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Rural Development in the Twentieth Century: International Perspectives

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Rural Development in the Twentieth Century: International Perspectives – An Introduction

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The history of international development has largely been written as a history of ambitious modernization projects which, more often than not, seem to have failed.[1] Research has focused on norms and institutions which manifest themselves in national or international contexts, while local or regional experiences have been eclipsed or have received only cursory treatment. There are good reasons for this, and they can best be explained by an 'urban bias', a term coined by Michael Lipton in the 1970s.[2] Lacking or ignored representation and mobilization of rural populations, the dominance of urban needs and requirements in public discourses, the necessarily distanced views of institutions and organizations on societies, and, last but not least, the theoretical and practical imperative of development as industrialization have led, until today, to a neglect of rural spaces in discourses and practices of development policies and their history.

Until recently, more than half of the world's population lived in rural areas and predominantly from agriculture. Continuing poverty and often only partial access to basic material and social rights are still a widespread phenomenon of many rural areas. Against this background, this theme issues puts problems of rural and agrarian development squarely at the center of interest. What kind of development initiatives were devised for rural areas, and how did rural populations relate to the doctrines and practices of development? Which effects did the various programs have, and what can they tell us about the history

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1   D. van Laak, Imperiale Infrastruktur. Deutsche Planungen für eine Erschließung Afrikas 1880 bis 1960, Paderborn 2004; J. C. Scott, Seeing Like a State. How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed, New Haven 1998.
2   M. Lipton, Why Poor People Stay Poor. A Study of Urban Bias in World Development, London 1977.

of development as seen through a rural lens? We seek to reconstruct diverse experiences in different regions of the world in order to answer these questions.

The history of development as a distinct field of enquiry emerged about two decades ago.[3] Growing interest built on two reasons. First, international relations changed after the end of the Cold War. Relations between the industrialized world and so-called developing countries gained in importance, and with the breath-taking processes of transformation in countries such as Brazil, China, or India national trajectories of development received increased attention. Global challenges such as climate change, the distribution of poverty and wealth, or concerns for individual opportunities and options have entered, more than ever, the complex network of global governance. A new generation of historians has considered these processes and has identified development as a promising field of historical enquiry. Secondly, and relatedly, international history has undergone fundamental changes in terms of methods and topics. Times are past when international history considered itself to be diplomatic history. The new international history of the past two decades has been a history of cross-border interactions, interconnectedness, of knowledge circulations and of comparison. These trajectories have opened up new fields of enquiry. Development is one of them.[4] In the following, we briefly chart the field and highlight the specific contributions of existing research to the history of rural development.

Arguably, the best-researched topic of development history is the connection between development, modernization and the Cold War. This goes in particular for American development politics.[5] Historians agree that after 1949 US administrations undertook development cooperation primarily in terms of political and strategic decisions.[6] In the eyes of American foreign policy experts, the United States possessed a unique combination of military and political power as well as economic potential. The United States were, as economic historian and top civil servant Walt W. Rostow famously wrote, the "high mass consumption society".[7] Until the crises of the 1970s they offered themselves to the world as a model and as the anticipated future of other societies. Various actors worked to make this happen. Social scientists devised theories of development and researched societies elsewhere, and universities created departments in area studies, demography, develop-

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3   N. Cullather, „Development? It's History. Research Note", in: Diplomatic History 24.4 (2000), pp. 641-653. For an excellent recent overview, see J. Hodge, "Writing the History of Development (Part 1: The First Wave)", in: Humanity 6.3 (2015), pp. 429-463, and "Writing the History of Development (Part 2: Longer, Deeper, Wider)", in: Humanity 7.1 (2016), pp. 125-174.

4   H. Büschel and D. Speich (eds.), Entwicklungswelten. Globalgeschichte der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit, Frankfurt a.M. 2009; M. Frey and S. Kunkel, "Writing the History of Development. A Review of the Recent Literature", in: Contemporary European History 20 (2011), pp. 215-232; M. Frey, S. Kunkel and C. R. Unger (eds.), International Organizations and Development 1945–1990, London 2014; C. R. Unger, Entwicklungspfade in Indien. Eine internationale Geschichte, 1947–1980, Göttingen 2015.

5   M. E. Latham, The Right Kind of Revolution. Modernization, Development, and U.S. Foreign Policy from the Cold War to the Present, Ithaca 2010; D.C. Engerman et al. (eds.), Staging Growth. Modernization, Development, and the Global Gold War, Amherst 2003.

6   C. Lancaster, Foreign Aid. Diplomacy, Development, Domestic Politics, Chicago 2007.

7   W. W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth. A Non-Communist Manifesto, Cambridge, MA 1960.

ment economics and provided grants for students, academics and practitioners from the global South.[8] Influential foundations such as the Rockefeller Foundation, the Ford Foundation or the Carnegie Corporation became active in the global arena in order to 'modernize' societies, diffuse 'Western' norms and conduct social engineering according to their liberal, anti-communist beliefs. American governmental and non-governmental actors distanced themselves from colonialism, as this was regarded as a historical anachronism and detrimental to a positive image of the 'free World' in times of the Cold War. While industrialization formed the theoretical and practical foundation of US development policies, governmental and non-governmental actors also became active, from early on, in such sectors as agriculture, institution-building, infrastructure and finance.

The historical literature emphasizes three complexes that were characteristic of development thinking and practice: the production of knowledge and technology, transfers of ideas and approaches and their limits as well as the connection between knowledge and power. As the articles in this theme issue highlight, American historians have somewhat prematurely interpreted international development policies as a genuinely American product.[9] According to this master narrative, development has its roots in the progressive age of the late nineteenth century. The New Deal and its intellectual and institutional legacy concretized and universalized development. The paradigm of 'modernization' is interpreted as an 'ideology' that deeply influenced U.S. foreign policy since the end of the Second World War. Based largely on American archival sources, these works have also shown the limits within which development cooperation operated, and they have pointed to the scope of action of recipients. Often enough recipients changed project designs, ignored conditions or refused expectations.

Within this body of literature, agriculture has received some attention. During the 1950s and 1960s, American advisers proposed land reforms in order to support small farmers and the agrarian middle classes.[10] However, local elites in Asia and Latin America were mostly unresponsive to such propositions, as they would alter local hierarchies of influence and power.[11] A second field of enquiry has been the so-called Green Revolution, which impacted heavily on agriculture and rural societies in Latin America and Asia from the late 1960s onwards.[12] Of particular interest have been the role of technology and

8   N. Gilman, Mandarins of the Future. Modernization Theory in Cold War America, Baltimore 2003; C. Simpson (ed.), Universities and Empire. Money and Politics in the Social Sciences during the Cold War, New York 1998; C. R. Unger, "Development Aid between National Interests and Philanthropy: American Public and Private Aid to the 'Third World' in the Postwar Era", in: Th. Olesen, H. Pharo, and K. Paaskesen (eds.), Saints and Sinners. Official Development Aid and its Dynamics in a Historical and Comparative Perspective, Oslo 2013, pp. 301-326.

9   D. Ekbladh, The Great American Mission. Modernization and the Construction of an American World Order, Princeton 2010.

10   L. J. Walinsky, (ed.), Agrarian Reform as Unfinished Business. The Selected Papers of Wolf Ladejinsky, New York 1977. See also D. Immerwahr, Thinking Small. The United States and the Lure of Community Development, Cambridge, MA, 2015.

11   E. Abrahamian, A History of Modern Iran, Cambridge 2008, pp. 131-133; N. Cullather, The Hungry World. America's Cold War Battle Against Poverty in Asia, Cambridge, MA 2010; J. F. Taffet, Foreign Aid as Foreign Policy. The Alliance for Progress in Latin America, New York 2007.

12   N. Cullather, "Parables of Seeds. The Green Revolution and the Modernizing Imagination", in: M. Frey, R. Prues-

knowledge transfers between International Organizations (for instance, the International Rice Research Institute in Los Baños, the Philippines), scientists and politics.

In the field of colonial development, the historiography has analysed the connection between investments into the colonies and a more efficient exploitation of dependent territories in the interwar period. Infrastructure played a leading role at that time.[13] After the Second World War, though, the emphasis shifted and health as well as education received much more attention than before. Late colonial development policy served to legitimize continued colonial rule, and in this context social affairs received prominent attention.[14]A couple of works focus on agricultural and rural populations. They investigate the motives and aims of colonial agricultural development, and they emphasize the important role of science and technology, which took center stage from around the turn of the twentieth century.[15] Suzanne Moon, for instance, argues that the Dutch authorities took a keen interest in raising living standards in rural areas particularly on Java, and she epitomizes the connection between agricultural science and local knowledge. Joseph Hodge, on the other hand, sees the colonial state as an actor interested in turning agriculture more market-oriented and more efficient.[16] This goes in particular for the period between the 1930s and the 1950s, during which governments prioritized the mechanization of African agriculture and the implementation of large-scale export-oriented projects.[17] Knowledge transfers moved vertically from the top down. One such project was the Office du Niger in present-day Mali, the subject of Marc Frey's contribution in

sen and T.T. Yong (eds.), The Transformation of Southeast Asia. International Perspectives on Decolonization, Armonk, NY, pp. 257-267; J. H. Perkins, "The Rockefeller Foundation and the Green Revolution, 1941-1956" in: Agriculture and Human Values 7 (1990), pp. 6-18; J. H. Perkins, Geopolitics and the Green Revolution. Wheat, Genes, and the Cold War, Oxford 1997. On the origins of the Green Revolution in Mexico, see A. Birn, Marriage of Convenience. Rockefeller International Health and Revolutionary Mexico, Rochester, NY, 2006; G. Esteva, The Struggle for Rural Mexico, South Hardy 1983; B. H. Jennings, Foundations of International Agricultural Research: Science and Politics in Mexican Agriculture, Boulder 1988.

13   A. Booth, "The Evolution of Fiscal Policy and the Role of Government in the Colonial Economy", in: A. Booth, W. J. O'Malley and A. Weidemann (eds.), Indonesian Economic History in the Dutch Colonial Era, New Haven, CT 1990, pp. 210-243; H. Sieberg, Colonial Development. Die Grundlegung moderner Entwicklungspolitik durch Großbritannien 1919–1949, Stuttgart 1985; M. Thomas, The French Empire between the Wars, Manchester 2005; van Laak, Imperiale Infrastruktur..

14   F. Cooper, Decolonization and African Society. The Labor Question in French and British Africa, Cambridge 1996; F. Cooper, "Writing the History of Development", in: Journal of Modern European History 8.1 (2010), pp. 5-23; A. Eckert, "Exportschlager Wohlfahrtsstaat? Europäische Sozialstaatlichkeit und Kolonialismus in Afrika nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg", in: Geschichte und Gesellschaft 32.4 (2006), pp. 467-488; D. K. Fieldhouse, Black Africa 1945–1980. Economic Decolonization and Arrested Development, London 1986, pp. 42-55.

15   V. Bernal, "Colonial Moral Economy and the Discipline of Development: The Gezira Scheme and 'Modern' Sudan", in: Cultural Anthropology 12.4 (1997), pp. 447-479; M. W. Ertsen, Improvising Development on the Gezira Plain, Sudan, 1900-1980, London 2016; M. Gilmartin, "Scientific Empire and Imperial Science: Colonialism and Irrigation Technology in the Indus Basin", in: The Journal of Asian Studies, 53.4 (1994), pp. 1127-1149; C. R. Unger, "Agrarwissenschaftliche Expertise und ländliche Modernisierungsstrategien in der internationalen Entwicklungspolitik, 1920er bis 1980er Jahre", in: Geschichte und Gesellschaft 41.4 (2015), pp. 552-579.

16   S. Moon, Technology and Ethical Idealism. A History of Development in the Netherlands East Indies, Leiden 2007; J. M. Hodge, Triumph of the Expert. Agrarian Doctrines of Development and the Legacies of British Colonialism, Athens, OH 2007.

17   J. S. Hogendorn and K. M. Scott, "The East African Groundnut Scheme. Lessons of a Large-Scale Agricultural Failure", in: African Economic History, 10 (1981), pp. 81-115.

this issue. Other studies show that after independence, African governments continued to support the production of a few agricultural commodities to the detriment of small farmers.[18]

The history of International Organizations and International Non-Governmental Organizations and their relation to development is a growing field of investigation. Although a few studies appeared before the turn to the twenty-first century, historians by and large neglected these important actors of international relations for a long time. By contrast, social scientists had studied IOs and INGOs from the 1930s onwards, with a couple of groundbreaking works being published even earlier. More recently, though, these actors have received much more attention from historians.[19] Between 2005 and 2011 the United Nations Intellectual History Project published several volumes on UN development policies and their history.[20] The United Nations Development Program and the World Bank commissioned important institutional histories.[21] Independent research on these and other organizations has proliferated.[22] Recent studies emphasize an 'urban bias' and a priority on infrastructure and industrialization within most development organizations of the postwar period. Only recently have they begun to investigate the reasons for the decades-long neglect of rural spaces and of agriculture, with a brief interlude of heightened interest in the 1970s.[23] In the past couple of decades, agriculture has received much more attention from international organizations. But the contemporary

18   M. Rempe, Entwicklung im Konflikt. Die EWG und der Senegal, 1957–1975, Köln 2012.

19   I. Borowy, Coming to Terms with World Health. The League of Nations Health Organisation 1921-1946, Frankfurt a.M. 2009; M. Herren, Internationale Organisationen seit 1865. Eine Globalgeschichte der internationalen Ordnung, Darmstadt 2009; A. Iriye, Global Community. The Role of International Organizations in the Making of the Contemporary World, Berkeley 2002; S. Kott, "Les organizations internationals, terrains d'étude de la globalization. Jalons pour une approche socio-historique", in: Critique international 52 (2011), pp. 11-16; M. Mazower, Governing the World. The History of an Idea, New York 2012; S. Pedersen, The Guardians. The League of Nations and the Crisis of Empire, Oxford 2015; B. Reinalda, Routledge History of International Organizations. From 1815 to the Present Day, London 2009.

20   L. Emmerij, J. Louis and Th. G. Weiss (eds.), Ahead of the Curve? UN Ideas and Global Challenges, Bloomington 2001; R. Jolly, L. Emmerij, D. Ghai and F. Lapeyre, UN Contributions to Development Thinking and Practice, Bloomington 2004; J. Toye and R. Toye, The UN and Global Political Economy. Trade, Finance, and Development, Bloomington 2004; D. Jain, Women, Development, and the UN. A Sixty Year Quest for Equality and Justice, Bloomington 2005; O. Stokke, The UN and Development. From Aid to Cooperation, Bloomington 2009.

21   D. Kapur, J. P. Lewis and R. Webb, The World Bank. Its First Half Century, 2 vols., Washington 1997; E. S. Mason and R. E. Asher, The World Bank Since Bretton Woods, Washington 1973; C. N. Murphy, The United Nations Development Programme. A Better Way?, Cambridge 2006.

22   M. Alacevich, The Political Economy of the World Bank. The Early Years, Stanford 2009; M. Alacevich, "The World Bank and the politics of productivity: The debate on economic growth, poverty, and living standards in the 1950s", in: Journal of Global History 6 (2011), pp. 53-74; M. Finnemore, "Redefining Development at the World Bank", in: F. Cooper and R. Packard (eds.), International Development and the Social Sciences. Essays on the History and Politics of Knowledge, Berkeley 1997, pp. 203-227; Frey, Kunkel and Unger (eds.), International Organizations and Development; R. Jachertz and A. Nützenadel, "Coping with Hunger? Visions of a Global Good System, 1930–1960", in: Journal of Global History 6.1 (2011), pp. 99–119; R. Paarlberg and M. Lipton, "Changing Missions at the World Bank", in: World Policy Journal 8.3 (1991), pp. 475-498; P. Sharma, Robert McNamara's Other War. The World Bank and International Development, Philadelphia 2017; A. Staples, The Birth of Development. How the World Bank, Food and Agriculture Organization, and World Health Organization Changed the World, 1945–1965, Kent, OH 2007; Th. Zimmer, Welt ohne Krankheit. Geschichte der internationalen Gesundheitspolitik 1940–1970, Göttingen 2017; Amy Sayward, The United Nations in International History, London 2017.

23   Kapur, Lewis and Webb, The World Bank, vol. 1, pp. 337-479.

doctrinal premises echo the predicaments of modernization theory: agriculture needs to be monetarized, and incentives and disincentives to production are a matter of markets and investments.[24]

In the shadow of this dominant discourse on the market and on industrialization, some development economists did write about agriculture. Some authors, among them Nobel laureate Theodore Schultz, called for an appreciation of small farmers, the transfer of technology, and systematic research on agricultural improvements already in the early 1960s.[25] These voices paved the way for the Green Revolution of the late 1960s, when chemical fertilizers, new seeds and intensive irrigation began to increase yields substantially. Appreciation for the economic contributions of small farmers, but also political discrimination and structural violence were reasons for the discovery, and romanticization, of rural life and peasants during the 1970s. One outgrowth was the founding of the journal Peasant Studies. Marxist-inspired, the journal connected well to research agendas such as the Subaltern Studies. Both wanted to provide the suppressed and the unheard with a voice, and both wanted to restore their historic rights. Since then, it has become common sense to consider small farmers rational economic actors and to acknowledge that subsistence farming can be strikingly efficient under certain conditions. These assumptions have been taken up by a number of contemporary approaches to development. While not explicitly targeted at rural populations, Amartya Sen's notions on individual empowerment, an enlargement of opportunities and human rights, resonate well with concerns about rural and agricultural development.[26]

The five articles assembled in this theme issue cannot represent the multitude and complexity of experiences with rural and agricultural development policies in their entirety. They do shed light, though, on a number of recurring issues, among them the centrality of the 'land question', the existence of stark social divisions within the rural population, and the political relevance granted to agriculture and rural production on part of national and international politicians and experts. Furthermore, the article share an interest in three interrelated topics: the importance of planning, knowledge production and the circulation of knowledge; the connection between security and development; and the tension between economic production and the well-being of local populations. The articles invite us on a tour covering Mali, Southern Italy and Southern Spain, Sweden, Ethiopia, Afghanistan, and Angola, and they trace the multifarious entanglements with actors on the local, regional and global levels.

The article by Marc Frey explores the checkered history of a large irrigation scheme, the Office du Niger in Mali, from its foundation in the interwar period up until the pres-

24   OECD-FAO Agricultural Outlook 2016–2025, http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/agriculture-and-food/oecd-fao-agri-cultural-outlook-2016_agr_outlook-2016-en (accessed 02.06.2017).

25   B. F. Johnston and J. W. Mellor, "The Role of Agriculture in Economic Development", in: The American Economic Review 51.4 (1961), pp. 566-593; Th. Schultz, Transforming Traditional Agriculture, New Haven, CT 1964.

26   A. Sen, Development as Freedom, New York 2001; A. Sen, The Idea of Justice, Cambridge, MA 2009. For a periodization, see F. Ellis and S. Biggs, "Evolving Themes in Rural Development 1950s–2000s", in: Development Policy Review 19.4 (2001), pp. 437-448.

ent. Devised after World War One, and founded in 1932, it is one of the oldest agrarian development projects that exist until the present day. From the colonial paradigm of production to postcolonial visions of a socialist rural economy to the liberal predicaments of the post-1980 period, external doctrines have left a deep imprint on the Office du Niger and its settlers. The article argues that while the Office du Niger underwent fundamental institutional and social changes throughout its long history, continuities can be detected, among them structural violence, an emphasis on productivity, and a hierarchical process of decision-making that conditions (and often limits) the options individual farmers have. As such, the Office du Niger, home to about 130.000 settlers, is also a laboratory in which cycles of agrarian development doctrines can be observed.

The persistent emphasis on production, which is so characteristic for the history of the Office du Niger, was also ever-present in the agrarian reforms undertaken by the governments of Italy and Spain in Sicily and Andalusia after World War Two. In her contribution, Grazia Sciacchitano investigates rural policies and the role attributed to agriculture and its workers during the 1950s and 1960s. Her analysis of socio-economic conditions in the countryside reveals a shared rural development model implemented by a democratic and an authoritarian government. This model prioritized agricultural productivity and a shift of people employed in the agricultural sector to industry and services. While in the Office du Niger, in-migration was a necessary condition for the development scheme, the Italian and Spanish governments considered out-migration to be essential. These strategies gave rise to the emergence of a new social group of agricultural entrepreneurs and to an increase in the percentage of landless laborers. The reforms emphasized productivity to the detriment of social responsibility in the countryside.

Karl Bruno's article introduces us to the first Swedish attempt at transferring agronomical knowledge to the global South in the context of development aid. The Chilalo Agricultural Development Unit (CADU) in the Ethiopian province of Arussi intended to generate socio-economic development and was geared at increasing small-farm production of cereal crops. This was a novel project in more than one respect. It targeted not the export sector, at the time still considered the driver of agricultural expansion and productivity, but the small farmers who produced for local and regional markets. Moreover, the interventions suggested and implemented were closely based on local knowledge and expertise. Bruno's findings confirm other studies on the Green Revolution in that the introduction of new technologies, pesticides, and fertilizers privileged richer farmers and increased social inequalities, a development little understood by the Swedish advisers at the time.[27] One unintended consequence was that CADU developed into a politically

27   G. Djurfeldt (ed.), The African Food Crisis. Lessons from the Asian Green Revolution, Wallingford 2005; F. Frankel, India's Green Revolution. Economic Gains and Political Costs, Princeton 1971; Scott, Seeing Like a State; V. Shiva, The Violence of the Green Revolution. Third World Agriculture, Ecology and Politics, London 1991. For positive assessments, see R. E. Evenson and D. Gollin, "Assessing the impact of the Green Revolution, 1960 to 2000", in: Science 300 (2003), pp. 758-762; M. S. Randhawa, "Green Revolution in Punjab", in: Agricultural History 51 (1977), pp. 656-661.

highly charged project in an increasingly tense environment of late-imperial Ethiopia and became an active party in the rural conflicts that preceded the revolution of 1974.

This connection between development, political stability and security is also the topic of Timothy Nunan's contribution to this theme issue. Covering a long period of time from the 1920s to the 1980s, his article explores the history of rural development in Afghanistan through the lens of land reform. During the twentieth century, the overwhelming majority of the country's population found employed in agriculture. As in Ethiopia, Sicily or Andalusia, landholding patterns were highly unequal. More than elsewhere, however, the Cold War transformed Afghanistan into a battleground for Western and Socialist visions of rural development projects such as irrigation or state farms. Timothy Nunan introduces us to the little-known visions of Afghan socialist intellectuals who demanded comprehensive land reforms as the solution to the inequalities of rural life. Equally insightful is his analysis of the conflict between Afghan socialists who seized power through a coup d'état in 1978 and the Soviet advising teams. While the socialists sought to impose radical visions of land redistribution, the Soviets urged moderation and favored private land ownership. This conversation brings back socialist ideas and their varieties into the global history of development. It also epitomizes one of the sharpest and most enduring conflicts in the history of rural areas in the twentieth century, the problem of land ownership.

Land ownership, social justice and economic inequality also informed the wars of national liberation in Lusophone Africa of the 1960s and 1970s. Miguel Bandeira Jéronimo draws our attention to the conflict in Angola, where Portuguese imperial and colonial authorities devised strategic political-military responses that tried to merge security, welfare and development. This combination was a key element of late colonialism in all empires challenged by rising nationalism and demands for sovereignty. Rural development received prime attention in the context of development and security. The article shows how the intended cultural and socio-economic transformation of rural spaces was profoundly shaped by securitarian rationales and military expedience. To some degree, the ideas and practices of development came into being as an attempt to translate political problems into technical solutions.

Together these essays show how intertwined politics, power, and development are, and how central rural spaces and agricultural practices were to the developmental visions of local actors, national governments, and international organizations. More generally, we hope that the articles in this issue provoke new interest in and fruitful debates on the international history of rural development.[28]

Doctrines and Practices of Agrarian Development: The Case of the Office du Niger in Mali

Marc Frey

ABSTRACT

Der Beitrag handelt von einem großen Bewässerungsprojekt im Binnendelta des Niger, dem Office du Niger. Geplant nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg und gegründet 1932 ist es eines der ältesten Entwicklungsprojekte im ländlichen Raum, die es gibt. Vom kolonialen Paradigma der Produktion über die Vision einer sozialistischen ländlichen Wirtschaft bis hin zu den liberalen Ansätzen der Zeit nach 1980 haben exogene Entwicklungsdoktrinen seine Geschichte maßgeblich geprägt. Der Aufsatz argumentiert, dass das Office du Niger zwar grundlegendem institutionellem und sozialem Wandel unterlag. Über seine lange Geschichte hinweg sind jedoch auch Kontinuitäten sichtbar, wie etwa das Phänomen der strukturellen Gewalt, die Betonung von Produktivität und hierarchische Entscheidungsprozesse, die die Möglichkeiten der Siedler einschränken.

Introduction

From far above, the interior delta of the river Niger looks like a huge oasis. Located within the semi-arid Sahel zone, creeks, canals, fields and meadows stretch over an area of 30,000 square kilometers. They provide the livelihood for about a million people. It is here that one of the oldest large development schemes is located, the Office du Niger in central Mali. Planned after World War I and founded in 1932, the Office du Niger, a large irrigation scheme, looks back upon a history of contestation, high expectations, and troubled relations between farmers and authorities.

By using the Office du Niger as a prism, this article traces the history of agrarian development doctrines and practices over *la longue durée*. It raises the following questions: Why was the Office du Niger founded, what was its rationale, and in which ways is it characteristic for late colonial agrarian development schemes? What kind of development doctrines played out on the ground? How did the Office du Niger evolve in the post-independence period? Why did the international donor community get involved in the project? What were their plans, and how did they realize them? And how did changing development doctrines impact on local farmers over time?

The article offers an analysis of one of the oldest agrarian development schemes that has persisted until the present day. Furthermore, it provides insight into the changing meaning of agrarian development over a long period. My main argument will be that while developmental strategies have changed considerably over time and have found their way into actual practices, long-term continuities can be detected. This concerns in particular three features: the persistence of structural violence; the primacy of economic interests over the well-being of the agents of development, the settlers, and the inherent necessity of planning and top-down interventions in all matters influencing the development scheme, including the promotion of 'grass roots', bottom-up and civil society activities.

Histories of development have focused primarily on three fields of enquiry. Most prominently, mainly American scholars have analyzed the role and function of the idea of development in foreign policy. They have highlighted the attractiveness of 'modernization theory' for social scientists and policy makers and have argued that universalist notions of socio-economic development have shaped the conduct of American foreign relations since the late nineteenth century.[1] A second field is interested in the production, dissemination and circulation of knowledge, the role of experts, and the 'scientization' of the social on a global scale.[2] A third field comprises the critics of development. They have either followed Gramscian notions of a modernist hegemony imposed by the West on the rest of the world or have emphasized the futility and hypocrisy of past and current development policy.[3] Compared to these fields, the history of agrarian development has received comparatively little interest.[4] There are, I think, four reasons for this. First,

1   D. Ekbladh, The Great American Mission. Modernization and the Construction of an American World Order, Princeton 2010; N. Gilman, Mandarins of the Future. Modernization Theory in Cold War America, Baltimore 2003; M. Latham, The Right Kind of Revolution. Modernization, Development, and U.S. Foreign Policy from the Cold War to the Present, Ithaca, NY 2011; A. Staples, The Birth of Development. How the World Bank, Food and Agricultural Organization, and World Health Organization Changed the World, 1945–1965, Kent, OH 2006.

2   F. Cooper and R. Packard (eds.), International Development and the Social Sciences: Essays on the History and Politics of Knowledge, Berkeley 1996; D. Engerman and C. R. Unger (eds.), Modernization as a Global Project, theme issue of Diplomatic History 33.3 (2009); R. L. Tignor, W. Arthur Lewis and the Birth of Development Economics, Princeton 2006.

3   W. Easterly, The Tyranny of Experts: Economists, Dictators, and the Forgotten Rights of the Poor, New York 2014; A. Escobar, Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World. With a new preface by the author, Princeton 2011; J. Ferguson, The Anti-Politics Machine. Development, Depoliticization and Bureaucratic Power in Lesotho, Minneapolis 1994; D. Moyo, Dead Aid. Why aid is not working and how there is another way for Africa, London 2010; J. C. Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed, Ithaca, NY 1998.

4   N. Cullather, The Hungry World. America's Cold War Battle against Poverty in Asia, Cambridge, MA 2011; F. Ellis

industrialization and infrastructure overshadowed other sectors of development during the twentieth century, and historians have mimicked this emphasis. Second, industrial sites contained far more symbolic significance than agricultural projects. Elites in Africa, Asia and Latin America regarded them as signifiers of modernization, providing them with meanings far out of proportion to their actual importance within the overall development trajectory. Thirdly, development policies were, for a long time, imbued with an 'urban bias' (Michael Lipton).[5] Agriculture was relegated to the sphere of 'tradition', not really worthy of major attention. Fourth, historians usually work in urban environments. This conditions their outlook and research interests, and distances them from agriculture and rural settings.[6]

A political economy approach to agrarian development in the Office du Niger offers important insight into the ways development agents – farmers, experts, governments and international organizations – have conceptualized the African rural space over a period of almost one hundred years. By political economy approach I understand a methodologically open interdisciplinary design which is interested in the connection between political and economic institutions, the political environment, and the economic system, and how they influence each other. I also draw on Johan Galtung's concept of structural violence. Following his exploration, I take structural violence as the imposition of social and institutional constraints which seriously limit individual choices and create an atmosphere of fear and oppression to explain continuities, and change, of institutional coercion.[7]

This article is based in part on primary sources obtained in the World Bank Archives. It also draws on secondary literature, some of which deals specifically with the history of the Office du Niger. I am in particular referring to Emil Schreyger's pioneering study on the institutional history of the Office du Niger, to Monica van Beusekom's exploration of the colonial history, and to Laura Ann Twagira's recent work on technology, food and gender in the Office du Niger.[8]

and S. Biggs, Evolving Themes in Rural Development 1950s-2000s, in: Development Policy Review 19 (2001), pp. 437-448; G. Federico, Feeding the World. An Economic History of Agriculture, 1800–2000, Princeton 2005; J. M. Hodge, Triumph of the Expert. Agrarian Doctrines of Development and the Legacies of British Colonialism, Athens, OH 2007; C. Kay, Development Strategies and Rural Development. Exploring Synergies, Eradicating Poverty, in: Journal of Peasant Studies 36 (2009), pp. 103-137.

5   M. Lipton, Why Poor People Stay Poor. Urban Bias in World Development, Cambridge, MA 1977.
6   C. R. Unger, Agrarwissenschaftliche Expertise und ländliche Modernisierungsstrategien in der internationalen Entwicklungspolitik, 1920er bis 1980er Jahre, in: Geschichte und Gesellschaft 41 (2015), pp. 552-579.
7   J. Galtung, Violence, Peace, and Peace Research, in: Journal of Peace Research, 6.3 (1969), pp. 167–191.
8   M. M. van Beusekom, Negotiating Development. African Farmers and Colonial Experts at the Office du Niger, 1920–1960, Oxford 2002; E. Schreyger, L'Office du Niger au Mali: la problematique d'une grande entreprise agricole dans la zone du Sahel, Wiesbaden 1984; L. A. Twagira, Women and Gender at the Office du Niger (Mali): Technology, Environment, and Food ca. 1900–1985, PhD dissertation thesis, Rudgers University, 2013.

Colonial Visions and African Life Worlds

The origins of the Office du Niger date back to the aftermath of World War I, when public debates focused on the reconstruction of France's war-torn economy. An important aspect of this discussion concerned the dire condition of the textile industry. During the war, the textile industry had come under severe pressure, as cotton imports from the United States had decreased significantly and world market prices exploded. Neo-mercantilist thoughts went hand in hand with ideas to utilize the colonial empire more efficiently in order to make the textile industry, and the nation as a whole, more independent from international markets and supply chains. An outspoken proponent of these ideas was a civil engineer by the name of Emile Bélime (1883–1969). A glowing proponent of Empire until late in his life, Bélime in 1919/20 surveyed the river Niger in what was then the French Soudan at the request of the French Ministry for the Colonies.[9] Bélime envied the British, who, by means of irrigation, had established large cotton production schemes in the Sudan and in India.[10] In the interior delta of the river Niger, Bélime encountered a solution to the problems of the French textile industry. To the colonial administrations in Dakar and Paris he proposed a large irrigation scheme encompassing an area 37,500 km^2, two-thirds the size of Belgium. This was a grand plan which involved major resettlements, the dislocation of the largely pastoralist indigenous population, and the construction of dams, roads, and canals in a location about fifteen hundred kilometers away from the nearest port city, Dakar. Bélime's "high modernist" vision was well received by his superiors, in particular by the then minister for the colonies, Albert Sarraut.[11] A former governor-general of French Indochina, Sarraut called for a sustained effort to utilize the economic resources of the colonies more efficiently. His concept of mise en valeur echoed earlier plans for the exploitation of colonies. What was new was his idea of 'development' in the interest of the colonizers and the colonized.[12] The differentiation between 'exploitation' and 'development', formulated by the British theorist of indirect rule, Frederick Lugard, in 1922, had crystalized in colonial discourses since the late 19th century in the Netherlands and Great Britain.[13] Because of European

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9   See his call for a continued French presence in sub-Saharan Africa in the late colonial period. E. Bélime, Gardons Afrique. Faits et Documents, Paris 1955. For context, see R.H. Roberts, Two Worlds of Cotton. Colonialism and the Regional Economy in the French Soudan, 1800–1946, Stanford 1996.

10   T. Barnett, Gezira Scheme: An Illusion of Development, London 1977; S. Beckert, Empire of Cotton. A Global History, New York 2014, pp. 340-358; H. Bell, Frontiers of Medicine in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, 1899–1940, Oxford 1999; V. Bernal, Colonial Moral Economy and the Discipline of Development: The Gezira Scheme and 'Modern' Sudan, in: Cultural Anthropology 12.4 (1997), pp. 447-479; M. W. Ertsen, Improvising Planned Development on the Gezira Plain, Sudan, 1900-1980, Basingstoke 2016; D. Gilmartin, Scientific Empire and Imperial Science: Colonialism and Irrigation Technology in the Indus Basin, in: The Journal of Asian Studies, 53.4 (1994), pp. 1127-1149.

11   Scott, Seeing Like a State, p. 89.

12   A. Sarraut, La Mise en Valeur des Colonies Françaises, Paris 1923. The standard analysis of French colonial capitalism is still J. Marseille, Empire Colonial et Capitalisme Français: Histoire d´un divorce, Paris 1984. See also M. Thomas, The French Empire between the Wars, Manchester 2005, pp. 32-33, 61-62.

13   Hodge, Triumph of the Expert; J. M. Hodge, G. Hödl and M. Kopf (eds.), Developing Africa. Concepts and Practices in Twentieth-Century Colonialism, Manchester 2014, pp. 1-34, P. H. Lepenies, An Inquiry into the Roots of the

needs for reconstruction, and novel forms to legitimize colonial rule as a "sacred trust", as the covenant of the League of Nations phrased it, the discourse on 'development' gained in importance after World War I.[14]

Sarraut's hopes of re-directing German war reparations to the French colonies soon evaporated. Likewise, Bélime's vision encountered increasing opposition in the French parliament. The investments needed seemed exorbitant. Experiments with cotton production in the French Soudan were not encouraging. Critics within the French parliament as well as in the public sphere pointed to the factor of labor. Given the sparse population density in the delta, cultivation of the whole area would necessitate the migration of hundreds of thousands of farm workers.[15] But despite the criticism and the megalomaniac character of the plan, the colonial administration in Dakar provided funds for pilot projects. In 1931, when politicians saw national development and protectionism as the solution to the economic crisis which had engulfed the world since 1929, significant metropolitan investments were made available for the construction of an irrigation scheme on 8,500 km². Administrators in Dakar and politicians in France were captivated by the prospect of cheap cotton for the French textile industry and the idea of a granary on the edge of the Sahara. One year later, the Office du Niger was founded as a public development agency for the interior delta of the Niger, with Emile Bélime as founding director (until 1944). The institution and the vision were modelled on the British Gezira scheme in the Sudan. Until the end of the Second World War, some 50 km² in four sectors were prepared for agricultural production. The important dam at Markala was completed in 1947.[16]

Under Bélime's directorship, the vision of *mise en valeur* transmogrified into the violent reality of a labor camp in which the developmentalist impulse exhausted itself in involuntary migration of the settlers, exploitation of labor, enforcement of production goals, and harsh living conditions. The pastoralist inhabitants of the area were expelled, and hardly anyone of the 28,000 settlers who lived in the Office du Niger by 1945 had come voluntarily. Most of the settlers, often young men and women from far-away regions, had been selected by local chiefs on the orders of the French, deported and re-settled in the Office. Polygamy, hardly an ingredient of the civilizing mission which legitimized French colonialism, was encouraged in order to produce as many prospective settlers as possible. Apart from the imperative of production, the Office du Niger was meant to become the nucleus for a model colonial society, a society cut off from its ancestral lands, ethnic bonds and social norms. Colonial modernity, though enforced by violence, would

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Modern Concept of Development, in: Contributions to the History of Concepts 4 (2008), pp. 202-225; S. Moon, Technology and Ethical Idealism: A History of Development in the Netherlands East Indies, Leiden 2007.

14   P. Clavin, Securing the World Economy. The Reinvention of the League of Nations, 1920–1946, Oxford 2013; S. Pederson, The Guardians. The League of Nations and the Crisis of Empire, Oxford 2015.

15   M. Echenberg and J. Filipovich, African Military Labour and the Building of the Office du Niger Installations, 1925–1950, in: The Journal of African History 27.3 (1986), pp. 533-551.

16   Beusekom, Negotiating Development, pp. 90-153; Schreyger; L'Office du Niger, pp. 111-134.

eventually conquer the semi-arid space of the French empire's interior frontier. Acts of resistance were ubiquitous, ranging from refusal to work to sabotage and escape.[17]

Once settlers had arrived in the Office, they were confronted with French technocrats convinced of the superiority of their knowledge and culture. Racism was a pervasive feature. Although conditions for the production of cotton had not been studied in detail, and had indeed shown meagre results, the settlers were forced to grow it.[18] Membership in rural cooperatives closely supervised by the French was mandatory, as was the preparation of the land by heavy oxen-driven ploughs (which routinely destroyed the thin fertile soil layer).[19] Settlers had to sell their crop to the Office du Niger, which dictated the price and marketed the produce. It charged fees for the irrigation and obligated the settlers to maintain the irrigation system. In exchange, the Office provided housing, infrastructure, seeds and technical equipment. But wells were not available at first, which led to a high rate of diseases. Medical centers were equally lacking, as were schools. Village headmen appointed by the French dictated the rhythm of life and work of the settlers. A French observer who toured the Office du Niger in the late 1930s compared the scheme to the forced collectivization of agriculture in the Soviet Union. To her, labor conditions amounted to the re-introduction of slavery.[20] Economically, the project was a failure. Until 1939, French investments amounted to around 50 million dollars (in 1960 dollars), and until the end of the colonial period the French sank between 83 and 175 million (in 1960 dollars) into the Office du Niger. This was a multiple of what the colonial administration invested in the whole of the French Soudan (in 1939, around 1.2 million dollars (in 1960 dollars)).[21]

The expectation that French know-how and technology combined with as well as African labor would enable the large-scale production of cotton did not materialize. Planning had been insufficient and deficient. Soil and climatic conditions were not adequate for cotton, and labor was not sufficient, but the high investments prohibited any thoughts about cessation. Almost frantically, Bélime again and again promised higher production rates and returns on the investment.[22] His call for further investments and for the

17   I. Dougnon, Travail de Blanc, Travail de Noir. La migration des paysans dogon vers l'Office du Niger et au Ghana 1910–1980, Paris 2007, pp. 63-88; J. Filipovich, Destined to Fail: Forced Settlement at the Office du Niger, 1926-45, in: Journal of African History 42 (2001), pp. 239-260, A. Magasa, Papa-Commandant a jeté un grand filet devant nous: les exploités des rives du Niger 1900-1962, Paris 1978.

18   For a comparable project in Togo, see A. Zimmerman, Alabama in Africa. Booker T. Washington, the German Empire, and the Globalization of the New South, Princeton 2012.

19   B. Diakon, L'Appropriation à l'Office du Niger des techniques et la dynamique sociale de l'époque colonial à nos jours", PhD dissertation, University of Bayreuth, 2006, pp. 111-203. Diakon shows how settlers modified the ploughs from the 1940s and adapted them to local needs.

20   G. Lydon, The Unraveling of a Neglected Source: A Report on Women in Francophone West Africa in the 1930s (La re-découverte d'une source négligée: un rapport sur la condition des femmes en AOF dans les années 1930), in: Cahiers d'Études Africaines, 37 (1997), pp. 555-584.

21   W. I. Jones, Planning and Economic Policy: Socialist Mali and Her Neighbors, Washington, D.C. 1976, p. 25; N. van de Walle, African Economies and the Politics of Permanent Crisis, Cambridge 2001, p. 143.

22   E. Bélime, Les Travaux du Niger, Paris 1940, p. 187. In that, Bélime was certainly not alone. See, for instance, D. L. Hodgson, Once Intrepid Warriors: Gender, Ethnicity, and the Cultural Politics of Maasai Development, Bloomington 2001.

successful completion of the irrigation scheme did not go unheard. Supported by the German colonial lobby, the French Vichy regime invested considerable amounts (600 million francs) to enlarge the area under production (a further 2000 km²).[23]

Mise en Valeur **Redux**

The immediate post-war period marks a turning point in the history of development policy in general and of the history of the Office du Niger in particular. During the "second colonial occupation", government intervention in African territories and resource transfers from the metropoles increased dramatically.[24] Colonial powers intended to utilize the economic potential of their dependencies more efficiently in the service of European reconstruction. Equally important, in the face of growing African nationalism and growing calls for independence, development was meant to legitimize continued colonial rule.[25] Funding for infrastructure remained high on the agenda, but investments in health and education increased significantly. Of particular concern to metropolitan governments was food production and, accordingly, support for agribusinesses. While in the 1930s government efforts had been directed to channeling abundant food supplies to a world market characterized by low demand, the early post-war years witnessed a fear of food scarcity and efforts to increase production as fast as possible.[26] It was in this context that, for instance, the British government implemented the ultimately disastrous Tanganyika groundnut scheme. In a similar vein, French authorities reconsidered their activities in the Office du Niger.[27]

The Office du Niger was heavily affected by these developments. Criticism of the poor living conditions of the settlers had already been voiced during the 1930s, but following the horrors of World War II, concern for human rights, often voiced by African activists, became an issue in national and international debates.[28] In France, a parliamentary commission provided settler voices a platform to be heard. They argued that their live resembled those of "goats tethered to a stake".[29] More than half of the settlers were heavily

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23 R. Ginio, French Colonialism Unmasked. The Vichy Years in French West Africa, Lincoln, NE 2006, pp. 74-75, and B. Schilling, Postcolonial Germany. Memories of Empire in a Decolonized Nation, Oxford 2014, pp. 68-89.

24 J. Lonsdale and D.A. Low, Introduction: Towards the new order 1945-1963, in: D.A. Low and A. Smith (eds.), History of East Africa, vol. 3, Oxford 1976, pp. 1-64, here p. 12.

25 F. Cooper, Africa and the World Economy, in: F. Cooper et al., Confronting Historical Paradigms: Peasants, Labor, and the Capitalist World System in Africa and Latin America, Madison, WI 1993, pp. 84-203, here pp. 127-128; F. Cooper, Africa Since 1940. The Past of the Present, Cambridge 2002, pp. 20-24; A. Eckert, 'We Are All Planners Now.' Planung und Dekolonisation in Afrika, in: Geschichte und Gesellschaft 34.3 (2008), pp. 375-397.

26 R. Jachertz and A. Nützenadel, Coping with hunger? Visions of a global food system, 1930–1960, in: Journal of Global History 6 (2011), pp. 99-119.

27 A. Eckert, Herrschen und Verwalten. Afrikanische Bürokraten, Staatliche Ordnung und Politik in Tanzania, 1920-1970, Munich 2007, pp. 101-103, 143-164; D. K. Fieldhouse, The West and the Third World, Oxford 1999, pp. 225-235; R. J. Reid, A History of Modern Africa. 1800 to the Present, 2nd edn., Malden, MA 2012, pp. 254-255.

