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Heike Paul (Ed.)

Re-Education Revisited: Conflicting Agendas and Cross-Cultural Agency in the Early Cold War

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Ed. by Heike Paul

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Editorial

Many approaches in the field of global history are based on the hypothesis that it is not so much the processes within societies that explain historical change, but rather the encounters and interactions between societies. This thesis is in conflict with Maximilien Robespierre's famous doubt as to whether revolutions can be successfully exported or whether every society must wait for the moment when it is ready for radical change. Both positions have their supporters and the latter was not by chance emerging during the French revolution when the very concept of society in its national form was born. Since unanimity is not to be expected on this question, the pondering answer suggests itself that it all depends. But on what? And how can these factors be determined?

Heike Paul and her colleagues, who have contributed to this issue on re-education, have opted for a triangular constellation which, although obvious in previous research, has nevertheless been largely neglected. They compare the efforts of the US-military and administrators in Japan and Germany to initiate a society freed from fascism and on its way to democracy. But was the American presence only a supportive factor for already existing tendencies towards democratic behaviour and attitude or had the US-army to create something from scratch? How to conceptualize the project of re-education: in terms of a decided diffusion of values or as an impulse for the self-healing of a society ready for democratization after the collapse of the Nazi or the Tenno regimes?

Parallel processes such as the shaping of cultural relations between the (here primarily American) occupying power and the inhabitants and authorities of Japan and Germany as war-loser states can apparently be compared well in a global-historical setting. Thus, ideas about more general trends coalesce from case studies, which can then be matched with overarching explanations and narratives on macro processes. But the very different terms in which these relationships are described also point to the recalcitrance that the material shows towards this procedure. Why is it called in one (the German) case "re-education" and for the other (the Japanese) "democratization" and "modernization"? These terms indicate, as the articles in this issue demonstrate, a direction in which the process was conceived – returning or advancing to a desirable state. And that, in turn, says much more about the positioning of those who wanted to re-educate (or cure, as Richard Brickner suggested in his 1943 book "Is Germany incurable?") or modernize,

as it was thought in relation to Japan, which obviously had not yet had its future behind it as the Germans did with the Weimar Republic. The fact that rhetorical figures (and practices such as land dispossession on the island of Okinawa) of the civilizing mission from colonial contexts were not far behind is shown by Akino Oshiro's contribution on the transformation of Okinawa into a huge American military base. In the German context, it is rather the contradiction in the re-education policy between the goal of the greatest possible capacity for democracy and the distrust of incurable Germany that is expressed. The fact that this contradiction did not disappear with the occupying troops, but continues to shape the debate on democracy in Germany to this day, is one of the legacies of the re-education period.

As contradictory as this period was, it cannot simply be reduced to a global moment with only slight variations in its manifestations in different places. Rather, we observe a wide spread of constellations that could be observed at about the same time at different ends of the Eurasian complex in confrontation with the USA, which had become the global power and the role-model for democracy. In this respect, the comparative procedure here rather leads to the identification of considerable differences with some similarities on the surface of events and thus forms a barb to a history of linear progressive convergence through global processes.

<div align="right">Matthias Middell / Katja Castryck-Naumann</div>

Introduction

Heike Paul

The term "re-education" is full of ambiguity. Firmly established in the post-war historiography of transatlantic relations between the US and Germany, it has been variously used to describe immediate punitive measures of the occupation forces as well as long-term soft power public diplomacy-efforts. It was coined by US social scientists and policy advisors and it was soon taken up by historians and political scientists alike; thus, the term is both, *descriptive and normative.*[1] "Re-Education" is certainly less of a fixture in post-war transpacific relations between the US and Japan, where a terminology of "reform", "democratization" or "modernization" was more readily employed for similar concerns, strategies, and programs. Whereas the dominant idea concerning Germany suggested a "return" to the democratic norms and practices first implemented during the Weimar Republic, for the Japanese context the plan implied more of an original "transformation" modelled on the Western, i.e., US example. Notwithstanding such semantic and rhetorical differences, this special issue seeks to draw on *re-education as a critical term* which allows for an examination of important social, cultural, economic, and political aspects of US-American policies in Germany and Japan after World War II and their effects in a subnational, transnational, and comparative perspective. Revisiting the post-war transatlantic and transpacific US engagement, this issue complements and reorients existing scholarship that for the most part has focused on national scenarios in isolation – to this

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1   The need for the post-war re-education of Germans has prominently been suggested by Richard Brickner in his 1943-study *Is Germany Incurable?* Brickner's examination of German society through the lens of social psychology diagnoses a somewhat disturbing pattern of paranoia in the German mind (R. M. Brickner, Is Germany Incurable?, New York 1943). Ruth Benedict's anthropological study *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword* (1946) has long been considered as a kind of companion piece and a somewhat controversial and essentializing study of Japanese cultural traits and national character (R. Benedict, The Chrysanthemum and the Sword: Patterns of Japanese Culture, New York 1946).

day, very few comparative studies exist.[2] Hence, the title of the special issue announces a "revisiting" of re-education, both in its historical use as a descriptive/normative label and as a critical tool. In a joint effort, this volume brings together scholars from Japanese and American Studies, from history and postcolonial studies, from cultural studies and sociology with the goal of pursuing questions of structural analogies and regional differences in a comparative mode/design. The subtitle of this issue "conflicting agendas and cross-cultural agency" bespeaks our shared observation that post-war policies and local responses to them draw out paradoxes and contradictions on minor and major issues with lasting effects on culture and politics.

"Re-education" commonly describes American strategies (and those of their allies) that were developed for a denazification of Germany and the democratization of Germany and Japan after World War II. The means for this re-education were diverse and spread through all central functional areas of society. Of course, it played a particular role in the educational sector. Re-education is a broad term, which incorporates aspects of correcting/re-doing both "up-bringing" (*Erziehung*) and "education" (*Bildung*).[3] The term is originally borrowed from the educational sciences and psychiatry and therefore transports the notion of "a re-learning of forgotten learning content" ("ein Wiedererlernen vergessener Lerninhalte") as well as "the correction of mental patterns of behavior" ("die Korrektur mentaler Verhaltensmuster").[4] In the historical moment, it is also bound up with quite some skepticism towards its effectiveness: *Is Germany Incurable?* Richard Brickner wondered about the pathologies of "the Germans".[5] Thus, this use of the term is based on the understanding that the defeated nations (Germany and Japan) are to be redefined: from enemies to patients in need of therapy or, if you will, "psychosocial engineering". Inherent in the term is a profound asymmetry of power. The term "re-education" may be considered as highly charged for various reasons, but it is useful as a heuristic device, nonetheless. In the present context, it serves to capture phenomena beyond the narrower confines of the educational sector (in which it was originally mainly deployed) and to probe its usefulness for the analysis of scenarios in the political, economic, jurisdictional, and larger cultural sphere. Conceptual framing certainly determines analytical findings and path-dependent interpretation. Rather than "Zero Hour", "cold war" or "cold war beginnings", or even "occupation", this volume focuses on re-education as a discursive framework for revisiting post-war developments in different occupational zones.

2   Notable exceptions are B. Rosenzweig, Erziehung zur Demokratie? Amerikanische Besatzungs- und Schulreformpolitik in Deutschland und Japan (Beiträge zur Kolonial- und Überseegeschichte 69), Stuttgart 1998 and Sebastian Conrad's study of post-war historiography (S. Conrad, Auf der Suche nach der verlorenen Nation: Geschichtsschreibung in Westdeutschland und Japan 1945–1960, Göttingen 1999).

3   See K.-E. Bungenstab, Umerziehung zur Demokratie? Re-Education-Politik im Bildungswesen der US Zone 1945–1949, Düsseldorf 1970, p. 19.

4   B. Braun, Umerziehung in der amerikanischen Besatzungszone: Die Schul- und Bildungspolitik in Württemberg-Baden von 1945 bis 1949, Münster 2004, p. 16.

5   Brickner, Is Germany Incurable?

1. Scenarios of Re-Education

The scenarios of re-education presented here can be described in a kind of typology – a typology that unpacks the ambiguities of re-education but that also attests to the disparities and semantic nuances in the usage of the term. This issue contains essays by Fabian Schäfer, Akino Oshiro, Katharina Gerund, Jana Aresin, and Michiko Takeuchi, who all (more or less explicitly) draw on a re-education framework to make their arguments concerning changes in post-war Japan and Germany. These changes concern discourses of rights and participation in the broadest sense. In each case, the peculiarities of re-education and its in-built tensions and paradoxes become evident.

2. Re-Education as Playful Pedagogy

Post-war re-education strategies were based on a pedagogical model of unlearning and re-learning that reforms and trains a collective, in fact an entire population, not only in tolerating a new political system and re-aligning itself with the ground rules of a liberal market democracy but also to readily participate in it. Participation, however, was not to be encouraged in the strictly political sphere only. Rather, a post-war new beginning suggested many small ways in which democracy and democratic practice could and needed to be inculcated. "Learn How to Discuss" (Lernen Sie diskutieren!") was one of the slogans of early re-education programs, and in the German context, Nina Verheyen has reconstructed the emergence of a new "Diskussionslust" in argumentative exchanges in West-German society.[6] The pleasures of participation often went along with entertainment. No one other than Billy Wilder, who worked for the American military's "Information Control Division" in Europe, described this strategy in his so-called "Wilder Memorandum" from 16 August 1945, titled "Propaganda through Entertainment", and he saw a privileged role here for film and other mass media:

> *Now* if *there was an entertainment film with Rita Hayworth or Ingrid Bergman or Gary Cooper, in Technicolor if you wish, and with a love story – only with a special love story, cleverly devised to help us sell a few ideological items – such a film would provide us with a superior piece of propaganda: they would stand in long lines to buy and once they bought it, it would stick. Unfortunately, no such film exists yet. It must be made. I want to make it.*[7]

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6   H. Roß (ed.), Lernen Sie Diskutieren! Re-Education durch Film: Strategien der westlichen Alliierten nach 1945 (Beiträge Zur Filmgeschichte Band 3), Berlin 2005; N. Verheyen, Diskussionslust: Eine Kulturgeschichte des 'besseren Arguments' in Westdeutschland (Kritische Studien zur Geschichtswissenschaft, 193), Göttingen 2010.

7   Billy Wilder in "The Wilder Memorandum". See G. Gemünden, A Foreign Affair: Billy Wilder's American Films, New York, 2008, p. 58.

Billy Wilder did indeed make that film, not with Rita Hayworth or Ingrid Bergman but with Marlene Dietrich as a "loose woman" with dubious political leanings:[8] *A Foreign Affair* (1947). Jennifer Faye has detailed the ways in which Hollywood became part of the "theater of occupation"[9] abroad. Film, television shows, radio programs and their specific genres – from comedy and melodrama to the quiz show, informed and entertained Japanese and German audiences. At the same time, these playful and seemingly non-authoritarian formats still allowed for their audiences to be quizzed, polled, and measured. *Fabian Schäfer's* contribution shows how the line between propaganda and entertainment became as blurred as Billy Wilder imagined it to be as the mass media was assigned a crucial role in purging totalitarian patterns of old and in teaching values of liberal democracy in light of a new beginning. Acknowledging the foundational paradox of a collective training in liberalist values such as "freedom", "individualism", and "fair play", forms of mediated playful participation became an appropriate channel for such an undertaking, the undertaking of 'managing' a free society. The latter included participatory broadcasting formats (e.g. street interviews and quiz shows) along with opinion surveys commissioned by the respective military government, conducted by newspaper companies or newly founded opinion research institutes in Japan and Germany. As Schäfer shows, the lasting effect of these measures extends to this day.

3. Re-Education as Propaganda

Historically, re-education has often been considered a cynical euphemism for the coercive and assimilationist work of a repressive state or an occupational regime. In the specific post-war contexts, "re-education" was also the beginning of a new form or agenda of political education.[10] Notwithstanding such well-intentioned educational agendas, the very concept remained stigmatized when referring to official programs. *Akino Oshiro's* contribution presents a critical appraisal of the US occupation on the island of Okinawa and its re-educational engagement. Okinawa, already in a minoritized, post-colonial relationship to mainland Japan before the war, became the site of a neo-colonial US occupational policy after World War II. The latter included a fundamental transformation of the island's economic structures that disrupted rural communities' way of life and implemented a new economy at the centre of which stood the military base. Transitioning from "farm to base", the local population was recruited for the service sector of the US military apparatus as many islanders lost their indigenous land through dispossession. This development was not couched in terms of loss and alienation or even occupation by US officials, quite the contrary, it was conveyed in a language of 'lessons' in progress, upward mobility, and modernization – and thus was related to the notion of a "civilizing

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8   For an in-depth analysis, see W. Sollors, The Temptation of Despair: Tales of the 1940s, Cambridge, MA 2014, pp. 247–277.

9   J. Fay, Theaters of Occupation: Hollywood and the Reeducation of Postwar Germany, Minneapolis 2008.

10   See, for instance, W. Gagel. Geschichte der politischen Bildung in Deutschland, 1945–1989/90, Wiesbaden 2005.

mission" in colonial discourse. This rhetoric of benevolent re-education hardly veiled the agenda pursued by the occupation forces in the name of their role and the management of the cold war in the global arena. To this day, protests against the US military presence on the island of Okinawa persist and bring to light this history of militarization (of Japan on Okinawa) in the name of post-war demilitarization and democratization (of Japan on the mainland), yet another paradox of re-education efforts as observed from a local vantage point. Such sectoral dissonance points to the euphemism in the use of the term "re-education" and merits the suspicion of ideological manipulation that in any use of and reference to the term arouses. From a comparative angle, scholarship has only begun to shed light on what it means to "live with the US military empire" at its peripheral outposts, one of them being the island of Okinawa.[11]

4. Re-Education as Reflexive Education

Race figures prominently in re-education regimes and accounts for many of the double standards that pop up in a comparison of the Japanese and the German theatre of occupation. Still, racial discourses not only define so-called foreign relations in the post-war, such as those between American soldiers and Japanese civilians, they also play a role in the intra-institutional negotiations within the US military – at a time when racial segregation in the US became increasingly controversial. While Akino Oshiro's paper points to the underlying neo-colonial attitudes toward native Okinawans in the post-war era in the Pacific, *Katharina Gerund's* essay examines yet another paradox of re-education: the discrepancy between an occupying power preaching equality and freedom while practicing segregation and discrimination based on race in its own ranks. In some respects, Oshiro and Gerund discuss two sides of the same re-education-coin, so to speak. The re-education-paradigm orchestrated overseas prompts a specific kind of self-reflection within the institution of the US military – a reflection on its dominant racial regime condoning racial inequality, on whiteness and white privilege. Albeit in limited and circumscribed ways, such reflection, according to Gerund, can be discerned as a kind of "self-conscious re-education": statements and communications of the military personnel and leadership reveal that consciousness raising abroad also had repercussions on the home front. It has become a canonical argument to link the African American participation in post-war occupation to the emergence of the civil rights movement, among whose activists many were veterans of World War II.[12] As a prequel to the narrative that unfolds in the 1960s and 70s, Gerund's essay chronicles the growing discomfort and uneasiness that

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11   See M. Höhn / S. Moon, Over There: Living with the US Military Empire from World War II to the Present, Durham 2010.

12   This has been argued, for instance, by Maria Höhn and Martin Klimke in their seminal study A Breath of Freedom: M Höhn / M. Klimke, A Breath of Freedom: The Civil Rights Struggle, African American GIs, and Germany, New York 2010.

bespeaks an awareness of the kind of structural racism within US institutions during the attempts to export freedom, American style, that is still being scrutinized today.

5. Re-Education as Gender Education

Two contributions highlight aspects of gender in post-war re-education scenarios, and both contest the dominant view that the new Japanese constitution written under the influence of US occupation for the first time granted Japanese women equal rights and universal suffrage, period. Both articles suggest that the story is far more complicated than that. *Jana Aresin's* essay discusses women's magazines across the political spectrum with regard to discussions of the nexus between democracy and specific gender roles and notes that most of post-war women's magazines in the United States and Japan share one characteristic: the recognition of a need to discuss and redefine the role of women in a democratic society – yet on whose terms? The contradiction that Aresin uncovers resides in the somewhat paradoxical assumption that Japanese women had to be empowered through outside, namely US, interference to become politically responsible citizens, yet their emancipation and democratization was firmly limited by the championing of a renewed pre-feminist domestic ideal defining women's lives in Japan and the US. The housewife-model became a hegemonic type (and led to the coinage of a new word in Japanese to describe it: *sengyō shufu*). Women's magazine culture disseminated it while also pointing to its limited attractiveness and relevance for women's lives.

While Aresin examines women's magazine culture in a transpacific perspective, *Michiko Takeuchi* engages with women's transnational networks contesting both the assumption that somehow Americans brought women's rights to Japan (forms of political empowerment had been there all along) and the observation that Japanese middle-class women became unwittingly complicit with the agents of the US empire in striving to assert themselves as democratic citizens. Instead, Takeuchi's argument prominently showcases the class divisions among Japanese women (with decades of activism among them) and their sense of superiority towards their US counterparts. Takeuchi argues that the former only pretended to comply with the reforms that came on the heels of occupation in order to humour American women's missionary zeal and self-declared "civilizing force".

6. All Is Well that Ends Well?

Revisiting re-education implies spelling out the different forms and functions re-education can have and did have in the post-war moment – and beyond. Certainly, all of the types identified here rather schematically in fact often appear in hybrid forms: play includes propaganda (perhaps in more subtly hidden ways), propagandistic efforts, however, can be re-appropriated by local actors (for purposes of protest, American style), re-education abroad can lead to re-education at home, and social and political changes can also be falsely attributed to re-education efforts against the backdrop of the post-

war US tendency to produce success stories. Each of the contributions in this volume discusses instances of "conflicting agendas" and "cross-cultural agency" in a time which saw the emergence of a new post-war order. This special issue prominently discusses contradictions arising with the post-war implementation of new norms in Japan and Germany by way of planned re-education, the re-emergence of mass media under the arc of democratization (and, paradoxically, military governance), and the rhetoric around the meaning of freedom, liberation, and emancipation resonating within civil society at large. The "management" of democratic citizens, the re-militarization of an island in the name of peace, the attempts at exporting equality while holding on to white privilege, the struggle around (some) women's rights and patriarchal gender norms – these are some of the tensions that this volume discusses and that any analysis of re-education and its cross-cultural agendas and actors has to bring to the fore in order to critically revise the dominant narrative of the post-war period that has focused on cold-war beginnings which almost immediately ushered in a politics of containment along with a geopolitical re-alignment that included the quick transformation of former enemies into potential allies through successful pedagogy. Of course, it has to be conceded that re-education efforts have shaped the post-war societies but, quite to the contrary of such generalizing success stories, they were and still are at the core of ongoing controversies.

The final contribution to this volume, "a conversation about two occupations", brings together two of the most renowned scholars on the subject, *Mire Koikari* and *Susan Carruthers*, whose work has shaped the field of cold war historiography and occupation studies in crucial ways. In a vivid exchange, they reflect on questions of terminology, shifting positionalities, the role of difference (including gender) and mass media, on questions of the archive and instances of 'archive fever' along with formats in which to teach occupation and re-education in the classroom. Both indicate next steps to be taken in the scholarship on re-education and occupation employing interdisciplinary and transnational research designs.

In sum, the contributions in this volume are bound together by their focus on institutions and actors in early cold war transpacific and transatlantic constellations: military institutions and their agents, a civilian labour force and its local, yet displaced workers, a national civil society along with transnational networks of activists, mass media entertainment and academic researchers investigating public opinion in different cultural contexts. The essays flesh out effects of and responses to re-education, reform, and "democratization" that point to the shortcomings of US efforts and of American democracy itself, to what is lost and gained in translation and transfer, and to the legacies of crucial post-war transformations today.

Quizzes and Questionnaires: Learning to Play Democracy under US Occupation in Germany and Japan

Fabian Schäfer

ABSTRACTS

Die Umerziehung „der Japaner" und „der Deutschen" nach Kriegsende war nicht nur ein politisches oder pädagogisches, sondern auch ein kulturelles Unterfangen. Unmittelbar beeinflusst durch das Denken und die therapeutischen Methoden eher neuer akademischer Disziplinen wie der Sozialpsychologie, der Psychotherapie und der Anthropologie, wurde re-education (oder „reorientation") als das Verlernen von (vermeintlich „pathologischen") kulturellen oder Verhaltensmustern verstanden. Neben der Notwendigkeit, die Bildungseinrichtungen zu reformieren, wurde den Massenmedien eine zentrale Rolle zugewiesen, um diese alten totalitären Muster zu beseitigen und stattdessen die neuen liberal-demokratischen und kapitalistischen Werte zu vermitteln. Angesichts des Paradoxons, ganze Gesellschaften in Zeiten einer militärischen Besatzung von oben herab in liberalistischen Werten wie „Freiheit", „Fair Play" oder „Individualismus" zu schulen, wurden Methoden der medialen „Partizipation" als geeigneter, angemessener und „spielerischer" Weg angesehen, den Menschen diese neuen Werte beizubringen. Zu diesen Methoden zählten insbesondere partizipative Rundfunkformate (z. B. Straßeninterviews und Quizshows) und von den Militärregierungen in Auftrag gegebene Meinungsumfragen, die von Zeitungsunternehmen oder neu gegründeten Meinungsforschungsinstituten in Japan und Deutschland durchgeführt wurden.

Re-educating "the Japanese" and "the Germans" after the war had ended was not merely a political or educational undertaking; it was also a cultural one. Directly influenced by the thought and therapeutic methods of rather new academic disciplines such as social psychology, psychotherapy, and anthropology, re-education (or "reorientation") was understood as the unlearning of (allegedly "pathological") cultural or behavioural patterns. Besides the necessity to reform educational institutions, the mass media was assigned a pivotal role in purging these

old totalitarian patterns, and instead teaching the new liberal-democratic and capitalist values. Acknowledging the paradox of training entire societies in liberalist values such as "freedom", "fair play", or "individualism" in times of a top-down military occupation, methods of mediated "participation" were considered an appropriate and "playful" way of training these new values. In particular, these methods included participatory broadcasting formats (e.g., street interviews and quiz shows) and opinion surveys commissioned by the military governments, conducted by newspaper companies or newly founded opinion research institutes in Japan and Germany.

1. Introduction

By the end of the 1940s, "to be questioned" had become a standard experience of the people in occupied Japan and Germany after WW II had finally ended in both countries. In Germany, by the beginning of the 1950s, thirteen million people in the American occupied zone alone had already filled in the *Fragebogen* ("questionnaire") with its 131 questions, by which all Germans striving for employment or public office had to clarify their relationship to National Socialism as part of the Allied denazification campaign. At the same time, several thousands of Japanese had been summoned for questioning to G-2, the counter-intelligence section of GHQ in Japan, to give proof of their suitability for public office. By the beginning of the 1950s, people in Germany already had become *fragebogenkrank* ("questionnaire-sick"), as the German entertainer, musician, and popular radio quizmaster Just Scheu had sarcastically sung in his popular song *Der Fragebogen* ("The Questionnaire", 1950).[1]

Moreover, even after the Allied government's interest in denazification and demilitarization had faded in Germany as well as Japan due to the change of course in the re-education strategy in the context of the US anti-Communist containment policy in 1947, the questioning of the Japanese and the Germans in fact did not come to an end. Hundreds of public opinion polls and surveys, conducted or commissioned by the military government in order to validate the effectiveness of its re-education measurements, replaced the denazification / demilitarization questionnaires and interviews in the experience of the people in both countries. Furthermore, as if that wasn't already enough, the radio audiences in Japan and Germany also became quiz-crazy towards the end of the 1940s, as these new entertainment programmes had been introduced in the course of the reorganization of broadcasting programmes as part of a milder form of re-education through mass media. In the 1950s, as a contemporary commentator in the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (FAZ) cynically stated, the "interest of the Allies in the questionnaire game […] had obviously subsided", and "the Germans therefore had to console themselves with the manifold quizzes which were regularly posed to them on the radio and in magazines".[2]

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1   See W. Sollors, "Everybody gets Fragebogened sooner or later": The Denazification Questionnaire as Cultural Text, in: German Life and Letters 71 (2018) 2, pp. 139–153.
2   N.N., Fragebogen-Rekord, in: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 25 March 1950.

2. Planning for Re-education: The Role of Mass Media

Although the re-educative strategy is usually divided in a negative (punitive) and positive (affirmative) phase in both countries,[3] a look into the directives for the planning of the occupation reveals that "positive" ways of re-educating the people in occupied Germany and Japan through mass media actually had been envisioned as part of an all-encompassing strategy from the very beginning. The strong emphasis on mass media must be seen as continuity of the wartime propaganda designed by the Morale Divisions and Propaganda Department as well as the Office of War Information (OWI) and the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), which had also used the radio amongst other media, such as leaflets or films, as propaganda means to destabilize the morale of the enemy.

In the case of Germany, directive 269/5 (1945/46), namely the "Long-range Policy Statement for German Re-education", described the goal of Germany's occupation as "a fundamental transformation of the German social structure" in order "to eliminate permanently the Nazi and militaristic elements". Instead of imposing this change upon Germany, it was recommended that the "Germans themselves" need to be prompted "to carry through this change in a democratic direction". The means to achieve this goal needed to go beyond a reform of "formal education in schools and universities" and should also include "programs of adult education through mass media and otherwise".[4]

In the case of Japan, directive SWNCC 162/2 (Reorientation of the Japanese) set the direction of re-education under US occupation. According to this document, the aim of re-education was to eradicate all feudalist-authoritarian character traits among the Japanese, such as strong world-supremacist and racist-antiforeign tendencies. Similar to the case of Germany, all means available were to be used to achieve this goal, including "all appropriate media, including books, text books, periodicals, motion pictures, radio, lectures, discussion groups and the schools".[5]

3. Quizzing the Germans: Audience Participation as Re-education

The division of the Office of Military Government for Germany, United States (OMGUS) that was responsible for the reorganization of German broadcasting had developed out of the Psychological Warfare Branch (PWD/SHAEF), which had been responsible for the propaganda operations against enemy troops during the war. The personnel of the division was recruited from the British Political Warfare Executive (PWE), OSS, and OWI. In addition to the Radio Branch, the superordinate unit, the Information Control Division (later renamed into Information Services Division, ICD/ISD from hereon),

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3   K. Gerund, Reeducation und Reorientation, 2020, http://www.historisches-lexikon-bayerbns.de/Lexikon/Reeducation_und_Reorientation; M. J. Mayo, The War of Words Continues: American Radio Guidance in Occupied Japan, in: T. W. Burkman (ed.), The Occupation of Japan: Arts and Culture, Norfolk, VA 1988, pp. 45–83.

4   The document can be found online at: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945Berlinv01/d343.

5   The document can be found online at: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1946v08/d119.

consisted of four more control branches, each responsible for press, film, theatre and music, and publications respectively. The first chief of ICD/ISD, Robert A. McClure, had already been the head of the Psychological Warfare Intelligence section of SHAEF during the war.

Compared to Japan, with the US military being the de facto only allied power involved in the occupation, the structural organization of the military government in Germany was far more complex. The allied occupation of sectored Germany notwithstanding, the American sector was additionally divided into four regions (later becoming four of the German federal states) as part of the aim to decentralise state-power in Germany. Besides the main ICD/ISD division at the headquarters of OMGUS (replaced in 1949 by the US High Commissioner for Germany, HICOG) in Frankfurt, every region had its own regional ICD/ISD subdivision, including its own Radio Branch and Research Analysis Staffs (RAS)/Survey Analysis Sections (SAS). These divisions were responsible for the implementation of the re-education policy in Bavaria, Hessen, Württemberg-Baden, and Bremen respectively. Accordingly, each region also had its own radio station, namely Radio München, Radio Bremen, Radio Frankfurt, Radio Stuttgart, and RIAS for the American sector of Berlin.

After rebuilding the broadcasting infrastructure in the conquered territories, which had often been deactivated or even destroyed by German troops in retreat, the psychological warfare divisions of the US military instantly started transmitting its own radio programme in occupied territories. In the first weeks following the war, broadcasting included news programmes or announcements by the military government or the programme of *Voice of America* (VOA), whereas the entertainment programme was for the most part taken over from other stations, such as Radio Luxemburg, which had been used to broadcast the radio programme of the PWD already since October 1944, after Luxemburg had been liberated by US troops. Usually headed by German-speaking military personnel, the Radio Branches of ICD/ICS soon began to re-hire German staff, and by June 1946 "they had found enough qualified, politically acceptable employees that ICD staff members could be limited to supervisory positions while Germans ran the stations".[6]

Besides news or political content, entertainment (such as literature or comedy, special programmes for women or children, or popular music) was a core part of the reformed radio programme. It was already in the fall of 1945 that "ICD shifted its emphasis", away from the punitive re-education of promoting collective guilt, continuing "its missionary work against Nazism" but adding "communication programs that fostered democracy and, increasingly, the 'American Way of Life'"[7] The impetus to enlarge the share of entertainment, however, did not come from ICD alone. Anton Hofbauer, German former chief of the entertainment section of *Hessischer Rundfunk*, argues that "given the overdoses of educational programs due to the political developments and the necessi-

6   R. L. Merritt, Democracy Imposed: U.S. Occupation Policy and the German Public, 1945–1949, New Haven 1995, p. 298.
7   Ibid., p. 295.

ties of the times as well as the influence of the American organs of surveillance" on the one hand, and "the steadily growing tiredness of the audience towards spoken content, especially of those that go beyond that of mere information" on the other hand, radio producers on the German side considered it overdue to "meet the demand of the listeners for entertainment".[8]

Around 1947, in the context of the change of course in re-education policy in line with America's Cold War anti-Communist containment policy, another shift occurred in the media policy that Merritt and Merritt have described as "democratization to anticommunism".[9] Hartenian summarizes this shift in the case of Germany as follows:

> *From the start United States occupation forces planned to use the media in two ways. Anti-Nazi Germans were to be allowed to use the newly established media to engage in this "re-education" while at the same time the US Military Government was to employ the media to disseminate propaganda to the occupied population. […] Yet within a year and a half American media policy in Germany underwent a dramatic transformation. From its initial antifascist goals American propaganda and media control became singularly focused on the propagation of anticommunism and the American way of life.[10]*

In an internal memo dated 21 February 1947 from the head of ICD's Content Analysis Branch, O.J. Brandes to Charles Lewis of the Radio Branch, this strategy was clarified as "exploit(ing) differences of opinion and interest between the Communist Parties of various countries" and giving "fair play" to the "failure and/or shortcomings of denazification in Eastern Zone," coupled with a "heavy play" to those "progressive features of American civilization" that should "serve as models for the Germans".[11] With regard to the broadcasting programme, the introduction of quiz shows must be considered a key moment of this strategy to promote "progressive features of American civilization", with this new type of radio entertainment quickly becoming one of the most popular entertainment programmes in almost any radio station across the American and the British occupied zone.

Despite its global popularity, the radio quiz in Western Germany under US occupation still is an astonishingly under-researched topic of post-war media history.[12] Other than the continuously growing amount of existing studies on radio content in occupied Japan, particularly regarding audience-participation programmes (see below), existing

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8   M. Crone, Das Quiz London–Frankfurt: Ein Paradigma der Hörfunkunterhaltung im Hessischen Rundfunk, in: Studienkreis Rundfunk und Geschichte 14 (1988) 1, pp. 11–19, at 11.

9   A. J. Merritt/R. L. Merritt (eds.), Public Opinion in Occupied Germany: The OMGUS Surveys, 1945–1949, Urbana 1970, p. 50.

10 L. Hartenian, The Role of Media in Democratizing Germany: United States Occupation Policy 1945–1949, in: Central European History 20 (1987) 2, pp. 145–190, at 145.

11 Quoted in ibid., pp. 164–165.

12 See G. Hallenberger, Vom Quiz zur Game Show: Geschichte und Entwicklung der Wettbewerbsspiele des bundesrepublikanischen Fernsehens, in: H. D. Erlinger/H.-F. Foltin/H. Kreuzer (eds.), Unterhaltung, Werbung und Zielgruppenprogramme, München 1994, pp. 25–67; G. Hallenberger/J. Kaps (eds.), Hätten Sie's gewusst? Die Quizsendungen und Game Shows des Deutschen Fernsehens, Marburg 1991.

studies in the field of German post-war broadcasting history for the most part deal with the denazification of media outlets in general or the federal and legal reorganization of the formerly state-controlled German broadcasting system,[13] and only to a lesser degree with the subject of re-education through radio content.[14]

It is difficult to find hard evidence to trace the exact route with regard to how quiz shows became such an integral part of the re-educative effort in the post-war period. All available evidence allows for the educated guess that radio programmes were introduced via informal and personal channels in Germany as well as Japan, and not necessarily as part of an orchestrated larger grand scheme. That quiz shows became such an integral part of the programme in the first place, however, is hardly surprising, since the quiz show had been a very popular audience-participation radio programme in the USA already since around the late 1930s. Moreover, quizzes were considered an ideal tool to present the American Way of Life to the German and Japanese listeners, since it was aimed at a much "broader, less political conception of 'the people'" than previous audience-participation formats, such as the "man-on-the-street" interviews or "town hall meeting" and "radio round tables", paying attention to "'the Great American Average,' a concept increasingly common in ad campaigns, the new science of public opinion polling, and the Fireside Chats of Roosevelt".[15] The quiz, thereby, represented an apolitical and consumerist radio format that "gestured both vaguely and insistently toward the centrality of 'the people' in the national experience of radio listening".[16] Via the radio quiz "the people" would hear themselves, thus hear the "language from the street" of "average people", but in a much more controlled and non-political setting. Moreover, the radio quizzes of the time represented clearly demarcated gendered roles, with women either being depicted as housewives or attractive talents and actors, while their male counterparts were the breadwinners, holders of public offices, or intellectuals, depending on the specific format.

In the German case, most of the quiz shows were not just one-to-one adaptations of Anglo-American shows. Except for RIAS' *Wer fragt gewinnt* ("Who asks wins") and Radio Frankfurt's *Doppelt oder Nichts* ("Double or Nothing"), which were based on MBS's *Twenty Questions* and CBS/NBC's *Take it or leave it* respectively, many of the radio quizzes in Germany were original programmes. Giving three examples, I would like to discuss the various types and specific designs of quiz shows that were broadcasted in post-war Germany. Although it was generically based on American and British models of the radio quiz, Germany's first post-war quiz programme, *Schnelldenker-Turnier* ("Quick Thinker's Tournament"), which was designed by Peter von Zahn (an editor at Radio Hamburg)

13   See H. Bausch, Rundfunkpolitik nach 1945 (= Rundfunk in Deutschland, vol. 3, part 1), München 1980; A. Kutsch, Rundfunk unter alliierter Besatzung, in: J. Wilke (ed.), Mediengeschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Köln 1999, pp. 59–90; Hartenian, Role of Media.

14   See U. M. Bausch, Die Kulturpolitik der US-Amerikanischen Information Control Division in Württemberg-Baden von 1945 bis 1949: Zwischen militärischem Funktionalismus und schwäbischem Obrigkeitsdenken, Stuttgart 1992; R. Bolz, Rundfunk und Literatur unter amerikanischer Kontrolle: Das Programmangebot von Radio München, 1945–1949, Wiesbaden 1991; E. Lersch, Rundfunk in Stuttgart, 1934–1949, Stuttgart 1990.

15   J. Loviglio, Radio's Intimate Public: Network Broadcasting and Mass-Mediated Democracy, Minneapolis: 2005, p. 53.

16   Ibid., p. 54.

and hosted by Hans Gertberg, the programme had been adapted to the "German taste". According to von Zahn, quiz shows merely featuring knowledge-based questions were allegedly disliked in Germany, hence the radio station decided to include "combination plays and skill questions", in order to appeal to the "proclivity of the Germans to tinker".[17] Moreover, the quiz also featured a prize-money, something still rather rare for the radio quizzes of the time.

Another very unique programme was the *London-Frankfurt Quiz*, a co-production of the BBC and Radio Frankfurt. In this show, which was very popular in Germany at the time, fixed teams from Great Britain and Germany competed against each other. The initiative for this quiz show originally came from the BBC, with the intention to "build bridges between two nations estranged by the war".[18] With its mix of knowledge-based questions and riddles, it was particularly the anti-elitist aspect of the quiz that made it so popular among the listeners. The programme was

> *not a demonstration of condensed knowledge; rather it could show that even the 'clever minds' had knowledge gaps.* […] *In any case, as the listeners' letters indicate, it was not only academics and members of the educated middle class who were interested in the show, but* […] *all strata of the population.*[19]

Audience participation in both the *Schnelldenker-Turnier* and the *London-Frankfurt Quiz* were restricted to sending in questions to the radio station, an opportunity that many listeners apparently made full use of. Moreover, quiz shows were often re-enacted in private, as the many letters from listeners sent to the station seem to confirm.[20]

By contrast, two other quiz programmes already featured direct audience participation, namely the aforementioned show *Doppelt oder Nichts* ("Double or Nothing") on Radio Frankfurt, which was hosted by Just Scheu and was recorded at large public venues, with the contestants coming from the audience. In this show, the contestants had the chance to either take the prize money after answering a question correctly, or leave it in favour of potentially winning a larger prize by answering also the next question. Another quiz show hosted by Just Scheu was a radio lottery called *Wer hört gewinnt* ("Whoever listens wins"), which had been broadcasted on NWDR (Nordwestdeutscher Rundfunk) since 1948. On this programme, the listeners were to send in the right answers to musical, verbal, or sound riddles via postcard, for which they had to pay a fee. In the show, the winner was drawn from the postcards featuring the correct answer. With ten per cent of the intake being the first winner's prize money, this quiz show featured a rather large reward. Nevertheless, the larger share of the income from the sale of lottery tickets was donated to the *Deutsche Hilfsgemeinschaft*.[21] Despite the show's standard not being very high from the beginning, it seemingly had further declined over the years. In 1951, a

17   N.N., Juckpulver fürs Gehirn, in: Der Spiegel, no. 52, 23 December 1948.
18   R. Rudorf, Zwanzig Jahre und ein Ende, in: Frankfurter Rundschau, 9 December 1967.
19   Crone, Das Quiz London–Frankfurt, pp. 14, 16–17.
20   Ibid.
21   N.N., Doppelt oder nichts, in: Der Spiegel, no. 33, 14 August 1948.

commentator of the high-brow weekly newspaper *Die Zeit* severely criticized the show for normalising the "average taste" of the people, since the standard of the questions had already been lowered to a level that even the "jacketed baboons in Hagenbeck [Zoo] were able to send in correct answers".[22]

By the end of the 1940s, quiz shows had become so popular that people re-enacted quiz shows at their homes or that they turned into very popular public events at cultural venues, such as the Housewives' Quiz at Frankfurt's *Palmengarten* or as part of the screening of a spy movie at Frankfurt's cinema *Filmpalast*.[23] In 1954, according to a report in the weekly magazine *Die Zeit* on the latest statistical results from the audience research divisions of various broadcasting stations, "*Bunte Abende* and quiz shows, followed by news and radio plays, were ranking highest in the preferences of the listeners".[24]

4. Questioning the Germans: Public Opinion Polls as Re-education

Until September 1949, the Surveys Analysis Section/Research Analysis Staff of the Intelligence Branch of ICD/ISD had produced at least 72 surveys and public opinion reports. The first report dealt with radio listening in Germany, researching the radio listening habits of the people in occupied Germany. Subsequent surveys dealt with socio-economic issues, i.e. the lack of housing or food, family income, inflation, or the standard of living, and the prevalent ideological and political attitudes, particularly towards National Socialism or the military government and its occupation policies.[25] The analysts of the military government were particularly interested in the consistent significance of a rather positive attitude towards National Socialism, which was still considered by at least a third of the respondents as something that was basically a good idea but only badly executed. The report identified worsening living conditions and a generally negative outlook on the future, together with a growing disappointment in the policies of the occupation as potential causes for this trend.[26] In response to this result, six subsequent surveys were conducted in 1947 alone to further clarify this diagnosis.

It was also around this time that attitudes towards Communism and the Soviet Union were frequently surveyed, which was part of what could be described as a shift within

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22   N.N., Just scheut sich nicht, in: Die Zeit, no. 15, 12 April 1951.

23   N.N., Muntere Hausfrauen, in: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 29 March 1940; N.N., Spionagefilm-Quiz, in: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 13. September 1950.

24   N.N., Bestseller des Funks, in: Die Zeit, no. 44, 4 November 1954.

25   See Merritt/Merritt, Public Opinion in Occupied Germany; A. J. Merritt / R. L. Merritt (eds.), Public Opinion in Semisovereign Germany: The HICOG Surveys, 1949–1955, Urbana 1980; Merritt, Democracy Imposed; U. Gerhardt, Denken der Demokratie: Die Soziologie im atlantischen Transfer des Besatzungsregimes: Vier Abhandlungen, Stuttgart 2007; H. Braun, Sozialwissenschaftliche Forschung als Selbstvergegenwärtigung und Evaluation der amerikanischen Besatzungsherrschaft, in: H. Braun/U. Gerhardt/E. Holtmann (eds.), Die lange Stunde Null: Gelenkter sozialer Wandel in Westdeutschland nach 1945, Baden-Baden 2007, pp. 205–226; A. Kutsch, Einstellungen zum Nationalsozialismus in der Nachkriegszeit: Ein Beitrag zu den Anfängen der Meinungsforschung in den Westlichen Besatzungszonen, in: Publizistik 40 (1995), pp. 415–447.

26   Gerhardt, Denken der Demokratie, p. 194.

re-education policies from "democratization to anticommunism".[27] As the Cold War with the Soviet Union became a priority of US foreign policy, the ICD/ICS focused on Germany as "the first battlefront of psychological warfare between the U.S. and the USSR".[28] In the course of the organizational change of the military government from OMGUS to HICOG (1949–1955), the director of the Reactions Analysis Staff was replaced by Leo Crespi, a psychologist with a PhD from Princeton University. In the second phase, the division conducted another 214 survey reports under the direction of Crespi. In these surveys, besides more general surveys on attitudes towards democracy and the political situation in Germany, particularly the East-West conflict and related issues clearly dominated the agenda, dealing with topics such as rearmament, the defence contribution of Western Germany, the Berlin Conference in 1954, or nuclear armament. Besides conducting surveys, methodological training of German staff and external researchers was considered another important task of the division. In the first phase of the OMGUS surveys, almost exclusively American personnel conducted survey research, with German staff being hired merely as pre-testers, interviewers, and only in the final phase of the early period also as research analysts, due to a lack of training in advanced polling methods and statistics on the German side.[29] An important catalyst for the dissemination of statistical as well as polling methods was a conference entitled "Empirical Social Research: Opinion Polling and Market Research, Methods and Problems" at Weinheim, co-organized in 1951 by Crespi and the *Institut zur Förderung Öffentlicher Angelegenheiten* ("Institute for the Promotion of Public Affairs"), which had been established under the aegis of the ICD. The conference was attended by 12 participants from the US, mostly personnel of the military government, and by 120 participants from Germany, most of them social scientists or representatives of the newly founded private opinion polling institutes. Theodor W. Adorno, who attended the conference as one of the keynote speakers, emphasized in his address the specific "democratic potential" of public opinion research in a democratic society.

The larger share of the surveys conducted by the Research Analysis Section of ICD/ICS were commissioned to private opinion polling institutes, such as the *Institut für Demoskopie in Allensbach* (IfD; "Allensbach Institute for Public Opinion Polling") or to the *Deutsches Institut für Volksumfragen* (DIVO; "German Institute for Public Opinion Polls"), which had been established under the guidance of ICD in 1951.[30] Both institutes did not only conduct political opinion polls but were also active in the field of market research. It was not until the second election of the German Bundestag in 1953 that

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27   Merritt/Merritt, Public Opinion in Occupied Germany, p. 50.

