Barcelona, however, at the proposal of the French delegate and “by common agreement”, he was re-elected for a new term of three years. This decision sufficed to establish a tradition and would be repeated several times. In fact, d’Arcis did not retire from office until 1964, at the age of 77, after a presidency of 32 years.³²

During the general assembly of Barcelona, the young Spanish Republic was already in a war-like state, leading soon to open civil war. The *Journal de Genève* in its article about the UIAA meeting was not really worried. Only army soldiers, weapons at hand, here and there reminded the visitors that the country was under siege. But the delegates had been warmly received by their Spanish colleagues, and there was enough to talk about. The Permanent Bureau in Geneva had prepared no fewer than a dozen reports on various problems: reimbursement of costs for mountain rescue, plans for a comprehensive book on alpinism covering every country, reciprocity for access to mountain huts and shelters between different clubs, and so forth.³³ The Bureau consisted of Egmond d’Arcis and a few unsalaried collaborators in Geneva, who often meet in the president’s private apartment. For a lengthy period, indeed, the UIAA was a kind of family business. The projects were many and ambitious, but the means were restricted. The budget, set at 6,000 francs in 1933, was supposed to be paid by the member clubs in proportion to their own membership. The total sum actually collected, however, was just a third of that

30 Bossus, *Fifty Years*, pp. 71–72; in Chamonix, d’Arcis had been the one who accepted the role assigned to the Swiss, on condition that the decision was approved by the Swiss Club, see *Journal de Genève*, 3 August 1932.

31 See Bossus, *Fifty Years*, pp. 72, 81, 83 and Tonella, *50 anni*, pp. 7–32; a short obituary in *Journal de Genève*, 8 December 1971; the Swiss library system currently gives 42 hits for d’Arcis as an author.

32 *Journal de Genève* 15 July 1935 and 8 December 1971; Bossus, *Fifty Years*, p. 85; the duration of the presidency was discussed and criticised in the 1950s, see Tonella, *50 anni*, pp. 29–30.

33 *Journal de Genève*, 15 July 1935.

amount, and the treasurers were constantly forced to find creative solutions in order to keep the Union halfway working. In the pre-war years the budget varied between 2,500 and 3,500 francs, and after World War II it went up only hesitantly.³⁴

Yet the later part of the twentieth century was the period when the global aspirations of the Union became more and more realistic, as revealed by its activities and its membership. From 1932 to 1939 there was one general assembly each year, combined with a meeting of the Executive Committee. The choice always fell on sites in Europe, twice in the Swiss Alps, twice in France, and four times in other countries. During the war the UIAA practically fell apart. No formal international reunion took place from 1940 to 1946. A new mountaineering federation was established in Nazi-Germany at the peak of its power which urged Egmond d'Arcis – in vain – to hand over his archives.³⁵ When the UIAA activities resumed in 1947, the pre-war kind of exclusive choices were continued. But from 1953 onwards the Executive Committee met more often, and a quarter of century later the time was ripe for general assemblies to be held on the margin of or outside Europe: during the 1970s in the Soviet Socialist Republic of Georgia, in Mexico, and in the USA, 1983 for the first time in the Himalayas, in Kathmandu, Nepal.³⁶ A similar development was evident with membership. At the foundation, eleven countries were formally represented in the UIAA, and by 1950 the figure had risen to twenty-four. In the following decades an increasing number of clubs joined the Union. The associations from the USA and from New Zealand that had left the Union in the early years because of the great distance, were back in 1966 and 1970. By now, air travel had changed physical remoteness. A sharp increase came eventually in the 1990s, when twenty-two new member countries could be registered.³⁷

The UIAA was both a complement and a rival to other mountaineering associations. Built on the explicit wish of important leaders of the alpinist movement, it also had to determine and carve out a field of activities for itself, and to watch over potential rivals on the international stage (for example by preventing the national clubs from setting up sections outside of their territory).³⁸ Back in 1933, Angelo Manaresi, the president of the Italian Alpine Club, and active fascist politician under Mussolini, wanted the UIAA to bring together “the aristocracy of mountaineering”, that is “all those who do not view mountaineering as an agreeable and munificent sport alone, but who are able to find in it an unsullied ideal of loyalty and kindness which enriches life and makes men better”.³⁹ Soon the UIAA was approached by the Swiss to intervene at the international

34 Bossus, *Fifty Years*, pp. 73, 77, 79, 85, 87.

35 *Ibid.*, p. 78.

36 *Ibid.*, pp. 48–49.

37 *Ibid.*, pp. 49–52 and the list of UIAA members on 3 March 2006 on the UIAA website (accessed 15 April 2006); currently the UIAA counts 89 member organisations from 66 countries on six continents, see <https://www.theuiaa.org/members/member-federations/> (accessed 7 July 2020).

38 *Ibid.*, p. 87.

39 *Ibid.*, p. 74; the 1933 UIAA assembly was held in the Italian Alps and hosted by Maranesi; afterwards he informed Mussolini that he had been able to give the statute a fascist turn and that the meeting closed with an ovation to fascist Italy (Pastore, *Alpinismo*, pp. 179–180); documents in the UIAA archive, located in Berne at the head-

level against the “unhealthy” way of mountaineering emerging in the 1930s, with the sensational climbs on the Eiger North Face and with the temptations posed by the medals for alpinism awarded since 1924 at the Winter Olympic Games.⁴⁰ Even after the idealistic presidency of Egmond d’Arcis, the UIAA remained prudent with regard to avant-garde alpinism. When Walter Bonatti opened up a new winter route on the Matterhorn in 1965, the Bureau sent him a note of congratulation “without exalting solo climbing”. At that time, it became clearer than before that climber stars could also be useful for the UIAA. In 1972 Reinhold Messner gave a speech at its fortieth anniversary on Lake Geneva, stressing the significance of alpinism against “the spiritual degeneration” in a world of material prosperity.⁴¹