28 M. Terretta, 'We Had Been Fooled into Thinking That the UN Watches Over the Entire World': Human Rights, UN Trust Territories, and Africa's Decolonization, in: Human Rights Quarterly 34.2 (2012), pp. 329-360.

29 Quoted in Filipovich, Destined to Fail, p. 257.

indebted to the Office and lived in a state of debt peonage. Crop yields were much lower than expected; the production of cotton had unequivocally turned out to be a mistake. The irrigation system was in dire need of maintenance; some fields were flushed with water, while others were desiccated. When, in 1946, the French parliament abolished forced labor and the *indigénat*, a discriminatory colonial law code which had provided the management of the Office with the legal instruments of repression, a third of the settlers fled. It was obvious to all observers that in economic terms the project had failed and that in social terms it was a scandal.[30]

While the Office du Niger faced its most serious crisis yet, construction workers completed the Markala Dam, the single largest dam of the whole irrigation scheme. In view of this, ending the project did not seem an option. Was what needed, rather, were more investments to make the Office profitable. The solutions of the colonial planners in Paris and Dakar were ambitious and did not seem especially new: they demanded more settlers, larger areas under cultivation, new crops, and improved methods of cultivation.

In this difficult situation, the new director, agronomist Pierre Viguier (1946–1951), for the first time sought the advice of the settlers. Following an analysis of local practices, the Office scaled back the production of cotton and moved to rice. Millet production became tolerated for private consumption. The crop rotation prescribed by the French was abandoned in favor of local practices, which left land uncultivated every third year. The management, moreover, tolerated the cultivation of vegetables and other crops on land not irrigated by the Office. Local knowledge and practices were, to some degree, appropriated and constructively utilized, for instance with regards to ploughs. [31] While this entailed a certain degree of local empowerment, the basic tenets of the project did not change: the primacy of top-down planning, a technocratic approach to problem-solving, the predominance of economic interest and production, and an indifference to the plight of ordinary settlers.

In 1960, Viguier published a book on African agriculture based on thirty years of experience in West Africa. He vehemently criticized the post-war drive for the mechanization of African agriculture, which he called "the grand illusion". He pointed to an insufficient infrastructure, missing spare parts and high petrol prices.[32] Viguier might have added that he had arrived at this conviction after a long and costly period of trial and error. In fact, it was he himself who, upon assuming the post of director of the Office du Niger, had called for large-scale mechanization. Only machines could balance the loss in production incurred by the flight of many of the settlers. When Marshall Plan aid reached

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30   Beusekom, Negotiating Development, pp. 90, 97, 153; Schreyger, L'Office du Niger, pp. 120-135.

31   M. M. van Beusekom, Disjunctures in Theory and Practice: Making Sense of Change in Agricultural Development at the Office du Niger, 1920-60, in: The Journal of African History 41.1 (2000), pp. 79-99. See also Diakon, L'Appropriation à l'Office du Niger des techniques et la dynamique sociale, pp. 111-203.

32   P. Viguier, L'Afrique de L'Ouest vue par un agriculteur. Problèmes de base en Afrique tropicale, Paris 1961, pp. 50-51. On unintended economic effects see also M. Rizzi, What Was Left of the Groundnut Scheme? Development Disaster and Labour Market in Southern Tanganyika 1946–1952, in: Journal of Agrarian Change 6 (2006), pp. 205-238.

the Office two years later, Viguier ordered tractors. Two comprehensive French development programs, initiated between 1949 and 1956, enabled the Office to acquire more. By the end of the decade, the Office owned 120 tractors in 15 different models, 21 of which could still be used. The rest corroded for the reasons Viguier had outlined in his book.[33]

The mechanization of agriculture in Africa seemed promising for a variety of reasons. Though the Office du Niger attracted a substantial number of new settlers in the decade following the abolition of forced labor (the settler population increased from 22,500 in 1948 to 49,600 in 1964), the labor force remained insufficient to maintain the complex irrigation scheme and support the salary of 7,000 employees in the various non-farm branches of the Office (1955). Mechanized extension of cultivated land, deep ploughing and the use of chemical fertilizers were meant to increase production in the face of continuing labor deficits. Finally, the use of machines and paid farm labor could eventually make possible the extensive and rational plantation economy which Bélime and other planners had envisaged. Indeed, rice yields her hectare increased to between 1.6 and 2 tons. Cotton yields, however, averaged between 0.7 and 1 ton per hectare between 1947 and 1964. This was lower than expected and did not reach the production levels obtained, for instance, by irrigated farming in India. The management responded with ever increasing fees for water. However, when high fees decreased settler incomes and increased their debts to the Office, they behaved rationally and switched to an informal economy. Towards the end of the 1950s, mechanized agriculture was discontinued for financial and technical reasons, and settlers were again called upon to work their land with the oxen plough.[34] After forty years of planning and implementing a large development scheme in the interior delta of the Niger, two central aims of the project had not been fulfilled: neither had the huge return on investments been realized nor had the living conditions of the settlers improved considerably.

The condition of the Office du Niger was emblematic of larger problems of European late colonial and development policies on the eve of decolonization. By 1957/58, a critical segment of the political elites in Europe's capitals was convinced that the resource transfers to Africa had been insufficient to generate self-sustaining economic growth. At the same time, they were not prepared to increase metropolitan financial commitments. Cost-benefit analyses clearly pointed towards decolonization and African independence. As elsewhere, investments in the Office du Niger dried up.[35] In the run-up to Mali's independence, a team of French consultants prepared a report that could be read in two ways: as a scathing indictment of past failures and missed obligations or as a list of

33   C. Pessis, The tractor as a tool of development? The mythologies and legacies of mechanized tropical agriculture in French Africa, 1944-56, in: Hodge, Hödl and Kopf, (eds.), Developing Africa, pp. 179-203; J. C. Wilde, Experiences with Agricultural Development in Tropical Africa, vol. 2: The Case Studies, Baltimore 1967, p. 282;

34   Beusekom, Disjunctures in Theory and Practice, p. 95; J.C. Wilde, Experiences with Agricultural Development in Tropical Africa, vol.1, The Synthesis, Baltimore 1967, pp. 247-251, 253.

35   F. Cooper, Possibilities and Constraint: African Independence in Historical Perspective, in: Journal of African History 49 (2008), pp. 167-96.

urgent recommendations. Either way, the French bequeathed to the new government of independent Mali a development scheme which in many ways was deficient and in need of massive future investments.[36]

The Postcolonial Period: Continuities and Alternative Visions of Production

Continuities rather than change characterized economic conditions in the immediate post-independence period in West Africa. A case in point was the Office du Niger. It remained a parastatal, now owned by the state of Mali.[37] Leading positions were filled with Malians, and the technocratic-paternalistic habitus of the management did not change much.[38] The largely French-educated and urban African management personnel were convinced of the need for technocratic planning and regarded settlers as 'backwards'. Modernization could only succeed if the 'indigenous', 'traditional' sector were transformed as swiftly as possible into a part of the 'modern' economy. Whether from a capitalist or a socialist perspective, 'modernizers' placed high emphasis on export-oriented cash crops; small farmers were regarded as obstacles to 'modernization' and should be taxed as much as possible to provide the funds for 'modernization'.[39] For the new Malian government, which called itself socialist and ruled until a military coup in 1968, the Office du Niger provided an ideal space to turn socialist development concepts into reality. During the 1960s, the Office received around 11 percent of all national investments. Once a Malian director, Samba Lamine Traoré, took over, the Office du Niger partially collectivized. By 1968, around 50 percent of the land was worked by salaried laborers. Cooperatives were reorganized and politicized. The Office was to demonstrate, as Traoré argued, "the superiority and modernity of collectivised agriculture".[40]

Next to the Malian state, international donors became involved in the Office du Niger. France provided some technical assistance, also via the newly established European Economic Community, whose development wing was dominated by former French colonial officials.[41] The Soviet Union provided a loan and sent twenty technicians, and the People's

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36   The commission suggested streamlining the administration, strengthening the rights of rural cooperatives, providing settlers with long-term lease contracts, and improving the irrigation system. Living conditions and living standards were judged to be insufficient. Republique du Mali, Ministère de l'Economie Rurale et du Plan, La Modernisation Rurale Dans La Haute-Valee du Niger. Mission Leynaud-Roblot, Paris 1960. Unpublished manuscript; a copy is available in the Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.

37   F. Cooper, Citizenship between Empire and the Nation. Remaking France and French Africa, 1945–1960, Princeton 2014, pp. 332-340, 398-413.

38   A similar observation can be made for independent Tanzania and other countries. See H. Büschel, Hilfe zur Selbsthilfe. Deutsche Entwicklungsarbeit in Afrika 1960–1975, Frankfurt 2014, 204-226.

39   W. A. Lewis, Economic development with unlimited supply of labour, in: The Manchester School 22 (1954), pp. 139-191; Tignor, W. Arthur Lewis, pp. 79-108; H.W. Arndt, Economic Development. The History of an Idea, Chicago 1987, 49-87.

40   Quoted in W. I. Jones, Planning and Economic Policy. Socialist Mali and Her Neighbors, Washington 1976, p. 305. See also Schreyger, L'Office du Niger, pp. 222-277.

41   V. Dimier, The Invention of a European Development Aid Bureaucracy. Recycling Empire, Basingstoke 2014, pp. 22-42.

Republic of China, which was regarded as a model of agricultural development for many African governments during the 1960s, sent agricultural specialists who experimented with transplanted rice.[42] This technique, used widely in Asian rice economies, increased yields dramatically, but it was labor-intensive and ultimately not accepted because it diverted too much time from growing vegetables for home consumption. International assistance and national efforts could not strengthen the economic viability of the Office or ameliorate the plight of the settlers. At the end of the 1960s, rice yields per hectare were on average lower than during the 1950s (1.5 tons per hectare), and the production of cotton, promoted by the socialist government, was abandoned altogether. As a World Bank team commissioned to study African agriculture remarked in 1967: "The check-ered history of the Office du Niger and the very limited output achieved after more than three decades of trial and error and the investment of substantial capital illustrate many of the pitfalls of planning and managing a large-scale scheme of this kind".[43]

The new leaders who came to power after the military coup of 1968 abandoned socialism and collectivization anyway. What would have happened to the Office du Niger without the tragedy of a prolonged drought in the Sahel zone in the early 1970s remains uncertain as the military government did not have a viable development strategy.[44] Due to the drought, though, many peasants decided to apply for settlement in the Office, whose population increased from 30,000 to 50,000 between the late 1960s and 1974. Rice production also increased, from 40,000 to 90,000 tons between 1968 and 1977. Yields per hectare also saw an increase (to 2.5 tons per hectare).[45]

While production increased significantly, living conditions had not changed markedly since the late 1940s. Settlers did not own the land and could not pass it on to family members. Commonly, contracts were concluded orally, and settlers customarily faced eviction in the event that they could not pay the water fees. Crops still had to be sold to the Office du Niger at fixed prices that, during the 1960s and 1970s, were usually below market prices. This was a regular practice throughout Africa, as governments subsidized food for urban dwellers. Security forces tried to make sure that settlers actually sold their crops to the Office. Often enough, though, they preyed upon the settlers. Daily life in the Office du Niger was determined by coercion, structural violence, poverty, and poor access to social services. During the mid-1970s, the annual per capita income did not exceed around $105 per year. That reflected the national average, but given the extensive investments undertaken in the past, incomes in the Office du Niger were disappointing. There were only very few schools and health centers, and the literacy rate did not exceed

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42   Declassified Documents Reference System, Central Intelligence Agency, Economic Intelligence Committee, Aid and Trade Activities of Communist Countries in Less Developed Areas of the Free World, 1 January – 30 June 1964, doc. no. CK3100507403; Mary Martin to John C. de Wilde, Mali – External Debt, 5.6.1970, World Bank Archives (WBA), Folder 1691370.

43   De Wilde, Experiences with Agricultural Development, vol. 1, p. 72 and vol. 2, p. 270. Quote in vol. 2, p. 287.

44   Human and natural factors were responsible for the droughts, and famine, of the 1970s and 1980s. One reason was desertification due to poor land management, deforestation, and overgrazing. Since the 1990s, climate change was identified as a major cause.

45   D. Aw and G. Diemer, Making a Large Irrigation Scheme Work. A Case Study from Mali, Washington, D.C. 2005, p. 13.

5 percent.[46] Well into the 1980s, many settlers lived in a state of debt peonage. Given these conditions, settlers tried to circumvent the official economy as much as possible. Irrigation schemes were manipulated, part of the crop withheld, and machinery loaned from the Office not well maintained.[47]

What had emerged slowly since independence was strikingly obvious by the mid-1970s: Mali had become dependent on external development assistance. Public investments were financed by development agencies from Europe, the Soviet Union and China; debts increased dramatically and rapidly. The Malian government – like most other governments in sub-Saharan Africa – continued to support public agricultural production, marketing boards and parastatals, despite being aware of their low productivity and high financial needs. Support for the urban population (in the 1980s around 20 percent of Mali's population) in the form of subsidized food remained a political priority. This 'urban bias' reflected deep-seated stereotypes about rural populations prone to 'tradition' and resistance to change. Much more than a question of developmentalist attitudes, this bias reflected security concerns. Urban populations could influence or disrupt fragile public administrations and weak governments much easier than rural dwellers; subsidized food for consumers thus received a clear priority over decent prices for producers.

The Rediscovery of Agriculture

The severe drought, and subsequent famine, in the Sahel zone in the early 1970s tragically confirmed the need for a strategic realignment in agrarian development doctrines and practices. Since the 1940s, agriculture and rural development had played only a subsidiary role in the emerging development industry. Development economists such as W. Arthur Lewis, Raúl Prebisch or Walt Rostow, to name only three prominent ones, had accorded agriculture only little developmentalist potential, apart from its function as provider of capital (through taxes) for industrialization. Dutch and British agricultural and rural development initiatives of the interwar period had, on the whole, not been continued by post-independence governments, with the exception of large-scale schemes. Apart from the Food and Agriculture Organization, large international organizations such as the World Bank or other specialized agencies of the United Nations had not paid much attention to agriculture and rural development.[48] With the exception of the plantation sector, agriculture was regarded as 'pre-modern' and 'traditional'; peas-

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46   World Bank Report and Recommendation of the President of the International Development Association to the Executive Directors on a Proposed Credit to the Republic of Mali for an Office du Niger Technical Assistance/Engineering Report, Washington, DC, 27 September 1978, World Bank Online Archive Report No. P-2387-MLI, 1, http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/pt/411811468278722067/pdf/multi-page.pd (accessed 26 February 2017)

47   R. J. Bingen, Food Production and Rural Development in the Sahel. Lessons from Mali's Operation Riz-Segou, Boulder, CO 1985, p. 118.

48   Hodge, Triumph of the Expert, pp. 144-178. D. Kapur, J. P. Lewis and R. Webb, The World Bank. Its First Half Century, vol.1, Washington 1997, pp. 109-119; Moon, Technology and Ethical Idealism, pp. 92-140.

ants were subsistence-oriented, backwards, and unable to and disinterested in integrating themselves in the modern monetarized economy, the only sphere within which development, national development, could take place.

This changed slowly in the 1960s, when it became apparent that the 'development decade', optimistically pronounced by the UN General Assembly in 1960, would not fulfill the high expectations countries and peoples associated with it. Certainly, the Green Revolution seemed to usher in a new era of high agricultural productivity based on the application of science and the introduction of high-yield varieties, fertilizers, pesticides and a range of other interventions. However, its impact was not dramatized until Norman Borlaug, a prominent scientist, received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1970. Moreover, the Green Revolution focused on Asia and not on Africa.[49]

From a theoretical angle, agriculture also received more attention. Most notably, Bruce F. Johnston and John W. Mellor published their important article "The Role of Agriculture in Economic Development" in 1961. They argued that the dichotomy between industrial and agricultural development was problematic, and that small-farm agriculture could contribute to economic growth in a substantial way. The solution was a more efficient use of resources in the agricultural sector, and a better integration and transfer of technology.[50] This position was supported by Theodore W. Schultz, who, in his book *Transforming Traditional Agriculture* (1964) argued that agriculture was central to the development of 'underdeveloped' countries, and that it had to be modernized with the help of technology.[51] According to these authors, peasants were not 'traditional' or 'backward' people. Instead, they needed to be seen as petty capitalists eager to promote their individual well-being. At the World Bank, President George Woods (1963–1968), influenced by these authors, accorded agriculture a greater role in development and increased bank lending towards rural and agricultural development. With the assumption of the presidency by Robert S. McNamara (1968–1981), agricultural and rural development moved to center stage at the World Bank.

Apart from theoretical reasons, strategic and political arguments played a huge role in increasing appreciation for agriculture and farmers or peasants. Most notably, experts and politicians identified global population growth as an alarming problem. Many feared a Malthusian trap: slowly increasing food production had to cope with a swiftly grow-

49   C. R. Unger, India's Green Revolution: Towards a New Historical Perspective, in: South Asia Chronicle 4 (2014), pp. 253-70. See also L. Brown, Seeds of Change: The Green Revolution and Development in the 1970s, London 1970; H. M. Cleaver, The Origins of the Green Revolution, Ann Arbor, MI 1975; N. Cullather, The Hungry World: America's Cold War Battle Against Poverty in Asia, Cambridge, MA 2011; K. A. Dahlberg, Beyond the Green Revolution. The Ecology and the Politics of Global Agricultural Development, New York, 1979; F. Frankel, India's Green Revolution. Economic Gains and Political Costs, Princeton 1971; J. Harwood, Has the Green Revolution been a Cumulative Learning Process?, in: Third World Quarterly 34.3 (2013), pp. 397-404. J. H. Perkins, Geopolitics and the Green Revolution: Wheat, Genes, and the Cold War, New York 1997; V. Shiva, The Violence of the Green Revolution. Third World Agriculture, Ecology and Politics, London 1991.

50   B. F. Johnston and J. W. Mellor, The Role of Agriculture in Economic Development, in: The American Economic Review 51.4 (1961), pp. 566-593.

51   Th. W. Schultz, Transforming Traditional Agriculture, New Haven, CT 1964.

ing population in the Global South.[52] This scenario seemed particularly dramatic in Southern Asia and in Sub-Saharan Africa. Since the early 1970s, therefore, the World Bank and other development outfits provided loans and expertise to support smaller farmers and rural areas. The primary aim was to increase food production, but how this could best be promoted remained unclear. Was it sufficient to provide new seeds and fertilizers? Should the focus be on infrastructure or on the construction of schools and health centers? The World Bank and other donors experimented with a range of technical interventions. Projects were somewhat eclectically identified, in many cases based on propositions from recipient countries which looked more like wish lists than like proper development plans. Lending operations towards rural development by the World Bank alone increased by 13.5 percent annually during the 1970s, from a total of $1.5 billion in 1970 to $5.3 billion in 1980.[53] In Mali alone, the World Bank funded ten projects to the amount of $144 million between 1972 and 1977 in such diverse fields as rice production, education, communication, livestock and infrastructure.[54]

The Office du Niger had until then not benefited from these huge investments. The irrigation system was deemed too expensive, the administration inflated, the Office du Niger unprofitable.[55] In other words: the Office du Niger was a hopeless white elephant. Nevertheless, as is not uncommon with 'high modernist designs', to use James Scott's famous concept, Bank analysts were fully aware that the irrigation system existed, that enormous investments had already been undertaken and that large numbers of settlers had arrived since the drought of the early 1970s.[56] As World Bank official Claude Blanchi put it: "The Office du Niger is here to stay, because of its size, its production potential, its economic and financial weight".[57]

The Politics of Technocracy

In the late 1970s, World Bank staff must have felt confused. McNamara's expansion of the rural and agricultural development sector meant that the institution had become more pro-active than ever in its search for projects. In addition, a major housing initiative for urban areas supplemented the range of interventions in the agricultural sector. On top of all this, the 'basic needs' approach was being debated and gender as a category of development began its creeping entry into discussions within the various departments

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52   M. Connelly, Fatal Misconception. The Struggle to Control World Population, Cambridge, MA 2009, pp. 237-275; M. Frey, Neo-Malthusianism and development: shifting interpretations of a contested paradigm, in: Journal of Global History 6 (2011), pp. 75-97.

53   Kapur, Lewis and Webb, World Bank, vol. 1, 398.

54   World Bank Report and Recommendation of the President, 27 September 1978, Report No. P-2387-MLI. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/877211468049786388/pdf/multi-page.pdf (accessed 27 February 2017).

55   Ibid, 11. See also Schreyger, L'Office du Niger, pp. 283-284.

56   Scott, Seeing Like a State.

57   C. Blanchi to D. Alisbah and S. El Darwish, Mali: Office du Niger. A proposal for immediate action, 22 April 1983, WBA, Folder 807349.

of the Bank, but it remained unclear how to operationalize them.[58] Given the need to identify projects, and in view of the doctrinal uncertainties, it is not surprising that the Bank sent an initial appraisal mission to the Office du Niger, a project that, in the Bank's previous assessments, had not had sufficient potential for financial returns.[59] An international conference of donors held in Ségou, the administrative headquarter of the Office du Niger, envisaged $43 million dollars for the rehabilitation of the project in late 1978.[60] This conference marked the beginning of a decades-long process of coordinated assistance, coercion and planning which continues until today.

By the time the World Bank committed itself to supporting the Office du Niger, important developments in the international political economy affected future strategies and lending policies of the Bank. The Iranian Revolution led to a further rise in oil prices, putting enormous pressure on oil-importing developing countries and on debt-servicing. Partly as a result of increasing oil prices, growth rates in so-called developed countries remained flat. In Great Britain and the United States, conservative governments took over and crusaded against state involvement in the economy. These developments reinforced a reconsideration of past lending practices within the Bank, where dissatisfaction with the sluggish impact of rural and agricultural development projects on national growth rates had been accumulating. The result of these deliberations was the famous Berg Report of 1981. It blamed African governments for past failures in agricultural production and continued rural poverty, rather than colonial legacies or the externalities of the world market. It called for market-oriented trade and exchange rate policies, and for improved public policies in general and agricultural policies in particular.[61] The report reinforced a new direction in Bank lending practices in two important ways: the so-called 'structural adjustment loans' called for continuous monitoring of overall development aims beyond the more circumscribed project levels, and were designed to not only fund certain projects but improve the political economy and the institutional structure of a recipient country. Conditions were not a novel phenomenon in development assistance, but the new conditionality of 'structural adjustment' demanded a more forceful regime of monitoring and compliance, a regime which in fact infringed heavily on the sovereignty of countries and the independence of national decision-making by interfering with their

58   E. V. K. Jaycox to W. C. Baum, Action Program and Interim Report of Urban Poverty Task Group, 23 October 1975, WBA, Folder 30146442; Jaycox to R. S. McNamara, Urban Poverty Program Status Report, 17 January 1979, WBA, Folder 30146462. With the assistance of the World Bank and the UNDP, the International Labor Organization in 1976 issued a report that defined basic needs as food, clothing, housing, education, and public transportation. While consisting of diverse people across several continents, the dependent variable to categorize small farmers, tenants and the landless as a "specific group of people" was "poverty", defined as the "equivalent of an annual per capita income of 50 USD or less". See World Bank, Rural Development. Sector Policy Paper, February 1975, Washington 1975, pp. 3-4.

59   R. Chaufournier to Files, Office Memo, Mali, Minister of Finance's Visit to Mr. McNamara, 17 December 1968, WBA, Folder 807346; M. Paijmans, Memo for the Record, Mali, Delegation's Visit to Mr. McNamara (Agricultural Credit), 1 May 1970, WBA, Folder 807346.

60   Schreyger, L'Office du Niger, p. 336.

61   World Bank, Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa – An Agenda for Action of the World Bank, Washington 1981, p. 5; See also Kapur, Lewis and Webb, The World Bank, vol. 1, pp. 505-510.

public spending and the organizational set-up of their governmental structures. The Office du Niger constituted an excellent case for the implementation of these new market-oriented, coercive development doctrines and practices. As a World Bank official stated in 1983, "rehabilitation of Office Niger implies that Government and ON will depart from policies and procedures applied for many years".[62]

From the perspective of Washington, the Office du Niger symbolized much that had gone wrong with African agriculture in the past. The state-run public enterprise (parastatal) had accumulated, over the past decade, a large but underemployed staff (around 10,000 for a total settler population of 60,000 in the early 1980s), crippling debts, and monopolies on the buying, at well-below market prices, processing and marketing of the farmers' harvests.[63] Relations between the Office as an institution and the farmers were of a highly coercive nature, as a World Bank official noted: "Socio-economic studies carried out in 1980 and 1981 have caused shockwaves in the Office establishment by highlighting well known issues that no one has dared to put into print before. They revolve around security of land tenure, removing police controls on marketing of paddy, changing the paternalistic nature of cooperatives, improving the appalling nutrition, water supply and health situation, and priority to functional literacy."[64]

By the mid-1980s, structural adjustment loans in the agricultural sector made up around 30 percent of Bank lending. Because of poor economic conditions, high debts, and the reluctance of donors to commit themselves in the future, the Malian government had not much choice but to seek the loan the World Bank offered. Other donors such as Dutch, West German and French development outfits had signed up to the Bank's policy and accepted its overall coordination. Deteriorating irrigation conditions within the Office du Niger and further decreases in production made rehabilitation of the area a national priority. It was in this context that the Bank was able to dictate conditions which preceded the conclusion of a loan agreement: lay-offs of administrative and supportive staff, an end to the marketing monopoly, a 'professionalization' of management (along with the acceptance of temporary external advisers), a new accounting system, an increase in water fees, and more responsibility, and freedom, for individual entrepreneurial activity on the part of the settlers.[65]

In the first few years after the signing of an initial loan agreement in 1989 between the Bank and the Government of Mali, as well as between Mali and donor institutions from

62   C. Blanchi to Files, Office du Niger (ON), Discussion with Malian Delegation in Washington, 28 February 1983, WBA, Folder 807349.

63   C. Blanchi to D. Alisbah, Mali – Office du Niger. A proposal for immediate action, 22 April 1983, WBA, Folder 807349. See also R. Paarlberg and M. Lipton, Changing Missions at the World Bank, in: World Policy Journal 8.3 (1991), pp. 475-498, here p. 488; Van de Walle, African Economies, p. 142.

64   J. Tillier to A.D. Knox, Mali – Office du Niger Irrigation Improvement of Farmers Situation, 11 December 1981, WBA, Folder 807347.

65   D. Lallement to J. Guillot-Lageat, "Office du Niger Consolidation Project – Updated Project Brief", 18 May 1984, WBA, Folder 807350, and Lallement to Guillot-Lageat, Office du Niger – Appraisal Mission. Back-to-Office Report/Debriefing, 05 August 1986, WBA, Folder 807353.

West Germany, the Netherlands, and France, reform proceeded slowly.[66] The government was reluctant to give up institutional controls and relax market restrictions favoring urban food consumers to the detriment of rural producers.[67] However, continuing financial problems and low productivity within the Office du Niger, as well as the ever-growing demands from donors and the global economy to liberalize domestic markets, forced the Malian government and the Office du Niger to comply with many the donor's prescriptions. These concerned three major areas: institutional reforms, increased productivity, and social reforms. Taken together, they transformed the role of the state and of authorities in the Office du Niger, the economic potential of the irrigation scheme, and the life of the settlers.

'Structural adjustment', often described as a ruthless instrument which enforced alien norms, infringed upon national sovereignty, and impoverished African urban dwellers, reflected the liberal agenda of the 1980s and 1990s.[68] It sought to liberalize markets and raise productivity. At the same time, it enhanced, perhaps for the first time in the history of twentieth-century development doctrines, the role and position of the individual. Human rights and gender assumed increasing importance, though critics argue that this emphasis was more rhetorical than substantial.[69] 'Structural adjustment' therefore seemed a double-edged sword and a contradictory mechanism for promoting liberal capitalism: it exposed societies, more than ever before, to the vagaries of the market; at the same time, it opened up opportunities for individuals to act as market participants.[70]

The Liberal Agenda and its Impact on the Office du Niger

Between the 1950s and the 1980s, settlers' living standards had improved, if only very slowly, but fundamental imperatives of production had not changed markedly. The Malian government and the management of the Office du Niger still placed an absolute emphasis on the production of rice, to the detriment of a diversified smallholder economy which allowed families, mainly women, to grow vegetables or raise chickens to sell in local markets. Hunger remained a pervasive threat to many of the poorer settlers. Written land contracts and long-term leases did not exist, and collectively the settlers still formed the labor factor in a development scheme that was organized along agro-industrial cri-

66   Memorandum and Recommendation of the President of the International Development Association to the Executive Directors on a Proposed Credit to the Republic of Mali for the Office du Niger Consolidation Project, 08.02.1988, Report No. P-4744-MLI, http://www-wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/IW3P/IB/1988/02/08/000009265_3960926203647/Rendered/PDF/multi_page.pdf (accessed 26 February 2017).

67   For a similar case concerning Kenia, see Van de Walle, African Economies, p. 158.

68   J. Harrington and P. Mosley, Evaluating the Impact of World Bank Structural Adjustment Lending: 1980-87, in: Journal of Development Studies 27.3 (1991), pp. 63-94.

69   M. R. Abouharb and D. L. Cingranelli, The Human Rights Effects of World Bank Structural Adjustment, 1981–2000, in: International Studies Quarterly 50 (2006), pp. 233-262.

70   H. Bernstein, Structural Adjustment and African Agriculture. A Retrospect, in: D. Moore (ed.), The World Bank. Development, Poverty, Hegemony, Scottsville 2007, pp. 343-368.

teria. Not for nothing did a farmer interviewed in the late 1980s declare: "Our country has been free since 1960, but we farmers in the Office du Niger are still the agency's slaves".[71]

The liberal reforms of the 1990s and the early 2000s witnessed a fundamental overhaul of the institutional structure of the Office du Niger. Coordinated by the World Bank, Dutch, French, and West German donor agencies as well as the European Union bankrolled the rehabilitation of the irrigation system, financed schools and medical centers, drilled wells, and supported a range of cooperatives and associations designed to turn settlers into 'stakeholders'. In the process, about three hundred million dollars were disbursed, three times more than initially expected. An elected Malian government, in office since the democratization of 1991/92, supported the rehabilitation. In line with the then current development doctrine, donors and recipient subscribed to the notion of 'good government' and the importance of functionally specific institutions designed to assist freer trade and open markets.[72] In the process, the Office du Niger lost many of its functions, most notably its right to buy, process and market the rice, and much of its personnel. Some 5,000 employees lost their jobs, many of them buying long-term leases with the compensation they had received. The organization confined its responsibilities to the distribution and administration of the irrigated land, the maintenance of the larger canals (primary and secondary), and to agricultural extension services. Maintenance of the tertiary irrigation system, the small canals watering the fields, became the responsibility of cooperatives.[73]

Downsizing of the Office and de-regulation of the agrarian sector of Mali have brought rising standards of living to two-thirds of the settlers. As a World Bank study noted in 2005: "Between 1982 and 2002, rice yields have quadrupled, total production has increased sixfold, incomes have increased dramatically while supporting a four-times-larger population, agriculture has diversified, cropping intensities have increased, and food security has improved."[74] The ultimate aims of the reform process seem to have been realized: productivity has increased tremendously, poverty, in terms of income, has been reduced. In social terms, perhaps the two most important consequences were an increase in security and access of women to income. For instance, rising incomes and more secure leases of land to settlers have made longer-term planning more dependable and increased school enrollment. Deregulation offered women the opportunity to sell surplus produce, especially vegetables, in local markets. While land tenure is still a male prerogative, independent incomes provide women with more choices and freedoms.[75]

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71   Aw and Diemer, Making a Large Irrigation Scheme Work, 1.
72   D. North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, Cambridge 1990.
73   Aw and Diemer, Making a Large Irrigation Scheme Work, 21-64.
74   Ibid., xi.
75   See, for instance a report by the German Kreditanstalt fuer Wiederaufbau from 2005. https://www.kfw-entwick-lungsbank.de/Evaluierung/Ergebnisse-und-Publikationen/PDF-Dokumente-L-P/Mali_Office_Niger_2005.pdf (accessed 10 February 2017)

Doubts about privatization and downsizing of the institution remain. Over the last three decades, the government of Mali has successively reduced, or terminated, its commitment to rural development, rural health and rural social policies. Donors have in fact assumed responsibility for a central element of the irrigation system: the maintenance of the Markala dam and the major canals.[76] Donors have also vigorously promoted the establishment of settler cooperatives. While they have regarded this move as an empowerment of rural civil society, critics argue that social pressure amongst the settlers and cooperative debt vis-à-vis the Office du Niger have increased.[77] Perhaps the single most important threat to individual and family security is land rights, which the Office du Niger continues to control.[78] Eviction in case of non-compliance with institutional regulations remains possible and is being executed, as a village headman told the *New York Times* in December 2010: "They told us this would be the last rainy season for us to cultivate our fields; after that, they will level all the houses and take the land".[79] Foreign governments and companies have discovered the area and invested many millions of dollars in large-scale agribusinesses on land lease terms much more favorable than small farmers have ever obtained.[80] If 'land grabbing' is the future of privatization and liberalization, then many small farmers might face an uncertain future, a future which could resemble in many ways the colonial past.

Conclusion

The colonial government, the postcolonial state of Mali, the international donor community, and, last but not least, the settlers themselves have invested about a billion dollars in the Office du Niger over a period of almost a hundred years.[81] From modest beginnings in the 1930s, the scheme provides the livelihoods for more than a 130,000 settlers today. As a hundred years ago, expectations are high. Productivity can only be realized in top-down decision processes and with substantial inputs and interventions. Most settlers no longer live under conditions of debt peonage, but they are still, to a sig-

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76   For an exploration of this argument in general, see Ch. Piot, Nostalgia for the Future. West Africa after the Cold War, Chicago 2010, pp.133-162.

77   F. Brondeau, Un 'grenier pour l'Afrique de l'Ouest'? Enjeux économiques et perspectives de développement dans les systèmes irrigués de l'Office du Niger (Mali), in: Géocarrefour 84 (2009), pp. 43-53.

78   For a historically informed assessment, see P.E. Peters, Conflicts over Land and Threats to Customary Tenure in Africa, in: African Affairs 112 (2013), pp. 543-562.

79   New York Times, 21 December 2010.

80   The current state of affairs is unclear and clouded in secrecy. Chinese companies seem active, as was (or is) the government of Libya. The latter invested more than 50 million dollars in areas on and around the Office du Niger prior to the war against Libyan dictator Gadhafi. See Le Monde Diplomatique, 9 September 2011. http://www.monde-diplomatique.de/pm/2011/09/09.mondeText.artikel,a0055.idx,17 (accessed 25 February 2017) and Afrique-Europe-Interact, Land Grabbing, Migration, Widerstand, Analysen und Interviews zu Landkonflikten in Mali, Bremen 2012. https://afrique-europe-interact.net/files/aei_brosch__re_anfang-1.pdf (accessed 26 February 2017).

81   The latest large investment took place in 2010. See World Bank, Others Provide US$160 Million to Boost Agriculture in Mali, 3 June 2010, World Bank Press Release No. 2010/453/AFR, http://go.worldbank.org/9QTDTHCOX0 (accessed 27 February 2017).

nificant extent, at the mercy of agro-industrial planning. As long as the threat of eviction exists, structural violence as a constitutive factor of daily life is still a characteristic feature in the Office du Niger, though the degree has lessened over time. A critical feature of individual security, namely long-term lease contracts, are still not available. Decades have passed since settlers' knowledge of the land and of farming methods were considered inherently inferior, but the distribution of land, seeds, water and communal tasks still sets limits on individual choices.

Development doctrines have deeply influenced the institution. From the colonial paradigm of production to visions of a socialist rural economy to the liberal predicaments of the post-1980 period, external doctrines have left a deep imprint on the Office du Niger and its settlers. As has been shown above, the colonial vision of *mise en valeur*, promulgated as a win-win situation for local and metropolitan interests alike, turned out to be, in practice, a labor site operating with false promises, involuntary labor and vastly unrealistic expectations.[82] The post-World War II period concretized the metropolitan aim of consolidating the colonial empire. Further investments and mechanization epitomized the paradigm of productivity in the interest of the metropole. Decolonization bequeathed plans and visions rather than functioning systems to the independent government of Mali. More than anything else, a man-made and natural catastrophe, the drought in the Sahel in the early 1970s, provided the backdrop to new departures in agrarian development on the ground. This was facilitated by a reconfiguration of knowledge and practical advice on agriculture, farmers, and the rural space during the 1960s. The new appreciation for small-scale farmers in the development doctrines of the 1960s and its realization in practices in the 1970s affected the Office du Niger at a time when the institution was, for all practical purposes, no longer sustainable.

A consistent thread that runs through the history of the Office du Niger is cooperatives. The French introduced them for the dual purpose of providing tools and machines as well as to enhance social control. Under the guise of a return to customary (or 'traditional', as it was called) forms of communal burden-sharing, the urban socialists of the 1960s politicized cooperatives. They became instruments of political mobilization but lost their economic functions. Cooperatives imposed by foreign donors since the 1980s assumed, again, economic functions, but social control and collective accountability have been prominent features of top-down institution building. As such, there is a high degree of continuity from the colonial period up until the present.

While the reforms of the Office du Niger since the late 1970s ensured its survival, and raised attractiveness and productivity, donors in particular were unable to alter the most critical issue affecting settler's lives, namely tenure arrangements. That foreign investors today get better deals than the settlers raises questions about the ultimate aim of development schemes. More often than not concerns about social or ecological emphases give way to the established focus on productivity.

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82   The parallels to another large irrigation scheme, the Gezira scheme in Sudan, during the colonial period are striking. See Ertsen, Improvising Planned Development, pp. 7-60.

Rural Development and Changing Labour Relations in Italy and Spain in the 1950s and 1960s

Grazia Sciacchitano

ABSTRACT

Der Aufsatz beschäftigt sich mit der Politik gegenüber ländlichen Räumen im Italien und Spanien der 1950er und 1960er Jahre. Er untersucht die sozio-ökonomischen Folgen dieser Politik am Beispiel Siziliens und Andalusiens. Der Vergleich der beiden ländlichen Räume verweist auf ein gemeinsames Entwicklungsmodell im südlichen Europa, in dem die Steigerung landwirtschaftlicher Produktion und die Verringerung der in der Landwirtschaft tätigen Arbeitskräfte im Mittelpunkt standen. Siedlungsprojekte spielten demgegenüber nur eine vergleichsweise geringe Rolle. Der Beitrag rekurriert auf Datenmaterial, das den Grad der Beschäftigungen in der Landwirtschaft zwischen 1950 und 1970 widerspiegelt. Er zeigt, dass zwar immer weniger Menschen insgesamt in der Landwirtschaft beschäftigt waren, die Zahl von Landarbeitern, die nicht über Grundbesitz verfügten, aber zunahm.

Introduction

Until the 1950s and 1960s a significant part of the population in Spain and Italy was employed in agriculture, and many lived in poor socioeconomic conditions. The term 'land-hunger' was used by contemporaries to illustrate the desires of many rural workers and peasants, as they had no other possibility of finding employment and as the possession of land was not only a source of income but also a source of political power. This situation was particularly problematic in the Southern parts of the two countries, where much of the land was in the hands of only a few owners. Low levels of subsistence and unemployment coexisted alongside large parcels of uncultivated land, which were often owned by absentee landowners. However, such problems were also endemic outside the

so-called *latifundium*, the extensive parcels of private land. A large workforce of landless labourers moved around the countryside looking for seasonal work, often for very low salaries. These labourers often included poor peasants who were either owners of small plots or settlers, and whose own work did not provide enough for them to subsist.

This situation changed dramatically during the 1950s and 1960s, when policies for industrialization and the reform of the rural system transformed the social and economic panorama of the countryside in both countries. This article focuses on the moment of transition in Italy and Spain during the 1950s and 1960s. Rather than studying the process of industrialisation and urbanization, the article investigates the two states' agrarian policies and their impact on socioeconomic conditions in the Sicilian and Andalusian countryside. In doing so the article raises the following questions: What role was attributed to agriculture in Italy's and Spain's economic development schemes? Which proposals existed to 'modernise' the agrarian system? And what were the effects of those programs at the local level?

Although Spain and Italy had very different governmental systems (Franco's dictatorship and Italy's parliamentary democracy), the two nations shared similar socioeconomic problems and were both trying to steer their way towards industrialisation. Hence, it seems promising to analyse them in a comparative way to ascertain whether we can speak of a 'Southern' model of rural change.

Broadly speaking, there were two driving interests at play. For one, the political elites of Spain and Italy aimed at increasing agricultural productivity, at protecting the interests of the rural elite, and at meeting the demands of the rural labourers and peasants living in the countryside by providing them with better living conditions. Secondly, the process of industrialization in the two countries affected the rural sector, too. To sustain the industrialization process, and to provide sufficient food resources for the growing urban population, agriculture needed to become more efficient, or more 'modern', as contemporaries put it. Additionally, a larger number of workers was required for the factories. Hence, the labour market had to change, too. It was against this background that the Italian and Spanish governments tried to implement rural reforms in the postwar decades.

In the following, I will first describe the political, social and economic contexts in which these policies took shape and then discuss the ways in which they represented a new direction of rural reform in both countries. Secondly, through an analysis of the different policies that were enacted and the expert debates surrounding them, I will trace the reasons and interests behind these policies, specifically the understanding of the relations between agriculture and industry they contained. Finally, shifting attention to the Sicilian and Andalusian countryside, I will illustrate the effects of the reforms and assess the relation between their social and economic aims. In order to ascertain the nature of the reforms I draw on data concerning the employment levels of labourers and peasants in the Spanish and Italian countryside from 1950 to 1970.

Land Reform in Post-War Italy and Rural Development Plans

After the Second World War, the working population in Italy's countryside made re-
newed appeals for a land reform. Similarly, the post-war Italian government began plan-
ning interventions in the agricultural sector, including a land reform. However, in spite
of the rhetorical support from the Italian Prime Minister, Christian Democrat Alcide
De Gasperi, as well as from other Italian politicians from 1946 onwards, a systematic
reform remained elusive until 1950. Still, some measures directed at a structural reform
of the rural system were implemented during the second half of the 1940s: the so-called
Gullo decrees.

The Gullo decrees, named after the communist minister of agriculture, Fausto Gullo,
were enacted in 1944 and 1945, right after the end of the war in Italy. Their goal was
to provide better rental contracts and to make previously uncultivated or poorly culti-
vated land available to peasants and labourers. Although these measures were praised by
the poorest inhabitants of the countryside, other political parties and the agrarian elite
strongly opposed them. This resulted in a series of strikes and land occupations, with
poor peasants demanding the application of the decrees and a full-fledged land reform.
Violent clashes between protesters and the police escalated in the second half of 1949,
with twelve people being killed by the police. Against this background, the press and the
Italian public pushed the government to overcome the resistance of the landowners and
to meet the demands of the peasants. Eventually, Gullo's successor, Christian Democrat
Antonio Segni, opened a new era of rural politics and policies.