28   C. S. Goldstein, A Strategic Failure: American Information Control Policy in Occupied Iraq, in: Military Review March/April 2008, pp. 58–65, MilitaryReview_20080430_art010.pdf; A. F. Levy, Promoting Democracy and Denazification: American Policymaking and German Public Opinion, in: Diplomacy & Statecraft 26 (2015) 4, pp. 614–635.

29   Gerhardt, Denken der Demokratie, p. 224.

30   J. Weyer, Westdeutsche Soziologie 1945–1960: Deutsche Kontinuitäten und nordamerikanischer Einfluss, in: Soziologische Schriften 41, Berlin 1984, p. 316.

opinion polls began to play a role in the political sphere in Germany, with the first psephological forecasts predicting the outcome of the election being produced and publicly debated for the first time.[31] In fact, Chancellor Adenauer's CDU had been the first party in Germany to exclusively contract a public opinion polling institute, the IfD, for political consultancy in the first half of the 1950s. Besides IfD and DIVO, two other private opinion survey and market research institutes had been founded in the 1940s – namely EMNID (*Erforschung der öffentlichen Meinung, Marktforschung, Nachrichten, Informationen und Dienstleistungen*; engl. "Public opinion research, market research, news, information and services"), which was founded already in 1945 in Bielefeld in the British zone and Infratest (Munich), which emerged out of the audience-research division of NWDR when it was discontinued in 1947.

As mentioned above, the reason for Germans to be continuously questioned by the military government did not merely lie in the concern of the occupiers to look into the minds of the former enemy or to evaluate the efficiency and effect of the re-education efforts. Oscar W. Riegel, in his *Report on a Survey of Public Opinion Research and Training in West Germany* to the Department of State in 1950, explicitly emphasized that to have the experience to be able to express an opinion and to be aware about diverging opinions would help to build and maintain a strong resiliency towards dictatorship.[32] Opinion polling, in the view of the military government, was thus considered an important method of re-education. Leo P. Crespi, who became the director of the Reactions Analysis Section in 1948, most accurately described the dual re-educative function of public opinion polling in a foreword to Anna J. and Richard L. Merritt's publication *Public Opinion in Semisovereign Germany*:

> *It was the hope of those of us engaged in public opinion research in Germany during the OMGUS and HICOG years that this enterprise would not only be of value to the guidance of American policy, but would also contribute to the development of German democracy. This hope was based on the conviction that polling and authoritarianism do not mix well. When people begin to* learn that their opinions are important *and begin to like giving their opinions and* finding out what their fellows are thinking, *it becomes more difficult for a government to force arbitrary measures on the populace. Moreover, the* experiences of being polled and of reading about public opinion issues *of the day helps to build the interest in political participation that was at so low an ebb in postwar Germany and what is so fundamental to the success of democracy.*[33]

Needless to say, the medium through which the people should "read about public opinion" was the German daily press. As an exemplary analysis of the reporting of the *Frank-*

31   E. P. Neumann, Tage der Entscheidung, in: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 1 September 1953; Id., Wie wird die Wahl ausfallen?, in: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 3 September 1953.

32   O. W. Riegel, Report on a Survey of Public Opinion Research and Training in West Germany, June–September, 1950. Submitted to the Department of State, Washington, DC, Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann Papers, Piazzogna.

33   L. P. Crespi, Foreword, in: Merritt/Merritt (eds.), Public Opinion in Semisovereign Germany, pp. xxiii–xxv, at xxiv (emphasis added).

furter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ) vividly illustrates, the results of polls had become news themselves already towards the end of the 1940s. The reporting of results of non-confidential surveys conducted by the research analysis branches of ICD/ICS notwithstanding, an endless stream of newspapers articles on opinion surveys conducted by the newly founded private opinion and market research institutes informed the Germans not only about their own political and ideological majority views, but also about the most recent consumerist tastes and economic trends. Amongst the survey results reported in the FAZ in the period of 1949–1952 (articles about 19 EMNID surveys and 36 IfD surveys in total) were broad topics such as the national demand for shoes (EMNID, 5 December 1949), the attitudes towards Adenauer's administration (EMNID, 7 January 1950), remilitarization (EMNID, 23 January 1950, 5 September 1951, and 9 October 1951), values and character attributes of the desired partner (EMNID, 8 February 1950), faith in god (IfD, 23 March 1950), the H-bomb and fear of the end of the world (IfD, 1 April 1950), the German preference for brown bread (IfD, 6 November 1950), the required family income (IfD, 9 February 1952), women's equality (EMNID, 12 August 1952), the dissemination of TV sets (EMNID, 10 October 1952), the daily routine of the Germans (EMNID, 29 October 1952), or the general interest in politics (EMIND, 15 November 1952).

One of the most frequently reported and also heatedly discussed topics were the OMGUS/HICOG's surveys regarding the persisting National Socialist tendencies as well as the changing attitudes towards Communism and the Soviet Union amongst the Germans. Until the beginning of the 1950s, these surveys mostly confirmed that nationalistic or National-Socialist tendencies were on the decline in Germany. Starting from the beginning of the 1950s, however, both anti-American and anti-Communist views seem to have been on the rise, according to reports on actual surveys in the FAZ. Nevertheless, this appears to be a paradoxical situation only at first glance. Needless to say, the growing anti-Soviet attitudes were also a result of the active interference of the ICD/ISD in German public opinion, who conducted and published surveys presenting anti-Communist attitudes of the Germans or forced licensed newspapers to publish content compatible with the new direction of US foreign policy focussing on building up Germany as a bulwark against Communism in Europe.[34] At the same time, anti-American views were in part also the result of a growing national self-consciousness and strive for self-determination in Germany, expressed in open criticism of the US occupation in public discourse.[35] In an article entitled "They want Peace and Freedom: What Germans think about Themselves", presenting the latest results of opinion polls on political issues conducted by IfD, it is argued that "placid, farsighted, and sober judgment does not flourish on occupied land" and that according to the poll, "60 per cent of the surveyed Germans think that a real German thrive for freedom could only prosper in the clean air of unrestricted German independence". Accordingly, it is argued, "there must be better recipes for the

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34   See Goldstein, A Strategic Failure.
35   See Levy, Promoting Democracy.

'pacification' of a nation than seizing its sovereignty".[36] Erich P. Neumann, director of the polling institute IfD, became a frequent commentator on political topics in the conservative *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* since the beginning of the 1950s. Particularly the topic of the allegedly enduring National-Socialist tendencies, as they were presented by the surveys of the military government, seem to have been a stumbling block in Germany's path towards self-determination in Neumann's view. A widely debated report in the *New York Times* (NYT) in January 1953 on the results of the latest HICOG survey entitled "A Year-End Survey of Rightist and Nationalist Sentiments in West Germany" added even more fuel to the fire of what could be described as an ongoing "Cold War" of opinion surveys. According to the report in the NYT on the results of the survey, the old ideologies were on the rise in Germany. It is important to add that the reported survey was conducted right after the openly National-Socialist *Sozialistische Reichspartei* had eventually been banned by the German Federal Constitutional Court. Nevertheless, Neumann weighed in again in a column in the FAZ on 21 January 1953, arguing that the report in the NYT was very likely published merely for "fomenting purposes" by the military government in order to influence public opinion in Germany, in fact being an "anti-German" interpretation of the surveys by the newspaper.[37]

5. Quizzing the Japanese: Audience Participation as Re-education

Slightly diverging from the organization of the military government in the American zone in Germany, the unit responsible for conducting surveys within the Cultural Information & Education Section (CIE) of GHG/SCAP (General Headquarter / Supreme Commander of Allied Powers) in Japan, Public Opinion and Sociological Research (PO&SR), was a division itself, whereas the Radio Branch, responsible for the reorganization of radio broadcasting, was a subdivision of the Information Division (ID). In Japan, similarly to Germany, the radio was singled out as the "major vehicle" for re-educating the Japanese from the very beginning, because it had the greatest range to re-educate "the masses" with a penetration rate of more than 50 per cent already in 1944, and because it was "immediately available".[38] Accordingly, it was not by accident that a radio-man, namely Colonel Ken Dyke, former vice president of the promotion and research section at NBC, became the first chief of CIE.[39] Moreover, the fact that CIE was located in the same building as NHK, Japan's national broadcasting station, further demonstrates the importance that was put on the radio as a vehicle for the cultural re-

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36   N.N., Sie wollen Frieden und Freiheit – Die Deutschen über sich selbst, in: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 18 January 1950.

37   E. P. Neumann, Die Amerikaner und der Nationalsozialismus, in: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 21 January 1953.

38   J. H. Jung, Playing with New Rules: Radio Quiz Shows and the Reorientation of the Japanese Under the US Occupation, 1945–1952, in: Historical Journal of Film, Radio and Television 34 (2014) 4, pp. 568–585, at 569; Mayo, The War of Words Continues.

39   Ibid., p. 13.

education of the Japanese.[40] Other than in sectored Germany, the military government in Japan took a more centralised approach to reforming the broadcasting system, not only by keeping most of the existing Japanese radio personnel but also by subjecting the entire activities of NHK, from production to broadcasting, to a very strict guidance of its Radio Branch.[41]

With the shift from the punitive re-education of "war guilt" programmes (aired in the first months of the occupation)[42] and as part of the shift towards "more positive aspects of democratization" in 1947,[43] various audience-participation programmes were introduced under the guidance of the Radio Branch's first chief William V. Roth and Frank Shōzō Baba, a Japanese-American (*nisei*) and former staff member of OWI and Voice of America.[44]

In an activity report published by CIE in February 1946, the double objective behind the introduction of audience-participation programmes, particularly those featuring the "public voice" of the people, was to "give the *average Japanese* citizen the opportunity to *express his opinion* on current problems and *demonstrate* to the listening audience the fact that Japan at last has *freedom of thought and speech* on the air".[45] One of the most popular formats in the early beginning of broadcasting was *Gaitō rokuon* ("Street Recording"), which started in September 1945 and was modelled after the man-on-the-street-interviews, a very popular audience-participation programme aired on US radio networks already since the 1930s. While the interview was recorded in a recording vehicle parked next to the street in the beginning, the interviews were recorded right on the street since May 1946, after the CIE had advised NHK to do so in order to achieve "both, a visual and audible demonstration of freedom of thought and speech". However, as Ota has correctly observed, despite CIE's aim being "to provide a showcase of democracy", this

> showcase encouraging the Japanese to foster grassroots discussion was a neatly-sanitised one in the sense that interviewees could never take the initiative to bring up a topic, but only discussed what CIE regarded as vital in terms of teaching democracy.[46]

The other audience-participation programme introduced by CIE at the end of 1945 was *Hōsō tōronkai* (Radio Round Table). This programme was also carefully designed to "reflect" public opinion, by either selecting discussants to represent pro, con, and neutral viewpoints in the roundtable discussions, or by ensuring that all participants were inde-

40 S. Un Kim, Performing Democracy: Audience Participation in Postwar Broadcasting, in: The Journal of Japanese Studies 46 (2020) 1, pp. 61–89.

41 Jung, Playing with New Rules, p. 596.

42 Mayo, The War of Words Continues; S. Smulyan, Popular Ideologies: Mass Culture at Mid-Century, Philadelphia 2010.

43 Jung, Playing with New Rules, p. 569.

44 See K. Ishii, Nihon ni hōsō wo tsukutta otoko: Frank Baba monogatari [The Man who Brought Broadcasting to Japan: The Story of Frank Baba], Tōkyō 1998.

45 Quoted in N. Ota, The Voiceful Voiceless: Rethinking the Inclusion of the Public Voice in Radio Interview Programs in Occupied Japan, in: Historical Journal of Film, Radio and Television 39 (2019) 3, pp. 584–601, at 586 (emphasis added).

46 Ibid., pp. 587–588.

pendent of any political or social organization.[47] At the recorded events, the audience was encouraged to voice their opinions and ask questions, so that "the participating audience" would "learn how to debate in a 'democratic' society".[48] The third audience-participation programme to be introduced in January 1946 was the Amateur's Singing Contest *Shirōto Nodo jiman ongakukai*, which was, other than the former two formats, not based on an existing radio programme from the US but a programme originally designed by the staff of NHK. Just like *Gaitō rokuon*, the programme was to reflect the "public voice" of the average man on the street by turning the radio into a stage for ordinary amateur singers. Maruyama Tetsuo, producer at NHK and designer of *Nodo jiman* described the programme as a "union of the microphone and the people", based on the "simplicity and fairness of the idea that anyone who comes to the station can get an audition".[49]

Needless to say, there were certain limitations to the idea of free speech and fairness, especially after the change of course in the re-education policy after 1947. Criticism of the ideological narrowness of these programmes was coming either from the labour unions, who wanted labour songs to be allowed on *Nodo jiman*, as well as the political left, which demanded to be equally included on the podiums of *Hōsō tōronkai*. Accordingly, the goal of these programmes "was not merely to prompt free speech, but in fact also to discipline audience members toward certain norms of behaviour".[50]

In a certain sense, quiz shows were considered an ideal format for this kind of sanitized audience participation, thus becoming one of the most important vehicles for promoting an idea of liberal democracy that was tightly connected to the American Way of Life. Before the advent of commercial radio broadcasting in 1951, three very popular quiz shows were aired on NHK.[51] Japan's first post-war quiz show, *Hanashi no izumi* ("Fountain of Knowledge"), started in December 1946. Based on NBC's *Information Please*, the quiz featured a panel of four regular experts with one alternating guest, who was to answer questions sent in by listeners. Despite participation from the audience being restricted to the submission of questions, the show "embodied basic principles of the genre by putting the contestants in direct opposition to each other and in intellectual competition", while the listeners "indirectly participated in the competition by challenging the contestants with their questions" and receiving "cash rewards for winning with their imagined competitions with contestants".[52] The show was an instant success; NHK received more than 10,000 letters weekly sent in from listeners.

Prompted by the success of *Hanashi no izumi*, NHK in November 1947 started to broadcast another quiz programme called *Nijū no tobira* ("Twenty Gates"), which was mod-

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47   Un Kim, Performing Democracy, pp. 67, 69.

48   Ibid., p. 68.

49   Ibid., p. 69.

50   Ibid., p. 72.

51   As already mentioned, research on the introduction of the radio quiz is by far more extensive than research on the German case. Ji Hee Jung has elaborately analysed quiz programmes on Japanese radio and their relation to the re-education effort in great detail, and I will paraphrase from his meticulously researched study from here on (Jung, Playing with New Rules).

52   Ibid., p. 571.

elled after WVTR's *Twenty Questions*. The design of this programme was very similar to *Hanashi no izumi*, featuring a panel of regular guest experts as well. Questions were also mailed in by listeners, who received a cash prize if their questions stumped the experts. The very first show to feature "normal" Japanese people as contestants on a quiz show was *Watashi wa dare deshō* ("Who am I?"), a programme first broadcasted in January 1949, modelled after MBC's *What's My Name*. *Watashi wa dare deshō* was more of a "guessing game", in which the contestants had to identify the names of famous figures from various categories, receiving 10 Yen in prize money for each correct answer.[53] Apparently, the instant cash reward obviously offended some listeners in the beginning, according to letters sent to the radio station from the audience in response to the new format. However, according to commentator Hijikata Masami, listeners quickly got "trained into it" within the first year of broadcasting.[54] Similar to Germany, the quiz game deeply penetrated into the everyday life of the people, either by being "re-played" in schools, at local events, and as a parlour game at the workplace or private gatherings.[55]

In the eyes of occupation officials, radio quizzes featuring panels of intellectuals, experts, and other popular figures counteracted the "feudalistic fear of loss of face", since the contestants on the panel were facing the real danger of losing their face under the eyes of the listeners, who themselves "had nothing to risk or lose by virtually participating in the competition".[56] According to F. B. Huggins, the chief of the Radio Unit who supervised the production of the first quiz show in Japan, this kind of audience-participation programme in particular contributed significantly to the re-education efforts of the occupation:

> *In giving the Japanese people a weekly half hour of information and entertainment, you have in my humble opinion, contributed to the rebuilding of a democratic Japan. What the concrete effects of this program which could never have been presented in militaristic Japan are, can probably never be measured. But I'm sure that you have done much to destroy feudalistic fear of loss of face and accelerated the rebirth of freedom of speech and thought.*[57]

According to a survey conducted by NHK from 1951, quiz shows were amongst the most popular radio broadcasts, with two of them ranking third and fifth of all programmes and listener ratings of more than 60 per cent.[58] Apparently, the peculiar popularity of the quiz show, and thus also its effectiveness for the re-education purpose, lies in the participatory and "sports-like ludic" character of the format.[59] One the one hand, by indirectly

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53   Ibid., p. 577.
54   Quoted in ibid.
55   Ibid., pp. 575, 576.
56   Ibid., p. 574.
57   Quoted in J. H. Jung, Radio Broadcasting and the Politics of Mass Culture in Transwar Japan, PhD thesis, UC San Diego, 2010, p. 156.
58   T. Furu, Ninki bangumi wo kentō suru (jō), in: Hōsō bunka 6 (1951) 10, p. 15.
59   S. Wada et al., Zadankai "kuizu" bangumi no miryoku wo kentō suru, in: Hōsō bunka 7 (1952) 5, p. 23.

competing with the participants on the show, the audience partook in a "simulated" competition with the contestants on the show, either by sending in difficult questions to stomp the experts on the panel or by sympathizing or competing with other "normal" people on the show, as soon as they had been included in formats such as *Watashi wa dare deshō*. On the other hand, the popularity of the quiz prompted the audience to mimic or "re-play" the game in schools or public events. In an extended discussion of the radio quiz, Furu Takeo, staff-member of NHK's Opinion Research Department, described the peculiar appeal of the quiz show in Japan by referring to Herta Herzog's famous study of the American quiz show *Professor Quiz*:

> *Drawing on Herzog's study, Furu demonstrated that Watashi wa dare deshō maintained the proper balance among the four appeals of an intellectual quiz show: competitive appeal, educational appeal, self-rating appeal and sporting appeal. Furu observed that commoner's participation as actual contestants significantly increased the competitive and self-rating appeal, in Herzog's terms […]. Furu noted that "as the* [knowledge] *level between contestants and listeners came closer" it sharpened "the sense of rivalry" that listeners felt towards the contestants.*[60]

According to Jung, while the quiz show itself simulates "the idea that individuals could acquire wealth and fame by proving their ability through a supposedly fair competition", listeners "willingly and actively participated in such a simulation by identifying and competing with the contestants" as well.[61]

6. Questioning the Japanese: Public Opinion Polls as Re-education

It was only after psychiatrist Florence Powdermaker, member of SCAP's visiting expert programme to Japan in 1948, had explicitly recommended the expansion of social research on Japan that PO&SR was upgraded to a full division from its previous status as a small branch of the then dissolved Analysis and Research Division.[62] Other than the much larger Research and Analysis Branch (R&A) of the Civil intelligence section (CIS), which produced classified weekly situation reports for internal use based on information collected by counterintelligence units or taken from press pieces, summarizing and analysing cultural and psychological trends or threats to the occupational goals, PO&SR was using purely academic methods, namely questionnaire-based surveys, field research, and opinion polls. Cultural anthropologist John C. Pelzel was appointed the division's first chief, with anthropologist Herbert Passin becoming his deputy. In 1949, anthropologist John W. Bennett replaced Pelzel, who left Japan to take up a position at Harvard University. Passin and Bennett were close friends and knew each other already from their

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60   Ibid., p. 578.
61   Ibid., pp. 578–579.
62   Cf. J. A. Miller, The Public Opinion and Sociological Research Division: Attempting to Understand the Japanese during the American Occupation, Albany 2012, p. 17.

time at the Midwest Domestic Intelligence Branch of OWI, where they both were involved in research on propaganda and morale.[63] Very similar to its German counterpart, the tasks of the unit were to (a) conduct research on Japanese social organization and public attitudes regarding the occupation and the rehabilitation programme, (b) provide training and technical guidance and surveillance of Japanese government public opinion research agencies, and (c) maintain liaison with private and academic Japanese research and polling organizations as well the other staff sections of GHQ/SCAP in the planning of research.[64] On average, the PO&SR division was staffed with four to five US military and non-military staff members and around 50 Japanese co-workers. Most of the staff members from the US were specialists trained in sociology or anthropology, including a small number of second-generation Japanese-American staff members (*nisei*). Two of them were Tsuchiyama Tamie and Iwao Ishino, who had both been trained in survey and fieldwork methods at the Japanese internment camp at Poston.[65]

After its upgrade to division status in 1948, PO&SR conducted or commissioned 32 attitude and opinion surveys and produced over 30 memoranda and sociological studies for distribution within SCAP by the end of the occupation. Many of the surveys were devoted to single topics and issues related to occupational reforms, such as prostitution, land reform, financial reforms, marriage, the status of women, the population problem, school reforms, and international relations. Most of the 32 surveys related to political issues or recent social trends were conducted in collaboration with private opinion polling institutes, such as newspaper publishers (Asahi, Mainichi, Yomiuri), news agencies (Jiji), or semi-public bodies, such as the *Yoron chōsa kyōgikai* ("Public Opinion Research Association"; funded in 1947). With regard to the dissemination of statistical and polling methods, the *Yoron chōsa kyōgikai* became a venue for the training of Japanese professionals and intellectual exchange between the staff of PO&SR and their professional and academic counterparts on the Japanese side.

One of the most heatedly debated issues between CIE and the Japanese government was the establishment of a national institute for public opinion research in Japan. Shortly after the war had ended, the Japanese government had already established an Opinion Survey Department (*Yoron chōsa-ka*) of the Cabinet Office under the control of CIE in January 1946. However, only half a year later CIE prohibited any kind of public opinion research to be conducted by the government itself, since it feared that polls could be misused for propagandistic purposes. Instead, CIE actively supported the establishment of opinion survey institutions in the private sector, namely at the large newspaper publishers or the national news agencies. Nevertheless, requests from both the Japanese parliament and the government to reconsider the establishment of a Japanese national institute for opinion surveys never subsided in the following years, and in 1949 the US

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military government eventually gave in and supported the establishment of the *Kokuritsu yoron chōsa-jo* (National Public Opinion Research Institute; NPORI) under the guidance of CIE.[66] This step was based on the strategic shift towards conceding more self-determinacy to the Japanese government, with the ultimate goal of bringing the occupation to an end in the context of the looming war in Korea.[67] Ironically, it was prolific wartime propaganda researcher and race theorist Koyama Eizō who was appointed as the first director of NPORI.[68]

Similarly to the attitude towards public opinion in occupied Germany, the activities of the new institute were continuously under the surveillance of the CIE, which "included negative controls to prevent the abuse of polling for thought control purposes, and active cooperation in technical improvement of the research".[69] Since the establishment of NPORI, "most of the attitude surveys requested by SCAP agencies were handled in the field for the Division by the Institute".[70] Yet again, this illustrates the fundamental paradox of re-education, since according to an internal memo, "while encouraging accurate and unbiased opinion polling by Japanese organizations, the GHQ (via the Japanese government's opinion research agencies) simultaneously reserved the right to vet polls whose content or research materials might be 'politically misused' (*seijiteki ni akuyō sareru*)".[71] The surveys conducted by NPORI in the period of its brief existence focussed on relatively specific social issues of current concern, ranging from public hygiene (1950), education (1950), women's civic consciousness (1951), agricultural cooperatives (1952), tuberculosis (1953), to political consciousness (1953).[72] Moreover, from the beginnings of the 1950s, the Cabinet Office also published the Public Opinion Annuals (*Yoron chōsa nenkan*), in which it publicized the compiled results of surveys conducted by private organizations, universities, and local governments. According to Morris-Suzuki, it was through "the constant conducting and publicizing of opinion polls" that "the flow of ideas into the 'mainstream'" was reinforced.[73] Put differently, it was the quantified and averaged answers to "intriguing questions" such as "Do you have a driver's license?" or "What images come into your mind when you hear the words 'polling booth'?" that a group called "the Japanese" developed a unique "national character" that was tightly connected to a democratic and consumerist "American Way of Life".

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66   Similar to the reorganization of NHK, NPORI was designed to be a non-partisan, autonomous public opinion data-collecting agency, answerable to the Prime Minister and overseen by a board of governors.

67   Miller, The Public Opinion, pp. 38–40.

68   See T. Morris-Suzuki, Ethnic Engineering: Scientific Racism and Public Opinion Surveys in Midcentury Japan, in: Positions: East Asia Cultures Critique 8 (2000) 2, pp. 499–529; T. Satō, Yoron to Seron: Nihon-Teki Min'i No Keifu-gaku [Public Opinion and Popular Sentiments: A Genealogy of Public Opinion in Japan], Tōkyō 2008; F. Schäfer, Public Opinion and the Press: Transnational Contexts of Early Media and Communication Studies in Prewar Japan, 1918–1937, in: Social Science Japan Journal 14 (2011), pp. 21–38.

69   J. W. Bennett, Social and Attitudinal Research in Japan: The Work of SCAP's Public Opinion and Sociological Research Division, in: University of Manila Journal of East Asiatic Studies 2 (1952), pp. 21–33, at 22.

70   Ibid.

71   GHQ/SCAP memo quoted in Morris-Suzuki, Ethnic Engineering, p. 417.

72   Ibid., p. 518.

73   Ibid., pp. 518–519.

As with the case of Germany, the press played an important role in publicizing and disseminating the results of an endless current of surveys and polls. Besides the surveys by PO&SR, NPORI, NHK, or the national news agencies, almost all of the main newspaper outlets also conducted hundreds of opinion surveys themselves. *Mainichi shinbun* founded its own polling division already in September 1945, conducting Japan's first post-war opinion poll related to the reform of the electoral procedure for the election of Tōkyō's governor.[74] *Asahi shinbun* and *Yomiuri shinbun* quickly followed by establishing their own opinion polling divisions in November 1945 and January 1946 respectively. In November 1945, *Asahi shinbun* conducted the first survey regarding the support for the current government in March 1946, namely the Yoshida cabinet. In the period from 5 August 1945–31 December 1952, Japan's two largest newspapers published 147 (*Yomiuri shinbun*) and 149 (*Asahi shinbun*) newspaper articles containing the word "public opinion survey". Whereas the Asahi almost exclusively published results of surveys regarding political issues (support rate for the current cabinet, political and social reforms, political scandals, such as the Hirano Incident, or the US-Japan peace treaty), Yomiuri also conducted surveys regarding the changes in cultural everyday life of the people (such as the abolition of Omnium, general living conditions, television broadcasting, movie-going, reading habits, radio listening) next to political issues (support rates, attitudes towards the occupation, support for the emperor system, attitudes towards the JCP).

In an accompanying commentary to *Mainichi*'s first poll, the publishers of the paper were eager to emphasize their own importance for the re-education effort, stating that "to conduct unsolicited opinion surveys regarding urgent problems of the nation" would "set spurs to the democratization of newly born Japan".[75] Koyama Eizō had put forth a much more pragmatic and commercial view regarding the future role of public opinion surveys in 1946, stating that "until recently, news were mainly reports on actual events (in the sense of "something has happened"), but today, newspaper publishers have understood that reports regarding public opinion will attract the larger attention of their readers".[76] Public opinion, to rephrase Koyama's remark, had not only acquired news value but also a commercial one. Opinions had turned into a commodity of the newspaper, something to be consumed by its readers.

7. Discussion

In October 1949, an article appeared in the *Asahi shinbun* that perfectly epitomizes the specific characteristics and also the ideological narrowness of re-education through audience-participation programmes and the continuous questioning through polls. During the recording of a radio round table (*Hōsō tōron-kai*) on the sensationally phrased

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74   N.N. Honsha yoron chōsa – Daiikkai kadai: chiji kōsen, dai-tasu ha chokusetsu senkyo, in: Mainichi shinbun, 12 November 1945.

75   Ibid.

76   E. Koyama, Yoron Chōsa Gaiyō [An Introduction into Public Opinion Polling], Tōkyō 1946, p. 10.

topic "Do newspapers tell the truth?", persistent heckling from the audience compelled the recording team of NHK to eventually stop their recording. Three discussants participated in the debate, the editor of the *Tōkyō shinbun*, a leading politician of the Japanese Communist Party (JCP), and the aforementioned director of NPORI, Koyama Eizō. The host of the debate was the popular quizmaster of the radio quiz *Nijū no tobira*, Fujiwara Shōichi. The obviously orchestrated tumultuous interruption from the audience occurred whenever any other person than the JCP representative took the floor on the podium. This kind of unsolicited "participation" from the audience in fact was an "uncontrollable feature" of not only political round table debates but of almost any not fully scripted participation format, giving the staff of NHK a "hard time" protecting these programmes "from aberrant participants".[77] Man-on-the-street interviews (*Gaitō rokuon*), for instance, were frequently used by members of the left-wing spectrum as an amplifier for their "unwanted" political views. Despite participation from the audience being certainly welcome, this only applied when it came from the desired ideological (non-Communist) camp. In the remaining paragraphs, I would like to discuss "what" (American-style capitalist liberal democracy) and "how" (re-education qua therapeutic and collective unlearning and learning through play) the audience participation programmes and opinion polls contributed to the re-education efforts in Germany and Japan.

One of the intellectual sources for understanding re-education as a process of "unlearning" and "learning" can be found in stage models developed in social psychology and group psychology already in the 1930s. Social psychologist Kurt Lewin, who was a key member in various think tanks developing strategies for the re-education of the former enemies after the war would have ended, described the process of re-educating a whole nation in psychotherapeutic terms as the necessary steps of unfreezing, moving, and freezing (or unlearning, relearning, and consolidation) of behavioural and mental patterns. According to his widely read contributions, the aim of re-education was to "change" the "group atmosphere from autocracy […] to democracy".[78] However, since even "extensive first-hand experience" would "not automatically create correct concepts",[79] re-education would have to take place as the spontaneous, "voluntary acceptance" of new values and behavioral patterns,[80] namely through the mimetic function of play and roleplaying. Thereby, the "group members" would be "convinced of democracy and learn to play their role in democracy as leaders or followers".[81] Mass media, as we have seen, was considered the most important instrument for the re-education of the nation (reaching far beyond the scope of the educational system). Besides popular music or Hollywood movies, it was particularly the imagined or simulated participation in quiz shows and opinion polls, which allowed for the playful and performative training of new behaviours and values by

77   Un Kim, Performing Democracy, pp. 72–73.
78   K. Lewin, The Special Case of Germany, in: The Public Opinion Quarterly 7 (1943) 4, p. 561.
79   K. Lewin, Resolving Social Conflicts: Selected Papers on Group Dynamics, New York 1948 [1943], p. 61.
80   Ibid., p. 65.
81   Lewin, The Special Case of Germany, p. 561.

an entire nation. As will be shown, the dissemination of capitalist liberal democracy as the "American Way of Life" through quizzes and polls, Hollywood movies, or American popular music alike shifted the aim of re-education from the "punitive" implantation of collective guilt towards the "playful" propagation of the "positive" values of Consumerism and Americanism, and thus the development of a collective amnesia concerning the memories of the war and the construction of the collective narrative of a "zero hour" in both countries.[82]

I am writing "playful", because quizzes and questionnaires can be both understood as therapeutic types of play or role-play in the Lewinian sense. Playing games, and this is also the reason why play therapy has become an important method in psychosocial therapy and psychoanalysis,[83] allows the patient to create and play out model situations and master reality in an experimental setting, as in a kind of emotional laboratory. Although "to play" means to step "out of 'real' life into a temporary sphere of activity", it can still be conducted with "great seriousness".[84] According to Roger Caillois, despite play defining a "second reality", namely an activity which is essentially "free", it is yet still "governed by rules".[85] Play is ontologically ambivalent, playing games is a human practice located in-between determination (rules) and indetermination (freedom) and reality and fiction (simulation, make-believe). If we refer to Roger Caillois' typology of play as agon, mimicry, alea, and illinx, particularly the former two types of play, namely competition and role-playing or simulative make-believe, are relevant ludic forms prevalent in quizzes and questionnaires.[86] Both are forms of "re-educative play", if we want to phrase it this way, enabling a collective mass-therapy qua unlearning / learning behavioural and cultural patterns through ludic make-believe and / or competition in a "second", or "mass-mediated" reality.

In the case of quiz shows, re-educative play refers to the imagined participation of the listener as *Tertius gaudens* (Georg Simmel), namely what Herta Herzog described as the "competitive appeal" between listener and the contestant on the show and the empathetic observation of the "sporting appeal" between the contestant and the quiz and questions. Audience-participation programmes such as quiz shows do not only enable the experience of a competition between the self and the contestants, but also the identification with the contestants, especially since quiz shows also started to include the "common man" as participants. Furthermore, public opinion surveys are re-educative play in a sense that they "simulate" political participation by translating "a given conflict

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82　U. Gerhardt, Soziologie der Stunde Null: Zur Gesellschaftskonzeption des amerikanischen Besatzungsregimes in Deutschland 1944–1945/1946, Frankfurt am Main 2005; C. Gluck, The "Long Postwar": Japan and Germany in Common and in Contrast, in: E. Schlant/T. Rimer (eds.), Legacies and Ambiguities: Postwar Fiction and Culture in West Germany and Japan, Washington DC 1991, pp. 63–78.

83　E. Homburger [Erikson], Configurations in Play – Clinical Notes, in: The Psychoanalytic Quarterly 6 (1937) 2, pp. 139–214. Lutz Dammbeck impressively revealed the relationship between re-education and quiz and game shows in a cinematic discourse analysis in his documentary "Overgames" (2015).

84　J. Huizinga, Homo Ludens: A Study of the Play Element in Culture, Boston 1955, p. 13.

85　R. Caillois, Man, Play, and Games, Urbana 2001, pp. 9–10.

86　Ibid.

or problem into a (circuit of) question/answer game", thereby imposing "the illusion that a public opinion […] is simply the sum of a number of individual opinions", as Jean Baudrillard has asserted.[87] Moreover, as we have seen, with the results of public opinion surveys being publicized in mass media, public opinion became news itself, thus being both "the medium and the message" at the same time.[88] Thereby, it was also possible for the military government to intervene into the simulation of democracy. Whereas the people were given the impression that they were actually listened to (when participating in a poll) and that their opinions were being heard (through the publication of the results), it was also possible to exclude unwanted "radical" expressions from the political spectrum that could potentially turn into a hindrance to the project of re-educating the people towards pro-Americanism and anti-Communism, especially after the change of course in 1947.

As we have seen, although the aim of re-education in both cases was defined as to unlearn the obsolete feudalist and/or totalitarian norms and values, with the shift towards educating the Germans and the Japanese towards anti-Communism and the American Way of Life, the values of liberal democracy (individualism, fair play, egalitarianism) were "spiced up" with capitalist values. This was particularly the case with quiz shows, a game of "rule-based competition" and the "gratification and prestige of the winner".[89] In this sense, the quiz show is a perfect simulation game of the "American-style capitalist liberal democracy". According to Jung, one is able to see "the connection between quiz show and the occupation's reorientation project" when one acknowledges that the quiz show represents a very "specific mode of participation" that is related to the "peculiar form of democracy preferred by the occupation", namely an "idealized image of American liberal capitalist society represented in opposition to the Communist system".[90] This way "they simulated, whether consciously or not, the idea that individuals could acquire wealth and fame by proving their ability through a supposedly fair competition. Listeners also willingly and actively participated in such a simulation by identifying and competing with contestants".[91]

Besides learning the capitalist values of the American Way of Life, both the quiz show and public opinion research also contributed to the standardization and normalization of the idea of the socio-cultural identity of "the Japanese" or "the German". Ideologically, both audience-participation programmes and public opinion polling were based on the idea of the "common man". Quiz shows and public opinion surveys thus trained the Japanese and the Germans in the "ideology of the common man", i.e. the imagination of belonging to and being heard as the "common German" or "common Japanese". Thereby, quizzes and surveys helped to construct "a normative and extremely narrow

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87   J. Baudrillard, Symbolic Exchange and Death, London 1993, pp. 65–66.

88   Ibid.

89   Y. Niwa, Yoshiyuki, Kuizu Bangumi No Tanjō, in: S. Ishita/H. Ogawa (eds.), Kuizu Bunka No Shakaigaku [A Sociology of Quiz Culture], Kyōto 2003, pp. 75–103.

90   Jung, Playing with New Rules, p. 570.

91   Ibid., p. 578.

definition of what being average means" – in other words, "the ideology of the common man produced an interpretation of normalcy that heavily favored dominant cultural formations and discouraged marginality and difference".[92] Accordingly, the term common "man" needs to be taken literally, since the construct of the common man did not only exclude the non-Japanese or non-German ethnic minorities but was also based on clearly demarcated gender roles and stereotypes of the period of the economic miracle, namely the woman as the consuming housewife and the man as the producing breadwinner.[93]

92   O. Hoerschelmann, Rules of the Game: Quiz Shows and American Culture, Albany 2006, p. 50.
93   S. Yoshimi, Television and Nationalism: Historical Change in the National Domestic TV Formation of Postwar Japan, in: European Journal of Cultural Studies 6 (2003) 4, pp. 459–487.

From Farm to Base: Post-War Economic Rehabilitation and the Emergence of the Base Worker in US-Occupied Okinawa

Akino Oshiro

ABSTRACTS

Militärarbeit auf Okinawa ist das Symbol der US-Besatzung in der Nachkriegszeit. Die bestehende Forschung beleuchtet die Details des Regimes der Militärarbeit, die Beteiligung der lokalen Bevölkerung an diesem Regime und die Auswirkungen der Militärwirtschaft auf die lokale Bevölkerung. Der vorliegende Aufsatz untersucht die Geschichte der Militärarbeit aus einer postkolonialen Perspektive und konzentriert sich dabei auf die Entstehung der Militärarbeit und darauf, wie die USA ihre Bemühungen um einen wirtschaftlichen Aufschwung durch *Shurei no Hikari*, eine im Nachkriegs-Okinawa herausgegebene Gemeindezeitschrift im Sinne einer gelungenen Re-education, propagierten. Es wird argumentiert, dass die Militärarbeit die Kommodifizierung dessen symbolisiert, was man als „überschüssige Bevölkerung" bezeichnen kann, auf die sich die USA während des Kalten Krieges in ihrem Streben nach antikommunistischen Aktivitäten verließen. Ich konzentriere mich auf die Struktur von Militärarbeit und deren Auswirkungen auf die einheimische Bevölkerung und verfolge dabei zwei Argumente. Erstens argumentiere ich, dass die US-Besatzung das Land und die Produktionsmittel der Okinawaner zugunsten einer Ausweitung der US-Militäranlagen enteignete und so eine koloniale Überschussbevölkerung produzierte, die sie als Arbeitskräfte für die militärischen Aktivitäten des Kalten Krieges mobilisierten. Zweitens wird aufgezeigt, wie die Kommodifizierung der einheimischen Arbeitskräfte im Kontext der Militärarbeit durch eine Befriedung der US-Besatzungsaktivitäten gerechtfertigt wurde.

Military work in Okinawa is the symbol of US occupation in the post-war period. Existing scholarship sheds light on the details of the regime of military work, the participation of the local population in this regime, and the impact of the military economy on the local community. This

paper, however, revisits the history of military work by prioritizing a postcolonial viewpoint with a focus on the emergence of military work and on how the US propagated their efforts towards economic recovery through *Shurei no Hikari*, a community magazine published in post-war Okinawa. It argues that military work symbolizes the commodification of what can be described as "surplus population" that the US during the Cold War relied on in its pursuit of anti-Communist activities. Focusing on the structure of military work and its impact on the local population, my argument is twofold. First, I argue that the US occupation expropriated Okinawans' indigenous land and means of production for the sake of an expansion of US military installations, and thus produced a colonial surplus population that they mobilized as a labour force for Cold War military activity. Second, it reveals how the commodification of the local labour force in the context of military work was justified by a pacification of US occupation activities.

1. Introduction

The US occupation of Okinawa from 1945–1972 is a historically distinct period that has attracted considerable scholarly attention over the past several decades. It has mostly been studied by scholars of international relations and military historians, who have paid attention to the nature of the occupational politics of Okinawa under the US military government.[1] The impact of US military bases on host countries and regions has also been researched, especially through a comparative and collaborative perspective that has allowed for mapping the influence of the global hegemony of the US military, past and present.[2] These studies have shown that although Okinawa is a small fraction of the global empire of US bases, the region is worth paying attention to. On the one hand, it shares obvious similarities with other host regions impacted by US military bases. On the other hand, it exhibits distinctive aspects that are unique to Okinawa.

Regarding the former, a long history of protests against US military bases in post-war Okinawa has been well documented by a number of scholars.[3] Regarding the latter, there is a growing interest in the specific circumstances of the equally important aspects of Okinawa's unique history of US occupation. For instance, Koikari has focused on Cold War cultural interaction,[4] specifically on the exchange between Okinawan and US-American women in both countries and has explained how the mobilization of women contributed to the development and perpetuation of both US and Japanese imperialism. Shimabuku

1   C. Johnson, The Failure of Japanese and American Leadership after the Cold War: The Case of Okinawa, in: The Korea Journal of Japanese Studies 10 (1998), pp. 19–37; R. D. Eldridge, The Origins of the Bilateral Okinawa Problem: Okinawa in Postwar U.S.-Japan Relations, 1945–1952, East Asia, New York 2001; Y. Taira, Sengo Okinawa to beigunkichi: Juyōto kyozetsuno hazamade 1945–1972nen, Tokyo 2012.

2   C. Lutz, The Bases of Empire: The Global Struggle against U.S. Military Posts, London 2009; M. Höhn and S. Moon (eds.), Over there: Living with the U.S. Military Empire from World War Two to the Present, Durham, NC 2010; D. Vine, Base Nation: How U.S. Military Bases Abroad Harm America and the World, New York 2015.

3   L. Hein et al., Islands of Discontent: Okinawan Responses to Japanese and American Power, Asian voices, Lanham 2003; G. McCormack, Resistant Islands: Okinawa Confronts Japan and the United States (Asia Pacific perspectives), Lanham 2012.

4   M. Koikari, Cold War Encounters in US-Occupied Okinawa, Cambridge 2015.

has examined the ambivalent status of life on Okinawa at the crossroads of militarism and imperialism of the US and capitalism and imperialism of Japan.[5] Focusing on the complex politics surrounding Okinawan women working in the sex industry and their mix-raced children born out of the interaction with the GIs, Shimabuku introduces the idea of the "alegal" to explain a form of life, found in post-war Okinawa, that exists in a state of "unintelligibility" to the biopolitical state of the US and Japan. The growing interest in a relatively small, yet significant, group of the population in scholarship on US-occupied Okinawa demonstrates the importance of more closely considering forms of agency of that specific historical moment. Based on the existing studies of US-occupied Okinawa that focus on the structural level of its history, the analytical lens adopted in this paper follows a recent shift in the field toward including a bottom-up perspective as a means of fostering an understanding of the period.

In a similar vein, this paper tries to revisit specifically the history of military work[6] in US-occupied Okinawa. The concept of military work in the context of this research refers to the civilian work necessary to support the installations and activities of the US military. Military work has been repeatedly registered as an important phenomenon and perhaps one of the most significant characteristics of post-war Okinawa.[7] Several studies have shed light on the details of the regime of military work, the participation of the local population in this work regime, and the impact of the military economy on the local community of post-war Okinawa. Scholars have pointed to the political and historical details of the ties between economic recovery, which the US administration made explicit effort to generate, and the development of a military-centred economy in post-war Okinawa. Another scholarly perspective has been that of social movement studies, which have analysed military workers' participation in the labour movement and the struggle of the Zengunrō (All Okinawan Military Workers' Union).[8] More recent studies on military work attempt to examine the heterogeneity of specific groups, such as transnational identities among military workers. Zulueta,[9] for instance, pays close attention to Filipino workers who were employed in post-war Okinawa by the US military. So far, however, scholarship on the regime of military work in post-war Okinawa has not explored the very detail of experience of those workers and it has failed to prioritize a postcolonial viewpoint in order to explain the meaning of the incorporation and commodification of the local population. Drawing on the postcolonial analytical standpoint of Shimabuku's

5   A. M. Shimabuku, Alegal: Biopolitics and the Unintelligibility of Okinawan Life (Fordham scholarship online), New York 2018.