Just a few years earlier, the president had stated that the UIAA would continue to grow “not as a result of excessive publicity”, but first of all based on the virtues of its work.⁴² In fact, in the first fifty years of its existence, the Union did not receive much attention from the general public, not even in Switzerland. The first two publications about its history, background and goals, were produced for the fiftieth anniversary. One of these brochures was written by an old friend of Egmond d’Arcis, and looked back at the “family period” of the UIAA in a personal way. The other one had an official character. It was authored by the president Pierre Bossus for the general assembly held in the Himalayas in 1983. The cover stressed the move into a global future with the subtitle “From Chamonix... to Kathmandu” and two respective images. Up to now, the two booklets have remained practically the only sources of information for this long-term exercise in globalisation.⁴³

4. Conclusions

With his seminal publication of 2011, the political scientist Pepper D. Culpepper has triggered an important debate about the difference between “noisy” and “quiet” business power in the contemporary Western world. Quiet business strategies, he observes, revolve around direct contacts and lobbying opportunities with politicians and regulatory agencies. Such strategies of low salience are often more profitable for companies and economic representatives than going public with media campaigns and open discussions in large audiences. Since re-election is the usual goal in democratic office holding, politicians are usually not inclined to meet business wishes easily when they are controversial

quarter of the Swiss Alpine Club SAC, give details about the previous elaboration of the statutes, and leave a somewhat different, sober impression; see folder “Assemblée générale 1932–1935” and “Anciens statuts”.

40 Rettner, Eiger, p. 131.

41 Bossus, *Fifty Years*, pp. 86, 90.

42 *Ibid.*, p. 87.

43 Apart from the two booklets quoted in note 29, I have only been able to trace short notes on the UIAA in various publications: *Dictionnaire des Alpes*, p. 726; D. Anker, *Bergsteigen international*, in *150 Years Stories*, ed. by Mammut Sports Group AG, Zürich 2011, pp. 162–163; the interesting new book by I. Scaglia (*The Emotions of Internationalism. Feeling International Cooperation in the Alps in the Interwar Period*, Oxford 2019) deals with special aspects in the first phase of the UIAA.

in the public medialised space.⁴⁴ In recent years this political science debate has evolved, and new evidence, new factors and some exceptions from the suggested model have been brought forward. For instance, a distinction has been drawn between politicians in search of technical policy advice and those seeking to polish their image. They would react differently to business offers or pressures.⁴⁵

As the debate on public visibility levels is still under way and has developed no historical, long-run perspective so far, it seems sensible for the present purpose to use only elements thereof as a background to our discussion of paths of globalisation. The aspects of mountaineering history presented in this article differ quite considerably with regard to publicity and political implications. Let us summarise our findings in four points:

(1) Since its inception, record-seeking alpinism has attracted a great deal of public attention. Many people were curious about the latest achievements on steep walls and high summits. Intense attention drew extensive media coverage which, in its turn, increased the audience. The publicity cluster so created became an attractive field for politics and power deployment. In the early twentieth century the direction was often nationalistic. During the three-day climb of the Eiger North Face in 1938, the German *Führer* demanded reports on a regular basis, and after the event claimed the “victory” of the four German and Austrian climbers for the Third Reich. After their feat they were invited to a reception and photo shoot with him. Fifteen years later, when the first successful climbers returned from Mount Everest, the long series of “post production” events on three continents provided an accurate reflection of the political order and aspirations. The winds of change were blowing through the colonial world. Sherpa Tenzing, the native climber, in particular did not fit into the metropolitan hierarchy which reserved the highest honours for the British. Yet on the Indian subcontinent most ascribed the exploit to him and not to his colleague from New Zealand.

(2) In the decades around 1900 most prominent mountaineering clubs cherished international ambitions. The relationships between them were marked both by their shared passion for climbing and by their national rivalry. An international federation created, or dominated, by one club alone would have produced “noisy” politics and would not have been sustainable. Thus, when the wish for international cooperation grew in the interwar period, that task was assigned to the Swiss, a small state and weak player where international technical activities could be kept low key. The presidency of the *Union Internationale des Associations d'Alpinisme* UIAA fell to the Swiss Alpine Club's section in Geneva, then seat of the League of Nations and of many international organisations. Some of the organisations were shaped by elites close to diplomatic and aristocratic circles.⁴⁶ The long-term president of the UIAA, Egmond d'Arcis, came from an aristocratic background as well, and thought of alpinism as a continuation of chivalrous ideals. In

44 Culpepper, Quiet Politics.

45 E. Keller, Noisy Business Politics: Lobbying Strategies and Business Influence After the Financial Crisis, in: *Journal of European Public Policy* 25 (2018) 3, pp. 287–306.

46 M. Herren, *Internationale Organisationen seit 1865. Eine Globalgeschichte der internationalen Ordnung*, Darmstadt 2009, p. 11; for the large number of international organisations located in Switzerland and particularly in

the first three decades of its existence, the Union was more or less his family enterprise and, in the war period, almost fell apart.

(3) The legitimacy of risk taking in mountaineering is an important field of discourse where views typically diverge. Driven by commercial interest, a considerable part of the media was pulled to the risk side in order to sell sensational thrills. Yet the public voices judging the latest adventures “suicidal” could become loud and prevail in certain moments. This kind of critique was also assimilated, at least officially, by the first generation of Soviet climbers. “Bourgeois” alpinism was denounced by them as an egoistic activity of individual “peak-eaters, supermen, record-seekers”. From another angle, but with similar results, the UIAA voted against the “unhealthy” way of mountaineering emerging in the 1930s and remained prudent with regard to avant-garde alpinism. After all, one of its main tasks was promoting safety in mountaineering. The Union should grow through honest work and not through “excessive” publicity. Nevertheless, developing more visibility was considered appropriate from the 1960s onward. Thus, a climber-celebrity like Reinhold Messner could be invited for a particular event. As he liked to describe life risking adventures in idealistic terms, this did not directly hurt the official view.