In 1950 a land reform was enacted that aimed both at redistribution and at achieving
higher productivity. This was done through two laws, the *Sila* Law (May 1950) and the
Stralcio Law (October 1950). The first was applied in Calabria, while the second one was
implemented in the Po Delta, Tuscany's Maremma, the Fucino Basin, some areas of the
Campania, and in Puglia, Sardinia, and Molise. Then, in December of the same year, the
autonomous region of Sicily enacted its own land reform. However, the land reform was
not only the result of pressure from the countryside, but a necessary choice to improve
the economic situation of the country, which could no longer endure its customary
agricultural model, especially the large estates with absentee owners.[1] In other words,
the land reform was not applied to the entire Italian territory but only to specific areas.
According to Giuseppe Medici, an agrarian expert and member of the Christian Demo-
crats, the reform was most crucial in regions where agricultural structures were 'archaic'

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1   C. Daneo, Breve Storia dell'Agricoltura Italiana, 1860–1970, Milan 1980, chap. IX; P. Ginsborg, A History of Con-
     temporary Italy, 1943–1980, London 1990, chap. IV; G. Massullo, La Riforma Agraria, in P. Bevilacqua (ed.), Storia
     dell'agricoltura Italiana in età Contemporanea, Vol. III, Mercati e Istituzioni, Venice 1991. On Sicily, see F. Renda,
     Il movimento contadino in Sicilia, in P. Amato et al., Campagne e movimento contadino nel Mezzogiorno, Bari
     1979. On the decrees, see A. Rossi Doria, Il Ministro e i Contadini, Decreti Gullo e lotte nel Mezzogiorno, 1944–
     1949, Rome 1983.

and on large properties where land owners failed to fulfil their economic and social func-
tion – their contribution to providing employment and allowing for economic growth.[2]
The term 'archaic' was used principally as an economic concept and was associated with
the type of agriculture that dealt with farm animals and the cultivation of extensive
crops like cereals and legumes. These provided lower levels of income in comparison to
intensive crops like vegetables and olive groves. It was therefore believed that a so-called
land transformation was required. This meant improving the quality of the soil to allow
for the cultivation of intensive crops, which together with the mechanisation of farming
would increase income levels per hectare, and thus allow for the existence of small but
economically self-sufficient farms. To encourage the transformation process, estate own-
ers were to be given monetary incentives. In this way, landowners were made responsible
to cultivate all the land available to them, thus ending the problem of uncultivated land
in the *latifundium*. As a result, there would be more opportunities for labourers and peas-
ants to gain work. Similarly, intensive cultivation would raise the demand for labourers
since it required more work than extensive cultivation. Therefore, through a series of
incentives, the reform pushed absentee landlords to become active land-entrepreneurs.
However, the land reform, and especially its redistributive component, represented just
a part of the plans designed to 'modernise' the agricultural sector. The reform and its
implementation were closely linked with the work of the *Cassa per opere straordinarie di
pubblico interesse nell'Italia Meridionale* (CASMEZ, 1950–1984), also called *Cassa per il
Mezzogiorno* (Fund for the South). The *Cassa* was a public institution, created with the
support of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, to stimulate the
economic development of the Italian South. The CASMEZ had a double purpose: First,
it was supposed to increase the value of agricultural resources through intensification;
second, it aimed at creating conditions under which the economic activity outside of the
agricultural sector could be intensified, for example by setting up industries.[3]
Furthermore, in 1954 the Italian Minister of Finance, Ezio Vanoni, presented the Em-
ployment and Income Development Scheme (*Schema di sviluppo dell'occupazione e del
reddito,* 1954–1964), also known as the Vanoni Plan. It was a result of the discussions
and objectives established by the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation
(OEEC), founded in 1948 to assist the administration of Marshall plan funds. The
Vanoni plan's principal aims were to increase the country's income and to reduce the
economic gap between the North and South of the country. In order to achieve this, the
Vanoni Plan intended to create four million new jobs in ten years on the national level,
to be divided between industry and services, with an increase of employment rates of
four percent and three percent in both sectors. Conversely, the number of employees in

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2   G. Medici, L'Agricoltura e la Riforma Agraria, Milan 1946, p. 92; G. Medici, Politica Agraria 1945–1952, Bologna
     1952, p. 81.
3   P. Saraceno, Necessità e Prospettive dello Sviluppo Industriale nelle Regioni Meridionali in Relazione all'Opera
     della Cassa per il Mezzogiorno, in: M. Carabba (ed), Mezzogiorno e Programmazione 1954–1971, SVIMEZ series,
     Varese 2008, p. 119; see also L. D'Antone, L'Interesse Straordinario per il Mezzogiorno (1943–1960), in: Meridiana
     24 (1995), pp. 17-64.

the agricultural sector was supposed to decrease by eight percent (from 41 percent to 33 percent).[4] To reach those targets, the plan counted not only on the creation of 120,000 new jobs but also on the emigration of 80,000 Italians abroad each year for ten years.[5] With regard to increasing the rates of employment in the agricultural sector, the Vanoni Plan counted on the land reform and the policies of CASMEZ, which were expected to create new jobs in agriculture in the context of land redistribution and transformation.[6] As becomes clear, the activities of CASMEZ and the Vanoni Plan were tightly interlinked with each other. The land reform aimed at the creation of small, self-sufficient peasant properties as well as the general increase of agricultural productivity by encouraging landowners to undertake the necessary transformational works. Those works, as well as the infrastructure measures, were supposed to be financed by CASMEZ. However, while considered crucial to improving the social and economic conditions in the South, those measures were not considered sufficient to entirely solve the problem of unemployment and poverty. In this sense, the Vanoni Plan constituted the third essential part of the development plan for the Italian South. It would shift the so-called agricultural 'surplus workforce' to the industrial sector, which would lower the pressure on the agricultural sector and provide industry with the necessary workforce. Clearly, an increase of employment levels in industry and services as well as emigration had to be generated by the primary sector from the southern agrarian regions of the country. In fact, an analysis of the Vanoni plan made in 1955 stated that an overall employment increase had to take place entirely outside agriculture with a shift, in ten years, of 900.000 workers from the agricultural sector to other ones.[7] Similarly, with regard to emigration, the movement had to originate in the southern regions and aimed for the transfer of 1.100.000 workers from the South to the North of the country and abroad.[8]

In sum, the plans of the early 1950s aimed at creating a new socioeconomic scenario in the countryside, characterized by a more efficient agriculture and fewer people directly depending on it. More people would be employed in decent conditions, while others would be able to live off their land more easily. This improvement would then lead to the social and economic modernization, not only of the South, but of Italy as a whole.

4   E. Vanoni, Lo Schema Decennale, Linea di Sviluppo e Metodologia, in: P. Barucci (ed), La Politica Economica degli Anni Degasperiani, Scritti e Discorsi Politici ed Economici, Florence 1977, p. 346.
5   G. H. Hildebrand, Growth and Structure in the Economy of Modern Italy, Cambridge 1965, p. 436 footnote no. 20.
6   G.G. Dell'Angelo, L'Agricoltura nello Schema Vanoni e nel Programma di Sviluppo Economico, in E. Zagari (ed.) Mezzogiorno e Agricoltura, SVIMEZ series, Varese 1997, pp. 429- 430.
7   L. Fezzi, Un Programma per gli Italiani, Appunti sul Piano Vanoni, in: Aggiornamenti Sociali, Aug.-Sept. (1955), p. 364.
8   P. Saraceno, Riesame del Piano Vanoni a fine 1957, in: Moneta e Credito, Vol. II, 4 (1958), p. 23.

Spanish Rural Development Plans in the Post-war Period

In Spain, land reform and rural development issues were discussed intensively throughout the 1950s, yet the plans were not implement until a decade later. This can be explained by the fact that during the first two decades of Franco's dictatorship, Spain pursued a policy of economic autarchy and self-sufficiency.[9] The economic isolation of the 1940s had serious consequences for the production and trade of major agricultural products, which in addition to the state's violent repression of any form of protest, led to wages being restrained and workers being exploited.[10] At the end of the 1950s, the severe situation of the agricultural sector and its workers put increasing pressure on the Spanish economy, forcing the Franco regime to abandon its policy of autarchy and to implement changes in economic policies.[11]

During the late 1950s and 1960s, the Spanish government tried to promote the consolidation of fragmented land holdings and settlements, hoping to increase agricultural productivity. The measures were carried out by the National Institute of Colonisation (*Instituto Nacional de Colonización,* INC, 1939–1971) and by the National Institute for Land Consolidation (*Servicio nacional de concentración parcelaria*, SPC, 1953–1971). The INC oversaw the procedures aimed at transforming uncultivated land into productive fields, and to attract new settlers in the regions. The SPC dealt with the problem of scattered land. As in the case of the Italian land reform, interventions into rural settlement and production structures were not the only instruments adopted to develop the agricultural sector. Policies aimed at industrialization constituted the second element of the overall modernization plan.

Rafael Cavestany y de Anduaga, the Spanish Minister of Agriculture (1951–1957), was the key thinker behind the policies that emphasized the interdependence between industrial development and agricultural reform. In 1955, referring to the developments in the United States, Great Britain, and Italy, Cavestany remarked: "A real revolution has been produced in the economic policy, and all the states are planning, stimulating, and leading an active policy of transformation and improvement of agriculture, parallel to an intense industrial revolution".[12] He specifically referred to the Italian case, speaking of "the Italian agrarian revolution". But it was not the Italian land reform he praised. He rather had the Vanoni Plan in mind – the central role the plan attributed to industrial

9 For a compendium see Barciela et al., La España de Franco (1939–1975), Economía, Madrid 2001, pp. 178-195; and J. L. Orella, La España del Desarrollo, el Almirante Carrero Blanco y sus hombres, Valladolid 2014, chap. III.

10 See M. Á. Del Arco Blanco, Morir de Hambre. Autarquía, Escasez y Enfermedad en la España del Primer Franquismo, in: Pasado y Memoria, revista de Historia Contemporánea, 5 (2006), pp. 241-258. For an analysis of the Francoist repression in the countryside see M. Sánchez Mosquera, Del Miedo Genético a la Protesta. Memoria de los Disidentes del Franquismo, Barcelona 2008.

11 J. R. Cuadrado Roura, Regional Economy and Policy in Spain (1960–1975), in: J. R. Cuadrado Roura (ed.), Regional Policy, Economic Growth and Convergence, Berlin 2009, p 23; P. Martín Aceña, E. Martínez Ruiz, The golden age of Spanish Capitalism: Economic Growth Without Political Freedom, in: N. Townson (ed.), Spain Transformed, The Late Franco dictatorship, 1959-75, London 2007, pp. 34-35.

12 R. Cavestany y de Anduaga, Menos Agricultores y Mejor Agricultura, in: Revista de Estudios Agrosociales, 13 (1955) p. 99. All quotes have been translated by the author of the article.

development, its aim to reduce the rural population, and the efforts toward the transformation of land.

Against this backdrop, Cavestany's call for "better agriculture and fewer farmers" became the slogan of Francoist agricultural policies throughout the 1960s. Better agriculture could be achieved by increasing agricultural productivity, thanks to measures such as land consolidation and land transformation, while to reach the goal of "fewer farmers" it was necessary to shift workers from agriculture to industry.

In addition, in Cavestany's view, the *latifundium* did not have to be measured in terms of extension but in economic terms since "when land ownership is fully exploited, there is no *latifundium*".[13] Hence, Cavestany was not opposed to the concentration of land in the hands of a few; what he considered problematic was that land was not cultivated. In this sense, the only commitment that large landowners had to agree to was similar to Giuseppe Medici's requirement stated before, that they fully exploited the natural resources on their land.

The principles of rural and agricultural development outlined by Castevany were taken up by two laws that were in force during the dictatorship. The first was the law on the Settlement and Distribution of Properties in Irrigable Areas (*Colonización y Distribución de la Propiedad en Zonas Regables)*, which was passed in 1949 and revised during the 1950s and 1960s. The second one was the law on Farm Improvements (*Finca mejorables*), passed in 1953 and modified in 1962. The first law operated together with the Coordinated Plan of [Public] Works (*Plano Coordinado de Obras*) and was led by both the Ministry of Public Works and the INC. They carried out irrigation, reclamation and infrastructural works on properties which were uncultivated or were still operating in the 'traditional' style. As part of this effort, the INC tried to acquire part of the properties which were considered excessive for the benefit of poor peasants and landless labourers.[14] In other words, it practiced a form of redistribution of land. The second law concerned the transformation and use of abandoned and uncultivated land belonging to estate owners, for the purposes of making it productive, and in turn to increase the labour supply in the area by having more cultivable land available. According to the law, if a property was qualified for improvement, the owner was offered state subsidies to make the land productive; if the owner chose not to make any improvements the state expropriated the land.[15] Consequently, the threat of the expropriation through the law of 1953 pushed owners to implement the improvement works.[16]

As a general plan for agricultural development, the Spanish rural development laws were supposed to combine the settlement of the expropriated land and the transformation of the land in conjunction with infrastructural projects. This dual approach was very similar

13   Ibid, 99-100.
14   See N. Ortega, Política Agraria y Denominación del Espacio, Madrid 1979, pp. 186-204.
15   J. González Pérez, La Declaración de Finca Mejorables, in: Revista de Administración Pública, 13 (1954), pp. 207-236; M. Pérez Yruela, La Reforma Agraria en España, in: C. Gómez Benito, J.J. González Rodríguez (eds.), Agricultura y Sociedad en la España Contemporánea, Madrid 1997 p. 898.
16   Pérez Yruela, La Reforma Agraria en España, p. 898.

to the Italian model outlined above. This similarity was not entirely a coincidence. In an article published in 1953, Emilio Gómez Ayau, one of INC's most influential experts, underlined the value of the Italian land reform both in political and in socio-economic terms, stressing the importance of property distribution and of land transformation, and the role of CASMEZ in promoting industrial development and increasing employment levels through state intervention.[17] Gómez Ayau was an expert of the Italian reform. In fact, he had edited Spanish translations of the works written by the famous Italian agrarian expert, Mario Bandini, who had worked closely with Antonio Segni in drawing up of the Italian land reform. In addition, Gómez Ayau visited the reform authorities in Puglia, Lucania, Calabria, Emilia, and Veneto, accompanied by Bandini, his "great friend and master of many things".[18] Hence, it seems safe to assume that there was a transfer of ideas and approaches from Italy to Spain.

The dual nature of the Italian rural reform was central to the thinking of Spanish and Italian experts, suggesting not only its effectiveness but also the creation of a shared agrarian development model. In 1959, Spain enacted the so-called Stabilisation Plan. The plan marked the end of the period of autarchy and foresaw interventions in the public sector, reforms in monetary policy, and more economic flexibility. During the 1960s, new legislation was introduced to allow for capital imports and to encourage foreign investment in national enterprises and industrial sectors, which had until then had only been reserved for Spaniards.[19] At the same time, Spain entered the Organisation for Economic Cooperation in Europe (OECD), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Bank. The stabilisation plan was the result of collective work involving a group of Spanish reformist technicians and international economic organisations.[20]

Finally, 1964 saw the enforcement of the First Development Plan, jointly with the new *Ordenación Rural* (Rural Laws), which encompassed the Land Consolidation and Rural Ordinance Service (*Servicio de Concentración Parcelaria y Ordenación Rural,* SNCPOR, 1962–1971) created in 1962 by the previous SPC.[21] The first national development plan (1964–1967) together with the new *Ordenación Rural* was defined as an "authentic organisation of community development".[22] On the one hand they both regulated and promoted the acquisition of land, favouring the extension of land surfaces for economic purposes through new state regulations. On the other hand, it introduced technical education for settlers, provided incentives to transfer their surplus labourers from the coun-

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17 E. Gómez Ayau, El Papel del Estado en las Grandes Obras de Transformación Agraria. Estudio de Poco Más de Medio Siglo de Legislación en España, Italia y Estados Unidos, in: Revista de Estudios Agrosociales, 4 (1953), pp. 57-59.

18 E. Gómez Ayau, Una Reforma Agraria Eficaz y Oportuna, in: Revista de Estudios Agrosociales, 82 (1973), pp. 69-76.

19 P. Martín Aceña, E. Martínez Ruiz, The Golden Age of Spanish Capitalism, pp. 34-35.

20 See M. J. González, La Economía Política del Franquismo (1940–1970): Dirigismo, Mercado y Planificación, Madrid 1979, chap. IV; J. L. Orella, La España del Desarrollo, pp. 45-61.

21 A. Maceda Rubio, De la Concentración Parcelaria a la Ordenación Rural, in: Ería 93 (2014), p. 18.

22 J. L. de Los Mozos, La Ordenación Rural en la Nueva Ley de 27 lujo de 1968, in: Revista de Estudios Políticos, 164 (1969), abstract.

tryside to industrial sectors, and promoted the establishment of industries and service sector.[23]

Similar to the Italian case, the Spanish plans for rural development included migration schemes, too. Emigration from Spain had been *de facto* forbidden in 1941. When rural development was put on the political agenda in the 1950s, the migration policy was reconsidered. In 1960 and 1962, new laws on migration were passed. Their purpose was to adapt the policies on migration in such a way that the rural population would decrease – in other words, the inhabitants of rural areas were supposed to migrate and become workers in underserved sectors in other regions. Toward that goal, the Spanish development plan of 1964 established (just as the Vanoni Plan had done nine years earlier) a target number of migrants, based on the assumed relation between population growth and job creation. The study on which the targets were based was carried out by the Spanish Institute for Migration (*Instituto Español de Emigración*, IEE); it suggested that Spain should aim for the migration of 80.000 workers per year from 1964 to 1972.[24]

Over the course of the early 1960s, the development doctrines enunciated by Cavestany in the 1950s were finally put into practice. Agricultural reforms, industrialization, and migration complemented each other to achieve their goals. Agricultural productivity was strengthened, through the marginalisation of the settlement policies in favour of land transformation and consolidation as stipulated by the Rural Laws.

In both countries the effect of the policies was a continuous decrease of the absolute number of peasants within the general population, with an modification of the rural labour structure especially in the regions of Sicily and Andalusia. In this respect, one of the first effects was produced by the state's rural reform plans, namely an important modification in land property sizes in the Spanish case, and a change in the ownership of land in the Italian case. However, this modification did not benefit poor peasant and rural labourers as in the intent of settlement policies. It was rather the result of an imbalance in the application of the 'combined model' of rural development, in which settlement policies played a minor role compared to migration and agricultural productive improvement. Let us look at this process in detail.

The effects of rural reforms on labour relations and social conditions in Italy and Spain

In Sicily, between 1949 and 1965 around 40 to 45 percent of landed property that exceeded 200 hectares changed owners.[25] However, this modification was not the direct result of the land reform. Most of the land that changed owners was sold, not expropriated

23   Ibid., p. 86; J. L. Orella, La España del Desarrollo, pp. 56-59; J. R. Cuadrado Roura, Regional Economic Policy in Spain (1960–1975), pp. 32-33.

24   See A. Kreienbrink, La Lógica Económica de la Política Emigratoria del Régimen Franquista, in: J. de la Torre and G. Sanz Lafuente (eds.) Migraciones y Coyuntura Económica del Franquismo a la Democracia, Zaragoza 2008, p. 222- 228.

25   F. Renda, Movimenti di Massa e Democrazia nella Sicilia del Dopoguerra, Bari 1979, p. 52.

or redistributed by force. 193,785 hectares were freely sold to 82,281 buyers; 243,000 hectares were purchased through the Law for the Formation of the Peasant Small Property (*Legge per la Formazione della piccola proprietà Contadina*, 1948); and 99,049 hectares were expropriated through the land reform, of which 74,290 were distributed to 17,157 beneficiaries and divided between labourers and poor peasants; and 24,759 hectares of land were given to 7,712 farmers.[26]

If the amount of land that was expropriated and redistributed was smaller than the amount that was sold, then there is scope to question the effectiveness of the land reform in terms of balancing economic and social inequalities. At the same time, this finding fits with both the state's reluctance to enforce the reform as well as with the politicians' emphasis on increasing agricultural productivity. In fact, as we have seen, the reform was enforced for mainly two reasons: a social one due to the demand coming from the countryside, which aimed at the formation of small peasant properties; and an economic one, directed towards absentee landlords and uncultivated properties, to be resolved through land improvement and expropriation. On the surface, the reform was most successful in terms of land improvement by irrigating 250,000 hectares of land in southern Italy within ten years.[27] However, the social impact of the land redistribution was basically a failure because landowners, under the Law for the Formation of Small Peasant Property, were allowed to sell the land. This represented a compromise, given that the Communists had called for a general expropriation while the Christian Democrats were trying to secure the support of the larger landowners by allowing them to gain financially from the redistribution.[28]

In 1952, two years after the enforcement of the Italian land reform, the Christian Democrat and agrarian expert Medici praised the land market, supported by the state, as the best way to encourage the formation of small agricultural units:

> *The goal will be easily achieved if the farmers enjoy the necessary credit and understand that the land cannot be donated, but you have to pay for it like all things that you want to preserve and grow: by paying for it, they will have the certainty of possession and will dispel the baleful visions of the miraculous land of milk and honey, where farmlands are given.*[29]

The poorer peasants criticized the law, which they considered to be in contradiction with the land reform principles.[30] Their critique notwithstanding, much land was sold according to the law for the Formation of Small Peasant Property, which granted tax breaks and up to thirty-year mortgages for land acquisition to the buyers. In addition, large landowners managed to further reduce the impact of the expropriation by giving away land that was already in use by the peasant and not the uncultivated ones. The

26   F. Renda, Il Movimento Contadino in Sicilia, p. 688.
27   G. Massullo, La Riforma Agraria, p. 527.
28   Renda, Movimenti di Massa e Democrazia nella Sicilia del Dopoguerra, p. 48.
29   G. Medici, Politica Agraria, p. 46.
30   A. Rossi Doria, Il Ministro e i Contadini, p. 149.

expropriation was affecting land which was the subject of contracts, either long-term or concessional, or managed through cooperatives under the Gullo decrees.[31] In other cases the transformational works began by landowners resulted in withdraw of existing contracts with sharecroppers and *piccolo affitto* (small tenants).[32] Landowners in Andalusia behaved similarly.[33]

During its implementation the land reform often resulted in the eviction of the tenants either because the landowners ended the contracts for a more profitable exploitation of the transformed land, or they presented land that was already rented to peasants as available for expropriation. Furthermore, organizational difficulties plagued transfer of the land and its cultivation. One of the problems was the size of the plots. The average size ranged from a minimum of six hectares to a maximum of 30 hectares, but many people were given plots of only two to three hectares.[34] Bandini himself recognised that in Sicily in 1956 out of 84,000 new properties only 25,000 could be considered economically self-sufficient.[35] The financial situation was supposed to improve with the help of the transformational work, which would increase the outputs of the small farms. In the meantime, Bandini suggested a temporary solution: the new poor settlers could find employment as rural labourers or by participating in the transformational works.[36] However, delays in the realisation of the works frequently prevented the success of this measure.[37]

Overall, the Italian land reform scenario suggests that the two main categories of workers in the countryside, the poor peasants and the labourers, instead of benefitting from the land reform, were excluded from its advantages. They lacked the financial means to purchase land, while the land redistribution, which was supposed to be in their interest, played only a minor role in the general modification of the property structure. Moreover, for those who remained in the countryside, this outcome represents a preamble of a massive transition in the rural labour force from peasants to dependent landless labourers.

Moving on to the evaluation of the results of the Spanish policies, it has to be said that this presents some difficulties since the national, and particular regional data sets are still missing.[38] However, the available data can provide us with a general understanding of the change that took place. The land acquired and redistributed by the National Institute of Colonisation (INC) amounted to 505,772 hectares and was distributed to 47,820 set-

31   Renda, Movimenti di Massa e Democrazia nella Sicilia del Dopoguerra, pp. 45-48.
32   Relazione al IV Congresso Provinciale della Federbraccianti-Agrigento, November 1955, FLAI-CGIL, Donatella Turtura Archive, Rome, Folder 38/3.
33   Manuel Romero Cadenas y otros presentan escrito sobre desahucio de la finca que llevan en arrendamiento, Asunto 62, 1957, Archivo De La Delegación Del Gobierno De Andalucía, Sevilla, Folder 748.
34   A. Graziani, La política del Desarrollo en el Sud de Italia. Enseñanzas de una Experiencia, in: Revista de Economía y Estadística, 6 (1962), p. 49.
35   M. Bandini, L'Offesiva contro la Rifoma, in E. Zagari (ed.) Mezzogiorno e Agricoltura, p. 273.
36   Ibid., p. 275.
37   G. E. Marciani, L'Esperienza della Riforma Agraria in Italia, Roma 1966, p. 95 footnote 2.
38   See C. Gómez Benito, Una Revisión y una Reflexión sobre la Política de Colonización Agraria en la España de Franco, in: Historia del presente, 3 (2004), pp. 81-86.

tlers and 5781 labourers over a period of 35 years.[39] This suggests that the result of the settlement intervention was almost irrelevant in terms of providing new employments, especially if we consider that the Italian land reform was not thought to be particularly successful even though it redistributed 681,000 hectares to 113,000 families over twelve years.[40] Nevertheless, large tracts of land were transformed in the same period: 600,000 hectares were improved through direct state intervention, and if we include the work enacted by private initiatives, the total amounts to 1,200,000 hectares.[41] The Spanish land consolidation effort continued until 1982 and affected 5,331,298 hectares. It achieved its best results in the north of the country where the reform was targeted, while in Andalusia only 39,080 hectares were consolidated.[42] The projects to improve soil productivity in Andalusia were quite successful in terms of size, as by 1975, 120.999 hectares had been transformed.[43] However, like the rest of the country the results of the land settlement were poor, with 91,695 hectares being redistributed to 14,556 farmers and 2,632 labourers.[44] If we compare this outcome with the Sicilian one - 99,049 hectares were distributed to 24,869 families - it appears that the results were similar. However, it has to be considered that the redistribution in Spain took place over a longer period of time and that the percentage of the rural population was much higher in Andalusia than in Sicily (see table 1).

To sum up, according to the data, in Spain the greatest successes were achieved in soil transformation and land consolidation. Similarly, in Andalusia, the settlements were barely implemented, but a significant amount of land was made productive. This finding reflects the predominantly economic outlook of the reforms and the fact that social concerns regarding the situation of the rural poor played a marginal role at best. Nevertheless, historians have argued that the outcome of the settlement is not surprising since a land reform was actually never part of the plan.[45] In fact, the Francoist agrarian policy never had the intention of changing the *status quo* but emphasized the importance of the market economy, especially with regard to the Stabilisation Plan.[46] In the 1960s, the government became even more determined to preserve landed property; settlement policies were now treated with less importance than in previous years.

39   N. Ortega, Política Agraria y Denominación del Espacio, p. 236.
40   G. Massullo, La Riforma Agraria, p. 525.
41   C. Gómez Benito, J. C. Gimeno, La Colonización Agraria en España y en Aragón. 1939–1975, Huesca 2003 quoted in C. Gómez Benito, Una Revisión y una Reflexión sobre la Política de Colonización Agraria en la España de Franco, p. 83.
42   J. Bosque Maurel, Del INC al IRYDA: Análisis de los Resultados Obtenidos por la Política de Colonización Posterior a la Guerra Civil, in: Agricultura y Sociedad, 32 (1984), p. 177.
43   E. Araque Jiménez, La Política de Colonización en La Provincial de Jaén, Análisis de sus Resultados, Jaén, 1983, quoted in J. Bosque Maurel, Del INC al IRYDA, p. 187.
44   My elaboration of data provided by N. Ortega, Política Agraria y Denominación del Espacio, p. 245.
45   M. Bueno, La Reforma de las Estructuras Agrarias en las Zonas de Pequeña y Mediana Propiedad en España, in: Agricultura y Sociedad, 7 (1978), p. 159; C. Barciela, La Contrarreforma Agraria y la Política de Colonización del Primer Franquismo, 1936–1959, in: A. García Sanz, J. San Fernández, (eds.), Reformas y Políticas Agrarias en la Historia de España: de la Ilustración al Primer Franquismo, Madrid 1996, p. 372; M. Pérez Yruela, La Reforma Agraria en España, p. 898.
46   J. Bosque Maurel, Del INC al IRYDA, p. 180.

This shift away from reform and toward stabilization was no coincidence. Rather, it has to be understood against the background of new policies relating to migration, industrial development, and the effort to anchor capitalist practices in agriculture. In practical terms, the proposed solution to overcoming unemployment and poverty in the countryside consisted of migration, the reallocation of the workforce to other sectors, and the improvement of the productivity of existing properties, which did not require a change in land ownership and would raise incomes and employment in the countryside. These policies permitted the state to avoid direct interventions into the rural property structure, which would have carried political risks, and to argue that the migration, transformation, and modernization policies would have the effect of improving the social and economic conditions in the countryside. In other words, the market forces would reduce inequality. This was stated quite clearly by the jurist Alejo Leal García, an important manager in the INC: "The reform of [rural] social structures will largely be a consequence of the economic reforms, and in part of the reforms that were directed at non-specific agricultural institutions".[47]

When, in 1968, Spain adopted the second development plan, the jurist and agrarian expert José Luis de Los Mozos stated that "the property of the land is not an important factor, having been replaced by the productive capacity".[48] In fact, if important results were achieved, it was done within the framework of the state's high regard for private property; indeed, the projected change was meant to keep existing power structures in place. Policies for land consolidation led to the progressive decrease of the number of small agricultural holdings and increased those that were of a size of 50 to 100 hectares.[49] In particular, the properties that ranged from one to five hectares generally decreased by 11 percent, with peaks of 37 percent where the land consolidation was more effective. Similarly, properties over 200 hectares increased by five percent overall, with peaks of 23 percent in areas that were affected by the reform.[50]

In both countries, the increasing importance that politicians gave to agricultural productivity played an important role in diminishing the number of the small peasant properties as land development clashed with small peasants' businesses, since they could hardly compete with large companies. The state actively supported this tendency by granting a series of benefits to estates owners, including credits, state subsidies, and fiscal privileges.[51] As in Italy, these benefits reinforced the landowners' standings and their business opportunities.

Overall, the emphasis placed on increasing agricultural productivity came with a certain preference for larger properties, and created the optimal conditions for new companies

47   A. Leal García, Perspectivas Generales de la Reforma de Estructuras Agrarias, in: Revista de Estudios Agrosociales, 64 (1968), p. 19.
48   J. L. de Los Mozos, La Ordenación Rural en la Nueva Ley de 27 lujo de 1968, p. 83.
49   C. Barciela et al., La España de Franco, p. 377.
50   M. Bueno, La Reforma de las Estructuras Agrarias, p. 164.
51   R. Carr (ed.), La Época de Franco (1939–1975), vol. 41 of R. Menéndez Pidal, J.M. Jover (eds.) Historia de España Madrid 1996, pp. 478-479.

who were capable of achieving higher profits. However, this also caused the progressive disappearance of small properties. Looking back, the founder of the Communist Party in Galicia argued in 1976 that the state's policy had led to the disappearance of small and medium peasants.[52] Similarly, in Italy, the *Alleanza Nazionale dei Contadini* (National Peasant Association) criticized the government's liquidation of small peasant farms, arguing that the majority of public funds and tax relief were being given to the big capitalist companies, which easily secured their supremacy on the market.[53]

In the Italian case, the privileged condition of larger properties owners further undermined the goal of creating new settlements. The disappearance of 'traditional' agriculture set in at the same time, and in some cases even prior to the changes in settlement. In Italy, there were basically two developments taking place at the same time: the first was driven by a group of agrarian entrepreneurs who were turning farms into businesses, through private and public capital investments; the second was the arrival of new settlers who were strictly dependent on the success and timing of the reforms addressed to them. In this scenario, the delays and the market competition clearly favoured larger existing farms that had already taken up more intensive practices. In this situation, it was very difficult for the less wealthy peasants to secure their position on the labour market. Bandini himself wrote that it was necessary to allow for a "natural selection" of the land assignment, which would determine "the progressive affirmation of the best of the most capable and hardworking" while the rest would leave.[54] In the end, 19.9 percent of new settlers abandoned the land given to them by the state; in Sicily the figure was even higher at 25.6 percent.[55] The only opportunity they had was to take up temporary jobs as labourers inside or outside the rural sector, or to migrate.

The fact that the Italian land reform did not result in a large-scale redistribution of land, and that in Spain the number of new settlers remained very low compared to the initial goals had important consequences for the shape of the new rural systems in the two countries. The rural economy lacked the means to provide the number of jobs for the unemployed, which originally the creation of new small farms was supposed to resolve. Consequently, the migration that originated from the countryside was higher than expected.

Labourers replacing peasants

In the Sicilian case, the general rural population employed in agriculture decreased during the 1950s, passing from 51.3 percent to 41.3 percent in the 1960s. Yet the major

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52   S. Álvarez, El Partido Comunista y el Campo, Madrid 1976, p. 41.
53   Alleanza Nazionale dei Contadini, Due linee di Politica Agraria, Conferenza Nazionale del Mondo Rurale e dell'agricoltura, Roma 1961, pp. 6-9; see also G. Fabiani, L'Agricoltura in Italia tra Sviluppo e Crisi, 1945–1977, Bologna 1979, pp. 129-130.
54   M. Bandini, L'Offesiva contro la Rifoma, pp. 276-277.
55   C. Barberis, La Riforma Fondiaria trent'anni dopo, Dieci tesi, in: Giornale degli Economisti e Annali di Economia, 39 (1980), p. 393.

decrease took place during the following decade. When the industrial turn consolidated, many labourers found employment in the infrastructure and construction sectors. Thus, in 1970 the Sicilian rural population employed in agriculture fell further still and accounted for only 28.7 percent out of the total working population.

Comparing these results with the initial proposition of the Vanoni Plan, it is evident that the percentages consistently surpassed the projected forecasts. The plan aimed for a decrease of eight percent in the rural sector between 1955 and 1964; meaning a passage from 41 per cent to 33 percent of the national average. However, already in 1960, the rate of decreased was already higher than the expected threshold, as the national percentage of the employed rural population reached 29.1 percent, with a further decrease in the next decade to 17.2 percent. At the same time, Sicily lost over 20 years almost three times more than the proposed eight percent of the Vanoni Plan. The Sicilian outcome provides an explanation for this rapid decrease, as the southern regions were the main target of the plan. In this sense, the southern population more or less responded to the plan. However, considering the sharp drop of employees in the rural sector in the national economy, it is possible to hypothesise that the other southern regions experienced a similar decline, if not more than Sicily; but it is also possible that regions which already had a low rural population overcame the optimal percentage proposed by the plan. This basically means that many more people moved from the agricultural to the industrial and services sectors, while the number of jobs created in the rural sector remained below the plans.

Similarly, in the Spanish case, the Andalusian population employed in the primary sector experienced an initial decrease from 1950 to 1960, passing from 64 percent to 58.2 percent, but the major decrease occurred in the next decade. This was due to the reinforcement of policies on migration as well as the enforcement of the development plans. Indeed, by 1970 Andalusia had 41.8 percent of the active rural population, about 16 percent less than the previous decade (Table 1, Figure1).

However, the most significant feature the data reveal is the reversal in the relation between the general rural population and the rural labourers. In terms of percentage, while there was a progressive decrease of the general rural population, within the same group there was an increase in the percentage of rural labourers. In 1950, at the beginning of the reforms, the rural labourer population in Sicily constituted 55.4 percent of the total rural working population. In 1960, the same group had increased to 66.9 percent. This was a growth of 11.5 percent in ten years, a tendency which remained largely stable throughout the 1960s. Similarly, Andalusia experienced an increase of rural labourers employed in the rural sector from the 64.5 percent in 1956 to 74.5 percent in 1970.

In other words, in Sicily and Andalusia peasants were replaced by rural labourers. The reasons were the eviction of tenants from the estates for a more profitable use the property, the formation of farming businesses, and the increasingly difficult conditions of small farms in this changing environment. This replacement of peasants by labourers is also mirrored in the Italian decrease of the general rural population employed in the rural sector parallel to the increase of the percentage of rural labourers. Italy saw a progressive growth of rural labourers, passing from 32.2 percent to 40.5 percent between

1950 and 1970. By contrast, the Spanish national average of rural labourers declined during those years, from 47.3 percent to 37.6 percent (Table 2, Figure 2). Studies that have considered the Spanish national average of rural labourers suggest that the massive migration from Spain in the 1950s can explain this decrease, as it largely affected rural labourers.[56] Others have argued that the increase of rural labourers started in Spain only in the 1970s.[57] Clearly, these two explanations cannot be applied to the Andalusian case analysed here, since its rural labourers population experienced, differently from Spain, an increase. However, the difference between the national Spanish and the regional Andalusian trends shows the necessity to take both regional cases and the country's overall development into consideration. In fact, the national average does not always represent local and regional developments.

Conclusion

As the analysis has shown, the decrease of the rural population and the general increase in the percentage of rural labourer in both Sicily and Andalusia was a response both to agrarian development strategies and to the Italian and Spanish states' attempts to preserve the property interests of agrarian elites. The land reform policies aimed to promote industrialisation of the country but were not interested in land reform *per se* to serve as a structural reform that would reduce the socioeconomic inequalities of the countryside. This idea was present in both countries, but it became radicalised under the Spanish dictatorship, since in Spain the demands for land reform from below were necessarily weak, whereas in Italy the communist party played a crucial role in national and regional politics. When we look at the Italian case only, it appears that the Italian land reform was not very effective in creating new settlements. However, its results appear much more effective when compared with the resulting settlement policies in Spain. In addition, in Italy the presence of an outspoken political opposition pushed the landowners who did not want to take part in rural development policies to at least sell their properties, which created an important land market and opened new possibilities for bourgeois entrepreneurs.

Beyond these differences, and in looking at the broader context, the two land reforms did not have notably different results when looking at Sicily and Andalusia. Relatively speaking, the redistributive effects of land reform were not decisive; migration, the shifting workforce, and aims to improve productivity also played an important role. In the policymakers' minds the improvement of the social and economic condition of the countryside would only have been possible by increasing agricultural productivity, and by reducing levels of employment in the countryside. In this framework, as long as the

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56   J. M. Naredo, La Evolución de la Agricultura en España (1940–1990), Granada 1996, pp. 204-205; A. Ferrer Rodrí-
       guez, M. Sáenz Lorite, Las Actividades Agrarias, in: J. Bosque Maurel, J. Vila i Valenti (eds), Geografía de España
       (Geografía Humana I), 2 (1989), pp. 302-303.
57   E. Sevilla Guzmán, La Evolución del Campesinado en España, Barcelona 1979, pp. 221, 225-226.

land was productive, its concentration was not considered a determinant for the socio-economic change of the countryside. Thus, it is not by chance that despite the plans for settlements, the 1950s and 1960s saw a progressive reduction of small peasant holdings. In particular, this shift was the result of the poor settlement outcomes, which was a result of the emergence of a new group of agrarian entrepreneurs who came into play during the transition period of the reforms. At the same time, this new trend provoked a shift in the workforce within the same rural sector from peasants to labourers, a shift that was particularly significant in regions such as Sicily and Andalusia, where the imbalances and inequalities were among the strongest in both countries.

Although infrastructure works were carried out, the expected mechanization and the envisioned change in cultivation from extensive to intensive cultivation did not take place on a large scale. Similarly, the social function of the landowners in creating employment through the full exploitation of the land and cultivation of intensive crops was not fully realized. This also meant that there was not a substantial increase in employment and the standard of living.

Indeed, the problems of unemployment, poverty, unfair contracts and so on had also moved from the peasant to the rural labourers. In fact, the decrease of the rural population did not represent a definitive solution to the pre-existing condition of underemployment and low salaries of rural labourers. This condition persisted after the land reform, due to both the abandonment of the land (or failure of settlement policies) and to the lack of a more rational use of the cultivations, in terms of full employment. The poor peasants moved from the low incomes of its land and joined the rural labourer working only few months a year for very low salaries. With the percentage increase of rural labourers this constituted a growing problem.[58] The precarious working situation of rural labourers has always been a recurrent problem in southern countryside. Still today, a large workforce, often made up by migrants, works under very exploitative conditions.

More generally, the value and meaning of land changed over time. For the population who remained in the countryside and who were employed in the new farming business, the possession of land was no longer the only aspiration. Land did not have to be owned to provide a decent source of income. Thus, new claims came from below; these included job contracts, salaries, and benefits that were in line with those of the industrial workers. Such changes marked a new era of rural history that in many ways is still present today.

Appendix

The following data presents my elaboration of the data provided by the ISTAT (Italy), INE (Spain) (National statistical Institutes). Sources: IX Censimento generale della popolazione, 1951, ISTAT, Vol. I-II; X Censimento generale della popolazione, 1961, ISTAT, Vol. III; XI Censimento generale della popolazione, 1971, ISTAT, Vol. II, IV, VI;

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58   Claims and working conditions of rural labourer are aspects covered in my Ph.D. thesis, The Damned of the South: rural landless labourers in Sicily and Andalusia, 1946 to the present, forthcoming.

Censo de la población De España, 1950, INE, Vol. II-III; INE, Censo de la población De España 1960, INE, Vol. III; Censo de la población y de las viviendas, 1960, INE, Tab. IV; INE Censo de la población De España, 1970, INE Vol. II-III.

The data for Andalusia of 1960 have been elaborated with the data provided by Encuestas agropecuarias of Junta Nacional de Hermandades (Agricultural surveys of National Board of the Francoist trade union), published in 1956. Therefore, the value in the tables are correspondent to 1960 refer to 1956.

Table 1 shows both the absolute terms and percentages of the general agriculture working population – sharecroppers, owners, labourers etc. – in the agricultural sector. Figure 1 shows, per area, a graphic representation of the percentages presented in tab 1. Table 2 shows both the absolute terms and percentages of the rural labourers place in the general agriculture working population. Fig. 2 graphically represents the percentages per areas.

Tab. 1, Number and Percentage of Employees in the Agricultural Sector

	1950		1960		1970	
Andalusia	1.123.384	64%	1.022.816	58,2%	673.890	41,8%
Spain	5.271.037	58%	4.696.390	49,8%	2.898.569	30,3%
Sicily	760.080	51,26%	610.333	41,3%	380.190	28,7%
Italy	8.261.160	42,2%	5.692.975	29,1%	3.234.710	17,2%

Tab. 2, Number and Percentage of Rural Labourers in the Agricultural Sector

	1950		1960		1970	
Andalusia	–	–	692.054	64,5%	502.081	74,5%
Spain	2.494.212	47,3%	1.977.930	42,1%	1.088.697	37,6%
Sicily	421.051	55,4%	408.080	66,9%	256.579	67,5%
Italy	2.660.236	32,2%	2.074.472	36,4%	1.309.422	40,5%

Fig. 1, Percentage of Employees in the Agricultural Sector

Fig. 2, Percentages of Rural Labourers in the Agricultural Sector

An Experiment in Ethiopia: The Chilalo Agricultural Development Unit and Swedish Development Aid to Haile Selassie's Ethiopia, 1964–1974[1]

Karl Bruno

ABSTRACT

Der Beitrag untersucht ein von Schweden geleitetes Projekt im Bereich der integrierten ländlichen Entwicklung, das Chilalo Agricultural Development Unit (CADU) in der Provinz Arussi in Äthopien. Entworfen von einer Gruppe von Experten des Agricultural College of Sweden bildete CADU den ersten größeren schwedischen Versuch, agronomisches Wissen im Kontext von Entwicklungszusammenarbeit in den globalen Süden zu transferieren. Mit Hilfe eines Maßnahmenbündels sollte sozio-ökonomische Entwicklung ermöglicht und beschleunigt werden. Im Mittelpunkt standen landwirtschaftliche Experimente, um die Produktivität von Kleinbauern zu steigern. Entwicklungsstrategien und die entsprechenden Technologien waren stark von der wissenschaftlich-technischen Tradition des Agricultural College geprägt. Einerseits berücksichtigten sie in erheblichem Maße die Spezifika der jeweiligen lokalen Landwirtschaft. Andererseits blendeten sie soziale Faktoren weitgehend aus. Die Berücksichtigung lokaler Gegebenheiten machte das Projekt zu einem der wenigen Projekte im Rahmen der Grünen Revolution in Afrika, die erfolgreich waren. Die Vernachlässigung sozialer Faktoren trug jedoch dazu bei, dass Bauern das Projekt nicht uneingeschränkt begrüßten, und dass insgesamt die soziale Ungleichheit im Projektgebiet wuchs. Als Folge des Fokus auf arme Bauern entwickelte sich CADU zu einem politisch stark umstrittenen Projekt. Im Kontext der zunehmenden Spannungen im spät-imperialen Äthiopien wurde es zu einem aktiven Akteur in den ländlichen Konflikten, die der Revolution von 1974 vorausgingen.

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1   This paper is based on results first presented in my doctoral dissertation. The direction of analysis is substantially

We were not too happy when we thus reacquainted ourselves with Addis Ababa. We suddenly saw everything clearly again. The dirt and the poverty hit us with almost the same withering force as the time when we first trod the ground of Ethiopia. […] We enter Chilalo. Something has happened here. The road is lined with undulating wheat fields. Just maybe! Our spirits rise. Kilometre is added to kilometre. We pass Kulumsa. The maize stands tall and fine. We stretch our necks. Yes, the fodder beets look like they are supposed to. Last year's astounding results were thus no coincidence.[2]

Thus wrote Swedish agricultural extension specialist Martin Wik in October 1970 in the staff magazine of his employer, the Agricultural College of Sweden. On leave from the college, Wik was working for the Chilalo Agricultural Development Unit (CADU), a Swedish-planned rural development project in Ethiopia's Arussi province. He described the project as a model of agricultural success amidst Ethiopian poverty and squalor. Sweden can make a difference in the world, his letter seems to say: come to Chilalo and see for yourself.