6   Military work refers to labour directly or indirectly connected to the US military (See Okinawa Daihyakka Jiten 1983, p. 849).

7   I. Namihira, "Gun-Sagyō" no Genkyō: Kyu Koza shi wo Chu-shin ni, in: "Gun-Sagyō" no Genkyō: Kyu Koza shi wo Chu-shin ni, Koza Bunka Box, Okinawa 2010, pp. 26–45; O. Yakabi, Okinawasen, Beigun Senryō-shi wo Manabi Naosu, Yokohama 2009; N. Yonaguni, Sengo okinawano shakaihendō to kindaika : beigunshihai to taishū undō no dainamizumu, Taimusu Sensho. 2 13, Naha 2001.

8   NK. Nagumo, Beigunkichi to rōdo ūndō: senryōkano okinawa, Kyoto 1996; K. Nagumo, Amerika senryōka okina-wano rōdōshi shihai to teikōnohazamade, Kobe 2005.

9   J. O. Zulueta, Transnational Identities on Okinawa's Military Bases: Invisible Armies, Singapore 2019.

work and insights that Koikari's work has made available, this paper tries to situate military workers of post-war Okinawa in US Cold War politics and to understand its effects as part of US hegemony.

This essay argues in a first step that post-war US occupation caused the emergence of what can be described as a "surplus population" within the local labour economy, and that the occupation mobilized this surplus population to become part of military bases' labour forces. This process began with the incarceration of Okinawan civilians in concentration camps during the Battle of Okinawa, which lasted until the immediate post-war period and dispossessed the Okinawan people of their most basic rights. In a second step, the US occupation forces mobilized interned civilians for work affiliated with the military, offering them food rations in exchange for work in the early years of the occupation. Territorial dispossession in Okinawa by the US military for building military installations produced another group of "surplus population", depriving them, too, of their means of production. The rapid expansion and consolidation of US military facilities was successfully conducted at the expense of indigenous land ownership, coercively expropriating land from civilians. In doing so, the US occupation ironically produced *Ersatz*-employment opportunities for the local population who had lost their means of production, their land *because* of the US occupation. Hence, the military occupation "succeeded" in securing a local labour force for its military operations by abolishing virtually every other alternative.

In the second part, this essay argues that the United States utilized activities to promote economic recovery as an opportunity to propagate an image of the US as a nation of progress, technological advancement, democracy, and freedom. The United States Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands (USCAR) constantly labelled its efforts in Okinawa as part of endeavours for democratization and social progress. By looking at a series of articles on the economic development in post-war Okinawa, published by the USCAR specifically for the local population, this paper tries to illustrate the US administration's views towards the mobilization of the local labour force in military institutions.

2. Modernization and Industrialization

It is generally agreed that processes of so-called modernization and industrialization in Okinawa were strengthened during the US occupation period.[10] Post-war Okinawa experienced quite drastic social changes and the impact was especially evident in its industrial structure. Before the Battle of Okinawa – a 1945 battle during the Pacific War fought on the islands of Okinawa between US and Japanese forces – the most important and established part of pre-war Okinawan economy was agriculture. Precise statistics on

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10   Yonaguni, Sengo okinawano shakaihendō to kindaika; M. Kishi, Dōka to tashaka sengookinawa no hondoshūshokushatachi, Kyoto 2013; A. Toriyama, Okinawa:kichishakaino kigen to sōkoku 1945–1956, Tokyo 2013; Yakabi, Okinawasen, Beigun Senryō-shi wo Manabi Naosu.

the social structure of pre-war Okinawa are difficult to find due to the destruction of records during the war, yet sources suggest that the primary sector of industry, including agriculture and fishing, comprised approximately 76 per cent of the entire employed population in pre-war Okinawa. The secondary sector, mostly concerned with manufacturing, comprised 9.8%, and the tertiary sector, the service economy, about 13.5 per cent.[11]

The *Okinawa Taikan* (The Overview of Okinawa), published in 1953 and cited in Yonaguni,[12] provides more detailed numbers on the industrial structure of pre-war Okinawa. In 1940, for instance, 74.22 per cent of the entire employed population in Okinawa was working in the agricultural sector, while 2.07 per cent was employed in the marine industry, 7.55 per cent in the manufacturing industry, 0.89 per cent in the mining industry, 1.32 per cent in the construction industry, 1.86 per cent in the transportation and infrastructure sector, 6.88 per cent in commerce, 3.48 per cent in the public sector and independent businesses, and, 1.36 per cent were categorized as "others". Based on these numbers alone, it can be argued that the economic structure in pre-war Okinawa was predominantly agricultural.

In contrast to this, numbers reported in the immediate post-war period show the emergence of a different form of economic structure. The number of people engaged in primary sector industries rapidly decreased to around 60.4 per cent in the immediate post-war period.[13] The secondary sector economy also shrunk to 7.7 per cent. Yet, the tertiary sector increased to 31.9 per cent in 1950. Another report on the immediate post-war statistics shows that 58.12 per cent of the entire employed population was working in agriculture,[14] 2.58 per cent in the marine industry, 3.38 per cent in the manufacturing industry, 0.06 per cent in the mining industry, 2.3 per cent in the construction industry, 0.87 per cent in the transportation and infrastructure sector, 3.48 per cent in commerce, 15.0 per cent in military work, and 9.03 per cent in the public sector and independent business.[15]

What this comparison shows is that there was a striking reduction in the number of people engaged in the primary sector industry, as it shrank from 74.22 per cent of the entire employed population to 58.12 per cent. Another significant change in the industrial structure from pre-war to post-war is the emergence of a new type of work affiliated with the US military presence in Okinawa. Besides being new, the level of social influence this work garnered is striking, as 15 per cent of the entire employed population had become employees of the US military by 1950.

This change in the industrial structure was also acknowledged by local Okinawan political leaders at the time. The First Round of Five-Year Promotion Plan of Economic Development, an economic recovery plan written by the government of the Ryukyu Islands

11   Y. Kurima, Okinawano nōgyō rekishino nakade kangaeru, Tokyo 1979, p. 57.
12   Yonaguni, Sengo okinawano shakaihendō to kindaika, p. 76.
13   Kurima, Okinawano nōgyō rekishino nakade kangaeru, p. 57.
14   Yonaguni, Sengo okinawano shakaihendō to kindaika, p. 76.
15   Ibid.

(GRI) in 1955, demonstrates that this social change was clearly observed.[16] A subsection of the plan which reviewed the recent economic development, points out that, while normal economic development goes along with the growth of the industrial sector such as manufacturing, post-war Okinawa experienced a drastic expansion of the tertiary sector due to the construction boom of the military establishments. The plan problematizes that this circumstance caused the emergence of an abnormality in the economic development, and it ultimately resulted in producing an unhealthy industrial structure. The plan also draws attention to a change in the income percentage by industry, noting that the income percentage of the combined proportion of the secondary and tertiary industries increased to become the majority, while the income percentage of the primary industry, previously the majority in the pre-war period, drastically decreased.

While local political leaders from the GRI asserted that this development should have included growth of the secondary industry and were critical of the drastic growth of the tertiary industry, the US military government had also been aware of these changing industrial structures. However, the report on the US military government of 1945–1950,[17] written in 1988, shows that the US side did not share the same level of concern about this phenomenon as did the local authorities. A section titled "Changing Employment" in the report starts as follows:

> *Military government figures began to register fundamental changes in Ryukyuan society in the 1940s. The monthly figures for September 1948, for example, show that unemployment within the Okinawa Gunto[18] stood at 1,284, while the total number of persons employed, including those working as farmers and fishermen, was 219,588. Of those, 39,579, slightly more than 18 percent, worked directly for agencies of the United States government. A great majority of the rest worked as construction workers, groundskeepers, drivers, domestics, and concessionaries in jobs indirectly, yet closely, related to the American military housing and base construction and operation. Apart from subsistence farmers, relatively few Okinawans were engaged in traditional native trades: 605 in woodworking, 348 in metalworking, and 148 in ceramics. These statistics, typically for the years 1947–1950, underlined the fact that the sustained American military presence was changing the economic life in the islands dramatically from its prewar configuration. Fewer Okinawans made their livelihood in agricultural industry, while more had become employed in light industry and service positions associated with the military facilities. This trend continued well into the 1950s, not merely because it made economic sense to the employees, but also because it made economic sense to the Department of the Army of the United States.[19]*

16   Government of the Ryukyu Islands, Department of Finance, Keizai sinkō daiichiji 5kanen keikakuan (1955), p. 53.
17   A. G. Fisch, Military Government in the Ryukyu Islands, 1945–1950 (Army Historical Series), Washington, D.C. 1988.
18   Gunto means archipelago.
19   McArthur quoted in Fisch, Military Government in the Ryukyu Islands, p. 144.

This passage indicates that such changes to the Okinawan employment structure were supported by the US Department of the Army for economic reasons. The report continues as follows:

> *In November 1948, General MacArthur advised the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations of employment realities on Okinawa. Noting that "labor was all the Ryukyuans had to sell," he continued: "[…] there are at present several thousand nonindigenous civilians, mostly Filipinos,*[20] *employed in the construction, maintenance and operation of military installations at a heavy dollar cost to the U.S. far in excess of native labor costs. […] if most of these foreign employees were replaced with native labor paid in yen purchased with appropriated funds, it would not only result in substantially lower dollar outlay by the U.S. but would enable the purchase of necessary consumer goods with dollars thus stimulating all branches of the economy and within a few years, it will reduce the substantial necessity for support under the GARIORA program."*[21]

This passage shows that the US military government recognized the change of industrial structure in post-war Okinawa and, more specifically, understood that it was the catalysts of that change. It appears that the US military government attempted to hire more local workers, but, according to General MacArthur's comments, his intention in doing so was to decrease the US's own economic burden in the occupation of Okinawa.

There was tension between local leaders and US officials as to how these industrial changes should be conceived. Local leaders saw these changes as a threat to Okinawa's post-war economic recovery. US officials, on the contrary, argued that such changes were fundamental for recovery and claimed that the US administration was vital to its "success".

3. Early Mobilization of Civilians for Military Work

When did the local population begin to participate in military work? The beginning of military work can be traced to the US administration's control of the local population through incarceration and the dispossession of indigenous landowners both during the war and in the immediate post-war years. Most of the Okinawan civilians who survived the Battle of Okinawa in 1945 were interned in camps on the island.[22] Among those camps, the one in the northern area of Okinawa Island held the largest number of civilians, interning about 206,700 people by July 1945. The population of the north camp increased to 249,000 three months later.[23] This increase was the result of the construc-

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20   The United States Occupation Government in Japan and the occupation possibilities offered on the US bases during the immediate post-war years played a significant role for the migration to Okinawa from the Philippines. Zulueta (2020) argues that the migrations between Okinawa and the Philippines that started in the immediate post-war period and continue up to this day were triggered by continuing US hegemony in the region and the need to perpetuate this status quo.

21   MacArthur quoted in Fisch, Military government in the Ryukyu Islands, p. 144.

22   Toriyama, Okinawa:kichishakaino kigen to sōkoku 1945–1956, p. 14.

23   Taira, Sengo Okinawa to beigunkichi: Juyōto kyozetsuno hazamade 1945–1972nen, p. 24.

tion of a US military base in the central area of the island. Civilians who were captured in this area were thus forced to relocate to the north. Not only did these camps function as a way of isolating civilians from war zones, but the construction of concentration camps also aimed at securing the labour power needed to efficiently support US military activities.[24]

At these concentration camps, the US military appointed a mayor and civil police force from among the captured civilians. The selection process prioritized one's ability to speak English, a cooperative attitude toward the US military, and social influence. Such appointees were in charge of informing captured civilians of the US military's plan to rebuild the social system torn down by the war. The arbitrary reconfiguration of social relationships in the concentration camps which ignored the social system that existed before the war resulted in the construction of a new social system among the locals and disrupted the traditional value system. Not only did the US military built the social order in a new way, but it also narrowed the gap between rich and poor by controlling access to and possession of resources, including food, at the camps. It was supposedly a new beginning, that of the "American era", and it was to start from the hour zero.[25] Four different administrative groups were created to support the camp mayors appointed by the US military. Activities that civilians engaged in within those groups demonstrate how in the early occupation period civilians were recruited for work on and around bases. A social work section organized US military rations, and an agriculture section took care of farming lands, preparing farming goods, and harvesting. A labour section worked on allocating workers, consisting of captured civilians, to wherever they were demanded by the US military and other administrative groups. A sanitation section took care of cleaning bathrooms and drains to eradicate mosquitos and flies.

Work generally started at 9 a.m. every morning, and if workers did not arrive on time or neglected their duties, they did not receive their food rations.[26] In this way, the US military disciplined and controlled civilians through employment in the military labour force. Civilians often had no choice but to be engaged in military work in order to get access to food. Captured civilians did not become part of the labour force only for the construction of US military installations and other infrastructure, which had already begun to be built during the Battle of Okinawa; they were also recruited to dispose of dead bodies and retrieve the belongings of those killed during the war. One war survivor testified that these activities risked civilians' lives as they worked while bullets were fired by US and Japanese forces above their heads.[27] Civilians who engaged in US military work were forced to face an additional risk: that is, their lives were threatened by the Japanese military, as they were perceived as potential spies.[28]

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24   Namihira, "Gun-Sagyō" no Genkyō: Kyu Koza shi wo Chu-shin ni, p. 33.
25   Okinawa Taimususha, Okinawanoshōgen: Gekidō25nenshi jō, Naha 1971, p. 80.
26   Ibid., p. 82.
27   Okinawaken shōkōrōdōbu (ed.), Okinawaken rōdōshi Volume 1 (1945–55nen), Naha 2005, p. 131.
28   Ibid., p. 132.

Early civilian recruitment for US military work involved labour that was fundamentally connected to the people's life. Civilians were literally kept alive through their labour for the US military: which at the same time dispossessed them of their way of life. Civilians were kept alive by having to clean the dead bodies of their fellow Okinawans, whose deaths were caused by the US and Japanese military. Civilians were forced to risk their lives while working under the US military as a means of survival. Ultimately, the labour that civilians provided while jeopardizing their own lives profited US military expansion, which yet further dispossessed civilians of their means of production.

It is important to note that recruitment of non-American labour forces for US military activities was rather common: the labour force needed by the US had already been supplemented by 12,000 captive Japanese soldiers in the early stages of the post-war period. After Japanese soldiers had been repatriated to mainland Japan in October 1946, the lack of labour power was compensated by local Okinawans.[29]

Only one month into occupation, due to the increasing costs of retaining civilians in camps, the US military government began to give interned Okinawans permission to either move to areas in the vicinity or to return to where they had previously lived. It was, however, the US military that held the right to decide which areas were to be released back to the people. Basically, the US military only released land that in their view was useless, while keeping the central part of the island for military expansion. By 1949, the land that had been seized by the US military government amounted to roughly 14 per cent of Okinawa Island. It is also important to point out that the central area of Okinawa Island, where the intensive construction of military bases took place, had previously been the most populated area of Okinawa Island and was the region with most agricultural properties prior to the Battle of Okinawa.

4. Mobilization of Civilians for Military Work Along with Intensification of Military Base Construction

In 1950, the US military administration issued a policy proclamation that indicated the long-term possession of US military installations in Okinawa, in the context of the intensification of Cold War tensions in Asia. Before and after 1950, Cold War tensions in Asia had been intensifying following the division of Korea after World War II and the subsequent establishment of two separate nation-states in 1948. The division between North and South Korea further escalated when North Korean forces crossed the 38th line, which led to the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950.

In addition to the political conflicts on the Korean Peninsula, the establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949 and subsequent political tensions played key roles in transforming the landscape and lives of Okinawans as both events spurred an influx of US military personnel and equipment. The time immediately before and after 1950

29   Taira, Sengo Okinawa to beigunkichi: Juyōto kyozetsuno hazamade 1945–1972nen, p. 25.

constituted a crucial period for post-war Okinawa that brought myriad structural, political, and social changes.[30]

Because of the island's geographical location, the US military readily acknowledged Okinawa's geopolitical value. Not only did they maintain existing US military facilities on Okinawa with a long-term perspective, but they also planned new ones to conduct anti-Communist activities. This additionally caused increased demand for civilian workers to construct military installations and brought about the so called "military construction boom" from 1950–1953.[31]

In order to encourage enlisting the local population, the US military government issued a proclamation in 1950 stating that they intended to raise the salary for Ryukyuan workers. In 1949, 15 per cent of the Okinawan workforce, about 40,000 people, were engaged in military work. These employees were former farmers whose land had been seized and who were thereby forced to give up farming. Some Okinawans also voluntarily quit farm work due to the associated economic hardships, and they decided to work directly for the US military or take on other jobs related to the military in order to receive regular income.[32]

Yet, there were also workers who quit military work. Apparently about 7 per cent of the Okinawan military workers, 2929 people, quit their jobs just within the month of December 1949.[33] To secure and increase the sufficient labour force for expansion of US military facilities to prepare for Asian Cold War politics, the US administration needed to employ a new strategy to mobilize the local population for work. They therefore decided in 1950 to triple the salary compared to the previous amount.[34] As the US had hoped, there was a sharp increase of job applications within the first month after the salary increase was issued. In 1950, more people left their agricultural work and many of them transferred to either construction work or work at military installations.[35] Following its salary increases, the US military government succeeded in mobilizing people and convincing farmers to switch to military-related work. While this policy provided financial stability for local workers, it also helped the US to secure a labour force for the expansion and consolidation of their military presence on the island. It can be argued that the US-led economic recovery policy in Okinawa functioned as a means of disciplining civilian local Okinawans and gaining their acceptance of the US occupation. At the same time, it enabled US military expansion, along with simultaneously reinforcing their global imperialistic ideology.

The US administration increasingly relied on local labour power in order to prepare for an intensification of military operations as part of their anti-Communism strategy. The

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30   P. Iacobelli, The Other Legacy of the Korean War: Okinawa and the Fear of World War III, in: T. Morris-Suzuki (ed.), The Korean War in Asia: A Hidden History, Lanham 2018, pp. 109–28, at p. 109.

31   Okinawaken shōkōrōdōbu (ed.), Okinawaken rōdōshi, Vol. 1 (1945–55nen), p. 309.

32   Ryūkyū Ginkō Chōsabu (ed.), Sengo Okinawa Keizaishi, Naha 1984, p. 270.

33   Ibid.

34   Ibid., p. 271.

35   Ibid.

enlistment of the local population could be seen as proof of the US occupation's aim to help the local economy recover through military infrastructure; yet it is important to pay attention to who actually benefited from this development. Civilians' supply of labour power allowed for a US military expansion that furthermore rested on the US administration's racist ideology which was employed to justify a hierarchical wage order. Considering the fact that Okinawan workers were still paid lower wages than all other workers, their mobilization did not only secure US hegemony on the island, but also garnered profits for the US military.

5. Publicizing America's Re-education Efforts

In this section, I illustrate how the US administration presented their efforts towards economic recovery in Okinawa in a positive light. *Shurei no Hikari* ("The light in the land of courtesy"), a magazine published by the US administration in occupied Okinawa, shows how the recruitment of local citizens for military work was portrayed as an American philanthropic activity that enabled progress and advancement in post-war Okinawa.

The US administration framed its effort in a publicity campaign for their occupational activities in Okinawa through a variety of media formats. Publishing a magazine was one of the core cultural strategies. One example is *Shurei no Hikari*, a magazine published by the High Commissioners' office from 1959 to 1972. It was written in Japanese and targeted at a broad public in post-war Okinawa. According to Kano, the magazine received considerable reception in the local community. By 1968, *Shurei no Hikari* had a circulation of 92,000 copies – almost the same as the *Okinawa Times*, one of the two major local newspapers in post-war Okinawa.[36] *Shurei no Hikari* was published for civilians working for military installations, as well as general households.

The common rhetoric concerning military workers in a number of articles was that US military installations provided employment opportunities and advancement to local citizens. For example, *Shurei no Hikari* featured a special issue on labour in Okinawa in September 1962 and explained the current conditions.

> *The majority of the labour force in prewar* [Okinawa] *was projected toward agriculture and forestry industry, and marine industry. A very small part of the labour force in urban areas was allocated to a few factories at that time and most of them were not in skilled jobs. Today, the whole labour population is about 410,000 people and from those, 346,000 are on Okinawa island. 187,000 of the whole labour population are working in agriculture or marine industry. The number of workers in other industries reaches up to 220,000. As of December 1961, 54,983 of Ryukyuans are employed in US military*

installations and a couple of thousands of them are learning various kinds of skills from Americans.[37]

This passage demonstrates clearly that the US administration acknowledged that they intended to change the industrial structure of post-war Okinawa: from an agricultural economy to one focused on other industries. This change, however, did not follow the common process of modernization or industrialization, which usually involves the development of a strong manufacturing industry. The significant point to make here is that a great proportion of "other industries" that emerged in post-war Okinawa were related to the military work that the US administration emphasized throughout the article. Instead of developing manufacturing to build a robust post-war industry in Okinawa as part of the economic recovery process, the US administration built a military infrastructure at the expense of other economic sectors and ultimately turned farmers into (base) workers. Another story emphasized in *Shurei no Hikari* is that the US administration made efforts to protect Okinawan workers by securing employment opportunities for them on military installations. The US administration explained that it was inevitable to hire a certain number of Americans, as well as third-country nationals, for jobs that required special skills Okinawans could not provide, as follows: "The US military needs some special skills that Ryukyuan workers do not know yet, so we have hired 2966 Americans and 1507 third-country nationals."[38] Considering this situation, the US administration aimed at encouraging private companies in Okinawa to have their local workers trained for skill advancement. The US administration emphasized the importance of replacing foreign workers with local workers to ultimately reduce the number of foreign workers hired for military work at US military installations. This protection policy of the US administration, which was projected on local workers, was turned into a discourse of philanthropy by the US administration who argued that the US military presence in Okinawa was "helping" the local population.

There is a series of articles titled "Growing Ryukyus", beginning in the January 1963 issue, that talks about "a great progress that the Ryukyu Islands accomplished under the US occupation since 1945".[39] This feature article once again emphasized US efforts to provide opportunities for the advancement of the local community by establishing an institution for vocational training for workers.

The 1962 special issue of *Shurei no Hikari* on labour in post-war Okinawa concluded ensuring that "there is absolutely no need to be pessimistic about the labour situation in the Ryukyus and the actual circumstance of local workers." The article mentioned that the payment roll had increased by 38.5 per cent compared to that of 1955 and the unemployment rate was only 0.7 per cent.[40] By highlighting the precise statistical num-

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37   Ryukyu Islands (United States Civil Administration, 1950–1972). Office of the High Commissioner, Shurei no hikari, Special Issue on Labor (1962) September, p. 12.

38   Ibid. (1963), January, p. 10.

39   Ibid., p. 5.

40   Ibid. (1962), p. 12.

bers, the US administration once again stressed their efforts to stimulate the economic recovery and bring about the betterment of Okinawa's life.

6. Conclusion

In this paper, I argued that the US occupation of Okinawa led to the emergence of a "surplus population" which was robbed of its land and its traditional work in agriculture, and that the local labour force was instead utilized for US military operations. The successful expansion of US military installations came at the expense of local civilians whose indigenous lands were coercively expropriated in the course of Cold War geopolitical considerations. Moreover, it is important to emphasize that these activities were operated under the name of economic recovery. Following the narrative of the US military government, they created employment opportunities for locals and the change in industrial structure brought about by the US occupation meant an advancement for Okinawa. By skilfully disseminating the message of the US occupation as a philanthropic project that put its efforts into improving Okinawans' lives though labour projects and vocational training, the US military government succeeded in strengthening its global hegemonic ideology by extending military operations in Asia.

Although it goes beyond the scope of this paper, it is critical to note that paying attention to the actual experiences of local workers at military bases reveals a more complicated and ambivalent situation, as two different interviews with former military workers, conducted by a sociologist and a local newspaper company in Okinawa, demonstrate.[41] The experience of working at the military bases with and for US soldiers cannot simply be framed as a story of "economic recovery", "freedom", or "technological advancement" as the US administration claims in *Shurei no Hikari*. While some recalled their experience of military base work as pleasurable – as illustrated by Kiyuna Makato's memory of having a Christmas party with her colleagues and receiving American gifts from them – others remembered the discriminatory treatment they received from their US, and even Filipino, colleagues. Chinen Tadafumi, who was hired as a garage organizer by the Supply Management Department of the United States Army Corps of Engineers, remembered that his Filipino boss maintained a blunt manner toward Okinawan workers. He also recalled that Okinawan workers were assigned a bathroom separate from that of the US and Filipino workers, located several hundred metres away. These stories contradict what had been described by the US administration. Thus, to more fully understand the effects of US occupational policy on Okinawan society, it remains necessary to apply a postcolonial lens to the historical narrative of Okinawa's post-war economic recovery.

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41   M. Ishihara, Sengo okinawano shakaishi-gunsagyō-senka-daimitsubōekinojidai, Naha 2012; Okinawa Taimusu Chūbushisha Hensyūbu (ed.), Kichidehataraku gunsagyōin no sengo, Naha 2013.

Re-Education and the Construction of Whiteness in the US Military[1]

Katharina Gerund

ABSTRACTS

Dieser Artikel untersucht Prozesse der Re-education im Hinblick auf ihre Rassenregime, die in Diskursen über „Rasse" und Rassismus im US-Militär gegen Ende des Zweiten Weltkriegs und während der frühen Tage der US-amerikanischen Präsenz im Nachkriegsdeutschland zum Ausdruck kommen. Er arbeitet die Rolle des Weißseins und des weißen Privilegs, das gegenüber einem schwarzen Anderen konstruiert wird, im Zentrum der US-Militärmission in Europa (und darüber hinaus) heraus und zeigt, wie die Kriegsanstrengungen und die (Planung der) Besetzung und Re-education / Neuorientierung Deutschlands Reflexionen über rassische Ungleichheit innerhalb der US-Armee (und der US-Gesellschaft insgesamt) auslösten. Dieses Potenzial interner Reformen und selbstbewusster ‚Umerziehung' unter dem Deckmantel des Arbeitskräftemanagements und der Steigerung der Effizienz im Ausland, wie begrenzt auch immer sein tatsächlicher Einfluss auf die Abschwächung von Rassismus und die Infragestellung weißer Hegemonie sein mag, verweist auf die (unbeabsichtigten) Auswirkungen der Re-education im eigenen Land noch vor den offiziellen Programmen, die sich an deutsche Zielgruppen richteten.

This article examines processes of re-education with regard to their racial regimes epitomized in discourses on race and racism in the US military toward the end of World War II and during the early days of the US-American presence in post-war Germany. It teases out the role of whiteness and white privilege, which is constructed via-à-vis a black Other, at the centre of the US military mission in Europe (and beyond) and shows how the war effort and the (planning of) the occupation and re-education / reorientation of Germany prompted a reflection on racial inequality within the US Army (and US society at large). This potential of internal reform and

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self-conscious re-education under the guise of managing manpower and bolstering efficiency abroad, however limited in its actual influence on mitigating racism and challenging white hegemony, bespeaks the (unintended) effects of re-education at home, even prior to the official programmes targeting the German population.

1. Introduction

Race has, by now, been firmly established as a central category for historical, cultural, and sociological studies of the post-war years and the US re-education efforts in defeated Germany (and elsewhere). African American soldiers, in this context, have emerged as a crucial focus to examine the racial politics in the transatlantic sphere. Studies have documented and analysed their experiences in American-occupied Germany and their interactions with the German population,[2] traced their influences on the Civil Rights movement in the US,[3] and assessed their impact on German notions of race and identity.[4] Their presence may have "forced some Germans to confront many of the racial demons which had been nurtured by over a century *völkische* ideology, German imperialism and Nazi propaganda,"[5] and the term *Rasse* as a categorical difference that had been at the centre of National Socialist ideology became taboo in the post-war context.[6] Yet, Germans quickly "recast" their understanding of race[7] and soon reclaimed "whiteness […] as an unmarked signifier of race and citizenship".[8]

In the context of re-education,[9] US-American occupiers / liberators and Germans could rely on a "shared sense of whiteness"[10] and (tacit) knowledge about race and racism. As I will show by examining the discourses on racialization on and around the US military at the time, re-education also from the very beginning potentially addressed and af-

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2 See M. M. Morehouse, Fighting in the Jim Crow Army: Black Men and Women Remember World War II, Lanham 2000; C. P. Moore, Fighting for America: Black Soldiers – the Unsung Heroes of World War II, New York 2005; J. Kleinschmidt, Besatzer und Deutsche: Schwarze GIs nach 1945, in: Amerikastudien/American Studies 40 (1995) 4, pp. 647–665; O. R. Schmidt, Afroamerikanische GIs in Deutschland 1944–1973: Rassekrieg, Integration und globale Protestbewegung, phil. Diss., WWU Münster, 2010, https://d-nb.info/1034311794/34.

3 See M. Höhn/M. Klimke, A Breath of Freedom: The Civil Rights Struggle, African American GIs, and Germany, New York 2010; C. Knauer, Let Us Fight as Free Men: Black Soldiers and Civil Rights, Philadelphia 2014; K. Kruse/S. Tuck (eds.), Fog of War: The Second World War and the Civil Rights Movement, Oxford 2012; N. A. Wynn, The African American Experience during World War II, Lanham 2010.

4 See H. Fehrenbach, Race after Hitler: Black Occupation Children in Postwar Germany and America, Princeton 2005; T. Schroer, Recasting Race after World War II: Germans and African Americans in American-Occupied Germany, Boulder 2007.

5 M. H. Little Jr., The Black Military Experience in Germany: From the First World War to the Present, in: D. McBride/L. Hopkins/C. A. Blackshire-Belay (eds.), Crosscurrents: African Americans, Africa, and Germany in the Modern World, Columbia 1998, pp. 177–196, at 193.

6 Fehrenbach, Race after Hitler, p. 7.

7 Schroer, Recasting Race, p. 1.

8 U. Linke, German Bodies: Race and Representation after Hitler, New York 1999, p. 28.

9 Re-education is understood here as a complex and inadvertently mutual process that exceeded official policies.

10 D. Alvah, Unofficial Ambassadors: American Military Families Overseas and the Cold War, 1946–1965, New York 2007, p. 10.

fected US-Americans themselves. The war and the subsequent occupation compelled the military to engage with questions of race on an institutional level and as part of its self-fashioning and propaganda. In the process, albeit inadvertently, whiteness as an unmarked norm and source of privilege among the armed forces and in US society at large was not only affirmed but also became exposed and partially acknowledged. The assumption of whiteness as an unmarked norm and the structural racism it facilitated were implicitly extended to include the (white) German population. As Johannes Klein-schmidt has shown, US officials did not consider it necessary to prime and prepare Germans for the advent of African American soldiers; in fact, they were more concerned that black soldiers might treat the (former) enemy too kindly.[11] Indeed, the image of the friendly black GI engaging freely and generously with German children became a staple of the post-war imagination – despite the fact that many Germans also expressed racist views and utter dismay at the presence of black soldiers.[12] The US military, according to Timothy Schroer, attempted to "limit the presence, visibility, and role of African American soldiers in Germany in order to avoid arousing Germans' racial antipathy" *and* because of their own racist belief that African Americans were not as capable as white soldiers.[13] African American soldiers were stationed – more or less – all over the American occupation zone in the beginning and were only later concentrated in a small number of locations.[14] The liberating experience of these soldiers in former Nazi Germany of all places and the perceived lack of racism among the German population became a powerful argument and motivational tool in the emerging Civil Rights movement as well as in the master narrative of German rehabilitation, which – among other things – coded race as an American problem and fuelled the illusion of a post-race moment in post-war Germany.

In transatlantic racial discourses, romantic and sexual relationships between African American soldiers and white German women – from initial flirtatious interactions to marriage vows to children resulting from these relationships – took on specific symbolic significance[15] and posed a challenge to Jim Crow laws, to the US Army's racial policies as well as to an emerging German (national) identity tied to whiteness. The cross-racial relationships were openly frowned upon on both sides of the Atlantic and thus attest to a shared anti-black racism and sense of white superiority in the transatlantic sphere. Cross-

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11   Kleinschmidt, Besatzer und Deutsche, p. 648.

12   Ibid., 652–654.

13   Schroer, Recasting Race, pp. 43–44.

14   Ibid., p. 62. As Michael Cullen Green has pointed out, "[g]overnment policy, based in part on racial fears, [also] increased African American assignments to Japan relative to Europe" (M. C. Green, Black Yanks in the Pacific: Race in the Making of the American Military Empire after World War II, Ithaca 2010, p. 6).

15   See, e.g., K. Gerund, Transatlantic Romance(s) of the Postwar Years: Interracial Relationships in *Die PX-Story* (1959) and *Transgression* (2015), in: B. M. Bauridl/I. Gessner/U. J. Hebel (eds.), German-American Encounters in Bavaria and Beyond, 1945–2015, Berlin 2018, pp. 147–170; M. Höhn, GIs and Fräuleins: The German-American Encounter in 1950s West Germany, Chapel Hill 2002; N. Klopprogge, The Sexualized Landscape of Post-War Germany and the Politics of Cross-Racial Intimacy in the US Zone, in: C. Erlichman/C. Knowles (eds.), Transforming Occupation in the Western Zones of Germany: Politics, Everyday Life and Social Interactions, 1945–55, London 2018, pp. 171–190.

racial intimacy in Europe, as Alex Lubin points out, "challenged white military officials' and soldiers' abilities to control white female and black male sexuality abroad" and it "became central to civil rights organizing".[16] Not only does it reveal the precariousness and temporary nature of the freedom that African American GIs enjoyed in Germany, but it also shows the transnational and historical continuities of anti-black racism. The War Department tolerated "black GI interracial intimacy" abroad but posed high obstacles to interracial marriage and war bride migration to the US.[17] Lubin's research reveals that there were many cases in which cross-racial relationships were hampered by military policy:

> *Sergeant William T. Malone was denied the right to marry his German fiancée because, according to his commanding officer, his interracial marriage signified his lack of maturity. […] [T]he […] officer undoubtedly thought that Malone had not considered the implication of antimiscegenation laws on his marriage. Yet such a statement also reveals how military policy relied on domestic race relations as a means to contain the explosive potential of international relations.*[18]

The continuities of white superiority and anti-black racism are evident, yet the forms of racism as well as the articulations of whiteness may have changed in the process of re-education. One soldier, Floyd Jones, remarked that, early on, the racism he encountered abroad was actually "made in the United States".[19] Re-education did not imply the un-learning and overcoming of Antisemitism and racism in all of its forms but rather a structural recalibration of racialized power structures and a reaffirmation of whiteness at the core of US-American and German national identities (constituted vis-à-vis a black American Other). The crucial paradox that the US fought fascism and racism abroad while at the same time facilitating racism among its own ranks and falling short of its own democratic ideal had been obvious from an African American perspective well before World War II and increasingly "embarrassed" white liberals in the US.[20] However, from a dominant perspective on US democracy, which has included such structural inequalities from its very inception, it appears rather consistent. The (re)construction of whiteness in German-American encounters after World War II from this hegemonic perspective facilitated the early Cold War logics that quickly turned the former enemies into friends and allies.[21] As Maria Höhn and Seungsook Moon have pointed out, the "more egalitarian relationship" between the US and Germany, compared to Japan and Okinawa, in the post-war years "was based on the assumption that his was an alliance between two

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16   A. Lubin, Romance and Rights: The Politics of Interracial Intimacy, 1945–1954, Jackson 2005, p. 97.

17   Ibid., p. 99.

18   Ibid., p. 102.

19   Quoted in M. P. Motley, The Invisible Soldier: The Experience of the Black Soldier, World War II, Detroit 1975, p. 178.

20   M. Höhn, "We Will Never Go Back to the Old Way Again": Germany in the African-American Debate on Civil Rights, in: Central European History 41 (2008) 4, pp. 605–637, at 606.

21   See K. Gerund/H. Paul, Einleitung, in: K. Gerund/H. Paul (eds.), Die amerikanische Reeducation-Politik nach 1945: Interdisziplinäre Perspektiven auf "America's Germany", Bielefeld 2015, pp. 7–18, at 11.

white nations".[22] The presence of soldiers of colour (as well as Afro-Germans) challenged this notion and turned the anti-black racism that had shaped US identity from its very beginnings into a transatlantic paradox of US democracy and democratization efforts.

In the following, I will focus on how the construction of whiteness in the transatlantic context of World War II and US re-education goes hand-in-hand with the racial Othering of African American soldiers within the US military, and illustrate how it exposes white US officials, commentators, and actors as racial subjects in their own right and with an investment in the racialized and racist discourse of their time. I will look at several examples to illuminate the contours of the largely unmarked whiteness and anti-black racism at the heart of the US military mission to Germany which have been established even before the end of World War II: (1) the 'classic' propaganda film *The Negro Soldier* (1944),[23] (2) an official military documentation, the 1944 manual *Leadership and the Negro Soldier,*[24] which addressed white officers commanding black troops, as well as, by way of a conclusion, (3) accounts from members of the military "on the ground", i.e. African American soldiers' reflections of their service experience, and white war historian Melvin Lasky's diary, which covers his experiences during the final days of World War II in the European theatre and the immediate post-war moment. All of these sources show how white privilege and anti-black racism have informed the re-education efforts and laid the groundwork for the export of racism American style, while at the same time bespeaking an unintended project to re-educate or reform US-Americans themselves as part of the war effort.

2. *The Negro Soldier* and the (Re)Educational Potential of Wartime Propaganda

The Negro Soldier (1944) constitutes an important contribution to the (mainstream) representations of African Americans on screen,[25] a crucial piece of military propaganda during World War II, and an essential document on racial discourses in 1940s US. Pro-

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22   M. Höhn/S. Moon, The Politics of Gender, Sexuality, Race, and Class in the U.S. Military Empire, in: M. Höhn/M. Seungsook (eds.), Over There: Living with the U.S. Military Empire from World War II to the Present, Durham 2010, pp. 1–36, at 17 (emphasis added). Höhn and Moon further elaborate on the differences in the transatlantic and transpacific post-war context: "a multiracial occupation […] confronted racial others in Asia but encountered for the most part, a homogenous white population in West Germany, which in turn was anxious about encountering soldiers of color" (ibid., p. 20).

23   The Negro Soldier, Dir. Stuart Heisler, 1944.

24   Leadership and the Negro Soldier. Army Service Forces Manual M5 Training, Washington, D.C. 1944.

25   According to Thomas Cripps and David Culbert, *The Negro Soldier* showcased the role of film for social change, facilitated the end of "race movies," and ushered in the era of the "message films" (T. Cripps/D. Culbert, The Negro Soldier (1944): Film Propaganda in Black and White, in: American Quarterly 31 [1979] 5, pp. 616–640, at 638–640). Elizabeth Reich similarly regards it as a film whose "general representational strategies were all but the inverse of the Hollywood set: [it] focused on domestic space, situating [its] soldiers in the embrace of the black community; [it] offered explicit and length renditions of black history; and [it] directly addressed black concerns about the war" (E. Reich, Militant Visions: Black Soldiers, Internationalism, and the Transformation of American Cinema, New Brunswick 2016, p. 84).

duced by Frank Capra, written by Carlton Moss (who also stars as the minister), and directed by Stuart Heisler, the film was originally "intended solely for black troops",[26] but, ultimately and due to the pressure of African American activists, reached a much broader audience, both military and civilian. Its content was carefully modified and censored by the Pentagon. The film capitalized on boxing champion Joe Louis' star power and likens warfare to athletic competition. It was, however, neither allowed to showcase black officers and their achievements, nor to place significant emphasis on black soldiers at the front lines and in combat, and it had to stay clear of any substantial interracial interactions.[27] Delicately balancing the requirements of the Selective Training and Service Act, which prohibited racial discrimination in the military,[28] and its message of a unified war effort with the realities of a strictly segregated Army (and society), *The Negro Soldier* engages several strategies: 1) It conveniently erases any reference to enslavement and racial discrimination within the US, calling out the racism of the "enemies" instead. The term "enslaved", for instance, is superimposed once in connection with the German enemy and followed by an image of several hanged men. These may resonate with images of lynching, but this racist and terrorist practice is here recoded to document the brutality of Nazi Germany. Similarly, the minister recites Adolf Hitler's *Mein Kampf* and especially its derogatory language used to describe blacks and its great contempt for African American achievements in a presumably less racist US society. Of course, as Kathleen German reminds us, "[d]uring World War II, both the Allies and the Axis powers expressed racial hatred and practiced systems of racial hierarchy".[29] 2) It focuses on black middle-class life and black achievement within the US (and especially within the Army), thus avoiding stereotypical depictions of African Americans. At the same time, it appeals to white audiences by emulating their dominant middle-class norms and standards. 3) It uses patriotic tropes and rhetoric to evoke national unity during wartime, yet without ultimately questioning or unsettling segregationist views: the temporary nature of the alliance necessary to obtain victory is clearly marked.

With its narrative frame of a church service, which also serves as a form of containment and a source of symbolic authority, the film literally preaches to the black community and positions white viewers as outsiders, who are not directly addressed but rather overhearing the testimonials of black contributions to US warfare then and now. While the film shows black servicemen as well as a servicewoman among the congregation, the two main characters, who serve as narrators and reveal the significant role of the soldiers, are

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26   Cripps/Culbert, The Negro Soldier (1944), p. 628.

27   See ibid., p. 629.

28   The Selective Training and Service Act was signed into law on 16 September 1940 after barely passing Congress on 1 July. It was "the first peacetime conscription act in American history" and "recognized conscientious objection as matter of individual conscience" (C. Howlett, Selective Service and Training Act, in: J. G. Ryan/L. Schlup [eds.], Historical Dictionary of the 1940s, Armonk 2006, p. 349). It also included two provisions that addressed discrimination and stated that "race or color" should have no effect on an individual's possibility to volunteer or to on the actual selection and training (see G. Q. Flynn, Selective Service and American Blacks During World War II, in: The Journal of Negro History 69 [1984] 1, pp. 14–25, at 14).