(4) The different link to publicity and politics created a different access to resources and resulted in a particular relationship to communication and transport technology, the single most important driver of globalisation. There are many indications that “noisy” mountaineering pushed technology. The Soviet expeditions to the summits of Central Asia in 1928 and 1933 were provided with the latest film and radio equipment. By the time of the climb of Mount Everest, television was expanding and it is quite certain that a part of the audience was encouraged by the spectacular event, a welcome addition to the Queen’s coronation, to turn to the new devices. In Britain alone, the returning heroes could be watched on over two million television sets.⁴⁷ The “quiet” side of international organisation, on the other hand, was not distinguished by technology but rather followed mainstream trends. The UIAA began to organise general assemblies far from Switzerland, in America and in Asia, only in the 1970s, after air travel had become affordable for the middle classes. A similar pattern emerged with the introduction of the internet. Although the UIAA conceived of itself as a global agency, its first website was not launched until after the turn of the millenium.⁴⁸

Geneva, see M. Herren-Oesch/S. Zala, *Netzwerk Außenpolitik. Internationale Organisationen und Kongresse als Instrumente der schweizerischen Außenpolitik 1914–1950*, Zürich 2002, p. 27.

47 Briggs and Burke, *Social History*, p. 213.

48 In 2001 (reconstructed with the website-version accessed on 15 April 2006).

REZENSIONEN | REVIEWS

Sverre Bagge: State Formation in Europe, 843–1789. A Divided World, Abingdon / New York: Routledge 2019, 297 pp.

Reviewed by
John Breuilly, London

This ambitious book aims to describe and explain state formation in Europe over a millennium. Bagge necessarily draws mainly on secondary literature and strays well beyond his own expertise as medievalist.

Chapter 1 outlines the rise to dominance by 1200 of some dozen territorial monarchies, arguing that how these acquired legitimacy is key to understanding state plurality and continuity thereafter. Chapter 2 traces the internal development of these monarchies to 1500. Chapter 3 looks at other significant forms of medieval rulership: the Catholic Church, and city-states. Chapters 4–6 cover 1500 to 1800: the impact of the global expansion of European power, the rise of science, the “military revolution”, the Enlightenment, the distinction between “constitutional” and “absolute” monarchies.

Competing kingdoms formed in post-Roman Europe north of the Alps. Comparing this region with southern Europe, East Asia and the Ottoman Empire, Bagge argues that neither geography nor culture provide much understanding of varying patterns within the “lucky latitudes” 20 to 40 degrees north. The same is true of cultural factors like language diversity. More time is spent on military arguments, such as Tilly’s dictum that “war made the state, and the state made war”. Bagge contends that European state formation does not fit any chronology of war-making. Radical change comes only with the early modern “military revolution but the European state system was largely set by 1200.

A problem is what is meant by “state”. Bagge focuses on “kingdoms” (including “empires”). He counts 15 in 1200, reducing to seven “fully independent” entities by 1648, plus the German Empire, to which are added Prussia and Sardinia by 1800. By contrast Tilly reckons 80 to 500 in 1490, settling for a median figure of 200, and 20 to 100 in 1848. Tilly explains such variation, e.g., whether every separately enumerated member of the Holy Roman Empire counts. Tilly’s dates (1490, 1848) are different from Bagge’s (1200, 1500, 1800) but that does not explain these differences. Neither offers a definition of “state”. Bagge begins with the 1933 Treaty

of Montevideo: “a state must have a permanent population, well-defined borders, a government and a capacity to honour international obligations” (p. 1). He notes this pays no attention to “the quality of government, internal sovereignty, impersonal bureaucracy, etc.”

Even by this definition, many medieval “states” lacked well-defined borders, discharged few of the obligations associated with a state today, and there was no “international recognition” procedure. Bagge’s “kingdoms” appear more “state-like” than Tilly’s “states” but co-existed with many other political entities.

Rather than fruitlessly searching for a definition useful for 1200 and 1800, we should ask if Bagge’s approach helps us understand changes over that time. His focus on dynastic legitimation is illuminating. Kingdoms had higher status than other political units. The effective making of dynastic claims were crucial for the construction of alliances and the merging of kingdoms, while failure to assert such claims had disastrous consequences. Huge efforts went into constructing genealogies, policing dynastic marriages and births, as well as challenging these. The Catholic Church played a vital role enforcing monogamy on European rulers, and providing the requisite ritual, ceremonies, symbols and personnel to legitimate succession.

War mattered but had to be linked to legitimation, something often made explicit in the very names of wars. Without legitimation war usually failed, and with it was often unnecessary for state formation. Most impressive is the Habsburg achievement. The dynasty’s apt motto was “let others wage war: thou, happy Austria, marry”. Aristocratic legitimation accompanied

monarchical legitimation; noble genealogies paralleled royal ones. Bagge argues this enabled stable elite structures, vividly expressed by Louis XIV and his palace at Versailles. This leaves the problem of explaining the incorporation of non-noble elites into late medieval and early modern monarchies.

Tilly in *Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990–1992* distinguished between how economic and military elites wielded power. Michael Mann in *The Sources of Social Power* differentiated between military, economic, political, and ideological power. Bagge does not proceed in such analytical fashion, instead making mainly descriptive points. He starts with “feudalism”, which highlights coercive-military power, followed by the three orders (those who work, fight, and pray), which adds economic and cultural power. However, counting lawyers, merchants, manufacturers, and bankers – all vital to state formation – amongst those who work add Tilly’s “capital” and Mann’s political power to the mix. This additive procedure explains little.