Two months earlier, CADU's executive director Paulos Abraham had also written to Sweden, to the Swedish International Development Authority (SIDA). SIDA was the Swedish government agency that funded most of CADU, which had become something of its flagship project. Paulos'[3] letter reported on a recent project study on the effects of mechanized farming on peasant agriculture, and it expressed concern about what was happening in Chilalo:

As you can gather from this study, mechanization has taken place at a fast rate especially during the last three years; CADU as an agent of improved practices seems to have contributed to the process; the process seems likely to continue. The consequence [sic] of primary concern to CADU are the likely effects on tenants, the worsening of the terms of contract for tenants and increased skewedness of income distribution.[4]

Among other things, these two letters attest to the significance and impact of knowledge and expert circulation to practices of rural development. Part of a longer historical trajectory intimately associated with colonialism, the presence of Western agricultural experts applying their knowledge in a "developing-country" setting remained the core of 1960s rural development efforts. Taken together, the letters also suggest something of the fundamental ambivalence of such efforts and the premises on which they rested. While

the same here, but the narrative is shortened and framed somewhat differently: K. Bruno, Exporting Agrarian Expertise: Development Aid at the Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences and Its Predecessors, 1950–2009, Uppsala 2016, chapters 3 & 4.

2   M. Wik, Utdrag ur brev till konsulentavdelningen från statskonsulent Martin Wik, in: Axplock: Lantbrukshögskolan informerar, November 1970, p. 13. Uppsala County Archives, Agricultural College archives, Planning Division, Secretary Section (hereafter cited as AC-SS), series Ö1, vol. 1 [this and all subsequent translations from Swedish by the author].

3   Ethiopian names consist of a given name followed by a patronymic. It is proper to use either the full name or just the given name when referring to a person.

4   Paulos Abraham to Lars Leander, 18 August 1970. Swedish National Archives, Swedish International Development Authority archives (hereafter cited as SIDA), series F 1 AB, vol. 778.

Green Revolution development projects had the potential to create "undulating wheat fields" in places where farmers earlier had struggled to make agricultural yields meet their needs, the consequent economic transformation often accentuated social divisions and conflicts, both within rural society and between states – often seeking to extend their power and control through development efforts – and their rural populations.

Understanding these ambivalences of agricultural development requires engagement with the crucial tension between the local and the global in agricultural science, and with questions of power and direction of knowledge flows in the context of expert-led development projects. One approach to these issues derive from a research tradition in history and anthropology from the 1970s and 1980s that recognized the failures and destructive potential of Western agricultural science in colonial contexts, and sought to highlight the efficacy of the knowledge already held by local populations in colonized areas. A useful distillation of its main points can be found in the work of political scientist and agrarian historian James C. Scott, who argues that Western interventions in developing country-agricultures regularly fails because they rest on a "high-modernist" ideology.[5] Modern science is uncritically understood to be able to improve human life, and this understanding is coupled with the willingness to use the power of a centralized or centralizing state to back up large-scale interventions to "solve" social problems. But solutions proposed on the basis of this ideology tend to be untenable because they are detached from local concerns and thus inherently reductionist: they abstract away the complexities of particular social and geographic contexts. This is particularly devastating in agriculture, which is an activity intimately tied to the local.

A second strand of work on agrarian development, associated in particular with historians of the late colonial period in Africa, and at times in direct polemic with Scott and others who share his views, has produced more nuanced accounts which show that there can be more to science in development than meets the eye.[6] Without downplaying that science and expertise have been instruments of colonial oppression, such work draws attention to the important roles historically played by cross-cultural exchanges, local knowledge production and adaptation, expert learning, and intermediary actors. Work in this tradition thus problematizes an understanding of modern agricultural science and technology as inherently reductionist and universalistic, and as generally imposed in a top-down fashion on the rest of the world. I am sympathetic to this problematization, and given the continuities between the late colonial development projects and development aid, I argue that the same qualification can be applied to the postcolonial era as

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5   J. C. Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed, New Haven 1998, chapter 8.

6   For example W. Beinart, K. Brown, and D. Gilfoyle, Experts and Expertise in Colonial Africa Reconsidered: Science and the Interpenetration of Knowledge, in: African Affairs 108 (2009), pp. 413–433; M. M. van Beusekom, Negotiating Development: African Farmers and Colonial Experts at the Office du Niger, 1920–1960, Portsmouth 2002; C. Bonneuil, Development as Experiment: Science and State Building in Colonial and Postcolonial Africa, 1930–1970, in: Osiris 15 (2000), pp. 258–281; H. Tilley, Africa As a Living Laboratory: Empire, Development, and the Problem of Scientific Knowledge, 1870–1950, Chicago 2011.

well. This highlights the need for studies of different sites of agricultural knowledge-making and knowledge-moving, such as CADU, in the comparatively less studied context of post-war African agricultural development.[7]

Looking to the movement of knowledge also actualizes questions about the nature and origins of the knowledge that moved and reshaped rural areas as it did so. CADU in a sense brought the world to rural Ethiopia, being constituted through international networks of knowledge and people as well as seed and animals. Though ostensibly a Swedish aid project, it built on strategies developed in Pakistan, on education provided in the United States, on experiences from Nigeria, on plant material from Kenya and Mexico, on European cattle, and so on. But the design and operations of CADU nonetheless clearly expressed a Swedish "national style" of agricultural development. Borrowed from the history of science and technology, the term, in the present paper, signifies nationally shared discourses and approaches within a field of scientific expertise.[8] In this particular case, it was expressed as a strong emphasis on the need to adapt agricultural knowledge to local settings: it was focused on spatially bounded understandings; on what historian of science Robert Kohler has termed "residential knowledge."[9] My argument is not that this attitude was, necessarily, unique to Swedish experts, but it was a characteristic feature of their expertise that they themselves saw as derived from long-standing national traditions. At the same time, the Swedish style of agricultural development also tended towards prioritizing technical solutions and downplaying social aspects of rural change. Highlighting these both sides of the Swedish national style contributes to an understanding of how national specificities could shape international development efforts. It also contributes to a better understanding of CADU, which is of some historical significance also as a particular project. During the 1970s it was considered a pioneering effort and an important source of experience for international discussions of rural development, and it has become a recurring point of reference in the historiography of late-imperial Ethiopia as well as the subject of studies in its own right.[10] But CADU has not been ap-

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7   Studies of post-war agricultural development have tended to focus on the Green Revolution programmes in Asia, particularly India. The literature is immense; for an overview see C. R. Unger, India's Green Revolution: Towards a New Historical Perspective, in: South Asia Chronicle 4 (2014), pp. 253–270.

8   For an example of history of science use of the concept, see J. Harwood, National Styles in Science: Genetics in Germany and the United States between the World Wars, in: Isis 78 (1987), pp. 390–414.

9   R. E. Kohler, All Creatures: Naturalists, Collectors, and Biodiversity, 1850–1950, Princeton 2006, pp. 156–162.

10   On CADU's importance in the 1970s, see, e.g., Uma Lele, The Design of Rural Development: Lessons from Africa, Baltimore 1975; for examples of studies putting CADU in the context of late-imperial agricultural policy, see, e.g., Getnet Bekele, Food Matters: The Place of Development in Building the Postwar Ethiopian State, 1941–1974, in: The International Journal of African Historical Studies 42 (2009), pp. 29–54; P. B. Henze, Layers of Time: A History of Ethiopia, London 2000, p. 272; Bahru Zewde, A History of Modern Ethiopia 1855–1991, 2nd ed., Oxford 2001, pp. 194–195. The most comprehensive study (including ample references) of CADU as a project is by political scientist and development scholar John M. Cohen: J. M. Cohen, Integrated Rural Development: The Ethiopian Experience and Debate, Uppsala 1987. Another important reference is the first project director Bengt Nekby's book on CADU's first three years: B. Nekby, CADU: An Ethiopian Experiment in Developing Peasant Farming: A Summary of the Work of the Chilalo Agricultural Development Unit during the Period of the First Agreement 1967–1970, Stockholm 1971.

proached historically in earlier work, and as a consequence, certain crucial aspects of its background and creation at the Agricultural College of Sweden have been missed.

In the following, I will present a narrative of CADU that builds on and elaborates the points discussed above. I will discuss how the project came about: its background, motivations, and main influences. I will also consider the general strategy chosen to effect the transfer of Swedish agricultural knowledge to Ethiopia, the channels that were deemed suitable to diffuse knowledge in the Ethiopian countryside, and the effects of the project on the region where it was implemented. In doing so, I hope to contribute to a discussion of conditions of post-war rural development policy development as well as to a broader discussion of rural populations' appropriation of interventions in the context of development projects.

The Agricultural College of Sweden, Localized Research, and Development Aid

The origins of CADU can be found in a reorientation of the international development debate in the early 1960s, which involved a reappraisal of the role of agriculture and an increased sensitivity to the fact that industrialization alone would not solve the problems of the Third World.[11] This view, promoted in Sweden not least by renowned economist Gunnar Myrdal, helped put agricultural and rural matters on donor agendas, and in 1963, the Swedish Agency for International Assistance (Nämnden för internationellt bistånd, NIB), a predecessor of SIDA, reached out to the Agricultural College of Sweden with an inquiry about whether it would be interested in taking part in the Swedish development aid program. In response, a college committee chaired by vice-chancellor Lennart Hjelm developed a sketch of a plan for how the Agricultural College could contribute to Swedish agricultural aid.[12]

The committee proposed the establishment of a research station in an unspecified developing country, to be associated with the Agricultural College and tasked with creating "technical improvements of the capital-extensive type." This alluded to the basic techniques of what would later be labelled the Green Revolution – higher-yielding cereal varieties and artificial fertilizer – which were to be implemented along with efforts in the areas of distribution and marketing of produce.[13] It also implied a focus on increasing land productivity through scientific interventions and the provision of new inputs, rather than increasing labour productivity through mechanization. Techno-scientific innovations and methods to help farmers use them, rather than capital-intensive machin-

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11   For a more elaborated discussion of this "rediscovery of agriculture" in the 1960s, see M. Frey, Doctrines and Practices of Agrarian Development: The Case of the Office du Niger in Mali, in this issue.

12   Forskning och undervisning på jordbrukets område: Ett förslag till ett svenskt biståndsprojekt i anslutning till lantbrukshögskolan. Meeting minutes, Faculty of the Agricultural College, 15 April 1964, attachment § 15a. Uppsala County Archives, Agricultural College's archives, Secretary Division, series A II a, vol. 31.

13   Ibid., p. 3.

ery that would drive labour displacement, were at the core of the proposed project. Rural incomes had to increase as a prerequisite for general socio-economic development, but without this generating surplus labour from agriculture: the report explicitly noted that moving beyond subsistence farming to more entrepreneurial forms of agriculture using capital-intensive and labour-saving technology would come at a "rather late" stage and that such developments presently were less relevant. For the time being, yields needed to increase without any significant decreases in labour demand; thus, an intensive rather than extensive strategy focused on the cultivation of basic food crops should be promoted.[14]

This plan required extensive research work, and the professors presented fairly elaborated reflections over the nature of the agricultural research that would be needed:

> *The economic and technical development naturally demands continual efforts in terms of agricultural research. In spite of the obvious importance of research, this point is most often the weakest in the development programs. This depends perhaps on an underestimation of the latter stages of applied research. The large variations in agriculture in terms of natural, economic, and cultural conditions demand an extensive regional experimental activity. Research results can thus only in special cases be directly transferred from one environment to another. A failure to complete the research to the stage at which the results are practically applicable, ought to play a larger part in the resistance to technological innovations than the often-cited cultural factors.*[15]

The demarcation of science from the knowledge held by farmers—with the latter being reduced to "cultural factors" with little real bearing on agricultural improvement—was typical of the time. In this sense, the proposal was permeated by what Scott calls high-modernism. But Scott also argues that high-modernist agriculture will tend to adapt environments to technology rather than technology to environments, and this was explicitly rejected by the college's professors.[16] They suggested that in agricultural science, research results would generally not retain their applicability when moved to new contexts, which meant that localized research would be necessary. This formed part of a broader ideological stance towards peasant agriculture. While their choice of words betrayed a reductionist view of Third World societies, the college's professors did not employ stereotypes of inherent conservatism and backwardness. They proposed research work directed towards the development of peasant agriculture, which implied that smallholding peasants would be ready to make rational changes if provided with proper incentives. Science's role was to provide such incentives in the form of practically applicable innovations. This positioned the plan in direct contrast with other would-be modernizers of the period, many of whom regarded traditional rural societies as fundamentally hampered by fatalism and

14   The terms intensive and extensive are used only in a relative sense here: if discussing whether modern agriculture should be optimized toward land or labor productivity, the latter represents the more extensive approach.
15   Forskning och undervisning, p. 3.
16   Scott, Seeing Like a State, p. 301.

lack of ambition.[17] In this regard, the college's professors had drawn on the work of American agricultural economist Theodore Schultz. In his 1964 book *Transforming Traditional Agriculture,* Schultz argued that what he called "traditional" agriculture normally represented an optimal utilization of available technologies in a given natural and social context. Western experts had misunderstood the stagnation they had observed among traditional farmers, Schultz claimed: if traditional agriculture had indeed stagnated, it was not because of fatalism or irrational reverence for past practices. It was rather the opposite: agrarian societies had, over centuries, employed rational methods to optimize their systems of production as far as their technologies allowed, but over time such optimization tended toward equilibria where further production increases were impossible using existing factors of production. Schultz's conclusion was that such societies needed to be provided with modern technology to break the impasse.[18]

These theses on "traditional" agriculture were distinctly ahistorical, were supported only by problematic evidence, and paid no attention at all to social or material inequality.[19] But Schultz's challenge to psychological and cultural explanations for agricultural stagnation lent support and credibility to those who had reason to favour peasant-oriented development: it suggested that peasants were in fact rational economic agents who could be main drivers in development processes if provided with proper incentives. It also implied another conclusion drawn by the Agricultural College's committee, namely, that peasant resistance to innovations tended to result from the failure to supply incentives that were good enough, often due to a dearth of research. More particularly, the committee concluded that resistance followed from the failure to sufficiently adapt technologies to local conditions.

A more concrete example of their suggested approach followed in the committee's discussion of crop production, in which they outlined some principles for plant breeding and varietal use:

> *The cultivation material can consist of already present varieties or of introduced varieties with better cultivation characteristics. Insofar as the already present cultivation material is well adapted to the environment it should primarily be used. It is eminently probable that this material, through breeding, can be improved concerning both quantitative and qualitative return. Plant breeding, which at the outset likely can be carried out with relative simple methods, can be expected to yield good results.*[20]

17   M. Adas, Dominance by Design: Technological Imperatives and America's Civilizing Mission, Cambridge, MA 2006, p. 257.

18   Schultz was not explicitly cited in the document I discuss here, but would be in later proposals by the same people. T. W. Schultz, Transforming Traditional Agriculture, Chicago 1983, pp. 29–32.

19   See the discussions of Schultz's work in P. Hill, Development Economics on Trial: The Anthropological Case for a Prosecution, Cambridge, UK 1986, pp. 23–26; T. Mitchell, Rule of Experts: Egypt, Techno-Politics, Modernity, Berkeley 2002, pp. 223–224.

20   Forskning och undervisning, p. 4.

Prioritizing local plant material was not a common stance among Western agricultural experts in the mid-1960s. Most varieties used as inputs in Green Revolution projects at the time were instead developed by what historian of science and technology Jonathan Harwood calls a "cosmopolitan strategy," a plant breeding approach aimed at the creation of plant material that would perform well under a wide range of conditions.[21] Against the cosmopolitan strategy Harwood describes a local strategy, which started from existing local varieties and strived to identify and develop those that would perform the best under specific, local conditions. While not unequivocally siding with either strategy, the college prioritized the local approach, in line with the more general argument about the importance of local and de-centralized research.

The contrast between cosmopolitan and local strategies for plant breeding reflects deeper tensions between the universal and the local in agricultural science. As a scientific field, it has something of a fundamental paradox: it is characteristic of modern science that it strives for universal theories, and it is equally characteristic of agriculture that it is a localized activity, directly dependent on ecological and social particulars that vary widely from place to place. Both sides of this paradox are represented in the history of agricultural development. Localist approaches to the development of tropical agriculture, focused on adaptation to particular environments, were often advocated in the colonies during the interwar period, but in the aftermath of World War II a more authoritarian and universalist view became dominant in colonial and postcolonial development efforts.[22] This universalism manifested in a range of ways, from Harwood's cosmopolitanism to the idea that almost any environment can be reshaped so as to fit with pre-existing agricultural approaches, to a belief in an off the shelf-approach that has been described as "transfer through analogy."[23] When put into practice, the lack of sufficient attention to local contexts that is implied in such project designs often resulted in well-publicized mishaps, such as the spectacular failure of the British East Africa Groundnut Scheme in the late 1940s. This was part of the context of the Agricultural College's plan, as the professors alluded to in their discussion of the need for local research. But they also had other reasons to argue for an approach that would require extensive resources dedicated to local survey and research activities, which had less to do with the Third World and more with the conditions of the agricultural sector in Sweden itself.

By the 1960s, it was clear that the establishment of modern, industrial Sweden meant that agriculture would lose its standing as the central sector of production in Sweden as in the rest of the industrialized world, and thus that its institutions would lose influence. As historian Kiran Klaus Patel puts it in summarizing what he describes as the

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21   J. Harwood, Europe's Green Revolution and Others Since: The Rise and Fall of Peasant-Friendly Plant Breeding, London 2012, pp. 45–46; 122–23.

22   D. Arnold, Europe, Technology, and Colonialism in the 20th Century, in: History and Technology: An International Journal 21 (2005), p. 100; J. M. Hodge, Triumph of the Expert: Agrarian Doctrines of Development and the Legacies of British Colonialism, Athens, OH 2007, pp. 148–152.

23   On transfer through analogy, see D. Porter, B. Allen, and G. Thompson, Development in Practice: Paved with Good Intentions, London 1991, pp. 85–86.

declinist narrative of modern agriculture, "the economic, social and political leverage of agriculture shrank" as "it became Western societies' sacrifice on the altar of modernity."[24] To maintain its relevance, the Agricultural College thus strived to widen its scope and make claims on new domains, and as vice-chancellor Hjelm perceived that the need for agrarian experts working in and for the developing world would increase significantly in the future, development aid came to be included among them. This was succinctly expressed in a memo he authored a few years later, in which he argued that there were three main reasons for the college's continued expansion over the next five years: (1) problems relating to the ongoing rationalization of Swedish agriculture; (2) pressing environmental issues; and (3) the matter of development aid and food production in developing countries.[25]

For the college to realize the third part of this agenda, it was imperative that the Swedish aid authorities settled on a strategy for its agriculture-related work that was congruent with the expertise available at the college and within the Swedish agricultural research network in which it was a central node. As such, it was fortuitous for its representatives that Schultz had proposed an approach that was very much in line with pre-existing and well-established Swedish traditions of localized research. They themselves used "a hundred years of Swedish experience in experiment organization and design" as an argument for why this type of effort was suitable for Swedish expertise.[26] This was no doubt an attempt to relate the proposal to the established policy that Sweden ought to provide aid mainly in areas for which its nationally available expertise was especially well suited, but it also provides a hint to the background of how agricultural experimentation was understood at the college. It referred to the agricultural experimental activities performed in Sweden since the nineteenth century within a growing research system that had always included a regional and localized component, investigating under which specific conditions or in which areas promising crop varieties could be recommended to farmers.[27] Such activities corresponded very well to what the college's committee proposed to establish in a developing country. Apart from Schultz' mostly theoretical argument, the plan thus drew primarily on experiences from Sweden. It made little effort to engage with the broader problem of differing development conditions in different settings. There was a perfunctory remark about how a "more or less extensive land reform" would be needed in many countries, but otherwise the plan ignored the larger social setting of the proposed experiment station.[28] The professors only manifested an interest in local contexts within

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24   K. K. Patel, The Paradox of Planning: German Agricultural Policy in a European Perspective, 1920s to 1970s, in: Past & Present 212 (2011), p. 239.

25   Lennart Hjelm, Målsättning för lantbrukshögskolans utbyggnad under nästkommande femårsperiod, attachment § 56 to meeting minutes, Working committee of the Faculty of the Agricultural College, 18 March 1966, AC-SS, series A VI a, vol. 1.

26   Forskning och undervisning, p. 4.

27   Mats Morell, Jordbruket i industrisamhället, 1875–1945, Stockholm 2001, pp. 142–156; for an inside account of the system as it looked in the 1950s, see Erik Åkerberg, Om fast och lokal försöksverksamhet, Växt-närings-nytt 11 (1955), pp. 2:1–2:3.

28   Forskning och undervisning, p. 3.

the domain of the agricultural sciences. Otherwise, they seem to have seen the Third World as something of a blank slate.

International and Domestic Influences

The college's plan made an impression at NIB, which appointed its authors to a working group tasked with the further planning of a Swedish agricultural aid project.[29] The secretary and main driving force of this group was agricultural economist Bengt Nekby. He had completed a PhD at Iowa State College under the well-known Earl O'Heady, who directed the Center for Agricultural and Economic Adjustment, a newly created research unit focused on the study of agricultural economics and policy in the United States and abroad. Nekby had then been employed by the Ford Foundation as advisor to one of the regional governments in Nigeria, a position that made him one of the few Swedish agrarian experts who had any experience with international development work.

In January 1965, Nekby travelled to Pakistan and India to study two ongoing efforts in rural development: the Comilla project in East Pakistan (present-day Bangladesh) and the Intensive Agricultural Districts Program in India.[30] The Comilla project, the brainchild of Pakistani social scientist Akhter Hameed Khan, focused on regional development by way of research, training, public works, and the organization of farmer cooperatives for the distribution of credit and inputs.[31] It made a particularly strong impression on Nekby and would come to shape the further planning of the Swedish project. After this study trip, its ambitions grew from agricultural development as such to regional rural development, including, but not limited to, efforts directly linked to the agrarian production.

Even so, the focus remained squarely on agronomic interventions. The final report produced by the working group discussed these at length.[32] It highlighted adaptations to the local, instead of adaptations of the local, meaning that the project was still to be based on extensive local research. But it was slanted toward technical and top-down perspectives and paid little attention to complicating factors beyond the agricultural research work. Land tenure was again mentioned only briefly and was not integrated into the larger analysis. The report also lacked any deeper reflection over whether the Comilla model, or something like it, was suitable to apply in wholly different social and natural contexts. But the most glaring example of the techno-centric attitude was the fact that when argu-

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29   The working group had several other members as well, but the part of its work detailed here was performed by the representatives of the Agricultural College.

30   L. Hjelm and B. Nekby, Preliminär rapport från studieresa i Libanon, Pakistan, Indien, Israel, Tunisien och Algeriet samt från diskussioner med the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations i Rom den 14/1 – 10/2 1965, Swedish National Archives, Swedish Agency for International Assistance archives, series F VIII, vol. 1.

31   About the Comilla project, see, e.g., A. F. Raper, Rural Development in Action: The Comprehensive Experiment at Comilla, East Pakistan, Ithaca, NY 1970.

32   Preliminär rapport över formerna och möjligheterna för en utökad svensk biståndsinsats på jordbrukets område, Meeting minutes, SIDA Board of Directors, December 10 1965, attachment 1 to point 2, SIDA, series A1 B, vol. 1.

ing for the relevance of the proposed project, the professors leaned heavily on Gunnar Myrdal's arguments for the primacy of agriculture in the economy of developing countries, all while ignoring how this in Myrdal's analysis was closely bound up with emphasizing land and tenancy reforms and careful analysis of local social structures.[33] This lack of attention to the broader setting of agricultural development contrasts sharply with the strong awareness the group demonstrated of the problems involved in transferring agronomic knowledge, and was most likely a consequence of the report's institutional origins. At the Agricultural College, there was little room for subjects like rural sociology or history at this time, and so there was comparatively little possibility for its experts to take broader social factors into account in their work.[34] In its relation to domestic agriculture, the college represented a kind of Swedish agricultural modernism, which paid much attention to local conditions as they pertained to agricultural production, but less attention to agriculture as a social system. Through the college, this modernism also came to shape the planning of the early Swedish agricultural aid, as it was expressed in the design of CADU.

On the basis of this final report and a brief tour through East Africa by the expert group, SIDA, the new Swedish aid agency which had replaced NIB in July 1965, decided to go ahead with the planning of a regional rural development project. It was to be situated in Ethiopia, a location deemed favourable because the climactic conditions in the Ethiopian highlands meant that Swedish agronomists would be able to work with species, and under agricultural conditions, that were reasonably familiar. Ethiopia also had the advantage of long-standing links to Sweden, and was seen as being in dire need of aid.[35] In the 1960s, the country, then still ruled by Emperor Haile Selassie I, was characterized by widespread poverty. The absolute majority of the population lived in rural areas, and most of the agrarian society remained embedded in a feudal or semi-feudal economic structure. Traditional elites—state, church and private landlords – held large parts of the land, much of it cultivated by sharecropping tenant-farmers using an ox-plough technology complex that would have been familiar, if distinctly amodern, to a 1960s Swedish agronomist.[36]

Describing the rest of the planning process falls outside the scope of this paper. Suffice it to say that the project was planned as a regional development project along the general lines presented above, with a strong focus on agricultural science as a driver of development. The project was located to the Chilalo *awraja* (sub-province) in Arussi province. Chilalo was a highland region with a climate suitable for cereal production. It had a

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33   This was clearly emphasized in the book by Myrdal that the report cited: G. Myrdal, Vår onda värld, Stockholm 1964.

34   J. Myrdal, SLU och det moderna samhällsprojektet, in: G. Ramberg (ed.), Sammanhang: SLU 25 år, Uppsala 2002, p. 24.

35   On earlier Swedish links to Ethiopia, see V. H. Norberg, Swedes in Haile Selassie's Ethiopia, 1924–1952: A Study in Early Development Co-Operation, Uppsala 1977.

36   On the ox-plow system, see J. C. McCann, People of the Plow: An Agricultural History of Ethiopia, 1800–1990, Madison 1995.

population of about 400,000, with 65,000 farm households. Its farmers mostly grew barley and wheat, with 52 per cent of the cultivated land devoted to the former and 18 per cent to the latter. There was little market-directed animal farming and no commercial dairy production, but most peasants kept animals for traction and for household food. According to the available data, the average peasant held less than five hectares of land. Though efforts had been made to find an area with more favourable tenancy conditions, about 50 per cent of Chilalo's peasants were tenants, and the tenants had on average slightly smaller holdings than those who owned their land. Whether tenants or not, the small-holders were generally subsistence farmers using traditional methods and implements.[37]

The Chilalo Green Revolution

CADU started its operations in September 1967. It was established as an autonomous agency within Ethiopia's Ministry of Agriculture, overseen by an inter-ministerial committee chaired by the Minister of Agriculture.[38] Bengt Nekby, who had left his position at the Agricultural College, was named its first executive director. The official objectives of the project were defined as follows:

• To bring about economic and social development,
• To give the population an increased awareness of and responsibility for development processes,
• To verify methods of agricultural development,
• To train staff.

In practice, the generation of economic incentives was prioritized in the early stages of the project, even if the goals were formally seen as equally important. Social development was then expected to follow from the economic progress.[39]

The project retained a wide range of activities, but the most important ones were those that related directly to the agricultural production: agricultural and animal husbandry experimentation, extension and education, marketing activities, and the provision of credit for the purchase of inputs. Also crucial to the project was the planning and evaluation section, which was tasked with gathering data and monitoring project developments and effects, as well as developing new methods based on project experiences.[40]

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37 The information about cultivation practices is from SIDA Project Preparation Team, Report No. I on the Establishment of a Rural Development Project in Ethiopia (1966), p. 151. For the other data, see Cohen, Integrated Rural Development, pp. 46–60.
38 Cohen, Integrated Rural Development, p. 72.
39 Nekby, CADU, p. 47.
40 Cohen, Integrated Rural Development, p. 76.

Figure 1. The organizational structure of CADU during the period of the first Ethio-Swedish agreement (1967–1970), illustrating the large number of activities undertaken.[41]

The importance afforded to this feedback mechanism goes to show the experimental and self-reflecting attitude that pervaded the project. Describing CADU, as Bengt Nekby did in the title of his book on the project, as an experiment in Ethiopia is thus fitting. Not only was agricultural experimentation the core of the effort, but one of its objectives was to verify a system of methods for agricultural development that had not been tested in Africa before.

The project's crop and animal production work, emphasizing adaptive research, was generally successful.[42] Under the leadership of Swede Harald Linder and Ethiopian Dagnatchew Yirgou, trials of wheat varieties from Ethiopia as well from research programs in Mexico and Kenya enabled staff to identify and improve well-adapted plant material that eventually yielded up to twice as large harvests as the local material under farming conditions, if supported by artificial fertilizer. On the animal side, a cross-breeding program was developed under which CADU cross-bred local heifers with higher-yielding breeds imported from Europe. This created a new dairy cattle stock capable of producing more than five times the amount of milk, but it required substantially more feed, proved

41   From Nekby, CADU, p. 95.
42   For a detailed account of this research, see H. Linder, Crop Produktion Improvement: Activities in Chilalo Agricultural Development Unit in Ethiopia, 1966-1970: Abridged Version of an Agricultural Thesis, Uppsala 1976.

somewhat susceptible to disease, and was more difficult to manage in comparison with local cattle.

In order to transfer this knowledge to local farmers and encourage them to take up the innovations, CADU operated extension and marketing activities. The basic premise of the latter was that farmers needed to know that their produce could be sold at a fair price, if they were to have any reason to experiment with ways of increasing production. CADU thus established a number of trade centres throughout Chilalo where the project bought wheat and milk from farmers. CADU's extension activities were based on a system of extension agents supervising model farmers, a method that had been adopted from the Comilla project. The number of model farmers grew steadily, exceeding 400 in the year before the revolution.[43] The final piece of the package that was intended to generate agricultural development in Chilalo was the provision of cheap credit to farmers, specifically to enable them to buy the inputs provided by the project. The interest rates on these loans were low enough to make them de facto subsidies.[44] Credit provision was handled at the trade centres under the supervision of extension agents, and credit was only given in kind, in form of seed and fertilizer.

The extension methods proved rather effective in terms of outreach, so that "all but the most remote" farmers eventually became aware of the project's message.[45] But awareness did not automatically translate into acceptance, and on close inspection, CADU's research activities highlight that it proved difficult for the project to fully reconcile modern agronomic techniques with the idea of local adaptation. To be sure, CADU's promotion of the new, locally adapted wheat varieties was very successful. They soon became highly popular among participating farmers, and wheat rapidly replaced barley as Chilalo's dominant crop. But other innovations were largely rejected. CADU attempted to promote other crops besides the new wheat varieties, but with little success. Farmers also rejected CADU's attempts to sell them clean seed produced by the project, preferring to use their own. Likewise, the new iron plough designed by the project proved problematic. It was largely rejected by farmers who considered it to be too heavy both for the oxen who were supposed to pull it, and for the farmers themselves who had to carry the plough to the fields.[46] All these problems indicate that the previous strong interest in local conditions and practices decreased somewhat when the project got under way. A later evaluation of the project suggested that its research on cultivation ought to focus more on "actual farm conditions". This indicates that the methods developed were not adequately adjusted to farmers' situations, which in turn can explain the farmers' rejection of them.[47]

The project nonetheless began to transform the agrarian society in Chilalo. The marked success of the wheat research and improvement was the most important factor, as it

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43   Cohen, Integrated Rural Development, chapter 4, note 37; Dagnatchew Yirgou et al., Final Report on the Appraisal of CADU and EPID (1974), p. 9.
44   Cohen, Integrated Rural Development, p. 92.
45   Ibid., p. 85.
46   Ibid., p. 92.
47   Dagnatchew Yirgou et al., Final Report on the Appraisal, p. 18.

quickly led to significant increases in agricultural productivity. The number of farmers taking part in the credit scheme increased as well. In 1971, the project had enrolled 25 per cent of its target population, and the participating farmers stood to significantly increase their harvests and incomes.[48] At the same time, the project suffered from not being positively integrated into its socio-political environment. Though it was well-connected with a group of younger, reform-minded civil servants in Addis Ababa, notably the junior minister of agriculture Tesfa Bushen who was one of the main driving forces behind the project in Ethiopia, it had failed to make similar connections in Chilalo. Attempts to facilitate dialogue and coordination between the project and the local authorities achieved nothing, reflecting CADU's inability to establish common ground with the local administration and with other powerful interests in the area, who saw the project as a threat to their own power base.[49] The tenancy conditions and entrenched social relations in the area thus begun to strongly shape the effects of the project's interventions. While incomes were up across the population, the distribution was skewed, with large farmers' incomes increasing much faster.[50] One reason was that many of the small-holding peasants were share-cropping tenants, who had little incentive to increase their production. Another was that it was easier and less risky for larger farmers to experiment with the increased farming complexity brought on by CADU's innovations. But even after CADU began to employ land holding ceilings for access to its credit schemes, so that the proportion of participating small-holders rose significantly, the prevailing patron-client relations, rigid social structures, and antagonistic policies of local officials still tended to steer project benefits disproportionally towards the larger farmers and the local elite.[51] The project had attempted to form peasant cooperatives for marketing and procurement, which could have counteracted this tendency, but strong resistance from local elites forced project management to move slowly in this regard, and so cooperative societies had little impact in Chilalo before the revolution.[52] The end result was, in the clear-cut language of economist Winfried Manig's analysis of CADU, that "[t]he *productivity growth* achieved by utilizing modern technologies was redistributed *along the lines of existing societal modes of distribution.*"[53]

Alongside this, a more sinister process, which would come to seriously damage the project's external reputation, was also well under way. By 1970 a large number of tenants had been evicted from their land by landowners to whom the example of CADU had made abundantly clear that modern agriculture, in particular in its mechanized variety, could be a profitable commercial endeavour. The mechanized seed production farm in

48 J. M. Cohen, Effects of Green Revolution Strategies on Tenants and Small-Scale Landowners in the Chilalo Region of Ethiopia, in: The Journal of Developing Areas 9 (1975), p. 340.
49 Cohen, Integrated Rural Development, p. 114.
50 Ibid., pp. 112–113.
51 All these constraints are discussed extensively in Cohen, Integrated Rural Development, chapter 5.
52 Ibid., pp. 116–117.
53 Winfried Manig, "Green Revolution" Technologies Reconsidered: Another View: The Ethiopian Example, Africa Spectrum 24 (1989), p. 281 (italics in original).

Kulumsa seems to have been a key source of inspiration, whose impact was further enhanced by the fact that the Ethiopian government provided subsidies to landowners who wanted to mechanize agricultural operations on their holdings.[54] When this became apparent, CADU attempted to implement mitigating strategies, such as the hiring of evicted tenants within its infrastructure department or the promotion of local industry, though none was fully successful. Evictions continued in areas affected by the project until the revolution.[55]

The Kulumsa farm had been developed into a modern Western operation that served as an experiment and seed production farm for CADU. To operate such a farm was perhaps necessary: consulting for the project, the Agricultural College's professor of crop production, Ewert Åberg, argued in 1966 that "measures for a rational agricultural operation" had to be taken at Kulumsa.[56] But it is of some interest that there seems to have been little discussion of possible knowledge transfer effects of operating a farm according to a Western model of intensive, mechanized farming in the project area, especially in an Ethiopian context where there were government subsidies available for mechanization. As has been pointed out by political scientist Michael Ståhl, there was also a deeper contradiction in play here, namely that all of CADU's attempts to support peasant agriculture were embedded in a political environment where large-scale commercial farming was simultaneously encouraged by the Imperial government.[57] There is no doubt that the implications of this contradiction had been underestimated by the project's planners. This conclusion can be stated more generally: they underestimated the extent to which Chilalo society could shape the project's effects because, in spite of their commitment to peasant agency, they did not fully grasp that this society was full of actors who could appropriate project knowledge in their own ways and for their own purposes. This top-down bias reflects the conditions of the project's initial conception at the Agricultural College, where, as noted, there was little research in fields such as rural sociology, history, or anthropology. The underappreciation of the agency of actors in Chilalo society is well illustrated by the fact that while the project's strategy largely rested on the power of models, with an elaborate system of extension agents and model farmers created to disseminate knowledge among the peasants, no one considered that the example of Kulumsa could, and would, likewise function as a model for an audience of larger landowners.

The social changes in Chilalo increasingly drew CADU into the rising political tensions in Ethiopia. The most important opposition to the regime at the time came from the radical student movement, centred on the Haile Selassie I University in Addis Ababa. Land reform and peasant empowerment were core issues for the students who had promoted them since the mid-1960s under the slogan "land to the tiller."[58] CADU, which

54   Cohen, Integrated Rural Development, 125–127.
55   Ibid., 127–129.
56   Ewert Åberg, Rapport över resa den 25 oktober – 12 november 1966 för utredningsarbete rörande det regionala utvecklingsprojektet i Etiopien, p. 6. 4 January 1967, SIDA, series F1 AB, vol. 770.
57   Michael Ståhl, Ethiopia: Political Contradictions in Agricultural Development, Stockholm 1974, p. 105.
58   Bahru Zewde, A History of Modern Ethiopia, pp. 220–226.

explicitly focused its work on peasants, became both an object and a subject of the political tension. The student movement was generally critical of CADU, seeing it as a government project that favoured private interests at the expense of the most disenfranchised of the rural poor. Within CADU itself, many of the Ethiopian staff opposed the prevailing order as well, though they rather argued that projects like CADU, acting as progressive rural forces, could help bring about the necessary conditions for change. In this regard, CADU increasingly differed from other projects employing Green Revolution techniques, most of which were guided by a technocratic vision of problems solvable without political intervention.[59] While CADU's development strategy put primacy on technical factors, Swedish aid administrators and diplomats simultaneously put pressure on the Ethiopian government to effect tenancy reforms in conjunction with the Swedish contribution. Together with the Agricultural College's strategy of focusing on poor peasants in an Ethiopian setting where this was politically highly charged, this helped create conditions for a radicalization of the project. This especially came with the rapid and generally successful Ethiopianization after 1970, when first Paulos Abraham and then Henock Kifle became project directors. The latter became involved in drafting plans for a rural land reform while directing CADU, and was at the centre of a controversy that engulfed the project in the final months of imperial rule as a coalition of landlords engaged in a struggle against him and the project. Henock's plan was later taken up by the new post-revolutionary military regime as they actually did carry out a land reform in 1975, but by then, CADU (soon geographically expanded and renamed ARDU, Arsi Rural Development Unit) itself had been turned into a vehicle for the new government's political ambitions.[60]

59   A. De Greiff A. and M. Nieto Olarte, What We Still Do Not Know About South-North Technoscientific Exchange: North-Centrism, Scientific Diffusion, and the Social Studies of Science, in: R. E. Doel and T. Söderqvist (eds.), The Historiography of Contemporary Science, Technology, and Medicine: Writing Recent Science, London 2006, p. 250.

60   The political tensions and struggles that arose around CADU at the end of the emperor's reign have not been part of my empirical analysis, but are discussed in a fairly recent master's thesis from Ethiopia: Tariku Degu, Transformation of Land Tenure and the Role of Peasant Associations in Eastern Arsii (1974–1991), MA Thesis, School of Graduate Studies, Addis Ababa University (2008), pp. 23–32. See also Andargachew Tiruneh, The Ethiopian Revolution, 1974–1987: A Transformation from an Aristocratic to a Totalitarian Autocracy, Cambridge, UK 1993, pp. 99–100. About the post-1974 developments of ARDU, see Cohen, Integrated Rural Development, chapter 6.

Figure 2. The radicalization of CADU can be clearly seen in this issue of the project's newsletter from September 1974, the month Haile Selassie was imprisoned by the army. Its editorial begins by stating: "History has time and again taught us that at a transitional stage, the ruling class makes a frantic and desperate attempt to hold on to the old order." It later makes the (somewhat revisionist) claim that "[e]nd to all feudalist oppression has been CADU's goal ever since its inception" and that "[t]here should be no illusion that the forces of reaction will peacefully accept fundamental changes." Thanks to Lars Leander for the newsletter.

IV – Concluding Discussion

In this article, I have discussed the conditions under which Swedish rural development aid policies changed and were given a more coherent formulation in the mid-1960s, with focus on the key role played by the Agricultural College of Sweden and its attempts to respond to structural changes in Swedish agriculture. The most significant effect of this was the implementation of the CADU project in Ethiopia, with which Sweden joined the ongoing international effort of applying Western agricultural science in the developing countries of Asia, Latin America, and Africa. Integrated into such international networks, CADU drew on practices, ideas, and resources drawn from a range of localities that spanned four continents. This highlights the fact that though the notion of bilateral aid suggests an interaction limited to two states, donor and receiver, reality can be much more complex. CADU was only realized through the harnessing of transnational flows of knowledge, people, and technology, brought together by a development strategy devised at the Agricultural College of Sweden. This dimension of knowledge transfer should not be overlooked when studying ostensibly unidirectional knowledge links, even if it is embedded in the unequal power relations that generally characterize development efforts.

In spite of its international character, I have argued here that a defining feature of CADU was that its development and technology transfer strategy was deeply connected to techno-scientific traditions at the Agricultural College, through which the international input was shaped. It was on account of these traditions that CADU emphasized the importance of agricultural science and understood applicable knowledge as highly localized, and so aimed to adapt knowledge to contexts rather than contexts to knowledge. Although the adaptive, local research was not fully carried through in all respects, this focus still made CADU, particularly its crop production improvement work, technically much more successful than many other contemporary projects and settlement schemes. It was one of the few really effective implementations of the Green Revolution technologies in Africa in its time, and was able to demonstrate how food production could be significantly increased in the setting where it operated. The importance of this fact should not be downplayed in a national context where starvation was, and remains, a real and present risk if harvests fail.[61]

But although interested in the local conditions, the Swedish planners' perspective was limited by certain techno-centric and top-down biases that came with their background. To them, agricultural experiments resulting in profit-generating innovations were always defining features of agricultural development. They downplayed how social aspects would shape the uptake and effect of the new technologies utilized within the project. The very choices of Ethiopia and Chilalo as the location were in important respects based on agronomic factors, in the face of socially disadvantageous conditions. In these re-

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61   See Christopher Clapham, The Modes-of-Production Debate in Ethiopian Agriculture, review of Integrated Rural Development, by John M. Cohen (and several other works), in: Africa: Journal of The International African Institute 58 (1988), p. 365.

spects, CADU's strategies reflected a Swedish national style of agricultural development, characterized by a strong attention to local agricultural environments but a comparatively limited sensitivity toward social factors. Given the profound internationalization of agricultural development networks at the time, the scope of this argument must be understood correctly: I do not, as should be clear, argue that CADU represented a direct transposition of insulated Swedish knowledge and experience to Ethiopia, but simply that the priorities and sensibilities of its planners and first managers were shaped by discourses and understandings shared by most Swedish agronomists, on account of them all having been trained at the Agricultural College and in a national context that historically had emphasized the importance of localized and farmer-oriented research.

Their lack of attention to the social dimensions of development also meant that the Swedish experts failed to fully grasp the implications of their own activities, a common feature of modern expertise that is well-documented in the literature. They were ill-equipped to understand that adaptation of technologies, in its strong sense, implied an extensive mobilization of local people in the adaptation process and the use of methods beyond the standard repertoire of experimentation and extension. The partiality of perspectives available to technical experts thus created problems for CADU as it has for many other well-intended but ultimately problematic agricultural development efforts: peasant response was mixed and social inequalities exacerbated as an effect of the project's activities. The project tried to mitigate this to some extent, but it had limited power over the entrenched networks of redistribution in the local society and had not foreseen the unintended appropriation of project knowledge by resource-strong local actors.

This story is fairly standard fare in the history of the agricultural modernization. More interesting is that in spite of this, CADU never developed into a technocratic project in the usual sense. Its original planners and managers were clearly experts committed to technocratic ideals, and this did shape the project, but it did not, in the end, rid it of politics nor of a certain sensitivity to political problems as such. On the contrary, between its often stated focus on poor peasants and small-farm agriculture, Swedish diplomatic offensives, rural tensions, and Ethiopian radicals, the project was always intensely politically charged, and once its management was Ethiopianized, it found itself an active party in the rural conflicts that preceded the revolution of 1974.