29   K. M. German, Promises of Citizenship: Film Recruitment of African Americans in World War II, Jackson 2017, p. 16.

the minister and a mother from the audience. The mother reads a letter from her son, Robert, who via voice-over gets to tell his own story to the theatrical audience. As Elizabeth Reich has convincingly argued, the opening sequence of the film "visually integrates the segregated armed forces" by superimposing the film's title on the US military logo and "establishes the centrality of the church to black America and the centrality of the black soldier to the church".[30] In contrast to the church audience, viewers of the film are offered visual evidence "that *black* Americans have made, transformed, and produced America" through a variety of quasi-documentary scenes covering US imperial endeavours from the settlement of the West to all major wars.[31] Though carefully "avoid[ing] stories of black activism" the film tells a "quite radical [history] of black participation in the US armed forces" based on its substantial "revision of American history"[32] that "reconstitute[s] black presence where it was absent from the official record and, in so doing, locate[s] black heroism and sacrifice at the figurative heart of the nation".[33] As Reich points out, this inclusion of "African Americans in the story of the nation" comes at the prize of excluding other marginalized groups. It suggests to African Americans exclusively that "they will escape their place alongside the other oppressed communities in America and become, finally, fully American" through their participation in the war.[34] The black community is singled out for the promise of inclusion based on military service and patriotic duty. Along these lines, the film also explicitly delegitimizes any notion of solidarity and of possible alliances between African Americans and the Japanese. Kathleen German interprets the film as entailing a "narrative [that] transforms the once 'inferior' African American into a competent soldier".[35]

The Negro Soldier provides an intriguing example of propaganda turned against itself, as it became a potential tool for educating especially white Americans on the historical significance of black achievements for the nation as well as re-educating them with regard to racist beliefs and investment in structural racism.[36] While the film showcases black strife it also contains it in ways that work to avoid unsettling a white audience. Stephen Tuck states that "[u]ndoubtedly the Army had unwittingly commissioned a propaganda film that by 1944 had become powerful propaganda against military segregation"[37] and

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30   Reich, Militant Visions, p. 102.
31   Ibid., p. 104.
32   Kathleen German explains that "[t]his revised history generated an unmistakably integrationist message for black viewers but reassured whites that victory was the ultimate goal of temporary cooperation" (German, Promises of Citizenship, p. 18).
33   Reich, Militant Visions, p. 84.
34   Ibid., p. 85.
35   German, Promises of Citizenship, p. 7.
36   While, of course, the actual effects of the film are impossible to assess, Kathleen German points out that it did reach a mass audience and finds it "more than likely" that "it modified perspectives and at the same time quieted demands for equality until military victory could be won" (p. 66). Whether World War II had a catalytic impact on progress with regard to racial equality or whether it even cemented racism and discrimination has been a contested issue in scholarship (see, e.g., Kruse/Tuck, Fog of War). My own readings seek to highlight the ambivalences of the racial discourses of the time rather than to neatly align the texts with a clear political-ideological agenda pointing towards consolidation or change of racial hierarchies and logics.
37   S. Tuck, Fighting the Government with Its Own Propaganda: The Struggle for Racial Equality in the USA during

contributed to the larger effects of wartime discourses, that Kathleen German describes as follows: "While neither blacks nor whites emerged cured of racial prejudice, American institutions were forced by the crisis of war to confront the inequities of racial separation."[38] Its revisionist narrative and the marked necessity to temporarily collaborate cross-racially for the sake of triumphing over the Axis powers led to a new image of blackness in mainstream depictions without substantially challenging the status quo of segregation – it "provided a short-term compromise".[39] *The Negro Soldier* strove to defer black "demands for change", which were seen as the reason for "racial problems", while unintentionally bolstering these demands by acknowledging the capabilities of black soldiers and African Americans' significance in US history at large. Despite its re-educational potential and its inadvertent support of racial equality, the film cements segregation among its ranks (and in society at large) as it half-heartedly promises African Americans full citizenship earned through military heroism and projects racism onto the Axis powers while deflecting from the systemic anti-black racism entrenched in the social fabric of the US.

3. The US Army as "Social Relations Laboratory"?

The Army Service Forces manual entitled *Leadership and the Negro Soldier* for use in officer schools was published in 1944 and outlines the racial policies of the Army. It reveals its approach towards the "social relations laboratory"[40] that the institution inadvertently found itself to be operating in the context of World War II and its aftermaths – despite all proclamations to the contrary.[41] The manual not only suggests *The Negro Soldier* as part of its accompanying teaching material but also indicates some of the same tensions that can be observed in the film. Already its foreword states that the "Army has no authority or intention to participate in social reform as such but does view the problem [i.e. blacks and more specifically the black soldier] as a matter of efficient troop utilization." However, this also means that "[t]he fact that race prejudice does exist cannot, in the interest of efficient operation, be disregarded".[42] Throughout the manual as well as Ulysses Lee's "classic" study *The Employment of Negro Soldiers*, which appeared later as a special study in the so-called *Green Books* series, the structural racism in US society is exposed, but the Army's racism is relegated to the past or relativized as the military is posited as a "democratic" institution that after the Selective Training and Service Act was to include "[a]ll classes, all racial groups, all sections of the population of the United States and its

the Second World War, in: T. Haggith/J. Newman (eds.), Holocaust and the Moving Image: Representations in Film and Television since 1933, London 2005, pp. 116–123, at 122.

38   German, Promises of Citizenship, p. 5.

39   Ibid., p. 65.

40   Cripps and Culbert, Negro Soldier, p. 616.

41   See, e.g., U. Lee, The Employment of Negro Troops: United States Army in World War II. 1963/2001, https://history. army.mil/html/books/011/11-4/CMH_Pub_11-4-1.pdf, p. 142 (accessed 15 October 2020).

42   Leadership, p. iv.

territories".[43] As Lee points out, "[t]he Army […] insisted that its job was not to alter American social customs but to create a fighting machine with a maximum economy of time and efforts".[44] It is in this context of the management of mobilization, manpower, and combat readiness, that the manual has to be read and interpreted.

It constitutes an educational tool with restricted circulation and for very specific audiences, i.e. white officers in command of black soldiers. The (white) officers are confronted with their biases[45] and are, for example, made aware that black soldiers do not constitute a homogenous group but may share a "background" with "common problems".[46] Black soldiers and Japanese American soldiers continued to be the only groups organized in separate units in the US military at the time, which is justified in the text by pointing out that the "Army […] reflects the pattern of that larger [social] body" even though the institution itself "*does not […] endorse any theory of racial superiority or inferiority*".[47] In this sense, leaders are expected to insure that "Army *standards* of training, performance, and leadership of Negro and white troops are identical."[48] The document also harbours re-educational potential as it openly tackles racist attitudes, images, and practices with an eye to the systemic inequalities that shape US society at large. Throughout, it acknowledges the realities and detrimental effects of structural racism:

> *In civilian life every Negro, at one time or another, has either been told, or has read, or has been made to feel that he is considered inferior by the majority of white people* […] [and] *has had to face to a greater or less extent (depending upon his community of residences and his family's financial position) limited opportunities for education, employment, recreation, housing and participation in the life of his community.*[49]

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43 Ibid., p. 1. See also Lee, Employment of Negro Troops, pp. 74–77 and p. 84.

44 Lee, Employment of Negro Troops, p. 83.

45 Lee retrospectively outlines the significance of this task to revise habitualized racist practices and attitudes: "Men who in all their lives had never considered it necessary, in their relation with Negroes, to practice the ordinary courtesies in human relations which make the civilized life of complex societies tolerable to its individual members were not always able to reach suddenly the conclusion that 'these men are human' and only waiting, like other men, to be led." (ibid., p. 183).

46 Leadership, pp. 1 and 2.

47 This claim is forcefully repeated in a later chapter: "The Army accepts no theories of racial inferiority or superiority for American troops but considers that its task is to utilize its men on their individual merits in the achievement of final victory. A realistic and impartial examination of evidence on racial differences in ability supports this position" (Leadership, p. 26).

48 Ibid., p. 4.

49 Ibid., p. 12. These inequalities are fleshed out with almost every aspect covered in the manual. Regarding adjustment, for instance, the text proposes that all soldiers have to adjust to the Army and the problems of black soldiers only differ by degree. In that, however, they provide for a special challenge for the white officer to handle the more significant skepticism and "lack [of] enthusiasm for the Army venture" due to the limitation for blacks in civilian life and those situations "that inevitably will raise questions and doubts in the minds of many Negro soldiers as to the worth of the venture and the reality for them of the goal" (ibid., p. 11). The manual further points toward the inequalities in the educational system (ibid., see chap. 3), explains the higher death rates and lower life expectancy for African Americans with the "less healthful environmental conditions under which Negroes live", the lack of access to medical treatment (ibid., p. 46), and exposes the stereotypes, omissions, and misconceptions that shape media representations of African Americans in news outlets as well as popular culture (ibid., see chap. 6).

It emphasizes that there are no inherent or hereditary differences connected to race but "there are differences in custom, experience, education, and behaviour between racial groups, just as there are such differences between individuals within any group".[50] Throughout this textbook, white superiority and structural racism of US society are addressed. The US Army – in the interest of military efficiency and out of dire necessity for the manpower to continue fighting in the war[51] – has to deal with the consequences of these social realities and, according to the manual, has no place for racism among its ranks. White officers thus have to overcome "civilian beliefs and prejudices […] based on unfounded but widely accepted myths" and treat their soldiers as individuals.[52] The "good" white officer commanding black soldiers, the manual holds, does not "think that his men are inherently inferior to any other group of men", he "should make it his duty to learn the facts concerning the history of the American Negro soldier", and he is encouraged to "do [his] best to gain an understanding of their [i.e. his soldiers] points of view, of their likes and dislikes, and of their limitations and advantages. Learn about their history, their families, their ambitions and fears".[53] While the manual offers a substantial chapter on African American military history[54] and empirically refutes many stereotypical notions about African Americans, it does not offer much guidance on how the officers are supposed to reflect on and overcome their own racist socialization (inside and) outside the military. Though this is not its explicit goal, the document can easily be read as a potential re-education tool and bespeaks the necessity to address racism and discrimination especially in times of war. It clearly falls short of doing so with an eye to the institution of the military itself. The Army is depicted as offering a potential remedy for some structural injustices, prejudices, and "racism by consequence"[55] in society (e.g. through providing health care and education to all of its soldiers). Beliefs in racial superiority are assigned to the Germans and Japanese,[56] and while racism is clearly marked in mainstream media and in camp communities (again with white officers being called upon to mediate or alleviate these inequalities),[57] its existence among the troops is downplayed, if not outright ignored. The manual, for instance, emphasizes that black soldiers serve in all capacities, in all regions where US troops are deployed, and across all military

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50   Ibid., pp. 33–34.
51   See ibid., pp. 4 and 10.
52   Ibid., p. 17. The text explains, for example: "Much that has been marked off as 'Negro traits' in civilian life, such as lack of initiative, mental laziness, lack of ambition, and irresponsibility, may be traced back to the limited opportunities afforded the Negro to obtain information and to see the relevance of his job to some goal which has importance to him" (ibid., p. 21).
53   Ibid., pp. 19, 23, and 34.
54   The importance of historical knowledge is made explicit: "The longest chapter in this book is the one on 'The Negro Soldier in American History'. Its length is an indication of how important it is believed to be to all soldiers, Negro and white, that they know the record of the colored troops in every war in which the United States has fought" (p. 23).
55   T. J. Guess, The Social Construction of Whiteness: Racism by Intent, Racism by Consequence, in: Critical Sociology 32 (2006) 4, pp. 649–673, at 652.
56   See Leadership, p. 26.
57   Ibid., chaps. 6 and 7.

branches and ranks and states that among soldiers "[n]o racial differentials have been discovered in their ability to lead troops".[58] It neither discusses segregation in the Army in detail nor does it explore the fact that African American soldiers were mostly confirmed to service units.[59] One soldier, Wade McCree, for example, talks about the officer corps as a "big disappointment" because it was predominantly white and he explains that "[t]here was no competition for assignments above company grade at the command level because all one had to do was to be white. Before a Negro officer would be promoted to the same rank as a white officer, the white would be immediately upgraded."[60]

The manual further asserts that it is not the Army's responsibility to redeem, address, or change racism, anti-black discrimination, and white privilege in society:

> *In numerous instances, both in the United States and abroad, the Negro soldier has been welcomed into the community and has been invited to share in the programs and activities designed for servicemen. Too often, however, the cordiality has been disturbed by the attitude and actions of white soldiers who come from sections where there is rigid separation between the races. This seems wrong to the Negro soldier.* [...] *When this kind of difficulty arises it is the responsibility of command to remind individuals that the Army has no authority to attempt to change existing community inter-racial patterns in any direction at all because of social preference.*[61]

The ambivalent racial politics of the document are neatly captured in this passage. The manual reveals an acute awareness of racism and its consequences for African Americans specifically as well as the nation at large but fails to overcome its own "possessive investment in whiteness" as it, in fact, promotes a "form of cultural unity at no cost to whites".[62] Acknowledging and facilitating black advancement within the controlled setting of the military secures the success of American forces in World War II without requiring any reflection of white privilege. In this sense, it steers clear of potential triggers for "white fragility".[63] The normativity and hegemony of whiteness is not lastingly challenged and only suspended within the military for the sake of troop readiness and victory in war. The effects of racism are presented as a problem for *white* officers to solve without, ultimately, unsettling their authority and position of power (ensured not just through their whiteness but also their military rank). They are endowed with agency and authority to meet this "challenge" if they take the lessons of this manual to heart.

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58   Ibid., p. 9.
59   Lee, Employment of Negro Troops, p. xi.
60   Qtd. in Motley, The Invisible Soldier, p. 297.
61   Leadership, p. 59.
62   G. Lipsitz, The Possessive Investment in Whiteness: How White People Profit from Identity Politics, rev. and exp. edn, Philadelphia 2006, pp. 2 and 82.
63   "[Triggered] by discomfort and anxiety, [white fragility] is born of superiority and entitlement." The term, as defined by Robin DiAngelo, "[summarizes] the familiar patterns of white people's responses to racial discomfort" (R. DiAngelo, White Fragility: Why It's So Hard to Talk to White People about Racism, Boston 2018, p. 2).

4. Conclusion: Modelling Whiteness, Exporting Racism?

According to the manual, the adjustment of white officers to avoid explicitly racist behaviour, actions, and speech acts, is a matter of military duty and responsibility (not of moral rightness or a sense of justice) and it takes on special significance abroad:

> [T]*he American Negro soldier will be a new experience for the citizens of* [other] […] *countries, and at the beginning there will of course be no common understanding or specific customary way of regarding him. Here is a potential source of trouble which must be guarded against by the Army itself, for the citizens of a country in which our men are stationed will tend in the absence of any previous contacts with large groups of American Negroes, to follow the example of white American officers and men. If individuals wearing the uniform of the American Army abroad show disrespect for others wearing the same uniform who happen to be colored, an example will have been set which may lead to lowering of the morale of Negro troops, increased chances for open trouble with the local population, interference with military efficiency, and a nationally regrettable loss of dignity and respect for the uniform of our Army.*[64]

The manual stresses the model function of white soldiers for e.g. a (white) German population and propagates a kind of colour-blindness. The notion of soldiers who "happen to be colored", of course, denies the effects of structural racism and of white privilege and stands in stark contrast to the policies and realities in the Jim Crow Army dispatched to oversee re-education and reorientation efforts in Germany.

> *Although American-style segregation was in effect at some locations in Europe, many black soldiers experienced unfettered relationships with local people. Generally, the only time black soldiers ran into blatant discrimination was when they encountered white American soldiers.*[65]

The (unintended) re-educational potential that can be identified in US propaganda as well as internal military documents concerning race and racism was ultimately not realized and the example set for Germans to emulate was that of white superiority and racial discrimination, American style. The power of this "shared sense of whiteness" could be observed early on with regard to the treatment of German prisoners of war. A soldier, Bert B. Babero, writes in a letter to the civilian aide to the secretary of war about the lamentable conditions at Camp Barkeley (Texas):

> *It was to my amazement* […] *when I had the opportunity of visiting the German concentration camp here at Barkeley to observe a sign in the latrine, actually segregating a section of the latrine for Negro soldiers, the other being used by the German prisoners and*

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64   Leadership, p. 60.
65   Morehouse, Fighting in the Jim Crow Army, p. 200.

the white soldiers. Seeing this was honestly disheartening. It made me feel, here, the tyrant is actually placed over the liberator.[66]

As Maggi Morehouse has observed, "[b]y the end of the war, there were many chinks in the armor of the army's segregation without discrimination policy".[67] During the occupation years, however, the US military not only tried to cap and reduce the percentage of black soldiers but, in fact, "established a program of affirmative action for white men".[68] The whiteness of the US Army and, by extension, the construction of whiteness as the norm in US society were largely preserved and enforced. Even though the black GI became a powerful figure in Germany's collective memory of the post-war years, the face of re-education and democratization was predominantly white and anti-racist rhetoric mostly a matter of written declarations or public lip service which hardly translated into individual behaviour and institutional practices during the occupation years.

Combat historian Melvin Lasky discusses the issue of fraternization in Germany in the weeks and months after the end of World War II, and specifically addresses the relationships between black soldiers and white women as part of the highly sexualized landscape of war-torn Europe. His observations not only point towards a lack of racism among the German population but also reinforce stereotypical notions of black masculinity. In Frankfurt am Main, he notes on 4 December 1945 that there was a raid in the barracks of black soldiers, where "twenty-four 'white German fräuleins'" were found and that one German woman remarked when "asked if she knew that social intimacy not to mention sexual relations with Negroes was normally frowned on" that she "[doesn't] see anything wrong. They're Americans. Same as you – are they not? Your democracy says all men are the same."[69] He further jots down a "conversation piece" quoting a soldier saying "I just love that white meat I've been getting. Those fräuleins have sure been good to us. I just love that white meat and I'm gonna look for more of it when I get back to the States…"[70] Lasky's disdain for black soldiers and their relationships with white German women is obvious, and the depiction of his own numerous sexual exploits, which he details with pride and a strong sense of entitlement, further reveal the white privilege and superiority that shape his perspective. There is a double standard with regard to race and the argument

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66 Reprinted in Wynn, African American Experience, pp. 118–119.

67 Morehouse, Fighting in the Jim Crow Army, p. 208.

68 Green, Black Yanks in the Pacific, p. 17. In the immediate aftermaths of war, the percentage of African Americans among the armed forces skyrocketed due to reenlistments as well as new recruits. "The army initially responded to the challenge by organizing a committee […] under the direction of Lieutenant General Alvan C. Gillem, Jr., to evaluate the future use of black troops. […] Their report, *The Utilization of Negro Manpower in the Postwar Army*, called for increased occupational opportunities for African American servicemen, the elimination of all-black army divisions, equality in the commissioning of officers, and the assignment of black troops to communities where racial attitudes were supposedly benign (outside the American South and certain European locales, in other words). Most of their recommendations […] remained operational on paper only. On the other hand, officials enthusiastically embraced the Gillem Board's proposal to set the proportion of African American personnel in the army at one in ten, roughly equal to the percentage of African Americans in the U.S. population" (ibid., p. 16).

69 Quoted in M. J. Lasky, 'First Indorsement' Journal of a Conscript. 1945. Melvin J. Lasky Papers, Lasky Center for Transatlantic Studies, München, Box: New York 1, Folder: 1, p. 243.

70 Ibid.

put forth by the "attractive well-dressed wife of a former German Army officer" – as Lasky describes the German woman quoted above – prefigures the myth of a post-racial moment in post-war Germany.[71]

The re-education programmes that ushered in the dominant success story of Germany's democratization and its strong transatlantic alliance with the United States, have to be situated within the larger conundrum of racial politics at the time. The systemic anti-black racism in the US military as well as among the German population and its long-lasting effects have been extensively documented.[72] If the US Army unintentionally became a social relations laboratory during World War II, the experiment obviously failed as racism persisted well beyond the formal desegregation of the military through executive order 9981 issued by President Truman in 1948. Yet, at least on paper and within a clearly limited moment of wartime efforts, the fight against racism and fascism abroad brought about propaganda and military policies which de facto named and exposed racism in the US and can be understood as however reluctant, imperfect, and unrealized re-educational efforts directed towards white US-Americans. This is not to say that whiteness as an unmarked norm was debunked or lastingly destabilized in the process, but it may have been a minor and inadvertent factor in facilitating black advancement as well as triggering a pronounced effort among whites to safeguard, assert, and (re)stabilize their identity as unmarked, national norm. In this sense, the US as a model for German democracy entailed a model of whiteness and the export of democracy potentially included the export of the racializations and racism entrenched in US society and culture. How Germans appropriated the American racial regime is, of course, another question. There have, for example, also been moments of what Berndt Ostendorf has termed "subversive re-education" with regard to jazz music as part of the re-education programmes or African American culture being appropriated in post-war Germany.[73] Such instances certainly challenged these racializations and exposed the pitfalls of US democracy and the structural inequalities it entailed, but they also coded race and racism as "American" problems thus paving the way for a reconstitution of German identity along the lines of whiteness that continues to shape public discourses and lived realities today. Overall, the post-war transatlantic world saw a moment of a profound destabilization of racial regimes on both sides of the Atlantic; this moment came and went, and the opening that it presented found closure in a reaffirmation of whiteness as a source of power and privilege for both white US-American and white German national identities.

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71 Ibid.

72 It appears not only in the many oral and written testimonies by African American soldiers (see, for example, P. McGuire [ed.], Taps for a Jim Crow Army: Letters from Black Soldiers in World War II, 1983, Lexington 1993; or Morehouse, Fighting in the Jim Crow Army) but is also evinced in the criminalization of African American soldiers in the post-war years, especially with regard to the racialization of rape, or in the extensive debates about the brown babies and their "fate" in a structurally racist and predominantly white German society.

73 B. Ostendorf, Subversive Reeducation? Jazz as a Liberating Force in Germany and Europe, in: Revue française d'études américaines 5 (2001), pp. 53–71.

Locating Women's Political Engagement: Democracy in Early Cold War US and Japanese Women's Magazines, 1945–1955

Jana Aresin

ABSTRACTS

Wie wurde der demokratische Kapitalismus der USA zu einem Modell, das während des Kalten Krieges in der ganzen Welt verbreitet wurde? Welche Auswirkungen hatte dies sowohl auf die US-amerikanische Gesellschaft selbst als auch auf die Länder, die solchen ‚Demokratisierungsbestrebungen' ausgesetzt waren? Der Artikel untersucht diese Fragen in Bezug auf Demokratie und Geschlechterrollen durch eine vergleichende Analyse US-amerikanischer und japanischer Frauenzeitschriften zwischen 1945 und 1955. Die Ausweitung von Frauenrechten in Japan nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg wird oft im Kontext der Demokratisierungspolitik der US-Besatzung betrachtet. Diese Entwicklung war jedoch deutlich komplexer als eine einfache ‚Befreiung' von oben und wurde von Frauengruppen, Intellektuellen und Aktivisten verschiedenster politischer Überzeugungen beeinflusst. Gleichzeitig fanden sich auch Frauen in den USA nach dem Krieg in einer sich wandelnden Gesellschaft wieder. Der Artikel analysiert die verschiedenen Narrative über Frauen und Demokratie und ihre Zusammenhänge, zeigt Unterschiede und Parallelen zwischen den beiden Ländern auf, und untersucht einen potenziellen Transfer von Ideologien über nationale Grenzen hinweg.

How did US capitalist democracy become a model to be 'exported' around the world during the Cold War, and how did this impact US society and the countries exposed to these 'democratizing' efforts? The article approaches this question with a focus on gender and democracy by comparing texts from US and Japanese women's magazines published between 1945 and 1955. The post-war development of women's rights in Japan is often examined in the context of the US occupation's 'democratizing' policies, yet it was more complex than a 'liberation' from above and influenced by local women's groups of various political beliefs, intellectuals, and

activists. At the same time, women in the US also faced a changing society after the war. The article aims to untangle the complex set of influences and narratives informing the discourse around women and democracy, outline parallels and differences between both countries, and examine the potential transfer of ideologies and narratives across national borders.

Taking the defeat of Japan as an opportunity, we newly attempt the establishment of a democratic peaceful state, and in the important fulfilment of this duty, women, who make up more than half of the whole population, bear more than half of the responsibility.[1]

(Tanaka Kōtarō, "What is a Woman's Duty?")

1. Introduction

In January 1948, Tanaka Kōtarō, who had served as minister of education in the first cabinet of Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru after the end of World War II and was among the signatories of the post-war Japanese constitution,[2] opened an article in the popular women's magazine *Fujin Kurabu* (Women's Club) with the above statement. Such sentiments were not rare in the immediate post-war moment. After the defeat in a brutal war that had suddenly lost its mantel of legitimacy following surrender, intellectuals, politicians, and the wider population were faced with the question of how Japan's future could look like. In this moment of transition and uncertainty, various social and political norms and relations seemed to be open to challenge or negotiation, and the "woman question", particularly regarding the issues of suffrage and constitutional reform, soon occupied a prominent position.[3]

This process was deeply entwined with the presence of the US occupation forces, whose post-war strategy was not only concerned with the disarmament and demilitarization of Japan, but also with a wider project of "re-education" aimed at changing the population's beliefs, values, and behaviour to ensure the "democratization" of society following the US model and US political interests.[4] "Democracy" and "peace" were two key terms that dominated the rhetoric of the US occupation forces and soon entered public discourse in Japanese mass media as well. The Basic Initial Post Surrender Directive (JCS1380/15) to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP), approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in November 1945, listed demilitarization and "the strengthening of democratic tendencies and processes in governmental, economic, and social institutions" as the basic objectives for the occupation, to ensure that "Japan will not again become a menace to

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1   K. Tanaka, Fujin no shimei to wa, in: Fujin Kurabu, January 1948, p. 13. All translations from Japanese are my own.

2   K. M. Doak, Tanaka Kōtarō and World Law: Rethinking the Natural Law Outside the West, Cham 2019, pp. 70–71.

3   M. Koikari, Pedagogy of Democracy: Feminism and the Cold War in the U.S. Occupation of Japan, Philadelphia 2010, pp. 48–50.

4   Y. Tsuchiya, Imagined America in Occupied Japan: (Re)Educational Films Shown by the U.S. Occupation Forces to the Japanese, 1948–1952, in: The Japanese Journal of American Studies 13 (2002), pp. 193–213, at 194.

the peace and security of the world […]."[5] There has been much debate in historical research regarding this US project of "democratizing" Japan. Discussions address questions around the "success" of this project, the extent of the influence of different actors from both the US occupation forces and Japanese political elites, and what continuities and breaks can be observed between the post-war period and wartime or prewar Japan.[6] It is important to note, however, that "re-education" and "democratization" not only denote a particular set of more or less "successfully" conducted political, economic, and social reforms, but also comprise a specific discourse with both practical and ideological functions. Studying the discourse of democratization can give valuable insights into the formation of US and Japanese national identity, values, and social norms in the transitionary phase between World War II and the Cold War, and in how far ideologies and narratives were transferred between the two countries. To explore the gendered aspects of both Cold War ideology and the democratization discourse, I will analyse the representation of women's political engagement in popular magazines by outlining parallels and differences between both countries and between magazines of different formats and (political) orientation to examine the potential transfer of ideologies and narratives across national borders.

2. The Discourse of Women and Democracy in Occupied Japan and the United States

As Tanaka's quote above suggests, the discourse of democracy and peace was deeply intertwined with the question of women's rights and duties in post-war Japan. This may not appear immediately obvious when surveying the early occupation documents. The JCS 1380/15 directive, which laid out the primary goals of the occupation, did not specifically address the situation and role of women.[7] The October 1945 memorandum for the "Removal of Restrictions of Political, Civil, and Religious Liberties", that ended, among others, the Peace Preservation Law which had served as a main instrument for the restriction of civil rights in Imperial Japan, demanded the end of "discrimination on grounds of race, nationality, creed or political opinion", but made no mention of gender.[8]

Yet among the five major demands for constitutional reform that were handed to the Japanese government by Supreme Commander Douglas MacArthur in October 1945,

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5   Joint Chiefs of Staff, Basic Directive for Post-Surrender Military Government in Japan Proper, JCS 1380/15 (1945), p. 135.
6   For an overview of these debates in scholarship on the US-occupation of Japan, see J. W. Dower, Occupied Japan as History and Occupation History as Politics, in: Journal of Asian Studies 34 (1975) 2, pp. 485–504; C. Ueno, Nationalism and Gender, Melbourne 2004, pp. 6–15.
7   See Joint Chiefs of Staff, Basic Directive for Post-Surrender Military Government in Japan Proper, JCS 1380/15 (1945), pp. 134–168.
8   Office of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Removal of Restrictions on Political, Civil, and Religious Liberties, SCAPIN-93 (1945), p. 1.

legal gender equality and women's suffrage were listed in first place.[9] Although the granting of women's suffrage had already been negotiated between the Japanese government and women political organizers,[10] MacArthur's strategical move lent significant symbolical meaning and visibility to the question of women's rights, and emphasized the US' proclaimed investment in the issue. While previous studies of the occupation period have evaluated such reforms as a sign of the progressive and liberating nature of the US occupation, recent scholarship has offered a more critical assessment of the occupation's gender policies, locating them within an ideological Cold War rhetoric aimed at mobilizing women through a nominally emancipatory project that, however, was constricted by conservative norms and values. The aim behind this was the containment of more radical movements, the stabilization of a liberal democratic society, and ultimately the expansion of US power.[11] These studies situate the occupation period within a wider Cold War history and pay close attention to the ways US political interests as well as underlying ideologies and values shaped occupation policies.

The period of democratization can thus be interpreted as an early example of US Cold War politics and arguably a testing ground for Cold War information and propaganda campaigns.[12] Women took on a both practical and symbolic importance in this endeavour. Firstly, the question of women's rights soon developed into an ideological battleground in the Cold War confrontation between the US and the Soviet Union. Promoting a narrative of the US occupation forces "liberating" oppressed Japanese women from feudalistic customs gave legitimacy to the ongoing presence of the US military in East Asia and was used to ward off criticism of potential imperialistic and colonialist ambitions.[13] At the same time, the "American housewife" in particular came to represent the supposed superiority of capitalist democracy in US self-representations abroad during the Cold War.[14]

Secondly, as Elaine Tyler May has analysed in her influential study of Cold War gender relations, US foreign policy concerned with the containment of communism was reproduced within US society through a turn towards the domestic sphere as a place where "potentially dangerous social forces of the new age might be tamed".[15] This resulted in an ideology that located personal agency, success, and happiness in the home and the family,

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9   E. Takemae, The Allied Occupation of Japan, New York 2003, pp. 240–242.

10   Ibid., p. 241.

11   See Koikari, Pedagogy of Democracy, pp. 17–25; L. Yoneyama, Liberation under Siege: U.S. Military Occupation and Japanese Women's Enfranchisement, in: American Quarterly 57 (2005) 3, pp. 885–910.

12   Tsuchiya Yuka interprets re-education policies as both a continuation of OWI wartime propaganda and a precursor to the "cultural Cold War" (Y. Tsuchiya, Amerika tainichi senryōgun 'CIE eiga'. Kyōiku to puropaganda no kyōkai. Amerika taigai bunka senryaku no shite no kyōiku eiga, in: Ehime Hōgakkai Zasshi 31 [2004] 1–2, pp. 109–142). Odd Arne Westad evaluates the occupation of Japan as a model for Cold War US interventionism (O. A. Westad, The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times, Cambridge 2007, p. 24).

13   M. McAndrew, Beauty, Soft Power, and the Politics of Womanhood During the U.S. Occupation of Japan, 1945–1952, in: Journal of Women's History 26 (2014) 4, pp. 83–107, at 85.

14   J. Bardsley, Women and Democracy in Cold War Japan, London 2014, p. 10.

15   E. T. May, Homeward Bound: American Families in the Cold War Era, New York 1999, pp. xxiv–xxvi, at xxiv.

particularly for women, and favoured "private and personal solutions to social problems" over political activism.[16]

This development went hand in hand with rising interest in and growing influence of psychology as an academic discipline since World War I, and its increasing extension into general public discourse and mass media after World War II.[17] The prevalence of psychological language influenced notions of democracy and citizenship in the US and consequently shaped the way "democratization" efforts in Japan were approached. In the past, citizenship in a democratic society had been understood primarily as a set of political and economic rights and duties. Yet in the post-war moment, the relationship of the individual to the state and the national community was increasingly concerned with defining a "democratic personality" that would ensure the population's emotional and mental strength supposedly necessary for political stability.[18] These notions of democracy and citizenship were transferred to Japan via the US occupation policies that emphasized the need for educational programmes to build a "democratic spirit" under the leadership of strong political elites.[19] This turn from a focus on political rights to consensus, stability, and a preoccupation with strengthening the population against subversive ideas was closely connected to growing tensions between the US and the Soviet Union. It contributed to the eventual "reverse course" of US occupation policies in 1947 and 1948, which resulted in anti-communist purges and the suppression of the labour movement in Japan. Eventually it shifted attention from labour rights to the furthering of economic growth in collaboration with conservative elites.[20]

This development renders visible that the US project of democratization of post-war Japan was not merely an endeavour to reform political and economic structures and institutions. The interpretation of democracy as a mindset or personality trait brought into focus the democratization of the people as individuals and as a national community through 're-education'. It further imagined virtually all aspects of everyday life, from workplace cultures and family relations, to ways of dressing, speaking, or organizing a household, as relevant for democratization, American style. Subsequently this often led to the conflation of political, social, and cultural ideals and norms associated with the United States. And more often than not, women found themselves at the centre of these debates and attempts to reimagine a society among transnational and local influences, prewar continuities and radical new beginnings.

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16   Ibid., p. xxv.
17   J. Capshew, Psychologists on the March: Science, Practice, and Professional Identity in America, 1929–1969, Cambridge 1999, pp. 1–3, 242–243.
18   A. Friedman, Citizenship in Cold War America: The National Security State and the Possibilities of Dissent, Amherst 2014, pp. 17–18.
19   J. Miller, Cold War Democracy: The United States and Japan, Cambridge, MA 2019, pp. 12–13.
20   Ibid., p. 28.

3. Negotiating Women's Place in Society in Post-war Mass Media

To analyse and understand the discourse around democracy and gender relations in occupied Japan, print mass media, and in particular, women's magazines, are a rich and complex historical source to draw from. Women's magazines are a medium with relatively easy access for a large part of the population, and they target women as a distinct audience. Usually containing a combination of entertainment, educational articles, and practical advice, they claim to represent relatable or idealized depictions of women's everyday life and offer direct or implied guidance on how to appropriately "be a woman" in various social contexts.[21]

Both the United States and Japan had a significant prewar history of magazine publishing, including high-circulation commercial women's magazines. In Japan, the turn of the twentieth century saw the establishment of a growing variety of women's magazines whose circulation numbers rose massively throughout the 1920s and firmly anchored women's magazines in public consciousness.[22] Building on a long tradition of publishing and reading, rapid industrialisation and the shift from woodblock printing to moveable type at the end of the nineteenth century led to a significant expansion of the publishing sector and made books and magazines accessible to the wider population, including the working class.[23] In the United States, magazine publishing dates back to the mid-eighteenth century and soon fulfilled an important role in circulating information, creating a sense of community, and integrating and organizing social, political, and economic spheres through the process of production, distribution and consumption of magazines.[24] During World War II, the respective governments of both countries had attempted to influence and control women's (and other) magazines to varying degrees to promote loyalty to the nation and devotion to the war effort.[25] Following the end of World War II, direct government control of the media was officially banned in the US through the Smith-Mundt-Act of 1948, yet less direct forms of influence remained.[26] In occupied Japan on the other hand, wartime era laws and regulations that had enabled control of the media were abolished, yet swiftly replaced with the US occupation's own institutions for influencing and censoring media, coordinated and executed by the

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21 Barbara Sato and Sarah Frederick describe the emergence of women readers as a distinct consumer audience and the effect of this on representations of women's everyday life and shared identity in the interwar period in Japan, see B. Sato, The New Japanese Woman: Modernity, Media, and Women in Interwar Japan, Durham 2003, pp. 78–82; S. Frederick, Turning Pages: Reading and Writing Women's Magazines in Interwar Japan, Honolulu 2006, pp. 4–6.

22 Frederick, Turning Pages, pp. 6–10, at 10.

23 A. T. Kamei-Dyche, The History of Books and Print Culture in Japan: The State of the Discipline, in: Book History 14 (2011), pp. 270–304, at 276–277.

24 H. Haveman, Magazines and the Making of America: Modernization, Community, and Print Culture, 1741–1860, Princeton 2015, pp. 7–10.

25 J. Keohane, Communist Rhetoric and Feminist Voices in Cold War America, London 2018, p. 5; B. Kushner, The Thought War. Japanese Imperial Propaganda, Honolulu 2005, p. 185.

26 Keohane, Communist Rhetoric and Feminist Voices, p. 6.

Civil Information & Education Section (CI&E) and the Civil Censorship Detachment (CCD).[27]

Both in post-war Japan and the United States, women's magazines can be considered a significant media form for the discussion and transmission of ideals and norms of womanhood that were closely linked to a wider ideological discourse around the nature of democratic capitalist society. The close connection of commercial women's magazines to advertising and consumption turned them into an ideal platform for Cold War narratives highlighting the importance of family, domestic life, and the achievement of a middle-class lifestyle shaped by access to consumer goods. In Japan, the extensive publishing sector recovered faster than any other part of the economy, and many magazines continued with only short interruption into post-surrender Japan or were relaunched soon after.[28] At the same time, despite the prevalence of dominant narratives of containment in the US and the close control of publishing in Japan, some magazines retained their potential for critique and resistance, giving voice to those on the margins of society. This included parts of the working classes, ethnic and racial minorities, and political dissidents, most prominently communists and other leftists, who were disillusioned with the hegemonic discourse and policies of US capitalism. Alternative narratives appeared in smaller, sometimes independent, or non-profit magazines, and references to popular women's magazines served as starting points for a wider critique of post-war gender relations in other types of publications.[29]

Among the most popular and commercially successful women's magazines in post-war Japan were those that had been founded in the early 1920s and had survived the wartime years by adapting to patriotic language and support of the war, and those that were newly established right after surrender.[30] The former, such as *Fujin Kurabu* and *Shufu no tomo* (Housewife's Friend), resumed publication after only a short interruption at the end of the war; now, however, under strict control of the CCD.[31] The latter, for instance *Fujin Seikatsu* (Women's Life) and *Shufu to seikatsu* (Housewife and Life), were mostly founded around 1946 and 1947 and largely emulated the style and structure of the older magazines.[32] In addition, older magazines that had been banned during the war years due to their more overtly political stance or refusal to ideologically support the war were relaunched. These included intellectual middle-class magazines such as *Fujin Kōron*

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27   McAndrew, Beauty, Soft Power, and the Politics of Womanhood, p. 86; H. Miki, Senryō to josei zasshi. 1945 kara 1949 nen, in: Kindai Josei Bunkashi Kenkyūkai (ed.), Senryōka josei to zasshi, Tokyo 2010, pp. 16–60, at 18–19.

28   J. W. Dower, Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II, New York 2000, pp. 180–181.

29   C. A. Gayle, Collapsing Past into Present: The Occupation of Japan as Seen in the Journal New Women, in: C. de Matos/M. E. Caprio (eds.), Japan as the Occupier and the Occupied, Basingstoke 2015, pp. 191–205, at 192–193; Keohane, Communist Rhetoric and Feminist Voices, pp. 16–17.

30   H. Matsuda, America, Modernity, and Democratization of Everyday Life: Japanese Women's Magazines during the Occupation Period, in: Inter-Asia Cultural Studies 13 (2012) 4, pp. 518–531, at 520–521.

31   Miki, Senryō to josei zasshi, pp. 16–17.

32   Ibid., p. 28.

(Women's Review) and leftist working-class magazines such as *Hataraku Fujin* (Working Woman).[33]

In the United States, the 1940s and 50s were dominated by a number of high-circulation magazines that had been established throughout the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, such as the *Ladies' Home Journal*, *Good Housekeeping*, and *Woman's Home Companion.* These magazines fell into the category of consumer or "service" magazines heavily focused on advice, guidance, and, increasingly, advertising of consumer goods. They were primarily aimed at helping women fulfil their roles as wives and mothers whereas political topics regarding women's rights, suffrage, or abortion were less common.[34] This bulwark of conservative and consumer-oriented magazines was gradually weakened by a diversification of the market, eventually producing more specialized magazines that took into account changing lifestyles and values. However, this process remained slow throughout the 1950s and only took off on a larger scale in the 1960s.[35] Overtly leftist women's magazines comparable to those in Japan were absent from the US magazine market. Instead, women writers on the left kept to general audience leftist periodicals and newspapers such as the *Daily Worker* or *New Masses* to criticize and challenge mainstream representations of women, for example by highlighting women's role in political and social history.[36]

To summarize, both Japan and the United States were equipped with an extensive and increasingly differentiated market for the production and distribution of magazines. In the immediate post-war years, women's magazines were among the most accessible media formats, and their specific targeting of women as an audience as well as their often prescriptive or advisory tone (through advice columns, practical tips on a variety of topics, and "expert" articles, often written by psychologists) turn them into an important source for the study of changing discourses on women's roles, rights, and responsibilities in society. The close connection between print media, the economic sphere of consumer goods, and (in Japan) institutional censorship and control, further tied them to emerging Cold War ideology. A comparative approach between the US and Japan can give an insight into the extent to which US norms and ideals were transferred to Japan through occupation era media control and "re-education" attempts, and in what ways they were accepted, rejected, or transformed through processes of translation and interpretation. It can also illuminate the tensions growing in both countries between normative ideals and everyday realities, and between growing Cold War containment discourses and leftist and other women's rights movements opposing such containment. In the following analysis, I will outline a number of different narratives regarding the political role of women

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33   Ibid., pp. 17, 28.
34   K. L. Endres, Introduction, in: K. L. Endres/T. L. Lueck (eds.), Women's Periodicals in the United States: Consumer Magazines, Westport 1995, pp. xi–xvii, at xiii–xv.
35   Ibid., p. xv.
36   K. Weigand, Red Feminism: American Communism and the Making of Women's Liberation, Baltimore 2001, pp. 119–121.

in a democratic state as found in both high circulation commercial women's magazines and in smaller, more specialized publications and relate them to these questions.

4. Women and Democratic Citizenship: Competing Narratives in Post-war Women's Magazines

How was the role of women in society and, particularly, their political role in a democracy represented in the post-war moment? As discussed above, the end of World War II marked a brief moment of disruption and transition for both the United States and Japan, and this notion of change is visible in women's magazines of the time. Naturally, the necessity of social and political change was far more evident and pressing in Japan than it was in the US. After defeat in a devastating war, much of the country's cities lay in ruin, political and economic elites were disbanded or placed under foreign control, and previous social and political structures, norms, and rules were increasingly challenged or underwent more or less successful reforms, both by the occupation forces and by various local actors. This reality is reflected in countless articles in women's magazines at the time that set out to ask the questions of where Japan had "gone wrong" to end up in this situation, what needed to be done to rebuild the country, and what the place of women should be in this process. A general line of argumentation present in most of these articles is a juxtaposition of democracy and modernity with feudalism. This narrative, strongly promoted and disseminated by US occupation forces, argued that Japanese imperialism and militarism were the result of an "incomplete modernization" that had caused people to blindly follow authority. A reform of Japanese society into a peaceful nation needed to go hand in hand with a "modernization" not only of political or economic structures but of traditions, beliefs, and the social relations they produced.[37] Women took on a special position in this narrative, being portrayed as the victims of feudalistic and militaristic society in special need of "liberation", yet also as the ones most deeply mired in tradition due to their assumed confinement to the family and the private sphere.[38] As these articles attempted to offer visions of an idealized democratic future for Japan, references to tradition and modernity, and the women's role in upholding or reforming seemingly "backwards" structures became a central element.

In the United States, the nation which had emerged victorious from the war, no such loss of legitimacy and scrutiny of traditions occurred. However, the war and the post-war moment brought social and economic change to the United States as well, resulting in an often contradictory and multifaceted transition period from war to peace, as different social groups' and political actors' interests and visions for post-war society collided.[39] At the same time, the wartime disruptions and the looming threat of a conflict with the So-

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37   Miller, Cold War Democracy, pp. 32–35.
38   Koikari, Pedagogy of Democracy, pp. 94–95; Yoneyama, Liberation under Siege, p. 892.
39   L. McEnaney, Postwar: Waging Peace in Chicago, Philadelphia 2018, pp. 1–3, 10.

viet Union prompted attempts to reaffirm presumed shared values and gender norms.[40] Furthermore, US foreign policy of "democratizing" and "re-educating" Germany and Japan, an endeavour later extended to the rest of the world in the ideological Cold War, necessitated a strengthening of the country's own identity as a democratic and capitalist role model for the world.[41]

Despite the shared recognition of women's significance and responsibility to contribute and strengthen democracy, the magazines located the potential for women's political engagement in different spheres: the family, civil society, institutionalized politics, or the workplace. They further differed in the way they imagined women's political agency, ranging from "cultural influence" as educators, to voting power, the possibility of running for political office, or engaging in grassroots and labour activism. In the following, I will outline three main approaches present in articles from the late 1940s and early 1950s in both the United States and Japan, and analyse their similarities and differences. The first approach imagines women's political agency primarily in the intersection of the family and civil society. The second approach negotiates women's relation to political institutions of the state through voting, party membership, or professional political careers. The third approach conceptualizes women as potential activists in grassroots movements or labour unions.