It also neglects key institutional and financial props. Bagge describes how Roman law promotes monarchical power, but not the marginalisation of local coercive power. State finance is treated sketchily; a list of the various taxes monarchs could raise but nothing on the elaborate banking system assembled by city-states such as Venice, Genoa, and Florence which were crucial to waging war and forming dynastic alliances.

There is little on the construction of a professional state apparatus, dealt with in a short section (pp. 75–79), half of which considers the English example. Yet Eng-

land is a-typical: a conquest state which suppressed significant regional institutions and was continually plagued by legitimisation conflicts from Stephen and Matilda to the Stuart pretenders.

In chapter 3 Bagge draws on Spruyt's "co-ordination" thesis to argue that neither the Catholic Church nor city-states could challenge monarchical power which was territorially focused. It would help to show how instead they helped monarchical coordination by providing resources, networks, and expertise.

The second three chapters are weaker. Chapter 4 is less about state formation than its post-1500 context: Reformation; global expansion; science. The narratives are elementary and connections to state formation are hardly explored. How far did the Reformation and Counter-Reformation "confessionalise" European monarchies and subordinate churches to their power? One could add many such questions.

Narratives explain little. One can always find stories with similar beginnings but different ends. Bagge describes how military defeats for the Danish monarchy led to a crisis which ended with the aristocratic estate agreeing "absolute" powers for the king. However, in another story military defeat for the "absolute" Charles I of England led to confrontation with Parliament, civil war, and regicide.

This highlights the problem of the absolute-constitutional monarchy distinction. Much hangs on contingency which seems ever reversible. Is there a coherent descriptive distinction? What about conceptual distinctions? Bagge does not explore arguments such as the eastern and western typologies of Perry Anderson in *Lineages*

of the Absolute State, or the distinction between "despotic" and "infra-structural" power made by Mann. Instead, he offers thumbnail case studies, moving from west to east. How one can generalise from these is unclear.

These chapters are wide-ranging, erudite, with many references to historiographical debates such as the Pomeranz thesis about a late economic divergence between China and Europe, or Hoffmann's argument about how the concept of the "tournament" can explain European military innovation. However, the whole is less than the sum of its parts, and many of the parts are purely descriptive.

I extend such criticism to the last chapter. It starts with a wonderful quote from Alexis de Tocqueville's *Democracy in America* on how "affections" have become wider and shallower compared to an earlier "aristocratic" age when they were intensely and narrowly focused on genealogy. This invites one to explore Max Weber's arguments about how modernity undermines dynastic legitimisation and leads on to other kinds of legitimisation. Instead, we get brief narratives of political thinkers, science and secularisation, printing, and "public opinion", followed by sketchy state histories. The elementary narratives cannot carry the conceptual and explanatory burden required of an historical analysis of state formation and its links to forms of legitimisation.

Gordon H. Chang / Shelley Fisher Fishkin (eds.): *The Chinese and the Iron Road. Building the Transcontinental Railroad*, Stanford: Stanford University Press 2019, 539 p.

Reviewed by
Thorben Pelzer, Leipzig

In 1869, Leland Stanford's "golden spike" joined the rails of the Central Pacific and the Union Pacific, forming the first transcontinental railroad of the United States. The two lines quickened passenger flow and economically vitalised the American West. Much has been written about symbolic meanings and practical consequences of the infrastructure, as well as about the "Big Four" railroad entrepreneurs behind the enterprise. The manual labourers however, many of them Chinese emigrants, have remained an unknown quantity. As discriminations against class and race intersected, historical sources are generally scarce. The workers left behind no known documents detailing their points of view. For the vast majority, not even their names were recorded.

The lengthy edited volume at hand is an outcome of the "Chinese Railroad Workers in North America" project at Stanford University. The interdisciplinary team includes, among others, the historian Gordon H. Chang, the literary scholar Shelley Fisher Fishkin, and the archaeologist Barbara Voss. The group faced the equally daunting and exciting task to capture the life of the Chinese railway workers in the

absence of concrete sources. Their way of dealing with the problem is best described as a method of multi-angular "approaching". The 21 essays never create the illusion of fully capturing the forgotten railway workers. Instead, the contributors encircle their subjects and observe them from a distance: through photos, through accounts of white acquaintances, through oral histories of descendants, through material excavations at the camps, or through cultural memory found in novels.

Subtracting the chapters introducing the historical background, the editors arranged the essays into four analytical parts. The three authors of the first cluster return to the Chinese coastal regions in search for clues about the railway workers' finances. Zhang explains the schemes of labour contractors in China. Workers accrued debt to finance their emigration. Creditors were often member of the expatriate's clan and saw the labour as a form of investment (p. 62). Native places absorbed not only wealth but also culture of the returnees. Yuan's and Liu's studies focus on remittances the workers sent back home. While in the early years, returnees acted as couriers, soon "Gold Mountain trading firms" offered remittance services to the railway labourers. These companies did not transfer money to the Mainland directly but invested it in their import-export business. The next cluster of texts is composed of eight studies most directly concerned with recovering the reality of the railroad workers. They include the chapters of the archaeological group of the Stanford project. Spatial analysis of the working camps points at a racist segregation, with Chinese workers residing on uneven, mosquito-ridden terrains. Abandoned everyday