With the revolution, CADU's scope, purpose, and methods changed and the project's international influence declined. But between 1967 and 1974, it was widely seen as a pioneering integrated rural development effort; as an experiment in Ethiopia that would generate new knowledge about methods to stimulate the kind of economic change in the countryside that was increasingly understood as central to social development in general. It received a steady stream of visitors, mostly perhaps anonymous policymakers and aid workers, but also high-profile officials like the president of the World Bank Robert McNamara, who visited in 1970 and, according to a report by the Swedish ambassador, stated his "lively appreciation" of the project as well as of the Swedish diplomatic pressure

for social and legal reform.[62] This suggests that CADU's particular niche in the post-co-lonial flora of rural development efforts and institutionalized development knowledge, which is beyond the scope of the present study, would be interesting to explore in further work. In conclusion here, I will simply say that in retrospect, it is clear that as an experiment CADU was both a success and a failure: it did systematize knowledge about the conditions of farming in rural Ethiopia as well as of how different attempts at stimulating agricultural development there could work, and in purely technical terms the project more than achieved its goals. But these successes came at an unintended social cost which in the eyes of many observers more than negated the benefits.

62   Carl Bergenstråhle to Lennart Klackenberg, 21 October 1970, SIDA, F 1 AB, vol. 778.

Rural (In)Securities: Resettlement, Control and "Development" in Angola (1960s–1970s)*

Miguel Bandeira Jerónimo

ABSTRACT

Nach dem Ausbruch organisierter anti-kolonialer Gewalt während der frühen sechziger Jahre suchten portugiesische imperiale und koloniale Akteure nach politisch-militärischen Strategien, die Sicherheit, rudimentäre Sozialfürsorge und Entwicklung kombinierten. Diese spezifische Kombination war ein Wesensmerkmal des Spätkolonialismus. Neben Strategien zur Bevölkerungskontrolle, „psychologischen Aktivitäten" oder einer Sozialgesetzgebung entwickelte sich ländliche Entwicklungspolitik zu einem zentralen Instrument der spätkolonialen Sicherheitspolitik. Ausgehend von der Analyse zweier zentraler Dokumente, die ländliche Entwicklungspolitik propagierten, zeigt der Artikel, wie ländliche Regionen zu einem wesentlichen Austragungsort von militärisch-politischen Sicherheitsstrategien wurden, die viele Elemente ländlicher Entwicklungspolitik enthielten

Introduction

The "wind of change" blew differently in the Portuguese colonies, since 1951 called "overseas provinces", after a Constitutional Revision. This legal, "semantic decolonization" did not entail a meaningful transformation of the authoritarian political nature of empire, marked by an exclusionary and discriminatory politics of difference, despite the widespread rhetoric of sociocultural "assimilation" and political "integration". The "lusotropicalist" ideology, which proclaimed a unique, benevolent and adaptive form of colonization, prevailed, including in diplomatic exchanges and in the ways in which the

Portuguese interacted with international fora such as the United Nations. Portrayed as a "multiracial, pluricontinental nation", not as an empire, Portugal refused the transformative energies of global decolonization, aimed to counteract internationalist dynamics of supervision and persistently dismissed dialogue and negotiation with anticolonial movements. On the contrary, a dynamic of reinforced colonization was predominant since the 1950s, but essentially from the 1960s. A combination of policies gained momentum: intense demographic, ethnic (white) colonization, sponsored by the state; social and economic developmentalism, with several state-coordinated developmental plans since 1953 and the opening up of the colonial economies; enhanced social control and military intervention, after a series of violent events in the north of Angola and in its capital, Loanda, in 1961 that marked the beginning of the colonial wars.[1]

The Portuguese authorities were very concerned with the outburst of organized anti-colonial violent initiatives during the early 1960s in three Portuguese "overseas provinces" – first in Angola, then also in Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique –, and believed that it was necessary to generate a series of multifaceted strategic political-military responses.[2] For instance, in the north of Angola, according to the metropolitan and the colonial elites, there was an imperative need to pacify an area of significant economic importance and to deal with the approximately half-million refugees caused by the 1961 events.[3] Numerous crucial, political and legal modifications were advanced immediately after, some merely *de jure*, others also *de facto*, with varying consequences across the vast colonial empire. The suppression of the *indigenato* system (1961) – the longstanding dual juridical regime that governed the colonies; the promulgation of a new Rural Labour Code (1962) – which at last prohibited all the legally sanctioned modalities of forced labour, according to international norms; the creation of the *Junta Provincial do Povoamento* (Provincial Settlement Board, or JPP) – which aimed to promote ethnic colonization and transform the politics and the economics of rural contexts; and the creation of *regedorias* – local administrative bodies envisaged to "respect the tradition and the habits of populations," as could be read in the Decree that established them, and to create a

1 M. Bandeira Jerónimo and A. Costa Pinto, A Modernizing Empire? Politics, Culture and Economy in Portuguese Late Colonialism, in: M. Bandeira Jerónimo and A. Costa Pinto (eds.), The Ends of European Colonial Empires, Basingstoke 2015, pp. 51-80. For the "wind of change" context see L. J. Butler and S. Stockwell (eds.), The Wind of Change: Harold Macmillan and British Decolonization, Basingstoke 2013. For the global contexts of decolonization see, for instance, M. Frey, R.W. Pruessen and T.T. Yong (eds.), The Transformation of Southeast Asia: International Perspectives on Decolonization, Armonk, NY, 2003; M. Shipway, Decolonization and its Impact: A Comparative Approach to the End of the Colonial Empires, Oxford 2008; M. Thomas, B. Moore and L. Butler, Crises of Empire: Decolonization and Europe's Imperial States, 1918–1975, London 2008.

2 G. Bender, Angola under the Portuguese: the Myth and the Reality, Berkeley 1978; Bandeira Jerónimo and Costa Pinto, A Modernizing Empire?; D. Ramada Curto, B. Pinto da Cruz and T. Furtado, Políticas Coloniais em Tempo de Revoltas – Angola circa 1961, Porto 2016.

3 A. Keese, Dos abusos às revoltas? Trabalho forçado, reformas portuguesas, política 'tradicional' e religião na Baixa de Cassange e no distrito do Congo (Angola), 1957-1961, in: Africana Studia 7 (2004), pp. 247-76; D. Ramada Curto and B. Cruz, Terrores e saberes coloniais: notas acerca dos incidentes na Baixa de Cassange, in: M. Bandeira Jerónimo (ed.), O Império Colonial em Questão, Lisbon 2012, pp. 3-35.

new platform for political engagement and control of African rural communities – were some of the most relevant.[4] In the next decade, as a consequence of a constellation of international, metropolitan and colonial pressures and dynamics, novel policies of security, welfare and development emerged, designed by a new generation of military men, human and social scientists, and politicians. Frequently interdependent, they markedly shaped the late colonial period, in a context characterized by the ongoing global political decolonization. Political and military goals were connected to socio-economic rationales. Improvements in security and rationalization, population control, developmentalism and welfarism coalesced in many ways, entailing the simultaneous *securitization* of late colonial development and the *developmentalization* of late colonial security. A "repressive developmentalism" formed as a consequence of the intersections of these two processes, although the genealogies of these intersections can be traced further back.[5] There were some commonalties with other European colonial empires facing similar challenges. Despite their distinct chronologies, idioms and repertoires of repressive developmentalism were shared between them. With some important distinctions, all were characterized by consequential entanglements between novel coercive repertoires of rule, projects of social engineering and "modernizing" programmes.[6]

These entanglements became particularly clear, for instance, in 1967, with the formation of a General Council for Counter-Subversion (GCCS), in which high-ranking Portuguese officials of the colonial and military administrations gathered to debate new *strategic* rationales of counter-subversion.[7] Its first meeting, in January 1968, defined the most important areas of (interrelated) concern: security; civil administration; the regrouping of rural populations, to foster "social promotion" and ensure their "defence"; population control; settlement; propaganda and counter-propaganda; and "psychological orienta-

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4   The *regedorias* aimed at assembling an average of "2000 to 3000 souls" in 133 "new settlements", in order to impede the "dispersal" of "native" communities, in an articulation of developmental rationales and security imperatives. Only eighty-three were actually formed by early 1964. See Joaquim Carrusca de Castro, "Relatório dos trabalhos de reordenamento rural e da organização comunitária – distrito de Uíge, 1964", Portuguese Diplomatic Archives, Arquivo Histórico Diplomático (henceforth AHD), AHD/MU/GM/GNP/RNP/0413/06592. For the entire legislative package see Providências legislativas ministeriais tomadas em Angola de 20 a 28 de Outubro de 1961, Lisbon 1961. For the regedorias see Decree no. 43.896. Decree organising Local Administrative Bodies known as Regedorias, Lisbon 1961.
5   M. Bandeira Jerónimo, "A Battle in the Field of Human Relations": The Official Minds of Repressive Development in Portuguese Angola, in: M. Thomas and G. Curlessn (eds.), Decolonization and Conflict: Colonial Comparisons and Legacies, London 2017, pp. 115-136; M. Bandeira Jerónimo, Ordering Resistance: The Late Colonial State in the Portuguese Empire (1940–1975), in: Political Power and Social Theory, forthcoming, 2017.
6   M. Bandeira Jerónimo, Repressive Developmentalisms: Idioms, Repertoires, Trajectories in Late Colonialism, in: M. Thomas and A. Thompson (eds.), Oxford Handbook of the Ends of Empire, Oxford, forthcoming, 2017; F. Klose, Human Rights in the Shadow of Colonial Violence, Philadelphia 2013; M. Feichtinger, "A Great Reformatory": Social Planning and Strategic Resettlement in Late Colonial Kenya and Algeria, 1952–63, in: Journal of Contemporary History 52 (2017) 1, pp. 45-72. See also M. Frey, Control, Legitimacy, and the Securing of Interests: European Development Policy in South-East Asia from the Late Colonial Period to the Early 1960s, in: Contemporary European History 12 (2003) 4, pp. 395-412.
7   For general approaches of counter-subversion in the Portuguese late colonial period, see J.P. Cann, Portuguese Counterinsurgency Campaigning in Africa 1961-1974; PhD thesis, University of London, 1996 and W.A. van der Waals, Portugal's War in Angola, Pretoria 2011.

tion." The planned resettlement of "native" populations was one of the most important topics of interest, reviving early efforts made in 1961 and building on the possibilities opened up by Decree no. 3484 of 25 April 1964, that enshrined rural resettlement as a central element in the ongoing process of formulating a counter-subversion strategy in Angola. According to the decree, the new policy aimed at using community development repertoires for socio-economic development of autochthonous rural communities, inducing their cooperation on the way. Their participation in a market economy and the provision of welfare were two other related intents. But this policy was also a political and securitarian instrument, aiming at gradual political integration, active social control, and focused on security, which was defined holistically. The *regedorias* were the spatial units in which these main purposes could be experimented with. Despite the identified risks (e.g. the disruption of "traditional" ways and customs), in just three years, from 1965 to 1967, the money spent in rural resettlement went from 5000 *contos* to 19591 *contos*.[8] In 1964, Silvino Silvério Marques, the Governor-General of Angola, had already established rural resettlement as an administrative priority.[9]

The centrality of rural resettlement and "population concentration" in the discernible strong nexus between civil administration, security, population control and socioeconomic development was further reinforced by the outcomes of a "secret" symposium on counter-subversion that was organized by the GCCS to assess past experiences and discuss future possibilities. Senior officials from the military, the administration, the police and the specialized security and intelligence services gathered from November 1968 until March 1969 to discuss the most appropriate avenues to solidify these seemingly fruitful interconnections. How to connect development and counter-insurgency more effectively was the collective challenge, characterized by the embracing the variegated idioms and repertoires of developmentalism that increasingly circulated during and after World War II. Reinforcing the strategy delineated at the GCCS, the symposium enabled the systematic cross-fertilization of ideas and programmes of population regrouping and control, social welfare and "social promotion," psychological "action" or "mentalization," rural resettlement and community development were recurrently promoted and their instrumental use stimulated. The entanglements between schemes of coercive societal control, on the one hand, and plans of development, on the other, were, revealingly, at the core of the symposium.[10]

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8   "Memorial dos principais assuntos tratados no Conselho Geral de Contra-Subversão", secret, Contra Subversão em Angola 1968-01-01/1972-01-01, AHD/MU/GM/GNP/RNP/56; Services of Centralization and Coordination of Information of Angola (SCCIA), Uíge Section, "Relatório dos trabalhos de reordenamento rural e organização comunitária, empreendidos no distrito de Uíge a partir de Junho de 1962", AHD/1/MU-GM/GNP01-RNP/S0413/UI06546; Alfredo J. de Passos Guerra, "Reordenamento rural. Promoção Económico-Social das Populações Rurais de Angola", IV Colóquio Nacional do Trabalho da Organização Corporativa e da Segurança Social (Loanda: JPPA, 1966), citations from pp. 2, 8, 9, AHU-IPAD-08418; C. Rebocho Vaz, Acção Governativa, Loanda 1971, pp. 97-107.
9   S. Silvério Marques, O reordenamento rural integrado nas preocupações globais da administração, Loanda 1964.
10   Bandeira Jerónimo, "A Battle in the Field of Human Relations". For developmentalism, see, for instance, M. Frey, S.

Focusing on two fundamental documents and respective discussions that encapsulated the variegated ways in which securitarian and developmental rationales intersected in the early 1970s – the *Norms of Rural Resettlement and Population Regrouping* and the *General Instruction of Counter-Subversion in Angola* –, this text builds on these previous developments, aiming to show how they evolved across time and became pivotal in the late colonial politics and policies, especially in rural areas, which became privileged loci of the overall spatialization of the developmental-securitarian nexus. The dynamics of everyday life in those areas was transformed, their economic value tentatively enhanced.[11] First, this text addresses the ways in which the decades-long experience of regular articulation between security and development arguments and demands in the formulation of a counter-subversion strategy was used to elaborate a renewed normative framework, namely in relation to political and socio-economic intervention in African rural communities. Second, it illuminates how this normative framework was central to the definition of a general policy of counter-subversion (and respective instructions), characterized by an attempt to merge civil and military modalities of social and psychological intervention. Third, it engages with the conditions in which these modalities of social change and control were enacted, focusing on some of their consequences. Economic disparities, labour relations and the "land problem" in rural contexts are mobilized in order to illustrate such conditions and consequences, revealing the circumstances in which the debates about the twin subjects of security and development occurred, and the related practices evolved. The central place occupied by rural development in these debates and practices, on how it was imagined and promoted, will be analysed throughout the paper.

On "systems" of control

On 3 April 1972, a meeting of the Angolan Provincial Council of Counter-Subversion (PCCSA) approved a new set of *Norms of Rural Resettlement and Population Regrouping* (hereafter *Norms*).[12] After years of exchange of ideas and arguments about the benefits and shortcomings of counter-insurgency strategies in the colony, connected to the variegated contributions to the "secret" symposium on counter-subversion, a novel normative framework was crystallized.[13] The symposium had concluded that a fundamental distinction needed to be made between population regrouping and rural resettlement. The first was essentially seen as a "process of population protection and control" in contexts

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Kunkel, and C.R. Unger (eds.), International Organizations and Development, 1945–1990, Basingstoke 2014 and J.M. Hodge, G. Hodl and M. Kopf (eds.), Developing Africa, Manchester 2014.

11   Much needs to be done to assess the diversity of local impacts of these transformative processes. As noted before, some of the schemes of rural intervention were essentially aspirations, not actual realities.

12   Normas de Reordenamento Rural e de Reagrupamento de Populações, Reserved, AHD/MU/GM/GNP/RNP/0163/01091 (hereafter Normas...).

13   For the major purposes, see "Plenary meeting of the Executive Council of Counter-Subversion," 21 August 1968, Reserved, Simpósio da Contra-Subversão. Sugestões das Comissões. 1968–1969, AHD/MU/GM/GNP/RNP/0570/01234.

of "direct pressure" from guerrilla action. Therefore, it should be a "transitory" solution. It should focus on areas of "violent subversion," of "emergency," in which prompt action was required, with no room for planning. Moreover, population regrouping should turn into rural resettlement, as soon as possible. The second was considered a process of "social, political and economic development of rural populations," mostly appropriate to relatively peaceful areas. It entailed planning and the use of the techniques of community development. Of course, this neat distinction had plenty of grey areas. Population regrouping could be instrumental in areas in which "subversion" was identified as a mere possibility. Regrouping enabled preventive "mentalization" of the populations against the opponent efforts of "infiltration and indoctrination." It also facilitated the promotion of self-defence in villages.[14]

The *Norms* prolonged these tendencies, trying to systematize ideas and experiences. The almost simultaneous formulation of *Norms concerning district militias and self-defence of rural populations*, added to the reinforcement of the intersections between securitarian and developmental rationales in Portuguese late colonialism. The *Norms* that should govern population regrouping and rural resettlement identified three major interrelated topics of intervention: the formulation of "systems of development," the restructuring of rural landscapes and the relocation and reorganization of population nuclei. There were three fundamental "systems" of developmental practices, which should be enacted according to particular local constraints and, an aspect of crucial importance, according to "security" considerations. These "systems" were the means to induce rapid social transformation by accelerating "the rhythm of evolution of rural communities."

The first one, community development, the guidelines for which were provided by the United Nations, was identified as *the* tool to provide an "integral," "harmonious" and "gradual" development of rural communities, in territories in which the population was "still in a scarcely developed state." Its ability to "avoid social disruptions" that could be "extremely serious" was underscored. The UN's "development decade" acquired multiple meanings, and was appropriated in a variety of ways.[15] The second was "rural extension," which was seen as an "educational, informal and flexible system" that aimed to instruct rural communities in "agriculture and domestic sciences." A pilot project in the Bié district was regarded as successful and was expanded. The main purpose was to modify individual and collective attitudes in rural contexts, transforming the rural men and women into agents with "responsibilities", not mere objects of developmental intervention. This was seen as "integral," "material and non-material" development. It was "informal" because the classrooms were the actual estates and the houses of rural communities. It was flexible because it was meant to be as adaptable to local circumstances and individual and family particularities as possible. The family unit should be the focus of all efforts of "mentalization," taking into account the putative "immediate," non-elaborate nature

14   "Conclusões finais," 22 March 1969, Reserved, Simpósio da Contra-Subversão. Conclusões finais. Encerramento. 1968-1969, AHD/MU/GM/GNP/RNP/0570/01235.

15   Normas, p. 3-5. See also Marc Frey's text in this volume.

of rural individuals in underdeveloped contexts. The fruitful convergence between science, politics and rural dynamics was the ultimate goal of "rural extension." Productivity should be measured beyond strict economic terms. Credit to agricultural endeavours should be as important as socio-psychological interference. The creation, in 1971, of *Brigades for rural promotion and development* materialised these multifaceted purposes: the facilitation of the acceptance by African rural communities of novel socio-technical behaviours that could enhance productivity and development at large, but also social control. As the decree that established the expansion of the programme of "rural extension" argued, "economic welfare" and the "gradual extinction of tensions" were "the most effective barriers to the infiltration of negative ideas." The *Norms* replicated these viewpoints. One fundamental obstacle emerged: the system was seen as "impractical" in "restless environments," marked by latent and manifest conflicts. And many areas of the overseas territories were certainly good examples of that. Finally, the third system was "closed supervision," which the document classified as "total supervision." With a "rigorous and paternalist" ethos and requiring considerable financial investment and qualified human resources, this solution aimed to identify those willing to cooperate, rewarding them with technical and financial assistance. It was seen as appropriate to small agricultural areas and populations.[16]

With variations, all these systems were crucial to the coeval policies of rural resettlement and population regrouping. The announced multiple purposes of rural resettlement – the articulation between social and economic development, between new socio-cultural "habits" and novel and more efficient "labour methods" to enhance economic productivity – required the close participation, and "adhesion," of local communities. Only with their acquiescence would the desired "convergent evolution" of coexisting "cultural groups" ("natives" and white colonists) become a reality. These goals required population concentration, not dispersion: welfare provision would be facilitated, social control easier to exert. On the administrative side, a considerable bureaucracy was set in place, including a "technical commission" which comprised delegates from several departments of the colonial administration, from the educational and health services to labour and commercial. Delegates from the police and security services were also members of the commission, as were those from the Department of Studies and Coordination of Counter-Subversion (DSCCS). The attainment of the purposes of rural resettlement entailed the regular collaboration and support of military units. The definition of any plan of rural resettlement should take "aspects of security and counter-subversion" into consideration, especially in level one and two "zones of subversion" (areas of guerrilla and areas surrounding guerrilla, respectively). The commander in charge and the DSCCS should be listened to before any decision. The abovementioned systems and rural resettlement

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16   Normas, pp. 6-7, 9. For "rural extension," see Missão de Extensão Rural de Angola, Alguns elementos acerca da Missão de Extensão Rural de Angola, Nova Lisboa 1973, pp. 1-3, and Bender, Angola under the Portuguese, pp. 186-187. For the brigades, see Decree no. 17482, 2 February 1971, and Junta Provincial do Povoamento de Angola, Brigadas de promoção e desenvolvimento rural, Loanda 1971.

were equally vital to the rolling "counter-insurgency" schemes. Their enhancement was a major goal that should be pursued vigorously on many fronts: they were critical to the combined strategy of assuring security and development.[17]

The same happened with population regrouping, which was deemed to be predominant-ly rural. This intervention was a "solution of opportunity and emergency" that responded to "economic and securitarian necessities." The economic rationale was connected to the purpose of finding the appropriate "population density" for the fostering of rapid eco-nomic transformation and "accelerated growth." The developmental technique of "closed supervision" was the preferred instrument in such circumstances, despite being onerous and constituting a "paternalistic system." Given the widespread conflicts in the so-called overseas provinces, the securitarian reasoning was clearly predominant. Development in "unsafe areas" was a critical problem. Population regrouping or resettlement enabled "self-defence" and tentatively insulated the population from the "subversive process." It also facilitated social and economic development, which was crucial to impede subver-sion. This population intervention, which had precise instructions regarding its spatial arrangements, went from minor dislocations to massive forced removal from areas of "violent subversion," following, at least on paper, ethnic criteria and taking into account "traditional authority." Production, self-defence, surveillance and "recuperation" (or re-habilitation) were the main goals. "Tactical resettlements" were ultimate examples of such combined purposes. "Recuperated" and "captured" populations, defined according to the degree of willingness to cooperate in the resettlement process and to the degree of "compromise" with the "enemy," were to be identified and appropriately dealt with. The populations that were "compromised" should either be submitted to "special measures of vigilance" and an "intensive action of recuperation" or relocated to "Recuperation Cen-tres," in which an "intense and well-guided psychological action" should be carried out. The centre in São Nicolau, in the south of Angola, was just one example. In both cases, a constant collaboration between military and civil forces was prescribed, involving "work groups" modelled on the mobile teams of community development. Developmental models and techniques of social intervention should be replicated by the military.[18]

"House and village files" (*ficha de casa e de aldeia*) should be meticulously filled in, one by one. They were crucial to the "control" of rural populations. The information on these – about personal data but also on religion, existing social services, "general conditions of nutrition," communications and, of course, security aspects – should be duplicated and channelled throughout the administrative chain, civic and military. The need for up-to-date information prompted the use of a pencil. This *individualization* of the informa-tion-gathering process constituted a significant change from proposals considered years before. In one of the documents that contributed to the "secret" symposium on counter-subversion, focused on population control in "native" resettlements, argued that it was

17   Normas, 14-15, 18, 28.
18   Normas, 30-31, 33-36; Provincial Council of Counter-Subversion, meeting of 13 May 1970, Secret, in AHD/MU/GM/GNP/RNP/S056/UI13505.

more practical and effective to keep "family files." These would be permanently available to any member of the local commission of resettlement. A copy should be placed on the main door of each house. Side by side with proper travel documents, registering all movements by each individual, and with an "information network" formed by resettled individuals recruited by the political police, this family card would facilitate population control. Any incongruence between the data on the family card and the observed reality in occasional inspections would have serious consequences: for instance, the missing individual would be considered a "collaborator with the enemy." His capture would be ordered. "Recuperation" ensued.[19]

Within the administrative and military circles, discussions about the most appropriate forms of controlling African rural communities, within or outside settlements, were recurrent. For instance, the transformation of the nature and scope of the instruments to gather information about them that occurred with the major changes after 1961 was criticized by many in those circles. The suppression of the *indigenato*, in that year, brought important modifications, although more in theory than in practice. One was the end of "transit permits" that restricted unchecked population mobility. Another, perhaps more significant, was the substitution of the *caderneta indígena* ("native card") by a standardized "identity card," extended to all citizens irrespective of race or the so-called degree of cultural advancement. The abandonment of a longstanding legal discrimination between "Europeans" and "natives", formally supressed by the 1961 law, transformed the nature of the information collected by the colonial state. In a sense, it made it less useful to those in charge, especially in what related to African subjects, and even more so in relation to rural areas, in which the administrative presence was notably scarce. For some authorities, the option for the identity card caused the mitigation of the colonial state's ability to obtain detailed individual socio-economic information, which was more present in the "native card". Therefore, the authorities' knowledge about the populations to be controlled diminished. To cope with this situation, new solutions were advanced, such as residency certificates or a more elaborate system of information and intelligence-gathering, based on novel, and more sophisticated governmental information services.[20] The escalation of conflicts and the intensification of subversion urged the devising of effective investigative instruments. But population regrouping also generated negative effects in itself, starting from its involuntary, frequently forced, nature and ending with the coexistence of distinct ethnic groups or with the failure in deploying the promised provision of social betterments.[21]

19   Normas..., pp. 38-39; Carlos Alexandre de Morais, "Controle das populações nos reagrupamentos," Simpòisio da Contra-Subversão. Comunicações para Estudo. 1968–1969, in AHD/MU/GM/GNP/RNP/0570/01236.

20   José Henriques de Carvalho, "Reagrupamento de populações e Promoção Social," 25 September 1968; Fernando Lisboa Botelho, "Controle de populações"; both in Contra Subversão em Angola, 1968-01-01/1972-01-01, AHD/MU/GM/GNP/RNP/56.

21   Carlos Morais, "Controle das populações nos reagrupamentos," 20 September 1968, Contra Subversão em Angola, 1968-01-01/1972-01-01, AHD/MU/GM/GNP/RNP/56.

The *Norms* reflected these longstanding debates, and were acutely debated in a meeting of the PCCSA and its DSCCS on 3 April 1972. The past shortcomings were addressed, including the fact that the necessary dialogue that could make military-civil collaboration possible, and fruitful, was far from accomplished. The production of knowledge, "as perfect as possible," of the "tendencies" and "habits" of the targeted populations was ever more essential in this regard. Surveillance and control depended on it. In relation to military-civil collaboration, the debates were more intense. Their separate "technical languages" had led to conflicts, a lack of "adequate planning" and related "hesitations." The *Norms* aimed to clarify positions, decision-making processes, and hierarchies. Those in charge of the military zones into which Angola was divided had to be consulted on issues related to rural resettlement and population regrouping. The same happened regarding the related projects of rural development. Developmental strategies in rural areas were gazed upon through securitarian and counter-insurgency lenses, which should define the "priorities" of socio-economic intervention.[22]

On "modern" instructions…

On the same day, in the same meeting, a pivotal, confidential document, the *General Instruction of Counter-Subversion in Angola,* was the subject of debate. The goal was to ensure the "close coordination and convergence" between the actions being taken by the armed forces, by civil authorities and services, and also by private entities (e.g. enterprises) to "re-establish peace." The topic of communications deserves special mention, as the economic and security reasons for the development of communication lines rarely coincided. Again, the military-civil collaboration and the precedence of security rationales were at the core of the debate. If coordination and convergence were goals, decentralisation was also a purpose. The idea was to set guidelines that could then enable a more localized decision-making process. The variety of political, economic, social and population circumstances and, of course, the distinct dynamics of conflict, required strategic flexibility. To seize, immediately, the "opportunity" to prevent or control insurrection, or to induce rapid socio-economic change (that could be central to the former), was crucial. Counter-subversion plans should focus on interrelated goals: "social promotion" (mainly education and sanitary assistance), economic development (agriculture and livestock farming), communications and self-defence of rural localities and populations (as defined by the respective *Norms concerning district militias and self-defence of rural populations*, approved in the same moment in time).

But the decisions on how to meet these goals, although guided by norms and rules, should be reached at local level. For such decisions to be as informed as possible, em-

22   After this consultation process, the Technical Commission could send the annual plan to another commission, the Technical Commission of Economic Planning and Integration, in which, anyway, the Commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces in Angola was a pivotal member. Actas da Sessão do Conselho Provincial de Contra-Subversão (3 de Abril 1972) (hereafter Actas da Sessão...), 82 pages, Secret, AHD/MU/GM/GNP/RNP/0048/01088.

phasis was placed, again, on the production of knowledge about the "social and political organization" of rural communities. "Family organization" was particularly important: forms of lineage and kinship, succession (customary law and practices), marriage rules, rites of passage and generational conflicts should be identified and systematized, and taken into consideration in the devising of local strategies of political control and socio-economic intervention. One of these strategies was the creation of "Rural Youth Centres," which was also debated in relation to the *General Instruction*. The idea was praised because it could serve as a way to socially frame youngsters (from 9 up to 22 years of age), making them immune to "the action of subversion," and promote their interest in "agrarian activities." The case of Rovuma, in Mozambique, in which the instrumental use of Rural Youth Centres paid off, and should be extended to Angola. But the idea was also feared. There were some examples that revealed the potential subversive nature these groups could take. The Provincial Secretary of Education offered his own personal, and negative, experience in Venezuela.[23]

The question of population control, a fundamental aspect of the *Norms of Rural Resettlement and Population Regrouping*, was also central in the *General Instruction*.

First, in relation to the usefulness, but also the problems, of the methods of Residency Certificates and Identity Cards. The circulation of individuals and groups was considered a crucial problem, creating additional difficulties in the much-needed population control efforts, due to political and military, but also economic reasons. In April 1968, a decree determined the extension of Residency Certificates to all Angola, not only the cities, as the 1964 legislation defined. An important contribution on the need to expand the scope of the existing legislation, and to turn population control into a more effective policy instrument was a confidential memorandum made by the Services for the Centralization and Coordination of Intelligence of Angola (SCCIA) in November 1967. The close articulation between population concentration and the control of its mobility was at the core of the memorandum's fundamental rationale, which ended up being crucial to the 1968 legislation, and resonates in the *General Instruction*.[24] But such articulation was hard to achieve. In the mid-1970s, in a meeting of the Council of Counter-Subversion, concerns were raised regarding the fact that the mandatory nature of the certificates was still to be legally confirmed. Pressure over the higher-authorities to urgently enforce the 1968 decree was in order, otherwise the identification and control of mobile populations would be ineffective, entailing dangerous consequences.[25]

The actual control of the mobility of individuals and groups was difficult for many other reasons. For instance, the movement of people for labour reasons was a recurrent economic problem. The "instability" of manpower had effects on the productivity of partic-

23   With variations, these centres were already being tested in Angola, in Cela, Pambangala, Catofe e Tongo. Actas da Sessão (April 3, 1972)

24   Decree no. 3819, of 4 April 1968, in: Boletim Geral de Angola, 1st Series, 81, 4 April 1968, pp. 597-604; SCCIA, Memorandum on "Population control," confidential, 22 November 1967, in AHD/MU/GM/GNP/RNP/0362/04514.

25   Provincial Council of Counter-Subversion, meeting of 13 May 1970, Secret, in AHD/MU/GM/GNP/RNP/S056/UI13505.

ular economic sectors in essentially rural and agricultural societies. The need to manage labour pools was a longstanding and crucial demand. But such administration required cautious methods. On one hand, the control of labour movements was fundamental to economic planning and to the reinforcement of population control. On the other, labour was a traditional cause of local and international criticism. The entire process should be one "without any appearance of coercion" over the African workers. Of course, these movements could also have politico-military consequences, as they could be channels for the circulation of "subversive" agents and agendas. In this respect, the expected use of polaroid machines was seen as a game-changer.[26]

The control of "native" labour mobility was crucial for other reason. The "instability" of labour, connected to multiple migratory flows, raised serious difficulties for the ongoing efforts of "psychological action." Of the estimated 531,153 salaried private employees, around 173,200 spent less than one year in their workplace. Circa 50,000 of these migrant workers were in their workplace less than six months. As noted above, this created significant economic and political problems. Labour "stabilization," which was systematically debated in international, interimperial and colonial meetings and organizations, became a priority in Portuguese developmental and security circles. Social, politico-military and economic reasons coalesced in making it a recurrent concern of numerous administrative policies. But mobility could also be used in a positive way. Afonso Mendes, one of the most important experts on colonial labour issues in the Portuguese bureaucracy and Director of the Institute of Labour, Social Security and Social Welfare of Angola (ITPASA) from 1962 to 1970, saw "native" labour mobility as a perfect laboratory for "psychological" intervention. In a reserved document produced for the Council for the Orientation of Psychological Action (*Conselho de Orientação da Acção Psicológica*), created in 1968, Mendes saw these mobile masses as "excellent carriers" of the Portuguese "doctrine and cause" or of "the subversive ideology and techniques." It all depended on the intervention of the authorities. With the exception of "military and educational concentrations," these mobile masses of workers provided "opportunities" for a systematic psychological intervention. They were young (18 to 30 years old, mostly), curious and eager for "new ideas and knowledge," and they circulated, therefore being able to disseminate the message. They would surely welcome any kind of "entertainment." The "poverty" and "lack of comfort" of the villages for workers certainly eased the process. Mendes offered some suggestions, some already taking place.

The ITPASA could collaborate in the efforts to guide these mobile masses to a proper psychological direction, as the existing and planned roadhouses (*estalagens*) could be places in which the radio *Voz de Angola* was exclusively transmitted, disseminating the authorities' propaganda, or in which the workers would find "simple literature," with "a

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26   Actas da Sessão (6 April 1972). For the labour problem, including international aspects, see M. Bandeira Jeróni-mo and J.P. Monteiro, O império do trabalho. Portugal, as dinâmicas do internacionalismo e os mundos coloni-ais, in: M. Bandeira Jerónimo and A. Costa Pinto (eds.), Portugal e o fim do Colonialismo, Lisboa 2014, pp. 15-54; J.P. Monteiro, A internacionalização das políticas laborais 'indígenas' no império colonial português (1944–1962), PhD thesis, University of Lisbon, 2017.

predominance of photographic images and intentional drawings" aiming at "doctrinaire education." The replication of *clubes* (social centres) for the migrant rural workers, already existing in some medium-size companies, should be promoted. The ITPASA also had four of these institutions. The "possibilities of propaganda and psychological action" in such premises were great: "selected" films and documentaries as elements of a "circuit of political propaganda" carried out by protagonists prepared for the "engagement with rural manpower," carefully instructed in "techniques and tactics of contact." "Political mentalization" was crucial: it would enhance political control of mobile rural workers and facilitate the territorial and sociological dissemination of the counter-subversion message. The development of "corporative sports," the realization of Labour Institute holiday camps (already working in Lobito and on the verge of starting in Loanda and Nova Lisboa) and the progress of the two periodicals being published by the Institute – *Trabalho* and *Jornal do Trabalhador* (*Labour* and *The Worker's Journal*, respectively), which had a print run of 3,000 and 10,000 – were another three instruments intended to achieve such purposes of "mentalization" and control. The combination of the "dangerousness of subversion" and the need to properly deal with rural manpower, which had been so far treated with a "neglect hard to understand" and which now needed to be submitted to "attempts at immunization," demanded innovative strategies.[27]

Second, and more important regarding rural areas, the utility of the *ficha de casa e de aldeia* was also addressed in the *General Instruction*. The "complete efficacy" of population control was based on the accuracy of such files, which, as we have noted above, became gradually *individualized*. All information, and changes to original information, should be provided by the head of the family, by the "traditional authority" or by the administrative authority with local jurisdiction. The local "native" militias should also be involved in the process. Since the promulgation of a decree on the subject in 1967, the idea was to foster the emergence of "militias of the *regedorias*," extending to rural communities those same principles and repertoires of civil defence being enacted in urban areas. In 1972, the legal responsibility for population control within the villages lay with the head of each family. The supervision and control of population and associated modifications in number and profile were legally attributed to the Angolan Public Security Police, the Directorate-General of Security (the political police) and to the Organização Provincial de Voluntários de Defesa Civil de Angola (OPVDCA), the Provincial Organization of Volunteers of Civil Defence, a voluntary militia-type force created in 1961 after the violent tumults in Angola.[28]

The *General Instruction* also included important direct references to "Rural Resettlement and Population Regrouping" and to "Social Promotion" as major developmental tools and also as crucial counter-subversion techniques. In the first case, the contents of the

27 Afonso Mendes, "Contra-subversão/Acção Psicológica," Reserved, 10 April 1969, in AHD/MU/GM/GNP/RNP/0440/00383. For the importance of labour "stabilization", see the magnum opus by F. Cooper, Decolonization and African Society. The Labor Question in French and British Africa, Cambridge, UK, 1996.

28 Actas da Sessão (6 April 1972); "Conclusões finais," 22 March 1969, Reserved, Simpósio da Contra-Subversão. Conclusões finais. Encerramento. 1968-1969, AHD/MU/GM/GNP/RNP/0570/01235.

Norms were synthetized and reiterated in the document. In relation to "Social Promotion," the fundamental ideas exposed at the 1970 Congress on Settlement and Social Promotion (October, 4-9) were reaffirmed: the socio-economic progress of African communities, especially in rural settings, was a "precondition of national survival" (meaning imperial resilience), as was argued in the conclusions of the meeting. Pacification depended on it. Social control would be easier. One of the ideologues of the spread of the "modern" doctrinal aspects of counter-insurgency in Portugal, Hermes de Araújo Oliveira, contributed to the illumination of the fruitful interdependence between social development, (re)settlement and counter-subversion. In the *General Instruction*, the "pressing urgency" to strengthen such interdependence was understood and highlighted. It was admitted that the "state of underdevelopment of many regions and populations of Angola" was one of the catalysts of "subversion." To those in charge of devising and debating the counter-insurgency strategy, the need for policies of "accelerated development" that could foster social promotion and minimize subversion was obvious. Concerns with social disruption, potentially caused by rapid social change, were voiced, but the widespread rhetoric of holistic integration – not merely social and economic, but also political and cultural – was praised. Again, the military-civil collaboration was crucial.[29] The military should be fundamental players in the enhancement of developed agricultural and livestock farming policies via the transfer of knowledge, using "the most developed agricultural workers, willing to cooperate and with local influence," and through direct intervention in the market. The list of their potential contribution was immense: from the participation in the diffusion of more advanced agricultural techniques and the acquisition and distribution of seeds to the promotion of afforestation or the distribution of tractors and breeding of animals (especially rabbits, sheep, pigs and chickens). The direct consumption of agricultural produce of local communities was also important, for many reasons. One of the most important was the expectation that it would bring dynamism to local markets. The presence of armed forces constituted a significant increase in the demand for agricultural products that could contribute to stimulating local economies. The consumption of local produce was also a measure that aimed at reducing the cost of the war effort, in transportation, for instance (at the time, a third of the Portuguese state Budget was being spent in defence). It was also seen as "one of the most effective ways" of bonding with local populations. Another important role was a securitarian one: the military should "support the evacuation of tradable products," guaranteeing their "necessary protection." In a context of widespread conflict, characterized by a particular modality of war, commercial security was absolutely essential. "Health and Assistance" was another area in which the crucial role of the military was advocated. The existence of areas in which the civil services were absent was just one of the reasons

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29   Actas da Sesão (6 April 1972); Congresso de povoamento e promoção social, Luanda, 4 a 9 de Outubro de 1970, Luanda 1970; H. de Araújo Oliveira, Povoamento e promoção social armas fundamentais contra a subversão, in: Congresso de povoamento e promoção social, Luanda, 4 a 9 de Outubro de 1970, pp. 311-321. See also his Guerra revolucionária, Lisboa 1960.

why many civil and military authorities did this. The medical staff of the armed forces had to realize that part of their responsibilities was related to local populations. Likewise, the military health and sanitary facilities – hospitals, wards or first-aid posts – should be open to all. The provision of drugs to local populations was an element of "Social Action." The civil-military cooperation in "local improvements" and the establishment of a central role of the Armed Forces in such efforts also merited attention. Its impact on the "indoctrination of populations" about the need "to improve their conditions of existence" was highlighted. As was declared at the meeting, local improvements were one of the demonstrations of social promotion. Military participation was more than the mere provision of materials or technical advice.[30]

… and "inconvenient procedures".

All these projects of intense social, economic and political intervention entailed debates about their unintended and undesirable consequences. Given past records and present circumstances, it was no surprise that the *General Instruction* had one Annex focusing on the principles and means to ensure the "Protection of populations in relation to inconvenient procedures." As noted above regarding questions of labour mobility, social antagonisms and "contradictions" were seen as the cause for subversion. It was mandatory to minimize the exploitation of local communities by "elements more evolved and with few scruples." According to the Head of the DSCCS, Carlos Bessa, the fact that exploitation was directed towards "coloured" populations had an additional consequence: it created the "appearance of being manifestations of racial discrimination," particularly dangerous given Portuguese imperial rhetoric and propaganda efforts to prove its exceptional multiracialism. The repression of these two interrelated phenomena should be a priority, and the "structure of counter-subversion" should have an important say in the process. The rules of the overseas public service should be strictly followed. Similarly, "commercial speculations" should be closely monitored. The provincial Secretary of the Economy, who raised the question, could not be clearer: he was not talking about inflation caused by market prices, he was targeting the "absence of scruples" in the economic relations with "less developed populations." Given the "large scale" prevalence of behaviours such as the adulteration of weights and measures or the sale on credit at high rates of interest, not to mention the imposition of low prices when buying and high prices on selling the exact same product, a more "intimate" collaboration between the armed forces and the Inspectorate of Economic Activities was suggested, especially in the countryside. The widespread "commercial speculations," and other issues such as contraband, would be

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30   The study of the entanglements between late colonial economic and securitarian dimensions is yet to be done. Actas da Sessão (6 April 1972).

better tackled with such collaboration. Their "extremely serious effects in the effort of counter-subversion" thus recommended.[31]

Already in the final conclusions of the 1968–1969 "secret" symposium, it was argued that it was important to consider, and avoid, the "suffocation" of the local producers and businessmen given the unequal conditions for the exercise of economic activities. "Discrimination" regarding the rules that related to the existence of "rural markets," in which the African producers were compelled to participate, was another example that was "susceptible to be explored by subversion." The difference in the level of salaries between the African and the European labourers, the disparity between the salaries of urban and rural African workers (the latter earned six times less than the former, despite representing three quarters of Angola's active manpower), the "repressive intervention" of the authorities over the "native" workers and the "irregularities" of the employers against them added to the vast catalogue of economic conditions that favoured social unrest, and "subversive" options. The problem of labour and the regime under which "native" labour was recruited, distributed and used was a longstanding cause of colonial dissension and unrest, as well as a recurrent topic of international criticism. The reformist efforts enacted at the beginning of the 1960s, such as the Rural Labour Code of 1962, for example, failed to deliver. Unequal salaries, paternalism, ethnic differentiation and discrimination continued.[32]

Another source of recurrent "inconvenient procedures," side by side with labour and fiscal exaction and the variegated forms of "commercial speculation," was the "land problem" ("*problema de terras*"). The "land problem" was one of the most important problems at the time.[33] Accordingly, the issue was naturally debated in several meetings of the council, deserving as well special place in the *General Instruction*. The existing 1961 legislation, and the (geo)political, military, economic and socio-cultural pressing circumstances, enhanced a manifest contradiction, or at least two purposes that were hard to balance. On one hand, the legislation aimed to facilitate the fixation of colonists coming from the metropole. An attractive policy of land concession distribution was essential to sustain one of the fundamental policies of late colonialism, on many levels: ethnic colonization.[34] The latter was simultaneously a developmental instrument and a securitarian tool. It was also an important element in the ongoing diplomatic strategy:

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31   Actas da Sessão (6 April 1972).
32   "Conclusões finais," 22 March 1969, Reserved, Simpósio da Contra-Subversão. Conclusões finais. Encerramento. 1968–1969, AHD/MU/GM/GNP/RNP/0570/01235; Afonso Mendes, "Aspectos relevantes da Contra-Subversão," Secret, Simpósio da Contra-Subversão. Sugestões das Comissões. 1968–1969, AHD/MU/GM/GNP/RNP/0570/01234. For the historical significance of labour question, see M. Bandeira Jerónimo, The "Civilizing Mission" of Portuguese Colonialism (c. 1870–1930), Basingstoke 2015; M. Bandeira Jerónimo and J. P. Monteiro, Internationalism and the Labours of the Portuguese Colonial Empire (1945–1974), in: Portuguese Studies 29 (2013) 2, pp. 142-163.
33   Much needs to be done regarding this topic, in itself and in relation to the developmental and securitarian policies that characterized late colonialism.
34   G.J. Bender, Planned Rural Settlement in Angola, 1900–1968, in: F.W. Heimer (ed.), Social Change in Angola, Munich 1973, pp. 235–279; C. Castelo, Passagens para África: o povoamento de Angola e Moçambique com naturais da metrópole (1920–1974), Porto 2007.

demography was crucial to sustain the rhetoric of a multiracial and pluri-continental nation and also to make solutions of political disengagement harder to formulate. On the other hand, the legislation was proclaimed as sufficient to impede the "disrespect of the rights of the natives" by Europeans, guaranteeing some forms of protection. This was particular relevant given the widespread criticism that the authoritarian regime was facing at many levels. The need to explicitly minimize, at least *de jure*, "inconvenient procedures" towards local "native" populations regarding land concession was obvious. It was imperative to promote a "fair distribution" and "determine the terrains attributed to autochthonous populations," as Manuel dos Santos Moreira, the Head of the DSCCS noted in June 1972. The "social, economic and political consequences" of "inconvenient procedures" and "abundant illegalities" – the recurrent disrespect for the existing legislation, and the related scarcity of means, or of will, to enforce it – caused numerous and profound problems to the counter-subversion strategies being enacted. This view was shared by a few. The Provincial Secretary of Rural Development (*Fomento Rural*) termed it one the "most distressing problems" of administration.[35]

As noted above regarding the negative effect of "commercial speculations," the final conclusions of the symposium already stated that the "serious problem of land" characterized "extensive areas." Two measures were seen as imperative to minimize that state of affairs. First, the application, "with rigour and opportunity," of the existing legislation. Second, the promotion of "more evolved cultural practices" in rural communities, causing their "gradual fixation" in a given area and also the increase of productivity. Also important, it was mandatory to "prohibit the concession of lands" that were left by autochthonous populations after their enforced regrouping. Until then, it had not been.[36] In 1972, the situation continued to cause major apprehensions among authorities. The rural nature of Angolan society and the near-absolute dependency of "traditional populations" on land utilisation were two of the reasons for this. Despite the 1961 suppression of the *Indigenato*, existing legislation still differentiated between "native" and Europeans in relation to land uses and property prerogatives. The old indigenous "reserves," which prevailed before 1961, aimed at securing a spatial unit for the autochthones to reside and explore the respective land, but failed. The "covetous and uncontrolled occupation" prevailed. The Decree on the Occupation and Concession of Land in the Overseas Provinces of September 1961 envisioned the correction of such practice. Land was divided into three types. The so-called "terrains of 2nd class" could only be occupied by the populations organized around and neighbouring the *regedorias*, in harmony with local tradition. They were forms of collective property, not individual.[37]

35 Actas da Sessão (6 April 1972); Actas da Sessão do Conselho Provincial de Contra-Subversão (12 de Junho 1972), 50 pages, Secret, AHD/MU/GM/GNP/RNP/0048/01090.