The first approach of defining women's political role is most common in conservative and commercially successful magazines. It references early Cold War ideals of domesticity and the importance of the family, and supposes that women's political power lies not in their participation in conventional forms of political engagement, but in their role as mothers and educators. Women are portrayed as a moral authority, responsible for the reproduction and transmission of values and norms to the younger generations. In an article from the July 1945 issue of *Ladies' Home Journal,* the author claims that women play a major role in "setting the moral temper of a nation […] [as] their husbands are influenced by their moral concepts, and their children are formed by them."[42] This rhetoric references a public discourse that viewed democracy increasingly as a "mindset" defined by personal morals, rather than as a political system. Another article from the same year defines the purpose of "democratic education" as "the creation of good human beings, who are taught from earliest childhood that the perfection of *themselves* is the chief democratic task".[43] This narrative is in line with the emphasis of individualism as a key aspect of US democracy and shifted questions of democratic rights and responsibilities for women from organized politics to community and family relationships.[44]

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40   M. Nolan, Consuming America, Producing Gender, in: L. R. Moore/M. Vaudagna (eds.), The American Century in Europe, Ithaca 2018, pp. 243–261, at 252–254.

41   L. Belmonte, Selling the American Way: U.S. Propaganda and the Cold War, Philadelphia 2008, pp. 7–10.

42   B. Blackman Gould, Women and Peace, in: Ladies' Home Journal, July 1945, p. 102.

43   D. Thompson, Education for Democracy, in: Ladies' Home Journal, March 1945, p. 166.

44   J. Weiss, "Fraud of Femininity". Domesticity, Selflessness, and Individualism in Responses to Betty Friedan, in: K. G. Donohue (ed.), Liberty and Justice for All? Rethinking Politics in Cold War America, Amherst 2012, pp. 124–153, at 138–139.

In the *Fujin Kurabu* article quoted above, Tanaka argues in a similar way that "it is the housewife who judges if the child is really acting in an upright and morally correct way or not, and who has the opportunity to give proper guidance".[45] His argumentation implies that the role of women as educators is not an addition but a substitute to an active role in politics. This is justified by a "separate but equal" logic, arguing that "men generally have the characteristic of exhibiting creativity, whereas women have the special talent of interpreting and reproducing the things men have masterfully created."[46] Following this rhetoric, political agency as a process of active production and change of laws or systems is the place of men, whereas the women's role is to reproduce and transmit the norms and values of the political status quo in the domestic sphere.

Both in the US and the Japanese magazines, this narrative of women as moral authority and educators whose role is to raise "democratic" (and, by implication, anti-communist) citizens, rather than to participate in politics themselves, is frequently connected to a rhetoric of women as peacekeepers. Referring to the post-war world in 1945, a *Ladies' Home Journal* article claims that "in this broken world the instinct and experience of women is perhaps the strongest force for reconstruction of a tolerable human society."[47] A similar article states that "[w]omen can make a true contribution to preserving peace" and likens the process of peacebuilding to a healthy marriage that is "generous, tolerant and kind".[48] Tanaka's article goes as far as calling women "apostles of peace" (*heiwa no shito*) and draws a similar parallel between the creation of a "healthy" family and home to that of a peaceful world.[49] By likening international politics to family and marriage relations and portraying the household as the smallest unit of society and as the foundation of social stability, women – who are assumed the driving force in ensuring such harmonious family life – are both elevated symbolically and constrained practically.

This does not mean to say that representations of women engaged directly in the traditional sphere of party politics are completely absent, albeit they are less common. In the US, they appear most frequently in magazines aimed at working and professional women such as *Independent Woman*. Whereas mainstream commercial magazines also include articles on political topics, they rarely represent women as active participants in the political sphere. *Independent Woman,* on the contrary, frequently features women as activists, or in political offices, both in the United States and abroad. It is notable that the portrayals of these politically active women make use of various strategies to attenuate the image of influential, independent, and potentially subversive women. In a 1950 article about the US ambassador to Denmark, Eugenie Anderson, a description of her political career and achievements is followed by the assertion that "[t]hrough all Mrs. Anderson's activities runs the golden thread of a happy marriage" and that she was

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45   Tanaka, Fujin no shimei to wa, p. 14.
46   Ibid.
47   D. Thompson, A Call to American Women, in: Ladies' Home Journal, August 1945, p. 6.
48   Blackman Gould, Women and Peace, p. 99.
49   Tanaka, Fujin no shimei to wa, pp. 14–15.

"always encouraged by the interest, advice and assistance of her husband."[50] The continued attention of women to their family, despite a political career, and the importance of familial support for achieving this goal, reappears throughout many articles. Whereas the article on Anderson concludes that "the healthy, wholesome family which has made it possible for her to pursue her political interests […] give[s] hope to the women in this country who are attempting to do the several jobs as wife, mother, homemaker and citizen",[51] another story about a female politician in the Philippines featured in the same issue quotes her as saying about politics: "Only the big in heart should venture into this field. And only single women or widows should attempt it, for it calls for dedication."[52] Throughout the magazines, engaging in politics professionally is represented as something that is possible, yet difficult, for women. Rather than being a normal and common way of exercising one's democratic rights, it is portrayed as depending on exceptional circumstances such as a husband who can work from home, a supporting family, and special talent and dedication. In the absence of these conditions, it implies the need for personal sacrifices such as giving up on the idea of marriage and family.

Another way of participating in politics that demands less commitment is voting in elections. Since women in the US had already been granted suffrage 25 years prior to the end of World War II, and given that voting does not demand major changes to established lifestyles, it is not surprising that elections are a less pressing topic in most US women's magazines of the time. In Japan, on the other hand, where women's suffrage was a newly gained right, there are a number of articles dedicated to the topic, usually explaining aspects of the political system and the election or giving advice on how to vote. Frequently the format of such texts is that of a conversation or an interview, usually including a woman asking a male "'expert" questions on a political topic. A *Fujin Kurabu* article from 1952 features a woman called Shirai Chieko, who is introduced as the wife of a medical doctor, asking journalist and critic Abe Shinnosuke about the general election of October 1952, the first after the end of the occupation. The general argument underlying the conversation is that women voters have significant political power that they do not yet know how to use. Starting from the observation that women make up more than half of eligible voters, the article proclaims in a sub-headline that "the right and wrong of politics is decided through the power of women."[53] Further, Abe observes that in the last election it "became difficult for candidates to get elected if they treated women voters carelessly."[54] In the following discussion about voting behaviour, women are cast in the ambivalent role of being simultaneously more and less suitable than men for participation in a modern democracy, making use of a rhetoric of maturity and innocence. Abe states that women's presumed lack of experience in politics means that "they have not

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50   G. F. McQuatters, Representing U.S. – an American Family, in: Independent Woman, January 1950, p. 4.
51   Ibid.
52   M. L. Fisher, Portia of the Philippines, in: Independent Woman, January 1950, p. 8.
53   Watashitachi wa dare ni tōhyō sureba yoi ka, in: Fujin Kurabu, November 1952, p. 110.
54   Ibid.

lost their innocence" and "are not corrupted" as men who "do not vote decently."[55] On the other hand, he expresses his concern about women's susceptibility to bribery, and predicts that without the development of a sense of responsibility, women "will get worse than the average male voter".[56]

The importance of education and self-awareness for a functioning democracy is a common theme in both the Japanese and the US magazines, although in the latter they are less explicitly about women, but rather about the population as a whole. This double-edged argument takes on a different meaning in different contexts. Some articles are seemingly inspired by a genuine concern about the ability of individuals to make informed choices in order to protect their interests, such as an *Independent Woman* article from 1945 that defines being a citizen as "being conscious of your own community" through "building an understanding of government and how it works, as well as voting and getting others to vote".[57] Other articles conceptualize the informed democratic citizen primarily as one with the "correct" morals. In most of the articles, this argumentation is tied to an emerging anti-communist rhetoric and an emphasis on consensus and stability, as seen in a *Ladies' Home Journal* article describing "[p]ublic mores, public opinion […] [as] a powerful factor in conserving society" and a "constitutional order" supposedly necessary for guaranteeing civil liberties.[58] Another article explicitly highlights the importance of "moral education" and its primary aim "to reduce, rather than increase, tensions between economic, racial and social groups."[59]

In contrast to this passive view of democracy as consensus culture that upholds a political and economic status quo and as being enforced through appeals to morals and conformity, a number of smaller political women's magazines imagined more active and radical ways for women to make use of their political rights – in the form of grassroots and labour activism. Articles in leftist magazines such as *Hataraku Fujin*, which had been founded in 1932 by the Communist Party (JCP) affiliated Federation for Proletarian Culture in Japan (*Nihon puroretaria bunka renmei*),[60] frequently represented activism in the form of strikes, demonstrations, or petitions, not only as possible, but natural and even necessary forms of political engagement for women, often with reference to the history of labour activism in other countries. A 1948 article on the history of International Women's Day calls for Japan's working women to "not limit […] [themselves] to the powerlessness of tears and complaints" and rather "to forcefully take the first step towards creating a democratic people's government".[61] Interestingly, the historical examples of women's labour activism around the world are not only taken from Europe, Russia, and

55   Ibid., p. 111.

56   Ibid.

57   Anonymous, Citizens by choice or chance?, in: Independent Woman, June 1945, p. 157.

58   D. Thompson, To Protect Civil Liberties, in: Ladies' Home Journal, January 1948, p. 12.

59   C. Gauss, The Aims of Education, in: Ladies' Home Journal, January 1948, p. 155.

60   M. Karlsson, United Front from Below: The Proletarian Cultural Movement's Last Stand, 1931–34, in: The Journal of Japanese Studies 37 (2011) 1, pp. 29–59, at 46–47.

61   T. Matsuda, Kokusai fujin dē wo mukaete, in: Hataraku Fujin, March 1949, p. 17.

China, but also reference "American working women" who "combined their demands as workers and their objective to obtain suffrage" in the early twentieth century.[62] This mention of the US as a favourable example for labour activism is remarkable, as it was apparently included despite, or maybe because, of the US occupation's political turn against Japanese labour unions from 1948 onwards.[63]

Despite these idealistic calls for action, most articles recognize a lack of knowledge and participation of women in political activism and even the simple act of voting, yet they identify different causes of and solutions to this problem. Some articles, usually written by men, place the responsibility on women themselves to "make [their] own political efforts" rather than receiving "special treatment".[64] Women writers, on the other hand, seemed to be more understanding of the difficulties faced by women due to their double role as workers and homemakers as well as social norms and rules limiting their political agency. A 1947 article blames "the customs of the family" and "the principles of the father" as aspects limiting women in society, and demands simple steps to make labour activism more accessible to women in the face of these social norms, for example through holding and finishing labour meetings earlier.[65] Another article notes that women rarely connect their personal everyday struggles to a larger political picture and calls for a change of mindset and self-awareness reminiscent of the psychological views on democratic citizenship common in the US at the time. However, in contrast to many of the US magazines, the importance of a democratic mindset does not lie in stability and consensus, and the role of women is not the reproduction of this mindset in the family as educators. In the aforementioned and many other articles in *Hataraku Fujin,* the change of mind is presented as necessary for women to step out of the home and engage in community and labour activism. The article laments that "ordinary women only use their sense to protect that small place called their home" and that "they are indifferent to anything outside of it".[66] It concludes that "as we are now trying to rebuild Japan as a democratic Japan […] we should all join hands and turn towards big aims that surpass individual feelings."[67] This adoption and reinterpretation of a "democratic mindset" is also identified by Miller in what she refers to as a moment of "vibrant public advocacy" in post-war Japan that imagined a "democratic spirit" not as a set of morals defined by elites, but as the "authentic […] interests of the people" represented by a critical civil society holding the state accountable.[68]

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62   Ibid., p. 16.
63   J. W. Dower/T. Hirata, Japan's Red Purge: Lessons from a Saga of Suppression of Free Speech and Thought, in: The Asia Pacific Journal. Japan Focus 5 (2007) 7, pp. 1–7, at 6.
64   T. Kamiyama, Senkyo ni onna no chikara wo shimese, in: Hataraku Fujin, July 1947, p. 16.
65   S. Hani, Dokuritsu, jiyū, kōfuku, in: Hataraku Fujin, October 1947, p. 51.
66   T. Okakura, 'Onna Daigaku' wo suteru, in: Hataraku Fujin, August 1947, p. 37.
67   Ibid., p. 38.
68   Miller, Cold War Democracy, p. 17.

5. Conclusion

Despite the diversity of narratives regarding women and democracy, most of post-war women's magazines in the United States and Japan share one characteristic: the recognition of a need to discuss and redefine the role of women in a democratic society. Informed by an underlying notion of social change and a global order in transition, many articles seem to be driven by the need to describe anew the place of women, or at least to reaffirm previous "common-sense" notions perceived as in danger of being challenged or eroded.

However, the answers that they offer for this question differ. Regarding political participation, most mainstream magazines in the US were dominated by an ideology of domesticity and "separate spheres" that imagined women's political engagement and their rights and duties as citizens as mediated through their position in the home and family, rather than advocating direct participation in the political sphere. Japanese mainstream magazines show similar narratives and lines of argumentation, yet it is noticeable that the clear separation of the private sphere of the home for women, and the public sphere of politics for men is less fixed. This tendency seems to be related to the greater disruption of social, political, and economic life in Japan that arguably made the separation of the home and "the public" impossible, particularly in the face of food and housing shortages as well as a political system still in the process of regaining its legitimacy. In the US, the idealized vision of a middle-class family with a fulltime housewife and a working husband remained unobtainable for a significant part of the population as well. Yet in comparison to Japan, an economically comfortable white middle-class that had already achieved or was close to achieving this ideal in the near future had developed enough as to render these representations of family life plausible and discursively sustainable.[69]

More progressive magazines in both countries questioned this ideology and offered alternative stories of women taking on political offices, casting their vote in elections, and participating in various forms of activism, from community organizing to more radical forms of labour activism. However, whereas in the US even more progressive magazines clearly distanced themselves from "feminists" and leftist women, often by emphasizing that political engagement would not threaten women's role as mothers and homemakers, in Japan, leftist and working-class women's magazines openly discussed how women could achieve independence and leave the narrow confinement of the home and family. In the US, leftist ideas were largely absent from women's magazines due to a more severe anti-communist climate, whereas leftist periodicals and newspapers were resistant to discussing gender and the special situation of women in addition to class. Political and ideological camps appear already more fixed and oppositional in comparison to Japan, where the establishment of new political groups and the re-emergence of those

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69   May argues that increasing wages and the rapid expansion of suburbs after World War II created cautious but optimistic attitudes among the middle and upper working classes. Investing into one's home in particular was considered a safe and rational way of spending money, see May, Homeward Bound, pp. 147–148.

banned and persecuted during the war seemingly left more opportunities for cooperation and a more far-reaching embrace of leftist ideas.[70] Despite the speed with which Cold War polarization was transferred to Japan alongside US democratization policies, public discourse initially allowed more space for discussions of democracy outside the communist-capitalist binary as people "fought to negotiate a third way" outside of "Western- or Eastern-bloc values, politics, and aesthetics".[71] Nevertheless, the "normalization" of social and economic relations in Japan, following economic recovery in the wake of the Korean War and the return to a conservative government and persisting prewar bureaucratic structures as a result of the US occupation's reverse course and clampdown against labour unions and leftists, weakened this tendency and resulted in an embrace of a more conservative consumerist lifestyle in mass media similar to that of Cold War US society. As democracy and politics were increasingly conflated with economic advancement, consumer goods, and US popular culture and lifestyle, similar ideals of the nuclear middle-class family and domesticity began to dominate mass media[72] and pushed more progressive discussions of gender roles, women's rights, and political engagement to the margins of public discourse.

70   H. Masuda, Cold War Crucible: The Korean Conflict and the Postwar World, Cambridge, MA 2015, pp. 26–28.
71   A. Sherif, Japan's Cold War: Media, Literature, and the Law, New York 2009, p. 7.
72   M. D. Smith, Mass Media, Consumerism and National Identity in Postwar Japan, London 2018, pp. 17–20.

Occupied Imperial Women: Japanese Feminists Making the US "Liberation of Japanese Women" Their Own Cold War Propaganda

Michiko Takeuchi

ABSTRACTS

Am 25. August 1945, zehn Tage nach Kriegsende, rief Ichikawa Fusae (1893–1981) Feministinnen zusammen, um das Frauenwahlrecht und die amerikanische Besatzung Japans (1945–1952) zu diskutieren. Sie arbeiteten mit amerikanischen Frauen zusammen, was zu drastischen Gesetzesänderungen für Frauen in Japan führte. Die bisherige Forschung mit einem Fokus auf Besatzer und Besetzte hat den Eindruck erweckt, dass diese japanischen Frauen nur sekundäre Akteure in der Politikgestaltung waren. Durch die Analyse vernachlässigter Aspekte des umfangreichen aktivistischen Hintergrunds japanischer Feministinnen, ihrer überlegenen Haltung gegenüber den amerikanischen Besatzern und ihrer Anti-Prostitutions-Bemühungen argumentiert dieser Artikel nicht nur, dass die Nachkriegspolitik in Bezug auf japanische Frauen die kolonialen Vorstellungen japanischer Feministinnen aus der Vorkriegszeit repräsentierte, sondern auch, dass diese Feministinnen die "demokratische" amerikanische Vorherrschaft nutzten, um eine Politik umzusetzen, die ihre Wurzeln in den japanischen Frauenbewegungen seit den 1870er Jahren hatte. Indem sie die proklamierte "Befreiung der japanischen Frauen" seitens der US-Besatzer zu ihrer eigenen Propaganda machten, führten japanische Feministinnen die Schaffung einer bilateralen US-amerikanisch-japanischen Vorherrschaft im transpazifischen Kalten Krieg an.

On 25 August 1945, ten days after the defeat, Japanese feminists gathered to discuss suffrage and the US occupation of Japan (1945–1952). They worked with American women that resulted in drastic legal changes for Japanese women. Previous scholarship with an approach of occupier and occupied based on race has given the impression that these Japanese women were secondary actors in the policymaking. By analyzing overshadowed aspects of Japanese feminists' extensive activist backgrounds, their superior attitude towards the American occupi-

ers, and their anti-prostitution efforts, this article not only argues that post-war policies relating to Japanese women represented Japanese feminists' prewar colonial notions but that these feminists took advantage of "democratic" American domination to implement policies rooted in Japanese feminist movements from the 1870s forward. Turning the US occupation's "liberation of Japanese women" into their own propaganda, Japanese feminists led the creation of bilateral US-Japan domination in the Cold War Pacific.

1. Introduction

"[S]how that Uncle Sugar's (combination of Uncle Sam and Sugar Daddy) boys and girls over here [in Japan] are really helping to educate Japanese women", wrote Marion P. Echols, head of the Public Relations Office of the US Army Forces, Pacific, in December 1946. Calling it "an excellent opportunity to 'sell' the occupation", Echols instructed Lt. Ethel Weed (1906–1975), women's information officer for Civil Information and Education (CIE), Supreme Commander of Allied Powers (SCAP), to add more paragraphs to an article she was drafting about Japanese women's progress after the granting of suffrage under the US occupation (1945–1952).[1] The topic of the raised status for Japanese women through the US occupation was a heavily publicized event labelled the "liberation of Japanese women", which became central to the US claim of a "workshop of democracy" in Japan. However, by August 1946, Cdr. Alfred R. Hussey Jr., special assistant to the chief of the Government Section of SCAP, had ordered that "[t]he formation of a women's block [*sic*] or the encouragement of a feminist movement in Japan must be avoided".[2] Scholars have criticized the false notion of the "liberation of Japanese women", which was actually used to paint the United States as "Uncle Sugar" – the benevolent, civilizing leader of the world – to sell American capitalism in competition with Soviet communism. Scholars further criticize Japanese feminists' supporting role in this imperialist propaganda effort, arguing that they assisted Americans in formulating policies for Japanese women based on Cold War middle-class American values. However, as this article shows, privileged Japanese feminists were capable of formulating their own "liberation" policies and even exploiting US propaganda for their own political agenda. Japanese feminists initiated their post-war women's movement on 25 August 1945, only 10 days after Japan's surrender. Gathered in bombed-out Tokyo by the summons of suffragist leader Ichikawa Fusae (1893–1981), 72 feminists had successfully lobbied for women's suffrage to be part of post-war law by 11 October.[3] However, a day later, the press in Japan and abroad, ignoring the feminists' achievement, sensationally reported

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1   M. P. Echols, 19 December 1946, Box 5247, Record Group 331, National Archives at College Park, MD.
2   A. Hussey, Memo Re the Emancipation of Women, 17 August 1946, 61-B-2-2, Reel 7, Alfred R. Hussey Papers, Microfilm, University of Michigan Asia Library, Ann Arbor, MI.
3   Ichikawa Fusae Kinenkai, Ichikawa Fusae to Fujin Sanseiken Undō: Ichikawa Fusae Seitan 100-nen Kinen [Ichikawa Fusae and the Women's Suffrage Movement: Ichikawa Fusae's 100th Anniversary of Birth], Tokyo 1992, pp. 49–50.

Gen. Douglas MacArthur's announcement claiming to liberate Japanese women by granting them suffrage – a gift crafted in an American workshop of democracy. Nonetheless, those 72 feminists became the nucleus of a de facto post-war women's policy alliance working with American women occupation members. This alliance, including Weed, brought about drastic legal changes, with new laws guaranteeing equality between Japanese women and men in marriage, education, and labour – rights even surpassing those of women in the United States.[4] Although the Japanese feminists were called "Weed's Girls", a closer examination of their backgrounds and their attitude towards the white American occupiers indicates that these Japanese feminists were more than nameless assistants of the American women.

First, my research on Japanese feminists' writings has revealed that Japanese feminists were the ones who formulated post-war policies related to Japanese women. The historiography of modern Japanese feminism confirms that most, if not all, post-war legal changes for Japanese women had been advocated by the same Japanese feminists since the 1910s.[5] Second, those writings show that Japanese feminists were much more educated and experienced activists than the majority of American occupiers, including those in the women's alliance. The Japanese feminists were upper-class and elite, even according to US standards of the 1940s, as many of them had been educated at prestigious American and British universities. Japanese feminists were also more experienced in the national and international women's movements than were the Americans in the women's alliance. They had had connections with prominent American feminists, including Jane Addams (1860–1935), Carrie Chapman Catt (1859–1947), and Alice Paul (1885–1977), since the 1920s. Third, the writings of these privileged feminists reveal that some believed that the occupiers – inexperienced and of lower socio-economic class – were unqualified to draft new laws and they were consequently rather condescending towards them. Some scholarship has suggested that these US-liberated Japanese feminists were "poster girls" for capitalist democracy in the US cultural battle against Soviet communism.[6] However, the history of modern Japanese feminism and the findings presented here indicate that, in a partial reversal of historical thinking, the US propaganda – and its motto of the "liberation of Japanese women" – actually served the Japanese feminists and their decades-long agendas.

Previous scholarship has criticized the US occupation politics of women's liberation and the legislation drafted by the women's alliance as constituting an imperialist, middle-class feminist project of American Cold War expansionism.[7] However, that argument relies heavily on US military records and adopts a postcolonial view of occupier and occupied based on race and empire. As such, it has featured Japanese women as "guided" seconda-

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4   B. N. Ramusack/S. Sievers, Women in Asia: Restoring Women to History, Bloomington 1999, p. 225.

5   See, e.g., V. Mackie, Feminism in Japan, Cambridge 2003.

6   M. Koikari, Pedagogy of Democracy: Feminism and the Cold War in the U.S. Occupation of Japan, Philadelphia 2008, p. 51.

7   For example, see Koikari, Pedagogy of Democracy; L. Yoneyama, Cold War Ruins: Transpacific Critique of American Justice and Japanese War Crimes, Durham 2016, pp. 81–110.

ry actors in the policy-making efforts and less imperialistic than the American women in the context of American expansionism. While sharing the critique of empire yet somewhat in contrast to previous scholarship, this article focuses on overshadowed Japanese women's own imperial subjectivity and their aggressive colonial past (and present).

Indeed, Japanese feminists' presumed secondary role in the liberation efforts was emphasized in previous scholarship. Pioneering scholar Susan Pharr states, "Cooperation with the American women in SCAP gave Japanese women a chance, for the first time in Japanese history, to have meaningful access to the policy making process."[8] Historian Sarah Kovner has claimed that "the American-written Japanese constitution granted women new freedoms" and "even as the Allied Occupation made some [Japanese] women victims [of sexual exploitation], it gave other, newly enfranchised women the tools to fight back."[9] In observing Japanese feminists' collective protest, sociologist Mire Koikari writes, "Empowered under the guidance of the CI&E, Japanese middle-class women fiercely protested the indiscriminate round-up [of Japanese women for the US military's venereal disease (VD) control]."[10] With the use of passive voice, these statements powerfully shape historical perceptions that Japanese women were merely supplemental actors in the US occupation.

This article offers a new and somewhat different interpretation of Japanese women during the US occupation and its central propaganda of the "liberation of Japanese women" by embedding the Japanese feminists' occupation-period gender politics in the modern Japanese feminist movement and its intricate relationship with Japanese imperialism. This approach suggests that it was the Japanese feminists, with their decades of activism, who most likely guided inexperienced middle-class Americans in formulating policies related to Japanese women. By formulating what were deemed progressive laws and in doing so behind the scenes, Japanese feminists granted Americans the opportunity to "save face" as the world's best civilizing force. Japanese feminists, by contesting prostitution between GIs and Japanese women and indiscriminate VD round-ups, claimed their own moral superiority – essential in establishing the division between superior and inferior in the occupied space – over the American occupiers.[11] These new perspectives could suggest that Japanese women were the primary, not the secondary, imperial agents of Cold War expansionism.

Rather than framing Japanese women's imperial subjectivity through a postcolonial approach – essentially a Eurocentric interpretation of colonialism – this article builds upon

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8   S. Pharr, Bureaucratic Politics and Social Reform: The Women's Minors' Bureau in Occupied Japan, in: T. W. Burkman (ed.), The Occupation of Japan: Education and Social Reform; The Proceedings of a Symposium, the MacArthur Memorial, Old Dominion University, [and] the MacArthur Memorial Foundation, 16–18 October 1980, Norfolk 1982, pp. 401–423, at 418.

9   S. Kovner, Occupying Power: Sex Workers and Servicemen in Postwar Japan, Stanford 2012, pp. 99 and 16, respectively.

10   Koikari, Pedagogy of Democracy, p. 162.

11   For a study of morality in occupied space, see A. Stoler, Carnal Knowledge and Imperial Power: Gender, Race, and Morality in Colonial Asia, in: M. di Leonardo (ed.), Gender at the Crossroads of Knowledge: Feminist Anthropology in the Postmodern Era, Berkeley 1991, pp. 51–101, at 85.

fundamental debates on Japanese women's imperialism by the leading Anpo (anti–Security Treaty movement of the late 1950s to the 1970s) generation feminists: poet Kōra Rumiko (b. 1932), historian Kanō Mikiyo (1940–2019), and journalist/activist Matsui Yayori (1934–2002). These feminists were keenly aware of Japan's unusual imperial status as Japan was subjected to unequal treaties with Euro-American powers while engaging in imperialism of its own by colonizing other Asian countries beginning in the late nineteenth century. They were critical of continuing Japanese neo-colonialism in the Cold War through the unequal US-Japan Security Treaty of 1951 (renewed in 1960 and 1970), which codified Japan's aid to US military aggressions in the Pacific, exemplified in the Korean and Vietnam Wars. Anpo feminists' criticism of Japan's role in those wars and subsequent economic boosts elucidate how the US occupation did not disrupt Japanese imperialism; rather, it enabled Japan to maintain imperial power in Asia.

The Anpo feminists were also well aware of Japanese women's unusual imperialist status and criticized how the "liberation of Japanese women" was realized at the expense of lower-class women and former colonial subjects. Kōra pointed out that post-war women's movements segregated lower-class women, farmers, outcasts, and *zainichi* (non-Japanese residents in Japan), which reflected how Japan's post-war economic recovery – stimulated by the Korean and Vietnam Wars – progressed at the expense of former Japanese colonies.[12] Similarly, Kanō noted that "the defeat was the turning point of Japanese women's changing perception towards the United States [for the better], but it did not change perceptions towards Koreans and Chinese [former colonial subjects as lesser]".[13] In observing other Asian women sex workers in contemporary Japan, Matsui questioned, "What price do other Asian women pay for the prosperity and daily comfort of so many Japanese women? How do we as Japanese women stand in relation to the thousands of Filipino hostesses working in Japanese bars [and GI bars]?"[14] By pointing out the inequality between "liberated" Japanese women and Asian women from former Japanese colonies, Anpo feminists demonstrate that Japanese women's imperialism has been unchanged since the 1890s. In light of such continuity, Japanese feminists were neo-colonial women who were "liberated" at the expense of lower-class women and former colonial subjects. This article, in contrast to postcolonial interpretations that foreground the victim status of occupied Japanese women, further demonstrates that privileged Japanese feminists held imperialistic attitudes about their middle- to lower-class white American occupiers. By analysing Japanese feminists' backgrounds, their attitude towards the American occupiers, and their anti-prostitution efforts, this article not only argues that post-war policies relating to Japanese women represented Japanese feminists' colonial notions of gender, race, class, and sexuality but that these feminists took advantage of "democratic" American domination to implement policies rooted in Japanese feminist movements from the 1870s forward. To some extent, Japanese women were (and still are) imperial women be-

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12   R. Kōra, Takamura Itsue to Beauvoir [Takamura Itsue and Beauvoir], Tokyo 1976, pp. 281–283.
13   M. Kanō, Sengo-shi to Gender [Post-war History and Gender], Tokyo 2005, p. 52.
14   Y. Matsui, interview by S. Buckley in: Id., Broken Silence: Voices of Japanese Feminism, Berkeley 1997, p. 136.

cause they turned the "liberation of Japanese women" into their own propaganda project in promoting Japan's re-emergence to neo-colonial power. In doing so, they led the creation of bilateral US-Japan domination in the Cold War Pacific at the expense of lower-class women and former Japanese colonial subjects, as well as their American occupiers.

2. Japanese Feminists' Backgrounds

In 1985, a journalist, Nishi Kiyoko (1907–1995), referred to Japanese feminists in the post-war women's alliance as "Weed's Brain", meaning Japanese feminists had actually formulated the women's liberation policies.[15] In an interview, Nishi asked Katō Shizue (1897–2001), a socialist and leading alliance member, how much influence Weed and other American women had in formulating the policies. Katō answered by using the metaphor of a tree, saying that while Weed took the final decisions (roots), Japanese women formulated the policies (branches and leaves).[16] In an absence of Japanese women's reports in SCAP records, Katō's post-occupation statement is a significant historical challenge to the prevailing view that Japanese feminists were merely assistants in policy-making. In fact, since the 1870s Japanese feminists had advocated for the same types of reforms that would become the hallmarks of occupation reform policies.[17] The key Japanese alliance members had been leaders of women's movements since the 1910s and active participants in the interwar international women's movements. By the 1930s, though antagonism existed among the future alliance members, the basic idea of women's liberation – suffrage, anti-prostitution laws, and labour protection – had been collaboratively set forth. This section investigates the leading Japanese post-war alliance members' pre-war backgrounds, which further support Katō's claim that Japanese feminists, not Americans, led the creation of the post-war liberation policies.

Despite being impoverished by the war, most Japanese feminists in the women's alliance were privileged, well educated, and well-travelled. Katō Shizue was from a wealthy family and graduated from Joshi Gakushūin, established as an aristocrat girls' school. Between 1919 and 1920, she lived in New York and studied at the Ballard School of the Young Women's Christian Association (YWCA).[18] Ichikawa had earned teaching credentials and lived in the United States between 1921 and 1924. In New York, she studied at the American Socialist Party's Rand School of Social Science and took University of Columbia extension courses.[19] Fujita Taki (1898–1993), a Tsuda College professor who reformed women's higher education, was from an elite family and had lived in imperial territories in Okinawa and Port Arthur, where she became fluent in Chinese. After gra-

15   K. Nishi, Senryōka no Nihon Fujin Seisaku: Sono Rekishi to Shōgen [Japanese Women's Policies under the Occupation: The History and Testimonies], Tokyo 1985, p. 206.
16   S. Katō, interview by Nishi, ibid., 65–66.
17   Mackie, Feminism in Modern Japan, pp. 15–119.
18   S. Katō, Aru Josei Seijika no Hansei [A Female Politician's Half a Lifetime], Tokyo 1997, pp. 23, 45.
19   F. Ichikawa, Ichikawa Fusae Jiden: Senzen-hen [Autobiography of Ichikawa Fusae: Pre-war], Tokyo 1974, p. 115.

duating from Tsuda College, Fujita lived in the United States between 1920 and 1925, earning another bachelor's degree at Bryn Mawr, and again in 1935/36 for graduate study at Smith College.[20] Many members of YWCA of Japan – future women's alliance members – had studied abroad, among them Hoshino Ai (1884–1972) at Bryn Mawr and Columbia Teachers College, and Katō Taka (1887–1979), who had studied at the University of California, Berkeley, and the London School of Economics and later worked for the SCAP women's section in Niigata.[21] While the US occupation promoted an image of helpless Japanese women needing American guidance, the "Weed's Girls" were comprised of elites whose education exceeded that of the majority of their American occupiers.

In addition, the Japanese feminists were experienced activists. In 1911, Gauntlett Tsuneko (1873–1953) and Kubushiro Ochimi (1882–1972) of the Japan Women's Christian Temperance Union (JWCTU) started an anti-prostitution movement.[22] In 1916, feminists, including a socialist, Yamakawa Kikue (1890–1980), began fiercely debating motherhood protections, and Yamakawa published "Women's Special Demands" (1925), which formed the basis of the post-war package of legislation for women.[23] Ichikawa briefly worked for Japan's largest union, Yūaikai, in 1919, forming a lasting bond with labour activists such as Akamatsu Tsuneko (1897–1965), who worked on women's labour issues during the occupation.[24] Ichikawa had joined the suffrage movement in 1919 and eventually led the Women's Suffrage League of Japan (JWSL), working closely with Gauntlett, Kubushiro, and Katō Shizue. Katō Shizue herself instigated the birth control movement by establishing the Birth Control Institute, along with Yamakawa, in 1922.[25] Thus, feminists had been working towards their idea of liberation for decades.

Japanese feminists were also active in international women's movements. In Geneva in 1920, Gauntlett participated in the Eighth International Women's Suffrage Alliance (IWSA); in London in 1928, Kubushiro helped JWSL join IWSA.[26] In Vienna in 1923, Katō Taka gave an eloquent speech calling for protective legislation for women workers at the Third International Congress of Working Women.[27] In Honolulu starting in 1928, Ichikawa, Fujita, Gauntlett, and Katō Taka participated in the Pan-Pacific

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20   S. Hastings, Women's Education and the World: Fujita Taki (1898–1993), in: Asia Bunka Kenkyū [Cultural Studies] 39 (2013), pp. 49–64, at pp. 50–53.

21   Notes on Hoshino Ai and Katō Taka, YWCA of Japan Records, Tokyo.

22   Y. Yanagizono, Sengo Kaikakuki ni okeru "Junketsu" no Seiritu: Nihon Kirisutokyō Fujin Kyōfūkai Kikanshi "Fujin Shinpō" wo Chūshin ni [The Establishment of *Junketsu* During Post-war Reforms: Centering on JWCTU Newsletters, "New Reports on Women"], https://www.hues.kyushu-u.ac.jp/education/student/pdf/2013/2HE12043P.pdf (accessed 10 October 2020).

23   B. Molony, Equality versus Difference: The Japanese Debates over "Motherhood Protection", 1915–1950, in: J. Hunter (ed.), Japanese Women Working, London 1993, pp. 122–148; M. Takeuchi, At the Crossroads of Equality versus Protection: American Occupationnaire Women and Socialist Feminism in US Occupied Japan, 1945–1952, in: Frontiers 38 (2017) 2, pp. 114–147, at 135.

24   Ichikawa, Jiden, p. 45.

25   S. Katō, Ai wa Jidai o Koete [A Love Transgresses Time], Tokyo 1988, p. 79.

26   M. Sato, Ganretto Tsuneko to Josei Sanseiken Undō [Gauntlett Tsuneko and Women's Suffrage Movement], in: Reitaku Daigaku Kiyō [Reitaku University Bulletin] (2002) 103, pp. 11–18, at 14; Ichikawa, Jiden, p. 162.

27   T. Katō, Working Women in Japan: Address to the International Congress of Working Women (1924), quoted in:

Women's Conference; Jane Addams initially presided, and Gauntlett did so between 1934 and 1937.[28] In Düsseldorf in 1936, Fujita was a discussant at the International Study Conference for Workers Among Boys and Girls in Secondary Schools.[29] Amid growing international activism, by 1928 Ichikawa and Gauntlett, along with YWCA of Japan, had established the Geneva-based Joint Standing Committee of Women's International Organizations to communicate with women's organizations abroad.[30] The feminists also served in international organizations. In 1924, Katō Taka became director of the women's division of the International Labour Organization's (ILO) Japan branch. Among those working there under Katō were Ichikawa, Kubushiro, and Tanino Sesu (b. 1903), a state factory inspector who drafted post-war protective labour legislation for women.[31] In 1937, Katō Taka became the first Asian to serve as secretary of World YWCA in Geneva.[32] Despite the dominant perception that Japanese women's feminism was simply following Western feminism, Japanese feminists had travelled during the interwar years to correct at least some of those Orientalist notions.[33] Furthermore, Japanese feminists' anti-Western colonialism and anti-racist views had inspired anti-colonial movements in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, even though such attitudes contradicted their colonizer status with regard to other Asians.[34] Defying the US-created post-war image of submissive Japanese women, these international ties with women of various imperial powers signalled Japanese feminists' imperial status.

Through their international activism, Japanese feminists built strong ties with prominent American women activists and leftists in opposition to the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) on the grounds that the ERA would nullify protective legislation for women workers. That amendment, which called for absolute equality between women and men in the United States, had been proposed by Alice Paul (1885–1997) and the National Women's Party in 1923.[35] Since 1922, Katō Shizue had had a close relationship with the historian Mary Beard (1876–1958), a founding member of the Women's Trade Union League (WTUL) and a vocal opponent of ERA.[36] In 1924, Beard introduced Katō Shi-

M. Moynagh with N. Forestell (eds.), Documenting First Wave Feminisms: Vol. 1, Transnational Collaborations and Crosscurrents, Toronto 2012, pp. 344–347.

28   R. Yasutake, The Rise of Women's Internationalism in the Countries of the Asia-Pacific Region during the Interwar Years, from a Japanese Perspective, in: Women's History Review 20 (2011) 4, pp. 521–532, at 527.

29   Dassel Conference, June 1936, Box WEC07.01 1927–1937 Youth Conferences, World YWCA Archives, Geneva.

30   Ichikawa, Jiden, p. 912.

31   Ibid., p. 131.

32   R. Woodsmall to T. Katō, 20 January 1937, Box World's YWCA01.08 1936–1937 Staff, World YWCA Archives; Nihon YWCA 100-nenshi: Nenpyō [Japan YWCA 100-Year History: Timetables] 1905–2005, p. 94.

33   S. Katō interview in Nishi, Senryōka no Nihon, p. 57.

34   R. Yasutake, The First Wave of International Women's Movements from a Japanese Perspective: Western Outreach and Japanese Women Activists During the Interwar Years, in: Women's Studies International Forum 32 (2009) 1, pp. 13–20, at 13.

35   M. Takeuchi, At the Crossroads, pp. 124–129.

36   Ibid. See also C. Uemura, Meari Bīado to Joseishi: Nihon Josei no Majikara o Hakkutu shita Beirekishika [Mary Beard and Women's History: An American Historian Who Excavated Japanese Women's True Power], Tokyo 2019, pp. 132–160.

zue to Carrie Chapman Catt of League of Women Voters, another leading anti-ERA.[37] In New York at YWCA Leadership Training between 1913 and 1915, Katō Taka, along with WTUL instructors, met her mentor, Mary Dingman (1875–1961), soon to be industrial secretary of World YWCA, who oversaw issues of women workers and became an international anti-ERA figure. Dingman worked with the ILO women's section in Geneva, while Katō Taka headed the ILO Japan women's section.[38] Another YWCA Leadership Training alum, Kawai Michi (1877–1953), along with various labour activists, assisted Jane Addams – an anti-ERA advocate – touring Japan in 1923.[39] Between 1921 and 1922, Ichikawa frequently visited Chicago's Hull House and WTUL – both central to Addams's activism – and forged friendships there.[40] Although Ichikawa developed a close relationship with Alice Paul, she did not support the ERA, so Paul contacted Ichikawa's friend, Fujita Taki, and in Geneva in 1936, Paul sought her support of the ERA. Fujita, however, had already allied with her anti-ERA American hosts there, Dingman and Ruth Woodsmall (1883–1963), secretary of World YWCA, who later became chief of the Women's Affairs Section of the Allied High Commission for Occupied Germany.[41] These ties further indicate that by the time Americans were trumpeting their "liberation of Japanese women", Japanese feminists were well aware of American women's struggles to attain gender equality, as well as of American class and race issues. They knew that the US government's idea of liberation was limited.

When these Japanese feminists joined the post-war women's alliance, they were seasoned activists. Some of them even had led the state mobilization of women for the war by cooperating with the Imperial government, because they saw doing so as an opportunity to prove women's ability and potentially secure a path to women's suffrage.[42] The leading American alliance members, though mostly of more humble backgrounds than their Japanese associates, nevertheless had impressive pre-war careers. Weed graduated from Western Reserve University and had been a publicist for the Women's City Club in Cleveland. Dr. Lulu Holmes, who worked on women's education reform, earned a PhD from Columbia Teachers College and was a dean of women at Washington State College. Capt. Eileen Donovan (1915–1996) of CIE, who assisted Holmes, had a master's degree from Boston Teachers College and was a former history teacher.[43] However, these

37 H. Hopper, A New Woman of Japan: A Political Biography of Kato Shidzue, Boulder 1996, p. 34.

38 Nihon YWCA 100-nenshi, p. 42. Documentations of Dingman at ILO Archives indicate her significant role in women's labour activism. See, for example, File World YWCA Dingman 1921 (D600/400), ILO Archives, Geneva.

39 M. Kawai et al., Jien Adamusu o Shinobi Heiwa o Kataru no Kai [A Meeting to Recollect Jane Addams and Talk about Peace], in: Fusen 6 (1932) 1, pp. 16–28, at 17.

40 Ichikawa, Jiden, pp. 106–110.

41 T. Fujita, Junēbu no Arisu Pōru: Nikki yori [Alice Paul in Geneva: From My Diary], in: Josei Tenbō (1936), quoted in: Fujita Taki Sensei no Ronshū to Omoide Sewanin-kai (ed.), Arigatō [Thank you], Tokyo 1993, pp. 39–44.