tools support the idea of ethnic division and distinction, as the tools of consumption resembled those of the Chinatowns and their native home villages. As Voss describes, the household utensils reveal global commodity chains that reached “the most remote locations” (p. 113). Ritualistic and ludic items, such as incense burners and improvised gaming tokens, also reveal practices of native traditions. Using bio-archaeological data from skeletal remains, Kennedy et al. go into detail about health and healthcare of the railroad workers. They boiled tea, hunted game, caught fish, and prepared a large variety of vegetables, resulting in a diet that was more nutritious than that of workers from other ethnicities. Describing San Francisco Chinatown temples, Gin Lum describes religious worshipping practices of immigrants and their fear of not having their bodies returned to China in case of death. Huang’s article provides interesting contemplations on the encounters between Chinese workers and Native Americans. She describes a complex relationship, marked by similar sufferings, and argues that the indigenous and the diasporic constitute “mirror images” (p. 180). The essay also includes examples of interracial intimacy and Chinese inclusion into Native families. Khor’s article analyses photographs, especially the stereoviews of the transcontinental railroad’s official photographer Alfred A. Hart (1816–1908). She argues that even though the Chinese workers appear on the photos, they were often “dwarfed” and “subsumed in relation to nature and the machine” (p. 200). Finally, Robinson analyses accounts of Europeans who travelled and worked in the States during the time. The travellers essentialised the Chinese immigrants

using positive and negative attributes and described their relation to the white workers.

The following three chapters deal with the cultural memory of the railway and its labourers. Gow provides an interesting study of US-American history textbooks. After 1900, the railroad worker became “the primary symbol of Chinese immigrant labor” and embodied the “hopes and anxieties” of the white population (p. 238). Only in the 1960s, a move from othering to inclusion began. Yuan’s article acts as a counterpart in that it analyses Mainland Chinese historiography. In the early Communist histories of the 1950s, railroad workers were interpreted as an example of labour exploitation. More recently, since the 1980s, historians have instead focused on the empire-building function of the railroad and the importance which Chinese labourers played in accomplishing this feat. Last in the cluster, Feng reads the novels *Donald Duk* (1991) by Frank Chin (b. 1940) and *Dragon’s Gate* (1993) by Laurence Yep (b. 1948). For Feng, both works present a “a common desire” of Chinese American writers to compensate for the railway workers’ absence in historical sources through the means of fiction.

Five historical studies about the heritage and aftereffects of the Chinese labour migration conclude the volume. As Chen points out, labour migration fostered the first Chinese community organisations and the spread of secret societies. Chung follows the Chinese influence towards the development of railway towns in Nevada, while Lew-Williams follows the tracks of Chin Gee Hee (1844–1929), a railroader-turned-entrepreneur who later invested in the development of railways in China.

Chang's essay on the reception of Leland Stanford is a great way to conclude the volume. The railway entrepreneur's "deeply conflicted and often contradictory attitude" (p. 347) reflects the public reception of Chinese labour migration.

The assemblage of so many different approaches is innovative and unquestionably of value. This being the case, the authors make it transparent that not every research is new from the ground up. Some chapters are digests of existing studies reconfigured to meet the railroad topic. Other contributors make clear that they profit from existing research. Facing a lack of historical sources, the authors needed to get creative. Most of the 21 studies succeed in providing puzzle pieces towards creating an image of the Chinese railroad workers. However, some approaches are rather far-fetched. The inclusion of a study on Cuban sugar plantation workers seems justified to some degree, even though the author admits the "speculative" nature (p. 43). But how much can an analysis of remittance schemes of the "somewhat later" 1940s possibly "extrapolate" about the reality of manual labourers in the 1860s (pp. 76, 82)?

Anyone reading the volume cover to cover will encounter frequent repetitions. To some extent this problem is inevitable. Each chapter aspires to stand on its own while sharing the common topic, consequently retelling parts of the same story. Nonetheless, a greater streamlining would have been desirable. Furthermore, not all chapters are of equal quality. A reader studying the bibliographical notes will find Robinson and Shu guilty of citing the internet encyclopaedias Wikipedia and Baidu Baike. The latter also ignores basic

rules of Chinese Pinyin hyphenation. The volume's high point is the archaeological section, which provide fascinating insights into the labourers' everyday life and interactions. The articles focusing on cultural and popular memories likewise provide creative entry points to analyse what Chinese railroad labourers have eventually become to symbolise, even when their historical conclusiveness is limited by design. The historical articles display a great attention to meticulous details. However, they often end with very short conclusions which barely leave the descriptive level.

The edited volume is a much-welcomed contribution towards approaching the subject of Chinese railway workers in the United States. Sometimes, the legitimate desire to vindicate the forgotten Chinese railroad workers falls into the trap of affirming essentialisms – e. g. when Fisher Fishkin maintains that the heterogenous group of Chinese immigrants "performed herculean feats of endurance and strength" (p. 293). However, given the historical absence of individual voices, such generalisations may have been almost unavoidable. The volume reminds its readers that there are still blank spaces in the history from below, especially when dealing with infrastructures and mobilities. The Chinese railway workers were exemplary for a modern, globalised world. The contributors recognise this and rehabilitate them as the human actors they were.

Michael Zeuske: Handbuch Geschichte der Sklaverei. Eine Globalgeschichte von den Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart, 2., überarb. und erw. Aufl., 2 Bde., Berlin/Boston: De Gruyter Oldenbourg 2019, 1399 S.

Michael Zeuske: Sklaverei. Eine Menschheitsgeschichte von der Steinzeit bis heute, Stuttgart: Reclam 2018, 303 S.

Rezensiert von
Jürgen Angelow, Potsdam

Das zweibändige Handbuch der Geschichte der Sklaverei, das nunmehr in zweiter, vor allem um die Abolitions-Diskurse sowie Formen der fernöstlichen Sklaverei erweiterter Auflage vorliegt, behandelt einen nach wie vor aktuellen Gegenstand, dem es sich von verschiedenen Ausgangspunkten nähert. Es basiert auf einer welt- und globalgeschichtlichen Perspektive, die dem Autor; Michael Zeuske, Emeritus für iberische und lateinamerikanische Geschichte an der Universität Köln, seit seiner Leipziger Studienzeit vertraut ist, und kann auf der Grundlage der reichhaltigen und sehr ausdifferenzierten Literatur zum Thema erzählt werden. Hinzu kommen eine Vielzahl lebensgeschichtlicher Quellen, die Zeuske in Jahrzehnten zusammengetragen und in Datenbanken gespeichert hat.