36 "Conclusões finais," 22 March 1969, Reserved, Simpósio da Contra-Subversão. Conclusões finais. Encerramento. 1968-1969, AHD/MU/GM/GNP/RNP/0570/01235.

37 Decree no. 43894, 6 September 1961; L. Polanah, Resistência e adesão a mudança, in: Reordenamento 25 (1972), pp. 7-16, cit. p. 9.

The 1961 legal framework aimed at moralizing the situation, minimizing the possibilities of arbitrary and systematic land expropriation and population eviction, but failed. The problem was that there were significant administrative and socio-political obstacles to such legal prescriptions. For instance, Francisco de Vasconcelos Guimarães, a land survey engineer of the Studies Office of the Provincial Secretariat from Rural Development in Angola (*Gabinete de Estudos da Secretaria Provincial de Fomento Rural*) noted that the government service responsible for demarcating the second-class tracts failed to incorporate anthropological, sociological or ecological knowledge about local agricultural dynamics. For autochthonous communities, the occupation of land entailed multiple meanings and social uses of land. It meant the territorial definition of a community, its political security, the delimitation of a unit for agriculture and cattle raising, and also hunter-gatherer economic activities. The *scale* and the requirements needed for such ends were distinct from the ones associated with European interests. At the Geographical and Land Survey Services, no such expertise, crucial to a proper planning and to a balanced policy, existed. Moreover, as Guimarães noted, the Portuguese colonists were "refractory in accepting the rights of the indigenous population to occupy land." Legal restrictions collided with their motivations, interests and also racialized worldviews. Their expectations were obvious, fostered by the positive economic conjuncture: overturn the prerogative that attributed a particular type of land to Africans and facilitate a privileged access to land, that which was available or that occupied by local populations. As a consequence, claims to concessions multiplied, arguments and demands for expropriation escalated, "coercion" and forced resettlement reigned, and conflicts abounded.[38]

Throughout Angola this reality was creating abundant disruptive circumstances. The pressure for granting land concessions to colonists for them to develop the culture of cotton, as in Malanje (Malanje District), or cattle farming, as in Quibala (South Cuanza District) or Benguela (Benguela District), was facing social and legal obstacles. First, some of such requests were backed by previous rights, some of a clearly dubious nature, as was noted in a meeting of the council. But the lands had not been developed before, and were then occupied by the "natives." The Governor general, Camilo Rebocho Vaz, synthetized the "historical process." Since the late nineteenth-century, the main goal had been to attribute land in order to prove actual occupation. For decades "nobody occupied or exploited it." The great landowners did not invest in their exploitation and the autochthonous population occupied them, in some cases pleasing the owners, as a "good source of manpower" became available. The rising prices of coffee and cattle, among other products, changed that state of affairs. Since the 1950s an interest in benefitting

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38   Francisco de Vasconcelos Guimarães contributed with a paper to the Council on Counter-Subversion in 1969, entitled "Aspectos do 'Regulamento de ocupação e concessão de terrenos nas províncias ultramarinas' com interesse para a contra-subversão." See International Documentation and Communication Centre (IDOC), Angola: Secret Government Documents on Counter-Subversion, edited and translated by C. Reuver-Cohen and W. Jerman, Rome 1974, pp. 72-74, cit. p. 74; Polanah, Resistência e adesão a mudança, p. 13 (social uses of land); Bender, Angola under the Portuguese, p. 182, n70.

from the overall economic and developmental impetus emerged: "everybody" wanted lands and, as a consequence, "conflicts" arose.[39]

This was the problem in Quibala, for instance, or in Nova Lisboa (District of Huambo): colonists with property deeds over abandoned or unexploited farms and terrains that were massively occupied by autochthones for a while. The attempts to solve the disputes abounded, but were unfruitful. Second, the pressure for land concessions, surely related to the state-funded policy of massive ethnic colonization and to the overall developmental projects associated with a "modernizing" empire, turned some "2ⁿᵈ class" terrains into coveted properties. In many areas, demand exceeded supply. To square the circle was not easy, but was imperative. An immediate "strong action" by the central administration and local services was mandatory. The ongoing "extremely violent attempt" carried out by some "evolved farmers" to expel "native" farmers from their properties, and "seizing those enclaves," seriously endangered the social, economic and political aims of the counter-subversion strategy: an equally "violent and exemplary" response was needed. The need to solve the situation had another motivation. The Secretary considered that the actions of occupation of European properties by the autochthones appeared to be governed by a particular "supervision," a suggestion that it was part of a wider political strategy, not merely a result of an "instinct of self-defence." As a consequence, if those properties were not "conveniently armed and protected", similar problems were to be expected. Anyway, the "tendency" for complications was "total." Throughout Angola, any decision regarding the dilemmatic circumstances – to favour the colonists' demands for more land and to support their occupation of their previously abandoned legal properties or to ensure a non-discriminatory policy of land concession and to protect rights resulting from actual land use – was as urgent as it was probably unsuccessful.[40]

Not even the scientific *apport*, purportedly less politicised or less motivated by particular local interests, brought by the *Missão de Inquéritos Agrícolas de Angola* – MIAA (Angolan Board of Agricultural Census and Surveys) – the institution created in 1962 to gather and analyse information on agricultural "traditional" and market-oriented practices in reaction to the activities of the UN Food and Agriculture Organisation in Africa and the worldwide agricultural census of 1960 – was seen as useful to solve the problem.[41] Their assessments frequently collided with the delicate local political and strategic (im)balance of interests. They were frequently critical of aggressive Portuguese agrarian colonization.

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39   The reference is to the principle of "effective occupation" connected to the aftermath of the Berlin Conference (1884–1885). Actas da Sessão (12 June 1972).

40   Actas da Sessão (12 June 1972). For the "modernizing" impetus see Bandeira Jerónimo and Costa Pinto, A Modernizing Empire?.

41   The decree that determined the realization of agricultural surveys in all overseas provinces, excluding Macau, was from 1959. In accordance with the FAO guidelines, the goals were to elaborate inventories of the factors that determined agro-economic production, assess the spatial dynamics of such activities and also provide statistical information of those realities, in order to enable the planning of agrarian development. For one example of an important MIAA survey that explores the entanglements between social, educational and agricultural dynamics see F.W. Heimer, Educação e sociedade nas áreas rurais de Angola: Resultados de um inquérito, Vol.1, Apresentação do inquérito/estatísticas descritivas, Loanda 1972.

From an ecological and sociocultural standpoint, it was disruptive of "traditional" agrarian communities and respective economic practices. The related resettlement policies, which frequently redistributed the finest and more fecund lands into Portuguese (or European) hands reinforced the negative appraisal. One example was the testimony of the agronomist Francisco Sá Pereira (Deputy Director of the MIAA), given to the Council on Counter-Subversion in 1968. No one could "doubt" the security rationale behind the European land occupation. But that option had costs, including from a securitarian point of view: the underdevelopment of "traditional agriculture". From the "white" settlement in Cela (South Cuanza District), one of the most well-known and important *colonatos*, to the pasture lands in Mucope (Cunene Province), the most productive lands were taken from the hands of Africans and given to European agrarian interests. The number and the *scale* of African lands was being minimised "without any technical compensation." The living conditions and communal existence – social and cultural, not only economic – of African herders and farmers was deteriorating greatly and resettlement was no definitive solution. For Sá Pereira, those communities interpreted circumstances as a "regression." And "each regression" entailed "a new potential stratum of subversion in the traditional milieu." As expected, his views and, more generally, the MIAA's "technical" emphasis were criticized within the administration, namely at the "structure of counter-subversion."[42]

The tensions between security through demography or security through autochthonous development continued to echo four years later. For some, the motto "development and settlement in the service of strategy" was restricted to white populations. It was "the most eloquent assertion of our will to remain".[43] But consensus about the balance between security through demography or security through autochthonous development did not exist. In the Uíge district, the Provincial Settlement Board and the District Governor were in disagreement on what to do regarding the need to create "reserved areas" for the "natives." In Huambo, the MIAA's suggestions that further areas should be allocated to them were met with surprise: there was no "sufficient land" for the existing population. As a consequence, the process of demarcation of "2nd class" terrains was cancelled. In Angola, the Geographical and Land Survey Services, understaffed and underprepared, were facing about 40,000 processes related to these issues. Their resolution was urgent, given their potential negative consequences. But, as the Provincial Secretary of Rural Development stated, these services were "completely obsolete." The capacity of the colonial administration to deal with the "terrible problems," namely the conflicts between the "evolved" and the "traditional," was notably inadequate. On one hand, the European communities were becoming increasingly distressed with the fact that the government was not providing "all the land they wanted," as happened in the "entire Nova Lisboa."

42   For Pereira's perspective, see Bender, Angola under the Portuguese, pp. 183-184. For Cela, see, for instance, C. Castelo, Reproducing Portuguese Rural Villages in Africa: Agricultural Science, Ideology and Empire, in: Journal of Southern African Studies 42 (2016) 2, pp. 267-281.

43   J. Pequito Rebello, Fomento e povoamento estratégico. Solução do problema de Angola, Lisboa 1966, p. 14.

On the other, an aspect considered to be increasingly relevant to the whole problem, the "natives" were starting to be interested in individual property, not communal. If it persisted, this tendency would aggravate the pressure on the governmental services, already with thousands of legal processes to solve.[44]

A novel legal framework was needed, and was being debated in Lisbon by a commission led by José Fernandes Nunes Barata, the Inspector of Overseas Economy and one of the most important experts on population politics, development and agriculture.[45] Given the circumstances, Nunes Barata was invited to participate on the council and explain the legal state of affairs. The social, economic and political disruptions the existing law was failing to solve were too important to be overlooked. The entire counter-subversion strategy was in peril. In his lengthy exposé, Nunes Barata argued that the forthcoming legislation was based in the "intransigent" defence of "native" populations. The protected access to and safeguard of the existing occupation of 2nd class tracts were considered an instrument of the desired social promotion. The rationales of "native" social promotion, economic development, and population ordering and control should prevail.[46] As an article in the Loanda-based periodical *Reordenamento* (Resettlement) stated, the existing law was "ineffective and inefficient," especially relating to the provision of legal instruments capable of guaranteeing the "good observance of its precepts." The current "socio-economic constraints" required novel legal tools, which enabled more operational political interventions. Local "peace and progress" depended on it.[47]

However, for Santos Moreira, the most pressing question was not legal: all district governors and presidents of the district councils of counter-subversion were asked to press administrative authorities to "prevent" any kind of transaction of "2nd class" terrains, owned or just occupied by natives, that were in-between European properties. The existence of 40,000 legal processes could also be the result of a good strategy, according to Rebocho Vaz: keep things as they were and avoid more concessions and the more than probable backlashes. In a sense, the preservation of the status quo was preferable to great transformations with predictable results: further disarray. The commander-in-chief of the Military Region of Angola, Francisco da Costa Gomes, concurred. The situation was already troubling: the impact of the "land problem" on the dynamics between subversion and counter-subversion was enormous. "Native populations" could "already be manipulated by the enemy" and, at the same time, it was also possible that "abuses or attempts of abuse" were being systematically carried out by "business interests" in a search for additional land. As the Governor general summed up, the "problem was so complicated

44   Actas da Sessão (12 June 1972).

45   J. Fernandes Nunes Barata, Estudos sobre a economia do ultramar, Lisboa 1963; idem, Para uma política de população, Lisboa 1964.

46   The new legal framework was promulgated on 1 August 1973. Actas da Sessão (12 June 1972).

47   Reordenamento was published by the Settlement Provincial Board of Angola, the public institution in charge of the policies of (re)settlement. J. R. Ferreira Amador, Lei de terras para o Ultramar, in: Reordenamento 30 (1973), pp. 23-24.

and severe" that it was doubtful that it would be possible to "put the house in order in the next fifty years." Three years later, the empire was over.[48]

Conclusion

Both the *Norms of Rural Resettlement and Population Regrouping* and the *General Instruction of Counter-Subversion* crystallized the debates that were held and the policies that were enacted, with different rhythms and impacts, in Angola, Guinea and Mozambique from the onset of the intensification of the colonial conflicts.[49] They both highlighted the centrality of rural development as a key instrument in the definition of the late colonial policies. That centrality was a result of socioeconomic considerations. But it was also an outcome of political calculations, securitarian rationales and military expediencies. Control, security and violence constrained the administrative imagination of rural policies. Notwithstanding natural divergences, namely between more "technical" and more political and military standpoints, a significant consensus prevailed within the colonial bureaucracy and respective armed forces. The embracement of developmental languages and repertoires – from social welfare and community development to rural extension and rural development – and the experimental combination between diverse forms of engineering of social change, including of spatial and social landscape, and a variegated catalogue of coercive repertoires of administration gained momentum, and thrived until the end of the empire.[50]

The debates and the policies that marked such an experimental combination occurred in a challenging context characterized by critical international pressures (from indictments in international organizations to cold war interferences[51]), metropolitan transformations (for instance the so-called *primavera Marcelista*, a period of relative political liberalization and economic modernization after Salazar's removal from power[52]) and colonial disturbances (namely the continuation of violent conflicts). In these circumstances, thinking about how to control the "native" population, secure the economy, administer social and cultural difference (the *politics of difference*), contain de-tribalization and deal with the perils of urbanization, stabilize labour pools, provide social welfare, find or create

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48   Actas da Sessão (12 June 1972).
49   For Mozambique, see J. Borges Coelho, Protected Villages and Communal Villages in the Mozambican Province of Tete (1968–1982), PhD thesis, University of Bradford, 1993 and A. Neves de Souto, Caetano e o ocaso do "Império". Administração e guerra colonial em Moçambique durante o Marcelismo (1968–1974), Porto 2007.
50   M. Bandeira Jerónimo, Managing Inequalities: Welfare Colonialism in the Portuguese Empire since the 1940s, in: F. Bethencourt (ed.), Inequality in the Portuguese-Speaking World. Global and Historical Perspectives, Eastbourne, forthcoming, 2017.
51   M. Bandeira Jerónimo and A. Costa Pinto, International Dimensions of Portuguese Late Colonialism and Decolonization, Special Issue of Portuguese Studies 29 (2013) 2.
52   Marcello Caetano replaced Salazar in 1968. During the first two years, prospects of change – or „evolution in continuity", as Caetano himself termed it – in the authoritarian regime emerged. In relation to colonial issues, no political solution to the military conflicts was offered. The official rhetoric advocated a gradual autonomy of the overseas provinces. Continuity without evolution prevailed.

the African *homo economicus* and foster productivity, induce new worldviews and ethos, counteract "subversive" agendas, (forcefully) resettle and reorganize rural communities and landscapes, minimize the number or impact of the causes of dissension and dissidence, respect international agreements, or balance the interests and initiatives of white and African communities was seen as entailing a systemic, holistic exercise. All these dimensions were closely related, and interdependent. Domain-specific experts debated contentiously, knowledge was produced, circulated and selectively appropriated. Legislation was redefined – for instance, the 1971 Constitutional Revision finally acknowledged "subversion" as a reality and a major problem to be dealt with systemically and systematically, legitimizing states of emergency and violent practices, recognizing the need to explore the interdependence of these dimensions. The related intersections became crucial to colonial policy-making, as well as to internal and external political legitimation.

All these dynamics were clear on the exchanges that characterized the formulation and institutionalization of a counter-subversion strategy, from the early responses to the 1961 events in northern Angola to the "systems" of control of the *Norms* and the comprehensive guidelines of the *General Instruction*. Security rationales and policies embraced developmentalism and welfarism, and the other way around. In a context of a failed, and actually undesired, strictly political transformation and "modernization," starting with the refusal to negotiate increasing self-determination, let alone imperial disengagement, with anticolonial movements, repressive developmentalism reigned. The co-constitution of the *securitization* of development and the *developmentalization* of security in the late colonial period thrived. The rural contexts, polities and economies, were privileged laboratories of these dynamics, and need to be more properly analysed.

From Land Reform to Veterinarians Without Borders in Cold War Afghanistan

Timothy Nunan

ABSTRACT

Der Beitrag untersucht die Geschichte ländlicher Entwicklungspolitik anhand der Landreformen in Afghanistan während des Kalten Krieges. Während des zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts lebte die überwiegende Mehrheit der afghanischen Bevölkerung von der Landwirtschaft. Grundbesitz war jedoch höchst ungleich verteilt. Der Kalte Krieg verwandelte Afghanistan in ein Schlachtfeld westlicher und sowjetischer Visionen ländlicher Entwicklungsprojekte etwa im Bereich der Bewässerung oder der Einrichtung von Staatsgütern. Afghanische sozialistische Intellektuelle forderten eine umfassende Landreform, um die Probleme der ländlichen Bevölkerung zu lindern. Nach einem sozialistischen coup d'état im Jahre 1978 versuchten sie, ihren radikalen Plan einer Umverteilung von Land auch gegen die moderateren Vorschläge der sowjetischen Berater durchzusetzen. Die Geschichte ländlicher Entwicklungspolitik im Afghanistan des Kalten Krieges führt sozialistische Entwürfe in die globale Geschichte der Entwicklungspolitik ein. Sie zeigt, dass für viele Akteure die Umverteilung von Land ein zentraler Aspekt der Entwicklungspolitik war. Und sie verweist darauf, dass sich die Sowjetunion ungeachtet ihrer Erfahrungen mit kollektiver Landwirtschaft sehr reaktiv zu den Forderungen radikaler Akteure des globalen Südens verhielt, um Lösungen für ländliche Armut und soziale Gerechtigkeit zu finden.

It is fitting that Osama bin Laden's main training camp and home near Kandahar, Afghanistan was no purpose-built facility, but rather the hollowed-out ruins of the Tarnak Research Farm, an agricultural research center for strains of wheat and barley.[1] Before

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1   Terms of Reference; 'Tarnak Farm' Rehabilitation Master Plan Designer, http://mrrd.gov.af/Content/Media/Documents/TOR_Tarnakfarm_2_Word200311220102133773.pdf (accessed 3 June 2017).

it became a hub for global jihadism in the 1990s, Afghanistan was a laboratory where ideas about economic development and modernization were tested under conditions of peaceful competition and, later, civil war. Throughout, however, rural development had to take center stage. Rural more so then than now (at least 90% rural until the 2000s, but no reliable census of Afghanistan has ever been conducted), Afghanistan and its economy remained dominated by agriculture, in spite of the fact that only 10% of its land is arable. Hence, Afghan political actors, along with the foreign backers on whom they relied for legitimacy, technology, and money, would have to come to grips with managing the rural economy. Indeed, no less than bin Laden's Taliban hosts had to navigate these dynamics as they sought to balance between the financial windfalls reaped by taxes on opium production, the incentives held out to them by the United Nations for cutting opium cultivation, and UN wheat shipments that kept Kabul from starvation.

In order to explore these themes, this piece examines the history of rural development in Afghanistan during the late 1970s and 1980s. A close examination of that story reveals a number of themes that need to be integrated into the global history of rural development. First among these is the crucial role that socialist ideas played in the history of rural development – not least through an insistence that efforts toward development had to be coupled with land reform or even collectivization. Soviet efforts to provide farmers with fertilizer, seed, and farming equipment went hand in hand with the effort to collectivize Soviet peasantry.[2] And with the Soviet victory in World War II, collectivized agriculture spread to the Eastern Bloc (except for Poland). Beyond the Soviet world, moreover, socialist regimes from Mao Zedong's China to Julius Nyerere's Tanzania enacted land reform programmes that saw state-run communal farms – not "development" per se – as the prerequisite for prosperity.[3] National liberation movements like the Zimbabwe African Nationalist Union and the Zimbabwe African People's Union envisioned the uncompensated redistribution of lands from whites to blacks as a precondition for negotiations for years, and as late as 1985, the African National Congress endorsed Soviet-style collective farms and state farms as the optimal outcome for a post-apartheid South African countryside.[4] As this piece shows, in short, Soviet schemes "went global" not only through military conquest, but through intellectual and material transfers to settings like Afghanistan, South Yemen, Ethiopia, and beyond.

The mention of such conflict-ridden societies reminds us of a second theme: that the history of rural development is central to the history of the Cold War, as well. As Nick Cullather's work on "the foreign policy of the calorie" emphasizes, American economists and foreign policymakers viewed the Green Revolution as "the right kind of revolution"

2   On longer-term trajectories of agriculture expertise in the Russian Empire and Soviet Union, see the 2016 theme issue of Cahiers du monde russe, "Terres, sols et peuples: expertise agricole et pouvoir (XIXe–XXe siècles)." For a recent account of agricultural reform toward cooperatives in the late Soviet era, see C. Miller, The Struggle to Save the Soviet Economy: Mikhail Gorbachev and the Collapse of the USSR, Chapel Hill 2016.

3   P. Lal, African Socialism in Postcolonial Tanzania: Between the Village and the World, Cambridge 2015.

4   Jabulani "Mzala" Nxumalo, "The Freedom Charter and its Relevance Today," Sechaba (March 1985).

as opposed to the bogeyman of communism.[5] Yet those at an array of Soviet research institutes on plant biology, epizootic disease, and the like, were not counting on famine to convince Third World societies of the superiority of socialist agricultural techniques and property relations.[6] Even as the USSR imported grain from the USA from the mid-1970s, Moscow exported agricultural techniques and technologies to Third World clients. This makes the story of rural development as an example of knowledge transfers more capacious that we understand it.[7] Moscow, for example, never sought to export collectivized agriculture to the Third World to the way it had Eastern Europe in the 1950s, but many Third World actors remained convinced that land *redistribution* (not just development) was the only option to achieve social justice.

One may object that the Third World actors most interested in land redistribution were most often opposition groups, rather than regimes like those in Saigon, Tehran, or Managua or experts from Washington, Rome, or (as this piece will show) Moscow. But this only emphasizes a third theme that emerges from this piece, namely rural development as part of an arena of power. Perhaps because we live in a world after the Green Revolution, it has become possible for us to conceive of a realm of the political divorced from the political economy of calories. But many political actors whose consciousness was formed prior to the Green Revolution did not have that luxury. In a world of limited calories, debates about whether "feudal" classes would continue to dominate peasants, or whether they would be swept away in a socialist revolution, were not just theoretical niceties but questions about who would dominate whom. Arguably, one reason for the violence of so many conflicts in societies during the period covered by this issue was less a clash of ideologies and more a clash between groups that understood themselves to be engaged in a zero-sum competition over land, food, and calories. Following the fortunes of rural development programmes in a setting like Afghanistan – in which resources were indeed scarce– allows us to appreciate this broader story as one in which even superpowers – here, the Soviets – often struggled to impress their own ideas onto elites and opposition groups still locked in zero-sum struggle.

In terms of sources, this piece uses Soviet economic archives, where many of the reports authored by Soviet experts on the Afghan economy are by and large open. The archives of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan as well as the Afghan state were destroyed during the Afghan Civil War (1992–1996); however, this paper draws on materials from the Hoover Institution's Afghan Partisan Series that bring Afghan ideas about land reform back into the picture. The ongoing mass digitization of much of Afghanistan's print heritage by institutions in Afghanistan and the United States also allows us to place experiments in land reform in Afghanistan into a longer duree perspective. Finally, the

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5   N. Cullather, The Foreign Policy of the Calorie, in: American Historical Review 112 (2007) 2, pp. 337-364; M. Latham, The Right Kind of Revolution, Ithaca, NY, 2011.

6   D. Engerman, The Second World's Third World, in: Kritika 12 (2011) 1, pp. 183-211.

7   K. Gestwa and S. Rohdenwald, Verflechtungsstudien. Naturwissenschaft und Technik im Kalten Krieg, in: Osteuropa 10 (2009), pp. 5-14.

short observations here on NGO engagement in Afghanistan come from the archives of the French non-governmental organization Medecins sans Frontieres (MSF).

Buying Time

Before turning to the focus of this paper – the 1970s and 1980s – a bit of orientation may help. While Afghanistan enjoyed autonomy in its internal affairs from 1879 onward, it was in 1919 that it gained formal independence from the British Empire in the Third Anglo-Afghan War.[8] Following a decade of gestures toward modernization under Amanullah Khan, the regime collapsed in early 1929. The former defence minister, Nadir Shah, raised an army from the Pashtun lands of British India and retook the capital later that same year. Nadir was crowned the Shah of Afghanistan, but a rogue high school student in the capital assassinated him in 1933, and so his son, Zahir, was declared as a regent. For the next thirty years, Zahir's uncles and, later, his cousin, Mohammad Daoud Khan, ruled the country as Prime Minister.

While Zahir's relatives continued to oversee the modernization of the Kingdom, the period was marked by political stagnation. Afghanistan held elections for mayoral offices and a national assembly in 1946, and in 1950 a more liberal press law helped stimulate an intelligentsia to debate ideas about constitutional government. Organized political parties were formed, too. Yet once Daoud took power in 1953, he curtailed these reforms, and Afghanistan remained a constitutional monarchy only on paper. Perhaps to shore up his legitimacy among the population, Daoud pushed for the independence of "Pashtunistan" – the Pashtun territories between the Indus River and the Afghan-Pakistan border – from Pakistan. Yet this irredentism led Pakistan to shut down the border with Afghanistan frequently, leading to Daoud's dismissal in 1963.

Efforts toward land reform in Afghanistan followed this parabola of reform and reaction. Following independence, Amanullah announced a major tax reform replacing payment in wheat or livestock (with payments dependent on the harvest in a given year) with a fixed cash payment that had to be paid regardless of the year's harvest.[9] While intended as a means to concentrate capital in the hands of the state and break feudal ties between peasants and the state, the tax reform drove peasants without large cash holdings into the hands of usurious loan markets. This, in turn, produced waves of bankruptcy and seizures of land that peasants had used as security on their loans. Furthermore, inflation reduced the real value of the government's tax income.

Beyond the tax reform, Amanullah also announced the first-ever sale of state lands *not* for government service. According to existing accounts from Soviet diplomats present in Afghanistan at the time, the announced low prices for land sales even generated the

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8   For recent overviews of Afghan history, see T. Barfield, Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History, Princeton 2010; R. Crews, Afghan Modern: The History of a Global Nation, Cambridge, MA, 2015.

9   A.D. Davydov, Agrarnyj stroj Afganistana (osnovnye etapy razvitiia), Moscow 1967, p. 54.

impression of a genuine land reform among peasants. However, the high fees for buyers *not* paying 100% cash up front for the land, not to mention bribes often equaling the price for the land itself, locked peasants out of the market.[10] Efforts to improve the land through irrigation schemes or to resettle poor southern Pashtun peasants and Indian refugees into northern lands also proved desultory.[11] Choice lands in the northern lands designated for the southerners and the Indians were already occupied by landowners who had obtained them for free in the 1880s.[12] While the settlers were granted tax relief and state loans, in reality, most ended up working as peons for large landowners.

Amanullah's failure to build a popular base of legitimacy among the peasantry was one of many reasons for the regime's collapse. While some expected Habibullah Kalakani, the upstart who overthrew him in 1929, to be a kind of Afghan Pugachev, Kalakani fell into the same trap when he was forced to announce tax increases on the peasantry to defend Kabul from Nadir Shah's armies.[13] Neither Nadir nor his cousins who ruled for Zahir during the latter's regency reversed the shift to taxes-in-money that Amanullah had introduced. Under the new regime, the state granted regional commercial elites monopolies in the production of certain export-oriented commodities (karakul wool, oil, fruits …) provided that they invested their capital into a new state bank. While regional uprisings continued under Zahir's stewards, the aforementioned Kabul-based intelligentsia commented on how the government's policies led to an over-concentration of land into the hands of the wealthy. "The wealthy man," wrote an editorial for the state newspaper *Anis*, "having bought land only to save himself from inflation, doesn't concern himself with raising the productivity of his crops." Worse, the same editorial continued, the very wealthy had "transformed poor peasants into sharecroppers and deprive them of any sense of interest in the conscientious working of the land in order to receive larger harvests."[14] The title of the editorial gave a sense of the zeitgeist, at least among reformist Afghan intellectuals: "Land Belongs to the Farmer ..!!"

Not until the mid-1950s, during the Prime Ministership of Mohammad Daoud Khan, were tentative efforts made toward any kind of land reform. In 1956, "for the first and only time in the entire history of the existence of the Afghan monarchy," the Ministry of Finances in Kabul published statistical information on the number of taxpayers in Afghanistan.[15] On the basis of this data, it became possible for progressive members of the court and journalists for the state-controlled newspapers to reflect on the connection between the overwhelming concentration of land and the country's sorry economic condition. During the late 1950s, regime-controlled newspapers even went so far as to publish articles on the need for "a limitation of land holdings and a reform to land use," while others noted that land use patterns "lower agricultural productivity, trample upon

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10   Ibid., pp. 71-72.
11   I.M. Reisner, Nezavisimyi Afganistan, Moscow 1929, pp. 168-169.
12   A.D. Davydov, Agrarnyj stroj, p. 75.
13   P. Alekseenkov, Agrarnyi vopros v afganskom Turkestane, Moscow 1933, p. 105.
14   „Zamin Mal-i Dehqan Ast ..!!" Anis, 11 March 1953.
15   A.D. Davydov, Agrarnoe zakondatel'stvo Demokraticheskoï Respubliki Afganistan, Moscow 1984, p. 13.

personal freedom, and threaten the very existence of the peasantry."[16] Showing a global awareness of Afghanistan's place among more or less "developed" countries, the same article noted that "in developed and even backwards countries, large-scale landholding has been curbed and quite positive results have been achieved. The time for such a limitation has arrived in Afghanistan, too."[17]

All the same, practical steps toward improving the lot of Afghan peasants remained disappointing. In 1959, the government began conducting surveys of Afghan farmers' land lease arrangements and found many farmers to be leasing land from larger landowners on short-term contracts with high and frequent payments, limiting their ability or desire to make capital investments.[18] Daoud made a major radio address announcing his intent to redress complaints between peasants and landholders in the same year, and a new Administration for Agrarian Legislation was founded inside of the Ministry of Agriculture in 1960. It began drafting new legal projects, among others one requiring the registration of estates. However, projects like these ran into opposition from landed estates as well as the large number of members of the Kabul merchant class and the state bureaucracy that drew some portion of their income from illegally occupied government lands. Hence, even as the Afghan King, Zahir, forced Daoud out of government in 1963 and introduced elections and a relatively free press in the same year, plans for the registration (much less redistribution) of ill-begotten lands were frozen. The specific law proposed by the Administration for Agrarian Legislation, for example, was tabled by the Afghan Parliament in 1968.[19]

One escape hatch from the contradiction between the domestic political economy and the monarchy's perceived need to modernize the country was recourse to foreign aid. Since the 1930s, Afghan governments had sought foreign expertise (first Japanese and German) to improve the lands of the Helmand River watershed, and from the late 1940s the American corporation Morrison-Knudsen had been hired on to complete the task. Morrison-Knudsen was later replaced by USAID itself, but for three decades, American hydrological experts sought to turn the marginal lands in southern Afghanistan into a resettlement site for landless Pashtun peasants and nomads from eastern Afghanistan. And in the mid-1960s, the Royal Government of Afghanistan convinced West Germany to carry out an provincial development project in Paktia Province in eastern Afghanistan. The People's Republic of China ran a similar rural development project in Parwan Province, Saudi Arabia in Herat, and the World Bank in Kunduz and Khanabad.[20]

Yet the most important foreign donor to Afghanistan was the Soviet Union. The USSR had been the first country to diplomatically recognise Afghanistan, and in December

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16   Aslah, 1 December 1958.

17   Anis, 14 December 1960.

18   A.D. Davydov, Agrarnoe zakondatel'stvo Demokraticheskoi Respubliki Afganistan, p. 14.

19   Ibid., pp. 14-18.

20   "Kredity I bezmozmezdnaia pomoshch', predostavlennye Afganistanu na tseli ekonomicheskogo razvitiia inostrannymi gosudarstvami I mezhdunarodnymi organizatsiami za gody respubliksanskogo rezhima,"), RGAE f. 365, op. 9, d. 2347 (obzory, spravki, informatsii), ll. 116-123.

1955, Soviet First Secretary Nikita Khrushchev made a surprise visit to Kabul, where he announced a large multi-year aid package and the training of the Afghan officer corps in the Soviet Union. Similarly to the Americans in the south, soon, Soviet aid institutions constructed hydroelectric dams along the Kabul River in the country's east. As part of the infrastructure downriver of the namesake Afghan capital, Soviet engineers built a large complex of state farms around one of the country's largest provincial cities, Jalalabad. The Jalalabad Irrigation Complex soon became a showcase for Soviet agricultural techniques, and Soviet celebrities like German Titov (the second man in space) visited Jalalabad to celebrate the species of olives and oranges transplanted to it by Soviet agronomists.[21] Yet Jalalabad was not a collective farm. Rather, it showed how state-led improvements plus large cooperatives or state farms outproduce the scattered, debt-riddled landscape of the Afghan countryside. If an Afghan state mustered the political will to end debt peonage – but then re-consolidate lands into productive large-scale agro-enterprises – it could transcend its dismal domestic political economy.

Yet this vision of the Afghan countryside did not sit well with intellectuals in Kabul. After watching liberal constitutionalist reform fail to deliver on agrarian reform for a generation, both older radicals like Nur Muhammad Taraki and a younger student generation at Kabul's universities wanted radical change. When the socialist People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan was founded on 1 January 1965, it set immediately to preparing its own agrarian programme, which it managed to publish a year later in one of the few issues of its newspaper, *Khalq*, published before the newspaper was banned. Its demands went far beyond the de facto Soviet programme of state farms and capital investment. The programme, for instance, argued for a "cardinal land reform in favor of the landless and land-poor peasants, with the participation of the entire peasantry with the goal of the liquidation of the existence of the existing antiquated productive relations and the development of the productive forces of the agrarian economy."[22] The plan in *Khalq* did not deny the need for more cooperatives and state farms, but these had to be side projects to the primary goal of liquidating feudal relations. Government-sponsored newspapers, such as Muhammad Haschemi Maiwandwal's *Musavat* ("Equality"), pushed back against this rhetoric by promising "the formation of just and effective forms of land ownership," but they still emphasized the primacy of private property as the basis for any reformed agrarian economy.[23] But as Afghan scholars themselves noted at the time, time was running out on a liberal solution.[24]

21   Leon Sudzhan, "Olivkovaia vetv'," Vokrug sveta 8 (1987).
22   Khalq 63 (11 April 1966).
23   Cited in A.D. Davydov, Agrarnoe zakonadatel'stvo Demokraticheskoĭ Republiki Afganistan, p. 20.
24   A. Hamidullah, Nazarī bih jughrāfiyā-yi zirā'atī-i Afghānistān, Kabul 1974.

Head Fake?

Whether an agrarian situation that Soviet advisors in the mid-1950s the first Soviet advisors had identified as "extremely backwards" could have been resolved in the parliamentary system that Zahir Shah introduced in 1963 remains an academic question. In the summer of 1973, Mohammad Daoud Khan staged a bloodless coup against his cousin Zahir Shah and declared Afghanistan a Republic. Yet Daoud's coup d'état required the muscle of Soviet-trained army officers affiliated with the PDPA. Daoud pledged in an August 1973 "Message to the Nation" "deep transformations in the social structures of the country," and he explicitly promised "land reform in the interests of the majority of the people."[25] In June 1975, Daoud's government announced a Law on Land Reform, whose centerpiece was to be a limit on land holdings (the precise number of hectares depended on the quality of the lands). The government committed itself to buy lands above these limits from owners. Landowners would receive compensation for their lands to be paid through a 25-year installment plus 2% annual interest.[26] Finally, the confiscated lands would be redistributed to peasants (preferably those already working the land) on a 25-year lease. The peasants, however, had to pay into a redemption fund plus 3% administrative fees in order to finance the state's reimbursement of landowners; otherwise, they would lose their rights to the land after three years.

The Law on Land Reform went into effect in early 1976. An Administration for Land Reform, formed in April 1976, was to be the "boots on the ground" in visiting the provinces and collecting taxes. And in June 1976 the government forbade the private sale of land altogether. By August of that same year, teams from the Administration for Land Reform had fanned out to Kabul Province; by November, they had extended their work to ten other provinces, and by March 1977, seven others had been surveyed. By that time, the teams had completed their initial work in Kabul Province in central Afghanistan as well as Samangan Province in northern Afghanistan and populated Nimruz Province in the country's southeast.[27]

Soviet advisors present in Kabul followed Daoud's land reform programme. One March 1977 report issued by the Soviet advising apparatus at the Embassy, however, was skeptical. Agricultural reforms were, the report explained, desperately needed in order to meet the demands of "economic and social development," but also by "the necessity of solving the pressing agrarian contradictions connected, above all, with the significant concentration of landed property."[28] While "development" mattered, Soviet advisors also spoke in terms of Marxist "contradictions"– contradictions, however, that could be solved via land reform, rather than the peasants seizing the land. Yet the report went on to criticise

25   Jumhuriyat, 23 August 1973, cited in Davydov, Agrarnoe zakondatel'stvo Demokraticheskoĭ Respubliki Afganistan, pp. 20-21.

26   A.D. Davydov, Agrarnoe zakondatel'stvo Demokraticheskoĭ Respubliki Afganistan, p. 21.

27   B. Titov, "O khode osushchestvleniia zemel'noĭ reformy v Afganistane" (15 March 1977), RGAE f. 365, op. 9, d. 2347 (obzory, spravki, informatsii), l. 190.

28   Ibid., l. 188.

Daoud's plans as "petty bourgeoisie" in character and poorly thought out. Little thought had been given to how land would be purchased from large landowners, or how it would be redistributed to poor peasants. Worse, the reforms seemed focused on distributing land to individual peasants rather than using it as a means toward "the forced development of agricultural cooperatives."[29] Since many of the lands that would be redistributed were untenable for sole ownership, it was hard to see what concrete gain their distribution to individual peasants would bring about. Against a background of double-digit price inflation, Afghan peasants were continuing to receive a raw deal.[30]

All of these criticisms, however, assumed that the reforms were even taking place. Yet as the Soviet advising apparatus ascertained, this was not the case. Even in Kabul, Nimruz, and Samangan Provinces, the majority of the land confiscated was from farmers illegally squatting on government lands, not from large landowners. Land had not been confiscated from large landowners at all, "and the resolution of this question has been put off for an indefinite period of time." On top of this, the Administration for Land Reform had not contemplated how to redistribute government lands and was still working its way through peasants' applications. "Hence," concluded the advisor, "the reforms have only a limited character and this, obviously, determines their relatively calm reception among the population."[31]

This dysfunction owed in part to the lack of proper leadership to carry out the reforms. The Administration for Land Reform (founded in 1976) was staffed with Afghan civil servants but rather "temporary workers, mostly youths." Of the 1,500 people employed by the Administration, only 400 had any background in government administration; 300 were soldiers or officers in the Afghan Army, while the remaining 800 were either university students or recent secondary school graduates.[32] Few of these workers were qualified or educated to determine land reform policy or make the political decisions necessary to determine the reform's goals. But another political body, the Council on Land Reform, on whom sat several government ministers, could not be formally staffed until the calling of a Loya Jirgah. Even the kind of national cadastral survey that would be required to carry out the land reform plan (the survey would take a minimum of ten years itself!) had to be confirmed by the Council on Land Reform, the composition of which remained dependent on Daoud's domestic political considerations.[33]

Daoud's land reforms left Soviet advisors confused, but they did not view his regime as deviating too far from a "progressive" line or Soviet interests in Central Asia. Yet Afghan Communists had a rather different line. Daoud's land reform constituted a structural reversal from four decades' worth of the government selling lands to large landowners, but it was far from clear that the result would be mass peasant prosperity, and, after all,

29   Ibid., l. 191.
30   "Obzor razvitiia ekonomiki Respubliki Afganistana" (April 1976), RGAE f. 365, op. 9, d. 2347, l. 311
31   Titov, "O khode osushchestvleniia zemel'noj reformy v Afganistane," l. 190.
32   Ibid., l. 190.
33   Ibid., l. 194.

landowners would still *earn* money on the "confiscations."[34] Reflecting on Daoud's land reforms in early 1979, Afghan agricultural economist Muhammad Saleh Zerai wrote in the Soviet-backed theoretical journal *Problems of Peace and Socialism*:

> *Muhammad Daoud tried to speak a 'revolutionary' language at first and started with a relatively revolutionary programme that progressive forces supported. But behind the pretty words and 'revolutionary' phrases there hid reactionary ambitions and anti-demo-cratic and anti-national goals. During the five years of Daoudist rule practically nothing was accomplished in the realm of social and economic progress.*[35]

By the mid-1970s, then, a split had emerged between Afghan socialists and the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union seemed content to live with Daoud as a predictable partner on their southern border, while both the Khalqist and Parchamist wings of what was to become the PDPA sought his overthrow. More than that, however, they had drawn different conclusions from Daoud's brief tenure regarding how to solve the agrarian question in Afghanistan.

With Friends Like These …

Daoud's experiment in land reform and republicanism proved short-lived. His tightening of the screws on Afghan Islamist groups by and large worked (one coup d'etat failed in 1975, and most Islamists fled to Pakistan), but Daoud ended up reliant on the Soviet Union as an international backer and its PDPA partners. (Moscow, for its part, was concerned about splits within the PDPA, and it forced the two wings to unite on 3 July 1977). Hence, when Daoud attempted a crackdown on the PDPA in the spring of 1978, PDPA leaders in the military launched a surprise attack on the Presidential Palace in Kabul on the evening of 27-28 April 1978. Daoud and his family had been murdered. The PDPA soon declared the coup d'état the "April Revolution" and was convinced that it now possessed a mandate to enforce its radical reform programme on Afghan society. Even erudite Soviet specialists spoke now of how Daoud's regime had "exhausted its historically necessary, and therefore objectively progressive, function, since this system had led to its logically inescapable collapse"-as if the sheer weight of contradictions rather than a bullet to the head had brought down the regime.[36]

As PDPA General Secretary Nur Muhammad Taraki confirmed in an interview after the Revolution to Pakistani television, land reform constituted "the main task of the revolution."[37] Soon, Soviet advisors descended upon Kabul to consult on the reforms.