42 B. Molony, From "Mothers of Humanity" to "Assisting the Emperor": Gendered Belonging in the Wartime Rhetoric of Japanese Feminist Ichikawa Fusae, in: Pacific Historical Review 80 (2011) 1, pp. 1–27, at 20–21.

43 H. Peters, My Cousin, Ethel Weed: A Biography and Sourcebook, San Bernardino 2018; L. Holmes, Changes in Higher Education for Women in Japan, 1946–1948, in: Japan Association for University Women Bulletin 68 (1967), pp. 2–4, at 2; Eileen Donovan, 81, Former Ambassador, in: New York Times, 25 December 1996, Section B, p. 9.

Americans' pre-war roles in national/international-level movements were quite limited in comparison to those of their Japanese counterparts. It would thus be misleading to suggest that the American women of the post-war alliance empowered and led the Japanese feminists. The Japanese feminists' pre-war backgrounds overwhelmingly indicate that they were the ones who led the alliance in formulating the post-war "liberation" policies. Furthermore, an analysis of the Japanese feminists' backgrounds negates the popular myth that Japanese women cooperated with American men because they were more democratic than Japanese men. Not only did the feminists doubt that the idealistic American democratic life did exist as promoted, they had experienced the same "democratizing" military forces' wartime air raids, which had destroyed their homes (including Ichikawa's) and their YWCA buildings and had devastated economic activity, contributing to acute food and material shortages.[44] Katō Shizue had to cultivate a vegetable garden to feed herself, and Fujita had to remake her Bryn Mawr regalia into *monpe* (wartime workpants).[45] What Japanese feminists' backgrounds indicate, however, is that they worked with the US military regime because they saw that the "liberation of Japanese women" could serve their decades-old agenda, just as Ichikawa had seen wartime cooperation with the Japanese government as leverage to gain women's suffrage. The fact that post-war laws related to Japanese women went beyond what SCAP authorities were willing to accept and exceeded the legal protections provided to American women meant that Japanese feminists successfully replaced the view of "liberation" defined by white American males with their own version, which they achieved by leading the American alliance members.

3. Japanese Feminists' Imperialistic Attitude towards White Occupiers

Although the occupation hierarchy called her an assistant, Katō Shizue considered herself a *hikōshiki komon*, or unofficial adviser to the American alliance members.[46] Katō's sense of superiority towards American women was not just about her pre-war activism. The leading Japanese feminists were the offspring of Imperial Japan. Growing up at the height of Japan's rapid industrialization between the 1890s and 1910s – a boom that outpaced the economic growth of Western nations – Japanese feminists' privileged status was not only hereditary but also owed to Japan's modernization and colonial expansion. That they learned English and studied in Britain and the Unites States also indicates Japan's unusual imperial position relative to Western powers. Nonetheless, these feminists' pre-war economic and social status, including the financial capacity to fund overseas travel and education and the necessary connections for meeting with in-

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44   Ichikawa, Jiden, p. 608; Nihon YWCA 100-nenshi, pp. 110–112.

45   S. Katō, Aru Josei Seijika, p. 117; Y. Nishimura, Fuji ni Mukatte [Towards Mt. Fuji], in: Ichikawa Fusae to Iu Hito: 100-nin no Kaisō [The Person Called Ichikawa Fusae: Recollections of One Hundred People], Tokyo 1982, pp. 231–233, at 232.

46   S. Katō, Ai wa, pp. 127–128.

ternationally acclaimed feminists, indicate that Japanese feminists constituted a group of highly privileged women, more privileged even than middle-class white American women. Most American occupiers, on the other hand, were from middle- to lower-class backgrounds, with less education and little activism experience. Thus, there would seem to have been a contradicting power dynamic between these occupied Japanese feminists and the majority of the American occupiers. Unfortunately, documentation that would provide evidence of that power dynamic is almost non-existent in occupation records. The US censorship, along with the 1947 purge of feminist leader, Ichikawa Fusae (apparently due to her wartime cooperation with the state but reasons remain unclear), may have muted Japanese feminists' public expression of their true views about the occupiers. However, small yet vivid examples in feminists' post-occupation statements elucidate Japanese feminists' sense of superiority towards American occupiers, and that attitude was strikingly similar to the Western chauvinist attitude towards colonized peoples. This section examines the overlooked issues of class and status in examining the relationship between occupier and occupied to demonstrate how Japanese women maintained their pre-war imperial subjectivity in the "liberation of Japanese women" effort despite their being occupied women of color.

Although the US-controlled Japanese media buzzed with American women's sense of imperialism urging submissive Japanese women to learn from liberated American women, Japanese feminists' opinions of the American women occupiers show an inversion of this imperialistic attitude. Katō Shizue, Fujita Taki, and Takahashi [Tomita] Nobuko (1916–1990, Weed's administrative assistant) mentioned that their impression of Weed – commonly known to have led the post-war women's alliance – was that she was humble, nice, naïve, and always eager to learn about Japan and Japanese women. Katō mentioned that "although Miss. Weed was not a specialist of women's issues, she had to work them […] so she was studying hard."[47] Katō further commented that Weed did not object to any policies that Japanese feminists formulated, except one on civil servants' right to strike.[48] By saying that Weed was a non-specialist who did not contest the Japanese feminists' proposals, Katō implied Weed's passivity and highlighted her ignorance of Japanese women's history, suggesting Weed was unqualified to lead the Japanese feminists. Similarly, Takahashi, who later served as ambassador to Denmark, stated that "Weed was a humble person and she studied hard about Japan".[49] Fujita mentioned that "Weed was nice and naïve".[50] While "naïve" could be interpreted positively in Japanese, none of these Japanese feminists described their prominent American feminist friends in these indifferent terms. Japanese feminists did not consider Weed their leader; Ichikawa even said, "I didn't really listen [to Weed]."[51] Japanese feminists' descriptions of Weed were almost identical to the US-promoted image of Japanese women as humble, passive,

47   Katō interview in Nishi, Senryōka no Nihon, p. 60.
48   Ibid., p. 66.
49   N. Takahashi, interview by Nishi, in Nishi, Senryōka no Nihon, p. 71.
50   T. Fujita, interview by Nishi, in Ibid., p. 88.
51   Ichikawa Fusae, Kodama Katusko, and Itō Yasuko, Ichikawa Fusae shi ni Kiku – Watasi no Fujin Undō, Senzen

naïve, and eager to learn American democracy. The impressions of Weed reveal Japanese women's sense of superiority towards inexperienced American women occupiers.

Japanese feminists' imperialistic attitude towards American women occupiers can also be seen in how they equated American women's competency with their socio-economic class. For example, Fujita, after mentioning how alliance members Weed, Holmes, and Donovan had a thrifty lifestyle, stated that it was only "because of [the power and backing of] GHQ [SCAP], [that the American women occupiers] were able to do what they did [work with the Japanese feminists to formulate national policies]".[52] Fujita visited Holmes's residence in Pullman in 1949 and later wrote that the former occupation member "used to lead a sumptuous lifestyle in Tokyo". In 1949, however, Holmes, as a college professor, was living alone "in a frugal small apartment".[53] By describing the living situation of Holmes as a single professional woman, Fujita exposed the truth – that the leading American woman occupier's life contradicted the Cold War propaganda about the American Way of Life, which supposedly equalled an affluent white family with male breadwinner and female homemaker, living in a suburban house with modern kitchen, courtesy of American capitalist democracy. By comparing Holmes's meagre existence in Pullman with her grand lifestyle in Tokyo, Fujita also revealed that the celebrity-like American conquerors in US-occupied Japan were "nobodies" when they were back in the United States. By crediting the power of the military regime with the American women occupiers' elevated status, Fujita indicated that American women alliance members did not have the social pedigree or credentials to be creating national-level policies. Judging American women's ability based on economic living standards further indicates that privileged Japanese feminists considered themselves superior to American occupiers not only because of their extensive activism experience, but also their social class and economic status.

Japanese feminists' imperialistic attitudes were also directed towards the larger population of lower-class, less-educated white occupiers. This was exemplified in Katō Shizue's candid statement of her superiority to a white enlistee, belonging to a group largely consisting of high-school graduates from lower-class rural families. Katō wrote that she was shocked to discover her stepdaughter and this white enlistee at her residence. Katō furiously said to the enlistee, "Whose permission you got to be with my daughter? […] You have to leave now. I won't give my permission." Katō then asked for the enlistee's superior's name, and after he left, she told her daughter not to see him again because her marriage potential would be "damaged".[54] By speaking English to the enlistee, Katō demonstrated that she was not an ordinary Japanese but educated and upper class. Asking his superior's name meant that Katō instantly identified his lower-ranking status and connoted that she was connected to the upper strata of SCAP, thus putting the enlistee in

kara Sengo e [Asking Ichikawa – My Women's Movement, from Pre-war to Post-war], in: Rekishi Hyōron [History Review] 347 (March) 1979, pp. 2–25, at 13.

52   Fujita interview in Nishi, Senryōka no Nihon, pp. 88–89.
53   T. Fujita, Zoku Wagamichi: Kokoro no Deai [A Sequel to My Way: Heartfelt Encounters], Tokyo 1988, p. 24.
54   Katō, Aru Josei Seijika, pp. 130–131.

his place, which she viewed as lower than hers. The question also signalled that a lower-ranking GI was inadequate to partner with the daughter of, in Katō's words, a "respectable household".[55] Katō's concern might have been about race, but the more important issue was her privileged family status. The white American GI, even with his presumed racial superiority, conqueror status, and economic wealth relative to the impoverished Japanese, had lower status in Katō's view. Her insolent attitude towards a young white man of lower socio-economic status represents the privileged Japanese feminists' sense of superiority towards the majority of the American occupiers.

John Dower argues that one of the major contradictions in the American "workshop of democracy" in Japan was that Americans constituted an inviolate privileged caste while preaching equality.[56] Even more contradictory was that Japanese feminists saw themselves as a privileged caste, with their prestigious education, language skills, and connections with more elite Americans, not just because of their abilities but also because of Japan's colonial expansion, which established their pre-war class and status. Fujita confirmed such a sense of privilege by saying,

> I didn't have to go to GHQ [SCAP] [to report my work, unlike other Japanese]. […]. We learned in American schools and could speak English freely, so [SCAP authorities] might have thought that [they] didn't need to put pressure on us.[57]

Contrary to the popular notion of defeated Japanese admiring Americans, Japanese feminists projected an attitude of superiority towards American occupiers they considered lower class, which signalled feminists' sustained imperial subjectivity even in their impoverished occupied status.

4. "Liberation" as Japanese Feminist Propaganda

Of all the "liberation" policies, the most contested was the one concerning prostitution. Some 70,000 to 150,000 women (and men) went to work as prostitutes for GIs, and this issue extended well beyond the end of occupation, persisting under the US-Japan Security Treaty that allows the stationing of American troops in Japan to this day. The US government banned Japanese licensed prostitution facilities, including the "special comfort facilities" for GIs, in 1946, after negative publicity in the United States had tarnished the image of the American "workshop of democracy" in Japan. However, prostitution was never prohibited during the occupation. US military authorities considered GIs' sexual interactions with Japanese women to be recreational activity that would release stress and tension, which increased when the Korean War began in 1950.[58] For Japanese officials,

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55 Ibid., p. 130.
56 J. Dower, Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II, New York 1999, p. 211.
57 Fujita interview in Nishi, Senryōka no Nihon, p. 86.
58 See, e.g., Maj. Gen. R. Parker, Chief of Chaplains, US Army, Sex and Soldiers, in: Cornet 32 (1952), pp. 103–106, at 103.

keeping prostitutes on the street was also convenient, because they saw prostitutes, like their "special comfort women" prepared for GIs, as a buffer between "good" Japanese women and American GIs to protect upper- to middle-class women from failing to become mothers of Yamato race – the cult of Japanese racial supremacy. To control VD among GIs, the US government ordered SCAP to conduct indiscriminate round-ups of Japanese women who were seen as VD carriers.[59] However, in December 1945, Japanese feminists in the women's alliance called for laws against prostitution as a part of the "liberation of Japanese women" and opposed the inhumane round-ups. Indeed, establishing an anti-prostitution law had been one of the oldest agendas of modern Japanese feminists, especially given that Westerners had been calling the Japanese system of prostitution the symbol of the country's backwardness since the 1870s.[60]

As scholars point out, the post-war anti-prostitution effort had a historical antecedent. Two members of the post-war alliance, Gauntlett and Kubushiro, were long-time anti-prostitution activists.[61] As part of their *junketsu* (purity, meaning chastity) movement, the Japanese feminists had utilized the "French system" – the basis of European and American purity movements – which proclaimed the need for public morality to protect "innocent" women and the health of the population, especially soldiers, who were essential in modern empire building.[62] And because the phonetics of *junketsu* also means purity of blood, concerns over the Yamato race had also been critical. In the post-war period, feminists called for the regulation of prostitutes to stop "that kind of women" from engaging in their *shūgyō* (vulgar deed).[63] Despite the feminists' call to end the indiscriminate round-ups, some scholars have pointed out these women's compliance with American Cold War middle-class respectability.[64] Japanese feminists protested that innocent women were being mistaken for prostitutes and that VD inspections exposing the genital area were compromising those women's potential for marriage. The anti-prostitution effort indeed validated American respectability and the Japanese government's class-based division of good and bad women. Scholars have thus considered Japanese feminists' anti-prostitution work an uncritical embrace of Western imperialistic values, including those of the American Cold War, on top of Japanese imperialism; this view makes the feminists appear apolitical, especially inasmuch as they were occupied women of colour.

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59 M. Takeuchi, "Pan-Pan Girls" Performing and Resisting Neocolonialism(s) in the Pacific Theater: U.S Military Prostitution in Occupied Japan, 1945–1952, in: M. Höhn/Seungsook Moon (eds.), Over There: Living with the U.S. Military Empire from World War Two to the Present, Durham 2010, pp. 78–108.

60 S. Sievers, Flowers in Salt: The Beginnings of Feminist Consciousness in Modern Japan, Stanford 1983, pp. 87–113.

61 S. Garon, Molding Japanese Minds: The State in Everyday Life, Princeton 1998, pp. 98–100; Y. Fujime, Japanese Feminism and Commercialized Sex: The Union of Militarism and Prohibitionism, in: Social Science Journal Japan 9 (2006) 1, pp. 33–50; Kovner, Occupying Power, pp. 100–102.

62 A. Corbin, Commercial Sexuality in Nineteenth-Century France: A System of Images and Regulations, in: C. Gallagher/T. Laqueur (eds.), The Making of the Modern Body: Sexuality and Society in the Nineteenth Century, K. Streip (trans.), Berkeley 1987, pp. 209–219.

63 T. Uyemura, Baishōfu no Inai Sekai o [Towards the World without (Happy) Hookers], in: Fujin Kōron (Women's Review) (April), March 1953, pp. 44–47, at 45.

64 See, e.g., Koikari, Pedagogy of Democracy, pp. 162, 173–174.

However, rather than merely accepting imperialist ideologies, the Japanese feminists' anti-prostitution work showcased their primary imperialist, leading role in building the new US-Japan bilateral empire in the Pacific under the banner of "liberation of Japanese women". Despite contradicting male authorities' prostitution policies, the modern Japanese feminists' strategy to promote their political agenda to the Japanese government as "civilized" coincided with American Cold War racial politics to further enforce the Security Treaty. In 1951, John Foster Dulles (1880–1959), special ambassador for President Truman, discussed with a British SCAP representative about creating the socio-cultural "off-shore defense pact" to prevent Japan from allying with communist China on the basis of "Oriental identity".[65] Dulles suggested exploiting the Japanese presumption of racial superiority (the Yamato race) over "Asiatic mainland masses" by encouraging the "social prestige" of being associated with "an elite Anglo-Saxon club" – the new, US-dominated capitalist imperial powers.[66] Similarly, the modern Japanese feminists since the 1870s – taking advantage of Western ideologies equating women's status with the level of civilization – had pushed feminist reforms as a pathway for Meiji Japan (1868–1912) to realize its slogans "civilization and enlightenment" and "catch up with the West" and to abrogate unequal treaties. To push their agendas, feminists decried Japanese women's "backwards" status and advocated for attaining the higher civilized status of Western women. They did so despite knowing about Western women's struggles for gender equality and despite being aware of Western imperial aggression, especially the Opium Wars.[67] This sort of self-Orientalizing discourse was proof that Japanese feminists took advantage of Japan's semi-colonized status (as a result of unequal treaties imposed by Western powers) and Western ideology about women and civilization to promote feminist reforms to a government eager to be seen as "civilized" by Western powers to join the imperialist club. Therefore, despite being anti-government or leftist, modern Japanese feminism was intricately intertwined with Japan's empire building. Japanese feminists were imperial women, not because of their birth in Imperial Japan or their "middle-class" status, but because their reforms equated raising the status of women with raising Japan's semi-colonial status to that of a primary imperialist power on a par with Western nations.

In the post-war years, Japanese feminists pushed anti-prostitution as a way to prove America as "Uncle Sugar" and Japan's readiness to join the elite Anglo-Saxon club, by taking advantage of Japan's occupied/semi-colonized status and the US "liberation of Japanese women", which linked Japanese women's "liberated" status to the benefits of American democracy and the level of Japan's democratization. Those two countries' post-war images were the key to establish bilateral empire-building or the off-shore defence pact in the Pacific. This section re-examines the feminists' post-war anti-prostitution

65   US Department of State, F. Aandahl (ed.), Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Asia and the Pacific (in two parts), Vol. VI, part 1, Washington, DC 1951, p. 826.
66   Ibid.
67   This feminist strategy is highlighted in Sievers, Flowers in Salt.

efforts to demonstrate their leading imperialist roles in creating the sense of an off-shore US-Japan bilateral empire by manipulating American Cold War propaganda, exploiting the war-torn Japanese male authorities' desire to catch up with the West once again, and being dismissive towards lower-class Japanese women and former colonial subjects, as well as American occupiers – all under the banner of "liberation of Japanese women".

Although previously dismissed as feminists irresponsibly casting blame on GIs for creating a demand for prostitution, a 1952 anti-prostitution appeal that Uyemura Tamaki (1890–1982) directed toward the wife of Supreme Commander Matthew Ridgway (1895–1993, MacArthur's replacement) showed the feminists' ability to manipulate the American Cold War ideologies. In challenging Americans with extraterritoriality, the plea exemplified Japanese feminists' strategy of using their higher socio-economic and educational backgrounds to undermine the moral authority of the occupiers. Accordingly, Uyemura, a Western-educated pastor and the first Japanese civilian to meet with President Truman after the war, emerged as the forerunner of women leaders and of the anti-prostitution movement. Around the time of Uyemura's appeal, Japanese feminists formed the Committee for the Promotion of the Establishment of Legislation Banning Prostitution (CPELBP). Kubushiro served as chair, while Uyemura and Kamichika Ichiko (1888–1981), soon to be a socialist member of the Diet, served as vice-chairs.[68] Uyemura's appeal arose from the feminists' collective effort to outlaw prostitution. Originally published in *Fujin Kōron* (Women's Review), a monthly magazine, the feminists' anti-prostitution appeal aimed at upper- and middle-class women. However, publishing this piece on the censored topic of GIs' prostitution issues at the highly sensitive time of the occupation's imminent end meant that they also aimed their appeal at the US government (and the subjugated Japanese government); the timing of the appeal signalled that the feminists were taking advantage of their occupied status under US media control. The CPELBP had chosen Uyemura as a new representative because of her impeccable credentials in terms of the new Cold War American Way of Life; she would thus have greater impact when challenging the morality of the American troops. The appeal also took advantage of the US claim of being "Uncle Sugar" who liberated Japanese women, by arguing that the GIs' prostitution activities were harming such an image.

The occupiers perceived the feminists' strategy to be significant, as can be seen in the reactions of American media such as the New York Times, which called Uyemura's appeal the "the most critical attack on the morals of the American garrison made publicly by any Japanese since the 1945 surrender" on 21 April 1952. Its article headlined "G.I. Brothel Ban in Japan Is Asked: Woman Leader in Letter to Mrs. Ridgway Attacks the Morality of U.S. Troops." In the appeal, Uyemura requested that Mrs. Ridgway speak to the general about prohibiting GIs' use of Japanese brothels and "isolat[ing] immoral United States troops".[69] Instead of focusing on this appeal, however, the New York Times dedicated

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68   Fujime, Japanese Feminism, p. 41.
69   T. Uyemura, Ridgway Fujin e: Panpan ni Atarashii Michi wo Hiraku Tameni wa [To Mrs. Ridgway: To Open a New Path to Pan-Pan Girls], in: Fujin Kōron (May), April 1952, pp. 36-40.

one-quarter of its article to Uyemura's background. She was a member of the National Public Safety Commission (which supervised the police), a Wellesley College and University of Edinburgh graduate, the daughter of a famous Methodist minister and a pastor herself, chair of YWCA of Japan, and vice-chair of the World YWCA. It is apparent that the New York Times called Uyemura's appeal the "most critical attack" because her background of social privilege and education, as well as her Protestant pedigree, exceeded the Cold War's culturally valued qualifications of average Americans. Such criticism coming from someone educated in Great Britain was also significant when the United States was claiming to replace Britain as the world's best civilizing force. Uyemura's background gave her appeal gravitas, especially in the Cold War context, in contesting the premise of "Uncle Sugar's boys and girls" democratizing Japan. It demonstrated the feminists' ability to publicly subvert American moral authority – the foundation of the occupation – at a time when that authority was about to be institutionalized by the US-Japan Security Treaty, defining Japan's semi-permanent subjugation to the United States.

Uyemura indeed highlighted her Cold War moral superiority by directing her appeal to the wife of the Supreme Commander, the woman of the highest strata in the military regime in the occupied space. Mrs. Ridgway, or Mary Princess Anthony Long (1918–1997), was the third wife of General Ridgway and was twenty-three years his junior.[70] She was supposed to epitomize the propagated Cold War middle-class respectability and the happy homemaker image that embodied the affluent, capitalist American Way of Life that American democracy would supposedly bestow on the Japanese people. Uyemura's appeal began by comparing her to nineteenth-century critic John Ruskin's ideal of the perfect woman, beautiful and full of Christian morality. She then validated America as a benevolent civilizer rooted in Christianity.[71] Uyemura next posed a series of questions, as reported in the New York Times:

> *Do you happen to know of the great number of American soldiers patronizing Japanese prostitutes? Step in to Tachikawa for one instance. You will see hundreds and thousands of women lining up on the streets.* […] [A]*t Iwakuni* […] *many Japanese children worked as procurers.*[72]

By posing questions in this manner, Uyemura intended to establish herself as an expert and moral authority on the topic of GIs' sexual activity with Japanese women, which involved children. Framing this in the form of questions was meant to highlight the ignorance of the Supreme Commander's wife concerning the daily "immoral" conduct of her husband's troops. Even if the general's wife had been aware of it, by posing a question Uyemura exposed the fact that neither Mrs. Ridgway nor the US military had done anything to discourage the GIs' prostitution activities. Uyemura adopted the stance that, according to her understanding of American and British Protestant middle-class re-

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70   Service for Gen. Ridgway's Widow, in: Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, 23 July 1997, p. 30.
71   Uyemura, Ridgway Fujin, p. 36.
72   New York Times, 21 April 1952, p. 2.

spectability, they should properly consider prostitution problematic. By writing an open appeal to the third and much younger wife of the Supreme Commander, rather than to Ridgway himself, Uyemura could also bring public attention to the commander's private life, which contradicted the American Way of Life, as his two previous wives had through divorce lost their "happy homemaker" positions that American democracy was supposed to guarantee. Uyemura challenged the moral superiority of American troops by questioning the morality and respectability of the highest authority, the Supreme Commander couple. Instead of American troops bringing democracy and affluent capitalist lifestyles, as claimed by the US government, Uyemura argued that Japanese women were turning into prostitutes and children were becoming pimps because American troops were, in her words, "corrupting Japanese morals" and the military authority was not moral enough to care.[73] She urged the US authorities to support the anti-prostitution effort, if the US government wanted to retain its highly publicized image as "Uncle Sugar" to Japanese women.

As the formal end of occupation approached, with the Japanese government able to enact new laws, feminists concurrently worked on passing the anti-prostitution law using the same modern feminist strategy. Given Japan's semi-colonial status under the new unequal Security Treaty, feminists claimed an anti-prostitution law would be proof of the "liberation of Japanese women" and Japan's civilized status, thus allowing Japan to gain full membership in the "elite Anglo-Saxon club". The CPELBP members argued that "the civilized countries of the world have all prohibited prostitution, and Japan is the only one that lags behind".[74] Scholars criticize the statement as false and "lip service to new global norms".[75] However, Japanese feminists' misleading statements about the western conditions had precisely been their strategy to pressure the Japanese government so eager to "catch up with the West".

CPELBP vice-chair Kamichika employed this strategy in the House of Councillors. On 25 July 1955, in a fifth attempt to pass an anti-prostitution bill, Kamichika repeatedly stated, "Prostitution violates women's rights and *junketsu*; therefore, it should be eradicated in a contemporary civilized nation." In the explicitly gendered, racialized, and class-segregated colonial language of *junketsu*, Kamichika alluded to the US workshop of democracy by arguing that prostitution should not be allowed among Japan's "liberated" women in democratized Japan. Continuing with a neo-colonial vision, she argued that "as Japan has gained independence and devotes itself for reconstruction as a democratic nation, to permit this dark, feudalistic existence [prostitution] is not only a contradiction, but also an obstacle to being equal to other democratic countries and to hold an honourable status in the international society when we join the United Nations in the future."[76] By regulating prostitution, Kamichika claimed, Japan could "catch up with

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73   Ibid.
74   Fujime, Japanese Feminism, p. 43.
75   Ibid.; Kovner, Occupying Power, p. 118 (quote).
76   Proceedings of the House of Councillors, Session 22, Judicial Affairs Committee, No. 7, 21 June 1955, Tokyo.

the West". Kamichika's view of civilized and democratic nations referred to Western imperial countries, the "elite Anglo-Saxon club". Membership in the United Nations, dominated by those countries, would signal Japan's admission to the club. Although the anti-prostitution legislation was defeated in 1955, Kamichika and the CPELBP succeeded in swaying public opinion. The legislation was passed a year later in response to the overwhelming public criticism towards the bill's earlier defeat, thus proving the feminists' leadership and ability to sway the masses and male politicians.[77] The feminists' anti-prostitution efforts demonstrated their remaking of the occupiers' "liberation of Japanese women" into their own imperialist propaganda, which was used to appeal Japan's re-emergence – the proof of becoming equal to the US-dominated capitalist imperial powers. Thus, the anti-prostitution efforts exposed the feminists' leading role in creating a sense of US-Japan "off-shore defense pact" at the expense of lower-class Japanese women, former colonial subjects, and even lower-class American occupiers, by exploiting the Yamato Japanese feeling of "social prestige" of being associated with the elite Anglo-Saxons.

5. Conclusion

Although the US government intended the "liberation of Japanese women" to serve as Cold War propaganda, Japanese feminists replaced it by something based on their own ideas of women's liberation that had been gestating since the 1870s. Upending the image that Americans imposed 'democratic' ideology on occupied women of color, the re-examination of the anti-prostitution effort shows that the "liberation" policies were in fact based on privileged Japanese feminists' own imperial agenda, which effectively implied a disdain not only for lower-class Japanese women and former colonial subjects but also for middle- to lower-class class white American occupiers. Previous scholarship has portrayed Japanese feminists as secondary actors of the US occupation. However, by placing their post-war anti-prostitution efforts in the context of broader modern Japanese feminist movements, including Anpo, the same sources that the previous scholarship used reveal Japanese feminists' powerful roles in the women's liberation Cold War propaganda. This approach leads to a reinterpretation – that the Japanese feminists guided the American women occupiers in formulating "liberation" reforms and, with those reforms, Japanese feminists granted the United States a chance to portray itself as the benevolent "Uncle Sugar". In doing so, Japanese feminists were able to push their liberation policies and "market" them as proof of America being the world's civilizing leader in the Cold War, and of Japan's democratization and hence its readiness to emerge from defeat and join the elite Anglo-Saxon club. This feminist-led construction of post-war images that promoted America's overseas role and Japan's swift transformation were key to building the US-Japan bilateral empire in the Cold War Pacific, especially for justifying the US-Japan Security Treaty military aggressions as democratic rescue missions from Soviet

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77   Y. Morosawa, Onna no Sengo-shi [Women's Post-war History], Tokyo 1971, p. 82.

communism. Through the "liberation of Japanese women", Japanese feminists may have aimed at transforming their own image – from colonial aggressors to "liberated women" – while disguising their continued [neo-]colonial status.

A Conversation about
Two Occupations

Susan Carruthers / Mire Koikari / Heike Paul

This conversation of two of the most renowned scholars of Cold War historiography and occupation studies, Susan Carruthers (University of Warwick) and Mire Koikari (University of Hawai'i) with Heike Paul (FAU Erlangen-Nuernberg and guest editor of this issue), took place virtually on 29 January 2021 across multiple time zones. It has been transcribed, edited, and abridged for this volume. The exchange sheds light on important topics in the larger field of post-war studies on Japan and Germany, contextualizes historical debates, and discusses pertinent issues for future scholarship.

1. What's in a Name? – Questions of Terminology

Heike Paul: Thank you, Professor Carruthers and Professor Koikari, for agreeing to a group conversation. In the study of geopolitical configurations following the end of World War II, various organizing categories have been prominently used and problematized: "post-war", "cold war", "occupation", "democratization", "modernization", "re-education", etc. Could you speak to your own senses of what these terminologies imply, and what kind of critical work they do? In what way do you consider them to be aptly descriptive, analytical, or even normative, as the basis of scholarly projects? Which do you find helpful for comparative analyses?

Susan Carruthers: Questions of terminology are really of foundational importance, and where I would want to start with that question is to think about language as it was employed by historical actors in the period that we're talking about, from the middle or early 1940s into the 1950s. And certainly, in my sort of study, particularly of US occupations, the historical actors were very strategic about which names they gave to

which practices in particular locations. "Military government" was the name given to the structure imposed on the Axis powers proper; while "civil affairs" was the name applied to governance arrangements in liberated territory, because it didn't sound as draconian as "military government". Obviously, one must be very careful about using the language of historical actors, unpacking what they thought about the strategic connotations of particular terms and names, as opposed to analytic categories I find helpful for my own work. Thus, I would prefer the looser category of "post-war" rather than "cold war". With "cold war" I want to be careful about what is being mobilized and what is being obscured by that term. I also use the term "occupation", because I think that is indeed an accurate description of what is going on in all sorts of places. You listed some other categories we might think about – for me, "re-education" and "democratization" are also terms which I would want to handle with great care. They clearly have normative connotations as they were applied both in the moment and in some cases afterwards. I would want to apply caution, because "re-education", which is maybe a *leitmotiv* of this conversation, has punitive as well as pedagogical aspects. And it is quite hard to tease those apart, although in the argot of Americans at the time, "re-education" was intended to connote something uplifting, elevating, morally edifying. Similarly, one cannot use the term "democratization" without being attuned to the many ways in which fundamentally un- or anti-democratic things were very much a part of it. The other thing I would want to put on the table, from the start, is where "decolonization" fits in this mix. And this is another reason why, when talking about the cold war, I want to draw attention to a north/south axis of power: whereas, very often, or at least in older historiography around the cold war, we are constantly drawn to rather think in terms of east/west.

Heike Paul: "Decolonization" (along with aspects of "neo-colonialism") is certainly a very important concept for the constellations that you, Professor Koikari, are looking at in your work as you are shedding light on power structures, both open and hidden. What kind of work do concepts such as "post-war" or "cold war" do for the questions you investigate in your work?

Mire Koikari: You ask the most difficult question at the very beginning! As I think through those terms, especially "re-education," I recall what we talked about at the Berkeley conference in February 2020. That is, those of us who study Japanese occupation do not see this term, "re-education", used in the Japanese context. In the US occupation of Japan, the terms that were used include "democratization" – which, of course, for reasons that Susan just talked about, is very problematic – and also "democratization and de-militarization". "Demilitarization" is no less problematic because Okinawa actually got re-militarized during the occupation. Two areas (mainland Japan and the island of Okinawa) came to take on very different roles. Other terms that often came up in the US occupation of Japan were "re-orientation" and "rehabilitation". To me, it is very interesting that in Japan, "democratization" and "demilitarization" were used, but in Germany it was "re-education". So, what are the implications? What sort of etymology in each case?

Many scholars talk about "racial difference" between Japan and Germany in the context of post-war occupations. So did race play a role? Or was it something else? In the case of Okinawa, nobody talked about re-education or democratization; and they really couldn't talk about demilitarization, either. As the occupation of Okinawa lasted until 1972, the Cold War provided an important context. As a result, the discourse of "people-to-people", or what Christina Klein in *Cold War Orientalism* (2003) defines as "integrationist dynamics", became salient.

Your question has made me think about what happened in the course of US "manifest destiny" across the Pacific. In the Western frontier, what fuelled expansionism were "assimilation", "civilization", and in the case of education of indigenous women, "domestication". In the case of US colonization of Hawai'i, "civilization" and "Christianization" were salient. As the Philippines were colonized by the US at about the same time, the key terminology there was "self-governance", as the lack of Filipino self-governing ability was used as a reason and justification for US interventions. And then in the case of post-WWII Japan, "democratization" or "demilitarization", in the case of Okinawa, "people to people" and also "mutual affinity and affiliation". To make matters more complex, the US occupiers also emphasized restoring "Ryūkyūan identity" (pre-Japanese colonial Okinawan identity). But the intent, of course, was to make Okinawans feel less affiliated with Japan and more allied with the US. So it was a case of de-colonization discourse used to establish American hegemony in the occupied islands. How these various terminologies were used in order to facilitate US imperialism in North America, the Pacific, and Asia is fascinating.

In my own work, the notion of "cold war" was actually very helpful when I shifted the locus of study from Japan to Okinawa. Cold War cultural studies offer useful insights for Okinawa. Elaine Tyler May talks about women and domesticity. Laura McEnaney talks about how "civil defence begins at home" (which is also the title of her book). Christina Klein talks about "Cold War orientalism", examining how US understandings of "self" and "other" were reconfigured in Asia and the Pacific. The notion of "cold war" really allowed me to focus on, especially in the case of Okinawa, shifting gender, racial, and imperial discourses transpiring between the US and Okinawa, with Japan also espousing its own version of multiculturalism and Orientalism. And, finally, "cold war" also helped me think about the Asian-Pacific region as a whole. Once I did that, it became easier to link the Okinawan case to other instances of imperialism and imperial feminism in Asia and the Pacific.

Now about "post-war". In Japan, this term has been used in a very specific way. There is a famous phrase: "post-war was over" (*Mohaya sengo dewa nai*). This was a pronouncement made in the 1956 Economic White Paper. To this day many think it meant that the hard years of post-war survival and struggle were over and that with the start of high economic growth in 1955, Japan would begin to enjoy a better era. That was the predominant understanding of this phrase. However, what it actually meant was that the recovery from defeat, which had been aided by an economic boom triggered by the Korean war, was over. Now Japan must face the real struggle: modernizing its economy and getting into

a new phase (without a war boom). So, it was intended as a cautionary statement, but it got misinterpreted almost from the beginning. The phrase travelled to an Okinawa still under American occupation, and then Okinawans were perturbed, thinking that "mainland Japan is recovering but we are left behind. Why do we have to continue to be disadvantaged in this way?" Thus, the term "post-war" generated all sorts of complicated dynamics during and after the occupation.

2. Shifting Positionalities

Heike Paul: With your changing positionalities – you both have lived and researched in different parts of the world, and now are located in Hawai'i and Britain, respectively – have there been any changes in perspective regarding your objects of study? Is there something pertaining to your own shifting locations and academic training that has prompted you to engage with the subject matter of your books?

Susan Carruthers: Yes. I'm a British citizen and also an Irish citizen. But I lived for 15 years in the US. And also, in terms of my academic career, my PhD thesis, which was my first book, was actually on British colonial counterinsurgencies. And it's really from that route that I arrived at an interest in post-war re-education and occupation in the first place, because I was very intrigued by the oftentimes horrific things that were going on in camps in Kenya in the 1950s, but also in Cyprus and Malaya, in which the British colonial state was purporting to "re-educate" so-called terrorist suspects, using "terrorist" as a category to stigmatize those who were waging anti-imperial war against British rule. And I set out in that project to try to get a handle on where the discourse of re-education came from. That took me to post-war Germany; it took me to camps in the Korean war, and so, my third book, *Cold War Captives,* thinks about where America's early Cold War fascination with captivity (with the whole discourse of "slave" and "free", with the furious competition over POWs in the Korean War) came from, and what gave those languages so much traction. So, I bring a British colonial perspective to bear on thinking about these questions. I only became an Americanist at a slightly later point in my career and, having decided that I was increasingly interested in figuring out things about the United States, I decided I would go and live there. So, I moved to the US in 2002 – I had been teaching in Wales for nine years before that, living in a tiny Welsh-speaking village, so this was a very intriguing place from which to start thinking about the United States. But living in the US definitely helped inspire me to take on my occupation book. One of your questions was about the "good occupation" of that book's title, which was a way of thinking about the mobilisation of a very particular account of the post-war occupations of Germany and Japan to try to legitimate the occupation and invasion of Iraq. And that – in my horror at the moving catastrophe that was playing out in front of my very eyes, in the first months when I lived in the US, teaching US foreign relations to US students on the most ethnically diverse campus in the country – was where I arrived at the idea

for that book. I really wanted to take apart the trope of "the good occupation" which had been mobilized for what I regarded as particularly injurious purposes.

Heike Paul: Professor Koikari, you live on the Hawaiian Islands and have been living and teaching there for quite some time. Your positionality in Hawaiʻi seems to be a special and unique one, and a particularly interesting vantage point from which to look in two directions: both to Japan and to the US mainland. Before you became a resident of Hawaiʻi and a professor at the University of Hawaiʻi, you lived in the US Midwest and did research at the University of Wisconsin at Madison, also a unique location in the Midwest. How have these two places affected or even shaped your work?

Mire Koikari: Very much. The book on the US occupation of Japan came out of my work at the University of Wisconsin, where I got my PhD in Sociology. In the nineties, when I was pursuing my degree, the discussions about empire, gender, and feminism were finally making their way into the field of Social Sciences. That's part of the reason I decided to focus on gender, feminism, and empire in the US occupation of Japan. But I must go further back to find the moment where I really got into critically thinking about the US-Japan relation. When I was living in Wisconsin, I sometimes visited places outside of Madison. Madison and the rest of Wisconsin were really two different worlds. On one such occasion, an old war veteran came up to me. He took off his hat, greeted me, and said: "You know, I really had a great time in my youth in Korea." He was obviously referring to his experience in the Korean war. This was surprising to me in two ways. I had just left Japan and landed in Wisconsin. In my context of growing up as a middle-class woman in the Tokyo area, it was unimaginable to mix Japanese and Koreans, due to racial or national dynamics in East Asia. The difference between the two was "obvious" in Japanese culture. The episode also made me realize that it was through World War II experiences that those in the Midwest had first come to understand Asia. This encounter showed me the significance of war and the role of the military as a "bridge" between the American Midwest and Japan.

With my second book, which is about the US occupation of Okinawa, my living in Hawaiʻi was crucial. Hawaiʻi was, of course, a steppingstone for US expansion across the Pacific. So, if you live here, it is really hard not to think about other communities in Asia and the Pacific in connection to Hawaiʻi. If you think about Hawaiʻi, you think about Guam; and if you think about Guam, you then think about Okinawa and the Philippines. Hawaiʻi makes you think about the ways in which the US military moved across the vast region over a period of time. So that made me, of course, become very interested in Okinawa.

Also in Hawaiʻi, there is a significant number of Japanese American World War II veterans who also served either in the occupation of mainland Japan or the occupation of Okinawa. Their stories are extraordinarily complicated. And they also had connection to Germany as well since Japanese American soldiers were involved in liberating the interned population from Dachau. All these stories are circulating in the Pacific. In addition, in Hawaiʻi there is almost complete silence about the cold war. Nobody talks about

it as a historical event or as a term of significance; nobody talks about how Japanese and Okinawan immigrant population in the islands got involved in the cold war reconstruction of Asia. This silence was too "loud" for me. So that is the way I ended up looking at the cold war and its impacts on Okinawa. Whether in Wisconsin or Hawai'i, I seem to be haunted by the history of military and empire. Though I never thought I would focus on the history of militarization, I have been following the footsteps of the military. With my research on post-2011 disaster mobilization in Japan, which became my third book, *Gender, Culture, and Disaster in Post-3.11 Japan* (2020), the military (of the US and Japan) was at the centre of my analysis.

3. The Role of Institutions in the Post-War Period, Both Military and Civilian

Heike Paul: Both of you have extensively studied the role of the military as an institution alongside other institutions that are part of civil society Professor Koikari, you show us how the concept of "manifest domesticity" (originally coined by Amy Kaplan to describe the aspect of gender and women's roles in imperial schemes of westward expansion) also matters for the imperial agenda that you are looking at in the cold war. In your book *Pedagogy of Democracy*, you point to the power of military institutions, but also to groups in civil society that seemed to be instrumentalized for purposes of re-education in post-war Japan and Okinawa, which also came with their own agendas and critical interventions. Can you speak to those of the women's groups, in particular? What was their "pedagogical agenda", and how was it realized or thwarted?

Mire Koikari: To me, what is fascinating is how civil society (and women, in particular) constantly intermingled with the military. I first noticed this while researching the mainland occupation of Japan, but with my research on the US occupation of Okinawa, it became really clear how the boundary between civil society and the military is so blurry. Women and domesticity were at the very centre of this dynamic. In US-Occupied Okinawa, a new community comprised of US military wives and Okinawan elite wives emerged, organizing tea and coffee parties, luncheons and dinner parties, and other types of gatherings, constantly using the language of, as I said earlier, "mutual affinity and affiliation". Both sides were keen on portraying their relationship as egalitarian. They were building friendship at grassroots level, they argued. These US military wives were actually given an order to befriend Okinawans but do it "unofficially". They were earnest about their "unofficial" activities. At the NARA (National Archives and Record Administration) in the US, I found a box full of historical artifacts illuminating these women's commitment to this informal diplomacy. Among them was the album of the military wives' clubs, documenting their grassroots activities. Many of the photos actually became part of the publicity efforts by the US civil administration in Okinawa. One of the clubs, USCAR Women's Club, ended up writing their own history, which was also in this box. That was fascinating.

Heike Paul: A serious case of "archive fever" that got you!

Mire Koikari: Yes. And another group of women – American home economists dispatched by Michigan State University to Okinawa – also aided the mission of the military occupation by containing anti-American protests in the islands in a gendered manner. What better way was there than to turn Okinawan women into a pro-America constituency by teaching them American domestic knowledge and techniques – cooking, sewing, and so forth. These home economists, too, were cognizant of their role. And their activities were inseparable from the military. Their travel from the US to Okinawa was by military transportation. Once in Okinawa, they travelled to other regions in Asia and the Pacific, where the US military was present. They always found their colleagues (other home economists) in Taiwan, the Philippines, and Korea. Once again, their trips to these places were aided by the US military. While in Okinawa, the home economists lived in the same housing facilities as the military families, and they dined at the same place. The link between domesticity and military was visible among Okinawans as well. Older Okinawans remember such things as kitchen utensils made from downed Japanese airplanes, or children's coats made out of American military blankets. Most poignant of all is the wedding dress made of an American military parachute. Everyday lives on the occupied islands were deeply intertwined with the military. These things really fascinated me.