Im Klappentext der deutlich kürzeren, viele Sachverhalte zusammenfassenden Reclamausgabe heißt es: „Verschleppungen und Zwangsarbeit gab es schon, als die Menschen gerade sesshaft geworden

waren, und es gab sie so gut wie überall. Michael Zeuske führt durch die gesamte Geschichte der Sklaverei in allen Weltregionen. Er macht seine Leser mit chinesischen Kindersklaven genauso bekannt wie mit osmanischen Elitesklaven oder den ‚Hofmohren‘ in preußischen Residenzstädten – und er blickt in die Gegenwart. Denn auch heute werden Menschen noch wie Waren behandelt – von der Zwangsprostitution bis hin zum Kindersoldaten.“ Sklaven haben nur selten oder gar nicht Eingang in die Archivüberlieferung gefunden. Deshalb erfordert jede empirische Fundierung eine besondere Sorgfalt und Kreativität: „Wenn überhaupt, ‚sprechen‘ meist Andere für Menschen, die versklavt sind oder waren“ (Handbuch, S. 31). Aus diesem Grund verwendet Michael Zeuske Notariatsprotokolle und Testamente von Menschen, in denen Aufschlüsse und Lebensgeschichten Versklavter verzeichnet sind. Neben den hierfür vor allem ausgewerteten, im Einzelnen jedoch nicht aufgezählten kubanischen Provinzarchiven wurden auch andere Überlieferungen zu Rate gezogen. Die entsprechenden Fundorte werden in der Einleitung genannt: Madrid, London, Lissabon, Havanna, Washington, New Orleans, Paris, Berlin, Caracas, Den Haag, Bogotá, Cartagena, Dakar, Berlin und Leipzig. Wenn aus bisher unveröffentlichten Quellen in den Fußnoten zitiert wird, gibt der Autor oft nur ungenaue Hinweise. Dass auf eine systematische Zusammenstellung der verwendeten Archivalien im Register verzichtet wird, ist wohl dem Stand der Erschließung und Verzeichnung von Akten in den kleineren Archiven geschuldet. Doch ist es dem Leser vielfach unmöglich, die verwendeten Bestände genauer zu identifizieren.

Die Darstellung wird durch einen historisch-anthropologischen Essay eingeleitet, in dem Zeuske – an der Stelle einer Zusammenfassung – Formen und Formwandel der „Sklavereien“ (im Plural) welthistorisch und in ihre Zeitverläufe einordnet, auf deren offene und verdeckte Prägungen aufmerksam macht, den Abolitionsgedanken kritisch hinterfragt und die aktuellen Reproduktionsmechanismen der Sklavereien im kapitalistischen Ausbeutungs- und Verwertungssystem anspricht, die in sozialer Ungleichheit, Unwissenheit und asymmetrischen Machtverhältnissen wurzeln: „Sklavereien“, so Zeuske, „gehören vor allem und gerade heute zum global agierenden Kapitalismus beziehungsweise zu Gesellschaften, in denen Eliten versuchen, auf schnellen Pfaden Profite, Verhalten, Mentalität, Wirtschaftsweise und Lebensformen des Kapitalismus für sich in ihren Herrschaftsgebieten durchzusetzen (natürlich ohne Rechtsstaat und Demokratie)“ (S. 48).

Dem Essay folgt eine profunde historiografiegeschichtliche Einordnung der Thematik aus globalhistorischer Perspektive (S. 51–190), in der die klassische Sklaverei-Forschung mit ihren nationalhistorischen Ansätzen genauso zur Sprache gebracht wird wie neuere Forschungsansätze, die das Phänomen „von unten“, aus mikrohistorischer und Akteursperspektive, makrohistorisch, transnational, in größeren Regionen bzw. globalgeschichtlich, geistes- und sozialgeschichtlich, aus anthropologischer, aus kolonialer, postkolonialer oder geschlechtergeschichtlicher Perspektive oder aus der einer Kulturgeschichte der Gewalt betrachten. Bereits hier wird das Ringen des Autors um eine dichte Beschreibung und definitorische

Eingrenzung des Gegenstandes (ab S. 124) deutlich, die im nächsten Kapitel fortgesetzt wird. Andererseits wird eine kritische Auseinandersetzung des Autors mit Forschungsmeinungen auch in den folgenden Kapiteln deutlich.

Unter der Kapitelüberschrift „Was war Sklaverei und was ist ein Sklave?“ (S. 191–291) stellt Michael Zeuske fest, dass es keine Definition *aller* Sklavereien gibt. „Sklavereien sind ein politisches, soziales, wirtschaftliches und moralisches Problem der Geschichte *und* der realen heutigen Globalisierung“ (S. 191). Das Phänomen lässt sich nur konkret beschreiben, und es gehört durchaus nicht der Vergangenheit an: „Buchstäblich unter unseren Augen existieren alte Plateaus, Entwicklungsstufen, Typen und Formen von Sklaverei, starken Abhängigkeiten und Menschenhandel, die sich unter Einfluss neuer Infrastrukturen und Kommunikationsmöglichkeiten (...), Vernetzungen und Kapitalakkumulation, Mobilität und Internet zu neuen Sklavereien verändern, die vielfach grausamer sind als die an sich schon sehr brutalen, aber wohlbekannteren Plantagensklavereien im Süden der USA, in der Karibik, in Brasilien, in Westafrika (...) oder die Sklaverei im alten Rom“ (S. 191–192.) Sklavereien, so Zeuske, bilden „die große globale Unterseite der immer wieder als Grundmerkmal heutiger Globalisierung beschworenen Mobilität und Migration“ (S. 192).