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34   A 1977 addition to the Law on Land Reform removed the 2% annual interest rate on state reimbursements to landowners entirely. See: Jarida-yi Rasmi, 1 January 1977, cited in A.D. Davydov, Agrarnoe zakondatel'stvo Demokraticheskoĭ Respubliki Afganistan, p. 21.

35   Saleh Muhammad Zerai, "Afganistan: nachalo novoi ery," Problemy mira i sotsializma 1 (1979), p. 57.

36   A.D. Davydov, Agrarnoe zakondatel'stvo Demokraticheskoĭ Respubliki Afganistan, p. 24.

37   Kabul Times, 29 July 1978.

But opinion among the advisors was divided. Many who came from the Soviet Central Asian SSRs assumed that the experience of agricultural transformation in settings like Uzbekistan or Tajikistan would form the model to be copied by the Afghans.[38] Others, like a team of advisors sent in June 1978 insisted that while the Central Asian experience offered lessons, it need not be followed slavishly. Even in Soviet Central Asia, they noted, it had taken seven years since the Revolution for all lands (as opposed to just the lands of the Romanovs or lands confiscated in the revolutionary chaos of 1917–1918) to be redistributed.[39] (In contrast to much of Russia, peasants in Russian Turkestan did not engage in mass land seizures following the abdication of the Tsar; instead, measures initiated in 1917 redistributed land from landlords to sharecroppers for private use, although the subsequent purchase or sale of land was forbidden. This was a distinct process from collectivization, which began only in late 1929.) Still others argued that a continuation of Daoud's land reforms would be the best option – including, it bears underscoring, "consistent observation of the right to private property and compensation for land."[40] The Soviet advising teams were divided, in other words, but there was a consensus against rash moves.

The Afghans ignored these voices. After nearly a half-year of preparations, Decree Number 8 of the Revolutionary Council, released on 30 November 1978, made clear the revolutionary intentions of the new regime. The decree had four major components: firstly, the absolute ceiling on land ownership for any one family was limited to 30 *jerib*s (6 hectares), or a third less than the Daoud-era reforms had allowed. Secondly, all lands that surpassed this limit (as well as the entire land holdings of the Afghan royal family and any land holdings whose deeds were held illegitimate) were to be confiscated by a Department of Land Reform *without* compensation. The only exception in this regard applied to improvements "relating to the land" such as irrigation systems, built since 1969. Thirdly, rather than seeking the consolidation of any confiscated lands into government-run estates, Decree Number 8 declared that all lands were to be distributed directly to landless peasants and nomads. Fourthly, all Afghans who received land were forbidden from reselling or leasing it to others. In other words, as Soviet expert Aleksandr Davydov noted, the reform was not so much a transfer of land ownership as a redistribution of the right of use and inheritance of parcels of land to peasants. Along these lines, Decree Number 8 expected that peasants would use the land with government-supplied fertilizers, seeds, and equipment, and work it upon receipt.

Even as plans were announced to implement Decree Number 8 starting in eastern and southern Afghanistan in January 1978, Soviet advisors in Kabul voiced their disapproval with the PDPA's land reform project. Rather than dividing large landowners from the PDPA's natural social base of landless farmers *plus* middle-tier farmers, the PDPA seemed

38   A.D. Davydov, Voĭny moglo ne byt'. Krestianstvo i reformy, Moscow, 1993, p. 115.
39   M.F. Slinkin, Narodno-demokraticheskaia partiia Afganistana u vlasti. Vremia Taraki-Amina (1978-79 gg.), Simferopol, 1999, p. 25.
40   A.D. Davydov, Voĭny moglo ne byt'. Krestianstvo i reformy, p. 117.

obsessed with class war. And rather than redirecting confiscated lands to state farms like the one in Jalalabad, the PDPA instead seemed hell-bent on creating an entire nation of unproductive subsistence farmers. The leader of the Soviet agricultural advising mission in Kabul, P.S. Fedorchuk, noted as much in a December 1978 missive to Moscow:

> *The land reform according to Decree Number 8 affects 272,000 middle-tier and large landowners, even though this is in no way necessary at this stage. The point is that the fundamental enemies of the April Revolution can be only those large landowners, and not even all of them. Among the 22,000 largest landowners, there are only 7,000 whose property approaches 1 million hectares of the best land. Hence, it would be necessary to start the confiscation of lands with them, with the resulting redistribution of land among landless peasants and model state enterprises. As far as the 250,000 landowners possessing a medium amount of land are concerned, it would make sense to bring them to the side of the people's government through support and stimulation of the middle-tier farmer in agricultural production until such a time that the state agricultural sector has been strengthened.*[41]

In spite of these profound misgivings (not to mention the lack of reliable land registers for most of the country), land redistribution efforts were launched ahead of schedule in southern Afghanistan on 20 December 1978 (two days after Fedorchuk's memorandum). Some 100 teams of government agents were to implement the reform decrees across Afghanistan from south to north from January to June 1979, leaving enough time for spring planting depending on climate. Yet the attempt to reform the rural economy faced immediate difficulties. A lack of vehicles prevented teams from reaching many rural localities, and the attempt to expropriate all middle-sized landowners (rather than the 7,000 that Fedorchuk had suggested) helped spur the Afghan resistance. The March 1979 mutiny of an entire Afghan Army garrison in the western city of Herat prompted delays to the land reform programme. And when land reform teams reached northern Afghanistan later in 1979, twenty-three government operatives were killed over just one summer.[42]

Reading Between the Lines

Critical readers might question whether the analysis thus far – coming mostly from Russian-language and Soviet sources – denigrates Afghan socialists as "irrational" subaltern actors unable to live up to the standards of their Soviet tutors. However, an examination of PDPA newspapers confirms the stereotypes about the fanatical nature of Afghan socialists. It bears stressing that such newspaper articles went unread outside of Kabul:

41   P.S. Fedorchuk, Private Memorandum (16 December 1978), cited in Slinkin, Narodno-demokraticheskaia partiia Afganistana u vlasti. Vremia Taraki-Amina (1978-79 gg.), pp. 30-31.
42   B.B. Basov and G.A. Polyakov, Afganistan: Trudnye sud'by revoliutsii, Moscow 1988, p. 27.

most Afghan peasants could not have read them, as they were almost all illiterate. However, they provide a view into the thinking of Afghan socialist intellectuals trying to justify a project that was disintegrating before them. Agricultural reform (*aslahat-i arzi*) was a prominent topic in issues of the official Party newspaper *Khalq* in the spring of 1979. The third issue of *Khalq* devoted a centerfold to the accomplishments of the land reform programme that featured facsimiles of Decree Number 8, as well as a sample card attesting ownership of the new regime. The latter was decorated with a hand-drawn border of a harvest of grapes, watermelons, wheat, apricots, and other fruits and vegetables. Yet the two pieces in the centerfold devoted to explaining land reform repeated the kind of ideological cant that had troubled advisors like Fedorchuk and Davydov.

One unsigned article, "A Summary of the Land Reforms," explained how unequal property relations had trapped Afghanistan and its peasants in a cycle of low wages, low agricultural productivity, and weak terms of trade. The PDPA, the summary continued, had enacted agricultural reform to solve this problem, but it took a moment to explain what it meant by land reform. Often, the piece explained, governments around the world had enacted land reform under the name of "integral reform" (*rifurm-i antagrali*). Integral reform, the piece noted, sometimes entailed land redistribution along with technical assistance. However, "integral reform" all too often meant that "land redistribution either completely disappears from the agenda or that it is very ineffective." Yet the only meaningful kind of land reform worth its name had to be directed toward land reform *qua* reform of property relations themselves. Only if land reform aimed to change class relations could it be deemed land reform. The piece, in short, challenged the Soviets' assertion that gradualist reform could serve the interests of socialism. Land reform had to be all or nothing, now or never.[43]

As if there were any lack of clarity on this matter, the centerfold on agricultural reform also featured a signed article by Dr. Saleh Muhammad Zerai, the Minister of Agriculture and Land Reform to whom the Soviet advisor Fedorchuk had emphasized the need for a gradualist approach. In the piece, Zerai explained how land reforms had been halted by an alliance between capitalists, imperialists, and feudalists. Often, this alliance of reactionaries had called for land reforms whereby peasants had, in effect, been obligated to sell their lands to feudal landlords. In other cases, capitalist interests had been strong enough to force land reforms that broke down feudal relations and introduced brutal market relations, thus preventing the formation of cooperatives or other associations that could protect peasants' interests. In contrast to all of these sham efforts at land reform, noted Zerai, the PDPA had introduced "democratic land reform" whose ultimate aim was "the foundation of a society in which the exploitation of man by man does not exist." Zerai went on to summarize the other elements of Decree Number 8, making it clear that Afghan peasants' lack of ownership of the land (in contrast to the obligation to maintain it with state support) was not a design flaw but rather a feature of the re-

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43   "Makhtasari darbareh-yi Aslahat-I Arzi," Khalq 3 (28 April 1979), 8, Afghan Partisan Series, Hoover Institution Archives (hereafter cited as APS, HA).

form. Only through these measures and the ongoing redistribution of land, Zerai noted, could harvests increase, the standard of living of the peasants grow, and "all the laborers rise".[44]

The writers for *Khalq* did not merely discuss ideology in abstract terms. Reporters for the newspaper visited existing Soviet-built projects, like those in Nangarhar. One 7 November 1979 piece explained how the cooperative farms built under Daoud had been shambolic, since they were run "in the service of feudal farmers and not for the poor, and they were run as a means of whatever best allowed for the exploitation of needy peasants."[45] However, the April Revolution had done away with both these "anti-people" cooperatives and the "social parasites" who ran them. The same piece went on to explore how both the number of cooperative farms as well as the number of members had grown since Decree Number 8. A later piece of reporting from the farm complex in Nangarhar started similar in tone, noting how the cooperative farms there had not only brought "green and light to Nangarhar," but would also occupy a prominent position as an example for economic, industrial, and social reform.[46] Yet there was a lack of ideological consistency between these two and other pieces. Whereas the former piece saw pre-1979 agricultural cooperatives as a tool of capitalist domination, the latter piece praised them as a valuable example of Soviet-Afghan cooperation that had given peasants control over their own lives. As the accompanying photograph of Afghan peasants (some in suits and hats, others in *shalwar kameez* and turbans) showed, now peasants could "enjoy the fruits of their labors" (one of Nangarhar's specialties was citrus).

Exacerbating these hardline ideological positions were the twists and turns in Afghan politics during the autumn of 1979. When PDPA General Secretary Nur Muhammad Taraki returned from a visit to the Non-Aligned Movement's Conference in Havana, his deputy Hafizullah Amin had him killed and unleased a wave of arrests and executions against the Taraki-aligned Party elite. Most of the important anti-Amin elite escaped as Ambassadors to socialist countries, but Amin's erratic behavior, not to mention his American educational background, made him suspicious to Moscow. In the meantime, however, the regime extended and intensified the land reform policies. In several areas, land reform officials redistributed land without measuring plots' borders, leading to conflict. Further, Amin redistributed land to his favored functionaries and engaged in programmes of forced resettlement (often moving one ethnic group to another's territories). Making Amin's situation worse, on 12 December 1979, NATO announced its intention to deploy medium-range missiles in Europe, thus signaling (in Moscow's eyes) that it had no intentions to extend détente.

Worried that Amin would turn toward the Americans, or that his regime would collapse in the face of the Islamist opposition, Moscow opted to liquidate Amin and replace him

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44 Saleh Muhammad Zerai, "Tahlil-i teorik va praktik-i farman nambard-I hashtom va jebnah-ha-yi nazari va amali-yi an," Khalq 3 (28 April 1979), p. 9, APS, HA.

45 "Kuperativha-yi zira'ati tusi'eh-yi miyaband," Khalq 37 (7 November 1979), p. 3, APS, HA.

46 "Hasalat-I satrus va zaytun farmha-yi nangarhar va sadfisad afsayash yafteh ast," Khalq 39 (17 December 1979), p. 3, APS, HA.

with Babrak Karmal (the Afghan Ambassador in Prague) as a "limited contingent of Soviet forces" invaded the country in late December 1979. Karmal and the new Afghan press proceeded to explain in *Problems of Peace and Socialism*, the flagship theoretical journal in the Eastern Bloc, how "subjectivism and Leftist excesses had broken such important measures as land reforms."[47] The PDPA's 1981 Programme for Measures on Land Reform went so far as to denounce the land reform as carried out under Amin as "hasty and rash," not to mention "carried out in violation of the law."[48] Yet this new-found respect for the rule of law and due process was late in coming. Later articles by Karmal in *Problems of Peace and Socialism* elaborated how 300,000 families had received land through the reform, but "the majority of them had been stripped of their rights, especially during the period of Amin's rule, or by fear of the landowners."[49] The strawman of Amin now permitted Afghan socialists to avoid coming to terms with the debates they had *not* had with Soviet advisors during the crucial autumn of 1978, when they issued Decree Number 8.

Game Change

An examination of the Afghan government's land reform policies from 1980 to its collapse in 1992 remains beyond the scope of this paper. For the moment, it bears stressing how the Islamist opponents of the regime shifted the rules of the game by which leftist regimes had to play. The most important opposition to the regime were the Islamist mujahidin groups that massed in Peshawar, which blasted the regime in Kabul on several fronts (their emancipation of women, their initial disrespect toward religion, and their invitation to the Soviets to occupy the country). But while a comprehensive investigation of *mujahidin* publications remains necessary, another reason for the resistance was material. After all, land reform's self-defined goal was to change social relations, democratize land ownership and to increase production to change Afghanistan's position in the international political economy. In response, empowered and well-funded Islamist ideologues in the refugee camps in Pakistan propagated the idea that land reform itself violated a verse in the Quran sanctioning the *inheritance* of land.[50]

Yet as Soviet analysts noted at the time, the authority of this verse was quite shaky. It was, they noted, ambiguous at best whether the Qur'an's sanctioning of inheritance amounted to an unrestricted right to private property.[51] Further, early Muslim historians had, Soviet analysts argued, made clear that early Caliphs had redistributed economically

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47   Babrak Karmal, „Narod Afganistan otstoit revoliutsiiu!" Problemy mira I sotsializma 1980 (4), pp. 40-41.
48   Program-i tadabir-i amali-yi edama-yi tadbik-i eslahat-i demokratik-i marhala-yi enkelab-i melli-yi demokratik, Kabul 1982.
49   Babrak Karmal, „Narastorzhimoe edinstvo s narodom," Problemy mira i sotsializma 1981 (6), p. 25.
50   The Qur'an, Al-Araf 7:128.
51   Davydov, Agrarnoe zakonodatel'stvo, Moscow 1984, 92.

inactive holdings.[52] Other analysts noted that Afghan intellectuals like Gul Pacha Ulfat had promoted the idea of "Islamic socialism" in the late 1960s, promoting economic equality as the only expression of a "truly Islamic society."[53] Iranian intellectuals like Ali Shariati and groups like the Mujahidin-i Khalq had championed "Islamic socialism" in the 1970s. Outside of Afghanistan's immediate region, countries at the core of the Arab world, such as Egypt, Syria, and Iraq had carried out land reform without inspiring the international jihad that the PDPA had. Tiny, arid South Yemen had even gone so far as to create collective farms without creating the jihadist vortex that formed in Peshawar.[54] The real issue was that the kinds of demands that Islamist ideologues felt empowered to make had changed since the 1960s.[55]

Undaunted in its pursuit of solving the land question, the PDPA continued to carry out land reform–although now, it repeated that it was doing so with respect for private property.[56] Citations of the PDPA's founding documents (which acknowledged private property *provided* that it was used to raise production and cultural levels) notwithstanding, the announcement amounted to a tactical retreat from the earlier insistence on removing exploitation altogether.[57] Yet even this retreat failed to appreciate the tectonic shifts in the politics of solidarity during the 1980s. Just as the PDPA continued to speak of "social parasites," many Western leftists had moved on from the dictatorship of the proletariat as well as national liberation movements. Individual empathy towards populations at risk of genocide trumped an international solidarity toward workers and peasants threatened by capitalists and landowners.[58]

Many former anti-colonial European leftists flocked to the Afghan-Pakistani border, to provide services to the Sunni Islamist resistance, not the "anti-imperialist" Afghan government. Some groups provided not just emergency medical aid but also longer-term agrarian aid programs. By the end of the 1980s, to take one example, the French group Veterinarians Without Borders (VSF) provided not only animal feed but also diagnoses and prevention of epizootic diseases to the herds of Afghan farmers living in the northeastern reaches of the country.[59] However, few of these programmes called into question basic property relations or issues of finance and debt in the Afghan countryside. The earlier debates about private property and land dating at least to the 1960s had been re-

52   Ibid., 93. Davydov was referring to Umar's treatment of Bilal ibn Rabah.

53   Gul Pacha Ulfat, "Susiyalisti," Anis, 10 September 1966, p. 3.

54   F. Halliday, Catastrophe in South Yemen: A Preliminary Assessment, in: MERIP Middle East Report 139 (March-April 1986), p. 37.

55   A. Jalal, An Uncertain Trajectory: Islam's Contemporary Globalization, 1971–1979, in: The Shock of the Global: The 1970s in Perspective, Cambridge, MA, 2011, pp. 319-326.

56   Haqiqat-i Enqelab-i Saur, 21 April 1980.

57   Khalq, 11 April 1966.

58   T. Nunan, The Anti-Colonial Origins of Humanitarian Intervention, in: Jadaliyya (15 September 2016), http://voxpop.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/25107/the-anti-colonial-origins-of-humanitarian-interven (Accessed 6 June 2017).

59   For an example of VSF's work, see Jo Daisniere and Michel Bouy, "Rapport de Mission Juli 89 – May 90," (VSF Jurm Badakhshan), Medecins sans Frontières Archives, Box "Badakhshan," Folder "VSF".

solved, albeit through the appearance of new Islamist and NGO groups whose presence few could have foreseen.

Concluding Thoughts

What emerges from this story as far as scholars of rural development are concerned are two themes. Firstly, socialist ideas about "the agrarian question" mattered. Remembering this in our accounts matters, because often the most interesting debates still remaining to be explored took place among socialists. As we have seen, the Soviets were not the revolutionaries in debates with their Afghan colleagues, yet we still lack for synthetic history of why Third World socialists pushed for redistribution vs. collective farms vs. villageization – and why and where the Soviets were willing to push back or suggest alternatives. Reconstructing these debates is crucial to understanding the woes of societies such as Afghanistan, Yemen, and Ethiopia and Eritrea today, and historians should be able to offer perspective on the rural poverty that drives conflicts in those countries.

Secondly, taking into account the socialist perspective matters not just because of its difference, but also because of its *continuities* with state capitalist or NGO-led development. Of the primary advisors dispatched to Kabul to advise on land reform in the autumn of 1978, two (Abdusattor Kakharov and M.B. Babaeva) were experts in epizootic diseases – the same kind of expertise that NGO operatives working with VSF would bring to bear on Afghanistan only a few years later. And the cartographers who worked with VSF were not just anyone, but Iranian development experts who had worked in earthquake-ridden areas for the Pahlavi regime. Here, again, the events in Afghanistan in the 1980s emerge not just as a battle between communism and capitalism, but rather a field onto which diverse actors transferred knowledge bases useful for rural development to a Cold War battlefield. Bringing in socialist perspectives matters, then, because it helps take in the global Cold War as a field not just defined by ideology but also by rival "high modernisms," embodied in these cases by veterinary sciences or cartography. It is by connecting these themes with the road to Osama bin Laden's Tarnak Farms compound that we may better understand the end of the Cold War and the beginning of our times.

BUCHBESPRECHUNGEN

Rezensiert von
Katharina Kreuder-Sonnen, Siegen

Woher weiß eine internationale Hilfsorganisation mit Sitz in Genf, wo auf der Welt Hunger herrscht und wo Hilfe geleistet werden muss? Der Frage, wie Hunger in bestimmten Regionen auf der Welt Gegenstand internationaler Politik wird, geht Joël Glasman in seinem Beitrag zu „Techniken der Globalisierung. Globalgeschichte meets Akteur-Netzwerk-Theorie" nach. Der Band will ausloten, was die Globalgeschichte von der Akteur-Netzwerk-Theorie (ANT) lernen kann, und Glasmans Beitrag kann dies überzeugend aufzeigen. Denn die ANT regt einerseits dazu an, die Frage nach Techniken der „Globalisierung des Hungers" überhaupt erst zu stellen und sie sensibilisiert zweitens für die vielfältigen, auch nicht-menschlichen Akteure, die dabei eine Rolle spielen.
Im Falle des Hungers, so zeigt Glasman eindrücklich, ist es ein einfaches Plastik-

maßband, das einen wesentlichen Beitrag dazu leistet, Globalität herzustellen. Während des Biafra-Kriegs (1967–1970) erhoben internationale Hilfsorganisationen den so genannten MUAC-Test zum maßgeblichen Instrument zur Feststellung von Hunger. Die „Mid-Upper Arm Circumference" wird bei Kindern zwischen ein bis zehn Jahren gemessen. Unterschreitet ihr Armumfang ein Normalmaß, so gelten die Kinder als unterernährt. Indem Glasman die Praktiken und Materialitäten des MUAC-Tests genauestens rekonstruiert – gemäß dem Vorschlag Bruno Latours zur „Irreduktion"[1] – kann er den Test als funktionierende Machttechnik darstellen. So ersetzte die Messung des Armumfangs durch medizinisch ungeschultes Personal mittels eines einfachen Maßbandes komplexe Verfahren zur Diagnose von Unterernährung. Die Messung, ihre willkürlich zusammengesetzten Grenzwerte und die Vernachlässigung anderer Indikatoren führten dabei zu wiederholt scharf kritisierten ungenauen Messergebnissen. Der MUAC-Test ist jedoch bis heute Mittel der Wahl zur Feststellung einer Hungersnot. Glasman argumentiert überzeugend, dass dies auf die Fähigkeit des Plastikmaßbands zurückzuführen ist, die chaotische Komplexität der Ernährungssituation von Millionen von Menschen in Krisenregionen für die Vertreter_innen von Hilfsor-

ganisationen und Geldgebern auf einfache und billige Art und Weise sichtbar und handhabbar zu machen.

Der Hunger als globales Problem wird hier also nicht als selbstverständlich gegebener Ausgangspunkt angenommen, sondern es wird historisch spezifisch bestimmt, wie Globalität in diesem Fall überhaupt erst hergestellt wird. Die Herausgeber_innen des Sammelbandes, Debora Gerstenberger und Joël Glasman, machen in ihrer Einleitung deutlich, dass genau darin der Mehrwert der ANT für die Globalgeschichte liege. Mit der ANT würde das Globale nicht mehr als selbstverständlicher Erklärungsfaktor in historische Analysen einbezogen. Vielmehr werde es vom Explanans zum Explanandum. Es gelte, gemäß einem Latourschen Diktum, den „Akteuren [dabei zu] folgen"[2], wie diese in konkreten und lokalen Praktiken Maßstäbe hervorbringen und so ihre Welt skalieren. „Objekte" und „technische Mittel" spielten dabei eine besondere Rolle. An die Stelle der schwammigen Ubiquität des Begriffs des Globalen, könne so eine „Globalgeschichte mit Maß" treten. Mit der konsequenten Historisierung von Großkategorien einerseits und der Untersuchung konkreter Praktiken andererseits biete die ANT zudem eine Chance, so Gerstenberger und Glasman, das Globale in seiner Gemachtheit zu analysieren, es jedoch nicht in konstruktivistischer Manier als reine Imagination aufzulösen.

Der Band versammelt nun in grob chronologischer Reihenfolge, ausgehend von der frühen Neuzeit und mit Schwerpunkt in der Zeitgeschichte, Beiträge zu diversen Themen, die konkrete Praktiken und technische Mittel der Globalisierung untersuchen wollen. Claudia Prinz zeigt beispielsweise, dass die Beschaffenheit der ‚Weltbevölkerung‘ in den 1960er und 1970er Jahren nicht nur ein diskursives Konstrukt war. Sozialwissenschaftliche Bevölkerungsstudien gingen vielmehr von konkreten Orten aus (hier Matlab / Bangladesch) und brachten Wissen mit Hilfe von „Female Village Workers", einem Lochkartenverfahren und Forschungsinstituten in Dhaka und Baltimore hervor. Auch Peter Lambertz argumentiert in seiner Ethnographie des japanischen Johrei-Kults in Kinshasa / Kongo, dass die ‚Energie‘, die in diesem spirituellen Kult übermittelt wird, nicht nur diskursiv als Glaube an etwas entsteht. Vielmehr übertragen in den spirituellen Praktiken konkrete Dinge wie japanische Kalligraphien, Amulette, bestimmte Zimmer- und Blumendekorationen das ‚Licht‘ des Johrei und verbinden so Kinshasa mit dem Referenzraum Japan. Es ist das besondere Verdienst von Lambertz' Beitrag, dass er „Techniken der Globalisierung" jenseits des europäischen und nordamerikanischen Raumes aufzeigt.

Die bedeutsame und gleichzeitig prekäre Rolle von Dingen bei der Herstellung von Globalität zeigt auch Anne Mariss' Aufsatz auf. Sie untersucht naturhistorische Sammelpraktiken im 18. Jh. Erst nachdem Tier- und Pflanzenspezies aus aller Welt erfolgreich in die europäischen Naturalienkabinette transportiert worden waren, konnte diese ‚Welt‘ im Sinne einer aufgeklärten Naturgeschichte geordnet und überschaubar gemacht werden. Dafür waren sammelnde Naturforscher auf den Erkundungsfahrten der frühen Neuzeit ebenso bedeutsam wie Präparier- und Konservierungstechniken, die ausgestopfte Tiere und getrocknete Pflanzen während des Schiffstransports vor dem Verschim-

meln bewahrten. Ohne das selbst explizit zu machen, verweist Anne Mariss' Beitrag auch darauf, dass Bruno Latours Konzept der „immutable mobiles" mit seinem Fokus auf flache Inskriptionen für die historische Analyse zu kurz greifen kann. Auch dreidimensionale Dinge müssen bisweilen unveränderlich mobil gemacht werden und erfordern ganz andere Techniken der Stabilisierung.[3]

Die Untersuchung von flachen Inskriptionen – Verfahren, die komplexe dreidimensionale Phänomene auf die zweidimensionale Papierfläche bannen (beispielsweise Landkarten) – ist eine klassisch Latoursche Herangehensweise an Herstellungstechniken des Globalen. Tim Neu zeigt in seiner Untersuchung von Wirtschaftspraktiken im British Empire um 1700, wie dieses Empire mit buchhalterischen Verfahren quasi zusammengeschrieben wurde. Die Bücher der Londoner Treasury setzten etwa Schiffsanmietungen in der Karibik, Einnahmen der Zollbehörden, staatliche Kredite und Sold für Truppen in Irland zueinander in Beziehung und konnten auf diese Weise Zahlungspraktiken im fernen Barbados beeinflussen.

Wie genau diese buchhalterischen Inskriptionen aussahen, welche Papiertechniken und Aufschreibeverfahren die Londoner Treasury einsetzte, geht aus Neus Aufsatz jedoch nicht hervor. In vielen weiteren Beiträgen bleiben die Ansätze der ANT nur angedeutet. Dies gilt für Kerstin Poehls Diskussion des Zuckerhandels während des Ersten Weltkriegs. Sie benennt die vielfältigen neuen „Allianzen" menschlicher und nicht-menschlicher Akteure bei der Konstituierung des globalen Zuckermarktes im Krieg. Der Bedeutung dieser neuen Verbindungen und insbe-

sondere dem Akteurspotential der nicht-menschlichen Entitäten wird hier aber kaum weiter nachgegangen. Stattdessen wird die ANT in das Methodenangebot der Ethnographie eingeordnet.

Auf eine Einbeziehung nicht-menschlicher Akteure verzichtet auch Cornelia Reiher in ihrer Analyse der transnationalen Genese von Messtechniken von Radioaktivität in Japan nach Fukushima. Wie menschliche Akteure Grenzwerte aushandelten, Bürger_innen aus Japan, Frankreich und Deutschland die „Blackbox" der Wissenschaft in dieser Frage öffneten und alternative Messpraktiken etablierten geht aus ihrem Aufsatz jedoch eindrücklich hervor. Kevin Niebauer will in seinem Beitrag zeigen, wie der Amazonas-Tropenwald zum Gegenstand eines globalen Umweltdiskurses wurde. Seine Analyse zeigt, wie lokale und globale Phänomene diskursiv miteinander in Beziehung gesetzt wurden. Konkrete Vernetzungspraktiken werden hingegen nur angedeutet. Trotz wiederholter Verweise auf ANT-Begrifflichkeiten bleibt auch der Beitrag von Sherin Abu-Chouka über die mexikanischen „Festivales de Oposición" hinter seinem Postulat zurück, internationale Vernetzungen von konkreten Orten und Praktiken ausgehend zu analysieren. Der Aufsatz von Philipp Wagner über „Internationalisierungspraktiken" von Experten in der „International Federation for Housing and Town Planning" kommt gleich ganz ohne die ANT aus und nutzt stattdessen Ansätze der Performanztheorie.

Dem Plädoyer des abschließenden Kommentars von Frederik Schulz, nicht nur eine Globalgeschichte mit Maß, sondern auch die „ANT mit Maß" zu betreiben, ist deshalb nur bedingt zuzustimmen. Selbst-

verständlich sollten nicht alle Globalhisto-
riker_innen auf die ANT einschwenken.
Dies ist auch nicht das Anliegen der He-
rausgeber_innen dieses Bandes. Wenn man
die Akteur-Netzwerk-Theorie jedoch für
globalhistorische Fragestellungen frucht-
bar machen will, dann muss man sich
auf deren methodische und theoretische
Konsequenzen auch einlassen. Sonst ent-
stehen (thematisch sicherlich interessante)
kulturhistorische Studien, die mit La-
tourschen Begriffen überfrachtet werden,
jedoch kaum Überraschendes aufzeigen
können. Die größte Leerstelle des Bandes
besteht denn auch darin, dass Herausge-
ber_innen und viele Autor_innen eine der
wichtigsten theoretischen Konsequenzen
der ANT ausklammern. Ein Großteil von
Bruno Latours Werk besteht darin, eine
elementare Grundlage westlichen Den-
kens seit der Aufklärung in Frage zu stel-
len – und zwar die Dichotomie von Natur
und Gesellschaft und daraus folgend von
Objekt und Subjekt.[4] In ihrer Einleitung
wollen Gerstenberger und Glasman in die
„fruchtlos geführte Diskussion" darüber
nicht weiter einstimmen und verweisen
stattdessen auf die bereits erwähnten „Ob-
jekte" und „technischen Mittel", die in die
Analyse mit einzubeziehen seien. Entspre-
chend bleiben die meisten Aufsätze auf
menschliche Handlungen konzentriert
und loten die Handlungsmacht nicht-
menschlicher Entitäten kaum aus.

Vielen Beiträgen hätte zudem ein
strengeres inhaltliches Lektorat gut getan,
um für eine stringentere Argumentations-
führung, insbesondere aber für eine präzi-
se Nutzung der Begrifflichkeiten der ANT
zu sorgen.

Dennoch kann der Band, insbesondere
durch seine Einleitung und einige der ver-
sammelten Aufsätze, überzeugend zeigen,
dass „Techniken der Globalisierung" mit
der ANT auf fruchtbare Art und Weise
untersucht werden können. Insbesondere
durch die konsequente Historisierung von
Maßstäben und durch die Einbeziehung
nicht-menschlicher Akteure geht die ANT
auch über jüngere Ansätze einer „Mikro-
geschichte des Globalen"[5] hinaus.

Anmerkungen:
1 B. Latour, The Pasteurization of France, Cam-
   bridge, London 1988, S. 153.
2 B. Latour, Eine neue Soziologie für eine neue
   Gesellschaft, Frankfurt am Main 2007, S. 28.
3 Vgl. hierzu H. Schmidgen, Die Materialität der
   Dinge? Bruno Latour und die Wissenschaftsge-
   schichte, in: G. Kneer; M. Schroer; E. Schütt-
   pelz (Hrsg.), Bruno Latours Kollektive. Kontro-
   versen zur Entgrenzung des Sozialen, Frankfurt
   am Main 2008, S. 15-46; K. Espahangizi, Im-
   mutable Mobiles im Glas. Ein Vorschlag zur
   Zirkulationsgeschichte nichtinskribierter Dinge,
   in: Nach Feierabend. Zürcher Jahrbuch für Wis-
   sensgeschichte 7 (2011), S. 105-125.
4 Vgl. u.a. B. Latour, Wir sind nie modern gewe-
   sen. Versuch einer symmetrischen Anthropolo-
   gie, Frankfurt am Main 2008.
5 Vgl. u.a. A. Epple, Lokalität und die Dimen-
   sionen des Globalen. Eine Frage der Relationen,
   in: Historische Anthropologie 21 (2013), S. 4-
   25; J.-P. Ghobrial, The Secret Life of Elias of Ba-
   bylon and the Uses of Global Microhistory, in:
   Past & Present 222 (2014), S. 51-93.

Marlis Schweitzer: Transatlantic Broadway. The Infrastructural Politics of Global Performance (= Transnational Theatre Histories, Bd. 1), Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 2015, 246 S.

Rezensiert von
Antje Dietze, Leipzig

Diese Monographie erschien in der neuen Reihe „Transnational Theatre Histories", die von Christopher Balme (Universität München), Tracy C. Davis (Northwestern University) und Catherine Cole (University of California, Berkeley) bei Palgrave Macmillan herausgegeben wird. Die Reihe thematisiert die Herausbildung des Theaters als globales Phänomen im Kontext von Modernisierungsprozessen und imperialer Expansion im 19. und 20. Jh. Sie verschreibt sich damit dem *transnational turn*, der seit einiger Zeit auch in der historischen Forschung nicht nur zum Theater, sondern ebenso zu kulturellen Aufführungen und Ausstellungen, zu Metropolenkultur und Massenvergnügungen produktiv geworden ist.

Die Theaterwissenschaftlerin Marlis Schweitzer (York University Toronto) legt mit „Transatlantic Broadway" den ersten Band der Reihe vor. Die rasante Entwicklung des New Yorker Theaterdistrikts in seinen frühen Glanzzeiten zwischen den 1890er Jahren und dem Ersten Weltkrieg ist bereits vielfältig dokumentiert und erforscht worden. Indem seit dem späten 19. Jh. neue Möglichkeiten der Mobilität,

Kommunikation und Rationalisierung erschlossen wurden, konnte das Theater zum *big business* werden. Damit einher ging eine nationale (und kontinentale) Ausbreitung und Verdichtung auf Grundlage von Theaterketten, Buchungskonglomeraten und Unternehmenszusammenschlüssen, die zum großen Teil in New York angesiedelt waren oder von dort aus gesteuert wurden. Der Broadway wurde so zu einem wichtigen Element im Aufstieg der amerikanischen Kulturindustrie.

Hier setzt Schweitzer an und betont, dass der nationale Durchbruch der modernen Theaterindustrie in den USA nur auf Grundlage einer transnationalen – und insbesondere transatlantischen – Expansion möglich wurde und mit dieser in enger Wechselbeziehung stand. Ihre Monographie zeigt detailliert und auf solider Quellenbasis auf, warum und vor allem wie New Yorker Theaterdirektoren, -verleger und -agenten begannen, nicht nur den amerikanischen Kontinent bis an die Westküste zu erobern, sondern sich ebenso energisch nach Europa zu orientieren.

Um diesen Prozess nachzeichnen zu können, rückt die Autorin den Blick weg von der Theaterbühne auf die Vermittlungsagenten, Infrastrukturen und Organisationsformen hinter den Kulissen. Ihr Hauptaugenmerk liegt dabei auf technischen Neuerungen in Kommunikation und Transport, auf deren Grundlage es möglich wurde, in großem Umfang europäische Stücke und Bühnenkünstler einzukaufen. Dampfschiffe, Telegraphen oder Schreibmaschinen, so argumentiert sie mit der Akteur-Netzwerk-Theorie und dem *new materialistic turn*, waren mehr als Mittel und Vermittler expansiver unternehmerischer Ambitionen. Schweitzer betont,

dass sie vielmehr selbst zu Akteuren wurden, deren *performances* die neuen theatralen Netzwerke grundlegend mitprägten, kommt bei ihren theoretischen Beschreibungen allerdings häufig nicht über eine erweiterte Theatermetaphorik hinaus.

Jedes der Kapitel zeigt, wie sich die Geschäftspraktiken und die Geographie des Theatersektors in Interaktion mit bestimmten technischen Neuerungen veränderten. Den Auftakt bilden die Ozeandampfer. Während die Nationalisierung der amerikanischen Unterhaltungsindustrie vor allem entlang der Entwicklung der Eisenbahn erzählt wird, stellt Schweitzer für die transnationale Geschichte des Broadway die Transatlantikliner in den Mittelpunkt. Erst durch diese entstand ein so regelmäßiger und intensiver Austausch zwischen Nordamerika und Europa, dass der Aufbau enger Geschäftsbeziehungen, teils sogar transatlantische Unternehmensexpansionen möglich wurden. Zugleich lässt sich anhand der Dampfschiffe erzählen, wie stark die Geschichte der Theaterindustrie mit den europäischen Auswanderungswellen nach Amerika, der Entstehung des modernen Massentourismus, nationalen und imperialen Rivalitäten und nicht zuletzt auch der Geschichte des Ersten Weltkriegs verwoben ist. Die Passagierschiffe wurden darüber hinaus nicht nur selbst zu sozialen Orten, sondern im imperialen Wettbewerb um die schnellste Atlantiküberquerung auch zum medialen Spektakel.

Darüber hinaus ist es der Autorin wichtig zu zeigen, wie stark die Technik auch den Wandel hin zu einer transnationalen Theaterkultur und zur Herausbildung moderner, teils selbst maschinenähnlich gewordener Subjekte vorantrieb. Beispiel-haft dafür steht im zweiten Kapitel die Rolle des Telegraphen in der Entwicklung des Broadwaytheaters. Schweitzer kann anhand der Analyse von Telegrammen aufzeigen, wie stark dieses neue Kommunikationsmedium die persönlichen wie geschäftlichen Beziehungen der Akteure zu prägen begann und sich auf Entscheidungsprozesse und Machtverhältnisse im Theatersektor auswirkte. Während einerseits schnellere, häufigere und engere Kontakte zwischen den Kontinenten möglich wurden, blieben Aufwand, Kosten und das Risiko von Fehleinschätzungen hoch. Schweitzers Analysen unterstreichen, wie mühsam und fehleranfällig transnationale Kommunikation trotz der massiven technischen Fortschritte oft blieb.

Das nächste Kapitel thematisiert das moderne Büro: Schweitzer gibt einen Überblick über die hochdifferenzierten Organisationsabläufe moderner Betriebsverwaltung, die Rolle von Schreibmaschinen, Telephonen und Büromöbeln sowie die immer vielfältigeren Funktionsbereiche vom leitenden Angestellten bis zum Büroboten. Die Agenturen und Theaterbüros am Broadway waren Schaltzentralen, in denen Planung, Vertrieb und Buchung tausender Stücke, Schauspieler und Artisten, Tourneerouten und Marketingkampagnen organisiert wurden, zumal in engem transatlantischem Austausch. Schweitzer wirft hier einen Blick auf die Mikroprozesse, die transnationale Mobilitäts- und Zirkulationsformen ermöglichten und aufrecht hielten. Diese Beschreibungen geben Einblicke in die radikalen Umbrüche, aber auch die alltäglichen Abläufe, die das Theaterviertel am Broadway als extrem verdichteten sozialen Interaktionsraum kennzeichneten.

Zuletzt wirft Schweitzer einen Blick darauf, wie das moderne Theatermarketing auf der Grundlage von Massenpresse, Postkarten und Werbeplakaten die Durchsetzung ausländischer Stücke und Schauspieler vorantrieb – und damit an der Entstehung von weit über den Broadway als physischem Raum hinausreichenden affektiven Gemeinschaften und transnationalen Öffentlichkeiten beteiligt war. Das Buch endet mit dem Tod des Broadway-Managers und „archetypal transnational subject" (S. 51, 192) Charles Frohmann auf dem Transatlantikliner „Lusitania", der 1915 von einem deutschen U-Boot versenkt wurde. Der Erste Weltkrieg zeigt die Anfälligkeit der grenzüberschreitenden theatralen Netzwerke und beendet die erste große Periode des Aufbaus moderner transatlantischer Theaterindustrien.

Schweitzers Studie reiht sich ein in neuere Forschungen zu den konkreten Mechanismen transnationaler Zirkulationen und den dafür notwendigen Infrastrukturen. Die Autorin leistet nicht nur einen Beitrag zu einer sozial- und technikgeschichtlich erweiterten Theaterhistoriographie, sondern auch zu den Debatten über eine transnationale Neukonzeptualisierung der Geschichte der USA. Dabei bringt die explizit räumliche Fragestellung der Studie neue Erkenntnisse über die Wechselwirkung von nationalen und transnationalen Handlungsebenen in der Entstehung moderner Kulturindustrien. Schweitzer kann außerdem zeigen, warum und wie die geographische Reichweite und Orientierung des amerikanischen Theaters im Jahrzehnt vor dem Ersten Weltkrieg grundlegend neu ausgerichtet wurden – vom Import europäischer Stücke und Stars hin zu einer transatlantischen Expansion des Broadway

mit durchaus explizitem Eroberungs- und Dominanzwillen einiger New Yorker Manager. Es handelt sich hier nicht allein um den Beginn der Amerikanisierung im Unterhaltungssektor. Die von Schweitzer aufgezeigten Prozesse bieten darüber hinaus immer wieder Anlass zu reflektieren, was vor dem Hintergrund enger transatlantischer Verflechtungen und der Entstehung einer transnationalen Theaterkultur unter „amerikanischem" Theater eigentlich zu verstehen ist. Trotzdem hält die Autorin an der Zentralität des Broadway und der amerikanischen Expansionsgeschichte fest. Es bräuchte noch eine genauere Darstellung der europäischen (und außereuropäischen) Partner und Gegenspieler, um vom Mythos Broadway zu einer Geschichte transatlantischer Interaktionen als Triebkraft der Entstehung moderner Kulturindustrien zu kommen.

Frank Hadler / Matthias Middell (Hrsg.): Handbuch einer transnationalen Geschichte Ostmitteleuropas, Band I: Von der Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts bis zum Ersten Weltkrieg, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 2017, 685 S.

Rezensiert von
Catherine Horel, Paris

Die Intention hinter diesem Versuch, eine Transnationalisierungsgeschichte zu schreiben, besteht darin, neue Forschungen anzuregen, indem die Autoren Beiträge liefern, die zur Diskussion einladen. Das ist

mehr als gelungen! Hier haben wir es nicht nur mit einem Band zu tun, der tatsächlich komparativ ist, sondern auch Vergleiche mit anderen Regionen der Welt bietet, also auch global ausgerichtet ist. Diese beiden Ebenen sind das Ergebnis der kombinierten Kompetenzen der Herausgeber aus Leipzig, die am GWZO sowie am Institut für Global and European Studies seit Jahren gemeinsam zu Ostmitteleuropa unter Globalisierungsbedingungen forschen. Ostmitteleuropa ist in dem Band nach der Definition von Oskar Halecki konzipiert, jedoch ist leider sehr wenig über die Beziehungen der Region zur See zu lesen (bei der Wirtschaftsgeschichte etwas mehr, vor allem in Bezug auf Triest), wo sich gerade globale Verflechtungen beobachten lassen. Da die Herausgeber einen zweiten Band vorbereiten, kann man hoffen, dass einiges, das man hier vermisst, zukünftig in Betracht gezogen wird. Als Handbuch für Studierende, aber für auch für alle anderen Interessierten kann man den Band fraglos empfehlen: die 85-seitige, reiche Bibliographie enthält besonders hilfreiches Material, wobei auch hier einiges zu verbessern wäre. Mehrere Titel sind etwas überholt (z. B. Pamlényis History of Hungary, S. 645), und es fehlen wichtige Bücher der letzten Jahre, die für die behandelten Themen von Relevanz sind.[1] Insgesamt ist die Bibliographie sehr auf die deutschsprachige Historiographie konzentriert, was einerseits legitim ist, andererseits könnte man der französisch- sowie italienischsprachigen (hier besonders über Triest bzw. Istrien) Geschichtsschreibung mehr Raum widmen.