Heike Paul: Professor Carruthers, you have researched what happens to American soldiers when the war is over, and how they become agents in the occupation. Those American "post-warriors", as you call them, often had limited training to prepare them for their post-war role. In your book *The Good Occupation*, you analyse at length the founding of the "School of Military Government" in Charlottesville, Virginia, where soldiers received training for their post-war mission. How did you become interested in the "School of Military Government"? And would you say the soldiers there were trained to become agents of re-education? Were they trained merely for aspects of governance, or could it be argued that they were also trained to "re-educate" civilian populations in Germany and Japan?

Susan Carruthers: I don't remember exactly how I first became interested in it. It may have been in the National Archives that I came across references to it, but I did actually go to Charlottesville, because the special collections of the University of Virginia have a lot of the materials from the School of Military Government. I was able to read the lecture notes and study the curriculum. There were also photo albums. So, it's a bit like Mire was describing with the unexpected troves of self-representations. And some of the particularly revealing things in the photo albums weren't just the photos that were rather static: "Here's the class of…" These guys were going for maybe three or four months, but they would compose little poems and ditties and songs, which were very revealing, and sometimes quite disturbing, about the sorts of self-identities that they were trying out as post-war "pro-consuls." Often very much indebted to America's imperial lineage.

But the question of empire, it seems to me, and the question of historical genealogies that arrive in Charlottesville, are intriguing, and they pull in different directions. One of the interesting things, of course, about the occupation and about the mobilization of that analogy in the run up to the so-called "Operation Iraqi Freedom", is that the "O-word," as Paul "Jerry" Bremer termed it, reminds us that on the one hand there was a desire to fabricate an ennobling, affirmative vision of America as a capable re-educator and uplifter of benighted parts of the world in the shape of Germany and Japan after World War II. But the "O-word" nevertheless conjures all sorts of things that smack of imperialism, from which one, nevertheless, wants to create some distance. So, you have these rather head-spinning juxtapositions of invoking occupation without being able to say "that word" about the very things that are being conjured. And similarly, in Charlottesville, one of the things I found most fascinating is that the instructional manuals that were at the centre of the education provided there – particularly the Field Manual on Military Government – explicitly warns that the occupying power should *not* try to change the culture or the social norms, of the place that is being occupied. So, in that sense, the officers that went to Charlottesville were not receiving any training to be re-educators. They are actually told that they should leave in place the existing culture and folkways, rituals and patterns of the people with whom they come into contact. This is curious, if we think about the occupation as intended to "re-educate", which is the language with which they spoke of themselves very soon thereafter.

So, where does that come from? Well, interestingly, as I traced back the genealogy of these ideas – about what occupation should or should not aspire to do, that firm stipulation against trying to change a culture or the way people think – to the aftermath of the American Civil War, and the occupation of the most unregenerate parts of the Confederate South by Union troops during the period of Reconstruction. By the end of the nineteenth century, most white Americans had converged in a shared understanding that imposing military government over Southern states had been a terrible disaster; that Union troops should never have been used to try eradicating certain ideas in the South; that their presence there was odious; that white Southerners were right to take up arms in some cases against that federal presence, and so on. The occupation of the South is really quite explicitly referenced in both the training lectures, as well as in the Field Manual, which is explicitly described as the "Bible" for men being trained. Of course, the fact that they were in Charlottesville, a Southern town, added public interest and indeed controversy to the existence of a School for Military Government. The Hearst Press called it "the school for Gauleiters", terribly un-American, the idea they are going to occupy anywhere was an anathema. But the iconography of the school, and some of the ditties, songs, and poems that officer trainees themselves produced, all point to their very Southern location. The campus itself, the town of Charlottesville, was replete with statuary commemorating Confederate generals and heroes. So that troublesome aspect of the US past was very "undead" in that particular place.

4. The Role of Women: Gender and Re-Education in the Post-War

Heike Paul: But let's turn to yet another aspect, i.e., gender. Professor Koikari, women appear as agents and objects of re-education. They are also frequently represented in popular culture, in films, magazines, and popular novels in quasi-allegorical fashion to shed light on post-war relations. What "types" of women do you see standing out? And how do you problematize them in your work?

Mire Koikari: In the case of the US occupation of Japan, Beate Sirota Gordon is enormously important. This is not only because of what she did, that is, her involvement in the constitutional revision. But also because of the fact that she went through several imperial spheres before she landed in occupied Japan. She was originally from Vienna, where her artist parents were Russian Jews from Kiev. Her father happened to be visiting Manchuria and befriended a famous Japanese musician, and this led to the family moving to imperial Japan. Right before Pearl Harbor, she moved to the US to attend Mills College in California. Once the war was over, she came back to Japan as part of the American occupation forces. The kind of mileage and mobility she had is exceptional. What is equally or even more interesting about Sirota Gordon is the legendary status she has come to assume in Japan. This has partly had to do with Japanese women volunteering themselves to write her biography, produce a documentary film, and do various other work to sustain her "mythology". After 9/11, Beate Sirota Gordon gained public attention as she spoke about similarities between women's liberation during the US occupation of Japan and women's liberation during the US occupation of Afghanistan. By now, there is even a children's book (in Japanese) on Beate Sirota Gordon.
In the case of the US occupation of Okinawa, when I think of women having an exceptional mobility and going through several spheres of empire, Kimiyo Onaga comes to mind. She was the head of the home economist department at the University of Ryūkyū during the occupation. Not of Okinawan background, she was originally from the Tōhoku area, a northern region of Japan historically perceived as "other". Growing up in this marginalized region, she was determined to get out of poverty and make something out of her life. She wanted to become a doctor, but could not. So she studied home economics, a feminized field of science and technology. After her college, she relocated to Japan-colonized Korea and became a well-known home economist. Once the war was over, she repatriated to Okinawa, because she got married to an Okinawan in Korea. And during the occupation she became the "queen" of home economics. She travelled to Michigan, Hawai'i, and other locations, all in the name of home economics research and education. And as Onaga, Gordon, and other women travelled across borders, they created vast networks of women reformers and educators who criss-crossed multiple regions and oceans.

Heike Paul: It is very impressive to see how you trace this network around the globe, and how you establish these women's mobility and connectedness. Professor Carruthers, in your book you write about the family entering the scene of the occupation as a way to

domesticate occupation: that is, to prevent single American soldiers from intermingling with "foreign women". In particular, when the latter were perceived as traditional and submissive, rather than as self-assertive and on the verge of a feminist movement.

Susan Carruthers: I definitely agree that the way in which segments of the US press and culture industries in the late 1940s, early 50s, constructed images of GIs and their sexual encounters with foreign women was quite explicitly intended to critique US women – to showcase the less desirable attributes that supposedly characterized American women as more aggressive, more career minded, and contrast this to Asian women. These gendered constructions are absolutely entangled with ideas about race and racialization. So Asian women get figured in very different and particular ways, so that they are elevated by these discourses into the most desirable kinds of helpmates, back scrubbers, pleasing, docile, submissive, attentive, never complaining, companions and so on.

And there I probably take issue a bit with the book *GIs and Germans* by Petra Goedde and with the claim she makes about the feminization of Germany. And Naoko Sibusawa's book, *America's Geisha Allies*, which we could think about as the counterpart that explores how those processes of gendering defeat play out in the Pacific. But my sense, at least in the early phase of the occupation, is that we see something quite distinct in Germany and Japan. That is, that German women are actually understood to be *political*. And one way in which American GIs are warned against fraternization – a euphemism for a rather shorter "f-word" – is by reminding them that German women are supposedly unreconstructed Nazis: and that GIs therefore risk being poisoned, and toxified not only by venereal diseases, but also with the ideological toxin of Nazism.

That motif appears in a wide array of American popular culture representations, and journalism written by both men and women. I am even thinking about how the centre piece of the original re-education program – the film *Die Todesmühlen*, rubbing German noses in the fact of Nazi atrocities and genocide – takes pains to show women SS guards, and to fixate on the figure of the female guards as particularly horrifying agents of atrocity. So, I would want to nuance Petra Goedde's claims a bit. I think it is striking that I didn't find any trace in Japan of Japanese women being configured as dangerous because they're, for instance, fanatical Shinto worshippers devoted to the emperor, to Japanese imperialism, and should not be slept with on account of the ideological peril that they pose to naïve young, wholesome, uniformed American boys.

There are all sorts of very intriguing and telling differences in how these occupations are construed, how they are talked about, and the categories generated to conceive otherness in these places. But that's the one thing that I find very striking, that German women are actually understood as ideological. They are not simply considered to be passive. It happens only later German women are reconceived as respectable, or indeed desirable, romantic partners, potential and actual wives, and so on.

Of course, these processes are complicated by race in the Pacific. But coming back to the point about families, American women and children heading first to Germany, and Japan, and Korea, and elsewhere – one of the things I find so intriguing about that process

of "domestication" is that it was not really part of the original blueprint for occupation. This happened because some very senior officers were eager that their *own* wives should come and join them – including Eisenhower, which is interesting since we know that he was having a relationship outside of marriage with an American woman in uniform – and responding to the groundswell of pressure from both American women, who wanted to join their husbands if they were not going to be demobilized quickly, and American men overseas themselves. So, these imperatives alter the complexion of the occupations. Truman cedes to that pressure, and the occupations are domesticated, sooner rather than later. And I think there was indeed an aspiration that the women would have a domesticating, softening, disciplinary function on the unruliness of male desire as it exceeded the boundaries that officers had tried to impose. Officers were, of course, often the worst "offenders" in violating non-fraternization rules and so on. That's one of many ways in which I was really struck by unruliness, the uncontainability, of all sorts of processes and forces in the occupation, where desire undoes military hierarchy and chains of command. And how, unsurprisingly, the presence of American women and children doesn't do that disciplinary work in any sort of straightforward or uncomplicated way. Men continued to sleep with foreign women at prodigious rates, despite the fact that there were wives and families around. So, all of these things I find very intriguing.

5. Similarities and Differences between the Two Occupations

Heike Paul: What do you consider characteristic specificities of the occupations in Japan and Germany? Where do you observe striking difference or similarities, broadly speaking? Where do you see the need for further comparative, transnational work?

Susan Carruthers: If I could just pick up on the "comparative, transnational" piece of this question, I would suggest that we complicate things further by adding more occupations into our comparative analysis. Because here, we have been, talking about Germany and Japan. And, of course, these were arguably the most consequential, certainly the best remembered and most studied of the occupations, but I think we would do well to additionally consider the occupation of Korea, the occupation of Italy. Remember that Germany and Japan were not the only two places subject to long occupations after World War II. They are also the two occupations I spent most of my book talking about. However, I do at different times talk about Italy and Korea. And, in terms of future directions, I think it would be useful to see more work that really brings these different occupations into the same frame. One of the things I was most struck by – and Mire has already talked about Japan and Korea, and about how Koreans are racialized and othered in Japan – is that Korea, it seems to me, gets the most punitive occupation of any place. And what is so striking is that Koreans had, of course understandably, expected that this would be their moment of restored self-determination, self-rule, and then – lo and behold – the peninsula is carved in half, and remains divided to this day, unlike Germany. And what goes on there has different kinds of dimensions. We haven't really

touched on that aspect of occupation or post-war re-ordering that was about producing more ethnically homogeneous states, and how the United States particularly led massive "ethnic cleansing", if one wants to call it that, in the Pacific. And it also happened in Europe, giving rise to all sorts of epic re-shuffling of populations. But it was particularly in the Pacific that the United States took it upon itself to remove people from Japan to Korea, and from Korea to Okinawa, and to other places, like the Philippines. And I think this dimension of post-war occupation is perhaps especially timely, as we live in an age of wrenching dislocations, refugee movements, forced relocations. So, this perhaps hasn't received as much attention as it might. And those other occupations – which starkly draw out the way in which questions of empire and reconfigurations of imperial power are central to what is happening in terms of post-war reordering – might be very productive.

Heike Paul: Professor Koikari, would you also like to expand on what is your sense about what needs to be done?

Mire Koikari: When I started doing my research of the mainland occupation of Japan, the so-called *senryō kenkyū* was a main context, a Japanese-American scholarly network centred on studies of the post-war US occupation of Japan, or *senryō*. The problem is that this *senryō kenkyū* has been dis-articulated from other instances of occupation, including the occupation of Okinawa. The problem occurs in an opposite direction as well: those involved in studies of the occupation of Okinawa are not necessarily talking with scholars on the mainland occupation. This leads to various misunderstandings and misrecognitions, including the notion that there was no exchange, no connection what-soever, between mainland Japan and Okinawa during the occupation years. In reality, there were many exchanges between the two in terms of people, ideas, resources, etc. Also, the occupation of Korea, which Susan mentioned, is out of the purview of analysis of *senryō kenkyū*, and so are the occupation of Germany or Italy.
Another issue is that "cold war" and "cold war culture" are not fully integrated into dis-cussions of occupied or post-occupation Japan. It is as if the cold war never happened. One Japanese scholar, who speculates on the reason of this omission, states that Japanese academia, and the populace in general, really do not talk about the cold war, because the topic forces us to think about Korea, Taiwan, and other areas that were colonized by Japan prior to 1945 and placed under US rule after 1945. So not talking about the cold war feeds into historical amnesia. This is another issue I keep thinking about. I wonder, if we look at these different occupations all at the same time, what new questions and insight might emerge?

6. Questions of the Archive

Heike Paul: Perhaps you can speak to questions of the archive and to the culture – as well as media-specificity of your sources. What is the most unusual source that has

helped you understand the post-war moment and its consequences for all groups involved, men and women, Americans, Japanese, or Germans, military personnel and civilians? Professor Koikari, having been in conversation with you for a while I have come to admire the breadth of your sources. Professor Carruthers, you have stated in an interview that you somewhat enjoy chasing after "unpublished sources" (and that you have become acquainted with the US through the archives and through visiting them in different parts of the country). In your work you engage with the perhaps cliché notion of a "good war" (referring to the somewhat ironic title of Studs Terkel's oral history collection) followed by a "good occupation", the equally ironic title of your own book. Has this irony always been understood?

Susan Carruthers: My book *The Good Occupation* has been translated into Japanese recently, and I noticed, although I don't read Japanese – hang on, one second [retrieves book] – I have noticed that they've given it a question mark. Sorry, I lost my chain of thought in my excitement to show off my Japanese question mark, just in case anyone misses that it was an ironic title!
Well, I adopted a very eclectic approach to gathering sorts of materials, because I was interested both in public narratives around occupation and the subjectivities of occupation soldiers, which make up the bulk of what's explored in the book. And I was keen to try to find men and women of as many different ranks as possible, different regional backgrounds, different ethnicities, and so on. Also, I read fiction, I looked at movies, and these were sources I used a lot in my work: but, for me, what was different about the research for this book was that I had never really used what might be called "ego-documents" so extensively. So, that was some of the most rich and eye-opening material. These came from letters home that were written by men and women in uniform, unpublished memoirs, and particularly diaries.
So, you asked if we could identify, perhaps, one especially revealing document that we had happened upon. And I guess I'll just limit myself to two finds that were differently exiting to me. One of them was a diary, which was kept by a nineteen-year-old boy who spent his nineteenth year in Korea, where he was sent in 1946. He was obviously drafted and had no desire to be an occupation soldier in Korea. He wasn't any sort of elite and hadn't even had time yet to have gone to college. But, because it was particularly hard to find those sorts of materials relating to the occupation of Korea, it was especially instructive to read what an ordinary poor white southern boy would think he was doing by occupying Korea. And in that era of his young life. And his diary is like the diary of teenagers everywhere: it's full of angst about his relationship with other boys, with girls, and it gave me a different way of thinking about sexual relationships. He spends a lot of time in his diary agonizing about whether to sleep with Korean girls or not. The women that he and his buddies are sleeping with, and paying money to for their sexual services, are also in and out of their house all the time – they're doing domestic work for them, in a sense, they are friends, in a particular kind of a way. And he is clearly experiencing some male peer pressure to have sex, and this complicated my understanding of American

men and their sexual relationships with women overseas. That far from being exercises in dominance – assertions of power that happened easily for the men and were uncomplicatedly gratifying – I was really struck by the torment that this young boy experiences about what he is doing there, and particularly about what he is doing having or not having sex with Korean women. So, I found this a very useful diary.

In terms of the biggest sort of pleasure of a completely different kind that I got was at the Yale special collections, the Beinecke Library. So, a novel that I have written about, both in the book and in a separate stand-alone essay, is John Hersey's *A Bell for Adano*, which functioned both in de facto and quite explicit ways as an affective primer for men who are going to be occupying all sorts of places. It was based on two weeks that Hersey spent with American occupation forces in the invasion and occupation of Sicily in 1943. And on his return, he wrote a novel which was intended to encourage Americans to think about occupation as a liberalizing undertaking that they should feel positively about. The novel quickly became a bestselling, multi-dramatized, radio-serialized, movie-ized cultural phenomenon. As Hersey became master of one of the Yale colleges in later life, all of his private papers were there, and I was eager to read the correspondence he received about the novel. And there were sack-fulls of mail that arrived. He was only 24 when he writes this: it was his third book, but first novel. A lot of the letters he got were from young men and women, school children, some occupation soldiers, thanking him for giving them positive resources to think favourably about the thing that they otherwise had much more anxious and edgy apprehensions about. In the midst of all of these eclectic letters, there is a letter from Albert Einstein – and it was like "oh my goodness!" It hadn't been highlighted in the finding aid for this collection. So I was taken aback to be handling an actual letter written by Albert Einstein to John Hersey, thanking him for his tremendous service to humanity, saying that he had stayed up until 5 a.m., reading *A Bell for Adano,* and that everyone should read it, because, yes, America is going to have to occupy places after the war, and the future of humanity lies with men like the fictional character Major Victor Joppolo. And it was just like "wow", I am handling something by Einstein! But imagine that: You're 24 years old and Einstein writes you this mash note saying he stayed up 'til 5 in the morning because he couldn't put your novel down. So: archive fever, indeed!

Heike Paul: Really amazing! Professor Koikari, you have examined material that no one has ever looked at. For instance, a plethora of objects of popular culture, such as magazines, from Okinawa.

Mire Koikari: The archives have always been a source of inspiration. In addition to historical records, museum artefacts have often sparked my curiosity. In the case of the US occupation of Japan, there is a place called MacArthur Memorial with an archive in Northern Virginia.[1] It is MacArthur's personal repository. The first time I visited the

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1   MacArthur Memorial (Norfolk, Virginia): https://www.macarthurmemorial.org/.

memorial (in the 1990s), their exhibit on the MacArthur family made me think about a genealogy of empire. As we all know, Douglas was the supreme commander in occupied Japan, but his father was the military governor of the Philippines following the US-Philippines War, and his grandfather fought in the American Indian Wars in the West. This presentation was followed by – and this was the most surprising and interesting part for me back then – a series of displays of numerous gifts General Douglas MacArthur received from people in various countries in Asia. Among them was this large tapestry, a portrait of MacArthur, made up of tiny needlepoints. It represented Asian gratitude to the American General in a gendered manner, telling complicated stories about memory, masculinity, empire, history, etc.

In terms of Okinawa, as I already talked about, I am intrigued by various military materials – planes, blankets, shell casings, coke bottles – that were turned into household objects. You would find many of them in a city museum called "Histreet", a combination of "history" and "street". It's located in a place formerly called Koza and now Okinawa City.[2] It was the place where a major riot took place by Okinawans against the US military in 1970. Part of the exhibit talks about how some African-American military personnel, who were Black Panther members, sided with Okinawans during this uprising. This and other museums and archives in Okinawa reflect people's strong commitment to historical preservation where alternative voices, stories, and histories are kept alive.

7. New Scholarship / New Books

Heike Paul: Professor Koikari, you have just published *Gender, Culture, and Disaster in Post-3.11 Japan* (Bloomsbury 2020). How does this book continue the narrative of gendered and racialized scenarios in post-war Japan? Which role, if any, does the US play?

Mire Koikari: At the most superficial level, the connection is that I was doing research for my second book in Okinawa, when I began to notice various discourses and practices concerning post-3/11 recovery, reconstruction, and resilience that were circulating in mainland Japan. At a deeper level, after I had studied the mainland occupation of Japan (which took place in the early cold war years) and the occupation of Okinawa (at the height of the cold war) and associated dynamics of militarization in both, my next question was: what about militarization after the cold war was over? During the disaster in 2011, the "Operation Tomodachi" ("Operation Friendship") that mobilized the American military and Japanese self-defence forces was a salient factor, and militarized and militarizing dynamics continued after 3.11. Thus, 3.11 and post-3.11 mobilization became a topic of my third book.

Post-3.11 mobilization heavily targeted women. They were told how to refortify their homes, re-strengthen their families, and re-vitalize their communities. Women were ex-

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pected to build "resilience" against earthquakes, tsunamis, and other emergencies and crises such as terrorist attacks. Women, and also children, were mobilized to the project of crisis containment and national securitization in a manner very similar to cold war civil defence in the US.

And just as it was the case with the US occupation of Okinawa, in post-3.11 Japan, Hawai'i became one of the offshore sites selected to resolve this national crisis. The Tōhoku region, which includes Miyagi, Fukushima, and Iwate, were hit by the earth-quake and tsunami, and then by nuclear meltdown. Volunteer groups from the region as well as Hawai'i – among them Japanese Americans – started coordinating to send children in the three prefectures to Hawai'i in the name of "healing tourism". Because of its reputation as a "paradise", Hawai'i was considered an ideal place to regenerate these children's bodies and spirits. The same kind of regenerative discourse was articulated by Americans at the turn of the last century, whereby Hawai'i became an ideal destination for the white elites to travel to and recuperate.

The significance of Hawai'i in post-3.11 Japan was not limited to this. In Fukushima, there is a resort called "Spa Resort Hawaiians", where a group of Japanese hula dancers perform a variety of Polynesian-style dancing. It was established in the 1950s, when the region, once a coal mining field, began to decline as a result of "energy revolution" which initiated a shift to petroleum. To save the community, one of the mining compa-nies began a tourism venture, opening a Hawai'i-themed resort named Jōban Hawaiian Centre, which was later renamed Spa Resort Hawaiians. Following the 2011 disaster, the resort became a gendered symbol of recovery and reconstruction. The dancers started travelling across Japan, spreading the spirit of "Aloha" and "healing" (or regenerating) the crisis-ridden nation. Hula, part of indigenous culture in Hawai'i, was appropriated to cope with the 3.11 crisis, which in so many ways has stemmed from Japanese post-war arrangement (which emphasized, among other things, the use of nuclear energy produc-tion). Japanese hula dancers came to embody "resilience" of the nation. Hawai'i, an island community in the middle of the Pacific, has come to play a part in Japanese body politics, and not for the first time.

Heike Paul: Professor Carruthers, your new book (forthcoming with Cambridge UP) examines Dear John letters in US military culture: that is, women's break-up letters become a key "to unlock larger themes about wartime intimacy and infidelity". The women at home, they probably do not differentiate between deployments in Japan and Germany. How are these letters offering us a more nuanced understanding of the war and post-war period?

Susan Carruthers: I am laughing because, counterintuitively enough, I've had an un-seemly amount of fun reading about Dear John letters. But one of the intriguing things about writing a history of Dear John letters is that there are almost no Dear John letters to be read. So that's perhaps the first thing I would say.

But I became very interested in soldiers and their correspondences through the occupa-tion project. This book about Dear John letters isn't really a book about post-war occupa-

tion in any explicit or direct way. But it is about romantic relationships in wartime, and how they're sustained – or severed – by writing. And it is also about storytelling. Perhaps my biggest epiphany in this journey of discovery about Dear John letters is that the Dear John letter is far better understood as the male oral tradition than as a female epistolary genre. So, men give us pretty much everything we know about Dear John letters because they tell stories about them. They invent apocryphal versions of Dear John letters; they have elaborated all sort of rituals for excoriating the women who write them, and so on. This book is my sixth, and it is much more explicitly about gender than any of my previous books, although gender is, obviously, a highly operative category in my occupation book as well. It's tragic in some ways and takes both me and readers into some very distressing terrain: the final chapter, particularly, deals with something that the military in recent years has been grappling with, which is about the relationship between romantic intimacy, or the implosion thereof, and suicide. And that's a long-running motif in discourses around Dear John letters: the relationship between romantic break-ups and men's mental health breakdowns, and the sometimes lethal consequences ascribed to Dear John letters.

To make another connection with Mire's project: discourses of resilience turn out, of course, to be very powerful in that regard, as well. As I am sure you all know, in the last decade or so, the US military, like many other institutions around the world, has really seized on "resilience" with a capital R as the inner state that the people should be psychologically striving to achieve; or that the military as an institution should be working to impart in not only men and women in uniform, but also spouses, family members, and so on. So I am also interested in how that discourse of resilience gets configured in terms of disciplining emotional life in wartime. How often women end up being targeted as those who have failed in their emotional obligations in wartime and may even be deemed culpable of in effect killing, from long range, the men with whom they break off relationships during wartime service.

8. Re-Education in the Classroom

Heike Paul: For a graduate seminar on the two occupations, what would be some of the sources that you would assign your students to read? A re-education curriculum may be important precisely because this historical period has been instrumentalized in so many ways. It is currently discussed with renewed poignancy – for instance, in suggesting a new Marshall Plan for the US and Europe. What should be canonical reading among the sources of and about the time of the post-war?

Susan Carruthers: Since I came to the University of Warwick, where I have been since 2017, I have taught a final-year undergraduate special subject module, which is called "Post-War: Aftermaths of World War II", which I adapted from a master's course that I taught at Rutgers. So, I used this opportunity to problematize periodizations, to think through everything that makes "post-war" a very tricky way of periodizing time, because,

of course, what was "post" in some places wasn't at all "post" in others. At what point could we satisfactorily say, the war was "post"? Arguably, that moment has not yet arrived and will not and cannot ever arrive.

I really enjoy teaching this course because the point of special subject module, as it is understood in a British history curriculum, is to thoroughly integrate primary and secondary sources. So, you invited us to think about what materials we would imaginatively offer to use at graduate students. I have used the same sorts of sources for both the master's students at Rutgers and my final-year undergrads at Warwick. I tend to liberally expose them to sources of a whole array of different kinds: we watch some films, I show them *Die Todesmühlen*, we talk about re-education, and we think about the project of exposing, in a very visceral way, atrocities perpetrated in Nazi extermination concentration camps and the politics of that venture. We also watch other films: we watch *Drunken Angel*; I invite them to watch *A Foreign Affair*; *Teahouse of the August Moon*, a film that I find particularly difficult to watch, with the "yellow face" drag that Marlon Brando wears as an Okinawan character. And I'm very interested in the connections between *A Bell for Adano*, the John Hersey novel I mentioned before, and *Teahouse of the August Moon*. Vern Snider, who wrote the novel on which the movie was based, himself spent time as an occupation officer in Okinawa, and in interviews he expressly cited Hersey as the most instructive training manual that he received to prime him for this venture. There are very obvious parallels in terms of plot and also the sentimentality of occupation: in which it turns out that everyone's visions for the post-war good life converge, that no one can tell anymore who is who, which is such a ludicrous lie to imagine that Okinawans and Americans dissolved into one. Marlon Brando's yellow face attempts to makes literal this vision of erased of racial distinction… fading into nothingness.

Those are some of the different sorts of primary sources. I also encourage them to read a lot of contemporary newspaper sources, magazines, photojournalism as well as historiography that cuts across all the occupations. So, we do talk post-war Korea, as well.

Heike Paul: Professor Koikari, in your teaching, how do you refer to the period that we are talking about?

Mire Koikari: I talk about post-war occupations and other instances of colonial occupation in my class on feminism and empire. One thing that I've tried to do with my students is to make them see the history of American occupation in Japan and Okinawa in relation to feminism, particularly imperial feminism. For this, Beate Sirota Gordon's book *The Only Woman in the Room* and her film *The Gift from Beate* can be used to discuss the mid-twentieth century manifestation of imperial feminism. From there, you can go back in history and try to see what was happening in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. For instance, a story of Mary French Sheldon, an American female explorer at the turn of the century, can be meaningfully compared to Gordon's because of their similarities. Following her alleged discovery of a lake in Africa, French Sheldon became well known as an adventurer, explorer, and scientist, being associated with the National Geographic Society and developing a career as a public lecturer. She became

a symbol of New Woman, a feminist icon, whose discourses and practices were deeply embedded in racist and imperialist dynamics of the day.

In turn, the dynamics embodied by Gordon and Sheldon can be compared to those in the twenty-first century. One interesting example is the project, Beauty without Borders, whose members' activities are depicted in a documentary film *Beauty Academy of Kabul* by a British film maker, Liz Mermin. The project sent a group of American and British hairstylists to post-Taliban Kabul to teach Afghan women American-style cosmetics in the name of women's liberation. There is a book written by one of the participants in the project, Deborah Rodriguez's *Kabul Beauty School – An American Woman Goes Behind the Veil*. The Beauty without Borders repeats some of the tropes Beate Sirota Gordon and Mary French Sheldon articulated, with additional layers of neoliberalism and globalization informing its operations. So looking across these three examples can be a useful exercise.

9. The Future and the Past of Occupation Studies

Heike Paul: In closing and to both of you, and this is in terms of new collaborative projects in the field. How do you see such things as "global occupation studies" or "global re-education studies" continuing to develop in the next decade?

Mire Koikari: In terms of collaborative research, we know about a project at Nottingham University in the UK under the leadership of Jeremy Taylor. That project has looked at sound and space, with specific topics ranging from photography to music to architecture. I don't think he, or anybody else, is doing anything at all about taste, that is, food-related topics. Since food studies seems to be an expanding field, and since I've looked at home economics, nutritional studies, and bodies and biopolitics in the context of occupation, there seems to be a lot of potentially interesting questions and topics there. I also wonder about children and juvenile culture in the occupation contexts. Not so much about schooling/education policies set by the occupiers, but rather more about war-orphans, children involved in a black market, mixed-race children, as well as occupation-era proliferations of American snacks, candies, chocolate, toys, and other things. Children making "friends" with the occupying soldiers could be part of the discussion as well. When I look at post-war essays – written by ordinary people and submitted to the newspapers or included in collections of life narratives – there seems to be quite a bit going on in terms of juvenile culture.

Yet another question is: What are some of the impacts of the occupation on knowledge-making institutions? How did intellectuals who had to contribute to Japan's empire-building go on to collaborate with foreign occupiers, re-establishing their authority and taking part in new empire building in the post-war context?

Susan Carruthers: Where I think more collaborative work might be done is not only to extend the range of what I talked before, with Italy and Korea in the matrix of US

occupation, but also obviously to think about the other powers who were involved in post-war occupation. I went to quite a useful conference in 2018, I think, the result of which was this book, *Transforming Occupation in the Western Zones of Germany* edited by Camilo Ehrlichman and Christopher Knowles, scholars who also study French and British occupations of post-war Germany. You know, we haven't mentioned the Soviet Union as an occupying power, though the United States construed its cold war projections of power in opposition to Soviet Power. For obvious reasons, since we're all Americanists, our conversation has foregrounded the US as the dominant player in post-war occupation. But thinking about the contributions of not only other European countries, but also the way in which imperial troops were also deployed as occupation forces, might be interesting to think through in terms of the subject positions of soldiers of colour from the United States, whom we mentioned before.

Having taken "time out" from occupation to write my Dear John book, I am planning to go back to post-war occupation for my next project, which will be about clothing – "refashioning the post-war world". So I was particularly intrigued to hear about that parachute being repurposed into the bridal gown. I agree that food is a really rich area that scholars are increasingly exploring, but we also need to consider clothing as an important space in which ideas about identity – about both militarization and the afterlives of military apparel – are being refashioned. What are the different meanings that people bring to clothing, the way that clothing itself is an artery of power, how the United States disposed of military surplus, using clothing as a disciplinary tool in some ways? So, I would be happy to engage in collaborative work on these sorts of questions.

Heike Paul: Thank you, both, for this wonderful conversation!

LITERATURBERICHT | REVIEW ARTICLE

Neue europäische Geschichte(n) wagen*

Corinna R. Unger

Europa ist in der Krise, sind sich viele Beobachter in Europa und in anderen Teilen der Welt sicher. Spätestens der Brexit scheint bewiesen zu haben, dass sich das „Projekt Europa" in einer Zerreißprobe befindet und der integrationspolitische Optimismus der 1990er und 2000er Jahre voreilig war. Für Historiker:innen, die sich mit der europäischen Geschichte im 20. Jahrhundert und mit der Geschichte der europäischen Integration beschäftigen, werfen diese Entwicklungen grundsätzliche Fragen auf. Inwiefern haben die normativen Annahmen, die der europäischen Integration in der zweiten Hälfte des 20. Jahrhunderts zugrunde lagen und die Strukturen der EEG, EG und EU geprägt haben, die Perspektive von Historiker:innen als Zeitgenossen der Integration beeinflusst? Müssen die etablierten Narrative vollständig ersetzt werden? Wie lassen sich neue Perspektiven auf die Geschichte Europas und der europäischen Integration entwickeln, die nicht vom linearen Integrationsfortschritt ausgehen und nicht ausschließlich die Entscheidungsprozesse einer vornehmlich männlichen Elite in Brüssel wiedergeben, sondern die Komplexität dessen berücksichtigen, was der Begriff „Europa" so knapp und kaum je präzise umreißt: eine Vielzahl an sozialen, ethnischen, religiösen Gruppen,

an Sprachen, Kulturen, Wirtschaftsformen, politischen und rechtlichen Systemen, und einen Kontinent mit dramatischen geographischen und naturräumlichen Unterschieden und engen Verbindungen zu anderen Weltregionen. Wie lässt sich all das in eine kohärente Interpretation der europäischen Geschichte zusammenführen, die mehr ist als ein Lexikon Europas?

In den letzten Jahren lässt sich eine zunehmende Dynamik auf dem Gebiet der europäischen Geschichtsschreibung beobachten. Eines der originellsten Projekte, eine „alternative" europäische Geschichte zu entwickeln, ist die von Johan Schot und Philip Scranton herausgegebene sechsbändige Reihe *Making Europe: Technology and Transformations, 1850–2000*. Die Reihe fußt auf Aktivitäten, die bereits in den späten 1990er Jahren im Umfeld der Foundation for the History of Technology in Eindhoven begannen und mit Unterstützung der damaligen European Science Foundation durchgeführt wurden. Inzwischen sind alle sechs Bände erschienen.

Making Europe hat zum Ziel, eine Gegenerzählung zur traditionellen politischen Integrationsgeschichte Europas zu formulieren. Eine solche traditionelle Geschichte beginnt gemeinhin mit dem Aufkommen paneuropäischer Ideen zu Beginn des 20. Jahrhunderts, die sich in Reaktion auf den Ersten Weltkrieg verstärkten. Sie verfolgt dann die zunehmende Integration auf politischer Ebene nach, an deren Ende die Durchsetzung der EU-Institutionen steht. Der Zweite Weltkrieg erscheint aus dieser Sicht als Unterbrechung des Integrationsprozesses, aber auch als Antrieb, den Nationalismus endgültig zu überwinden. In Abkehr von dieser teleologischen Sichtweise wollen die Herausgeber und Autor:innen der Reihe *Making Europe* ergründen, wie Technologie und Technik europäische Gesellschaften und Länder miteinander in Verbindung brachten, wie weit diese Verbindungen reichten, wer hinter ihnen stand und welche Interessen und Logiken mit ihnen verknüpft waren. Wie Schot und Scranton in ihrer Einleitung zu der Reihe betonen, geht es ihnen vor allem darum, Kontinuitäten sichtbar zu machen, die über die Weltkriege und den Kalten Krieg hinwegbestanden. Der Technologiebegriff, mit dem sie arbeiten, umfasst nicht nur Technik und Maschinen, sondern auch Menschen, Werte, Ideen, Fähigkeiten und Wissen. Das Europa-Verständnis, das der Reihe zugrunde liegt, ist eng mit diesem inklusiven Technologiebegriff verknüpft. Die Herausgeber argumentieren, dass ab der zweiten Hälfte des 19. Jahrhunderts eine Phase der Globalisierung einsetzte, die sich wesentlich den neuen Technologien im Bereich der Kommunikation und des Transports verdankte, die in Europa ihren Ursprung hatten. Es ist diese Idee von „Europa in der Welt", auf der die Reihe fußt.[1]

Jeweils zwei, in einem Fall drei Autor:innen haben die sechs Bände gemeinsam verfasst. Es ist ihnen gelungen, die immense Herausforderung der Co-Autorschaft zu meistern und eine gemeinsame Sprache zu finden, die weit über den Gebrauch des Englischen hinausreicht. Die internationale Zusammensetzung der Schreibteams bedeutet, dass nicht eine „nationale" Schule oder Perspektive dominiert, sondern dass die Bände selbst trans-

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1   Johan Schot/Philip Scranton, Making Europe: An Introduction to the Series, in Ruth Oldenziel/Mikael Hård (eds.), Consumers, Tinkerers, Rebels: The People Who Shaped Europe, Basingstoke 2018 (2013), pp. ix–xv.

nationale Produkte sind. Der Bereitschaft der Autor:innen, sich auf diese intellektuelle und soziale Herausforderung einzulassen, gebührt großer Respekt.

Ein weiteres herausragendes Merkmal der Reihe ist der Wert, den die Herausgeber und Autor:innen auf die visuelle Gestaltung der Bände gelegt haben. Alle sechs Bände sind wunderbar groß gesetzt und gut lesbar. Sie enthalten eine Vielzahl an Abbildungen, die nicht nur der Illustration dienen, sondern als Quellen verwendet werden und in die Diskussion integriert sind. Nicht in allen Bänden ist die Auflösung der Abbildungen gleich gut. Allerdings existiert eine Website des Projekts *Inventing Europe: European Digital Museum for Science & Technology*, das Johan Schot initiiert und an dem mehrere der Autor:innen beteiligt sind; die dort vorhandenen digitalen Ausstellungen enthalten viele der in den Büchern verwendeten Abbildungen.[2]

Inhaltlich stellen die sechs Bände einen Wissens- und Informationsschatz dar. Die sechs Themen bzw. Bereiche, die sie behandeln, sind Folgende: *Consumers, Tinkerers, Rebels: The People who Shaped Europe* (Ruth Oldenziel und Mikael Hård, 2013); *Building Europe on Expertise: Innovators, Organizers, Networkers* (Martin Kohlrausch und Helmuth Trischler, 2014); *Writing the Rules for Europe: Experts, Cartels, and International Organizations* (Wolfram Kaiser und Johan Schot, 2014); *Europe's Infrastructure Transition: Economy, War, Nature* (Per Högselius, Arne Kaijser und Erik van der Vleuten, 2016); *Europeans Globalizing: Mapping, Exploiting, Exchanging* (Maria Paula Diego und Dirk van Laak, 2016); *Communicating Europe: Technologies, Information, Events* (Andreas Fickers und Pascal Griset, 2019). Es wäre interessant gewesen, etwas zu den Überlegungen zu erfahren, die zu dieser Konzeption geführt haben. Die sprechenden Titel der Bände sind attraktiv gewählt, wenn auch nicht immer selbsterklärlich; in einigen Fällen geht der Inhalt darüber hinaus, was die Titel erwarten lassen.

Gemeinsam bilden die sechs Bände Perspektiven der Technikgeschichte, der Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte, der Politik- und Kulturgeschichte, der Kolonial- und Imperialgeschichte, der Wissens- und Kommunikationsgeschichte, der Geschlechtergeschichte und der Umweltgeschichte ab. Die „technologische Linse", aber auch die Vielfältigkeit und der Umfang der Bibliographien, auf denen die Bände fußen, erlauben frische und oftmals überraschende Einblicke und Erkenntnisse. Jeder einzelne Band hält (selbstverständlich je nach Vorkenntnis der Lesenden) viel Neues bereit, und vieles, das schon bekannt sein mag, wird auf neue Weise präsentiert und eingeordnet. Den Anspruch, eine neue Perspektive auf die europäische Geschichte des langen 20. Jahrhunderts zu bieten, lösen die sechs Bände gemeinsam überzeugend ein. Nicht in allem handelt es sich um eine vollständige Alternative zu etablierten Narrativen. Die berühmten Gestalten der europäischen Integrationsgeschichte kommen durchaus vor, und auch die zentralen politischen, wirtschaftlichen und kulturellen Ereignisse sowie die sozialen und intellektuellen Entwicklungen, die das Jahrhundert geprägt haben, sind in den Bänden abgebildet. Doch der Schwerpunkt liegt eben nicht auf den Akteuren, Strukturen und

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2   http://www.inventingeurope.eu/.

Zäsuren, an denen sich „orthodoxe" politische Geschichten Europas orientieren. Die Reihe nimmt die Materialität historischer Entwicklungen nicht nur ernst, sondern stellt sie ins Zentrum. Damit erlaubt sie es, etablierte Interpretationen zu hinterfragen, bestehende Argumente zu schärfen sowie Vernachlässigtes und Übersehenes zu integrieren. Kurzum: Die Reihe beweist, wie fruchtbar es sein kann, neue europäische Geschichte(n) zu wagen. Wie das funktioniert und wo das Wagnis an Grenzen stößt, soll im Folgenden anhand einiger ausgewählter Aspekte besprochen werden.

Das charakteristische Element der Reihe ist, wie erwähnt, sein technologiehistorischer Ansatz. Dem Selbstverständnis der anglophon geprägten History of Technology entsprechend nehmen die Herausgeber und Autor:innen eine kritische Haltung zu deterministischen Interpretationen der Technik ein. Sie betonen, dass Technologien aus spezifischen Situationen entstehen und Entscheidungen, Präferenzen und Interessen abbilden, nicht aber menschliches Handeln oder politische Entwicklungen vorherbestimmen. Die einzelnen Bände der Reihe unterscheiden sich im Grad der Dekonstruktion des Technologiebegriffs und der Form, wie sie mit Technik als Gegenstand umgehen. Um dies an zwei sehr unterschiedlichen Bänden zu verdeutlichen: *Europe's Infrastructure Transition* ist mit dem Fokus auf Eisenbahnen, Telegraphen, Radiowellen und Öl-Pipelines thematisch näher an der Technikgeschichte im klassischen Sinne. Allerdings erzählt der Band nicht in erster Linie die Geschichte der einzelnen Technologien, sondern konzentriert sich auf deren Entstehung und Einsatz im Kontext von Bevölkerungswachstum, Expansionspolitik und Kriegen. In *Consumers, Tinkerers, Rebels* unterdessen geht es nicht um Ingenieure, Erfinder und technologischen Fortschritt im Labor, sondern um Hauswirtschaftslehrerinnen, die neue Methoden in der Hausarbeit erprobten und um Fahrradfahrer, die sich Raum auf der Straße eroberten und damit eine neue Technologie in der Welt etablierten – also eine Perspektive „von unten", in denen die gemeinhin als politisch verstandenen Entwicklungen nur eine hintergründige Rolle spielen.