Der Autor findet eine sehr weiträumige Definition von Sklaverei, die immer dann vorhanden ist, wenn der Körper eines Menschen zeitweilig oder permanent unter der Kontrolle einer anderen Person steht. Letztendlich geht es bei Sklaverei immer um Statusdegradierung zum Beispiel

durch Kauf und Verkauf, rassische, soziale oder ethnische Rangzuschreibungen, um extreme Gefährdung, Schutzlosigkeit und körperliche Gewalt, Arbeits- und Dienstleistungszwang zur wirtschaftlichen Bereicherung Anderer sowie die Einschränkung von Mobilität. Im Kapitel werden weitere Strukturen, Perioden, Formen und Übergänge der Sklaverei beschrieben sowie neuzeitliche Sklavereien und abschließend welthistorische Ursachen identifiziert.

In den nächsten Kapiteln beschreibt Michael Zeuske konkrete Formen und Ausprägungen (Plateaus) von Sklavereien: Den Beginn machen nicht institutionalisierte Formen (S. 292–322), es folgen Verwandtschafts-Sklavereien, Statusdegradierungen und Ideologien der Versklavung (S. 323–362), Gesellschaften mit Sklaven (u. a. moderne Plantagensklaverei) sowie Sklavereigesellschaften (S. 363–391). Anschließend geht er stärker auf die Akteursperspektive ein und beschreibt Sklavenhalter sowie den Zusammenhang von Sklaverei und Recht (S. 392–501). Es folgt ein Kapitel, in dem die Erlangung und Verteilung der Ressource „Sklave“ behandelt wird, Razzien, Kaufsklaverei, Menschenhandel und Sklavereien (S. 502–549) sowie Akteure und Strukturen der Akkumulation: Sklavenhändler, Sklavenmärkte und Handelsnetze (S. 550–658). Im Kapitel „Transkulturation, Wissen und Widerstand“ (S. 659–687) setzt sich Zeuske mit dem Konzept der „Kreolisierung“ auseinander, das auf Fernando Ortiz' Begriff der „transculturación“ zurückgeht. Anschließend beschreibt er transatlantische Menschenhandelskulturen zwischen Amerika und Afrika (S. 688–717) und geht im Kapitel „Mobilität, Diäten, Terror und translokale Infrastrukturen der

Gewalt“ (718–752) auf die grausamen Zulieferungsbedingungen von Sklavinnen und Sklaven ein, wobei namentlich der atlantische Raum die Bezugsgröße bildet und auch auf die Lebensumstände der Verschleppten in der neuen Welt eingegangen wird.

Um eine Quantifizierung von Sklavereien geht es im Kapitel „Zahlen und Menschen“ (S. 753–798). Der Leser erfährt, dass allein das kleine Kuba zwischen 1790 und 1880 ca. 1–1,3 Millionen Sklavinnen und Sklaven eingeführt hat, Brasilien in der ersten Hälfte des 19. Jh.s, als der Sklavenhandel bereits der internationalen Ächtung unterlag, gar mehr als zwei Millionen (S. 770). Auch das Problem der Profiteure des außereuropäischen Menschenhandels wird thematisiert (S. 799–870), wobei klar wird, wie sehr Europa seinen Aufstieg seit dem Mittelalter der Ausbeutung von Sklavinnen und Sklaven aus den angrenzenden Regionen und seit dem Frühkapitalismus dem transozeanischen Menschenfernhandel verdankte. Die abschließenden Kapitel des Handbuchs gehen den Bezeichnungen von Sklaverei nach (S. 871–935). Sie beschreiben aktuelle Entwicklungen: „Moderne Sklavereien nach der Sklaverei“, mit einem Ausblick auf den Sklavereiboom im 21. Jh. (S. 936–998), der von Zwangsarbeit (unter anderem auf usbekischen Baumwollplantagen) und weltweiter Zwangsprostitution sowie Menschen- und Kinderhandel geprägt ist und aktuell weltweit rund 35,8 Millionen Menschen vor allem in Indien, China, Pakistan, Usbekistan und Russland betrifft (S. 997).

Der Anhang des Handbuchs nimmt allein 400 Seiten ein. Er enthält zahlreiche Abbildungen und Karten, die dem Leser die Orientierung erleichtern. Es folgt ein

Quellen- und Literaturverzeichnis. Dieses enthält die gedruckt vorliegenden Quellen und gibt einen wahrscheinlich vollständigen, nach Themengruppen strukturierten bibliografischen Überblick. Angaben zu den eingesehenen Archivbeständen sind allerdings nicht aufgeführt. Dem schließen sich ein ausführliches Sach-, Personen- und Orts-Register an, die zum Teil eingehender sind als notwendig (S. 999–1399).

Anders als die zweibändige Handbuchausgabe ist die deutlich kürzere Reclamausgabe stringenter angelegt. Sie enthält neben einem hinführenden und definierenden Kapitel eine zusammenfassende Beschreibung der verschiedenen globalhistorischen Sklavereiplateaus, die von Zeuske als historische Formationen von Sklavereien beschrieben werden. Das erste Plateau bildet Sklavereien ohne Menschenhandel ab (20.000 bis 8.000 v. Chr.), das zweite umfasst kleine Sklavereien im Rahmen von Verwandtschafts- und Siedlungsgruppen (Beginn ab 3 Jahrtausend v. Chr.), das dritte Plateau bezieht sich auf transozeanische Sklavereien, die sich ab ca. 1400 mit der kolonialen Expansion Spaniens und Portugals, später auch anderer Staaten, im Atlantik und in der östlichen Hemisphäre an den Rändern Chinas etabliert haben. Während das vierte Plateau die Sklavereien ab 1800 der „Second Slavery“ in den beiden Amerikas sowie im indischen Ozean und Pazifik beschreibt, beginnt das fünfte Plateau etwa um 1900 und betrifft Zwangsarbeitssysteme, Besatzungsregimes und andere Ausbeutungsformen bis in die Gegenwart. Dem schließen sich Kapitel über den Preis menschlicher Körper bis in die Gegenwart, den ostasiatischen Raum,

quantitative Aspekte und aktuelle Entwicklungen an.