Der Band gliedert sich entlang zweier Hauptlinien: eine Darstellung der jeweils fünf ausgewählten Themen, welche für die Herausgeber in Bezug das Konzept der Transnationalisierung besonders geeignet sind, und dem Forschungsstand über sie. Beide Teile sind von denselben Autoren verfasst, was Wiederholung und Redundanz vermeidet. Von den fünf Dimensionen Raumordnung, Migration, Kultur, Wirtschaft und internationale Organisationen ist besonders die letzte bahnbrechend, überzeugt aber nicht immer.

Die Konzeptualisierung Ostmitteleuropas als besonders relevant für Transnationalisierung ist gerechtfertigt, weil man hier einer Region begegnet, die permanenten Wechsel erlebt hat – und das nicht nur im 19. bzw. 20. Jh. (!), wo es zu einer Gleichzeitigkeit mehrerer Phänomene gekommen ist (S. 26) –, die von einer Fluidität in der Identität von Territorien und Menschen charakterisiert ist. Sollte man nicht also anstatt von „transnational" eher von „transregional" oder „translokal"[2] sprechen? Wenn man sich bemüht, mit großer Kompetenz und Ernsthaftigkeit über die Kategorie „Nation" hinaus zu denken, sollte man mit der Terminologie beginnen. Es wäre nicht ohne Interesse gewesen, auf die Bedeutungsverschiebung von „Nation" im 19. Jh. einzugehen. Was die Terminologie betrifft, ist die systematische Verwendung des Begriffs „Container" sehr störend: einerseits könnte die deutsche Sprache ein besseres Wort finden, andererseits ist es vom Sinne her unheimlich. Man sieht auch, dass die Autoren sich des Ausdrucks „Kulturtransfer" bedienen, wobei dieser schon seit einigen Jahren als überholt gilt. Dann wäre eine nähere Definition dieses Begriffes wünschenswert, damit man versteht, was genau gemeint ist.

In den beiden Kapiteln über Territorialisierung wird gezeigt, wie viel die Geschichts-

schreibung über Ostmitteleuropa von den letzten *„turns"* der Humanwissenschaften profitiert hat und profitieren kann: einige davon scheinen sogar „maßgeschneidert", darunter der *„spatial"*, der *„linguistic"* und selbstverständlich der *„cultural"* turn. Sie erlauben den HistorikerInnen, über den geographischen, und zeitlichen Rahmen hinauszugehen. Die Forschung über Raumordnungen und ihre Perzeption ist hier sehr gründlich dargestellt, und es fehlt keines der wichtigen Themen, die man als transnational betrachten kann. Besonders interessant sind die neueren Arbeiten über Statistik und Kartographie, hier unter der Überschrift „Vermessung des politischen Raumes", in denen erneut deutlich wird, dass es überhaupt keine „neutrale" Karte gibt (S. 74). Im Prozess der Identifikation der Nation mit dem Territorium liegt die Schwierigkeit, mehrere Aspekte dieses Punktes werden angesprochen, u. a. das Projekt einer Föderalisierung, die angebliche Transnationalität der Sozialdemokratie, das „transnationale" Judentum (letzterem hätte man insgesamt mehr Aufmerksamkeit widmen können). Die Autoren befassen sich ausführlich und mit Recht mit dem Thema Grenzen, vor allem der Hierarchisierung von Grenzen, ihrer Verschiebung mit Varianten und Alternativen (S. 84), welche die Achse Zentrum-Peripherie ändert. Der Ort, wo diese Probleme kristallisieren, ist die Stadt (S. 116), in erster Linie Wien (S. 121), aber in multikulturellen und Grenzstädten kreuzen sich internationale und regionale Verkehrssysteme. Urbane Geschichte behandelt somit Fragen, die transnationale und nationale Aspekte zusammenfassen (S. 453). Die Fragestellung über Grenze und Peripherie führt zu einem der Leitmo-

tive des Bandes: Rückständigkeit bzw. verspätete Modernisierung (S. 434) wird als *topos* begriffen und nicht als Charakteristik Ostmitteleuropas. Zugleich geht Zivilisierung nicht unbedingt in Nationalisierung auf (S. 435). Die neueste Forschung über Imperien zeigt im Gegenteil, dass Modernisierung stark auf Initiativen der Zentralbehörden beruht.[3] Ein Beweis dafür ist die Permanenz jener Strukturen nach 1918, und darüber werden wir vermutlich im Band II mehr erfahren (S. 438).

Richtig ist, dass Migrationen die Transnationalisierung Ostmitteleuropas beschleunigt haben. Es wäre aber relevant, zwischen Migration und Mobilität zu unterscheiden: Beamten, Militär, Studenten, Groß- und Kleinhändler sind kreuz und quer in der Region und nach außerhalb gereist, haben transnationale Netzwerke (S. 145) aufgebaut. Unter ihnen sind noch einmal die Juden zu nennen, mit entsprechenden Heirats- und Wirtschaftsstrategien. Diese Migration ist sehr oft ein Etappenprozess, der auch manchmal mit einer mehr oder weniger definitiven Rückkehr endet (S. 175). Möchte man hier eine globale Dimension einführen, wäre der Begin der Auswanderung nach Palästina zu erwähnen. „Einheimisch werden" (S. 158) in einer transnationalen Gesellschaft wie jener Wiens oder kleinerer Städte bedeutet nicht unbedingt die Annahme einer nationalen Identität.

Die Autorin des Kapitels über kulturelle Dimensionen stellt mit Recht fest, dass es ein Defizit an Studien über Kulturkontakte und Vermischung der Kulturen innerhalb Ostmitteleuropas gibt. Es hat zum einen mit der Einseitigkeit des angeblich immer auf den Westen orientierten Kulturtransfers zu tun, zum zweiten mit der Schwie-

rigkeit, mehrere Sprachwelten zu erfassen (als Beispiel hier die Konfusion über Altofen, also Óbuda und nicht Ópest, S. 231). In diesem Sinne wird hier auch ganz klar, dass es falsch ist, von Rückstand zu sprechen (S. 491). Besonders interessant zu diesem Thema sind die Ausstellungen unterschiedlicher Art, die überall in der Region stattgefunden haben (S. 209). Träger des Multikulturalismus waren viele BürgerInnen, darunter in erster Linie die Juden. Hier hätte man etwas mehr über Religion als transnationales Kulturmodell sagen können (Priesterseminare, Mischehen, Kyrill & Method-Gesellschaften usw.). Mobilität hat zu diesem permanenten Austausch beigetragen, Grenzgänger waren nicht Mitglieder der Eliten (S. 248). In den Städten gab es polyglotte Analphabeten. Was die Behandlung der Kunstgeschichte angeht, ist es schade, dass die Architektur nicht eigens erwähnt wird, da sie doch eine transnationale Kunstform ist, die beständig auf Nationalisierungsdruck reagierte. Die Anfänge des Films sind leider nicht erwähnt, ein Kommunikationsmittel, das von einer sehr transnationalen Produktion geprägt war. Die Debatte über den gleichzeitigen Niedergang der Pluralität zugunsten der Nationalisierung ist von großem Interesse und wird wahrscheinlich noch Bände füllen (S. 518f.). Die Dezentralisierung der hohen Bildung, als Modernisierung gesehen, hat tatsächlich zu ihrer Nationalisierung geführt (S. 223).

Zu Recht wird betont, dass sich Ostmitteleuropa für eine transnationale Wirtschaftsgeschichte anbietet (S. 527). Die Habsburgermonarchie bildete einen Rahmen für transnationale Kapitalbewegung (S. 280). Dagegen behaupteten nationale Diskurse, dieser Prozess würde der Nation

schaden. Es soll nicht überraschen, dass hier die Zuschreibung von Rückständigkeit dezidiert hinterfragt wird (S. 539), denn es kann deutlich gemacht werden, wie Ostmitteleuropa in der ersten Globalisierung seine Rolle findet. Darüber ist noch viel zu forschen, z. B. über die Beziehungen zwischen Österreich-Ungarn und der weiten Welt (S. 549).

Sehr innovativ sind die beiden Kapitel über die Rolle der Ostmitteleuropäer am Beginn der Internationalisierung: Wie und mit welchen Herausforderungen hat die Region ihre Anwesenheit in den ersten internationalen Organisationen manifestiert? Repräsentanten Österreich-Ungarns haben loyal die Monarchie vertreten, ungeachtet ihrer jeweiligen Identitäten. Deswegen ist die Tätigkeit jener Akteure nachher verschwiegen oder vernachlässigt worden (S. 327). Auch bei der Internationalisierung, wie schon bei der Wirtschaft, war die Region prädestiniert zu partizipieren (S. 348): Die Akteure waren vernetzt, mehrsprachig, also gleich einsatzfähig! Das ungarische Beispiel ist hier besonders aufschlussreich, aber bitte, Oberbürgermeister Bárczy gehörte nicht zur Sozialdemokratischen Partei (S. 385)! Man vermisst hier noch einmal den jüdischen Aspekt: in der Frauenbewegung (vor allem in Ungarn) gehörten die meisten Anführerinnen dem Judentum an; die Tätigkeit der *Alliance Israélite Universelle* mit ihrer Wiener Filiale und Zweigstelle in Triest ist nicht erwähnt, wobei sie dort eine wesentliche Rolle gespielt, die österreichischen Juden für die Leiden ihrer Glaubensgenossen mobilisiert hat. Auch andere jüdische Frauenorganisationen verdienen es, besser erforscht zu werden.

Zusammenfassend kann man sagen, dass biographische- sowie Netzwerk-Forschung und Prosopographie zum Thema Transnationalisierung innerhalb und außerhalb Ostmitteleuropa noch ein weites Feld ist. Die in der alten Geschichtsschreibung als transnational betrachteten Kategorien: Dynastie bzw. Adel, Beamtentum, Militär und Kirche(n) sind noch valid. Sie müssen nun mit Hilfe neuerer Methoden bearbeitet werden, andere, bisher weniger berücksichtigte Akteure sind es ebenfalls wert behandelt zu werden, und das ist, was dieser Band beabsichtigt. Damit ist eine wesentliche Etappe erreicht, die hoffentlich weitere ankündigt.

Anmerkungen:
1 Zu nennen sind z. B. T. Zahra, Kidnapped Souls. National Indifference and the Battle for Children in the Bohemian Lands, 1900–1948, Ithaca 2008; W. Telesko, Geschichtsraum Österreich. Die Habsburger und ihre Geschichte in der bildenden Kunst des 19. Jahrhunderts, Wien 2006.
2 Siehe z. B. G. M. Dienes (Hrsg.), Translokal. 9 Städte im Netz 1848–1918, Graz 1996.
3 Das Symposium des DHI-Warschau (28.-30.11.2016) „Österreich-Ungarn und die imperialen Herausforderungen im 19. und frühen 20. Jh.: Nationalismen u. Rivalitäten im Habsburgerreich, in Europa u. der Welt" hat zu dieser Diskussion beigetragen (Publikation ist in Drucklegung).

„*The King's Two Bodies*" – Ernst Kantorowiczs auf die Herrscher des Mittelalters gemünzte Unterscheidung zwischen dem sterblichen und dem politischen Körper des Königs scheint in der Person des thailändischen Monarchen Rama X. eine spätneuzeitliche Inkarnation gefunden zu haben. Während der Nachfolger des im Volk verehrten Bhumibol Adulyadej nämlich in seiner bayerischen Wahlheimat am Starnberger See einem durchaus fragwürdigen, da von *noblesse oblige* weit entfernten Dresscode und Lebenswandel frönt, von dem seine Untertanen im fernen Asien nach Möglichkeit nichts erfahren sollen, warfen sich seine Minister Anfang Dezember 2016 förmlich in den Staub, um dem frisch ernannten König nach strengem Hofzeremoniell zu huldigen. Was heute als Posse des royalen Jetset erscheint, verweist in historischer Perspektive auf die bei Kantorowicz angelegte Ausdifferenzierung verschiedener Sphären der Legitimation. Die Autorinnen und Autoren des von Milinda Banerjee, Charlotte Backerra und Cathleen Sarti herausgegebenen Sammelbandes spüren deshalb der Frage nach, wie es den von Traditionsballast beschwerten Monar-

chien gelang, ihren Frieden mit der modernen Nation und deren Trägern zu machen. Erweitert wird das Forschungsdesign um eine transnationale Perspektive, welche die Interaktion von Dynastien über die Grenzen von Ländern und Kulturen hinweg beschreiben will.

Aus dem ersten Abschnitt, der sich der Konzeptualisierung königlicher Nationen widmet, sticht vor allem Amerigo Carusos Aufsatz über die nationalstaatlichen Nachzügler Preußen und Sardinien-Piemont hervor. Caruso verwendet den Begriff der Resilienz, um das Durchhaltevermögen beider Monarchien zwischen Revolution und Reform zu charakterisieren. Der monarchische Diskurs sei in einer „new hybrid narrative identity" (S. 53) aufgegangen, die sich aus der alten Anhänglichkeit gegenüber dem Monarchen ebenso speiste wie aus dem neuen Respekt gegenüber einer sich stetig professionalisierenden Verwaltung. Dass sich die Öffentlichkeit dabei zusehends für das Privatleben der Königsfamilie interessierte, die nicht von ungefähr als Speerspitze der bürgerlichen Moral imaginiert wurde, verstärkte eine „ideological and semantic ambiguity" (S. 59), die die um Stabilität bemühten Kreise freilich für ihre systemerhaltenden Ambitionen zu nutzen wussten. Martin Kohlrausch kann dieser Lesart mithilfe seines instruktiven Beitrags zu dem flamboyante Auftritte nicht scheuenden Kaiser Wilhelm II. sekundieren, der als „particularly successful label" (S. 93) weit über die Grenzen Deutschlands hinaus für Furore sorgte.

David Mednicoffs Aufsatz über die marokkanische Monarchie besticht durch eine begrifflich scharfe Analyse der Macht- und Legitimationsstrukturen in dem politisch vergleichsweise stabilen Maghrebstaat. Um islamistischen Anfechtungen die Spitze abzubrechen, umgab sich bereits König Hassan II. mit einer „neo-papal legitimacy" (S. 115). Der Grüne Marsch 1975 sollte dann Marokkos Gebietsansprüche in der spanischen Kolonie Westsahara zementieren, diente dem nach gescheiterten Attentaten geschwächten König aber auch dazu, seine Herrschaft zu sakralisieren. Konstitutionelle Anleihen von der ehemaligen französischen Kolonialmacht und ein Scheinpluralismus, der sich im Wesentlichen auf regimetreue Eliten stützte, sorgten dafür, dass sich das politische Leben Marokkos zwar einer hohen Zahl an Organisationen und Parteien erfreut, diese aber kaum politisches Gewicht in die Waagschale zu werfen vermögen. Hassans Sohn und Nachfolger, Mohammed VI., untermauerte seine Legitimation, indem er – wenn auch in homöopathischen Dosen – Menschenrechtsverletzungen seines Vaters aufarbeiten sowie die Rechte von Frauen und Berbern ausweiten ließ. Mednicoff sieht die marokkanische Monarchie daher als ein „set of contingent, accumulated, contested political resources" (S. 123), mit deren Hilfe Marokko politisches Chaos im Gefolge des Arabischen Frühlings abwenden konnte.

Der zweite Abschnitt behandelt die Visualisierung und Inszenierung der königlichen Nation. David Malitz untersucht den Kulturtransfer, der die Monarchien Japans und Thailands in die Moderne begleiten bzw. bekleiden sollte. Traditionelle Hofgewänder mussten im späteren 19. Jh. allmählich Militäruniformen europäischer Provenienz Platz machen. Sowohl der Tenno als auch der König von Siam wollten sich so als Mitglieder einer transnationalen

Elite zu erkennen geben, zumal sie immer häufiger, wenn auch nicht immer freiwillig Würdenträger aus westlichen Staaten empfingen. Kaiser Meiji verpflichtete schließlich im Jahr 1872 seinen Adel, sich westlich zu kleiden, rekurrierte dabei jedoch bezeichnenderweise auf eine – erfundene – japanische Tradition, um den nur mäßig begeisterten Höflingen des Kaisers neue Kleider näherzubringen.

Ebenfalls in Fernost ist Jia Fengs aufschlussreicher Beitrag angesiedelt. Feng untersucht das kurios anmutende Nebeneinander des seit 1912 offiziell republikanischen China und des weiterhin in der Verbotenen Stadt residierenden Qing-Hofs. Die „ironic co-existence" (S. 226) zweier konkurrierender Anwärter auf die höchste politische Legitimität wirft ein bezeichnendes Licht auf die von der transnationalen Historiographie in Frage gestellte lineare Geschichtsteleologie des Westens. Der Hof des letzten Kaisers fungierte unabhängig von den neuen Eliten als traditionsgeheiligte Quelle sozialen Prestiges, die nicht zuletzt dank opulenter Auszeichnungen auch nicht so schnell versiegte. Die „immaturely founded republic" (S. 237), die zunächst nur dürftig mit sozialem Kapital ausgestattet war, brauchte über ein Jahrzehnt, bis sie es wagte, den Sohn des Himmels aus dem Palast zu vertreiben.

Der dritte Abschnitt thematisiert die Erinnerung an die königliche Nation. Erhellend sind Eva Marlene Hausteiners Ausführungen zur para-royalen Konzeption in postmonarchischen Gemeinwesen. Am Beispiel von Wladimir Putins Russland möchte sie die Vereinbarkeit des scheinbar Unvereinbaren ins Bewusstsein heben. Ausgestattet mit dem methodischen Rüstzeug der symbolischen Kommunikation präpariert Hausteiner den Antagonismus zwischen der Ornamentik der Oberfläche und dem institutionellen Rahmen im Russland der Gegenwart heraus. Putin unterfüttert seine Herrschaft mit einem „triangle of legitimation" (S. 338), nämlich mit Versatzstücken des absolutistisch-imperialen Zarenreichs, auf Tuchfühlung mit der orthodoxen Kirche sowie dank einer medial befeuerten Popularität. So gelingt es dem Präsidenten, die für viele Russen schmerzlichen historischen Umbrüche der vergangenen Jahrzehnte rhetorisch einzuebnen und der Geschichte Russlands eine Kette bruchloser Legitimation zu entleihen. Der neoimperiale Anspruch des Kreml manifestiert sich obendrein im Konzept des nahen Auslands, dessen – zumindest propagandistische – Ähnlichkeit mit der Breschnew-Doktrin den Nachbarstaaten Unbehagen bereitet.

Die Rolle von Monarchien im Übergang vom Gottesgnadentum zum politischen Massenmarkt ist zweifellos ein lohnenswerter Untersuchungsgegenstand, dessen Relevanz durch die Faszination des Boulevards angesichts royaler Eskapaden nicht geschmälert wird. Die vorliegenden Beiträge lösen indes das Versprechen, einem neuen Verständnis des modernen *nation building* Vorschub zu leisten, nur teilweise ein. Hier wäre eine Klärung des facettenreichen Begriffs der Nation hilfreich gewesen, denn er wird weitgehend uniform auf ganz unterschiedliche Kulturräume angewandt. Auch die transnationale Dimension der royalen Dynastien, die ja aufgrund weitgespannter familiärer Netzwerke auf der Hand liegt, tritt nicht in jedem Beitrag gleichermaßen zutage.

Georgina Brewis: A Social History of Student Volunteering. Britain and Beyond, 1880–1980, New York: Palgrave Macmillan 2014, 263 S.

Rezensiert von
Isabella Löhr, Leipzig

Studentische Bewegungen werden zumeist mit Politisierung assoziiert, so zum Beispiel Studenten als Barrikadenkämpfer im Gefolge der Französischen Revolution und in den Revolutionen von 1848, als Verfechter einer antiliberalen und nationalistischen Politik in den Jahrzehnten vor dem Ersten Weltkrieg, als Träger völkischer und faschistischer Ideologien in den 1930er und 1940er Jahren oder als treibende Kraft in den Protesten von 1968. Deutlich seltener taucht dagegen die soziale Dimension studentischer Bewegungen in Form von gemeinnütziger Arbeit, Sozialhilfe oder einer eng mit Bildung verknüpften missionarischen Arbeit auf. Das Buch von Georgina Brewis widmet sich dieser sozialpolitischen Dimension studentischer Bewegungen in Großbritannien, die sie anhand von Freiwilligenarbeit thematisiert. Die Studie ist an der Schnittstelle zwischen Universitätsgeschichte, einer historischen Auseinandersetzung mit Jugendbewegungen und der Geschichte der Sozialpolitik in Großbritannien angesiedelt. Die Aufmerksamkeit liegt auf der Entstehung einer „student associational culture", die sich parallel zur Ausweitung der höheren Bildung in Großbritannien entwickelte. Die Studie unterscheidet sich in ihrem konzeptionellen Zugriff in mehrfacher Hinsicht von anderen Zugängen zur historischen Analyse studentischen Lebens. Erstens schreibt sie diese Geschichte aus der Perspektive der Studenten. Das bedeutet, es geht nicht um Maßnahmen zur Verbesserung sozialer Bedingungen insbesondere ab den 1920er Jahren oder um gesellschaftspolitische Bildungsangebote für Studenten, sondern um „volunteering undertaken by young people". Zweitens verlagert Brewis den Schwerpunkt ihrer Analyse auf die staatlichen Universitäten, womit sie dem Umstand Tribut zollt, dass sich ab den 1880er Jahren mit zwei Dritteln die deutliche Mehrheit der britischen Studenten und Studentinnen außerhalb der alt eingesessenen Universitäten Oxford und Cambridge befanden. Genau hier liegt ein wichtiger Mehrwert der Studie.

In der Einleitung setzt Brewis sich mit den Gründen für die bisher nur marginale Aufmerksamkeit für freiwilliges studentisches Engagement auseinander, was, wie sie anschaulich illustriert, aufgrund der sozialen und thematischen Breite dieses Phänomens durchaus erklärungsbedürftig ist. Den Grund dafür sieht Brewis in einer unausgewogenen Überlieferungssituation. Die meisten britischen Universitätsarchive haben die Unterlagen studentischer Vereine nicht aufbewahrt, nachdem diese oftmals als „dispensable ephemera" eingeschätzt und anschließend entsorgt wurden. Der daraus resultierende Rückgriff auf publizierte Tagebücher, Erinnerungen oder private Nachlässe führte zu einer überproportionalen Präsenz von zumeist männlichen Absolventen aus Oxford und Cambridge, die später als Politiker, Literaten oder Journalisten öffentlich bekannt wurden. Die Autorin steuert einer

solchen Schlagseite entgegen, indem sie auf studentische Zeitschriften und auf die Archive nationaler studentischer Unionen wie der National Union of Students, der Student Community Action oder der britischen Zweige des International Student Service und der World Student Christian Federation zurückgreift. Gerade weil Brewis mit bisher wenig benutztem Material arbeitet und einen Quellenkorpus zusammengestellt hat, der sich teilweise einer kleinteiligen Recherche verdankt, hätte ein Archiv- und Quellenverzeichnis der weiteren Forschungen wichtige Impulse geben können. Das Fehlen einer solchen Übersicht ist eine vergebene Chance, die das ausgewählt schmale Literaturverzeichnis von zweieinhalb Seiten nicht ausgleichen kann.

In dem Rückgriff auf überregional und teilweise international organisierte studentische Gruppen liegt ein wichtiger dritter Mehrwert der Studie. Denn einige dieser Gruppen hatten einen religiösen Hintergrund in der protestantischen Ökumene und bildeten einen wichtigen Teil dessen, was in der Forschung sporadisch unter dem Stichwort des religiösen Internationalismus angedeutet, bisher jedoch nicht weiter systematisch untersucht wurde. Brewis macht diese christlichen studentischen Gruppen hingegen zu einem zentralen Pfeiler ihrer Analyse, was ihr eine weit über die Universitäten hinausgehende gesellschafts- und sozialgeschichtliche Kontextualisierung erlaubt.

Diesen Ansatz setzt Brewis in neun thematischen Kapiteln um. Chronologisch angeordnet, decken die Kapitel den Zeitraum von den 1880er Jahren bis in die 1980er Jahre ab, wobei der zeitliche Schwerpunkt auf der ersten Jahrhunderthälfte liegt, während der Zeitraum von den 1950er Jahren bis ungefähr 1980 in zwei Kapiteln behandelt wird. Die ersten beiden Kapitel widmen sich den Anfängen der christlichen Studentenbewegung, die Brewis zeitlich mit dem Ausbau der höheren Bildung ab den 1860er Jahren veranschlagt. Dabei zieht sie eine Linie von dem Konzept der „active citizenship" und „character building", wie es idealistische Philosophen der Zeit propagierten, zur University Settlement Movement, in der sich ab den 1880er Jahren vor allem Studenten in sozialreformerischer Absicht in ärmlichen Gebieten in britischen Städten betätigten. Diese spezifische Form gemeinnütziger Arbeit war, so Brewis, konstitutiv für die Herausbildung einer „associational culture" an Universitäten und Colleges, die vor allem von christlichen Studentenvereinen getragen wurde.

Das folgende Kapitel zeigt das Ausgreifen dieses missionarisch und entwicklungspolitisch motivierten Engagements innerhalb des britischen Empire. Dabei argumentiert Brewis, dass diese spezifische Form des sozialen Engagements keine größeren politischen Kontroversen transportierte und deswegen in vielen Fällen zu einer Art Solidarisierung zwischen Studenten aus Großbritannien und aus Indien führte, während der eigentliche Zweck, Brücken in die unteren sozialen Klassen oder Kasten zu bauen, in den meisten Fällen misslang. Dafür bewirkte der soziale Dienst an verschiedenen Orten des Empire eine erhöhte Mobilität innerhalb der Studentenschaft, die zunehmend regelmäßig zu beobachten war, und zu einer erhöhten Präsenz von Studentinnen, die sich mit diesem sozialen Dienst eine eigene Domäne erarbeiteten.

Die folgenden drei Kapitel thematisieren die Entstehung einer „student popular front" in den 1920er und 1930er Jahren. Das zentrale Argument lautet, dass sich über das Bindemittel der freiwilligen sozialen Arbeit und der Hinwendung von Studenten und Universität zu gesellschaftlichen Problemen eine Studentenbewegung und eine spezifische Art der studentischen Solidarität herausbildete, die sowohl innerhalb des britischen Universitätssystems als auch international funktionierte. Diese These veranschaulicht Brewis anhand verschiedener Themenkomplexe. Im Kapitel zur Nothilfe für Studenten aus den ehemaligen Habsburgischen Gebieten und dem Russischen Reich im direkten Anschluss an den Ersten Weltkrieg argumentiert sie, dass diese Hilfsaktionen der Entwicklung eines spezifischen studentischen Internationalismus Vorschub leisteten. Dazu gehörten die Gründung von nationalen und internationalen Verbänden wie der National Union of Students und European Student Relief, das zur World Student Christian Federation gehörte, Reisen im Rahmen dieser Hilfsmaßnahmen vor allem nach Ostmitteleuropa und die zumindest oberflächliche Überwindung von Frontlinien, sobald sich in Person von Helfenden und Hilfe Empfangenden ehemalige Kriegsgegner gegenüberstanden. Im Kapitel zur Rolle der Studenten im Generalstreik von 1926 ordnet Brewis den Generalstreik in den Kontext neuer sozialer Programme ein, in denen sich Studenten mit Arbeitslosigkeit und sozialen Notlagen in Nordengland und Wales auseinandersetzten. In diesem Sinn interpretiert sie den studentischen Anteil am Generalstreik weniger als Streikbrechen als vielmehr als Fortsetzung von Freiwilligen-

arbeit, sozialer Bildung und der beschriebenen „associational culture". Das Kapitel zur Massenarbeitslosigkeit im Zuge der Weltwirtschaftskrise setzt diese Linie fort. Auch hier zeigt die Autorin anhand einer beeindruckenden Breite von Beispielen wie der International Workcamp Movement, dass es eine universitätsübergreifende studentische Bewegung gab, die einen großen Zulauf erhielt, weil sie sich in die Gesellschaft hineinbewegte und mit anderen Organisationen wie den League of Nations Societies an den britischen Universitäten kooperierte. Auch die Nothilfeprogramme für geflohene Studenten aus Deutschland, Initiativen im Kontext des Spanischen Bürgerkriegs und des Chinesisch-Japanischen Krieges ab 1937 sieht Brewis als Auslöser für die Festigung einer breiten studentischen Bewegung, die auf einem sozialen Profil beruhte, das politische Demonstrationen und soziales Engagement selbstverständlich vorsah. Für die späten 1940er und 1950er Jahre zeigt Brewis, dass humanitäre Hilfe, Flüchtlingsarbeit und Wiederaufbau nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg ähnlich solidarisierend auf nationaler und internationaler Ebene wirkten wie nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg. Allerdings war hier eine neue, verstärkt staatlich geförderte Generation am Werk, die sich kritisch gegenüber den paternalistischen Dimensionen der Settlement-Bewegung oder den Workcamps zeigte. Entsprechend kamen neue Themen auf wie das World Refugee Year der Vereinten Nationen 1959, Kritik an Rassismus und Apartheid sowie internationale Bildungsungleichheit, die in Form internationaler Kampagnen und einer weit ausgreifenden, moralisch und christlich unterlegten Freiwilligenarbeit angegangen wurden. Die

Politisierung studentischer Bewegungen ab den 1960er Jahren thematisiert Brewis schließlich nicht als solche. Stattdessen untersucht sie die Auswirkungen der „New Left", indem sie den Übergang von sozialem Dienst zu „social action" analysiert, der sich in der Hinwendung und gleichzeitigen Kritik an Entwicklungshilfeprogrammen niederschlug, die sie als alternative Protestformen interpretiert. Von dieser Hinwendung zu entwicklungspolitischen Themen profitierten vor allem Entwicklungshilfeorganisationen wie Oxfam, die mit Third World First ein eigenes studentisches Netzwerk einrichtete, das genau diese Zielgruppe für die eigenen Zwecke anwerben sollte. Brewis zeigt, dass die daraus hervorgehenden Freiwilligenprogramme im Ausland eine bereits international orientierte und mobile Studentenbewegung ansprachen, dass diese Tendenz dadurch aber quantitativ ausgeweitet und verfestigt wurde. An die Stelle des sozialen Dienstes trat eine politisierte humanitäre Aktion, die sich allerdings in der Praxis nicht immer eindeutig vom traditionellen Sozialdienst unterschied.

Die Studie bringt eine beeindruckende Fülle von Themen vor, die sie überzeugend argumentativ zusammenführt. Die These, dass sich seit den 1880er Jahren in Großbritannien eine Studentenbewegung formierte, die auf einer sozialreformerisch-paternalistischen und christlichen Grundlage beruhte und die maßgebliche Impulse aus internationalen Konflikten bezog, leuchtet ein und ist durchweg sehr gut nachvollziehbar. Das gleiche gilt für die vielen Beispiele, mit denen Brewis veranschaulicht, dass und wie die studentische Freiwilligenarbeit universitären Campus und gesellschaftspolitische Pro-bleme schrittweise miteinander verband. Es wäre wünschenswert gewesen, wenn die Autorin einige Themen konsequenter beibehalten hätte, so zum Beispiel die Rolle christlicher Studentenverbände, die nur in den ersten und letzten Kapiteln auftauchen. Das gleiche gilt für die Gender-Perspektive: In den ersten Kapiteln wird die Freiwilligenarbeit als Vehikel für Studentinnen dargestellt, sich neue Handlungsspielräume und Verantwortungsbereiche zu erarbeiten, eine Perspektive, die danach allerdings verschwindet. Schließlich ist die Studie sehr britisch ausgerichtet, womit die imperialen Kontexte der studentischen Freiwilligenarbeit und Stichworte wie Zivilisierungsmission nur am Rand oder gar nicht auftauchen. Diese Kritik steht allerdings hinter der beeindruckenden Syntheseleistung zurück, die dieses Buch darstellt. Brewis gelingt eine erfrischende und kenntnisreiche Erweiterung der Sozialgeschichte der höheren Bildung, die jedem Leser zu empfehlen ist, der sich für Universitätsgeschichte und die Geschichte sozialer Bewegungen interessiert.

Horst Dreier (Hrsg.): Grundgesetz-
Kommentar, Band II: Art. 20-82,
Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck, 2015,
3. Aufl., XLII, 2248 S.

Rezensiert von
Helmut Goerlich, Leipzig

Es spricht für Organisationstalent und Ansehen eines Herausgebers, wenn – wie hier – unter seiner Ägide ein zweiter Band eines Kommentars, der eine ganze Reihe von Autoren zusammenbringt, planmäßig erscheint. Der Kommentar ist unverändert auf drei Bände angelegt und wird dann abgeschlossen sein. Die Anlage ist unverändert. So sind in den Kommentierungen regelmäßig historische und vergleichende Abschnitte an den Anfang gestellt, sodass man sich die Tradition der verschiedenen Bestimmungen ebenso wie ihre Neuerungen gut vor Augen führen kann. Das ist für andere als juristische Nutzer sicher ebenso wichtig wie für die Zunft, die heute nicht mehr in bloßem Positivismus verweilt. Es ist sicher kein Zufall, dass der Herausgeber einen ganz wesentlichen Teil seiner Studiensemester an einem Fachbereich in Hannover verbrachte, der damals nicht nur sozialwissenschaftliche Lehrstühle aufwies, sondern diese Wissenschaften auch in die juristische Ausbildung zu integrieren suchte, wie damals dort auch noch das berühmte Göttinger Seminar von Rudolf Smend nachwirkte, in dem regelmäßig auch historische Aspekte in die Debatte einbezogen wurden; Vergleich-

bares fand sich natürlich in Würzburg bei Hasso Hofmann, bei dem Dreier länger assistierte und dann habilitierte. Der erste Band, der vor zwei Jahren in dritter Auflage erschien, wahrt diese Perspektive ebenso. In ihm geht es wesentlich um die Grundrechte des Grundgesetzes für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Im zweiten Band werden in der Abfolge der Artikel des Grundgesetzes verfassungsgrundsätzliche, organisationsrechtliche, institutionelle und Kompetenzen betreffende Bestimmungen verhandelt.

Auf dem Feld der vielen Kommentierungen des Grundgesetzes tritt dieser Kommentar besonders nicht nur durch seinen methodischen Anspruch hervor, sondern auch durch Konsistenz der Kommentierungen, ohne damit den Schulen, die es ja immer noch gibt, allein dieses Forum zur Verfügung zu stellen. Konkurrent ist ein ursprünglich kurz nach der ersten Auflage des „Dreier" erstmals erschienener dreibändiger Kommentar von von Mangoldt / Klein / Starck, der bald die 7. Auflage erreicht haben wird, aber sicher eher als eine Folgeveröffentlichung denn als ein originäres Produkt gesehen werden muss, dem, noch mehr als dem „Dreier", durch ein sehr gutes Marketing eines überaus starken Verlags Erfolg beschieden ist. Der „Dreier" hingegen überzeugt durch sich selbst. Darüber hinaus gibt es noch zahlreiche einbändige Kurzkommentare, neben zwei größeren Loseblatt-Kommentaren, die fortlaufend ergänzt werden.

In der neuen und wohl letzten Auflage des Kommentars unter Herausgeberschaft von Horst Dreier sind wenige Autoren ausgewechselt worden, teils sicher, weil sie die für größere Projekte eher bedeutsame Altersgrenze erreicht haben, teils aber auch,

weil sie aus der Wissenschaft zum Bundesverfassungsgericht gewechselt sind, wie dies früher auch schon vorkam, damals etwa im Falle von Gertrude Lübbe-Wolff und jetzt in demjenigen von Johannes Masing. Es sind nun jüngere Kolleginnen und Kollegen hinzugetreten, darunter auch Schüler von Dreier oder solche, die ihm während ihrer Ausbildung begegnet sind, wie etwa nun wieder Fabian Wittreck und Frauke Brosius-Gersdorf. Probleme mag dann ein Wechsel auch in der Herausgeberschaft aufwerfen, weil Autorität und Bestimmtheit sich in jüngeren Jahren nicht so leicht erwerben lassen, wie sie für diese Rolle notwendig sind.

Was die einzelnen Kommentierungen angeht, so hat Horst Dreier selbst wie bisher zentrale Bestimmungen zu Verfassungsprinzipien (Einführung, Republik und Demokratie), zu Verfassungsänderungen und ihren Grenzen (Textänderungsgebot, Zweidrittelmehrheit und Ewigkeitsgarantie), das Homogenitätsgebot für die Landesverfassungen im Vergleich zum Grundgesetz sowie die kommunale Selbstverwaltungsgarantie und auch diejenige zum Vorrang des Bundesrechts übernommen, während Helmuth Schulze-Fielitz den Rechtsstaat, den Schutz natürlicher Lebensgrundlagen, Indemnität und Immunität sowie Zeugnisverweigerungsrecht und Beschlagnahmeverbot wie auch Urlaubsanspruch, Behinderungsverbot und Entschädigungs- sowie Beförderungsanspruch der Abgeordneten im Recht des Bundestages kommentiert. Das Sozialstaatsprinzip und das Widerstandsrecht hingegen erörtert Fabian Wittreck. Hartmut Bauer verhandelt wesentliche, den Bundesstaat ausgestaltende Regelungen, dann auch die Rechts- und Amtshilfe, die

Personalstruktur von Bundesbehörden, den Bundeszwang, den Bundesrat und seine Ausgestaltung und die Ausfertigung und Verkündung von Bundesgesetzen. Martin Morlok als Parteien- und Parlamentsrechtler kommentiert in diesem Bereich zentrale Bestimmungen. Georg Hermes ist hier auf die Bundesregierung spezialisiert, hat aber auch die Kommentierung zum parlamentarischen Kontrollgremium übernommen. Werner Heun verantwortet vor allem den Bundespräsidenten, zudem aber auch etwa den Gemeinsamen Ausschuss von Bundesrat und Bundestag, den auswärtigen Ausschuss des Bundestages und manche wehrrechtlich relevante Bestimmung wie die Führung der Streitkräfte, den Spannungsfall und den Verteidigungsausschuss des Bundestages. Fabian Wittreck kommentiert außerdem kompetenzrechtliche Regelungen, die das Verhältnis von Bund und Ländern betreffen. Nicht anderes gilt für Frauke Brosius-Gersdorf, die aber auch manche Regelung zum Gesetzgebungsverfahren und für Staatsbürger- und Beamtenrecht bedeutsame Bestimmungen, sowie etwa auch zum Gesetzgebungsnotstand übernommen hat. Joachim Wieland beschränkt sich auf Staatshaftung sowie Bundeshauptstadt und Bundesflagge. Ferdinand Wollenschläger befasst sich mit ganz unterschiedlichen Regelungsbereichen, etwa zur europäischen Integration, der Übertragung von Hoheitsrechten und zur innerstaatlichen Wirkung von Völkerrecht, der Handelsflotte und den auswärtigen Beziehungen.

Dabei ist zu betonen, dass all diese Beiträge eben als Kommentierungen gefasst sind – eine Literaturgattung, die die rechtsdogmatische Tradition fortführt, bisher gewichtige Lehrmeinungen einbezieht

und die Rechtsprechung der Verfassungsgerichte, insbesondere des Bundesverfassungsgerichts, aber auch anderer Gerichte, soweit sie bedeutsam ist, berücksichtigt, einer gemessenen Kritik unterzieht und auch noch eine eigene Stellungnahme entwickelt. Dies erklärt, weshalb Kommentare mit wachsender Auflage immer voluminöser werden und von Zeit zu Zeit auch einer gewissen Bereinigung und Kürzung bedürfen, um handhabbar zu bleiben. Auch das gelingt meist nur unter einer strafferen Herausgeberschaft, weil auch hier gilt, dass jeder seinen eigenen Beritt für besonders darstellungsbedürftig ansieht. Entscheidend für die Tauglichkeit eines Kommentars ist außerdem die Zuverlässigkeit seiner Nachweise, die vollständige Darstellung der Rechtsentwicklung unter Einbeziehung der Rechtsprechung und die Zugänglichkeit des Aufbaus, der Sprache und des Stils. All das ist hier gegeben und zwar auch dann, wenn die Kommentierung die bisherige Struktur der Erläuterungen beibehält, also auf den ersten Blick den Eindruck macht, nichts Neues zu bieten.

Hervorzuheben ist zudem, dass Änderungen des Grundgesetzes neue Anstrengungen erfordern, also etwa die Ergebnisse der Föderalismusreform im Bereich der Gesetzgebung; hier hat sich ein Kompetenz-Labyrinth ergeben, durch das eine Wegweisung nötig ist; auch werden dabei der Befugnis zu abweichender Gesetzgebung der Länder Grenzen durch einen abweichungsfesten Kern gesetzt, den man erst einmal verstehen muss; er führt teilweise in Streitfragen des besonderen Verwaltungsrechts, die natürlich in einem verfassungsrechtlichen Kommentar nicht erschöpfend erörtert werden können.

Manche Neuerung, so etwa die Schuldenbremse, wird indes erst im letzten Band des Kommentars Gegenstand werden, was mit dem Standort finanzverfassungsrechtlicher Bestimmungen im Grundgesetz zu tun hat. Manchmal ergibt auch die Rechtsprechung Aktualisierungsbedarf, so etwa die bekannte Entscheidung des Landgerichts Bonn zur Haftung der Bundesrepublik für Handlungen deutscher Soldaten, verbunden mit Individualansprüchen zugunsten geschädigter Personen im Falle Kunduz, die hier Jochen Wieland erörtert.

Die europäische Überformung des Grundgesetzes als nationale Verfassung eines Mitgliedstaates der Europäischen Union und darüber hinaus wird ebenfalls eingehend sichtbar gemacht und erörtert. Dabei stößt man auch auf Kritik an der einschlägigen Rechtsprechung des Bundesverfassungsgerichts, die nationalstaatliche Kategorien an europarechtliche Regelungen anlegt und glaubt, diese nationale Perspektive durchhalten zu können. Ob es sich dabei etwa im Lissabon-Urteil des Bundesverfassungsgerichts (BVerfGE 123, 267 ff.) um „reines Illusionstheater" handelt, so Dreier im Vorwort des Herausgebers, oder doch mehr davon Bestand haben wird, ist noch offen. Es zeichnen sich aber in der Wissenschaft Versuche ab, vertieft zu begründen, weshalb ahistorische und von einem gewissen Nationalismus mitgetragene Begründungen, die die Kompetenzen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts erweitern sollen und zugleich sozusagen mit Hilfe von starren Begriffen des nationalen Verfassungsrechts davon, was einen demokratischen Verfassungsstaat und seine Souveränität ausmacht, Grenzen der europäischen Integration auf Dauer festzulegen suchen.[1] Hier ist der Kommentar mithin auch Aus-

gangspunkt einer tieferen Betrachtung, die über den Stand der Rechtsprechung hinausreicht, die sich ja immer nur sehr umsichtig ändern und nicht Ort der Theorie sein kann.

Insgesamt ist der Kommentar interdisziplinär von besonderem Interesse, weil er für die Nachbarwissenschaften offen ist. Die Perspektiven dieser Wissenschaften sind seinen Autoren geläufig; das wirkt sich auf die Qualität der Kommentierung neben den rechtsvergleichenden und historischen Ansätzen der Betrachtung aus. Auch als Sozialwissenschaftler im weiten Sinne sollte man daher gerade zu diesem Kommentar greifen, wenn man sich nicht nur eine juristische Betrachtungsweise heranholen will. Auch in diesem Sinne ist er uneingeschränkt zu empfehlen, was sich im Falle dieses Bandes besonders bei der Kommentierung von Verfassungsprinzipien zeigt, aber etwa bei der Kommentierung der Grundrechte im ersten Band ebenso sehr ins Spiel kommt. Daher ist der „Dreier" gerade auch aus komparatistischer und aus historischer Sicht besonders gelungen.

1   Vgl. dazu etwa S. Simon, Grenzen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts im europäischen Integrationsprozess, Tübingen 2016, und G. Sandberger, Die rechtliche Ordnung von Geld, Währung und Banken. Erfahrungen aus der Euro- und Bankenkrise, Marburg 2016.

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