Gemeinsam bieten die sechs Bände sehr aufschlussreiche Perspektiven darauf, wie sich Technologie als Linse verwenden lässt, um alte Annahmen zu hinterfragen und neue Erkenntnisse zu gewinnen. Zugleich ist mit dem Fokus auf Technologie auch ein Risiko verbunden, nämlich dass die Geschichte weniger „politisch" und weniger konfliktreich erscheint, als sie häufig vermutlich war. Der Band *Writing the Rules for Europe* etwa konzentriert sich auf den sogenannten „technokratischen Internationalismus" und reproduziert dabei häufig die Selbstdarstellung der Experten, die sich als „unpolitisch" inszenierten. Die Autoren benennen zwar das Problem dieser Selbstinszenierung, lösen es aber letztlich nicht auf. Ein zweites Problem, das mit dem Fokus auf das grenzüberschreitende Potential der Technologie verbunden sein kann, liegt darin, die Existenz von Verbindungen über räumliche, politische und kulturelle Distanzen hinweg für sich genommen als positiv zu betrachten. So enthält etwa *Communicating Europe* einen Abschnitt mit dem Titel „Perverted Radio" (60), in dem es um den Einsatz des Radios in totalitären Diktaturen geht. Dahinter steht die Idee, dass Radiotechnik an sich dazu gemacht sei, die Kommunikation zwischen Menschen über Grenzen zu befördern, aber eben auch „missbraucht" werden könne. Umgekehrt erscheint es problematisch, den Suez-Kanal

als progressives Infrastrukturprojekt zu charakterisieren (*Writing the Rules*, 34), ohne auf die imperialen Interessen einzugehen, die den Kanal so prominent machten. Die Frage, wie Technologie und Technik bestehende Machtungleichgewichte verstärkten oder ermöglichten, steht im Mittelpunkt des Bandes *Europeans Globalizing*. So zeigen die Autor:innen etwa, wie die Kartographie als vermeintlich objektive Darstellungsform geographischer Gegebenheiten dazu diente, europäische Herrschaftsansprüche in anderen Teilen der Welt zu etablieren. Zugleich betonen sie, dass das Machtgefälle zwischen Europa und anderen Teile der Welt keineswegs selbstverständlich und allein durch die Existenz bestimmter Technologien möglich war. Sie zeigen, dass Konzepte wie Zirkulation und Adaption der historischen Realität weit mehr entsprechen als die Idee eines Europas, das durch seinen technologischen Vorsprung die Welt eroberte.

Wer waren die Menschen, die die Technologie entwickelten und einsetzten und auf diese Weise dazu beitrugen, „Europa zu machen"? Im Vorwort der Herausgeber werden sie als „Consumers and tinkerers; engineers and scientists; system-builders and inventors. Experts in technology, law, and business; communicators and entrepreneurs; politicians and ambassadors" beschrieben (Schot und Scranton, Introduction, xv). Entsprechend dominiert in den meisten Bänden eine Perspektive auf Eliten. Weniger erfahren die Leser:innen darüber, was die technologischen Maßnahmen und Interventionen für die Bevölkerungen verschiedener Regionen, Städte und Dörfer, für einzelne Menschen und soziale Gruppen bedeuteten und wie sie sich dazu verhielten. Der Fokus auf die genannten Akteure impliziert zudem, dass die Mehrzahl der Individuen, die in den Bänden behandelt werden, Männer sind. Dass Geschlechterdifferenzen und Gender-Normen erheblichen Einfluss sowohl auf die Geschichte der Technologie als auch auf die Art hatten, wie die Technologiegeschichte erzählt und erinnert wird, bleibt weitgehend unerwähnt. Einige Autor:innen verweisen zwar darauf, dass es Telefonistinnen und Sekretärinnen in Laboren, internationalen Organisationen und Unternehmen gewesen seien, die die technologisch hergestellten Verbindungen überhaupt erst ermöglichten. Doch diese marginale Erwähnung ist nicht nur politisch problematisch, sondern auch historisch irreführend. Zum einen gab es, wie wir inzwischen wissen, eine große Zahl von Frauen, die zur wissenschaftlichen Elite gehörten, aber nicht die entsprechende Anerkennung erhielten. Der männliche Erfinderkult funktioniert nur über den Ausschluss von Frauen aus der öffentlichen Wahrnehmung. Zum anderen bedeutet die Relegation der Frauen in den Bereich der technologischen Hilfsarbeiten, ihren Anteil an der wirtschaftlich-technischen Gesamtentwicklung zu negieren und zugleich die vermeintliche klare Trennung zwischen einer „männlichen" und einer „weiblichen", einer „öffentlichen" und einer „privaten" Welt zu reproduzieren. Wenn die Geschichte der Technologie als zentrale Linse dienen soll, die Geschichte Europas neu zu lesen, dann müssen diese künstlichen Gegensätze überwunden und die geschlechterspezifischen Konnotationen und Normen, die mit den Kategorien „Technik" und „Technologie" verbunden sind, systematisch analysiert und reflektiert werden. *Consumers, Tinkerers, Rebels* ist in dieser Hinsicht wegweisend. Der Band zeigt auf eindrucksvolle Weise, wie sich Gender als analytische Kategorie durchgängig und konstruktiv in die historische Perspektive integrieren

lässt und wie dadurch ganz neue Einblicke in die Geschichte möglich werden. Hier liegt ein Vorbildpotential für zukünftige Geschichten Europas.

Welches Verständnis von Europa legen die Bände zugrunde, und welches Bild von Europa entsteht aus ihren Analysen? Die meisten Autor:innen gehen nicht von einem statischen Europa-Begriff aus, sondern betonen, dass sich die Wahrnehmung dessen wandelte, was historisch als Europa verstanden wurde. Das gilt besonders für den Band *Europeans Globalizing*, der danach fragt, wie die Erfahrungen, die Europäer in und mit der Welt machten, dazu beitrugen, dass bestimmte Strukturen und Formen als europäisch zu gelten begannen. Andere Bände orientieren sich demgegenüber stärker an technologischen Strukturen, die bestimmte Regionen Europas miteinander verbanden oder aber von dem, was als Europa galt, ausschlossen. So heißt es zum Beispiel in *Writing the Rules for Europe*: "The Soviet Union was never part of the European Railway technological zone. It kept its own gauge and set of standards. In this sense the Soviet Union was not part of Europe" (148).

Wie auch immer die Leser:innen zu der Frage stehen mögen, ob Russland zu Europa gehört, erweist sich die Linse der Technologie grundsätzlich als geeignetes Mittel, um die etablierten politischen Kategorien, die lange die Interpretation europäischer Geschichte dominiert haben, zu hinterfragen. Dies gilt vor allem für die Dichotomie Ost-West, die spätestens im Kalten Krieg zu einem wesentlichen Bestandteil der Geschichtsschreibung wurde, und für die Idee eines von West- über Mittel- nach Osteuropa verlaufenden Entwicklungsgefälles. In deutlicher Abgrenzung zu solchen Perspektiven charakterisiert *Making Europe* Ostmittel- und Osteuropa weder als homogene Einheit noch als rückständig. Zwar gibt es in einigen Bänden Hinweise darauf, dass Phänomene, die gemeinhin mit Westeuropa assoziiert werden, zumindest implizit als Norm zugrunde liegen. Aber da es den Autor:innen nicht in erster Linie darum geht, zu zeigen, wie sich ideologische Differenz in technologischen Ansätzen abbildete, sondern sie die Technologien an sich in den Mittelpunkt stellen, vermeiden sie vereinfachende Ableitungen und zeigen Ähnlichkeiten zwischen vermeintlich ganz unterschiedlichen Systemen auf.

Süd- und Nordeuropa erhalten insgesamt nicht ganz so viel Aufmerksamkeit wie West- und Ostmittel- und Osteuropa, und die einzelnen Bände binden das jeweils zugrunde liegende Europa unterschiedlich stark in die Welt ein. In allen Bänden finden sich Hinweise auf Verbindungen zu den Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika, die mit Blick auf technologische Entwicklungen im 20. Jahrhundert maßgeblich waren. Die vielbeschriebene Spannung zwischen Faszination und Kritik, Austausch und Abgrenzung von den USA und „amerikanischen Verhältnissen" prägte auch in diesem Fall die Wahrnehmung europäischer Beobachter, Experten, Techniker und Ingenieure. Während Amerika und die Sowjetunion häufig Quelle technologischer Inspiration waren, erscheinen die anderen Teile der Welt in *Making Europe* eher als Regionen, in denen Europäer neue Technologien einsetzten. So enthält etwa *Communicating Europe* ein Bild aus dem Jahr 1932, das die damals größte Radioanlage der Welt zeigt, die in Bandung stand (98). Der Standort der Anlage war kein Zufall. Die Kolonialmächte waren aus wirtschaftlichen Gründen und im Interesse des Machterhalts darauf angewiesen, innerhalb kurzer Zeit und über

große Distanzen Nachrichten auszutauschen. Diese und ähnliche Beispiele würden sich anbieten, um zu zeigen, wie koloniale und imperiale Strukturen und Praktiken neue technologische Entwicklungen beförderten, deren Ergebnisse in den Kolonien erprobt wurden und häufig ihren Weg zurück nach Europa fanden. Diese Perspektive eines ungleichen, aber dynamischen Verhältnisses zwischen Europa, Asien, Lateinamerika, und Afrika, das die europäischen Gesellschaften mindestens ebenso sehr prägte wie die „außereuropäischen" Weltregionen, ist charakteristisch für den Band *Europeans Globalizing*. In anderen Bänden kommt der imperialen und kolonialen Geschichte Europas – die ja nicht auf die offiziellen Imperial- und Kolonialmächte beschränkt war, wie in den letzten Jahren zahlreiche Studien gezeigt haben – eher eine nachgeordnete Rolle zu.

Mit dem Fokus auf das „kontinentale" Europa verknüpft ist die zentrale Rolle des Nationalstaats und nationalstaatlicher Kategorien, die sich in vielen Bänden der Reihe beobachten lässt. Vielfach definiert der Nationalstaat die Akteure als „Schweizer", „Iren", „Portugiesen" oder „Polen". Auch in den Bänden, die sich auf die transnationalen Verbindungen zwischen Personen und Organisationen konzentrieren, bleiben die nationalen Strukturen sichtbar. Damit zeigen die Autor:innen, wie sich transnationale Geschichten schreiben lassen, ohne darüber den Nationalstaat in seiner historischen Bedeutung zu übersehen oder zu relativieren. Kritisch anzumerken ist jedoch, dass die meisten Bände die Vielfalt nationalstaatlicher Formen und die Entstehung zahlreicher europäischer Nationalstaaten aus früheren Imperien so gut wie unerwähnt lassen. Angesichts des Untersuchungszeitraums von 1850 bis zum Ende des 20. Jahrhunderts wäre eine systematischere Einbeziehung des Habsburgischen, des Osmanischen und des Russischen Reiches naheliegend gewesen. Einerseits ließe sich so den technologischen Einflüssen aus und den Wechselbeziehungen mit der asiatischen und der arabischen Welt nachgehen. Andererseits wäre es eine Möglichkeit, die Kontinuitäten und Brüche zwischen den ehemaligen Imperien und den neuen Nationalstaaten nach 1919 in den Blick zu nehmen, etwa anhand des Fortbestehens ehemals imperialer Forschungsinstitute oder mit Blick auf technologische Alleingänge unter national(istisch)en Vorzeichen. Solch eine Perspektive, die imperiale und koloniale Bezüge systematisch integriert, könnte dazu beitragen, das von einem westeuropäischen „Idealtyp" geprägte Bild des Nationalstaats und seiner Wesensmerkmale zu nuancieren. Ein solchermaßen differenziertes Verständnis des Nationalen wäre auch für die Analyse transnationaler und supranationaler Phänomene ein Gewinn.

Dies führt zurück zum Ausgangspunkt dieser Besprechung: dem Ziel der Reihe, eine neue Geschichte Europas zu entwickeln, die nicht mit der politischen Integrationsgeschichte Westeuropas identisch ist. Die Autoren von *Writing the Rules for Europe* positionieren sich am deutlichsten zur europäischen Integrationsgeschichte, indem sie es sich zur Aufgabe machen, die Europäische Union zu „dezentrieren" (1). Entsprechend spielen die Europäische Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft, die Europäische Gemeinschaft und die Europäische Union eine eher nachgeordnete Rolle. Mehr Aufmerksamkeit erhalten demgegenüber die europäischen intergouvernementalen und transnationalen Organisationen, die auf die eine oder andere Weise an technologischen Entwicklungen

beteiligt waren. *Building Europe on Expertise* etwa behandelt die Vergemeinschaftung natur- und technikwissenschaftlicher Forschung im Kontext von EURATOM sowie der Europäischen Weltraumbehörde (ESA). Über die Reihe hinweg gesehen bleibt aber eher unscharf, welche Bedeutung die mit der heutigen EU assoziierten Organisationen für die technologisch interpretierte europäische Geschichte hatten. Hier ließe sich etwa an die Bemühungen von Europapolitikern und Unternehmensvertretern in den 1970er und 1980er Jahren denken, die EG auf dem Gebiet der Kommunikationstechnologie im Wettbewerb mit den USA und Japan zu stärken. Solche Themen bieten die Möglichkeit, danach zu fragen, ob und wie sich das Verständnis von Europa in transnationalen und intergouvernementalen Zusammenhängen veränderte, wie sich die beteiligten Akteure genuin europäische Forschung und Technologie vorstellten und ob und wie sich diese Vorstellungen in die Praxis übersetzten. Hier liegen auch Anknüpfungspunkte zum Konzept der Europäisierung, auf das sich einige Bände beziehen. In einigen Fällen dient es als analytischer Zugang, in anderen als Beschreibung. Dass die Reihe nicht mit einem vorgegebenen Verständnis von Europäisierung als zunehmender Verdichtung und Intensivierung europäischer Verbindungen arbeitet, entspricht ihrer anti-deterministischen Grundhaltung. Dennoch wäre es interessant, diese Perspektive vergleichend auf die sechs Bände anzulegen.

Wie die Besprechung nur einiger ausgewählter Aspekte deutlich gemacht haben sollte, bildet die Reihe *Making Europe* die Geschichte Europas im langen 20. Jahrhundert in eindrucksvoller Breite, Tiefe, Komplexität und Vielfalt ab. Die Kritik, die sich an einigen Bänden formulieren lässt, wird häufig von anderen Bänden aufgefangen. Nicht alle werden die technologische Linse des Projekts übernehmen wollen oder vollständig überzeugend finden, aber sie ist ungeheuer effektiv darin, aufzuzeigen, wie sich europäische Geschichte anders lesen und schreiben lässt. Darin liegt das große Verdienst von *Making Europe,* und dies macht es zu einem Meilenstein in der europäischen Geschichtsschreibung.

REZENSIONEN | REVIEWS

Nachdem in den letzten Jahren einige bemerkenswerte Studien zum Nordpazifiks im 18. und 19. Jh. in englischer und russischer Sprache erschienen sind, wie etwa Ilya Vinkovetskys *Russian America*[1], Ryan Tucker Jones *Empire of Extinction*[2] oder Andrei Grinëvs *Alyaska pod krylom dvuglavogo orla*[3], erfährt Alaska nun auch bei deutschsprachigen Historiker:innen ein aufgelebtes Interesse. Zuerst erschien 2016 mit Martina Winklers *Das Imperium und die Seeotter*[4] eine globalhistorische Geschichte Russisch-Amerikas, die sich mit den russländischen Raumvorstellungen des Nordpazifiks befasste. Nun legt Henner Kropp mit seiner Studie zu „Russlands Traum von Amerika" nach, die auf seiner an der Universität Regensburg eingereichten Dissertation beruht und ähnliche Fragen nach Imaginationen, Raumerfah-

rungen und konfligierenden Interessen im Nordpazifik stellt.

Kropp untersucht Alaska als territoriale und politische Schnittstelle der russländischen und US-amerikanischen Expansionsprozesse im 18. und 19. Jh., bis Russland 1876 seine einzige Überseekolonie an die USA verkaufte. Er findet einige Parallelen zwischen den Attitüden in St. Petersburg und Washington, D.C., von denen die vielleicht frappierendste die allgemeine Ratlosigkeit war, was man mit dem großen Land im Nordpazifik anfangen sollte. Während das ressourcenreiche Territorium für Russland als „Projektionsfläche für imperialpolitische Utopien" (S. 10) diente, mangelte es der St. Petersburger Entscheidungselite an politischem Interesse und an Entschlusskraft, die Überseekolonie in das imperiale System des Reiches zu integrieren. Für die Vereinigten Staaten hingegen, wo Alaska erst spät auf dem Expansionsradar erschien, war der Kauf ein logischer Abschluss siedlungskolonialistischer Territorialisierungsprozesse auf dem nordamerikanischen Kontinent, wenn auch der hohe Norden in Washington – ähnlich wie in St. Petersburg – von untergeordneter Priorität war (S. 75–77). Die Auflösung des Spannungsverhältnisses zwischen imperialen Vorstellungen und dem Mangel an einer entschiedenen Agenda, so Kropps zentrale These, war den russländischen

‚Kolonisten' in Alaska überlassen, die vor der unlösbaren Aufgabe standen, ökonomische und zivilisatorische Vorgaben zu erfüllen, ohne auf Rückendeckung aus St. Petersburg zählen zu können. Die Geschichte Russisch-Amerikas müsse daher unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Erfahrungswelten erzählt werden, die den Alltag der unmittelbaren Träger der russländischen Expansion vor Ort ausmachten (S. 11).

Zunächst jedoch führt Kropp den Leser in zwei Kapiteln, die den Alaska-Vorstellungen imperialer Eliten in Russland und den USA gewidmet sind, vom Nordpazifik nach Petersburg und Washington. In Russland, argumentiert er, projizierte man auf Alaska ein aus der sibirischen Expansion adaptiertes Raumverständnis. In der US-amerikanischen Hauptstadt wurde Alaska erst mit der Beilegung des Konfliktes um das Oregon Territory 1846 Teil des aktiven Wahrnehmungshorizontes, weil der nordamerikanische Kontinent lange nicht als zusammenhängender Handlungsraum wahrgenommen wurde. Die ‚Boston Men', amerikanische Händler und Walfänger von der Ostküste, erkannten jedoch das ökonomische Potential des nordpazifischen Raumes und etablierten Handelsbeziehungen mit der russischen Kolonie und den Alaska Natives.

Den russländischen ‚Kolonisten' selbst widmen sich zwei Kapitel: Kapitel 3 zeichnet ihre Reiserouten von Europa nach Alaska nach, die die Kolonie in globale Menschen- und Warenströme einflochten. Dabei folgt Kropp den Reiserouten berühmter Alaska-Reisender in Diensten des russländischen Reiches wie Krusenstern, Etholén und Wrangell. In Kapitel 4 kommen wir in Alaska an, wo sich den ‚Ko-

lonisten' eine Lebenswelt darbot, die sich signifikant von den Petersburger Kolonialphantasien unterschied. Auf der Grundlage von Tagebüchern und Briefen der Kolonialelite zeichnet Kropp einen Alltag, der vor allem durch die Auseinandersetzung mit multiplen Unsicherheiten geprägt war, die der Abgelegenheit und Ausgesetztheit der Region, den ambivalenten Beziehungen zu den Alaska Natives und ungeklärten Verhältnissen zu anderen imperialen Akteuren im Nordpazifik geschuldet waren. Kapitel 5 setzt sich schließlich mit anderen Schauplätzen russisch-amerikanischer Begegnungen im Nordpazifik auseinander: die russische Kolonie Fort Ross in Kalifornien, die Bedeutung Hawaiis für das Russische Reich sowie die Idee einer russischen Siedlung am Columbia River.

In seiner Betrachtung Alaskas wechselt Kropp zwischen den Brennweiten. Mit dem Weitwinkelobjektiv flechtet er die Geschichte des Nordpazifiks in globale imaginative und physische Territorialisierungsprozesse ein. Indem Kropp die US-amerikanische Westexpansion in direkten Bezug zum russischen Kolonialprojekt in Alaska setzt, ergeben sich globale Themenkomplexe, die nicht nur in der Alaska-Historiographie wiederkehrende Motive sind. So fragt er etwa nach der Rolle Alaskas als Schauplatz des Austarierens internationaler Interessen (S. 75) oder danach, ob Alaska als Sonderfall der imperialen Geschichte betrachtet werden soll – was Kropp eindeutig mit Nein beantwortet (S. 31–32). Er vermisst das Pendel zwischen privat-wirtschaftlichen und staatlich-politischen Motiven imperialer Akteure in Petersburg und Washington, und legt dar, wie sich die imperialen Phantasien von der russländischen Überseekolonie zu einer

begrenzten, punktuellen Beherrschung zwecks wirtschaftlicher Ausbeutung reduzierten. Andere Folgefragen hingegen werden nur kursorisch angegangen. Ohne die lästige Frage bemühen zu wollen, wieso gewisse Themen unangeschnitten bleiben, drängt sich doch die Überlegung auf, dass etwa die Rolle der Hudson's Bay Company und der britischen Kolonialpolitik für die US-amerikanischen und russländischen Interessen im Nordpazifik auch jenseits des Konflikts um das Oregon Territory von zentraler Bedeutung waren und einen prominenteren Platz in der Untersuchung verdient hätten.

Während Kropp den imperialen Alaska-Vorstellungen viel Platz einräumt, fällt der Blick durch das Teleobjektiv auf die Erfahrungswelten der russländischen ‚Kolonisten' vor Ort auf knapp 40 Seiten eher komprimiert aus. Kropps Befund basiert auf einer Auswahl von Egodokumenten der kolonialen Eliten, wie der Hauptverwalter, ihrer Ehefrauen und einiger Kapitäne. Ihm ist bewusst, dass diese Quellenbasis lediglich einen kleinen Anteil von Alaska-Erfahrungen repräsentiert und sich kaum auf die gewöhnlichen promyshlenniki (Pelztierjäger) übertragen lässt. Zuweilen entsteht dennoch der Eindruck einer gefährlichen argumentativen Nähe zu den fragwürdigen Angewohnheiten, die die Alaska-Historiographie (und die des Nordens im weiteren Sinne) zu plagen pflegen. Etwas zu mühelos fügt sich Kropps Alaska-Bild in quasi-exotisierende Topoi des Nordens als hinterwäldlerischen, trost- und gesetzlosen Raum ein, der von homogenen Entbehrungserfahrungen, Freudlosigkeit und Isolation geprägt war (S. 146–148). Dennoch trifft es bei der Lektüre unerwartet, dass Kropp

mit dem Verweis auf gewaltsame Konflikte zwischen ‚Kolonisten' und verschiedenen indigenen Gruppen Alaska als „anarchischen Gewaltraum" in Jörg Baberowskis Wortsinn charakterisiert (S. 147). Dies wirft die Frage auf, ob sich diese analytische Kategorie für den Übertrag in den Kontext des frühen kolonialen Alaska eignet, zumal die Ausübung von Gewalt in den komplexen sozialen Ordnungen, wie sie beispielsweise bei den Tlingit im Südosten Alaskas zu finden sind, einem festgelegten Regelkanon folgte.[5]

Dass sich die Suche nach einer allgemeinen analytischen Sprache schwierig gestaltet, zeigt sich auch an der ungewöhnlichen Begrifflichkeit, mit der Kropp das Verhältnis zwischen ‚Kolonisten' und Alaska Natives beschreibt. Während das Begriffspaar ‚Allochthone' und ‚Autochthone' in der Ethnographie eine gewisse Tradition hat, wenn ‚Fremdes' von ‚Indigenem' unterschieden werden soll, haftet ihm doch eine entpersonalisierende Technizität an, die Unbehagen hervorruft, wenn es auf Menschen angewandt werden soll. Ob sich diese Vereinheitlichung lohnt, ist zumindest fraglich, da sie uns in die Verlegenheit bringt, fixierte Identitäten definieren und zuschreiben zu müssen. Die diesem Begriffspaar zugrundeliegende Dichotomie kann aber die Komplexität und Fluidität der Gegebenheiten vor Ort weder abbilden, noch erklären – nicht zuletzt in Bezug auf die kreolische Bevölkerung.

Trotz ihrer Schwächen leistet Kropps Studie einen willkommenen Beitrag zu einem lange unterbeachteten Forschungsfeld. Der Brennweitenwechsel zwischen Makro- und Mikroperspektive demonstriert ein beträchtliches heuristisches Potential für die Re-Evaluation gängiger Annah-

men über imperiale Expansionsprozesse und individuelle Kolonialerfahrungen und zeigt, wie extreme Peripherien, die im 20. Jh. zum Austragungsort und Objekt globaler Interessenskonflikte wurden, bereits im 18. und 19. Jh. wirtschaftlich, politisch und imaginativ in Konsolidierungs- und Destabilisierungsprozesse von Imperien eingebunden waren. Diese Verschiebung des imperialhistorischen Fokus in den Norden macht Kropps Buch für Nordpazifik-Interessierte allemal zu einer anregenden Lektüre.

Anmerkungen

1 Ilya Vinkovetsky, Russian America. An Overseas Colony of a Continental Empire, 1804–1867, Oxford 2011.
2 Ryan Tucker Jones, Empire of Extinction. Russians and the North Pacific's Strange Beasts of the Sea, 1741–1867, New York 2014.
3 Andrei Grinëv, Alyaska pod krylom dvuglavogo orla, Moskau 2016.
4 Martina Winkler, Das Imperium und die Seeotter. Die Expansion Russlands in den nordpazifischen Raum, 1700–1867, Göttingen 2016.
5 Hier sei beispielhaft auf Dauenhauers et al. exzellentes Buch zu den Kämpfen um Sitka verwiesen: Nora Marks Dauenhauer, Richard Dauenhauer, Lydia T. Black (eds.), Anóoshi Lingít Aaní Ká – Russians in Tlingit America. The Battles of Sitka 1802 and 1804, Seattle 2008.

Moritz Brescius: German Science in the Age of Empire. Enterprise, Opportunity and the Schlagintweit Brothers, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2019, 428 p.

Revue par
Marie de Rugy, Strasbourg

Situé à la croisée de l'histoire des sciences et de l'histoire impériale, ce livre tiré d'une thèse de doctorat a pour objet l'entreprise scientifique des frères Schlagintweit en Inde britannique au milieu du XIXe siècle. Employés entre 1854 et 1857 par l'East India Company (EIC) pour effectuer des observations magnétiques, les trois explorateurs munichois rapportent des milliers de mesures, notes et objets dans le but d'obtenir leur consécration scientifique. La réception de leurs travaux est cependant complexe: les critiques n'ont jamais vraiment cessé en Grande-Bretagne, tandis que les États allemands en font des héros.

L'ouvrage s'organise chronologiquement en huit chapitres, qui abordent chacun un aspect de l'entreprise scientifique. Les trois premiers peuvent être regroupés autour des questions de patronage et de réseaux d'exploration, tandis que les chapitres 4 et 5 traitent davantage du terrain et que les trois derniers reviennent sur la réception et la postérité de l'expédition.

La genèse en est donnée dans le premier chapitre, où l'auteur revient sur les années de formation de Hermann, Adolph et Robert Schlagintweit, qui contiennent en germe les éléments de la controverse fu-

ture – sentiments nationalistes et querelles d'école apparaissent déjà en filigrane. Les jeunes protégés de Humboldt s'insèrent dans les réseaux savants anglo-allemands, dont les contours sont finement restitués. On peut déplorer que des figures essentielles soient trop rapidement évoquées : August Petermann (p. 41; pp. 43–44) fut une figure également controversée et pour les mêmes raisons que les frères Schlagintweit – manque de compétence scientifique et inadaptation en société. Sans doute la comparaison mériterait-il d'être creusée.

Le chapitre 2 retrace brièvement l'histoire des explorations dans les marges septentrionales du raj britannique et montre surtout comment "les idéaux d'une science de gentlemen", défendus par un Joseph Hooker, sont mis à mal par la réalité des subsides accordés par l'EIC aux scientifiques étrangers. Une typologie convaincante de ces acteurs est proposée, qui replace les Schlagintweit au sein des mobilités transnationales non exemptes de critiques de la part des Britanniques.

Le chapitre 3 met en lumière l'attitude ambiguë des frères Schlagintweit eux-mêmes, qui contribue à nourrir une polémique que les discours nationalistes et les jalousies personnelles n'expliquent qu'en partie. Financés par des fonds britanniques, mais aussi prussiens, les explorateurs se trouvent face à des ordres et des attentes parfois contradictoires et en jouent pour demander toujours davantage de fonds à leurs sponsors. Très vite, la publication des premiers résultats et des notes de voyage dans des revues allemandes facilite la publicité de l'entreprise des trois frères, qui y gagnent une notoriété avant même la fin de leur mission.

Le chapitre 4 décrit de manière très précise le travail scientifique effectué sur le terrain, depuis les méthodes des différents relevés et les instruments utilisés, jusqu'aux moyens de transport à disposition. Il sera utile aux historiens des sciences et des techniques, confirmant ce que montrent les travaux récents sur cette science en action. L'auteur montre également comment les frères Schlagintweit effectuent des mesures anthropométriques, sur des prisonniers ou des cadavres. Sans forcément cautionner ou soutenir les ambitions coloniales, ils bénéficient largement des structures existantes, créatrices d'opportunités.

Le chapitre 5, qui constitue à nos yeux le cœur de l'ouvrage, immerge le lecteur dans la "vie intime" de l'expédition, met en lumière la complexité des relations entre ses différents membres, les dépendances qui se créent dans ces territoires reculés, ainsi que les hiérarchies qui s'instaurent et se recomposent au gré des dissensions. L'auteur a su tirer le meilleur parti de ses sources, qui lui permettent de restituer au plus près les soubresauts internes de l'exploration, pour montrer la richesse et les limites du contact entre Européens, Indiens – les frères Singh notamment – et d'autres acteurs de la rencontre.

Le chapitre 6 établit un lien entre la révolte des Cipayes de 1857 et la dimension publique que prend la controverse à propos des frères Schlagintweit, dans un contexte de crise impériale. La mort d'Adolph, le garant scientifique de l'expédition, et la disparition de l'EIC, principal employeur et sponsor, rendent difficiles la réception des résultats, la pérennité de l'entreprise et la bonne réputation des deux frères Schlagintweit au sein des réseaux scientifiques transnationaux.

Le chapitre 7 revient sur les obstacles aux-
quels se heurtent les frères Schlagintweit
pour la mise en musée des objets rappor-
tés, alors que le modèle humboldtien est
remis en cause. Il apporte une contribu-
tion intéressante aux travaux actuels sur
l'origine des musées ethnographiques et
l'élaboration de collections scientifiques
héritées des explorations.

Le chapitre 8, enfin, traite des différentes
mémoires de l'exploration. Tandis que les
critiques se poursuivent en Angleterre,
les échos sont positifs dans le Raj britan-
nique, où les avancées scientifiques sont
reconnues, tandis que les frères Schlagin-
tweit sont réutilisés à des fins politiques
dans leur patrie, où l'impérialisme naissant
cherche des héros à célébrer.

Par l'exploitation de nombreuses archives,
collectées principalement en Allemagne et
en Angleterre, mais aussi ailleurs, l'auteur
nous offre une étude très complète de l'en-
treprise des frères Schlagintweit. L'un des
mérites de ce livre, et non le moindre, est
de la replacer à la fois dans l'histoire géné-
rale des explorations, dans celle de l'Inde
britannique à un moment de profonde
remise en cause, et dans celle des réseaux
scientifiques transnationaux. Si le contexte
allemand est plus rapidement brossé que
celui de l'Angleterre, l'auteur montre ce-
pendant la haute considération dont béné-
ficie la science allemande à cette époque,
dans la ligné d'Alexander von Humboldt
et de Carl Ritter principalement. Le cha-
pitre sur la vie intime de l'expédition per-
met également de diversifier les acteurs de
cette histoire et de sortir d'une perspective
uniquement européenne. On peut saluer
enfin que l'approche transnationale adop-
tée, tout en mettant en valeur les mobilités
et les échanges transversaux, ne masque pas

les limites d'une science sans frontière. Au
milieu du XIXe siècle, en effet, les enjeux
nationaux sont primordiaux et le fait que
les frères allemands soient employés par
les autorités britanniques ne va pas de soi,
soulève des critiques, selon des logiques de
compétition bien montrées. La démons-
tration, claire et convaincante, est servie
par des illustrations pertinentes et sou-
vent reproduites en couleur. En résumé, il
s'agit là d'un ouvrage fort bienvenu, à lire
pour les historiens des sciences et ceux des
empires.

**Mulugeta Gebrehiwot Berhe: Laying
the Past to Rest. The EPRDF and
the Challenges of Ethiopian State-
Building, London: Hurst & Co. 2019,
xxi + 355 pp.**

Reviewed by
Ulf Engel, Leipzig

Ethiopia is at a crossroads: the ruling Ethi-
opian People's Revolutionary Democratic
Front (EPRDF, which in-itself is a coali-
tion of former liberation movements) is
split, general elections due on 29 August
2020 have been indefinitely postponed,
"ethnic" and "religious" violence is flaring
across the country, secession of parts of
the country has become a serious option,
the planned filling of the Great Ethiopian
Renaissance Dam (GERD) is causing a
major conflict with downstream riparian
states Sudan and Egypt – and on top of
that the worst locust invasion in decades

as well as the Corona virus have hit the country hard.

Politically, the young Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed (b. 1976), who has come to power in April 2018, has embarked on a series of domestic and foreign policy reforms: Political prisoners were released, the diaspora invited to participate in the politics of the country, hardliners of the regime replaced by reformers, and serious efforts undertaken to improve the human rights record. And for the reconciliation with neighbouring Eritrea, Abiy was awarded the Nobel peace prize in 2019. In pursuance of his political reform project, in November 2019 the Prime Minister transformed the ruling EPRDF into the Prosperity Party (PP) – only that one of the four components of the ruling party, the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF), is not having any of this, up the point that it wants to run the general elections as originally scheduled in the northern part of the country which it controls. From their perspective, Abiy's policies are seen as a betrayal of the shared values of the liberation struggle against the military junta, the communist Derg under Mengistu Haile Mariam (1974–1991).

It is therefore absolutely timely to have a book published on the history of the EPRDF which is written by an insider, with unparalleled access to people and documents. Only very few, if any, accounts of this nature are available. The author's course of life is emblematic for the country's contested history. Mulugeta Gebrehiwot Berhe is a former TPLF commander, member of the party's central committee and founding member of the EPRDF council. From 1991 to 1997 he led the country's disarmament, demobili-

sation and reintegration programme. And in 2001, he was part of a group in the TPLF's central committee which openly challenged Ethiopia's leader, the late Meles Zenawi. In response to a paper in which Meles compared the TPLF and EPRDF leadership in Ethiopia in 2000/2001 to the post-revolutionary situation in France after 1789, and in which he also called for a discussion of "Bonapartism" among the new elite, a group dissenting TPLF members accused him of being too "liberal" and giving in too easily to IMF economic conditionalities. The dissenting group walked out of the meeting (which actually lasted for a month) and Meles finally secured a 17 to 12 vote in his support. Mulugeta, who had suggested to postpone the meeting, survived the following purges (for his own account of the leadership crisis, see pp. 217–225).

After he left politics, Mulugeta became director of the Institute for Peace and Security Studies (IPSS) at Addis Ababa University (2007–2014) – which is also the alma mater of the current Prime Minister who graduated from this institution with a PhD in 2017. During this time, Mulugeta enjoyed an ambivalent relationship with the regime: the institute became an island of critical debate protected by the university's then Vice Rector Prof. Andreas Eshete (2003–2011) and tolerated by Meles. Today, the author is a senior fellow with the World Peace Foundation at The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University (Medford MA) which is directed by his brother-in-spirit Alex de Waal. Mulugeta has co-authored a number of important reports on the future of peacekeeping in the Horn of Africa, security sector reform, and other issues.

Laying the Past to Rest is based on Mulugeta's PhD dissertation which he has author conducted at the University of Victoria, British Columbia. The main arguments are constructed in dialogue with the academic debate and on the basis of a variety of internal, partly not accessible party sources, often written in Tigrigna (while others are drawn from the archives of the Tigrai Martyr's monument and the National Archives). As already indicated in the third paragraph of this review, as a key participant of many of the developments analysed in his book, Mulugeta is walking a tightrope as somebody that analysing at least parts of his own history. The important episode in 2000/2001 around the TPLF's leadership crisis, for instance, is largely reconstructed with reference to the memoirs of Gebru Asrat – himself being a former member of the TPLF central committee.[1] Given the culture of secrecy of the party, this may be as best as it can get. However, serious challenges in writing the history of contemporary Ethiopia and contested party politics remain.

Nevertheless, Mulugeta has tried to develop a balanced account of past EPRDF achievements and contemporary challenges. The arguments presented are based in a sound discussion of the literatures on African liberation movements in general, the EPRDF and democratic transitions in Africa. Only few relevant contributions to the academic debate are missing.[2] In addition, the author has conducted some 15 extensive (although anonymous) interviews with key informants emanating from the regime. The conceptual framework for the thesis is pragmatically chosen (based in organisational studies, partly rooted in the 1960s). First and foremost, Mulugeta has

an interest in why the TPLF/EPRDF succeeded in its liberation struggle and what shaped the party/coalition, what explains the EPRDF achievements and constraints in power, and how this compares to the initial aspirations of a "reform rebellion" (pp. 10–11). Accordingly, in the first part of the book Mulugeta looks at the formation of TPLF and the way it organised governance in liberated areas; in the second part he takes an interest in the debates leading to the creation of the Marxist-Leninist League of Tigrai (MLLT) and the EPRDF coalition; and in third part he recalls the challenges this coalition has faced since in government – from the "democratic transition" to the war with Eritrea to contemporary challenges which predate the above mentioned critical juncture the country is fronting today. Unfortunately, the author decided for the year 2012 (i.e., when Meles passed away) as a cut-off date of his analysis. The brief epilogue only offers a glimpse of how relevant Mulugeta's analysis could be for understanding the current crisis (pp. 301–303).

Yet elsewhere, the author has extended the argument convincingly developed in this book: focussing on the loss of the EPRDF's intellectual leadership (which, according to him, was so crucial to gain power and start the Ethiopian state-building project after 1991), Mulugeta argues that the current leadership of both the country and the Prosperity Party are retreating from earlier promises: the Prime Minister is said to be personalising power, there is a roll-back of reforms invoking memories of authoritarian pasts, the new party has lost legality, and the "country is at risk of balkanisation along ethnic lines".[3] In any case, this book offers a comprehensive basis for under-

standing the underlying debates, grievances and contradictions Ethiopia as a polity currently is confronted with.

Notes

1   Gebru Asrat, Sovereignty and Democracy in Ethiopia, Addis Ababa 2014 (in Amharic).
2   On the 2001 leadership crisis in TPLF, see also, e.g., Paulos Mekias, Ethiopia, the TPLF, and the Roots of the 2001 Political Tremor, in: Northeast African Studies 10 (2003) 2, pp. 13–66; Medhane Tadesse/John Young, TPLF: Reform or Decline?, in: Review of African Political Economy 30 (2003) 97, pp. 389–403.
3   Mulugeta Gebrehiwot Berhe, "Ethiopia's poll has been pushed out by COVID-19. But there's much more at play", The Conversation, 18 May 2020, https://theconversation.com/ethiopias-poll-has-been-pushed-out-by-covid-19-but-theres-much-more-at-play-138322 (accessed 17 June 2020).

Casey Marina Lurtz: From the Ground Up. Building an Export Economy in Southern Mexico, Stanford: Stanford University Press 2019, 296 p.

Reviewed by
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Regional history and its subsidiary microhistory continue to rewrite the narrative of Mexico's economic and political development since its independence in 1821. Since Luis González y González in his *Invitación a la microhistoria* (1973) issued the challenge to explore the many Mexicos, dozens and dozens of studies using state and local archives, illuminated the upheavals that wracked the nation during the 1810s and 1910s, the politics, economics and quotidian life of the early republic, and the pre and post Revolution. Historians produced and continue to produce nuanced stories about the regions and localities. Casey Lurtz's *From the Ground Up* is another such carefully crafted, meticulous study, analyzing the economy of Soconusco in the state of Chiapas, the southernmost area of Mexico.

The analysis focuses on the development of an economy based on coffee exports. Soconusco was and is the leading producer of Mexican coffee, which was during the period under study (1870s to 1920) the nation's second or third most important agricultural export commodity. The region was in the nineteenth century sparsely populated and isolated, with difficult, but immensely fertile land. It provides an interesting case to complement existing studies about vanilla, henequen and sugar. The author argues that none of the usual narratives and analyses of Latin American export economies apply to Soconusco. Most important, foreign plantation owners, who stole land from peasant villages and abused their workers, did not dominate. In fact, though there was a strong foreign presence, especially German, foreigners produced only half the coffee; small, local landowners accounted for the other half. Villages, small merchants, laborers, and plantation owners interacted and connected intimately and extensively to the global economy.

Professor Lurtz upholds one current tenet of Mexican historiography, that politics and economy centered locally, and discards another long ago, strongly held view that the globalization disadvantaged exporters of agricultural commodities. In the former view, historians concluded that neither the Díaz regime (1877–1911)

nor the Revolutionary regimes that followed were nearly as powerful as they once thought. Soconuscans seemed to operate by either ignoring or defying both the national government and the state government, when they judged the administration or laws of either entity were not in their best interests. In the latter perspective, an interpretation known in the 1970s and 1980s as the "dependency" theory or paradigm, the global system disadvantaged primary resource and agricultural exporters. Foreign investors often in conjunction with domestic elites dominated the export economies to the detriment of the host nation as a whole.

Soconusco was a melting pot of foreigners from Germany, China, Japan, Turkey, France, Denmark, Central America, and the Gilbert Islands. They and the local merchants and villagers forged the necessary structure for the emerging export economy, even when neither the national nor state governments provided it. The obstacles to this development were many. First, establishing ownership of the land was difficult. For decades, the border with Guatemala was in dispute. It was often unclear to which nation a plot of land belonged. The author devotes a chapter to the establishment of a permanent border that enabled the construction of the coffee economy. Without proper documentation of ownership, it was impossible to obtain credit. A second roadblock was the scarcity of workers. Coffee production was highly labor intensive. It was nearly impossible to attract enough workers to exploit fully the fertile land on the hillsides potentially cultivable for coffee plants. Producers never completely solved this problem. Consequently, they never used the land to capac-

ity (at least not before 1920). The partial solution was debt peonage. In this case, debt peonage was not the slavery like institution it was in other regions. Workers and planters alike knew that workers did not have to repay the advances they received. Although the plantations carried the debt on their books, they did not enforce repayment. The offer of advances in actuality served as an attraction to workers. Both planters and workers opposed reform efforts during the Revolution to abolish debt peonage, because it was in everyone's interest to maintain it.

Credit was a third obstacle to development. Until nearly the turn of the century, no banking institutions serviced the region. A closely related fourth obstacle was the lack of laws and regulations concerning business transactions. The Díaz regime enacted these. Professor Lurtz examines in considerable detail how the Soconuscans adapted to the new rules. She traces the transformation from an informal credit structure with no written agreements or recourse to the courts to more formal institutional lending with property as collateral. She also discusses the adoption of futures or advance contract lending.

Professor Lurtz brings the narrative to life with the personal stories of Matías Romero, who left a substantial archive from his long career as a diplomat and entrepreneur, and the Bado family, import/export merchants, storekeepers, and coffee growers. Romero was of interest, because as a pioneer coffee grower, he failed, returning to Mexico City a bit poorer than when he arrived in Chiapas. Despite his lack of success, he was an effective propagandist for the region and helped draw investors. Antonio Bado came from Gibraltar

in the 1870s and as other ambitious foreigners who immigrated during this era, he married into a local elite family. His case is illustrative of how business in the region functioned. Bado died in 1898 with his holdings valued at 400,000 pesos, a substantial fortune. At the same time, he owed 200,000 pesos to creditors and debtors owed him nearly 200,000 pesos. His business interconnections spanned the globe, as well as the region.

From the Ground Up is an excellent contribution to the historiography of export crops. It has important evidence and insights into the development of local solutions to crucial impediments to export development, especially the lack of credit institutions and a body of accepted business regulations, and into the role of foreign enterprise in the Mexican economy. Although the study does not emphasize politics, it sheds light, too, on the operations of the Díaz regime and the relations between small landowners and the revolutionaries after 1914. It is an important study because it supports the view that during the Díaz and revolutionary eras, Mexicans, not foreigners, controlled the Mexican economy, and that foreigners neither exploited their host nation nor abused its workers (at least no more than any other Mexican entrepreneurs or domestic business people anywhere else in the world).

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