Werden beide Bücher resümierend betrachtet, macht die Zusammenführung von mikrohistorischer, dezentraler Quellenfundierung und der globalgeschichtlichen Interpretation des Themas das Spannungsfeld, aber auch den eigentlichen Reiz der Darstellungen aus. Dabei steht das Handbuch gleichsam zusammenfassend für die wissenschaftliche Gesamtleistung Michael Zeuskes, die durch diese voluminöse wie profunde Darstellung gekrönt wird. Die Reclamausgabe ist weniger ausladend und schlägt die Brücke zu einem breiteren Leserkreis.

Bei aller Kritik am assoziierenden Schreibstil, den manchmal zu ausführlich geratenen Zitaten, den kaleidoskopartig zusammengestellten Fakten sowie den Abschweifungen, die die Übersichtlichkeit beeinträchtigen, gebührt Michael Zeuske Respekt für diese akribische, ambitionierte und gedankenreiche Darstellung von „Sklavereien“. Sie ist auf der Höhe der Zeit, weil sie zum einen viele konkrete Beschreibungen von Sklavereien enthält und die wichtigsten Erkenntnisse der Forschung zusammenfasst und zum anderen den Blick für ein Phänomen öffnet, welches schon totgesagt worden war, aber in Wirklichkeit nur mehr oder weniger ausgeprägt bzw. institutionalisiert weiter existiert, alle Epochen der Menschheitsgeschichte bis zum heutigen Tag begleitend.

ANNOTATIONEN

Gwyn Campbell: Africa and the Indian Ocean World from Early Times to circa 1900 (New Approaches to African History, 4), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2019, xv + 305 pp.

In 2019, Gwyn Campbell, Director of the Indian Ocean World Centre at McGill University, Montréal (Canada), published the monograph “Africa and the Indian Ocean World from Early Times to circa 1900” in Cambridge University Press’s “New Approaches to African History” series. In line with the series’ objectives, the book both introduces students and general readers to the history of Africa in the context of the Indian Ocean world, and stimulates debate by arguing for a particular approach to the subject, namely a focus on human-environment interaction as driving force for the region’s history in the longue durée. The latter is not to be confused with ecological determinism, as “humans can have major impacts on the environment” (p. 17). Instead, Campbell makes a case for correlating a dynamic understanding of environmental phenomena with developments and events in human history.

The book consists of twelve chapters, sketching over two millennia of human-environment interaction in the Indian

Ocean world and in Indian Ocean Africa. After an introductory chapter explaining the book’s guiding principles, the author discusses the Indian Ocean world as a “global economy” (what Fernand Braudel has called “une économie-monde”) in chapter 2, and moves on to suggest a periodization of three upswings/upsurges (chapters 3, 5, 6 and 9) contrasted with periods of instability and uncertainty (chapters 4, 7, and 8). Volcanic eruptions, changes in climate, oceanic currents and winds, as well as in agricultural activity and in the use of energy, provide plausible explanations for these vicissitudes. The final three chapters present “indigenous modernization” in Egypt, Ethiopia, and Madagascar within a single interpretative framework (chapter 10), a narrative on the Scramble for Africa in an Indian Ocean context (chapter 11), and an innovative interpretation of slavery and slave trade in the Indian Ocean world (chapter 12).

The book is richly illustrated, with over 50 figures, maps, and informative tables. Twelve pages of (somewhat dated) references point to further reading. A thirteen pages index helps the reader to browse through this thought-provoking monograph.

Geert Castryck

Weiping Wu / Mark W. Frazier (eds.): The SAGE Handbook of Contemporary China, London: SAGE Publications 2018, 1269 pp.

The Sage Handbook of Contemporary China encompasses 58 short articles about China's economy, political culture and system, nationalisms, social change, and global role. The focus on contemporary China, however, only allows the reader brief glances into the country's history. The somewhat confined character of the handbook is maintained throughout as the articles are kept concise. The structure, with several dozen partially highly specialized articles organized in 10 chapters, tends to be overloaded and at certain points confusing. For example, China's role in global structures is described in an extra chapter, not as part of China's "normal" development. This leads to certain repetitions, with one article summarizing China's energy situation and another one China's role in global energy governance. Both report on China's energy resources, with a slightly different focus as the latter includes strategies in respect of exports and imports (which is, nonetheless, very inter-

esting, as it identifies two factions in the country's economic bureaucracies – one promoting self-reliance, the other international integration – which struggled over hard-currency oil exports and technology imports before China became a net oil importer again in the 1990s).

Exemplary for what a global historian could expect from such a handbook is Chris Bramall's depiction of Chinese economic history in the twentieth century in the form of controversies on continuities and ruptures. Many of these controversies circulate around one crucial question: was Maoism a hindrance to development before China's economy was liberated by market reforms, or were the industrial legacies of the Mao era the fundament of China's rise to becoming a global economic power in the twenty-first century (still based on state policies to a large extent)? Thus, while many of the articles focus on contemporary life and quantitative methods – and thus are rather oriented towards social scientists, or even practitioners of economic, political, and cultural exchange – there are exciting points to be found for (global) historians as well.

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